

As in the case of the Kansas law prohibiting extended kisses in public, there will be great sections of enacted law which will not be enforced due to wide-spread refusal or obstruction, both on the part of enforcement agencies and their constituents. That this type large-scale "innovation" could produce a fascist or totalitarian response in the form of a reactionary government seems only slightly more probable than a group of Weathermen successfully taking over the White House with carbines. Both views make good romantic drama and poor analysis of how people of post-modern culture behave (not to mention ignorance of this country's socio-political heritage).

The social system will begin to look much less like Parson's version than like Mill's, at least in terms of the individual. In the economic realm (which after all served as Parson's model), there will be even greater rationalization and centralized planning, but in the interest of using as few men for as few hours as possible without jeopardizing necessary output. But in all other aspects, especially involving human values and social control, "integration" will mean nothing. In the world of a Cooley, value integration made some sense; the world of Alvin Toffler does not expect or permit any type of holistic interpretation of reality, for both in social and physical terms, it is much too complex to lend itself to such premodern evaluations. Like it or not, diversity and change will displace Parson's emphasis on continuity and system-maintenance just as surely

as the auto replaced the carriage. The purpose of the system will be to insure sufficient goods and services to its members so that their self-imposed schedule of living will be expedited and not interrupted as is now usually the case. And that this vision is not construed as the latest nonworkable utopia, it should be emphasized that just this kind of life-style is already approached by a great many social actors, who in most instances occupy professional positions within the upper middle and upper classes. The divorce rate, singles' housing, the rate of job-changing and the decreasing importance of stability throughout life which now are beginning to permeate these classes are some of the better known indicators. With more time, education, and money, the remaining strata will doubtless follow suit. What was described in an earlier time as chronic social disorganization or disintegration is more properly characterized today with the phrase, "business as usual".

As promised, the chapter will now be concluded with my personal reservations about culture-wide innovation as predicted by this theory.

Depending upon the critic's viewpoint, the theory may be said to utilize a conception of man which is either "radically empirical and rational" or "naively positivistic". Since the theory has been offered with the implication that it is of scientific value, I will only for the sake of argument consider seriously the latter characterization.

The 20th century has produced a conception of man which is for some uncomfortably ambiguous: he is calculatingly cool and precise enough to produce unending technological wizardry, yet with the same gray matter he has come close to self-annihilation in the interests of ill-conceived, ill-defined abstract sentiments. Jung and like thinkers have suggested repeatedly that we are more subject to the dark, unfathomable and treacherous whims of the "unconscious" than to the pull of the 18th century's favorite, reason. The existentialists have tried to make the case for radically aggressive individualism, to the exclusion of an understanding of what "culture and the individual" is all about. However, even the most sociologistic rationalists can be awed at least momentarily by the incredible irrationality which apparently pervades post-modern existence at some levels. But this senselessness stems not of course from anything so indistinct as the unconscious, but from an irrationally constructed social order. We are as instinctless as the bees are instinct-ridden, thus what we get out of the social order is pretty much what goes in as far as rationality is concerned. But, so that I do not seem utterly blind to nonrationalist perspectives, it must be admitted that people tend to behave in their own best interests with not quite the frequency and predictability Adam Smith supposed they would, and they do tend to embrace nonsensical, emotionalistic appraisals of reality somewhat more readily than J. S. Mill would have thought possible. However, since this theory concerns

itself with the future of post-modern culture exclusively, it is important that a measure of the stupidity evidenced by populations historically will henceforth be avoided due to the democratization, the general diffusion of social knowledge. Just because the 16 year old girl next door "believes in" astrology does not mean that she won't "believe in" birth control pills rather than relying on magical amulets and chants. Try as some might, the modern social actor cannot very easily unlearn what he knows to be true, on behalf of romantic attachments to the primitive. Sullivan's insight about the richness of a child's small, intense vocabulary as compared to the watered-down, precise words and phrases of the adult world does not impune the value of precision and a modern understanding of causality. Historical examples of gross irrationality have also been connected, ever since Hegel, to societal irrationality at the structural level. Presumably (a basic tenet of Critical Theory), increased rational input into structure would produce, in an unstated dialectical fashion, similarly demystified social behavior.

When the modes of perception which grew out of 350 years of science, producing relatively exact formulations and theories, can be transferred to the masses regarding their understanding of not only physical but also social phenomena, then the richness and luxuriously interesting imprecision of premodern thought will no longer prevail. (That 80% of those polled believe in Nixon's culpability

while only 20% approve his removal is typical of the contradictions inherent in a worldview based more on emotion than reason, if I may use a mildly accurate dichotomy.)

Connected with the problem of just how rationally men can be expected to behave is an analog: how adventurous will they be? The innovator would wish that experimentation in a variety of settings could not jeopardize an individual's life-chances in other nonrelated areas of life, as is now the case. Somehow the British politician who enjoys prostitutes ipso facto becomes unqualified for office. The point of his having been elected, to provide capable government, is connected only tenuously with his bedchamber behavior, yet time and again a minor "indiscretion" concerning one area of existence becomes nefariously linked to the "whole man" (recalling my objections to Gestalt theories), and he suffers out of all reasonable proportion. That Byron and Pushkin "violated" literally thousands of damsels, somehow did not diminish their stature as poets; but when the venerable Justice Douglas took a young wife to fit his young mind and body, he won the lasting disapproval of the sturdy middle class. Likewise in the financial world, one major blunder spells the end of a burgeoning career, whether the disaster was a function of poor business sense or some totally unrelated iniquity. In order to make innovation the norm, the individual's protection against negative labelling would have to be assured so that he would not have to consider his "good name" when taking innovative steps in

whatever direction. What is needed is a move to a "segmented" world, a series of disparate, mutually irrelevant, noncontiguous roles-situations, the behavior within any one area not threatening the individual's status in another.

It is a common assumption among many writers that humans "by their nature" seek the familiar, predictable and therefore unthreatening, that undue amounts of fresh stimuli can precipitate near "traumatic" reactions. This again makes the mistake of turning historical actuality, the chronicled behavior of man, into a non sequitur, that man is "essentially" fearful of change. My reading of history, especially in this century, shows just the opposite: men working feverishly to overstep, widen and modify institutional, structural constraints upon their lives in the interest of maximizing uncommon opportunities. What history does show is that men have subjected themselves and each other to the ordeal of unending monotony, mind-numbing repetition and generally senseless rounds of highly predictable, unexciting behaviors. However, in allowing the conservative position its due, I am in something of a quandry regarding the limits - defined by the nature of the animal, by our neurological and physiological condition - beyond which innovational energies will bring more sorrow than joy. And the reason this question escapes answer for the time being is that any good data on the subject is not to be had. Societies have done such a marvelous job of incarcerating their members into unthinking boredom that the data on the effects of tedium is relatively

good: people don't like it for long. Although there may well be some naturally defined limitations to radical behavior, until a culture of innovators becomes a reality, there will be no definitive answer to the problem except for supposition based for the most part on the way noninnovating man thinks he might react to a hyperfluid life-style. And as many "social science prophets" have pointed out, thinking about tomorrow with only slightly modified mental constructs of today is folkish and comforting, but in all likelihood, utterly unreliable. (Another possibility of course is to rearrange the physiological capabilities of men to suit a more demanding existence, but that transcends somewhat the scope of this thesis.)

Another problem is that of resources. This entire exposition uses as an a priori an unremitting affluence for more and more people, along with other necessities for innovating performances. The current misuse of the ecology, if continued, as described by the more pessimistic (realistic?) writers, will not only disallow wide-spread affluence in the future, but will also deplete the earth's supplies of necessary ingredients to the point that subsistence will be in question. The more scientific prophets foresee in technological development a certain cure for the problem. Everything I have read on the subject seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of the pessimists, especially when added to the ecological difficulties is the specter of phenomenal population growth in those areas most dependent for survival on

post-modern donors. As one critic was overheard to say, "My vote for the most evil man in the world today goes to the Pope", obviously because of his medieval appreciation of the intimately connected problem, population growth. Again, because of the inconclusive data - and its manipulation, either by the Club of Rome or Standard Oil - I do not know where to stand, except to say that without the creation of an anti-consumer ethic (as outlined above) growing concomitantly with scientific advances, the power of this thesis to predict change in the future will diminish at the same rate that affluence declines. The theory is predicated upon the possibility of tremendous human freedom growing out of advanced technology; obviously, without the latter we are back to neo-modern or premodern times, and the days of milk and honey are no more (Galbraith notwithstanding).

As I mentioned before, were the culture of innovators and social actors to exist (for more than one generation), then provision must be made for the handling of children. Their nurturing, according to authorities like Piaget, Sullivan and Erikson, is an extremely sensitive "skill" which most "mothering ones" develop only partially. That our current mode of childbearing is less than might be desired requires little debate. We expect a young, often immature and uneducated female with almost no qualifications, either formally or informally garnered, to act as child psychologist, nutritionist, educator, to the degree necessary, sociologist, to mention only the most elevated of her responsibilities.

When her relationship with the offspring begins to interfere substantially with the antecedent "romantic" involvement with the progenitor, the situation for the child becomes entirely dysfunctional to its development. Much more informative and terrifying in its implications than Spock is Sullivan's treatment of the child in the very earliest stages, the focus being on the relationship between its consciousness of well-being and not-well-being as a function of the mothering one's behavior, overt or covert. Many writers since Sullivan have found empirical validation for his hunches that tension in the child is quickly converted to anxiety of varying degrees if the mothering one does not behave in ways which could curtail or alleviate somewhat the initial tension. While a certain amount of physiological tension is normal and necessary in the young human, the amount sustained by the infant is very often excessive resulting in long-term emotional problems. New developments in transactional analysis owe a lot to Sullivan, but in their undisguised optimism over the rapidly changeable self-concepts of adults, they have closed the barn door many years after the horse's departure. This is not to say that later resocialization cannot be of extreme use (of course, it happens every day and is not regarded as noteworthy), but my concern is that whatever methods or agencies are devised to handle the early socialization of children which the parents wish not to bother with, have to be very sound. The reports of Bettelheim and others on the kibbutz are not encouraging. Apparently,

placidity and complacency mark the kibbutz "product", and there would be no sense whatever in constructing an excitingly innovational social structure, only to people it with persons unable to use it, or undesirous of anything but the ordinary.

I do not want this reservation to be construed as an addendum to all sorts of conservative arguments about the efficacy of severe, tension-filled upbringing. In more cases than not, one who is brought up by excessively parent-centered adults, generates an I'm-not-OK that distorts and destroys most of what is good in life ad infinitum. (Our president's public image is such a "person".) But there must be considered the other end of the continuum: just how much tension is sufficient to produce a rebellious, innovative individual. And if determined, could this degree of attention and restriction be administered to the millions of progeny which will fall to agencies in the wake of the final destruction of the traditional family. Obviously, the home as now understood does a first rate job of almost nothing, but it does a barely sufficient job of a lot. One way or another, substitutes must be found so that those social actors who do not care for parental shackles may feel personally at ease in transferring their children to professionally-run agencies. Of course, I am not suggesting an enforced abduction of children from the parents by the state or any such related plan. But apparent in my own generation of college-educated innovators is a marked distaste for "doing the family thing" as it was done for, to and (somewhat) by them. Whether they

are, as their parents hint, egotistic and self-centered to the point of being unable to care for children, or if they have assessed the problem of childrearing, material and emotional, and found the entire 20-year experience not to their liking, is beside the point. The fact is that right now many would-be parents won't be, because of an enormously complex, demanding, and anxiety-producing package, promulgated incessantly by the culture as the ultimate good which they can imagine to be nothing but trouble. If the role of parent could be redefined towards a looser model - that is being parent, and also freedom-seeking adult - the first step of which liberation would involve a restructuring of property needs and relationships, then perhaps this generation would not religiously eschew parenthood. It is sadly ironic that this generation of students is by far the best informed in so many ways, childrearing included, and it is the most reluctant in history to discover whether there is any congruence between theory and practice. Moreover it is of small comfort to know that recently the U.S., following Japan, attained zero-growth in population while premodern societies reproduce as if there were no tomorrow.

The final question as to the relationship between population, affluence and innovation on a cultural basis comes to this: just how many bodies can the world sustain in a post-modern cultural condition? That becomes a function of improved technology, deconsumerized values and less children. But those variables may succumb to the detestable nationalism

which still appeals to some of the less modern political minds of the era. Yet it would seem that a finite "n" would be determinable and my guess is that world population will have to stabilize at a smaller figure than now obtains if culture-wide innovational opportunities are to be extended to the international realm. That could be done humanely and otherwise, and if history is any guide, the latter course would almost certainly be followed if an optimum world population were deemed internationally desirable by the controlling elites.

Moving now from the macro to the micro-cosmic level, I see in the theory the easy possibility of misinterpretation as far as "ultimate" human values are concerned. Recently Raymond Aron studied Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason with extreme care - not of the disciple but of the critic - and found that if Sartre's doctrine were adhered to strictly and without regard for the writer's larger intentions (domain assumptions), then Stalinist terrorism could be defended by it (115). If the spirit of the current theory is misinterpreted, or assumed to be other than it is, the theory can be construed as a defence of hedonistic epicureanism and little more. Although a concern for maximum pleasure from life is central to the theory, there is as important to it the assumption that cultural innovation will provide loosely-structured opportunities for learning; that this learning should sometimes prove displeasing for all concerned is an accepted part of the package. What should not be thought

however, is that the theory is so utterly atomistic in intention that "significant others" and less important people are to be utilized in a radical instrumentalism by the innovator, and "discarded when empty". Although some of this is only wise - and much practiced now - this would not be the hallmark of the culture. Rather, instead of forced, fraudulent "duty" binding people together long after they would prefer separation, the glue of the culture would be composed of mutual interest and affection stemming from a variety of sources, perhaps in the very dissimilarity of backgrounds, personalities and aspirations. Put anecdotally, the uneasiness the professor feels when in the elevator with the bemused and destroyed middle-aged janitor, that the white fraternity boy feels when in the forced or unexpected company of an alluring black girl, and so on, would dissolve into a generalized and refreshing curiosity. There may be too much of Pollyanna in this vision, but given the status quo vis a vis interpersonal "communication" - if it can be even be called that - some positive hyperbole will not harm.

As to the underlying values of the innovator: he would regale in the diversity of culture and the inevitable relativism which grows from such knowledge; he would, to put it very briefly, be adamant and absolutistic in only one sense - in his strictest avoidance of narrow and life-diminishing definitions of what is "suitable for consumption" and otherwise "fitting and proper" in the social world. Lest visions of the Marquis de Sade immediately arise, it is also

assumed that the innovator during socialization would somehow come to embrace the standard liberal definition of freedom for all: that one's action does not destroy the possibility that another may be able to behave in a chosen manner, given the limitations of resources. (The ability of societies to inculcate into their young "charges" practically anything they want is well documented. Thus the specter of "Clockwork Orange" morality is less than worthy of consideration.) However the role of judge ideally conceived does not consider the possibility of graft, and likewise those who so wish could easily bastardize the preferred situation of mutual respect and the kind usage of people. Yet the joy of deceit when taken out of its typically financial setting would become another historically defunct behavior pattern, much less relevant within post-modern culture.

I am all too aware that this vagueness lends itself to misunderstanding, but for me to posit a series of absolute "goods", and by implication, their opposites, would be to say more about the future than I know. I think the theory can explain a great deal of future social change, but I am aware that our current cynosures do not in most instances satisfy the qualifications of the innovator. In spite of his enormous contribution to sociology, Mannheim has been repeatedly attacked because of his use of Alfred Weber's unfortunate phrase, "the socially unattached intelligentsia", more often expressed as "free-floating elite". His critics attach to his thinking the same fallacies common to all utopians from

Plato to Harrington: the belief that some men will scrupulously adhere to the "good" and remain mentally and emotionally incapable of abusing their ruling authority. The conservatives are right in laughing at this position, since historically, such abuse has been the rule. But in as much as my presentation is "beyond Marx", concerning itself with post-scarcity existence and the relative paradise which becomes possible (when compared to the scenario Marx described), many of the motives for past abuses are no more. Mannheim was in many things ahead of his time and perhaps his desire to invest with tremendous power a select group of intellectuals was more than his period could take; but today it is obvious that most of the best minds in the culture rigorously avoid public office (Kissinger notwithstanding). They would far rather spend their life in personally meaningful activities and leave the crass tedium of governing to others. Times have changed*, and the fears of men gone wild with power are as anachronistic in some areas of the world as a Nazi flag. As outlined in the historical chapter, the opportunity for strong-men and tyranny

*I was extremely gratified to find Barrington Moore (in his latest work, Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery...) supporting several of my central contentions connected with the realization that "the times have changed", and the related impact on modes of social change. More elaborate treatment of his book (in some ways incompatible with my views) was not possible due to practical limitations. However, concerning the preeminence of individual vs. collective change in the future, see pp. 146, 178-9, 189. Regarding the limitations of traditional revolution and its likelihood in this country, see pp. 168-174.

came at an earlier stage of civilization, the move from feudal to modern social organization. A Hitler arising in the United States or Germany at this time - at least in anything like the method used by the Fuehrer - is out of the question, for the same kinds of reasons that social movements no longer work.

My point then is this: in times when there was much to be gained (in terms of personal enrichment of life) from amoral and abusive behavior, of course that type of interaction prevailed. But the post-modern situation makes exploitation of other people much less profitable and in many instances extremely costly, so that the need for a strict code of "goods" and "bads" is not as necessary to the operation of an innovating populace. However, the most basic "commandments" would still be matters for socialization of course, not to kill, steal, willfully harm, and so on. But the nature of situational ethics is so much tied to particular sets of circumstances and particular groups of social actors that immutable statements about the morals of the future make little sense. Any such attempt is another example of projecting today's understanding of social reality into a future which will be more unlike the present than like it. That there will be personal and social disorganization because of overly ambitious or otherwise unrealistic attempts at social innovation seems assured, but the damage inflicted will not be of the sort traditionally imposed upon people by others more powerful than they. It will be the pain of

inaccuracy and not of "evil".

This leads to my final consideration of the theory as problem. I have dispensed with any extended comment about the morality of innovation to this point for reasons already stated. But there is in fact a basic a priori which would I think dominate a culture of change, experimentation and rationality: that is, a quest for the accurate, for what is true as far as we can know it. We now know that the Biblical explanation of the earth's development is untrue; we also know that the monogamous relationship is not "natural, good and true" any more or less than polyandrous or polygynous kinship arrangements. We know a great many more things to be either in accord with or not in accord with empirically understandable reality, physical and/or social. But to date most of our major institutions remain in their original state, that is built around and for the sake of quasi-mythological testaments of faith which have no more connection with what is real than did the Biblical explanations of physical phenomena. The sloppiness of primitive social organization is no longer feasible or sensible in a world too fast and complicated for positively sanctioned incompetence to be protected. We know that racial prejudice and the attendant authoritarian personality are based on inaccurate appraisals of reality, so moves have slowly been made in the direction of its eradication. The same type of institutional house-cleaning is now consistently in evidence throughout the culture for a myriad of reasons, all the way from simple

sentiment for the traditional to the iron-hand of financial interests maintaining an irrational social order to maximize profits. But as subsistence becomes less and less an issue, then the innovator is left with considerable resources in both time and money, and his targets for institutional change will probably focus on those areas of life which can be most personally constricting and irritating: kinship, the supernatural, education, recreation and to some degree the aesthetic. The economic, governmental and stratificational systems are the most firmly protected by social control devices and therefore least subject to outright personal modification, although they undergo change yearly as more and more people seek alternative positions in relation to these hierarchies. Change as chronicled by historical and sociological writers has usually depicted as interesting and significant only those manifestations which occurred in the last three mentioned institutions. But, again, while this was a defensible scholarly position at one time, such limited foci are insufficient for an adequate understanding of post-modern change. The cultural revolution of the 1960's had and will continue to have long-term effects on all institutions although its most dramatic successes came in the educational, kinship and recreational. The Today's Army campaign, along with other major alterations of the status quo, can be interpreted as a product of the liberating climate of the 60's and the adverse effects upon the traditional military. Whether a redistribution of goods took place or a radical rearrangement of power relations for the most part

remains to be seen. But to limit to these criteria an assessment of the cultural revolution and the part of the innovators within it is to miss the point. There was a great deal more going throughout that decade of turmoil than analysis of the vulgar Marxist variety is capable of analyzing.

Whether men in society will be able to handle accuracy and rationality in their lives, or rather to what degree they will be able to include more of it, is a question I am not prepared to answer.* But the fact that more realistic and voluntaristic attitudes are producing an increasingly rational social order means that in the future the joys and sorrows of mythology will give way to more calculated innovation. Values will move in the direction of empirically established truth (the rapid change in kinship today reflect increasing awareness of the failure of the standard models), and "regularized" innovation throughout the culture will as much become the norm then as emotionalistic conformity is today.

*My doctoral dissertation will deal with that issue.

APPENDIX

This addition to the text is offered as a response to Professor Kerner's reservations about the thesis. The form of an appendix is used for purely technical reasons so that typing could be carried on in the main body while these answers to Prof. Kerner were formulated. Time was of the essence.

The first objection has to do with lines on page 27, specifically, "it has begun in some minor ways to correlate with reality", referring to Parsons' system theory and modern society. Dr. Kerner rightly observes that this remark contradicts one made earlier to the effect that "the nature of change is itself changing", thus leading me into a hypothetically confusing position. The explanation is rather straightforward: the phrase "in some minor ways" refers not to the culture broadly, but more specifically to the inordinate growth of complex organization in the West, culminating in the production of "organization and conglomerate men", and the well-documented conformity rampant in some of the more affluent sectors of the society. Thus in contrast to the socio-economic chaos of the thirties, when Parsons began dreaming up the system theory under L.J. Henderson, the post-war era (even given the putatively disruptive late 60's) is better approximated systemically, again, "in some minor