

because he is a man of character enough to win the respect of his  
foe."<sup>29</sup> General Grant, who came to know Colonel Mosby intimately  
after the war, offered him the position as consul to Hong-Kong.<sup>30</sup>  
He wrote of him in his Memoirs: "He is able and thoroughly honest  
and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who  
could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the  
rear of the opposing army and so near the borders of hostility  
as long as he did without losing his entire command."<sup>31</sup>

Despite the fact that "Morgan's Command," "Mosby's Rangers",  
and a few other partisan corps really rendered invaluable service  
to the Confederacy, the Ranger service as a whole was a menace  
and proved to be rather disastrous to the Cause. Although the  
act legalizing partisan groups was not passed until April, 1862,  
before the middle of that summer the number in that branch of  
service greatly exceeded the requirements.<sup>32</sup> General Lee opposed  
partisan service from the very first.<sup>33</sup> President Davis likewise  
was against this branch of the service and refused to accept  
into the Confederate army a company of volunteers for the protection

29. Ibid., p. 24

30. Mosby did not accept the offer then, but he did accept  
it under Hayes in 1870.

31. Grant, Grant's Memoirs, v. 2, p. 142

32. O. R., IV, v. 2, p. 48

33. cf note 3 p. 161

of the frontier of Texas, because he said: "Unity and cooperation by the troops of all the States are indispensable to success, and I must view with regret this as well as all other indications of a purpose to divide the power of the States by dividing the means to be employed in efforts to carry on separate operations."<sup>34</sup>

The objections of General Lee and President Davis were not without grounds. From the very beginning Partisan Rangers embarrassed the conscript officers and sadly interfered with the enrollment of conscripts who were eager to avoid enrollment by enlistment.<sup>35</sup> Governor Clark of North Carolina complained that partisan service had attractions which would carry everyone into the cavalry or rangers if no deterrent were interposed. He observed that substitutes particularly had a preference for that service.<sup>36</sup> Since substitutes were likely to be of a venturesome spirit, it is not strange that the saddle, the guerilla existence with its air of romance and outlawry, and the prospect of receiving his proportionate part of all the property taken from the enemy should appeal to him. He would become a knight no better and no worse than the knights of old.

To check the influx of men into partisan service, transfer from the line to partisan corps had to be prohibited, and any officer of such a corps who knowingly would enlist one from the

37. Ibid., v. 1, p. 313.

34. Stephenson, The Day of the Confederacy, p. 38

35. O. R., IV, v. 2, pp. 5, 71

36. Ibid., pp. 4, 31

37. Ibid., p. 48

line would have his authority revoked to raise partisan troops. In addition he made himself liable to such punishment as a court martial might inflict.<sup>37</sup> Besides this, recruiting for such service was to be punished.<sup>38</sup>

The passage of the above mentioned acts did not remedy the situation of conscripts and substitutes. Consequently, on July 31, 1862, another act was passed which made it unlawful for any person who was liable to conscription to be taken as a ranger.<sup>39</sup> To prevent the ranger service from becoming a haven for substitutes, another act was passed on September 8, 1862, making illegal the reception of substitutes into partisan corps or any other company not fully organized and received by the War Department.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the War Department adopted a rule requiring the recommendation from a general commanding a department before granting permission to raise partisan bands. Notwithstanding this, partisans continued to increase and the numbers were far in excess of the need. A precaution was then taken of requiring these organizations to conform in all respects to that of other troops and the Secretary of War recommended that those partisans who were not needed be brigaded and made, in fact, troops in the line though nominally partisans.<sup>41</sup>

37. Ibid, v. 1, p. 1151

38. Ibid, p. 1152

39. Ibid, v. 2, p. 26

40. Ibid, p. 78

41. Ibid, p. 48

Despite all the efforts made by the War Department and Congress, Partisan Rangers continued to be a menace. When they could no longer organize with permission from the War Department, they did so without authority. In fact, the Department did not have one-third of the companies listed that claimed to have organized under the Secretary. Many were unarmed and unequipped and had only a paper organization to keep them from being enrolled as conscripts.<sup>42</sup>

In addition to the interference with conscription the partisan corps by its allurements caused many men in the regular army to desert their places in the line. General Lee in a letter to President Davis about the seriousness of these desertions claimed that the Virginians who were deserting were going off in many cases to join the various partisan corps in the State.<sup>43</sup>

The various complaints coming in to the War Department about the rangers caused the Secretary to write the President.

The advantages anticipated from the allowance of partisan rangers with peculiar privileges . . . have been very partially realized, while from their independent organization and the facilities and temptations thereby afforded to license depredations, grave mischiefs have resulted. They have, indeed, when under inefficient officers and operating within our own limits, come to be regarded as more formidable and destructive to our own people than to the enemy. The opportunities, too, afforded them of profit by their captures as well as the light bonds of discipline under which they are held, serve to dissatisfy the trained soldiers of the Provisional Army, who, encountering greater perils and privations, are denied similar indulgences. There are certainly some honorable

42. Ibid., pp. 71, 72

43. Freeman, Lee's Dispatches, August 17, 1863, p. 123

of the troops led to a third evil - desertion. General Rosser

exceptions to the general estimate thus held of the partisan corps, and in several instances partisan leaders have distinguished themselves and their corps by services as eminent as their achievements have been daring and brilliant. They constitute only notable exceptions, and experience of the general inefficiency and even mischief of the organizations would recommend that they either be merged in the troops of the line or be disbanded and conscribed. To preserve the few that are valuable coadjutors, discretion may be intrusted to the Department.<sup>44</sup>

The opinion expressed by the Secretary of War was also voiced by two generals in the regular army. General Rosser in a letter to General Lee on January 11, 1864, expressed the opinion that the effect of Partisan Rangers on the service was bad and should be corrected. The first ill effect as seen by him was that it kept men out of the service whose bayonet or sabre should be counted on when the life or death of the country was at stake. The second evil effect was that the Rangers made it impossible for him to manage the different companies in his brigade from Loudoun, Fauquier, and Fairfax Counties, and the region which was occupied by Mosby, when his men of the regular army saw so much latitude and so many privileges allowed the irregular troops; when they saw the rangers sleeping at home, living at ease, and turning out in the cold only when it was announced by their chief; and when they saw the rangers enjoying the booty captured by them on their plundering expeditions, it was only natural that these men in the ranks should be dissatisfied with their hard life in the regular line. This dissatisfaction

43. *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 1002; *Gen. Freeman, Lee's Dispatches*.  
44. *O. R.*, IV, v. 2, p. 1003  
45. "Partisan Rangers," *Confederate Veteran*, v. 27, p. 246  
September, 1923  
46. *Freeman, Lee's Dispatches*, note, pp. 152, 153

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of the troops led to a third evil - desertion. General Rosser suggested that this condition could be remedied "by placing all men on the same footing who are of the same rank." If it should be necessary for troops to operate within the lines of the enemy, then he would "require the commanding officer to keep them in an organized condition, to rendezvous them within our lines, and to move upon the enemy when opportunity is offered."<sup>45</sup>

General Ransom would apply more stringent measures against the Partisans than General Rosser. Writing in December, 1864, General Ransom said:

Having witnessed a good deal of the operations of what are known as partisan rangers, I have the honor to petition that all such organizations be abolished. They are usually, as far as my experience has gone, the most trifling troops we have. Acting alone, they accomplish nothing, and when serving with other troops they hang upon the rear to gather up property and instead of turning it in, spirit it away for speculation.<sup>46</sup>

General Rosser's letter was forwarded to General Lee by General Stuart who, although commending Mosby, added this statement: "Such organizations, as a rule, are detrimental to the best interests of the army at large." General Lee wrote on the same paper: "As far as my knowledge and experience extends there is much of truth in the statement of General Rosser. I recommend that the law authorizing these partisan corps be abolished. The evils resulting from their organization more than counterbalance the good they accomplish."<sup>47</sup> In a letter written to General Cooper on April 1, 1864,

45. Ibid, v. 3, p. 1081; Idem, Freeman, Lee's Dispatches, note, pp. 132, 133

46. "Partisan Rangers," Confederate Veteran, v. 29, p. 345 September, 1921

47. Freeman, Lee's Dispatches, note, pp. 132, 133

General Lee, after enumerating all the Partisan Ranger Corps, said: "with the single exception mentioned [Mosby] I hope the order will be issued at once disbanding the companies and battalions [partisan rangers] serving in this department."<sup>48</sup> Mosby's Rangers, the exception which General Lee made, as a matter of fact acted under General Stuart until the time of his death and then under General Lee. He was independent only in the sense that both Stuart and Lee had such confidence in him that they permitted him to act on his own discretion.<sup>49</sup>

As a result of all the complaints against Partisan Rangers, and the recommendations of the Generals and the Secretary of War, Congress passed a law abolishing partisan corps. The result of this measure was to place "Mosby's Rangers," "Morgan's Command" and other partisan corps in the regular service.<sup>50</sup> There were a few of these bands that could not be reached by the law since they were not regularly enrolled, and these continued to be a curse to the Confederacy as long as the war lasted.<sup>51</sup>

48. O. R., I, v. 33, p. 1252; *Idem*, Williamson, (note) The Secretary of War's endorsement on these papers reads: "Mosby's and McNeill's command I prefer to have retained as partisan rangers. *Ibid*

49. Williamson, Mosby's Rangers, p. 23

50. Freeman, Lee's Dispatches, note, p. 133

51. Occasionally in sections of a state where the conscript law could not be enforced the War Department permitted the organization of independent commands even to the very last. O. R., IV, v. 3, p. 1169. (March 25, 1865 - Assistant Adjutant-General to John R. Baylor.)

CHAPTER VII

PROBLEM OF ARMY ORDNANCE

Hand-in-hand with the problem of raising an army came the problem of arming the troops. At the beginning of the war, the confederacy had no improved arms, no powder mills, no arsenals, no armories, no cap machines, and no improved cannon. Because the South was almost purely agricultural, it could not hope to work any revolution in the production of firearms; and because of the lack of recognition abroad, together with the tightening of the blockade along the Atlantic seaboard, large quantities of munitions could not have been imported even if the market had been open to it. During the early period of the war, old imported Austrian and Belgian rifles and the traditional muzzle-loading musket of the American Revolution, altered only by the percussion cap and rifling, were just about the only types of guns which the South had to depend upon.<sup>1</sup>

1. "Poison gas, liquid fire, balloons, machine guns, and submarines of a rather primitive type were known even during the earliest years of the war, "carcasses," "smoke balls," and "suffocating balls" - shells with several fuse holes from which horrible fumes or vapors rushed forth - were likewise known. The attitude of American soldiers both North and South towards such methods of warfare is shown in the reply of General McClellan to an inventor of an incendiary shell from which liquid streams of fire were guaranteed to spread most fearfully in all directions: "Such means of destruction are hardly within the category of those recognized in civilized warfare. Kindred inventions have been made in Europe, but I do not think they have been employed in modern times. I could not recommend their employment until we exhaust the ordinary means of warfare." O. R., III, v. 1, p. 606



The Confederate soldier had to rely for improved arms on captures on the battlefield. After battles, men were detailed to collect arms. These were taken to the arsenal and repaired and reissued to the army.<sup>1a</sup> To obtain even these inferior firearms there were two available sources of supplies: first, those in the forts of the United States lying within the borders of the various seceded states; and second, those belonging to the individual state governments. Within the limits of the seceded states were regarded

Theoretically, the arms in the United States arsenals lying within this seceded territory belonged to the Confederate government. Yet, in seeming deference to the states, on March 16, 1861, the Confederate Congress adopted resolutions "recommending to the respective States to cede the forts, arsenals, navy yards, dock yards, and other public establishments within their respective limits to the Confederate States."<sup>1b</sup> President Davis, thereupon, directed the Secretary of War to write to the governors of the various states asking that a complete inventory be taken at once of the quantity and character of the arms and munitions of war required from the United States, and that the results be sent without delay to the Department of War. He also asked for an inventory

1a. Brown, "Confederate Ordnance During the War," Confederate Veteran, v. 12, p. 20 ff. (Mr. Brown was lieutenant colonel of ordnance of the Confederate Army, and commanding officer of the arsenal at Richmond.)

1b. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, v. 1, p. 303

3. S. E. S. P., v. 20, p. 287

of all other arms and munitions which the states might desire to turn over and make chargeable to the Confederate Government.<sup>2</sup> In theory many of these states did turn over the arms and munitions from the United States arsenals, but in practice several of the governors acquired a large part of these arms to be used in the defense of their own states.<sup>3</sup> In fact, so many of these arms were retained that the claim made by President Davis "that the arms and munitions within the limits of the several states were regarded as entirely belonging to them,"<sup>4</sup> might seem to be true. Most notable of the governors who retained these arms was Governor Brown of Georgia. Even though the Convention of Georgia had ordered the arsenal in Augusta and the arms in it turned over to the Confederacy, the governor sent his agent to Augusta and had all the good arms sent to Savannah before the agent of the government could get there.<sup>5</sup>

The trouble which the Confederate Government had over getting the arms from the United States arsenals was nothing in comparison with the difficulties over getting the arms belonging to the states. If possible, the State Rightists dealt the Confederacy a more serious blow over the question of not furnishing state arms than for the defense of his coast which was in no immediate danger.

2. O. R., IV, v. 1, pp. 119, 121  
3. O. R., IV, v. 1, pp. 228, 292  
4. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, v. 1, p. 305. In 1861, the Confederate Government had 190,000 small arms and 6,000 cannon and the States had 360,000 small arms - Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy, p. 275.  
5. S. H. S. P., v. 28, p. 287

it did over not furnishing state troops. Volunteers were plentiful during the first year but, as previously pointed out, over 200,000 could not be accepted and were lost forever to the Confederacy because the government had nothing with which to arm them and the states refused to furnish such arms. According to a statement made by T. R. E. Cobb on May 3, 1861, the Confederate States had in their borders at least 100,000 stand of arms and ample ordnance for its necessities and there was powder enough to furnish the troops for a year's active campaign, and 2,500,000 percussion caps.<sup>6</sup> The states, however, would neither give up these arms (or if it did so, with reluctance) nor furnish troops armed with state owned munitions. In March, 1861, Governor Moore of Alabama wrote Secretary Walker that he was "inclined to the opinion" that the arms of the state "should be retained by the state to enable her to meet any emergency and protect and defend her citizens."<sup>7</sup> Then in July, after the plea had gone forth from Richmond for 3,000 armed men, the governor found it out of the question to arm the 3,000 men called out for general service because it would leave the state almost defenseless.<sup>8</sup> Yet, at the same time Governor Moore was able to arm six regiments and 2,500 other troops for the defence of his coast which was in no immediate danger.<sup>9</sup>

5. *Ibid.*, I, v. 3, pp. 496, 507, 523

6. *Ibid.*, IV, v. 3, pp. 358, 377

7. *O. R.*, IV, v. 1, P. 121

8. *Ibid.*, I, v. 3, p. 372

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 702, 704, 705

At the same time that Alabama was protesting, Governor Moore of Louisiana took exactly the same stand. On May 20, 1861, he informed the Secretary of War that he doubted that he could furnish any more armed troops, for he was "emphatically unwilling to leave the state without sufficient arms for home protection,"<sup>10</sup> and in July he refused to arm the troops called for because it would take all the guns in the arsenal and he did not think they should be without arms when an invasion might occur in the fall.<sup>11</sup>

Other states took the same attitude. Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas refused to comply with the request for armed troops.<sup>12</sup> Tennessee contributed no arms. She even received arms from the Confederate Government to equip her own state troops who refused to be mustered into Confederate service.<sup>13</sup> Governor Pickens of South Carolina wrote Secretary Walker that his state could not arm any more Confederate troops because 15,000 state troops had to be armed.<sup>14</sup> He even requested that some of the arms which had been taken from the state be returned.<sup>15</sup> The governor of North Carolina likewise felt concern over its arms being taken into

10. *Ibid.*, p. 337. He further ordered the officers who

11. *Ibid.*, p. 442

12. *Ibid.*, I, v. 3, pp. 484, 586, 623

13. *Ibid.*, IV, v. 1, pp. 358, 479

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 624, 634, 636, 479

15. *Ibid.*, I, v. 6, p. 372

other states. In fact, Governor Vance became so uneasy over the situation that he issued a proclamation against the purchase of arms or the impressement of any kind of military equipment by Confederate agents.<sup>16</sup> Like the governor of South Carolina he, too, in January, 1862, asked the return of a large quantity of arms which had been taken into Virginia "in view of the immediate and pressing necessity of arms in our own defense."<sup>17</sup> Virginia added her voice to that of the other states and asked to reserve the arms left in the armory in Richmond to be given her unarmed militia in case of an emergency.<sup>18</sup> She did, however, finally transfer her arms to the Confederacy.<sup>19</sup>

While all this dilly-dallying was going on among the states over arms, the need for arms and munitions within the Confederacy had become desperate, and some of the Confederate officers, in their efforts to supply this need, had seized arms for use in the Confederate Army which the states claimed. This seizure caused such a storm of protest from the states that the Secretary of War had to issue an order prohibiting the seizure of any property whatever belonging to the states of the Confederacy, especially arms and ordnance stores. He further ordered the officers who

16. Appleton's, 1862, p. 660  
17. O. R., IV, v. 1, pp. 827, 828  
18. Ibid, p. 511  
19. Ibid, pp. 358, 468-473, 504-512

20. O. R., IV, v. 1, p. 368

had made these seizures by mistake to restore the impressed goods at once to the state from which they were taken.<sup>19a</sup>

As was usual in all protests against the Confederate Government, Georgia led the ranks in her opposition. Governor Brown was determined not only to keep the arms in his state, but to get all he could out of the Confederate Government. He berated all volunteers who attempted to carry state arms out of Georgia, and he issued a proclamation that he would punish to the limit of the law any officer who permitted his men to carry out of the state any arms belonging to Georgia.<sup>20</sup> Several companies, organized and ready to march to the front, were thoroughly indignant over Governor Brown's attitude; however, he steadily refused to let any of the cannon leave the state. President Davis also felt outraged at the governor's action and said that Brown was the only man in the seven states who persistently thwarted him in every endeavor to carry out the policy of the Government.<sup>21</sup>

After refusing to let any of Georgia's arms leave the state, Governor Brown put in a claim for the powder stored in the arsenal at Augusta.<sup>22</sup> When the Confederate Government did not act as quickly as he thought it ought in furnishing this powder, he ordered the state arsenal at Savannah closed to all Confederate officials

19a. *Ibid.*, v. 8, p. 26

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 319, 332, 350, 355, 366, 367, 401, 402, 473, 491; *Ibid.*, I, v. 52, pt. 2, p. 97

21. S. H. S. P., v. 28, pp. 286, 288

22. O. R., IV, v. 1, p. 368

and reminded Secretary Walker that the arsenal and its contents were the property of Georgia to do with as she pleased.<sup>23</sup>

In January, 1862, when the terms of the twelve months men were about to expire, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution stating that "the military exigencies of the Confederate States render it absolutely necessary that the arms of these volunteers now in service should be kept within the control of the President of the Confederate States, so that whenever the present volunteers shall be discharged from service, the arms may be placed in the hands of others."<sup>24</sup> The crying need for arms in the Confederacy likewise caused another decree to go forth providing that all persons of every degree, except those in the service of the state or the Confederate States, having arms in their possession should deliver the same to the Ordnance Department on or before the fifth of March, 1862, otherwise they would be seized and taken possession of by the Provost Marshall.<sup>25</sup> Because of the law passed by Congress requiring all arms of the twelve months men to be kept under the control of President Davis, Governor Brown wrote to the Secretary of War asking the return of all the rifles in the hands of the Georgia volunteers, as he was not willing for the superior guns belonging to Georgia to become the property of the Confederate Government for general use.<sup>26</sup>

23. Ibid, pp. 401, 416

24. Ibid, p. 867, 1059

25. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, v. 1, p. 221

26. O. R., IV, v. 1, pp. 1046, 1047

Had Governor Brown confined his authority solely over the arms belonging to Georgia, it would have been bad enough, but this governor - in his zeal to defend Georgia or to thwart the plans of President Davis - did not stop there. He went hither and thither over the state calling frantically upon the people to help defend their rights against the Confederate Government. He accused the government of gross neglect in not returning the Georgia boys who were in Virginia and in not restoring the arms to the state. He succeeded in getting a resolution passed by the Senate and House of Representatives of Georgia stating that "whereas the State of Georgia has heretofore loaned to the Confederate Government about 160,000 pounds of powder and whereas the State now needs a portion of the same for internal police . . . that the Confederate Government return to the Government of Georgia 25,000 pounds of the amount of powder so loaned as soon as the same can be done for use in the State."<sup>27</sup> Not getting the proper response to his demands, Brown finally wired Secretary Benjamin to supply him arms sufficient to equip four regiments for local defense and suggested that he be allowed to get what arms he needed for state defense from a Confederate cargo which had just landed in Savannah.<sup>28</sup> When Secretary Benjamin wired him that the supply was needed for the poorly armed troops in Virginia "where real fighting was being done,"<sup>29</sup> Governor Brown prevailed upon Confederate General Lawton

26. *Ibid.*, I, v. 6, pp. 112, 113

27. *Ibid.*, v. 2, p. 208

28. *Ibid.*, v. 1, p. 614

29. *Ibid.*, p. 615



to seize the cargo and place the rifles in the hands of the local defense troops.<sup>30</sup> The Secretary of War at once ordered General Lawton to recover all but 1,000 rifles, and voiced the opinion that "if the government cannot have its property landed at any point of the Confederacy without its being seized and appropriated for local needs, it would be better to abandon at once all efforts" of an organized system and give the control of the military to the local militia and popular meetings.<sup>31</sup> Despite this stinging rebuke, Governor Brown tried to seize the very next cargo of arms landed in Georgia.<sup>32</sup>

The results of such a policy as was followed by the Confederate States could not be other than disastrous to the successful prosecution of the war. As early as June, 1861, some of the troops were in a bad condition to fight because they lacked arms and ammunition,<sup>33</sup> while other troops who were armed found their weapons very ineffective. One soldier describing the guns said of them that they were "smooth-bore six-pounders of ancient manufacture, appearing as if they might have done service in revolutionary times," and that "in actual service they could not be very effective, except at short range."<sup>34</sup> By the end of the year, the Confederate

30. Ibid, pp. 617, 618

31. O. R., IV, v. 1, pp. 624, 625

32. Ibid, I, v. 6, pp. 318, 319

33. Wayland, Virginia Valley Records, p. 249

34. Jones, Under the Stars and Bars, p. 16

government could accept no unarmed troops for a period less than during the war.<sup>35</sup> In January, 1862, orders were sent out by the War Department to "bear in mind we will accept no men for a period less than three years or for the war unless they arm themselves at their own expense. In that event you may accept them for not less than twelve months."<sup>36</sup> Could the condition occasioned by the shortage of arms have been remedied early in 1862, the results of the War might have been very different.<sup>37</sup> As it was, the troops in the West under General A. S. Johnston were idle when a few thousand armed troops would have enabled him to take the offensive. Could this have been done, the results at Shiloh might have been very different. The troops in the East under Generals Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard were also unable to move for lack of armed men. Thus the advantage which the South had at the beginning of the war because of its better trained soldiers and its superior generals was lost, and the early popular enthusiasm for war decidedly waned and never returned - a second great price to pay for State Rights. Be that as it may, the Confederate States never seemed to see this error, for in 1864 General Lee wrote that he had 1,700 unarmed men in his army; that in two weeks there would be 5,000; and that in a month the number would be increased to 10,000. He suggested that the troops for local defense and even

35. The Virginia Ferry Company and the Fredericks Ferry Company united in 1864 as the Fredericks Ferry Company. In 1865 the owner of the company.

35. O. R., IV, v. 1, p. 765  
36. Ibid, I, v. 6, p. 795  
37. Cf. Chapter III, ref. 17

the militia be disarmed to supply his men,<sup>38</sup> but his suggestion most likely went unheeded as had all the others.

Fortunately for the Confederate Government, it did not have to depend entirely upon the states to supply army ordnance. For practically half a century, Virginia had possessed the regional monopoly in coal comparable with that of New Castle, England. Because of this monopoly, Virginia became one of the centers of the iron manufacturing industry in the United States.<sup>39</sup> As early as 1837 the Tredegar rolling mills was established in Richmond and was producing iron at the rate of seven and a half tons per day. The establishment of this company was followed quickly by the Shekoe Manufacturing Company and the Virginia Foundry Company.<sup>40</sup> In 1836, D. I. Burr's shop was constructing a locomotive for the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway.<sup>41</sup> By 1860 there were in Richmond four rolling mills, fourteen foundries and machine shops, one nail factory, six shops for the manufacture of iron rails, two circular saw works, and fifty iron and metal works. Besides this, the Virginia State Armory, which had been reenforced by machinery removed from Harper's Ferry, possessed the sole equipment

38. Jones, Diary, v. 2, p. 9

39. Bruce, "Economic Factors in the Manufacture of Confederate Ordnance," Army Ordnance, v. 5, p. 166

40. The Virginia Foundry Company and the Tredegar Company united in 1838 as the Tredegar Iron Company. In 1848 Joseph E. Anderson became the owner of the company. *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 167

41. *Ibid.*, p. 168

in the Confederacy for making muskets. Petersburg, Portsmouth, and Alexandria were likewise manufacturing railway cars, steam engines, and other machinery.<sup>42</sup> Lynchburg had iron works, and the Wheeling district had seven rolling mills.<sup>43</sup> The census of 1850 showed that 2,756 males altogether were employed in the iron furnaces, forges, foundries, rolling mills, and other iron works in Virginia. In 1860, over 1,600 mechanics were employed in the iron concerns in Richmond alone which represented an investment of \$4,000,000.<sup>44</sup>

Prior to 1850, the principal markets for the iron products manufactured in Richmond had been the states north of the Mason-Dixon Line and the Federal Government. The Tredegar Iron Company had built the Polk, an ironclad revenue cutter; manufactured the boilers and machinery of the Union frigates, Roanoke and Colorado; and furnished the United States War and Navy Departments with 1,200 cannon.<sup>45</sup>

After 1850, because of political changes, the Richmond iron market lay almost wholly in the South. By 1855 at least forty-one locomotives built by the Tredegar Company were running over Southern tracks, and three other machine shops in Richmond were also furnishing locomotives. In the meantime, between 1856 and 1858, Georgia completed two powerful rolling mills, and other

42. *Ibid.* (This was natural because almost all the iron in the Richmond area was about the only coal in the entire Richmond area. See the Hall of Chatterbox, which was established in 1875, p. 3, and in Alabama, *Ibid.*)

42. *Ibid.*, p. 168

43. *Ibid.*, p. 167

44. *Ibid.*, p. 168

45. *Ibid.*, p. 167

southern States had completed eight such mills.<sup>46</sup> The center of the iron industry, however, was still confined to Richmond.<sup>47</sup>

At the outbreak of the war, South Carolina had sixty-four guns which the Tredegar Company had cast in 1861, \$2,500 worth of shot and shell, \$2,000 worth of powder, and \$7,000 worth of ordnance. Anderson, who owned the Tredegar Company, had also informed South Carolina by telegram that they had 250 eight-inch shells, and that in one day they could make 100 ten-inch shells, 100 thirty-two pounder shot, and 25 eight-inch shot. This number, he said, could be doubled in ten days. He also wired that 1,000 kegs of cannon powder were available in Richmond for immediate shipment.<sup>48</sup> Beside this the Tredegar Company had also furnished ordnance to North Carolina, Mississippi, Virginia, Alabama, and Georgia - which State, on the eve of 1861, contracted for 6 eighteen-pounder cannons modeled after guns used in the Union Army.<sup>49</sup>

Since in 1860 the only important center for the manufacture of munitions lay in Virginia - Richmond especially - the hopes of the entire Confederacy depended upon that state. As early as February, 1861, Mr. Anderson offered to turn over the Tredegar

46. Ibid

47. Ibid (This was natural because except for Chattanooga, Richmond coal was about the only coal in the entire Confederacy. After the fall of Chattanooga, mining was established in Egypt, N. C., and in Alabama.) Ibid, p. 262

48. Ibid, p. 169

49. Ibid, pp. 168, 169

company to the Confederacy in case Virginia should secede. The Confederate Government, however, refused this offer as well as every other offer made by him, and the Tredegar Company remained the property of Mr. Anderson until the close of the war, and was the principal source of supplies for the Confederate War Department from 1861 to 1865.

On March 6, 1861, the Tredegar Company signed the first contract with the Confederate Government for 30 ten-inch Columbiads and 30 iron carriages.<sup>50</sup> In that same month Mr. James H. Gilmore of Marion, Smythe County, notified the Secretary of War that there was a company there which could furnish three or four tons a week and could increase this amount if the force were enlarged, and that this company desired a contract for shot and shell.<sup>51</sup> About this time the Navy Yard in Norfolk, taken in the name of the Commonwealth of Virginia, added an immense supply of munitions of war, and a foundry and boiler shop which was of vast importance, and which shipped 533 heavy guns to all parts of the Confederacy.<sup>52</sup>

Realizing the extreme value of the Tredegar Company to the Confederacy, and wishing to aid the cause in every way possible,

50. *Ibid.*, p. 169. The Tredegar Company was the chief manufacturer of siege and field guns, all cast iron and smooth bore. It also made the howitzers and twelve-inch bronze Napoleons. Brown, "Confederate Ordnance During the War," Confederate Veteran, v. 12, p. 20 ff. January, 1904

51. O. R., IV, v. 1, p. 191

52. Bruce, "Economic Factors in the Manufacture of Confederate Army Ordnance", Army Ordnance, v. 5, p. 168

Mr. Anderson set about to increase the efficiency of that company, to establish subsidiary iron works, and to encourage the reopening of foundries which had been idle for sometime. As a result of his efforts, six puddling furnaces which employed nine hundred men were rekindled in the spring of 1861. In the Valley of Virginia lead furnaces which had been active since the American Revolution became more active, and others which had been idle were put in readiness to be rekindled.<sup>53</sup> By 1862 iron works were established in the Shenandoah Valley, in Botetourt and Alleghany Counties, and at Buchanan, the terminus of James River and Kanawha Canal.<sup>54</sup> So tireless were the efforts of this man that by 1863 he had succeeded in establishing a line of ordnance plants from Richmond to Alabama.<sup>55</sup>

The growing demands for munitions which had been steadily increasing since 1850 had resulted in a great lack of raw materials. In Virginia, pig iron had decreased 50 per cent, while the manufacture of iron products had increased 194 per cent. To meet the deficiency, in 1861 contracts for large amounts of pig iron were made in Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, and for large amounts of

53. Ibid, p. 169

54. Ibid, p. 170, v. 6, p. 260

55. Ibid, v. 5, p. 170

copper from the mines of Tennessee.<sup>55a</sup> The next year the demands had increased so much that 15,000 tons of pig iron and 75,000 tons of coal were necessary to meet the needs. To avoid speculation, the government fixed the price of pig iron at \$50 a ton, and the founders broke their contracts. As a result of this, the Secretary of War advised Anderson to begin the manufacture of pig iron, and the Confederate Government immediately advanced \$300,000 for this purpose, and in the autumn of 1862 increased this amount to \$500,000. Besides this, in order that the Tredegar Company might meet the demands of the War Department, the government turned over to Anderson the pig iron for which it had contracted in other places.<sup>56</sup>

55a. When the Confederate Army lost control of Tennessee, the Confederacy lost its sole supply of copper. Since copper was absolutely necessary in the manufacture of percussion caps, something had to be done. It had been rumored that there were many stills in North Carolina; therefore, secretly, but with the consent of the Chief of Ordnance, an officer was dispatched with the necessary authority to purchase or impress all copper still found available in that state, and to ship the same out into strips to the arsenal at Richmond. This officer was so successful in his mission, that he was able to send enough copper to Richmond to supply the demand. In fact, all the caps issued from the arsenal at Richmond and used by the armies of the Confederate States during the last twelve months of the war were manufactured from the copper stills of North Carolina. Brown, "Confederate Ordnance During the War", Confederate Veteran, v. 12, p. 20 ff., January, 1904

56. *Ibid.*, v. 6, pp. 259, 260



Because of the ever-growing, urgent calls for munitions during the year, 1861, the demands for labor steadily increased. To supply the needed laborers the munitions plants did all they could, but they received a tremendous blow in the spring of 1862 by the passage of the Conscript Act. Many of those who were then employed in the rolling mills and foundries had to enroll and were sent to the regular army. Everywhere there was danger that the output of ordnance would be diminished. In fact, in many instances the decrease in the number of workmen was so very disastrous that the furnaces were forced to remain entirely idle.<sup>57</sup> The shortage of labor caused by the passage of the Conscript Act was further increased when State Executives ordered non-militant mechanics out of the country and when the Confederate Government sought to enroll all aliens in the Conscript Bureau.<sup>58</sup> Since the majority of the aliens had remained in the Confederate States for the purpose of smuggling, or trading with the United States Government, and were working in the foundries to aid in the amassing of individual fortunes,<sup>59</sup> just as soon as the law was passed providing

57. An act passed April 21, 1862, provided for the exemption of those employed in mines, furnaces, and foundries, but often, before a conscript could get his papers through the red tape of the War office, he had been sent to the army. O. R., IV, v. 1, p. 108.

58. Bruce, Army Ordnance, v. 5, p. 162; O. R., IV, v. 2, p. 162; Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, v. 3, p. 236; Upton, Military Policy of the United States, p. 477.

59. O. R., IV, v. 2, pp. 9, 10.

for their conscription, there was a wholesale exodus of this group from the Confederacy. As soon as the War Department realized that requisitions upon manufacturers of army supplies could not be filled because of the labor shortage, the Quartermaster-General urged that the required number of men be discharged or detailed to meet the demands;<sup>60</sup> and the Secretary of War at once made use of his discretionary powers and enrolled and detailed men for work in Government plants. Mr. Anderson, however, was operating a privately owned company, and had to use other means to keep his plant running at maximum production. He, therefore, sent agents throughout Eastern Virginia and North Carolina to hire men to work in the furnaces, but found none. Since Mr. Anderson was not a man to be downed, and since for twenty years he had demonstrated that negroes could be used, he appealed to the Governor of Virginia in the summer of 1862 and contracted with him for negro convict labor. This plan proved so very practicable that Anderson made additional contracts in January and March, 1863.<sup>61</sup> Even this force was not sufficient to meet the demands; therefore Mr. Anderson called on the Confederate Government for help for his foundries and other foundries whose furnaces, stripped of men, were idle. The Government not only caused such men to be detailed from the army as might be needed to carry on the operations of

59. *Ibid.*, p. 259

60. *Ibid.*, v. 1, p. 1127

61. Bruce, Army Ordnance, v. 6, p. 259, 260

the Tredegar Company, but also adjusted prices to enable Anderson and his partners to continue their business.<sup>62</sup> Many slave owners also in order to aid the cause hired out what slaves could be spared from the plantations to work in the Tredegar mills, and by 1863 there were several hundred employed.<sup>63</sup>

The gigantic efforts of Mr. Anderson surely seem to have been rewarded. As early as April, 1862, a soldier in a letter to a friend said:

I saw yesterday at the Southern depot in Richmond some of the largest cannon ever out in the Confederate States. I was told they were 700 pounders, and I tell you they were rousers. I could have crawled into them easily. They were cast at the Richmond Iron Works and are to go to Charleston where the gallant Beauregard is still holding off the Federal fleet and army infesting that port. The Confederacy is not so badly off, after all, in the way of supplying her fortified posts with large guns and ammunition. It is a sight to a countryman to go through those shops and see the great piles of shot and shell and other paraphernalia of war.<sup>64</sup>

The opinion expressed by the soldier was confirmed in a letter from the Secretary of War to President Davis on November 26, 1863. It is gratifying he said to be able to report that during the past year the Ordnance and Mining Bureau has "steadily increased the production and supply of arms and munitions." He further pointed out that "notwithstanding the serious injury sustained from fire by one of the leading establishments in the

62. This refers to the fire of May, 1862, which consumed nearly the whole of the Tredegar Foundry and its contents.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 260. Anderson rebuilt, completing in 1863 another large gun and wheel factories. *News*, *AME*.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 259. *S. P.* 242

64. Jones, Under the Stars and Bars, p. 95 (Chicago, Ill., December 7, 1862.)

confederacy for the manufacture of ordnance,<sup>65</sup> yet by prompt repairs and the establishment of similar works in other portions of the Confederacy, the manufacture has further increased." He expressed the belief that the supply was adequate for the regular demands of the service, and informed Mr. Davis that arms of approved kinds were being made at more places and in larger numbers than at any previous time and that this supply was being augmented by importations from abroad. Progress too, he said, had been marked "in the manufacture of powder, balls, and shells." There seemed, however, to be one drawback - they were not "wholly independent of niter." Although, as he pointed out, during the past year the increase in production had been nearly doubled; yet the "temporary occupancy of the enemy in the nitrous section" had diminished the supply. Despite this drawback the Secretary of War seemed well pleased because "mining operations in iron, lead, and coal despite all embarrassment resulting from paucity of laborers and fluctuating prices showed a better prospect of future sufficiency than had been enjoyed at any previous time."<sup>66</sup>

The note of optimism sounded by the Secretary of War over Army Ordnance was soon to receive some several setbacks, and but money which the people were refusing to accept. Consequently,

65. This refers to the fire of May, 1863, which consumed nearly the whole of the Tredegar foundry and its auxiliary shops. Anderson rebuilt, completing in two months the gun and wheel factories. Bruce, Army Ordnance, v. 6, p. 262

66. C. R., IV, v. 2, p. 1007; Idem, p. 1043 (Message of President Davis to Congress on December 7, 1863.)

for the almost Herculean efforts of Mr. Anderson, the supply of munitions would have been reduced to a point that would have been disastrous. The Government had expected the Tredegar Company to use 20,000 tons of pig iron during 1863. This amount, however, was not obtained, so in January, 1864, the Company bought the Mount Terry Furnace hoping to supply the deficiency. Almost immediately following this purchase, Hunter, on his raid in the Valley of Virginia destroyed four of the leading Tredegar furnaces and several other independent works which had remained unmolested up to that time. The War and Mining Bureau at once furnished \$150,000 to rebuild these furnaces and \$150,000 to build a rail and plate mill at the Tredegar Works in Richmond,<sup>67</sup> but to Anderson was left the task of having this work done. Nor was this the only task facing him. The men employed had to be fed, clothed, and shod. To provide these essentials, the Tredegar Company employed nine large boats and other smaller craft and sent agents everywhere to arrange for the purchase of supplies. In 1862 and 1863, the Company through its agents had bought food and clothes in Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama. In 1864, however, the chief currency was Confederate money which the people were refusing to accept. Consequently, Mr. Anderson had to resort to barter and used nails, spikes, and bar iron for this purpose. By the end of 1864 he had storehouses

67. Bruce, "Economic Factors in the Manufacture of Confederate Army Ordnance", ARMY ORDNANCE, v. 6, p. 263

1811, pp. 253, 254, 255

in Georgia and South Carolina crowded with provisions which he had paid for in iron. Since shoes could not be bought within the Confederacy, he established a shoe factory and had shoes manufactured for his men.<sup>68</sup>

In July of 1864, the Tredegar Company was faced with another problem when a change in government policy withdrew the regular payments which had been made to that company. As a result of the withdrawal of government funds, Mr. Anderson had to resort entirely to barter. He even established trade with the Bermudas sending out cotton to bring back arms for the government, and cloth for the Tredegar company. By December 1864 he realized that he could not carry on beyond January the first without government aid; therefore he once more offered the Tredegar Company to the Confederacy. Once more the government refused the offer, but it did resume the policy of providing regular payments for that company. When the war ended, two of the three restored Tredegar furnaces could make 2,000 tons each year instead of their former maximum of 1,100 tons yearly; and between New Year's Day 1865 and April the first, Anderson cast 35 heavy guns, completed 9 chasses, and 24 heavy gun carriages, besides large amount of shot, shell, and shrapnel. Barely six weeks before the end, the Tredegar Company experimented and succeeded in casting on a hollow core a 12 inch iron gun of greater strength and hardness than their iron Napoleon.<sup>69</sup> Even when General Grant crossed the

68. Ibid, pp. 260, 261

69. Ibid, pp. 261, 263, 264

James and the Tredegar battalion of 300 men were called into service, work was still carried on by several hundred negroes superintended by white experts exempt from service.

The value to the Confederacy of the Tredegar Company, together with the line of munition plants which it had established either directly or indirectly from Richmond to Selma, Alabama, cannot be overestimated. The untiring devotion of General Anderson to the Confederate Cause relieved the much harassed Confederate Government of one of its many problems, for the problem of Army Ordnance was more largely the problem of that great patriot than that of the War Department. The Tredegar Company remained loyal, nor did it cease its valuable service to the Confederate Cause until April 3, 1865, when Richmond was evacuated. If the states had seen the wisdom of complete cooperation with the Confederate Government and had practiced it as did General Anderson, the problem of Army Ordnance would have been almost no problem at all.

According to the laws of the several states. The acts passed the first few months to raise the Provisional Army studied three outstanding weaknesses. First, in the haste to raise an army, Congress voided too many concessions to the states, thereby strengthening the doctrine of state rights which later proved its undoing. Second, the acts provided for short enlistments, usually from three to twelve months. Third, the principle of popular election of officers, except those of brigades and divisions, was abolished by law. This privilege of election officers

### CONCLUSION

During the War Between the States, the Congress and the President of the Confederate States were faced with many problems, but the principal ones were those connected with the problem of raising an army. At first, and even to the end of the war, this problem was shared almost equally by the state and central governments. Each state was much concerned over increasing and strengthening its militia so that its sovereign entity might be preserved; the Confederate Government was faced with the task of raising the Provisional and Regular armies. The Provisional Army, when raised, was made up of the militia tendered by the several states, and of the volunteers who entered the army by the consent of their respective states. The volunteers were organized into companies and officered according to the laws of the several states. The acts passed the first few months to raise the Provisional Army embodied three outstanding weaknesses. First, in the haste to raise an army, Congress made too many concessions to the states, thereby strengthening the doctrine of State Rights which later proved its undoing. Second, the acts provided for short enlistments, usually from three to twelve months. Third, the principal of popular election of officers, except those of brigades and divisions, was sanctioned by law. This privilege of electing officers



proved to be a real evil, and although efforts were made to remedy it, it persisted to the end of the war. With the exception of the section providing for general officers, the act to establish a regular army never materialized except on paper.

As the year, 1861, advanced, the Confederate Government attempted to weaken the power of the states and to strengthen its power by passing further bills calling for volunteers who should offer their services directly to the President without any formal call upon the states and who should serve for the war. These early calls for volunteers were answered with enthusiasm, but because of a shortage of arms, over 200,000 were rejected during the first year. This 200,000 fired with patriotic fervor, felt that they must get into some branch of the service; therefore, they offered their services to their state governments and were placed in local organizations. Many of these were thereby lost forever from service in the Confederate Army since the states often refused to surrender their militia to the central government.

By the end of 1861, the situation in the Confederacy was worse than the people as a whole realized. The states had become alarmed over the growing power of the central government and had already begun their opposition movement by demanding that troops be raised directly by the states and submitted by them to the Confederate Government. The

Confederate Government and General Lee were gravely concerned because volunteers had not answered the last calls for service with the enthusiasm that they did at first. Moreover, the term of service of the twelve months troops was about to expire and many were planning to return home - this in the face of the spring campaign and the gigantic efforts being made in the North to strengthen the Union Army. To offset this danger, the Confederate Congress passed the "bounty and furlough" act in December, 1861. This act they hoped would induce the twelve months men to reenlist.

In the spring of 1862 the situation became much graver. The "bounty and furlough" act did not bring the results hoped for, and the army was about to be disorganized. Consequently, at the suggestion of General Lee and President Davis, the Confederate Congress decided upon conscription to prevent the disintegration of the army. This act brought the Confederate Government into many serious controversies with the State Rights leaders in all the states. Just as soon as the first law passed in April, 1862, Governor Brown, supported by Vice-President Stephens and Robert Toombs began the opposition movement and this opposition steadily increased until the end of the war. They opposed the law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and unnecessary; that it would break up the state governments since there were no

exemptions; that it would entirely break up the state militia; and finally, that each state would be nothing but a puppet in the hands of the Confederate Government, the President in particular. Governor Brown got his legislature to declare the Conscription Act null and void and even took the matter before the courts of state. Although the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the conscription law constitutional, Governor Brown carried the matter into the army and encouraged the troops to mutiny against the act. Governor Vance of North Carolina also became a strong opponent to conscription. His opposition and that of Brown was a constant thorn in the flesh of the Confederate authorities in Richmond and of the officers of conscription. None of the other governors throughout the Confederacy definitely entered the lists of opposition to conscription until the act of 1864 which placed the ages from seventeen to fifty. Then practically all of the states raised a stern voice of protest.

To offset some of the weaknesses of the Conscription Act and to appease the opposition to conscription which already was threatening, Congress passed the exemption act before the end of April. This act included so many classes that those who did not come under any group and who wished to evade service soon entered one of the occupations named in the act. The exempted group that gave the Confederate Government the most trouble was that class

claiming to be state officers. The governors who opposed conscription not only aided the group in office, but created many more state offices in which many found an asylum. A very conservative estimate would place the number of state officers in the Confederacy at 18,843, but if we would credit statements from such men as General Howell Cobb of Georgia, General Rains, Chief of the Bureau of Conscription, and President Davis, the number of state officers would easily reach 50,000. The problem of exemption became increasingly more serious and the dissatisfaction created by this law found its way even into the army. Many revisions were made from time to time to solve the problem; however, the difficulty persisted and was one of the most bitter controversies between President Davis and Congress during its closing session in 1865. The difficulty arising over exemptions greatly lessened the ability to raise an army in the Confederacy.

When the Conscrip Act made it impossible for the twelve months men to return home, which many had planned to do, some of the less patriotic ones decided upon desertion as the only way of evading military service and availed themselves of the first opportunity to escape. The number of desertions finally reached such alarming numbers that General Lee along with other Confederate officers appealed to the President and to the War

department to pass some stringent acts to stop the evil. Congress therefore permitted the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. President Davis used the privilege very sparingly, however, because Brown, Stephens, Toombs, and Vance bitterly opposed putting that much power in the hands of the chief executive. Their opposition was so strong that when the first law expired, the President could not get the privilege extended. In fact, he was unable to get a law passed to suspend the writ during the whole year, 1863. In February, 1864, because of the earnest appeal of President Davis coupled with that of General Lee, Congress passed another act suspending the writ in certain cases; but when the time expired, the storm of protest against the act brought by the State Rightists kept it from being renewed. During the entire war the writ was suspended in the Confederacy less than a year and a half. This was disastrous because it left the Confederate authorities with no way of getting draft-evaders and deserters into the army. With no weapon with which to fight these evils, the numbers grew to alarming proportions before the war ended. The opposition to martial law not only prevented the conviction of deserters and the arrest of draft-evaders, but also led many people in the Confederacy to oppose President Davis and the Government and to withhold their whole-hearted support which was absolutely necessary to the success of the cause.

Despite the serious opposition to martial law, President Davis knew that the suspension of the writ was necessary. He therefore made another urgent plea for this privilege when the last Congress met. By this time Congress was under the control of the State Rightists and the final session refused the President's request and closed its doors while engaged in a bitter controversy with the President over his insistence on suspending the writ.

Still another problem which the government had to face in raising an army was that of substitution. All the acts to raise an army in 1861 permitted substitution and the Conscrip Act in 1862 continued this privilege. From the very beginning substitution proved an evil and led to many kinds of frauds and scandals. Since the Conscrip Act made all the white male population between eighteen and thirty-five subject to enrollment, many people who had not been in the service prior to this time hastened to find a substitute. Those people offering to serve in this capacity were of the very lowest class in society and few generals wished such cowards in their army. They were in the business for the money and after receiving their fee for service, which went as high as \$10,000, they would desert again and in a few weeks offer themselves to someone else. Since only the rich could afford to furnish a substitute, and since for the most part only the influential were exempted, the war became

unpopular among the poorer classes and was known as "the rich man's war, and the poor man's fight." The evils of substitution were so great that such people as Senator Phelan and General Bragg thought it the worst evil of the war. Congress passed many laws to remedy the abuses of substitution, but they persisted just the same. Just as many of the other problems, substitution, too, remained a problem with Congress until the end of the conflict.

To furnish the army with arms, labor, and clothing - all of which were just as necessary in raising an army as men - was also a great task of the Confederate Government, and the states raised just as serious objections to the methods used by the government in obtaining these supplies as they had raised about conscription, exemption, substitution, and the writ of habeas corpus. When the officers of the Confederate Government took arms from any state which that state claimed, if the protest was vigorous enough (as was that of Governor Brown) the arms would be returned and the government officials warned not to interfere with any state arms. If the states felt that they needed all the arms they had, they would refuse to turn over any portion to the Confederate Army. At times some of the governors even ordered the Army in the field to return arms they were using in active campaigns against the enemy, because they felt that they must get their state in readiness for an invasion which might occur.

Had Governor Brown not been so insistent on keeping the arms of Georgia, the Confederate Government would not have been forced to reject the 200,000 volunteers the first year and the war might have ended by the close of 1861.

If the slaves were impressed for service to aid in railroad building, to work in factories, to help move the artillery, or to take care of the horses' with the army, the slave owners, supported by the state governments, would raise their voice in opposition, even though the service of the slaves was very necessary in order to keep from detailing soldiers from the army. Virginia suffered more than any other state from the impressment of slaves, but as usual, Governors Brown and Vance were the principal objectors. Again, if the Confederate agents would attempt to get cotton from the land owners, and clothing from the factories, the land owners and the factories would often refuse to sell to the agents, and in many instances, they were supported in their refusal by the state governors. North Carolina, which had the principal cotton mills in the Confederacy, often received impressed cotton from the Confederate Government, used men detailed from the Confederate Army to work in the cotton factories, and then refused to furnish the manufactured articles to the Confederate Government. Governor Vance, according to his own statement, had everyone of his soldiers well-clothed when the war ended and had 92,000 uniforms stored in warehouses, besides



large supplies of leather and blankets - this when Lee's army had neither blankets, shoes, nor clothing. This supply would have given Lee's entire army two uniforms apiece.

One more of the controversial questions between the states and the Confederate Government was that of providing officers for the army. The states insisted upon providing officers for the militia and for all volunteer groups from the state. These officers were selected according to the state laws, which usually meant popular election. Governor Brown even insisted upon appointing brigade officers for Georgia troops even though the Confederate laws prohibited such appointments. This insistence upon officering troops was quite a detriment to the army. Often a state did not have men well-trained and with experience enough to handle and train troops while the Confederate Government had many well-seasoned officers in its army who could have served with distinction. The most serious disagreement over this question arose when some of the governors claimed the right to fill vacancies among their troops after they had become a part of the Provisional Army of the Confederacy. This privilege had been allowed before conscription, but experience had taught that it was a bad policy. Therefore the Conscription Act gave the Confederate Government the right to fill all vacancies in its army. This change of policy

met with immediate opposition, especially from Georgia and North Carolina. The War Department often yielded to the states demands to keep from having any serious breaks. This controversy, while not as serious as the first, continued during the entire war and resulted in decreasing the efficiency of the army. In the case of the quarrel with Governor Brown over appointing brigade officers, it prevented increasing the size of the army when troops were essential.

Thus during the entire period of the war, the quarrels between the Confederate states and the Confederate Governments over such questions as the state troops, conscription, suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and impressment made it impossible for the Confederate Government at any time to raise the army to its maximum strength or to fill the ranks when vacancies occurred. Indeed the problems of the Confederate Government in raising and arming the army were so mammoth, that one wonders how that army could possible have lasted for four years, and have conducted the brilliant campaigns for which it is justly famous.

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State	Number	Remarks
Virginia	13933	
North Carolina	21328	
South Carolina	7120	
Georgia	3493	
Alabama	14875	Exclusion of the operations of General
Mississippi	5001	Pillow
Louisiana	362	Suspended and under general order till Jan
Arkansas	51	1863
Tennessee	2250	From historical report furnished in Aug
Total	21903	1862

Approximate estimate of men who have joined the Army  
in April 1862, without passing through the camps of instruction

State	Number	Remarks
Virginia	5000	
North Carolina	8000	
South Carolina	6000	
Georgia	26000	
Alabama	5000	
Mississippi	3000	+ 2000 in army, but fraction present only
Louisiana	2000	the army 18 273
Arkansas	500	
Tennessee	500	
Total	162000	

Appendix

A. Number of conscripts enrolled and assigned to the Army from camps of instruction since the act of Congress April 16, 1862

State	Number	Remarks
Virginia	13433	
North Carolina	21348	
South Carolina	9120	
Georgia	8993	
Alabama	14875	
Mississippi	8061	Exclusion of the operations of General Pillow
Florida	362	Do
East Louisiana	81	Suspended and under General Cobb till Dec. 1863
East Tennessee	5220	From September Report commenced in Aug. 1862
Total	81993	O. R. II, V. 3, P. 1101

B. Approximate estimate of men who have joined the Army since April, 1862, without passing through the camps of instruction.

State	Number	Remarks
Virginia	15000	
North Carolina	8000	
South Carolina	6800	
Georgia	26400	
Alabama	10060	
Mississippi	3032	* Do in copy, but factors produce only the sum of 72, 292
Florida	2000	
East Louisiana	500	
East Tennessee	500	
Total	76206*	O. R. II, V. 3, P. 1101



### D. Exemptions

State	Age	Total
Virginia	18 and 45	12556
	17 and 18	121
	45 and 50	763
<b>Total</b>		<b>13443</b>
North Carolina		
<b>Total</b>		<b>16564</b>
South Carolina		
<b>Total</b>		<b>5839</b>
Georgia		
<b>Total</b>		<b>15346</b>
Alabama		
<b>Total</b>		<b>10218</b>
Mississippi		
<b>Total</b>		<b>4018</b>
Florida		
<b>Total</b>		<b>748</b>
East Tennessee		
<b>Total</b>		<b>573</b>
East Louisiana		
<b>Total</b>		<b>219</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>66586</b>

As in copy; but factors produce sum of 67,054

O. R. IV, v. 3, pp. 1102-1103

### E. Agricultural Details

221

State	Number
Virginia	605
North Carolina	229
South Carolina	296
Georgia	1509
Alabama	38
Mississippi	20
Florida	18
East Tennessee	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2717</b>

O. R. IV, v. 3, p. 1104

### F. Detail on account of public necessity

O. R. IV, v. 3, p. 1104-1106

State	Number
Virginia	1971
North Carolina	437
South Carolina	1056
Georgia	2148
Alabama	86
Mississippi	47
Florida	51
East Tennessee	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>5803</b>

### G. Details for government service

State	Number
Virginia	2421
South Carolina	558
Georgia	1016
Alabama	218
Mississippi	3
Florida	275
East Tennessee	121
<b>Total</b>	<b>4612</b>

O. R. IV, v. 3, pp. 1106-1107

H. Details of contractors to furnish supplies

State	Number	
Virginia	252	
North Carolina	93	
South Carolina	93	O. R. I., v. 3, p. 1107
Georgia	240	
Alabama	44	
East Tennessee	15	
Total	717	

I. Government Details of artisans, mechanics, etc.

State	Number	
Virginia	3484	
North Carolina	1885	
South Carolina	271	
Georgia	581	
Alabama	570	
East Tennessee	169	
Total	6960	

L. Recaptulation

Number of conscripts assigned to the Army from camps of instruction .....	81993
Deserters returned to the Army.....	21056
Assignment under section 8 of the Act of February 17, 1864 .....	7733
Men who joined without going through camp of instruction .....	16206
Total number of exempts .....	66586
Agricultural Details .....	2717
Details on account of public necessity .....	5803
Government details (bureaus, etc) .....	4612
Details of contractors to furnish supplies .....	717
Details of artisans, mechanics, etc. ....	6960

Geo. D. Ouster, Supl. of Bureau of Conscription to  
 J. C. Breckenridge, Secretary of War, February, 1865

Number of Deserters from the Confederate Army

State	Officers	men
Virginia	84	12071
Maryland	.....	28
North Carolina	428	23694
South Carolina	36	3579
Georgia	79	6797
Florida	8	2211
Alabama	5	1578
Mississippi	56	11604
Louisiana	24	4517
Texas	9	4655
Arkansas	66	10029
Missouri	45	4365
Tennessee	153	12155
Kentucky	16	3466
Arizona	.....	16
Indian Territory	.....	154
Regular Army	5	1274
Jeff Davis Legion	14	1207
<b>Total</b>	<b>1028</b>	<b>103400</b>

Source, Desertions During the Civil War, Appendix I, p. 231

*Generals in the Confederate States Army  
in Order of Rank*

<i>Name</i>	<i>State</i>	<i>Date of Appointment</i>	<i>Date of Rank</i>	<i>Date of Confirmation</i>
<i>Samuel Cooper</i>	<i>Virginia</i>	<i>Aug. 31, 1861</i>	<i>May 16, 1861</i>	<i>August 31, 1861 and April 23, 1863</i> }
<i>Albert S. Johnston</i>	<i>Texas</i>	<i>Aug. 31, 1861</i>	<i>May 30, 1861</i>	<i>August 31, 1861</i>
<i>Robert E. Lee</i>	<i>Virginia</i>	<i>Aug. 31, 1861</i>	<i>June 14, 1861 Gen. in chief.</i>	<i>August 31, 1861 April 23, 1863 January 31, 1865</i> }
<i>Joseph E. Johnston</i>	<i>Virginia</i>	<i>Aug. 31, 1861</i>	<i>July 4, 1861</i>	<i>August 31, 1861 April 23, 1863</i> }
<i>P. G. T. Beauregard</i>	<i>Louisiana</i>	<i>Aug. 31, 1861</i>	<i>July 21, 1861</i>	<i>August 31, 1861 April 23, 1863</i>
<i>Braxton Bragg</i>	<i>Louisiana</i>	<i>April 12, 1862</i>	<i>April 6, 1862</i>	<i>April 12, 1862</i>

*General Provisional Army.*

<i>Edmund Kirby Smith</i>	<i>Florida</i>	<i>Feb. 19, 1864</i>	<i>Feb. 19, 1864</i>	<i>May, 11, 1864</i>
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*General With Temporary Rank*

<i>John B. Hood</i> <sup>+</sup>	<i>Texas</i>	<i>July 18, 1864</i>	<i>July 18, 1864</i>	
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*\* Rank of Lieutenant-General January 23, 1865*

*Wright, Marcus J., General Officers of the Confederate Army,  
pp. 9-13*

VITA

- Birth:** Surry County, Virginia, October 9, 1894.
- Parents:** Edwin Stith and Clara Warren Spratley.
- Training:** Graduate State Teachers College, Farmville, Virginia, 1915; B. S. State Teachers College, Farmville, Virginia, 1929.
- Honor Societies:** Kappa Delta Pi; Pi Gamma Mu; Beore Eh Thorn, Honor Society in English, Farmville, S.T.C.; History Club, College of William and Mary.
- Experience:** Teacher in High School, Surry, Virginia--1915-16.  
Principal of High School, Surry, Virginia--1916-17; 1917-18.  
Principal of High School, Rice, Virginia--1918-19.  
Assistant principal of High School, Surry, Virginia--September 1919--June 1924.  
Teacher in Junior High School, Davy, West Virginia--1925-26.  
Principal of Junior High School, Asco, West Virginia--1926-27; 1927-28.  
Instructor in English, State Teachers College, Farmville, Virginia--1929-30; 1930-31.  
Instructor in English, High School, Hampton, Virginia--September 1932 to June 1937.  
Head of History Department, High School, Hampton, Virginia--1937 ----
- Candidate for the Master of Arts Degree from the College of William and Mary in 1938.