

**PUBLIC STATEMENTS**

**OF**

**ROBERT M. GATES**

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

2009



**Historical Office**  
**Office of the Secretary of Defense**



Some of the material appearing in this compilation has been transcribed by other organizations and may contain errors.

## PREFACE

The Public Statements of the Secretary of Defense have been published continuously by the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense since 1947, beginning with those of Secretary James Forrestal. The Public Statements of Secretary Gates for 2009 is a compilation of the Secretary's most significant statements, including those authored and delivered by him, as well as those broadcast or authorized for release. The compilation is comprehensive in publishing together in one place the Secretary's formal speeches, official transcripts, and authorized statements. This compilation also includes select journal articles, op-ed pieces, impromptu press statements, and additional unofficial statements authored or articulated by the Secretary. The editor included these materials for their import and because they represent issues discussed extensively throughout the year.

The collection includes both full reports and executive summaries to which the Secretary has penned his signature or which were released under his authority. This material is public in nature and important for understanding the issues and policies that were critical during his tenure. The Department of Defense each year releases a large number of reports, wide-ranging in subject. Some are mandated by Congress and might be recurring or uniquely topical; others are the result of a particular defense requirement and are authorized by the Secretary. In a few instances, the editor included photos to document events not mentioned in official Department of Defense news releases, and to enhance the reader's experience. Routine pronouncements such as personnel appointments and reassignments, recruitment figures, and troop authorizations and the like are not included.

Erin R. Mahan  
Chief Historian  
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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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## A Balanced Strategy

Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age

January/February 2009

Robert M. Gates

*ROBERT M. GATES is U.S. Secretary of Defense.*

THE DEFINING principle of the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy is balance. The United States cannot expect to eliminate national security risks through higher defense budgets, to do everything and buy everything. The Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs.

The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such

counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.

### UNCONVENTIONAL THINKING

THE UNITED STATES' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. To be blunt, to fail-or to be seen to fail-in either Iraq or Afghanistan would be a disastrous blow to U.S. credibility, both among friends and allies and among potential adversaries.

In Iraq, the number of U.S. combat units there will decline over time-as it was going to do no matter who was elected president in November. Still, there will continue to be some kind of U.S. advisory and counterterrorism effort in Iraq for years to come.

In Afghanistan, as President George W. Bush announced last September, U.S. troop levels are rising, with the likelihood of more increases in the year ahead. Given its terrain, poverty, neighborhood, and tragic history, Afghanistan in many ways poses an even more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq-one that, despite a large international effort, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time.

It would be irresponsible not to think about and prepare for the future, and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that. But we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.

Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support-including in the Pentagon-for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign-a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan-that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire-anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales.

Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches-primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces- to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary

within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos and criminality. The most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. 16

homeland-for example, that of a U.S. city being poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack-are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.

The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. The United States does not have the luxury of opting out because these scenarios do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.

Furthermore, even the biggest of wars will require "small wars" capabilities. Ever since General Winfield Scott led his army into Mexico in the 1840s, nearly every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a longer subsequent military presence to maintain stability. Whether in the midst of or in the aftermath of any major conflict, the requirement for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and prop up local governments and public services will not go away.

The military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have responded unevenly and have grown increasingly out of balance.

The problem is not will; it is capacity. In many ways, the country's national security capabilities are still coping with the consequences of the 1990s, when, with the complicity of both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, key instruments of U.S. power abroad were reduced or allowed to wither on the bureaucratic vine. The State Department froze the hiring of new Foreign Service officers.

The U.S. Agency for International Development dropped from a high of having 15,000 permanent staff members during the Vietnam War to having less than 3,000 today. And then there was the U.S. Information Agency, whose directors once included the likes of Edward R. Murrow. It was split into pieces and folded into a corner of the State Department. Since 9/11, and through the efforts first of Secretary of State Colin Powell and now of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the State Department has made a comeback. Foreign Service officers are being hired again, and foreign affairs spending has about doubled since President Bush took office.

Yet even with a better-funded State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, future military commanders will not be able to rid themselves of the tasks of maintaining security and stability. To truly achieve victory as Clausewitz defined it-to attain a political objective-the United States needs a military whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.

Given these realities, the military has made some impressive strides in recent years. Special operations have received steep increases in funding and personnel. The air force has created a new air advisory program and a new career track for unmanned aerial operations. The navy has set up a new expeditionary combat command and brought back its riverine units. New counterinsurgency and army operations manuals, plus a new maritime strategy, have incorporated the lessons of recent years in service doctrine. "Train and equip" programs allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner nations. And various initiatives are under way that will better integrate and coordinate U.S. military efforts with civilian agencies as well as engage the expertise of the private sector, including nongovernmental organizations and academia.

#### CONVENTIONAL THREATS IN PERSPECTIVE

Even as its military hones and institutionalizes new and unconventional skills, the United States still has to contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries. The images of Russian tanks rolling into Georgia last August were a reminder that nation-states and their militaries do still matter. Both Russia and China have increased their defense spending and modernization programs to include air defense and fighter



capabilities that in some cases approach the United States' own. In addition, there is the 17 potentially toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea has built several bombs, and Iran seeks to join the nuclear club.

What all these potential adversaries-from terrorist cells to rogue nations to rising powers-have in common is that they have learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on conventional military terms. The United States cannot take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in the programs, platforms, and personnel that will ensure that dominance's persistence.

But it is also important to keep some perspective. As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined-and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners. Russian tanks and artillery may have crushed Georgia's tiny military. But before the United States begins rearming for another Cold War, it must remember that what is driving Russia is a desire to exorcise past humiliation and dominate its "near abroad"-not an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe. As someone who used to prepare estimates of Soviet military strength for several presidents, I can say that Russia's conventional military, although vastly improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in check.

All told, the 2008 National Defense Strategy concludes that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. It is true that the United States would be hard-pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I have asked before, where on earth would we do that? U.S. air and sea forces have ample untapped striking power should the need arise to deter or punish aggression-whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait. So although current strategy knowingly assumes some additional risk in this area, that risk is a prudent and manageable one.

Other nations may be unwilling to challenge the United States fighter to fighter, ship to ship, tank to tank. But they are developing the disruptive means to blunt the impact of U.S. power, narrow the United States' military options, and deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action.

In the case of China, Beijing's investments in cyberwarfare, antisatellite warfare, anti-aircraft and antiship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten the United States' primary means to project its power and help its allies in the Pacific: bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. This will put a premium on the United States' ability to strike from over the horizon and employ missile defenses and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems, such as the next-generation bomber.

And even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, as long as other nations possess the bomb and the means to deliver it, the United States must maintain a credible strategic deterrent. Toward this end, the Department of Defense and the air force have taken firm steps to return excellence and accountability to nuclear stewardship. Congress needs to do its part by funding the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program-for safety, for security, and for a more reliable deterrent.

When thinking about the range of threats, it is common to divide the "high end" from the "low end," the conventional from the irregular, armored divisions on one side, guerrillas toting AK-47s on the other. In reality, as the political scientist Colin Gray has noted, the categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy boxes. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction-from the sophisticated to the simple-being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.

Russia's relatively crude-although brutally effective-conventional offensive in Georgia was augmented with a sophisticated cyberattack and a well-coordinated propaganda campaign. The United States saw a different combination of tools during the invasion of Iraq, when Saddam Hussein dispatched his swarming Fedayeen paramilitary fighters along with the T-72 tanks of the Republican Guard.

Conversely, militias, insurgent groups, other nonstate actors, and developing- world militaries are increasingly acquiring more technology, lethality, and sophistication-as illustrated by the losses and propaganda victory that Hezbollah was able to inflict on Israel in 2006. Hezbollah's restocked arsenal of rockets and missiles now dwarfs the inventory of many nation-states.

Furthermore, Chinese and Russian arms sales are putting advanced capabilities, both offensive and defensive, in the hands of more countries and groups. As the defense scholar Frank Hoffman has noted, these hybrid scenarios combine "the lethality of state conflict with the financial and protracted fervor of irregular warfare," what another defense scholar, Michael Evans, has described as "wars ... in which Microsoft coexists with machetes and stealth technology is met by suicide bombers."

Just as one can expect a blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so, too, should the United States seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities it has-the types of units fielded, the weapons bought, the training done.

When it comes to procurement, for the better part of five decades, the trend has gone toward lower numbers as technology gains have made each system more capable. In recent years, these platforms have grown ever more baroque, have become ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever-dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is perhaps reaching a point of diminishing returns. A given ship or aircraft, no matter how capable or well equipped, can be in only one place at one time.

For decades, meanwhile, the prevailing view has been that weapons and units designed for the so-called high end could also be used for the low end. And to some extent that has been true: Strategic bombers designed to obliterate cities have been used as close air support for riflemen on horseback. M-1 tanks originally designed to plug the Fulda Gap during a Soviet attack on Western Europe routed Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah and Najaf. Billion-dollar ships are employed to track pirates and deliver humanitarian aid. And the U.S. Army is spinning out parts of the Future Combat Systems program, as they move from the drawing board to reality, so that they can be available and usable for troops in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Nevertheless, given the types of situations the United States is likely to face-and given, for example, the struggles to field up-armored Humvees, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (mraps), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) programs in Iraq-the time has come to consider whether the specialized, often relatively lowtech equipment well suited for stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed. It is time to think hard about how to institutionalize the procurement of such capabilities and get them fielded quickly. Why was it necessary to go outside the normal bureaucratic process to develop technologies to counter improvised explosive devices, to build mraps, and to quickly expand the United States' isr capability? In short, why was it necessary to bypass existing institutions and procedures to get the capabilities needed to protect U.S. troops and fight ongoing wars?

The Department of Defense's conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy.

The Defense Department has to consider whether in situations in which the United States has total air dominance, it makes sense to employ lower-cost, lower-tech aircraft that can be employed in large quantities and used by U.S.

partners. This is already happening now in the field with Task Force ODIN in Iraq, which has mated advanced sensors with turboprop aircraft to produce a massive increase in the amount of surveillance and reconnaissance coverage. The issue then becomes how to build this kind of innovative thinking and flexibility into the rigid procurement processes at home. The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drive the procurement, rather than the other way around.

#### SUSTAINING THE INSTITUTION

THE ABILITY to fight and adapt to a diverse range of conflicts, sometimes simultaneously, fits squarely within the long history and the finest traditions of the American practice of arms. In the Revolutionary War, tight formations drilled by Baron Friedrich von Steuben fought redcoats in the North while guerrillas led by Francis Marion harassed them in the South. During the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps conducted what would now be called stability operations in the Caribbean, wrote the Small Wars Manual, and at the same time developed the amphibious landing techniques that would help liberate Europe and the Pacific in the following decade. And consider General John "Blackjack"

Pershing: before commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in World War I, Pershing led a platoon of Sioux scouts, rode with buffalo soldiers up San Juan Hill, won the respect of the Moro in the Philippines, and chased Pancho Villa in Mexico.

In Iraq, an army that was basically a smaller version of the United States' Cold War force over time became an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that transition came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. There have to be institutional changes so that the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.

One of the enduring issues the military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops—something still not considered a career-enhancing path for the best and brightest officers. Another is whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough to dissuade or co-opt them—or, more significant, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.

As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations. I have done so not because I fail to appreciate the importance of maintaining the United States' current advantage in conventional war fighting but rather because conventional and strategic force modernization programs are already strongly supported in the services, in Congress, and by the defense industry. The base budget for fiscal year 2009, for example, contains more than \$180 billion for procurement, research, and development, the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems.

Apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, however, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts.

Think of where U.S. forces have been sent and have been engaged over the last 40-plus years: Vietnam, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and more. In fact, the first Gulf War stands alone in over two generations of constant military engagement as a more or less traditional conventional conflict from beginning to end. As General Charles Krulak, then the Marine Corps commandant, predicted a decade ago, instead of the beloved "Son of Desert Storm," Western militaries are confronted with the unwanted "Stepchild of Chechnya."

There is no doubt in my mind that conventional modernization programs will continue to have, and deserve, strong institutional and congressional support. I just want to make sure that the capabilities needed for the complex conflicts the United States is actually in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also have strong and sustained institutional support over the long term. And I want to see a defense establishment that can make and implement decisions quickly in support of those on the battlefield.

In the end, the military capabilities needed cannot be separated from the cultural traits and the reward structure of the institutions the United States has: the signals sent by what gets funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in the academies and staff colleges, and how personnel are trained.

Thirty-six years ago, my old CIA colleague Robert Komer, who led the pacification campaign in Vietnam, published his classic study of organizational behavior, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*. Looking at the performance of the U.S. national security apparatus during the conflict in Vietnam, both military and civilian, he identified a number of tendencies that prevented institutions from adapting long after problems had been identified and solutions proposed: a reluctance to change preferred ways of functioning, the attempt to run a war with a peacetime management structure and peacetime practices, a belief that the current set of problems either was an aberration or would soon be over, and the tendency for problems that did not fit organizations' inherited structures and preferences to fall through the cracks.

I mention this study not to relitigate that war or slight the enormous strides the institutional military has made in recent years but simply as a reminder that these tendencies are always present in any large, hierarchical organization and that everyone must consistently strive to overcome them.

I have learned many things in my 42 years of service in the national security arena. Two of the most important are an appreciation of limits and a sense of humility. The United States is the strongest and greatest nation on earth, but there are still limits on what it can do. The power and global reach of its military have been an indispensable contributor to world peace and must remain so. But not every outrage, every act of aggression, or every crisis can or should elicit a U.S. military response.

We should be modest about what military force can accomplish and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. The Taliban were dispatched within three months; Saddam's regime was toppled in three weeks. A button can be pushed in Nevada, and seconds later a pickup truck will explode in Mosul. A bomb dropped from the sky can destroy a targeted house while leaving the one next to it intact.

But no one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. War is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain, and it is important to be skeptical of systems analyses, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. We should look askance at idealistic, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to transcend the immutable principles and ugly realities of war,

that imagine it is possible to cow, shock, or awe an enemy into submission, instead of tracking enemies down hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block. As General William Tecumseh Sherman said, "Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster." 21

Repeatedly over the last century, Americans averted their eyes in the belief that events in remote places around the world need not engage the United States. How could the assassination of an Austrian archduke in the unknown Bosnia and Herzegovina affect Americans, or the annexation of a little patch of ground called Sudetenland, or a French defeat in a place called Dien Bien Phu, or the return of an obscure cleric to Tehran, or the radicalization of a Saudi construction tycoon's son?

In world affairs, "what seems to work best," the historian Donald Kagan wrote in his book *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, "... is the possession by those states who wish to preserve the peace of the preponderant power and of the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve that purpose." I believe the United States' National Defense Strategy provides a balanced approach to meeting those responsibilities and preserving the United States' freedom, prosperity, and security in the years ahead.

[Sidebar]

Over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory.

[Sidebar]

The U.S. military's ability to kick down the door must be matched by its ability to clean up the mess afterward.

[Sidebar]

As long as other nations possess the bomb and the means to deliver it, the United States must maintain a credible deterrent.

[Sidebar]

For every heroic and resourceful innovation on the battlefield in Iraq, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon.

[Sidebar]

Not every outrage, every act of aggression, or every crisis can or should elicit a U.S. military response.

[Author Affiliation]

ROBERT M. GATES is U.S. Secretary of Defense.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### Armed Forces Farewell to the President of the United States (Arlington, VA)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Tuesday, January 06, 2009

Thank you, Admiral Mullen.

Some of you of a certain generation might remember a line from the John Wayne movie "Red River," an epic story of a thousand-mile cattle drive across Texas. At one point, one of the characters says: "There's three times in a man's life when he has the [a] right to yell at the moon: when he marries, when his children come, and when he finishes a job he had to be crazy to start." Well, before President Bush finishes this job, I'm pleased to have this chance – on behalf of the United States military – to pay tribute to our Commander in Chief and give him proper thanks.

The legacy of George W. Bush in matters of war and peace began taking form more than a year before he first took the oath of office. In the fall of 1999, then-Governor Bush gave a speech at the Citadel titled "A Period of Consequences." He observed that nearly a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military was still organized more for Cold War threats than for the challenges of a new century – what he called "an era of car bombers and plutonium merchants and cyber terrorists and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators – all the unconventional and invisible threats of new technologies and old hatreds."

On a bright Tuesday morning in September, eight months into President Bush's first term, we learned how dangerous and unpredictable this new era could be, and saw in the starkest terms how necessary was the task of transforming the American defense establishment to meet these challenges.

It was a task inspired by the vision of President Bush, propelled by the energetic advocacy of Secretary Rumsfeld, informed by the experience of our senior military leaders, and accelerated by the urgent demands of two unconventional ground wars. The result is an American military that has become more agile, lethal, and prepared to deal with the full spectrum of 21st century conflict – and, on a personal note, a force that is dramatically more deployable and expeditionary than when I last served in government 15 years ago.

Consider just a few of the historic changes:

- The Army has undergone its most significant restructuring in more than two generations, moving from a division-based to a modular brigade-based force;
- The Navy's Fleet Response Plan has nearly doubled the number of strike carrier groups that can be surged in the first weeks of a crisis;
- America's Special Forces have seen vast increases in budget, personnel, authorities – and most importantly, in capabilities – in the campaign against terrorism worldwide;
- The number of unmanned aerial vehicles has grown some 40-fold to more than 6,000, and we have seen a genuine revolution in the military's ability to fuse intelligence and operations;
- Cold War basing arrangements in Germany, Korea, and Japan have been modernized and sized to better reflect the security requirements of this century;
- New authorities and programs enable the military to build the capacity of allies and partners in cooperation with civilian agencies and organizations;
- And much, much more.

As this historic institutional shift was underway, President Bush led our military through two major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and a broader struggle against terrorist networks worldwide. He has not flinched when faced with difficult war-time decisions, including the momentous decision two years ago to send more troops into Iraq and revamp our strategy there.

Nor has the President ever hidden from the human consequences of his decisions. We have seen this in countless visits with the wounded at Walter Reed, Bethesda, and other military hospitals. And there are the meetings that he and the First Lady have held with thousands of family members of wounded and fallen troops.

The President's deep regard and affection for our service members and their families has played out in ways big and small: surprise visits to Iraq and Afghanistan to shake hands and high-five, and personal phone calls to those deployed over Thanksgiving. And even the occasional chest bump to unwary cadets.

Some might remember the story of Staff Sergeant Michael McNaughton of the Louisiana National Guard. In January 2003, he stepped on a land mine 30 miles north of Kabul and lost his right leg. President Bush visited Michael at Walter Reed and suggested they go for a run when he received his prosthetic. Months later Michael and the president jogged around the South Lawn of the White House together.

A single promise to a single soldier. A small act that reflects President Bush's commitment to care for and honor every

member of the armed forces. Mr. President, every day these volunteers execute your orders with courage and determination – facing down danger for the greater good of America. On behalf of more than two million men and women in uniform, we are deeply grateful for your leadership and service to America in a time of war.

Finally and personally, I would like to thank you for granting me the opportunity to serve as Secretary of Defense. It is true that I have been known to grouse from time to time about coming back to Washington, D.C. Yet working every day with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines has been the greatest honor of my life and I will always owe you a debt of gratitude for that. I have appreciated your steadfast confidence and support over these past two years. I wish you and Laura the very best as you begin the next phase in your lives.

Ladies and gentlemen, the President of the United States.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS AT FAREWELL TO PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH

Jan. 6, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, President George W. Bush and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen watch as the U.S. Military award the president with a shadow box of campaign streamers for the time he was commander in chief during the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to the President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates awards the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service to President George W. Bush at the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
[Download Hi-Res](#)



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates awards the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service to first lady Laura Bush at the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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
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U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stand during the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to the President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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President George W. Bush and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talk prior to the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to the President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates awards the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service to President George W. Bush at the Armed Forces Full Honor Farewell to President on Fort Myer, Va., Jan. 6, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

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## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 015-09  
January 08, 2009

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### SecDef Releases Statement on the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management

"I want to thank the review panel, led by James R. Schlesinger, for their very thorough and detailed report on the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management," said Secretary of Defense Robert Gates today. "I really appreciate the tremendous effort that went into the phase two review of the DoD nuclear mission and commend all of the task force members on the thoughtful recommendations made with respect to these complex and serious issues."

"The U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and reliable; no one should doubt our capabilities or our resolve to defend U.S. and allies' interests by deterring aggression. The report identified numerous trends, both recent and long-term, that may warrant corrective actions. The Department will continue to review the panel's recommendations while ensuring the long-term credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and sustaining allied confidence in U.S. security commitments well into the future," said Gates.

For a copy of the report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management Part II go to: <http://www.defenseink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PhaseIIReportFinal.pdf>.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: James Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense, Chair; General Michael Carns, U.S. Air Force (Retired); Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, U.S. Navy (Retired); Jacques Gansler; Franklin Miller; Christopher Williams

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January 08, 2009

### DoD Press Briefing with the Secretary's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management

BRYAN WHITMAN (deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public Affairs): Well, good morning. And let me just go ahead and do a brief introduction here.

I think that most of you were here in September for the initial work of the task force, but I'm pleased today to have with us the members of the secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management. It was in June that Secretary Gates appointed the task force to recommend improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in U.S. nuclear -- in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The task force was appointed as a subcommittee of the Defense Policy Board and chaired by Dr. James Schlesinger here.

The task force was asked by the secretary to report in two phases. The first phase was to deal with the matters related to the Department of the Air Force, and they published that report, as you will recall, last September. Today, the task force is here to discuss the second phase, which was an examination of the nuclear matters in DOD as a whole.

And today, Dr. Schlesinger has with him the other panel members. Most of them, I think, are known to all of you, but they are Dr. Jacques Gansler; retired Admiral G, as we fondly refer to him; retired General Michael Carns; Mr. Christopher Williams; and Mr. Frank Miller.

So with that, Dr. Schlesinger is going to give you an overview of their findings and then, as necessary, call on some of his subject matter experts here.

So, Dr. Schlesinger, thank you again, and thank you for -- on behalf of the department for the work that the task force did on this.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, thank you.

The task force has immensely enjoyed the work that it has done.

And we are grateful to the secretary for having appointed this task force. We expressed that gratitude to him when we presented him with the second-phase report, which I believe you have a copy of.

The secretary sent a letter of thanks to the members of the commission. I want to read only one sentence from it. "The U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and reliable. No one should doubt our capabilities or our resolve to defend U.S. and allied interests by deterring aggression."

Deterrence, as all of you know, is as old as human conflict. What the Israelis are doing at the present time in the Gaza Strip is to re-create a deterrent. Deterrence during the Cold War became identified with nuclear weapons to a large extent, perhaps an excessive extent. But deterrence is quite separate.

Nuclear deterrence is different. It is different in two respects. One is the enormous power, destructiveness, of nuclear weapons. The second is that nuclear weapons are basically created in -- in the desire to avoid the actual use of those weapons in combat. It is, therefore, a different kind of deterrent.

Conventional forces likely will be used in combat. Nuclear forces, we hope, will not have to be used. And therefore it creates a kind of divergence with respect to the capabilities that one has in one's nuclear force.

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On the one hand, there is a concept of a second-strike force, that even under attack we'll be able to destroy the designated targets on the other side. But the larger role, and the one that we feel has been neglected to some extent, within the DOD at large as well as previously, with the Air Force, is that role of deterring any use of nuclear weapons against American soil, against American interests, against America's allies. 28

And consequently, the — this larger purpose of our nuclear forces, our nuclear deterrent, has sometimes been neglected within the Department of Defense as a whole, in the same way that the Air Force came to neglect it, as recounted in the phase one report.

The services, as we discovered, have tended to understate the unique aspects of deterrence, and the principal question is to some extent that they have failed to fully recognize the psychological and political consequences of our deterrent forces. This has many illustrations, some of which you will read about when you go through the report; but most of these illustrations reflect a focus on the military aspects rather than on the psychological aspects, remembering that deterrence is in the eye of the beholder.

The strength of the American deterrent will be evaluated in Moscow, Beijing, Warsaw, Tokyo and other such places; that is, amongst potential — potential — opponents and amongst the allies whom we are committed to protect.

I remind you of what we stated in the first report: that the United States is obligated to provide a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus nations, and that number may increase. Thus, those 30 nations must retain confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If they fail to do so, some five or six of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own, and the consequence is to add to proliferation. The strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the credibility of that umbrella, is a principal barrier to proliferation.

As I mentioned earlier, some of the problems that we saw in the case of the Air Force are replicated in the DOD at large. There has been a dispersal of office and personnel. There has been a downgrading and dilution of authority. There has been no training and no teaching of the doctrine of deterrence and an absence of an understanding of the unique role that nuclear weapons must play, irrespective of how large their domain happens to be. As you know, since the Cold War, the domain of nuclear weapons has substantially shrunk, but whatever the size of that domain, others must see that the forces that we have are quite capable of carrying out their responsibilities.

We emphasize that deterrence must start from the top, that the services, indeed, have picked up clues over the years since the end of the Cold War that the interest in deterrence at the highest levels of DOD has diminished. And if deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, it is a political statement that must come from the very highest offices of the government, not only here in the DOD but from the White House, from the Department of State and the like.

We, generally speaking, found one aspect of our deterrent posture to be quite impressive, and that is the Navy. The Navy is a — SSP within the Navy is isolated and it performs its functions quite well.

Admiral Giambastiani, referred to earlier as Admiral G, may have something to say on that subject.

But we were quite satisfied, generally, with the Navy's performance. Morale is high, by contrast to some of the indications of lower morale in the Air Force in the nuclear establishment when we visited them earlier.

We make some recommendations for change. Within the OSD, we urge the establishment of an assistant secretary of Defense; within the policy shop, an assistant secretary of Defense for deterrence, who will have within him — within his authorities over other elements in the OSD.

We urge that the Nuclear Weapons Council be expanded to cover the full range of nuclear capabilities. To this point, the Nuclear Weapons Council has been focused primarily on the nuclear weapons themselves, in association with the Department of Energy, which has the responsibility for making and maintaining those weapons.

We urge that the missions assigned to STRATCOM be reviewed because STRATCOM has multiple and diverse missions, and we believe that STRATCOM is overloaded. We urge that the STRATCOM and JFCC capabilities be reviewed to see that they have adequate resources because the — I mentioned there has been some downgrading and shrinkage of the resources available in this mission. Repeat, no matter how circumscribed this mission becomes in the postwar — Cold War era, there must be adequate resources, so that nobody doubts its capabilities.

And finally, we have recommended that the Joint Staff capabilities for oversight and direction, which have eroded, be restored and placed under a general officer.

One should bear in mind that we are interested in the future. We are not just interested in what the capabilities are today. We are concerned, as we look out five, 10 years, that to the extent that we need a nuclear deterrent — and the Commission on Strategic Posture appointed by the Congress states that we will need a nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future — that there be no doubt in the minds of any observers in foreign capitals as to the strength, the credibility — indeed, the impressiveness — of the nuclear deterrent of the United States.

As we look to the future, we must look to sustain our forces. We must look in certain respects to modernize our forces. Some aspects of our nuclear forces will begin to fade from the scene about the year 2013, so we will have to have plans to sustain our forces. 29

And at that point, I'm going to turn this over for any further comments from our task force members. What have I left out?

GEN. CARNS: Mr. Secretary, you might mention the role of the Air Force has turned -- (off mike).

MR. SCHLESINGER: General Carns suggests that, as we mentioned in the study -- and we have commended both directly and indirectly the Air Force -- that the Air Force has really turned, too. They have been immensely responsive to the phase one report. They are putting the additional resources necessary into strengthening those forces. And it has established a separate command which will be focused on the Air Force's element of the nuclear mission.

MR. MILLER: You might also mention how impressed we are with the interest Secretary Gates has shown in this since he has taken office.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Franklin suggested how impressed we are with the continued interest of Secretary Gates in this problem, as reflected in his letters.

He has gone through the material, without endorsing every element of it. We have a general approval. And I think that as long as he is around, this ex-SAC officer will continue to see to it that the services are attentive to the nuclear mission.

Gentlemen, ladies?

Q Mr. Secretary, what's your assessment of the damage that's been done to international confidence in the U.S. deterrent because of the shortcomings that your report points out?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that it has created a concern and that the concern reached -- I hope, reached its peak and passed its peak at the time of the two episodes, Minot and the forward end of the Minuteman missiles going to Taiwan. It showed that we were -- that we had been less than attentive to the details of the nuclear mission.

I think that it has been undermined by -- for some extent -- by some extent with the usual talk within a democracy whether we can get rid of nuclear weapons ultimately or whether we need to have a nuclear mission at all. This is kind of perpetual. Many of you who are old enough to remember will recall the nuclear freeze. You will recall the nuclear build-down. You will recall the questioning of the deployment of Pershing Missiles to Europe. Each and every time, within our democratic framework, questions have been raised. And to a large extent, those conversations are treated by babble -- as babble in foreign countries, but sometimes if they seem to be serious enough there is an expression of concern.

I think we have had some direct expressions of concern from some of those who are under American protection. I think that, given the actions that Secretary Gates has under way, given the attitude within the Air Force, which has, on this issue, turned around entirely, that those concerns will fade, if they have not already done so.

Q Can you say in which countries the concerns have been greatest?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that there has been public expression of concern in Japan by senior officers, and that there has been what I'll call private expressions of concern.

Some of the nations in Europe, most notably, those in Eastern Europe, have -- who were eager to come under the umbrella by becoming part of NATO have, particularly in the light of activities in Georgia, had to be reassured once again. But I think that we are progressing in -- to the extent that there was a loss of confidence, that that confidence is restored.

This task force, as you may recall, was established by Secretary Gates to ensure the credibility of the continued U.S. nuclear mission.

Ma'am?

Q This is probably answered in the report, but I guess -- I don't know if you're aware, we were not provided copies of the report before the briefing, so we're kind of flying blind here.

MR. SCHLESINGER: That's just to increase your eagerness to read -- (laughter) -- subsequent to the meeting.

Q We'll let you know if that worked or not. (Laughter.) The assistant -- or the --

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm disappointed in the dedication of journalists if there is no such activity.

Q The -- your recommendation to assign a -- an assistant secretary of Defense for policy --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Assistant secretary of Defense for deterrence, who will be part of the policy shop.

Q Has that been -- has the timeline been set for when that position will be created? It's -- I'm assuming that's something Secretary Gates has approved or signed off on.

MR. SCHLESINGER: I don't think that anyone would suggest there's a timeline. There is, I think, a willingness to create an ASD position. There will -- we recommend that it be in the policy shop, but there may be turf concerns on the part of other elements of the Pentagon. And where it will ultimately rest is not dependent on the specific views of this task force.

Sir?

Q To what do you account the differences you discovered between how the Air Force and the Navy are handling their missions?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I mentioned one of them, which is a difference in morale.

The Navy mission is encapsulated. The Air Force mission was spread over the Air Force. After the dissolution of SAC in 1991, the assets of SAC were distributed throughout the Air Force.

And as a result, the bombers went off to the Mobility Command.

MR (off mike): Air Combat Command, sir.

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm sorry. Did I say the bombers?

The tankers went off to the Mobility Command. The bombers went to the Combat Command. Initially the missiles were assigned to the Air Combat Command then were shifted to Space Command, where they were renamed not missile wings but renamed space wings, which may sound unimportant to outsiders but were important to the people in it.

As a result, by and large, the people in the Air Force mission and particularly in the bomber wing of that mission did not believe that there was any seriousness taken at higher levels.

In the case of the Navy, it is encapsulated within the SSP. We point out that there is some fraying at the edges, even with the Navy, particularly with long-run personnel problems and with regard to the TLAM problem, the land attack missile, nuclear. And we expressed some concern about that.

But the central submarine mission has remained a high morale mission. They are like the Air Force people. They notice that there is less interest at the highest levels in what they are doing. And basically they do not care.

They say, we know what our mission is. We are good at -- we know that it's valuable to the country. So the fact that it's encapsulated and consequently has high morale has protected the Navy mission from some of the -- many of the ills that are associated with the Air Force.

Admiral G.

ADM. GIAMBASTIANI: Sir, the only thing I would add to that, in this question is, is if you look -- Secretary Schlesinger explained to you about the complexity and the diversity of the organizations within the Air Force.

And certainly General Carns can address that. But since the mission was spread over so many locations, it is very different than, as Secretary Schlesinger described to you, having this very tight group.

I'm a submarine officer, myself, as many of you know. And this -- these units have remained integral throughout the Cold War and through today. We did find some changing, though, of the staff levels within the Navy. And if you look at our report you'll see that we recommend that both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the submarine force have group commanders. Right now there's a single one who shares a staff -- actually, a reduced-size staff.

So as we went through the Air Force and looked at the Air Force very carefully, we looked at the Navy and said, what long-term goals? We also looked at the Strategic System Project Office, and even though it's a very well run, tight organization, we thought some additional responsibilities ought to go to them and that we want to increase the rank of the commander of that unit.

But you have to look at the report in some detail to see these organizational changes. But Secretary Schlesinger covered the main piece.

GEN. CARNS: As you're well aware, in the early '90s, the Air Force downsized considerably, reorganized and focused primarily on the conventional mission. As the secretary has pointed out, the bombers were put into the ACC, which combined Tactical Air Command and the other strategic assets. The tankers were migrated off and so were missiles. Along with that, the ISR assets were also dispersed.

With the emphasis on the conventional mission and the Drell report, which suggested we no longer have bombers on alert, the nuclear mission was sharply degraded in importance and those that were in those systems, responsible for that, felt as though it was not an important mission. Following that, of course, we have used the B-52, later the B-1 and even the B-2 in the conventional mission. And therefore, the sense was this was not an important mission.

Moreover, when the missiles were moved over to Space Command, the Space Command overwhelmed the missile responsibility in terms of people, in terms of budget, in terms of emphasis, and therefore it sort of got lost over there as well.

This decision by the chief and the secretary, which we strongly endorse, brings the three missile wings and the three nuclear-capable bomb wings into a single organization with no other responsibilities -- no ISR, no cyber, none of the other things that were in 8th Air Force and other units -- to put focus and commitment on that mission, to bring it up to strength and create a professional force once again that's focused on the nuclear mission.

We laud these moves. Of the 33 recommendations in phase one, 30 are all under way and the other three are being taken on. So we believe this has been a wonderful joint undertaking in carrying this out.

Q Could I ask a question?

MR. : (Inaudible.)

MR. MILLER: Just to keep with the theme, as you'll see in the report, this dissolution of authority and focus not only occurred within the Air Force, it occurred in this building, as well. And as we note, there are something like 40 different offices in OSD that deal with nuclear deterrence or weapons of mass destruction. And so what needs to occur, in our judgment -- and you'll see that in our recommendations -- is again the same kind of single focus that we have talked about with respect to the Air Force and which we do find in the Navy. And that extends to the Joint Staff as well. So there is a consistent theme in what we're recommending.

MR. SCHLESINGER: One other point, if I may mention, and I hope it's not redundant, but it is, I think, important. The Navy submarines are out there all the time. The mission, particularly for the Air Force bombers, has not been exercised in -- what is it -- 10 years or so? Unless you have continued exercising of these missions, they tend to seem unimportant.

We are about to have the thousandth mission of the Ohio Class submarine. We have urged that -- partly as to demonstrate the high-level attentiveness to what the Navy is doing and continues to do -- that senior figures go down to visit at King's Bay for that thousandth mission.

Sir?

Q I want to ask you both. For seven years, we've been hearing about transformation of the military under the Rumsfeld regime here, focused largely on conventional forces.

Is it a fair and accurate review -- reading of your report that that overemphasis on conventional didn't account -- it didn't take into the importance of -- didn't transform our understanding of the importance of maintaining the nuclear mission in terms of doctrine, training and funding?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that that's a fair interpretation. I think that there was a view that the nuclear mission was sizable, that, in a sense, it could take care of itself, and that the new focus should be on building up certain conventional forces that seemed to be more relevant to what we --

Q Was that a mistake, though, in retrospect, to assume that this could go on kind of by rote, without proper maintenance of doctrine and funding?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that it's always an error to assume that the esprit of military units will be sustained because they have been high-esprit units in the past, if there is as long as a decade of just relying on them to do their thing.

Sir?

Q Sir, you mentioned that STRATCOM is overloaded. I was wondering if there were any current missions of STRATCOM in particular that you identified as being best assigned to another command.

MR. SCHLESINGER: We were, I think, somewhat delicate about that. We emphasized the three missions that should stay with the command, which were nuclear -- 32

MR. (off mike): Global strike.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Global strike, yes.

MR. (off mike): And space.

MR. (off mike): And the space mission.

MR. SCHLESINGER: The space mission.

Sir?

Q In the view of the task force, how important is modernization to enhancing deterrent? And also, does the sort of weakened deterrent preclude much deeper reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal?

MR. SCHLESINGER: It certainly does not preclude them. Let me rephrase that -- or modify that.

It certainly does not preclude further reductions. Whether deeper reductions are possible is, I think, beyond the purview of this task force, but in my own personal judgment, we should be very cautious about that.

One of the things that tends to be forgotten in this period is that the Russians are sitting out there with 8,000 nuclear weapons, and that to the extent that we can reduce -- both of us can reduce weapons -- as we are urged by other members of the international community -- this must be done, in my judgment, on a bilateral basis, which means further negotiations on START and SALT. But if the Russians come down, we can come down further.

It is important for all of us to bear in mind something that the Russians repeatedly tell us: that the important issue is not numbers; the important issue is stability, and that to the extent that one focuses only on numbers and neglects the issue of stability, one could endanger not only the United States and Russia, but also international peace.

So, no, it's not precluded. I think that there is in mind the possibility of further significant reductions. I don't want to call them deep reductions -- significant reductions. That should be a result of negotiations with the Russians, who have been slower than we have to come down.

Q And on modernization?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Oh, I'm sorry. On modernization, there are two questions, or at least two questions. One is the continued refurbishment of elements of the force. If the force is allowed to decay, obviously it is not capable of doing what we would like it to do.

And particularly it will be noticed sooner or later by other nations, for whom the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent is critical.

Refurbishment refers, as you will read, to elements of the force like -- ALCM-- the TLAM-N. Some of these will disappear as capabilities, in the years ahead, unless they are refurbished.

Then there is the longer-run question: Bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs. There are plans within the Department of Defense to handle all of these. I don't really regard that either as modernization, although there may be elements of modernization.

Modernization, I think, refers to adjustments that turn -- alter the character of the force. And on that, the task force has been silent. We have been more focused upon the weakening, the dispersal of attention, in a sense, the degradation of the force, not in upward changes in the character of the force.

You may be referring to the RRW, which Secretary Gates has spoken eloquently about. I think that it is plain that the stockpile is aging and that one way or another, we are going to have to pay attention, over time, to the aging of the stockpile and whether or not we can have the same degree of confidence, in the stockpile, that we have had in the past.

To this point, the stockpile stewardship program has been remarkably successful in that it has served, as Bill Perry has observed, far beyond our wildest expectations, in terms of sustaining confidence in the stockpile. Yet there are still uncertainties. Over time, those uncertainties will grow. And we will have to deal with them.

Sir.

Q One thing about the capability review you mentioned for the JFCC and STRATCOM to sort of identify how --



MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm not sure -- I can't hear you.

Q Sorry. One of the points you mentioned earlier was the capability review for STRATCOM and JFCC --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Right.

Q -- to identify possible inadequacies in resources. Did the task force see any signs of where that may go? I know the review's not complete yet, but what are some of the preliminary thoughts on where some those inadequacies may lie in those organizations?

MR. SCHLESINGER: Admiral?

ADM. GIAMBASTIANI: There's a couple of areas here that specifically we talked about within the department. First of all, you're referring to the JCIDS process or the joint capability improvement process that takes place on a routine basis between the services, the combatant commands and the joint staff.

Many of the functions that were -- and you'll see this in the report in detail -- many of the functions that used to occur in the nuclear deterrent area, the nuclear weapons area, were eliminated, reduced in size, reduced in scope, the ranks were reduced and the focus and attention, for example, inside the joint staff and also the focus and attention, as described earlier, within OSD were proliferated amongst a large number of staffs.

And essentially what we're trying to do is recommend consolidations and a better focus and day-to-day attention. What we're looking for are staffs -- people, most importantly, and senior folks who get up every morning and worry about the nuclear deterrence mission and the nuclear weapons mission in a way that does not detract from that overall mission and attention.

For example, a question earlier on STRATCOM: It's not that STRATCOM is not a very capable combatant command; the problem is, is we've proliferated the number of missions up to nine major areas over the last number of years. And we've recommended a consolidation and a reduction and better focusing to allow the commander and his staff to conduct the kind of oversight they need. So that's the type of things we're talking about. And I'd just take a look at the report for those very detailed pieces.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Sir.

Q Dr. Schlesinger, how does your model for an assistant secretary of defense for deterrence differ from the model that General Welch's Defense Science Board task force recommended in February?

He called for the creation of an assistant secretary of Defense for the nuclear enterprise. I'm just wondering how your models differed, if you used --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Well, ours is -- ours is somewhat broader. I don't remember where General Welch assigned it. We recommended that it be a part of the policy shop. The question of nuclear deterrence is to a great extent a policy matter.

Where did Larry put his?

MR. (off mike): I do not recall, sir.

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that it was sort of generic. We are more specific where to put it.

MR. (off mike): I've actually got a -- (off mike).

MR. SCHLESINGER: And it's a broader responsibility: assistant secretary of Defense for deterrence.

MR. (off mike): The deputy is to be a person from that division.

MR. SCHLESINGER: The deputy should be somebody from the AT&L.

Sir.

Q Did your report or your research give any indication that North Korea over the last decade has become emboldened in both its long-range missile programs and its nuclear enrichment programs by a perception that the U.S. nuclear deterrent has degraded, diffused authority, no longer is seen as significant?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I don't think that Pyongyang has the exquisite vision, you know, to examine any small adjustments of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

As a general proposition, I think that Pyongyang years ago might have had a higher probability estimate of a nuclear move against North Korea, but as the decades have gone on and as we have not reacted in the way they might have anticipated to their development of nuclear capabilities, they might have been encouraged to believe that they were reasonably safe from a nuclear response. 34

Q Okay, but for a follow-up, does that carry through to today or is that -- I'm not understanding you clearly here. Do you think that's today's situation, or that was a more historic view?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that that probably is today's situation, that they have developed confidence -- perhaps misplaced confidence -- that the United States, if it were to go after their nuclear capabilities, likely would do so with conventional forces.

Q Versus nuclear forces?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm sorry, not --

Q Versus nuclear forces? That they think that the U.S. would go after their nuclear capability with conventional forces --

MR. SCHLESINGER: Right. Right.

Q -- versus U.S. nuclear forces?

MR. SCHLESINGER: That we would not use nuclear forces, right.

Q Thank you, sir.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Sir.

Q Same question. Does Iran feel the same way?

MR. SCHLESINGER: If so, it would reflect, in my personal judgment, which may be shared an undue confidence on the part of the leaders in Tehran.

Q Are you saying -- (off mike) -- weapons against Iran?

MR. SCHLESINGER: I'm saying that they would regard that as a much more likely development.

As you may recall, in the recent Democratic primaries, Mrs. Clinton observed that we can obliterate you. Mrs. Clinton will be the secretary of State. And I don't think that remark will be forgotten in Tehran, even if it has been forgotten in this country.

MR. (off mike): Remember, the point is the deterrent, not the actual use of the weapons. The weapons are used every day as a deterrent. And that was the central focus of our group.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Sir.

Q In the briefing with Dr. Gates, what recommendation or what part of your recommendation did you get the most pushback from him? What recommendations weren't as warmly embraced as the others?

For example, when you briefed us in September, I believe, Dr. Schlesinger, you said that in talking to the Air Force, you got the most pushback from them about the idea of moving all bombers, under Air Force Space Command, under your Air Force Strategic Command construct.

So along those same lines, again, where was the pushback most from Dr. Gates with your Phase II recommendations?

MR. SCHLESINGER: The secretary of Defense takes a broad overview of the department. Within the department, he has no, quote, "special interests." Within the Air Force, there is turf protection, special interests. So one might expect a higher level of pushback. So far we have gotten no pushback from the secretary.

Q So this idea of creating an assistant secretary for Deterrence; do you think that's going to happen? Or do you think it's --

MR. SCHLESINGER: I think that that is very likely to happen and that there will be a concentration of authority in that office. Moreover I think that you will find that the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council will be expanded.

And I think that the Joint Chiefs are carefully listening and that there will be -- that the Joint Staff will be more responsive on this issue and we will see a general officer put in charge.

Okay?

MR. WHITMAN: I'd like to once again thank all of you for your work. It's not often that we get quite a group of distinguished individuals like this at the lectern here and at the podium. So thank you for your work.

Secretary Gates, as you can tell, was unable to join us today. But as you pick up your report, we do have a statement from him, that I encourage you to take along, thanking the task force for their work and commenting on it.

MR. SCHLESINGER: Thank you.

MR. WHITMAN: Thank you.

MR. SCHLESINGER: And remember, careful studies of the document. (Laughter.)



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

**Commissioning Ceremony for USS George H.W. Bush (Norfolk, VA)**  
As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Norfolk, VA, Saturday, January 10, 2009

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, Governor. It is a special pleasure to be here with the Bush family, and so many distinguished military and civilian leaders, on this historic day.

There is no one more worthy of having the last Nimitz-class aircraft carrier named in his honor than our 41st President – the last of the World War II generation to serve as commander-in-chief. By now, everyone knows the story of a fledgling pilot so eager to serve his country when it was attacked, and so brave in the heat of battle. Less well known is that, as a 17-year-old, he considered joining the Royal Canadian Air Force. He thought his enlistment would be even quicker. Just think, if history had turned out differently, this event might have taken place in Halifax Harbor. And it would be a lot colder.

There is pomp and ceremony and observance of Navy tradition today, as well there should be. I'd like, however, to speak briefly about the decent and modest public servant I know – somebody with a sense of humor, about Washington and about himself. Of course, if you have a wife like Barbara Bush, his amazing partner for 64 years, you both better have a good sense of humor.

Some of you might recall that the cartoonist Garry Trudeau made quite a good living at President Bush's expense in his cartoon strip, "Doonesbury." The strip often featured 41's invisible other self – "President Skippy" – as an asterisk. One morning when the President had stepped out of the Oval Office, we had a photographer come in and take a picture of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Chief of Staff John Sununu, and me, all of us talking and gesturing vehemently at the President's empty chair. We later presented a large, framed copy of the photo to him and we inscribed it: "To President Skippy, from the gang that knows you best."

He loved it, but suddenly turned stern, jumped up out of his chair and said, "The press has to know about this." He strode into the White House briefing room without any forewarning, nearly causing a press riot. He showed the startled reporters the picture, said there was clearly a conspiracy against him inside the administration, and then attributed the whole thing to his spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater – who, didn't have a clue what was going on.

And some of you no doubt remember – and may have been recipients of – President Bush's nearly daily bestowal of an award to the American official who most obviously fell asleep in a meeting with the President of the United States. The first annual honoree was Brent Scowcroft; the second annual honoree, and for some reason the last, was the then-Secretary of Defense [Dick Cheney].

As commander-in-chief, President Bush had a courage and a toughness that impressed all those who worked for him. At the same time he was, and is, a man of feeling – especially where men and women in uniform are concerned. Early in his administration he came here to Norfolk to pay tribute to American crewmen who had perished aboard the USS Iowa in a tragic accident. As he spoke of the fallen, he appeared to rush his delivery, raising eyebrows among the reporters, who thought he was going through the motions. But those of us close to him knew something they didn't: President Bush was so moved on that day by the sacrifice of those 47 sailors, that if he had not sped to the end of his remarks, he never would have made it through them at all.

He made life-and-death decisions as President. He thought hard about our role in the world. To lead this country, the first in history to rise to global preeminence without seeking it, takes a special combination of energy and restraint, pragmatism and idealism – qualities that President Bush displayed in full when he brilliantly managed the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, and the liberation of millions of people long oppressed.

He once said that a peaceful, prosperous international order required "the leadership, the power, and yes, the conscience of the United States of America." This ship that bears his name, this ship we commission today, embodies all three. With its advanced military hardware; its sophisticated communications; and above all its skilled and dedicated crew – it will ply the oceans to the far corners of the earth as an instrument of war when necessary, but always as a symbol of American strength and credibility.

I would like to close with words spoken at the christening of this carrier by a son of today's honoree. Our current commander said then: "The men and women of the United States military represent the best of America. And they deserve the best America can give them. And the George H.W. Bush is the best America can give them."

Mr. President, we would all agree. Ladies and gentlemen, it is my honor and privilege to introduce the President of the United States, George W. Bush.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS AT COMMISSIONING FOR USS GEORGE H. W. BUSH


Jan. 10, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks with former President George H. W. Bush prior to the commissioning ceremony for the USS George H. W. Bush aircraft carrier at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va., Jan. 10, 2009.  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates addresses the audience during the commissioning ceremony for the USS George H. W. Bush aircraft carrier at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va., Jan. 10, 2009.  
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Crew members line up in preparation for the commissioning ceremony for the USS George H. W. Bush aircraft carrier at Naval Station, Norfolk, Va., Jan. 10, 2009.  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### 24th Annual Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Observance (Arlington, VA)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Pentagon Conference Center (Arlington, VA), Thursday, January 15, 2009

Thank you, Mike.

Good morning and welcome to this celebration of Doctor Martin Luther King Junior's life and legacy.

This past year, I was honored to participate in the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of racial integration in the military and federal workforce.

As I said last year: I am honored to lead an institution that, however imperfectly, helped upend prejudice before the civil-rights movement gained momentum. I would add that I am committed to building an organization that recognizes the inherent worth and dignity of all men and women.

In five days, President Obama will place his hand on the same bible that President Lincoln used for his inauguration in March 1861 – a month before the start of the war that would determine whether America would remain half-slave, and half-free. A couple of years later, when Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, thousands of black men rushed to enlist. Frederick Douglass, who recruited heavily in the north, said, "Once let the black man get upon his person the brass letters, U.S.; let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder, and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth which can deny that he has earned the right to citizenship in the United States."

About 200,000 African Americans served in the Union army and navy during the Civil War. From time to time, a movie like "Glory" receives attention, but too often their stories go untold – even when reminders of their service are close to home.

Consider Benjamin Drummond. He was born a freeman in New York and, at the age of 18, enlisted as a sailor in the Union navy. In 1863, Drummond was serving aboard the *USS Morning Light* in the Gulf of Mexico when his vessel came under attack by two Confederate "cotton clads," so-called because the hulls had cotton bale as their armor.

The Confederates battered the *Morning Light* with withering fire; one Rebel boasted that Union soldiers "fell from the masts like squirrels from a tree." Drummond was among them. After falling to the deck, he was shot in the shoulder and both legs, then taken prisoner with the rest of the crew. After seven months in captivity, Drummond miraculously escaped and made his way back to Union lines.

He reenlisted in December 1864. When his war wounds failed to heal properly, he became the first patient of any color at the Old Naval Hospital on Capitol Hill, located a stone's throw from Marine Corps Barracks – the setting for Friday evening parades that have become an elegant and moving fixture in D.C.

Drummond was discharged in 1868 and, years later, received a disability pension of \$4 a month – just over a dollar per gunshot wound. Drummond's pension was also less than half the amount normally allotted to whites. As you can see, there were issues with the disability ratings even then. He fought for an increase and eventually received a lump sum of \$210 right before his death. He was buried in a pauper's grave, at which time his wife began a long and costly process to petition for what was then called a "widow's pension."

The Drummonds' struggles for what they were due presaged – literally and figuratively – the "promissory note" to which Doctor King referred from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial nearly a century later. There, in his words, he came to "cash the check" of freedom and equality that for too long had been returned marked "insufficient funds."

As all of our citizens watch the historic events of next week, we should remember Benjamin Drummond and countless others – the men of 54th Massachusetts Regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers, the Tuskegee Airmen, and millions more – who faithfully defended this nation long before their duty and devotion had been earned or acknowledged. Who never had a chance, or even imagined it would be possible, to carry out the orders of a commander-in-chief of African descent. But who, next Tuesday, I believe, will be looking down on the front steps of the Capitol with a measure of pride and satisfaction – for themselves, and for our country.

Thank you and God bless.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen January 22, 2009

### DoD News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I have a couple of brief points I'd like to make, and then -- and then take your questions.

First, I'd just like to say that the transition here at Defense has gone very smoothly, a testament I believe to the desire and strong commitment by both the outgoing and incoming administrations to ensure continuity during a time of war. I again thank those Bush appointees who have already left, as well as those who were asked and have agreed to stay on during the transition and until their replacements are appointed or nominated. Their help has been invaluable.

I'm impressed with the caliber and credentials of the individuals recommended by the president's team for positions here in Defense, and I look forward to working with them. On that note, the president and I both urge the Senate to take up the nomination of the new deputy secretary as swiftly as possible so that we can begin addressing the myriad challenges the department faces. I also hope other senior nominees will be taken up as soon as possible, once the Senate has all the necessary paperwork.

I believe the new national security team is a strong and collegial one, and off to a fast start. We had several substantive meetings during the transition, and I would say in particular Secretary Clinton and I are committed to further strengthening the collaborative relationship between the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

Finally, a personal note. Over the holidays, I managed again to injure one of my arms, this time the left one. The injury, a torn ligament, is tractor-related, which I consider to be a step up from falling on the ice. I was trying to attach a snowplow blade to a tractor up in the Northwest during the holidays and managed to tear the biceps tendon from the bone. It's an inconvenience, and tomorrow morning I'll have surgery to repair the damage. For the brief period I am undergoing this procedure, because the new deputy is not yet on board, Deputy Secretary England will continue on and serve as acting secretary on Friday. And I expect to be back -- back at work on Saturday, though again in a sling.

With that somewhat embarrassing information out of the way, be happy to take questions.

Andrew.

Q Mr. Secretary, wonder if you could enlighten us a bit more about your discussions yesterday at the White House on Iraq. In particular, is a speedier withdrawal from Iraq more likely under this administration than it was under the last one? And is the 16-month timetable the basic plan you're working on?

SEC. GATES: I would say that yesterday's meeting was the beginning of a process of evaluating various options. There was a good give and take, a good discussion with both Ambassador Crocker and General Odierno and General Petraeus. There is some follow up in terms of additional analysis to be done, but I would say simply that we have begun a process in which a variety of options are being examined.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q I wanted to ask you about Guantanamo. We were told from the podium last week that 61 former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected of returning to the fight, and that is a pretty substantial increase we were told. So if Guantanamo closes, won't that threat only increase? And also, if 61 are returning to the fight, what does that say about your review process?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think you have to find out what the other part of the equation is, because I think at one point -- well, you have to know -- and I don't -- the total number of people who have been processed through Guantanamo over the past several years. So the number 61 is a big number compared to the 250 or thereabouts that we have now. It's not as big a number if you're talking about 700 or a thousand or however many have been -- have been through Guantanamo.

Clearly, the challenge that is -- that faces us and that I've acknowledged before is figuring out how do we close Guantanamo and



at the same time safeguard the security of the American people. And that's the challenge that we will continue to face. I believe that there are answers to those questions, but we clearly have a lot of work to do. And the executive order spells out the -- I think the work that has to be done to get there.

Q Mr. Secretary, among the executive orders signed by President Obama today is one which would -- the intent appears to be to put all national security/military/intelligence interrogation processes under the Army Field Manual. There are some in the intelligence community that will say one size doesn't fit all, that there's a gray area and there may have to be exceptions made. Given your experience at both the CIA and now at DOD, do you think that all interrogations can be conducted under the rules and regulations of the Army Field Manual?

SEC. GATES: I haven't read the latest -- I haven't read the version of the executive order that the president signed. But if that's what he said, that's what will be done.

Q But given your experience in the intelligence community, would it present problems for intelligence officials in their attempts to gain actionable intelligence in a timely manner?

SEC. GATES: I think you have to weigh the -- the costs of the more severe interrogation measures with, as the president talked about in his inaugural address, our values and the impact on our values. We know a lot more about al Qaeda now than we did in the early years of the administration, the early years after September 11th, 2001. And personally, I believe that the need for measures that go outside the Army Field Manual is dramatically less than it was several years ago. So based on my experience in both arenas, I've very comfortable with where the executive order placed this.

Q Just --

Q To clarify -- the question for both of you -- to clarify on the first question, did you specifically discuss the 16-month time frame during yesterday's meeting? Do you consider that effectively an order from the new president? And as people who have at one time or another been critical of outside or artificial deadlines, do you consider it wholly responsible?

SEC. GATES: We have, from really every since the election, been looking at several options, and obviously 16 months is one of them. We are very aware of what the president has said, and we have an obligation and responsibility to provide him with a range of options that include the one that he has spoken about.

Do you want add to that?

ADM. MULLEN: The only thing I would add is we discussed a deliberate and yet rapid process. The secretary talked about this being the beginning, and in fact, to look at a responsible drawdown, and there's still work to be done. We've worked this very hard. We've planned an awful lot of options. But there is -- I think there will need to be additional meetings and engagements to work our way through the fullness of both Iraq, Afghanistan, hear from -- hear from the Joint Chiefs, which is what the president has said he would do as well. So there's still more work to be done there, and I think a lot of that will be done in the very near future.

SEC. GATES: Barbara.

Q What should we take from the fact that the White House statement last night doesn't mention the 16-month option specifically?

SEC. GATES: I wouldn't take anything from it.

ADM. MULLEN: Yeah. I think you need -- ask the White House. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: Barbara.

Q Admiral Mullen, you've just said the words a more rapid withdrawal. So whether it's 16 or 17 or 18 months, certainly more rapid than till the end of 2011 is one of the things you're looking at.

ADM. MULLEN: I said a responsible drawdown, but a deliberate and rapid process to get to the decisions. If I didn't say that, that's what I meant to say.

Q Okay. Well, my question is -- and also for the secretary, then -- is, the notion of 16 months is certainly in the national dialogue and has been for some time. So it seems to me there's -- I don't understand. There's one of two things. Either you think 16 months is it, as you said, doable, as you've said in the past, and a doable idea -- in which case I'd like to ask, did you ever tell President Bush that you could bring troops homes faster, save -- save troops and money and time? Did you ever tell him that you could do it faster than the Bush plan called for? And if you did not, why not?

And if 16 months or whatever, a faster one, is not a good idea, are you both absolutely committed to telling President Obama that you think the risk is too high?

ADM. MULLEN: With -- with respect to at least my role with respect to President Bush's, I was operating under very clear guidance from him, followed that guidance in terms of what we reviewed and what we recommended. Actually, in the engagement with the new president and the new administration, it will be much the same, to both receive that guidance and then execute it, and would intend to do that.

As the secretary said, we've certainly heard 16 months for a long time. We've looked at options -- looked at that option and the risks that are associated that -- with that. And when the time comes to have that -- to have that full engagement with the president with respect to that -- which, as the secretary indicated, has started -- you know, I will advise him accordingly and then he'll make the decision.

Q You certainly must, at this point, have a fair idea of what your view is about a 16-month withdrawal.

ADM. MULLEN: All of us, I think, understand where we are on the possibility of various options. That's -- and that's the advice, tied to the risk that's associated with that, that -- that I'll -- I give the secretary and I'll give to the president.

Q On this --

SEC. GATES: Let me just -- let me just say, I think our obligation is to give the president a range of options and the risks associated with each of those options and -- and he will make the decision. He has said that he wants it to be a responsible drawdown. He has said that before he makes a decision he wants to talk to the military commanders and the chiefs and get their independent views. Once he has all of that, he will make the decision and we will execute it.

Q Mr. Secretary, on Guantanamo, you told us that you tried to have it closed something like a year ago and failed. The issues really haven't changed. So what's going to be different this time, particularly with regard to the two tough issues of where to send those that you'd like to transfer and what to do with those you can't put on trial but aren't ready to release?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think those are exactly some of the issues that -- that are going to be investigated, as -- as laid out by the executive order.

Those -- we have developed some options in terms of how many we think could be returned to other countries, if we could get the other countries to take them. That diplomatic initiative has not started. That will await work on -- in carrying out the executive order.

We have identified a number of possible prisons here in the United States. I've heard from members of Congress where all of those prisons are located. Their enthusiasm is limited.

(Laughter.)

The -- so I think, you know, these are just issues that we will have to work through with the new administration. And some of the legal issues, which are really outside of our purview, are the things that the Justice Department and the White House counsel and so on will -- will be working on.

Q But is there some option out there that you identified before but was rejected by the Bush administration, particularly with regard to those that you can't release and can't put on trial?

SEC. GATES: I don't think so. But I think one of the things that has come with the new president, as we have heard publicly from some of the European countries, is that they were willing to consider taking these. And we've not heard from those people before. So we may have some opportunities in terms of sending some of these detainees to other countries that did not exist before January 20th.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q Where, in your opinion, did Gitmo go wrong?

SEC. GATES: I am -- you know, I was busy running Texas A&M on September 11th, and -- well, actually, I wasn't; I was back up peacefully in the Pacific Northwest. And I haven't read the books and I haven't looked into the details of this, and I think that's a judgment that somebody else is going to have to make.

Q Well, let me ask this question, then: Was the intelligence garnered from the detainees at Gitmo worth the international condemnation?

SEC. GATES: That's a net assessment that I don't think I'm in a position to make.

Q Mr. Secretary, you started about saying you'd like the prompt approval of Bill Lynn, the deputy Defense secretary nominee. About a half an hour ago, Senator Levin sent out an e-mail saying his committee needs more information from the administration about what steps Lynn could take to recuse himself from the potential Raytheon conflicts of interest.

Could you talk a little bit about what -- what -- when you vetted him, was that a troublesome aspect, that he was while qualified on paper, coming from the number five defense contractor?

SEC. GATES: People certainly recognized -- people in the transition certainly recognized that it was an issue. And I interviewed Bill Lynn. I was very impressed with his credentials. He came with the highest recommendations of a number of people that I respect a lot. And I asked that an exception be made because I felt that he could play the role of a deputy -- of the deputy -- in a better manner than anybody else that I saw.

Q Well, one follow-up, then. What steps --

SEC. GATES: And I would just say I think that we certainly -- we certainly owe the Armed Services Committee whatever information they need to feel comfortable going forward.

Q What steps, realistically, can the department take to give not only the panel, but the American public a sense that the number two guy will be impartial about Raytheon decisions?

SEC. GATES: Fair enough.

Q You know, there's a big DDG 1000 --

SEC. GATES: And I think that -- I think that the White House Counsel's Office, presidential personnel and our own General Counsel's Office are in the process of working those arrangements out right now.

Q And you'll make them public when they're done?

SEC. GATES: I assume so.

Yeah.

Q During the campaign, President Obama said that he would, when elected, send perhaps two to three additional brigades of troops to Afghanistan. Lately, actually since the election, we've heard talk about as many as 30,000 troops -- significantly more than that -- going to Afghanistan. Have any decisions been actually made, pending this review that the president has talked about, in terms of how many American forces might go to Afghanistan this year?

SEC. GATES: No final decision has been made. Part of -- part of what the president made clear was that they intend to look at Iraq and Afghanistan holistically. And so I think part of the -- one of the things that the president will expect before making decisions is what the implications are not just for Iraq, but for Afghanistan. And I expect, as I say that, to be part of those decisions to be forthcoming pretty soon.

Do you want to add anything to that?

ADM. MULLEN: I -- I really wouldn't add a lot except to say that these are the level of forces that the commander has asked for. So again, we've looked very carefully at how to do that. There have been some recommendations that have been made up the chain of command, but no decisions yet.

And consistent with what I said before, I think a very deliberate process now, but rapid as it can be, to both recommend and have the president make this decision -- these decisions.

Q Are there detailed plans that you've already seen for what these 30,000 troops would do -- in other words, where they would be deployed specifically in terms of what provinces and cities, and what their tasks would be? Or is it just a ballpark estimate about what these --

ADM. MULLEN: No. I -- consistent with how the commanders on the ground have acted for years now is when they come forward, they come forward and have a very clear plan of what they want the forces to do. And that's certainly the case here as well.

Yeah.

Q Sir, just to follow up on what AI asked, were you ever asked by the previous administration to come up with a plan to close Gitmo, and that you started on that process and then found that you had no place to send these detainees? Or were you not asked to look at that plan? And what is your best military advice as to whether these detainees should be tried in military courts here in the U.S. or in federal courts?

SEC. GATES: First of all, I was not asked. I took that action on my own. And I am one of the least-qualified people to evaluate whether people are tried under the military commissions, Article III, or the UCMJ. I think those -- those decisions will be made, or recommendations will be made, by the Justice Department, perhaps with the input of the White House counsel for the president.

Q Mr. Secretary, on Afghanistan, as you've gone through these various reviews -- and, Mr. Chairman, this question's for you also -- have you come to a point where you've decided that it's clear that you've got to go after the drug -- narcotics trade in Afghanistan, tying those together in that way. And I have signed off on a change in the rules of engagement for our own forces that essentially say the same thing. If we have evidence that the drug labs and drug lords are supporting the Taliban, then they're fair game?

SEC. GATES: No, we clearly have to go after the drug labs and the drug lords that provide support to the Taliban and to other insurgents. And to that end, the NATO defense ministers, at our meeting in December, gave new guidance to the ISAF commander, tying those together in that way. And I have signed off on a change in the rules of engagement for our own forces that essentially say the same thing. If we have evidence that the drug labs and drug lords are supporting the Taliban, then they're fair game.

Q Is that enough, do you think, to really take them out?

SEC. GATES: Well, we'll see.

Q You said at one time that legislation would be needed to close Guantanamo. You specifically cited the asylum rights of

detainees, if they were brought to the United States, that they -- that those rules need to be changed. The executive order signed today doesn't say anything about new legislation. Do you still think that that is necessary? Or in your discussions with the transition and now the new administration, do you think that that is -- is that no longer a concern of yours?

SEC. GATES: What I heard the Justice Department saying in the last administration was that legislation would be required in certain areas. I think that the Justice Department, White House counsel and others in this administration will probably take a look at that and make their own determination on whether new legislation is needed.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary -- when the previous -- when you were looking at the previous goals for Afghanistan, the end state, I mean one of the questions as we -- as we send additional troops into the country is, what -- when do we know we've been successful? You know, what is our end state? When are we done there?

And I'm curious to know whether you see any differences between the Obama administration and the last administration in terms of, you know, what is our goal in Afghanistan? When do we know we've completed our mission there?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me make a comment and then invite the chairman to comment.

I think one of the -- one of the points where I suspect both administrations come to the same conclusion is that the goals we did have for Afghanistan are too broad and too far into the future, are too future-oriented, and that we need more concrete goals that can be achieved realistically within three to five years in terms of reestablishing control in certain areas, providing security for the population, going after al Qaeda, preventing the reestablishment of terrorism, better performance in terms of delivery of services to the people, some very concrete things.

So I think that that's -- that's a starting point. But you know, the president, I think, has referred -- I think referred last night to the need for a comprehensive assessment on Afghanistan. And what we have -- you know, I mean, we have a -- we have a NATO campaign plan. We have an RC [Regional Command] South campaign plan. We have a commander's campaign plan. We have General Petraeus's study. And we have the Afghan review that was conducted in the last administration at the White House.

So I think all of these pieces will be inputs into the -- into the review that this administration will take in terms of determining what those nearer-term goals should be and how we get to where we -- where we can achieve them.

ADM. MULLEN: I'd only say that that's clearly the message I'm getting is, what are the near-term goals going to be? And I think that will be part of this initial assessment. And then, how do we -- obviously, how do we achieve them over that time frame?

And we've talked about the military side of this. Certainly, a big part of all the reviews has been the need to make sure that we have the right civilian corps there as well, numbers of PRTs; that we have the right governance development in Afghanistan, along with the economic development; because, over time, without that, all the military troops in the world aren't going to make any difference.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q We've heard about the possibility that combat troops could be withdrawn from Iraq in 16 months, but we haven't heard anybody put a number to how many troops we're talking about. Could you talk about that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that's one of the decisions that still has to be made.

Q Well, how many combat troops are in Iraq?

SEC. GATES: It'll depend on which option he chooses.

Q All right. But how do you define "combat troops"? If you are told to withdraw combat troops in 16 months, how many troops would that be?

SEC. GATES: I don't know that answer.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary, it's been clear for some time that obviously Iraq was a top priority for the Bush White House. And when you talk about Afghanistan being an economy-of-force mission, in your communications thus far with the transition team and now with the new president, is it clear to you that that's now changing, and that for the Obama White House Afghanistan will be the top priority, and not Iraq? And if so, beyond troops, what does it mean to have high-level presidential attention be focused on Afghanistan primarily, as opposed to on Iraq primarily?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, clearly, whatever time frame we end up with for drawdowns in Iraq, the administration will be paying very close attention to that. But it is clear -- I mean, the president has been quite clear that the mission is to responsibly draw down and end our active combat role, the role that we have been playing over the last number of years.

He wants to put more emphasis on Afghanistan and deal with the problems in Afghanistan there and the challenges that we face in

So that -- I think what you're -- what I'm trying to get at is what you're seeing is, is a transition from -- moving from concluding the size of role and high -- highest priority that we have given to Iraq over the last number of years and moving that priority to Afghanistan.

The admiral's spoken to this quite often.

ADM. MULLEN: I think, actually, they're very much linked; it is the responsible drawdown, that the conditions in Iraq clearly permit that now. So it becomes -- as the secretary has said many times, it becomes an issue of pace, specifically, and that -- generally availability of troops for Afghanistan are tied to that drawdown.

And we're in a time right now over the next 24 to 36 months that it's just a very delicate balance because we haven't built out the army yet, we don't have more capability, and that the focus is moving towards Afghanistan. But I -- I see it as a broad focus on both as opposed to a principled focus on one or the other.

Q Just a follow-up briefly on Iraq. There's been so much talk coming especially from the commanders in the field that the gains are fragile. At the same time, they've held. I mean, the numbers are still very good, the Iraqi government's power has grown, its army's power has grown. Are you hearing from them now more confidence that you could do a faster and more substantive drawdown, that they are more comfortable with it today than they were, say, a few months ago or six months ago, because, as you say, the conditions may now permit it?

ADM. MULLEN: I think there's -- there's growing confidence, but it's not -- it's not in leaps and bounds. I mean, this -- this really does work over time. General Odierno right now, as we all are, very focused on the elections which come up in nine days in Iraq. That's a big deal. How the provincial elections play out will, I think, be a big indicator for 2009, which is a big year. So I think there is growing confidence, but it's something that we all watch very carefully, and that General Odierno still uses the word "fragile" and "irreversible," but more durable than it was just a little while ago.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to Gitmo. As someone who did advocate for taking steps to close down Gitmo, can you just talk a little about what you think the impact will be, assuming that the mechanics get worked out over the coming months on how to do it -- what the impact will be on the overall U.S. war on terrorism? Will it help the United States achieve its goals? If so, in what way?

SEC. GATES: One of the things that -- that that I have found interesting is the very positive response around the world to the determination to close Guantanamo, to close the detention facility there. And I think that closing Guantanamo creates additional opportunities for us in terms of partnering with other countries and other countries' eagerness to work with us in dealing with violent extremists. I don't think that can be measured.

But just based on the nature of the public comments that have been made and the statements about, "Well, maybe we can help the Americans close Guantanamo by taking some of these detainees" tells me that this is going to be very positively received -- has -- is being positively received. And I think -- as I said, I think that creates opportunities for us.

Q Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, General Odierno yesterday said that if the provincial elections in Iraq go smoothly, the security gains could become irreversible. And I wanted to ask you, how important is that, the provincial elections, in terms of determining your plans forward? How much of that is a metric in terms of determining which plans you'll go forward with, the provincial elections and that post-period?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would just basically repeat what the chairman said a couple minutes ago about we are looking to the provincial elections as a really important event. They are the first elections in -- since 2005, as I recall. This is a chance for particularly the Sunnis to become engaged more in the political process, in contrast to 2005. And so I think that -- I think all of us see these provincial elections as very important.

There are two more elections in Iraq this year. There will be district and sub-district elections sometime in the summer, perhaps in June, and there'll be national elections in December. So these elections -- with each set of these elections that goes -- that takes place and works, the roots of political reconciliation and of solving problems with words and legislation instead of with guns -- the roots of that get deeper.

And so that's why I think most of us believe that 2009 is a really important year in terms of the political evolution of Iraq and away from some of the tragic problems of the not-too-distant past.

STAFF: We probably have time for about one more, sir.

Q Have there been communications with the new administration during the transition about repealing don't ask, don't tell? And can I ask both of you whether -- what your attitudes are for calls to repeal don't ask, don't tell, and whether attitudes have changed within the military and DOD about -- that will make the policy not necessary anymore?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'll say -- I'll offer a comment and then the admiral can.

Don't ask, don't tell is law. It is a political decision. And if the law changes -- changes, we will comply with the law.

ADM. MULLEN: The president has been very clear in his -- I mean, as he was coming in to take over as president that it was his intent to do this. So the intent clearly is there. There are no more specifics with respect to when or anything like that that have been addressed to me.

Q Do you sense a change in attitudes within the military, within the armed forces, that would make this viable?

ADM. MULLEN: Part of -- part of my responsibility as a senior military officer is to go out and do that kind of assessment, should -- should -- we get direction or when we get direction to do that. And I certainly look forward to the opportunity to make that assessment, and give the president my best military advice with respect to this and the impact of what a potential change could be.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 049-09  
January 22, 2009

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### Defense Department Announces Expedited Disability Evaluation System Process For Combat Wounded

The Department of Defense announced today, in collaboration with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), a process designed to expedite a service member seriously injured in combat from military to veteran status, by waiving the standard Disability Evaluation System (DES), resulting in receipt of benefits in three to four months, compared to a recovery and standard DES process that would normally take much longer.

"This new policy should allow service members and their families to focus on the essentials of recovery, reintegration, employment and independent living, with the combined assistance from DoD and VA," said Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Michael L. Dominguez. "The policy supports our belief that there must be a distinction for those who incur devastating disabilities in combat."

The expedited process applies to service members whose conditions are designated as "catastrophic" and whose injuries were incurred in the line of duty as a direct result of armed conflict. A catastrophic injury or illness is a permanent, severely disabling injury, disorder, or disease that compromises the ability to carry out the activities of daily living to such a degree that a service member or veteran requires personal or mechanical assistance to leave home or bed, or requires constant supervision to avoid physical harm to self or others.

Service members who participate in the expedited process will be rated by DoD at a combined rating of 100 percent, and the VA will identify the full range of benefits, compensation and specialty care offered by the VA. Dominguez emphasized that the new process is optional for qualifying service members.

"Service members and their families will be empowered to decide, after counseling on the options and potential concerns and benefits, the most appropriate choice for their situation," said Dominguez.

The policy provides special consideration and exception for members who retire under the expedited DES process to reenter the service with a waiver, should they subsequently request reentry to the service after recovery and rehabilitation.

The expedited policy differs from the DES pilot program, currently underway to test a new process design eliminating the duplicative and time consuming elements of the current standard disability processes at DoD and VA. Key features of the DES pilot include one medical examination and a single-sourced disability rating. To date, more than 1,000 service members have participated in the pilot during the last 14 months.

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES  
SUBMITTED STATEMENT  
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2009, 9:30 A.M.**

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of challenges facing the Department of Defense and some of my priorities for the coming year. In doing so, I am mindful that the new administration has only been in place for a few days and new or changing policies will likely arise in coming months. Later this spring, I will present President Obama's defense budget, and, at that time, will be better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the Department.

On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your very kind farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you that you are no more surprised to see me back than I am. In the months ahead, I may need to re-read some of those kind comments to remind myself of the warm atmosphere up here as I was departing. Seriously, I am humbled by President Obama's faith in me, and deeply honored to continue leading the United States military. I thank the committee for your confidence in my leadership and your enduring, steadfast support of the military.

I'd like to start by discussing our current operations before moving on to my ongoing institutional initiatives.

### **Afghanistan and Pakistan**

There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. As you know, the United States has focused more on Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas military priority. The ideology we face was incubated there when Afghanistan became a failed state, and the extremists have largely returned their attention to that region in the wake of their reversals in Iraq. As we have seen from attacks across the globe – on 9/11 and afterwards – the danger reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan or Pakistan.

There are more than forty nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and more, involved in Afghanistan – all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of many stripes, not the least of which is Al Qaeda. Coordination of these international efforts has been less than stellar, and too often the whole of these activities has added up to less than the sum of the parts – a concern I'm sure many of you share.

Based on our past experience in Afghanistan – and applicable lessons from Iraq – there are assessments underway that should provide an integrated way forward to achieve our goals.

As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas – a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban. That is why the U.S. is considering an increase in our military presence, in conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan security forces. Because of the multi-faceted nature of the fight – and because of persistent ISAF shortfalls for training teams – all combat forces, whether international or American, will have a high level of counterinsurgency training, which was not always the case.

In the coming year, I also expect to see more coherence as efforts to improve civil-military coordination gain traction – allowing us to coordinate Provincial Reconstruction Teams in a more holistic fashion, both locally and regionally. And there will be an increased focus on efforts at the district level, where the impact of both our military and rebuilding efforts will be felt more concretely by the Afghan people, who will ultimately be responsible for the future of their nation.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives: an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda, reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and in which they have a stake.

Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the porous border between them. I do believe that the Pakistani government is aware of the existential nature of the threat emanating from the FATA. The U.S. military knows firsthand how difficult it is to wage counterinsurgency with a force designed for large-scale, mechanized warfare – a fact complicated by Pakistan's recent tensions with India. Pakistan is a friend and partner, and it is necessary for us to stay engaged – and help wherever we can. I can assure you that I am watching Pakistan closely, and that we are working with State, Treasury, and all parts of the government to fashion a comprehensive approach to the challenges there.

### **Iraq after SOFA**

As you know, the Status of Forces agreement between the U.S. and Iraq went into effect on January 1<sup>st</sup>. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June, and all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest. It balances the interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq in full control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are another sign of progress.

The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed – a firm indication that American military involvement is winding down. Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though violence has remained low, there is still the potential for setbacks – and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.



As our military presence decreases over time, we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come – assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership. The stability of Iraq remains critical to the future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of both political parties have considered vital to the national security of the United States.

### **North Korea, Iran, and Proliferation**

Beyond these operations, one of the greatest dangers we continue to face is the toxic mix of rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. North Korea and Iran present uniquely vexing challenges in this regard. North Korea has produced enough plutonium for several atomic bombs; Iran is developing the capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program. North Korea's conventional capability continues to degrade as it becomes more antiquated and starved – in some cases literally – for resources and support. Both countries have ballistic missile programs of increasing range and a record of proliferation.

The regional and nuclear ambitions of Iran continue to pose enormous challenges to the U.S. Yet I believe there are non-military ways to blunt Iran's power to threaten its neighbors and sow instability throughout the Middle East. The lower price of oil deprives Iran of revenues and, in turn, makes U.N. economic sanctions bite harder. In addition, there is the growing self-sufficiency and sovereignty of Iraq, whose leaders – including Iraqi Shia – have shown they do not intend for the new, post-Saddam Iraq to become a satrapy of its neighbor to the east. This situation provides new opportunities for diplomatic and economic pressure to be more effective than in the past.

On North Korea, the Six-Party Talks have been critical in producing some forward momentum – especially with respect to North Korea's plutonium production – although I don't think anyone can claim to be completely satisfied with the results so far. These talks do offer a way to curtail and hopefully eliminate its capacity to produce more plutonium or to enrich uranium, and reduce the likelihood of proliferation. Our goal remains denuclearization, but it is still to be seen whether North Korea is willing to give up its nuclear ambitions entirely.

### **Russia and China**

Even as the Department of Defense improves America's ability to meet unconventional threats, the United States must still contend with the challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from the actively hostile, to rising powers at strategic crossroads. The security challenges faced by other nation-states is real, but significantly different than during the last century.

The Russian invasion of Georgia last year was a reminder that the Russian military is a force to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. We should not, however, confuse Russia's attempt to dominate its “near abroad” with an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe – as was the case during the Cold War. The country's conventional military,

although much improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor. Saddled with demographic and budget pressures, the Russians have concentrated on improving their strategic and nuclear forces, but recently have begun to devote more attention to their conventional capabilities.

As we know, China is modernizing across the whole of its armed forces. The areas of greatest concern are Chinese investments and growing capabilities in cyber-and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles. Modernization in these areas could threaten America's primary means of projecting power and helping allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them.

We have seen some improvement in the U.S.-Chinese security relationship recently. Last year, I inaugurated a direct telephone link with the Chinese defense ministry. Military to military exchanges continue, and we have begun a strategic dialogue to help us understand each other's intentions and avoid potentially dangerous miscalculations.

As I've said before, the U.S. military must be able to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, respond to challenges across the spectrum – including the armed forces of other nations. On account of Iraq and Afghanistan, we would be hard pressed at this time to launch another major ground operation. But elsewhere in the world, the United States has ample and untapped combat power in our naval and air forces, with the capacity to defeat any adversary that committed an act of aggression – whether in the Persian Gulf, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the Taiwan Strait. The risk from these types of scenarios cannot be ignored, but it is a manageable one in the short- to mid-term.

### **Wounded Warrior Care**

Apart from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, my highest priority as Secretary of Defense is improving the outpatient care and transition experience for troops that have been wounded in combat.

Since February of 2007, when we learned about the substandard out-patient facilities at Walter Reed, the Department has implemented a number of measures to improve health care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers. We have acted on some 530 recommendations put forth by several major commissions and the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008.

Notable progress includes:

- Working closely with the Department of Veterans Affairs to better share electronic health data and track patients' long-term recovery process;
- Dedicating new facilities, with the help of private partners, such as the national Intrepid centers in Bethesda, Maryland, and San Antonio, Texas; and
- Improving overall case management through programs such as the Army's "Warrior Transition Units" that shepherd injured soldiers back to their units or help them transition to veteran status.

More than 3,200 permanent cadre are now dedicated to soldiers assigned to warrior transition units, and they have cared for more than 21,000 men and women thus far. I have personally visited these units at Fort Bliss, Texas, and Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Post-traumatic stress, traumatic brain injury, and associated ailments are, and will continue to be, the signature military medical challenge facing the Department for years to come. We have made some strides to reduce the stigma associated with the scars of war, both seen and unseen. For instance, last February, the Army Inspector General identified a disturbing trend: Troops were hesitant to get help for mental health because they were worried about the impact on their security clearance, and perhaps their career. To resolve this problem, we worked with our interagency partners to change "Question 21" on the government security clearance application so that, as a general matter, it excludes counseling related to service in combat, including post-traumatic stress. Put simply, mental health treatment, in and of itself, will not be a reason to revoke or deny a security clearance.

We have invested more than \$300 million in research for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and recovery. The Department created a comprehensive TBI registry and thus now has a single point of responsibility to track incidents and recovery. In the last year, we've added more than 220 new mental-health providers to treatment facilities across the country.

The Services are doing more to address mental health needs. The Marine Corps is, for instance, embedding Operational Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) teams in front-line units to better channel medical attention to those who need help quickly. All the services have 24-hour "hot lines" available to troops. Health-care providers are being trained to better identify the first signs of psychological trauma.

We are addressing PTSD and related injuries on a number of fronts and have made much progress. But not every servicemember returning from Iraq and Afghanistan is getting the treatment he or she needs. I believe we have yet to muster and coordinate the various legal, policy, medical, and budget resources across the Department to address these types of injuries.

Considerable work remains as we institutionalize what has been successful and recalibrate what still falls short. The Disability Evaluation System is a useful example. In November of 2007, a pilot program was launched to streamline the Disability Evaluation System (DES) by providing a VA rating to be used by both DoD and VA. Approximately 900 servicemembers are currently enrolled in the pilot program, and it has enabled us to reduce the time required to determine their disability rating and, more importantly, to alleviate some frustration caused by a needlessly complex process.

Overall, I remain concerned that our wounded warriors are still subjected to a system that is designed to serve the general military beneficiary population – the overwhelming majority of whom have not been injured in combat. Earlier this month, we implemented a policy that allows the secretaries of the services to expedite troops through the DES who have combat-related illnesses or injuries that are catastrophic. Nonetheless, we must give serious consideration to

how we can better address the unique circumstances facing our servicemembers with combat-related ailments.

As long as I am secretary of defense, I will continue to work to improve treatment and care for every single wounded warrior.

### **Ground Force Expansion and Stress on the Force**

In an effort to meet our nation's commitments and relieve stress on our force and their troops' families, the Department continues to expand the end-strength of the Army and Marine Corps – growth that began in 2007 and will continue for several years.

The Army exceeded both recruiting and retention goals for FY 2008, and is on path to achieve its goal of an active duty end-strength of 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. It will continue to increase the number of active Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) with a goal of moving from 40 to 42 BCTs this year and towards an end goal of 48 BCTs.

Despite having fallen 5 percent short of its retention goal, the Marine Corps is on track to meet its end-strength goal of 202,000 by the end of this fiscal year.

In all, the Army and Marine Corps are undergoing the largest increase to their active ranks in some four decades. The expectation is that, with a larger total force, individual troops and units will, over time, deploy less frequently with longer dwell times at home. The goal for the Army is two years off for every year of deployment. The expected reduction of American troops in Iraq could be offset by proposed increases in Afghanistan, so it may take some time before we reach that goal. The Services are carefully managing their growth to ensure that it is consistent with the high standards expected from an all-volunteer force.

### **National Guard**

As a result of the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the role of the National Guard in America's defense has transformed from being a strategic reserve to being part of the pool of forces available for deployments.

In view of the National Guard's growing operations and homeland security responsibilities, and to elevate the Guard in deliberations over policy and budget, I am pleased to say that the chief of the National Guard Bureau is now a full general. Another senior Guard officer recently became Northcom's deputy commander, also a historic first that I hope will pave the way for a Guard officer to one day head that command.

One of the challenges we face is to see that, to the extent possible, the Guard's critical domestic responsibilities do not suffer as a result of its operational missions. The demand for Guard support of civil authorities here at home remains high: For example, the "man-days" that Guardsmen have spent fighting fires, performing rescue and recovery, and other duties increased by almost 60 percent in 2008 as compared to 2007.

With the support of the Congress, the Department has substantially increased support for America's reserve component – the Guard and Reserves – which for decades had been considered a low priority for equipment, training, and readiness. Today, the standard is that the Guard and Reserves receive the same equipment as the active force. For FY 2009, the base budget request included \$6.9 billion to continue to replace and repair the National Guard's equipment.

The panel created by Congress four years ago, the Punaro commission, has been a useful spur to the Department's efforts to ensure that both reserve components are better trained, manned, and equipped for this new era. We have taken, or are taking, action on more than 80 percent of the commission's recommendations.

For example, the panel suggested a combined pay and personnel system to fix problems stemming from the shift from the reserve pay system to the active duty pay system. The Department is now launching that integrated system.

Since taking this post I have tried to ease, to the extent possible, the stress on our reserve components by implementing mobilization policies that are more predictable and conducive to unit cohesion. We have provided greater predictability as to when a Guard member will be deployed by establishing a minimum standard of 90 days advance notice prior to mobilization. In practice, on average, the notification time is about 270 days.

There is no longer a 24-month lifetime limit on deployment, but each mobilization of National Guard and Reserve troops is now capped at 12 months. The goal is five years of dwell time for one year deployed. We have made progress towards this goal but are not there yet. For example, the ratio of dwell time to mobilization for the Army National Guard this fiscal year is just over 3 to 1.

Reliance upon the reserve component for overseas deployment has declined over time. For example, the percentage of Army soldiers serving in Iraq and Afghanistan who are Guardsmen or Reservists is about half what it was in summer 2005.

### **Nuclear Stewardship**

I continue to believe that as long as other nations have nuclear weapons, the U.S. must maintain an arsenal of some level. The stewardship of that arsenal is perhaps the military's most sensitive mission – with no margin for error.

That there should be any question in that regard is why recent lapses in the handling of nuclear weapons and material were so grave. They were evidence of an erosion in training, expertise, resources, and accountability in this critical mission. And they brought severe consequences, starting at the unit level and reaching up to the top leadership of the Air Force.

Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of the past, I do believe the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure, and reliable. The Air Force has taken significant steps to improve its nuclear stewardship by:

- Streamlining the inspection process for nuclear material to ensure that it is all handled properly;
- Standing up a new headquarters office – Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration – that concentrates on policy oversight and staff integration for nuclear programs. The office’s leader reports directly to the Air Force chief of staff;
- Creating a Global Strike Command, which has brought all of the Air Force’s nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs under one entity; and
- Reassigning the supply chain for nuclear programs to the complete control of the Nuclear Weapons Center at Kirtland Air Force Base, which is being overhauled and expanded.

A task force headed by former Energy and Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has now reported. It has identified many trends, both recent and long-term, that may warrant corrective action. Among its recommendations:

- A new assistant secretary of defense for deterrence to oversee nuclear management; and
- Develop and maintain a strategic roadmap to modernize and sustain our nuclear forces.

I will be evaluating all of the Schlesinger Commission recommendations along with the new service secretaries and defense team.

## **Defending Space and Cyberspace**

The full spectrum of U.S. military capabilities on land, sea, and air now depend on digital communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. Our communications, navigation, weather, missile warning, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems rely on unfettered access to space. At the same time, more nations – about 60 in all – are active in space, and there are more than 800 satellites in orbit. The importance of space defense was highlighted during my first year in this job when the Chinese successfully tested an anti-satellite weapon.

In an effort to maintain our technological edge and protect access to this critical domain, we will continue to invest in joint space-based capabilities such as infrared systems and global positioning systems. Air Force Space Command has nearly 40,000 personnel dedicated to monitoring space assets and is training professionals in this career field.

With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to DoD’s vast information grid – a system that encompasses more than 15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7 million IT devices. DoD systems are constantly scanned and probed by outside entities, but we

have developed a robust network defense strategy. We will continue to defend our systems against network attacks, intrusions, and other incidents.

It is noteworthy that Russia's relatively crude ground offensive into Georgia was preceded by a sophisticated cyber attack. The massive cyber attack suffered by Estonia in 2007, which I discussed with our partners during a recent visit there, illustrates how quickly malicious hackers can bring even a technologically-sophisticated government to a standstill. To learn from this experience and share technological know-how, the U.S. government is co-sponsoring the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

### **Wartime Procurement**

When we are at war, I believe the overriding priority of the Defense Department and military services should be to do everything possible to provide troops in the field everything they need to be successful. To place our defense bureaucracies on a war footing with a wartime sense of urgency, I have accelerated procurement of a number of capabilities, notably:

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance – specifically, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs); and
- Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles – or MRAPs.

UASs have become one of the most critical capabilities in our military. They give troops the tremendous advantage of seeing full-motion, real-time, streaming video over a target – such as an insurgent planting an IED. Last April, I launched a Department-wide taskforce to speed additional UASs to theater and to ensure we were getting maximum use out of the assets already there. Since then, the Air Force has:

- Increased Predator air patrols by nearly 30 percent;
- Opened a second school to train personnel on UASs;
- Created a career track for UASs; and
- For the first time, allowed non-rated officers to operate UASs.

We've also seen how relatively low cost, off-the-shelf technology can have a huge impact on the battlefield. The Army's Task Force Odin resulted in a dramatic increase in the amount of full-motion video available to commanders in Iraq. We are in the process of trying to replicate those successes in Afghanistan. As part of the effort to increase ISR, we are fielding more than 50 turboprop aircraft outfitted with sensors.

In Iraq, the majority of our combat deaths and injuries have been a result of road-side bombs, IEDs, and explosively formed penetrators. The casualty rate from an attack on an MRAP is less than one-third that of Humvees, and less than half that of an Abrams tank. In May 2007, I directed the Department to make MRAPs our top acquisition priority, and, with extraordinary help from the Congress, the Department has sent more than 12,000 MRAPs to theater. The Army is currently developing a lighter version of the MRAP better suited for the difficult terrain of Afghanistan.

The MRAP and ISR experiences raise a broader concern about wartime acquisition. In the past, modernization programs have sought a 99 percent solution over a period of years, rather than a 75 percent solution over a period of weeks or months. Rather than forming ad hoc groups to field capabilities like UASs and MRAPs, we must figure out how to institutionalize procurement of urgently-needed resources in wartime.

One option is to continue to spin out components of large-scale, long-term modernization projects in real time for early field testing and use in ongoing operations, then fold the results into longer-term product development. We are doing so in Afghanistan and Iraq with Small Unmanned Ground Vehicles, a component the Army's Future Combat Systems used to clear caves, search bunkers, or cross minefields. Such field testing ensures that a program like FCS – whose total cost could exceed \$200 billion if completely built out – will continue to demonstrate its value for both conventional and unconventional scenarios.

### **Defense Acquisition**

As I focused on the wars these past two years, I ended up punting a number of procurement decisions that I believed would be more appropriately handled by my successor and a new administration. Well, as luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts – and in this game there are no fair catches.

Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisitions – broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers' money. The Congress, and this committee in particular, have rightly been focused on this issue for some time. The economic crisis makes the problem even more acute. Allow me to share a few general thoughts.

There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with long-standing systemic problems:

- Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and between DoD and other parts of the government.
- At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress – making any sort of long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base costs next to impossible.
- Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years, for example, the Department of Defense has operated with an average percentage of vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.

Thus the situation we face today, where a small set of expensive weapons programs has had repeated – and unacceptable – problems with requirements, schedule, cost, and performance.



While the number of overturned procurements as a result of protests remains low in absolute numbers – 13 out of more than three and a half million contract actions in FY 2008 – highly publicized issues persist in a few of the largest programs. The same is true of cost overruns, where five programs account for more than half of total cost growth. The list of big-ticket weapons systems that have experienced contract or program performance problems spans the services: the Air Force tanker, CSAR-X, VH-71, Osprey, Future Combat Systems, Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, Littoral Combat Ship, Joint Strike Fighter, and so on.

Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies on these problems – to little avail. I mention all this because I do not believe there is a silver bullet, and I do not think the system can be reformed in a short period of time – especially since the kinds of problems we face date all the way back to our first Secretary of War, whose navy took three times longer to build than was originally planned at more than double the cost.

That said, I do believe we can make headway, and I have already begun addressing these issues:

- First, I believe that the FY 2010 budget must make hard choices. Any necessary changes should avoid across-the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs.
- We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient rates for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of scale to lower costs.
- I will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the “75 percent” solution instead of smaller quantities of “99 percent,” exquisite systems.
- While the military’s operations have become very joint – and impressively so – budget and procurement decisions remain overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk, we may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one service and less in that of another service – particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.
- We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.
- I feel that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the Department should seek increased competition, use of prototypes, and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.
- Finally, we must restore the Department’s acquisition team. I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process. On that note, I thank you for continuing to give us the funding, authorities, and support to sustain our growth plan for the defense acquisition workforce.

## Conclusion

As we look ahead to the important work that we have in front of us, I would leave you with the following thoughts.

I have spent the better part of the last two years focused on the wars we are fighting today, and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are supported in battle and properly cared for when they return home.

Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops in theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.

The choices we make will manifest themselves in how we train, whom we promote, and, of course, how we spend. As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget later this spring. One thing we have known for many months is that the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department.

But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment also presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity. To critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.

As I've said before, we will not be able to “do everything, buy everything.” And, while we have all spoken at length about these issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I remain in this post I will focus on creating a unified defense strategy that determines our budget priorities. This is, after all, about more than just dollars: It goes to the heart of our national security.

I will need help from the other stakeholders – from industry, and from you, the members of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on national interests. And then to stick to those decisions over time. The

President and I need your help as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making those decisions.

I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while I am at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line and make systemic progress – to put the Department on a glide path for future success.

I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and recommendations along the way. Once more, I thank you for all you've done to support the Department of Defense and the men and women wearing our nation's uniform.

I look forward to your questions.

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### Opening Statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, January 27, 2009*

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an overview of challenges facing the Department of Defense and some of my priorities for the coming year. In so doing, I am most mindful that the new administration has only been in place for a few days and new or changing policies will likely arise in the weeks and months ahead. Later this spring, I will present President Obama's defense budget, and, at that time, will be better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the Department.

On a personal note, I want to thank many of you for your very kind farewell remarks at my last hearing. I assure you you are no more surprised to see me back than I am. In the months ahead, I may need to re-read some of those kind comments to remind myself of the warm atmosphere up here as I was departing. Seriously, I am humbled by President Obama's faith in me, and deeply honored to continue to lead the United States military. I thank the committee for your confidence in my leadership and your enduring, steadfast support of our military.

My submitted testimony covers a range of challenges facing the Department: North Korea, Iran, and Proliferation; Russia; China; Wounded Warrior Care; Ground Force Expansion and Stress on the Force; National Guard; Nuclear Stewardship; Defending Space and Cyberspace; and Wartime Procurement.

But for the next few minutes I would like to focus on Afghanistan, Iraq, and defense acquisition.

There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. As you know, the United States has focused more on Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the Afghanistan theater should be our top overseas military priority.

There are more than forty nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and more, all involved in Afghanistan – all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless and resilient insurgency, and violent extremists of many stripes, not the least of which is Al Qaeda. Coordination of these international efforts has been difficult, to say the least.

Based on our past experience in Afghanistan – and applicable lessons from Iraq – there are assessments underway that should provide an integrated way forward to achieve our goals.

As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan. But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas – a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban. And that is why the United States is considering an increase in our military presence, in conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan security forces – and also pressing forward on issues like improving civil-military coordination and focusing efforts on the district level.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives: above all, an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for Al Qaeda, who reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and in which they have a stake.

Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the porous border between them. Pakistan is a friend and partner, and it is necessary for us to stay engaged – and help wherever we can. I can assure you that I continue to watch the situation in Pakistan closely.

As you know, the Status of Forces agreement between the United States and Iraq went into effect on January 1<sup>st</sup>. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to be out of the Iraqi cities by the end of June, and all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest. It balances the interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq in full control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are another sign of progress.

The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed – a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down. Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though the violence has remained low, there is still the potential for setbacks – and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.

As our military presence decreases over time, we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come – assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership. The stability of Iraq remains crucial to the future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of both political parties have considered vital to the national security of the United States.

As I focused on the wars these past two years, I ended up toward the end of last year punting a number of procurement decisions that I believed would be more appropriately handled by my successor and a new administration. As

luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts – and in this game there are no fair catches.

Chief among institutional challenges facing the Department is acquisitions – broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers' money. There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with long-standing systemic problems:

- Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition: a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability, and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and between Defense and other parts of the government.

- At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress – making any sort of long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base costs next to impossible.

- Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years, for example, the Department of Defense has operated with an average percentage of vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent in the Army to 43 percent in the Air Force.

Thus the situation we face today, where a small set of expensive weapons programs has had repeated – and unacceptable – problems with requirements, schedule, cost, and performance. The list spans the services.

Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies on these problems – to little avail. While there is no silver bullet, I do believe we can make headway, and we have already begun addressing these issues:

- First, I believe that the FY 2010 budget must make hard choices. Any necessary changes should avoid across-the-board adjustments, which inefficiently extend all programs. We must have the courage to make hard choices.

- We have begun to purchase systems at more efficient rates for the production lines. I believe we can combine budget stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of scale to lower costs.

- We will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the “75 percent” solution instead of smaller quantities of “99 percent,” exquisite systems.

- While the military's operations have become very joint – and impressively so – budget and procurement decisions remain overwhelmingly service-centric. To address a given risk, we may have to invest more in the future-oriented program of one service and less in that of another – particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.

- We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior.

- I feel that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on an inadequate initial foundation. I believe the Department should seek increased competition, use of prototypes – including competitive prototyping – and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.

- And finally, we must restore the Department's acquisition team. I look forward to working with you and the rest of Congress to establish a necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process.

This is no small task, and will require much work in the months ahead, which brings me to a few final thoughts.

I have spent the better part of the last two years focused on the wars we are fighting today, and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are supported in battle and properly cared for when they come home.

Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed underlying flaws in the institutional priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war. The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gained and means to support troops in the theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats. Our wartime needs must have a home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries, and less by what is technologically feasible given unlimited time and resources.

As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget later this spring. One thing we have known for many months is that the spigot of defense funding that opened on 9/11 is closing. With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on this department.

But for all the difficulties we face, I believe this moment also presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity. To critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.

As I've said before, we will not be able to “do everything, buy everything.” And, while we have all spoken at length about these issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I remain in this post, I will focus on creating a unified defense strategy that determines our budget priorities. This, after all, is about more than just dollars: It goes to the heart of our national security.

I will need help from the other stakeholders – from industry, and from you, the members of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about

specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on national interests. And then to stick to those decisions over time. The President and I need your help as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making those decisions.

I have no illusions that all of this will be solved while I am at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible for years. My hope, however, is to draw a line and from here forward make systemic progress – to put the Department on a glide path for future success.

I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and your recommendations along the way. Once more, I thank you for all you've done to support the Department of Defense and the men and women wearing our nation's uniform.

I look forward to your questions.

## CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS

Congressional Hearings

Jan. 27, 2009

House Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on the Priorities of the Defense Department in the Obama Administration

## LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES

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SKELTON:

Good afternoon, and welcome.

Before we begin our committee hearing, I wish to thank Solomon Ortiz, Congressman Ortiz from Texas, for chairing the hearing last week. I found myself very much under the weather and unable to do it. So we thank him for doing that for us.

This afternoon, our committee is pleased to welcome secretary of defense, Robert Gates, for a hearing entitled "The Priorities of the Department of Defense in the New Administration."

Let me take a moment to thank the secretary directly for his continued service to our nation as he stays on into the new administration. That's remarkable, and we appreciate you're doing so. The department and the country continue to benefit from your leadership, and we appreciate all that you do for us. So thank you, Mr. Secretary, for staying on and being the secretary of defense.

About this time of year, we begin to anticipate the arrival of the administration's budget request for the upcoming fiscal year. Shortly thereafter, the committee begins to have the posture hearings, and the -- that process is going to be delayed this year because the incoming Obama administration naturally wants a chance to review and perhaps modify the department's proposals before they send them over here to Congress.

So this is a useful opportunity for Secretary Gates to share his thoughts on the direction in the department, how it's headed, and what he sees as the significant security challenges facing our country.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, though, you will give us an indication of when we can expect this year's budget submission, because that would be very helpful to us, and legislative proposals so that we can begin to plan for the Defense Authorization markup.

Mr. Secretary, as you know, I've had a long interest and been focused on the need for a grand strategy for the United States. I think the transition to a new administration provides the opportunity for us to reconsider our strategic framework and embark upon a holistic and robust process that produces the kind of grand strategy this country needs.

Your piece, Mr. Secretary, in the recent edition of Foreign Affairs is brilliant, and I put a copy in front of every member here today. It's exactly the sort of thing the administration must consider at this point in time and build into a full national security strategy. President Obama's desire to retain you indicates that he values your counsel, and I am glad you will be here as he leads this team to the development of a new national security strategy in the near future.

SKELTON:

The stakes are too high for us to play this strategy game haphazardly. I'd like to hear your thoughts on how we might improve this process.

Let me say a few words about some of the recent announcements by President Obama. I have long championed the return to focus on the war in Afghanistan and am pleased to hear the president embrace this idea so fully in his first week.

This is a critical moment in Afghanistan for American national security interests. We need a clear definition there of the end state we're trying to achieve in the short term and the long term and a coordinated strategy that gets us there. More forces in combat support capability can make a great difference, particularly, in the troubled south of that country.

But I'd like to understand more, Mr. Secretary, of how the department intends to balance the needs for combat enablers, UAVs, transfer local security forces, medivac assets and other capabilities between Afghanistan and Iraq. Our combat forces will not be fully effective, particularly, in Afghanistan's difficult terrain without enablers such as those.

In addition, it can't be stated too strongly that we won't win in Afghanistan with military force alone. I think you point that out.

Additional combat brigades in Afghanistan cannot be fully effective unless we provide more diplomatic, development, governance, and economic resources with it. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to hear your view of how we proceed in Afghanistan, what the end state is -- I'll repeat that -- what the end state is, how the administration, through you, will approach the question about the strategy in the difficulties the force may encounter in making additional resources available for General McKiernan.

The department will face many other challenges. The breadth of your written testimony demonstrates just how many. We have to come to terms with the wars of today and the unforeseen challenges of tomorrow.

We need to provide the possibility of force-on-force conflicts and simultaneously provide for insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. And we must do this in a time of great fiscal strain for this nation. Hard choices will be needed.

And as I have said to other senior defense leaders, lately, we face two problems in getting it all done. One is time, and the other is money.



And I hope you'll lay out for this committee how the new administration is thinking about strategy and tradeoffs both in any budget and in the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review. This Congress must understand the capabilities we need to face current and future threats and the risks associated with our choices.

Finally, let me say a few words about President Obama's actions last week to close the detention facilities at the U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and, otherwise, to chart a drastically different course for our country regarding detainee matters.

With a few short strokes of a pen, the president singlehandedly repaired much of the damage done to our country's international reputation because of the controversial detainee policies of the previous administration.

I'm concerned, however, that there are precious few good answers to the complex questions that are central to the detainee policy, including how to prosecute known terrorists with the full force of the law so their convictions stick and justice is served; what to do with the other hardcore detainees so that they do not return to the battlefield; and where to place them now and in the future.

I ask you to keep us fully informed as you work through the task forces that will recommend answers to these questions.

Mr. Secretary, we're absolutely pleased you're here, and we look forward to your thoughts and your comments. But first, my friend, Mr. McHugh.

MCHUGH:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me echo your words of appreciation and compliments to our mutual good friend, Solomon Ortiz, for his able of the hearing in which you were regrettably unable to attend.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, this committee is, for the moment, better suited by having you back with us. And we're thrilled that you've recovered from that.

Mr. Secretary, welcome. I can't resist saying, in spite of the facts behind it, as I look at your physical condition, tough morning in the Senate?

For those of you who may not have noticed, the secretary is wearing a sling on his shoulder. He was out doing the great work of trying to clear snow, which we've begun to realize is an important part of operations here in the D.C. district. And it underscores the fact that our great secretary, through now two administrations, takes his responsibilities very seriously appearing this morning in the Senate and agreeing very generously and graciously to being with us here in the House side this afternoon when, perhaps, he may have other challenges facing him.

And I could not agree more with the comment of our distinguished chairman, Mr. Secretary. We deeply appreciate your leadership, your contributions and sacrifices that both you and your family have made and agreed to continue to make is unparalleled.

And I certainly -- and I know I speak for all my colleagues -- look forward to working with you and your staff and helping to face the challenges that lie before us both immediate and on the horizon and continue the tradition of bipartisanship, consultation, cooperation, and collaboration that really has been the hallmark of this committee.

So, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.

Just a few thoughts. We do have some votes coming up

Let me agree again with the chairman. I'm a subscriber to Foreign Affairs Magazine. I read very carefully -- in fact I've read twice -- your -- I agree, Mr. Chairman, brilliant article -- as to the challenges that we are looking at with respect to the Pentagon's national defense strategy and your interest in trying to achieve a balance.

As we go forward here today, I would say as I kind preface, I agree. We've got to be prepared to meet the full spectrum of warfare from conventional combat operations to counterinsurgency to space and cyberspace. In so doing, ensure and continue to ensure our military edge.

MCHUGH:

I agree. Our military can't do everything. And I would say that regrettably, in recent years, we've asked them to do more than proper. We've asked them to take on responsibilities that should rest elsewhere. And we have to begin to emphasize that our partner nations as well as partner agencies need to do their share. The piracy off the coast of Somalia is a great example of where unilateral U.S. military response simply is both insufficient and inappropriate.

Let me also say while I hope you will comment a bit more about this very informative article, that you have the opportunity to talk obviously about Iraq and Afghanistan. At the onset of this new year, our military forces began operating under a new paradigm in Iraq with the security situation on the ground vastly improved, due in large measure because of the success of the surge. There is a picture for the way forward.

And I would suggest as well the new status of forces agreement that you had somewhat of a hand in, Mr. Secretary, lays out what I believe is a very logical plan for the responsible reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq. But in Afghanistan I seem to believe that it's a much different situation, a much different operating environment.

It's a poor nation, a nation with a history of continuous violence. The insurgency is a web of Taliban, Al Qaida and narco-criminals. The enemies' tactics are growing in sophistication and lethality. And here in

Washington we wait for the results of multiple strategic reviews. And we focus on the pending deployment of additional U.S. forces.

And we make calls that land on largely deaf ears of our -- at least some of our NATO allies to do more and restrict less. And we're not here to have a hearing on Afghanistan, but we need to talk about what the path ahead may look like, how the visions between Iraq and Afghanistan may differ and what victory in both of those theaters may look like.

And thirdly, Mr. Secretary, picking up on the comments of the distinguished chairman, the president's three executive orders last week did make a decisive step, did, indeed, send a certain message, but I would argue has caused a great deal of uncertainty as to the way ahead with respect to how do we detain and how do we interrogate and how can we ensure that terrorists released or transferred to another country don't reappear on the battlefield or in a position to attack Americans or our allies. Where do we house terrorists that are deemed too dangerous to release or transfer to another country?

And if the judicial procedures that were established under the Military Commissions Act are overturned, will we at the end of the day have sufficient evidence and legal processes in place to continue to hold the most dangerous terrorists such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammed? These are difficult questions.

Whether you agree with the president's decisions or not, I would hope we could all agree we have to understand the ramifications and the path ahead. And these are all things that I look forward to your comments on, Mr. Secretary, but most importantly, with a final word of thanks for your appearance here today.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

SKELTON:

Thank you, Mr. McHugh. I must announce that the secretary has a hard drop at 5 o'clock this evening. Secondly, we just received word that there are four votes expected at, we were told, 1:45. And so, Mr. Secretary, when the votes come, we will do our very best to get back here as soon as we can to take up.

The five-minute rule means five minutes. And everyone, of course, is very familiar with that.

So with that, Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours. And we, again, appreciate you being with us.

GATES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative McHugh, members of the committee. Thank you for an opportunity to provide an overview of the challenges facing the Department of Defense and some of my priorities for the coming year.

In doing so, I am very mindful that the new administration has only been in place essentially for a week. And newer, changing policies will likely arise in the coming months. Later this spring I'll present President Obama's defense budget and at that time will be better equipped to discuss the details of his vision for the department.

And thank you for your kind comments here at the outset of the hearing. I assure you that none of you are any more surprised to see me back than I am. I'm humbled by the president's faith in me and deeply honored to continue to lead the United States military. And I want to thank this committee for your confidence in my leadership and your enduring support of our military.

My submitted testimony covers a range of issues: North Korea, Iran and proliferation, Russia and China, wounded warrior care, ground force expansion and stress on the force, National Guard, nuclear stewardship, defending space and cyberspace and wartime procurement. For the next few minutes, though, I would like to focus on Afghanistan, Iraq and defense acquisition.

There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. As you know, the United States has focused more on Central Asia in recent months. President Obama has made it clear that the Afghan theater should be our top overseas military priority.

There are more than 40 nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and more involved in Afghanistan, all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a thriving drug trade fueling corruption, a ruthless and resilient insurgency and violent extremists of many stripes, not the least of which is Al Qaida. Coordination of these international efforts has been, to say the least, difficult.

Based on our past experience in Afghanistan and applicable lessons from Iraq, there are assessments underway that should provide an integrated way forward to achieve our goals. As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution in Afghanistan.

But it is also clear that we have not had enough troops to provide a baseline level of security in some of the most dangerous areas, a vacuum that increasingly has been filled by the Taliban.

GATES:

That is why the United States is considering an increase in our military presence in conjunction with a dramatic increase in the size of the Afghan Security Forces and also pressing forward on issues like improving civil, military coordination and focusing efforts more on the district level.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can attain what I believe should be among our strategic objectives -- an Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for Al Qaida, reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and which they have at stake.

Of course, it is impossible to disaggregate Afghanistan and Pakistan given the porous border between them. Pakistan is a friend and partner and it is necessary for us to stay engaged and help wherever we can.

I assure you we will all continue to watch the situation in Pakistan very closely.

As you know, the status of forces agreement between the United States and Iraq went into effect on January 1. The agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to be out of Iraqi cities by the end of June and all troops out of Iraq by the end of 2011, at the latest.

It balances the interests of both countries as we see the emergence of a sovereign Iraq and full control of its territory. Provincial elections in just a few days are another sign of progress.

The SOFA marks an important step forward in the orderly drawdown of the American presence. It is a watershed, a firm indication that American military involvement in Iraq is winding down.

Even so, I would offer a few words of caution. Though violence has remained low, there is still the potential for setbacks and there may be hard days ahead for our troops.

As our military presence decreases over time, we should still expect to be involved in Iraq on some level for many years to come, assuming a sovereign Iraq continues to seek our partnership.

The stability of Iraq remains critical to the future of the Middle East, a region that multiple presidents of both political parties have considered vital to the national security of the United States.

As I have focused on the two wars these past two years, I ended up punting a number of procurement decisions that I believe would be more appropriately handled by my successor in a new administration.

As luck would have it, I am now the receiver of those punts. And in this game, there are no fair catches.

Chief among institutional challenges facing the department is acquisitions; broadly speaking, how we acquire goods and services and manage the taxpayers' money.

There are a host of issues that have led us to where we are, starting with longstanding systemic problems. Entrenched attitudes throughout the government are particularly pronounced in the area of acquisition, a risk-averse culture, a litigious process, parochial interests, excessive and changing requirements, budget churn and instability and sometimes adversarial relationships within the Department of Defense and between defense and other parts of the government.

At the same time, acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, from administration to administration, and from Congress to Congress, making any sort of long-term procurement strategy on which we can accurately base costs next to impossible.

Add to all of this the difficulty in bringing in qualified senior acquisition officials. Over the past eight years, for example, the Department of Defense has operated with an average percentage of vacancies in the key acquisition positions ranging from 13 percent in the <Army> to 43 percent in the Air Force.

Thus, the situation we face today for a small set of expensive weapons programs has had repeated and unacceptable problems with requirements, schedule, cost and performance.

The list spans the services. Since the end of World War II, there have been nearly 130 studies on these problems, to little avail. While there is no silver bullet, I do believe we can make headway and we have already begun to address these issues.

First, I believe that the 2010 budget must make hard choices. Any necessary changes should and, I believe, must avoid across-the-board adjustments which inefficiently extend to all programs.

We've begun to purchase systems that have more efficient rates for the production lines and I believe we can combine budget stability and order rates that take advantage of economies of scale to lower costs.

We will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the 75 percent solution instead of smaller quantities of 99 percent exquisite systems.

While the military's operations have become very joint and impressively so, budget and procurement decisions remain overwhelmingly service centric. To address a given risk, we may have to invest more in the future oriented program of one service and less in that of another service, particularly when both programs were conceived with the same threat in mind.

We must freeze requirements on programs at contract award and write contracts that incentivize proper behavior. I believe that many programs that cost more than anticipated are built on inadequate initial foundations. I believe the department should seek increased competition, the use of prototypes and competitive prototyping, and ensure technology maturity so that our programs are ready for the next phases of development.

And finally, we must restore the defense's acquisition team. I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a necessary consensus on the need to have adequate personnel capacity in all elements of the acquisition process.

This is no small task and will require much work in the months ahead, which brings me to a few final thoughts.

I've spent the better part of the last two years focused on the wars we are fighting today and making sure that the Pentagon is doing everything possible to ensure that America's fighting men and women are supported in battle and properly cared for when they return home.

Efforts to put the bureaucracy on a war footing have, in my view, revealed underlying flaws in institutional priorities, cultural preferences and reward structures of America's defense establishment, a

set of institutions largely arranged to plan for future wars, to prepare for a short war, but not to wage a protracted war.

The challenge we face is how well we can institutionalize the irregular capabilities gain and means to support troops in the theater that have been, for the most part, developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

This requires that we close the yawning gap between the way the defense establishment supports current operations and the way it prepares for future conventional threats.

Our wartime needs must have an institutional home and enthusiastic constituencies in the regular budgeting and procurement process. Our procurement and preparation for conventional scenarios must, in turn, be driven more by the actual capabilities of potential adversaries and less by what is technologically feasible, given unlimited time and resources.

#### GATES:

As I mentioned, President Obama will present his budget later this spring. The one thing we have known for many months is that the spigot of defense spending opened on 9/11 is closing.

With two major campaigns ongoing, the economic crisis and resulting budget pressures will force hard choices on the Department of Defense.

But for all the difficulties we face, I believe the moment also presents an opportunity, one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements; those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead.

We will not be able to do everything, buy everything. And while we have spoken at length about these issues, I believe now is the time to take action. I promise you that as long as I remain in this post, I will focus on creating a united defense strategy -- a unified defense strategy -- that determines our budget priorities. This, first of all, is about more than just dollars. It goes to the heart of our national security.

I will need help from the other stakeholders, from industry, and from you, the member of Congress. It is one thing to speak broadly about the need for budget discipline and acquisition reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific weapons systems and defense priorities based solely on national interests and then to stick to those decisions over time.

The president and I need your help as all of us together do what is best for America as a whole in making those decisions. I have no illusions at all that this will be solved while I'm at the Pentagon. Indeed, even if I am somewhat successful on the institutional side, the benefits of these changes may not be visible for years.

My hope, however, is to draw a line and to begin to make systemic progress to put the department on a glide path for future success. I look forward to working with each of you to gain your insight and recommendations along the way.

Once more, I thank you for all you've done to support the Department of Defense and the men and women wearing our nation's uniform.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.

SKELTON:

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We appreciate your excellent testimony and maybe we can squeeze a few questions in before we go over to vote for the four measures.

Let me first ask, in your best judgment, when will the budget submission be made to the Congress?

GATES:

My hope is that we will have a fiscal year '09 -- the remaining fiscal year '09 supplemental proposal up here within a matter of two or three weeks, perhaps, a little longer. And as best I can understand, we will be looking toward the FY '10 budget coming up somewhere near the end on March.

SKELTON:

That's good. Now can along with that is the roles and missions requirement that we -- report that we had in our recent legislation.

I hope that will be a thorough review. I know sometimes it's very difficult to talk about roles and missions. We had a panel that worked on that issue under the able to leadership of Jim Cooper this last year. And I hope that that will accompany it and be a substantial document.

One last question before -- Mr. McHugh, before you can -- my last question: What is the end state as you see it, in Afghanistan?

GATES:

I believe our goals in Afghanistan have to be more near term and more modest. I would define success in Afghanistan as a situation Afghanistan where it is no longer a source of terrorist threat or extremist threat to the United States or our friends or allies.

Much has to be done to create that kind of an end state, but I believe that we should be cautious in having very long-term, very idealistic aspirations in Afghanistan and rather focus on what we think we actually can accomplish within the next three to five years.



SKELTON:

Thank you.

Mr. McHugh, would you like to ask a question or two?

MCHUGH:

Mr. Chairman, given the interest of other members to go vote, if the secretary has a few moments extra, I'd -- perhaps, it would be better to get members over, allow them to vote and come back if that's agreeable with you?

SKELTON:

That's certainly agreeable.

Mr. Secretary, we'll take a break and be back as quickly as we can.

MCHUGH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCHUGH:

Thank you,

SKELTON:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(RECESS)

SKELTON:

Thank you very much for waiting. We did finish our four votes.

And, Mr. Secretary, we're back.

And the microphone is with our ranking gentleman, John McHugh.

MCHUGH:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me add to your words of appreciation to the secretary for bearing with us.

Mr. Secretary, you talked in your opening comments about the situation in Iraq for what I believe you described as the potential for setbacks. And I think, I hope, we can all agree that's still a very tenuous situation and a very dangerous one.

Outgoing Ambassador Crocker talked about the dangers of precipitous withdrawal. In my opening comments, I talked about the SOFA, talked about the timeframe for redeployments that has been embedded in that. And I happen to believe after talking to General Petraeus and other military leaders that it's an achievable objective.

Just last week our new president met with the military leaders and talked about the 16-month timeframe with withdrawal -- for withdrawal. And we're looking at eight months, roughly, differential. What worries me, Mr. Secretary, is that those kinds of redeployment decisions may be based on not military imperatives, but political imperatives.

I was hoping today you might fill in the blanks a bit about what the directive was to the military leadership as to the 16-month timeframe.

MCHUGH:

Are we asking them to look at it as a potential, assessing the downsides of that, or if this was an order that said simply I want out in 16 months, how do we do it? What can you tell us about that decision and that timeframe?

GATES:

What we are preparing for the president in response to his request are several options and -- beginning with a 16-month completion of the current mission and transition to an advise and concept -- or an advisory and assistance role. We are developing other options as well, and I have tried to do this in a way, with the president's agreement, that ensures that he hears directly from each of the commanders, each of his senior military commanders.

So he will have spoken directly to General Odierno. He will have spoken directly to General McKiernan, to General Petraeus. As I think is public, he is meeting in the -- at the Pentagon tomorrow with the joint chiefs of staff. And he, obviously, will hear from the chairman and myself.

He has been firm in saying he wants a responsible withdrawal and one that is safe for our troops, and we are laying out, with each of the options we will present to him, our view -- each of the commander's -- of the risks associated with that time-line. So I think that -- I think he has entirely properly asked for a range of options, including, the 16-month. We will give him that.

He has asked for more information on some of our assumptions. He asked for more analysis in certain areas. But I think this is a very thorough and a very real process. I don't think they're -- I don't think anybody associated with it in the Department of Defense feels like we're going through the motions; that a decision has already been made. And I think that the president will listen to the commanders. And I think we will come out in a good place on this.

'09 is a year that is actually fraught with both opportunity and risk and they're the opposite sides of the same coin in the respect of the really four elections that will be held: the provincial elections this fall -- in a few days, the district and subdistrict elections this summer in June, the referendum on the SOFA at the end of July, and then the national elections at the end of the year.

If we make it through those elections, then the prospects, I think, for an enduring domestic peace in Iraq are substantially enhanced. And I think that -- and we'll see how these elections go. Clearly, successful provincial elections that -- which the Sunnis participate in, having boycotted them several years ago, would be a big step forward.

So we'll -- we'll measure the risk as we go along. But these are the kinds of issues that we're laying out in front of the president.

MCHUGH:

Then I can assume that you have a reasonable level of confidence that this will be a military not a political based decision. It's no secret that our new president opposed the surge. In fact, he said, in his judgment, it would make matters worse not better.

There's no sin in, perhaps, making misjudgments. But I truly worry that we would squander the great progress that our men and women in uniform have made and the brilliant leadership of people like General Petraeus, and I might add, also, Mr. Secretary, you.

And I'd just like to hear you say this will be a military based decision.

GATES:

I -- the president is the commander-in-chief. But I will tell you, Mr. McHugh, I am completely confident that the president will make a decision based solely on what he believes is in the best interest of the United States.

MCHUGH:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Last week -- I'm going to ask one more if I may.

Last week, the president signed three rather controversial executive orders with respect to detention, with respect to interrogation, and such. And his new press secretary said, and I want to quote, "The president believes that what we did today will enhance the security of the American people; that it lives up to our values as American people."

Mr. Secretary, I have to be very honest. Without debating the objectives of those orders -- and I think there was a pretty widespread agreement that, indeed, we should do what we can to close Guantanamo across the board. Nevertheless, as a 16-year member -- now 17-year member -- of this committee, and as a four-year member of the Intelligence Committee, I'm hard-pressed to understand how uncertainty breeds security.

And for whatever one might think of the objectives of the president's executive orders, it seems to me that the unquestionable result for the moment is we have uncertainty. And I was wondering if you could help us and help me to better understand, for example, if we're to pick up a high value target out of Pakistan, out of Afghanistan, or any other place on the globe, tomorrow, we would have a reasonable way by which to detain these individuals, by which to interrogate these individuals?

And what the path is between now and the timeframe by which the president has said that Guantanamo will close. We can disagree and debate as to the former administration's policies in these regards, but they were policy. They did have a way to detain individuals. They did have a process to interrogate them. They did have a process to bring them to trial.

What does the path ahead look like? What if, for example, tomorrow we pick up Osama bin Laden in a cave somewhere in the FATAH or whenever it may be? What does tomorrow bring as a lead-up for a year from now from the closing of that facility in Cuba?

GATES:

I think -- I think our folks believe that they have the authorities that they need in Afghanistan, in particular, and in going after Al Qaeda to detain high-value targets. The reality is our special forces have been detaining Al Qaeda and other insurgents for some period of time and observing the <Army> Field Manual in their interrogation techniques.

GATES:

And I don't think that they felt that they've been inhibited from getting the information that they could get out of these detainees.

With respect to Guantanamo, my view is that -- I guess I would make two points. I think if we did not have a deadline -- first of all, let me concede your point.

There are some very difficult decisions ahead with respect to Guantanamo. But I believe that if we did not have a deadline, we could kick that can down the road endlessly. And I think that a -- my experience in making anything work at the Department of Defense is the only way I get anything done is by putting a deadline on it and making people understand that the deadline is meaningful.

And I think the only way we'll come to grips with some of the tough decisions that have to be made with respect to Guantanamo is by having a deadline that then forces the rest of us to turn to and figure out solutions to some of these problems.

A number of the detainees at Guantanamo, perhaps 70, are people that we are prepared to return to their home countries or other countries that would take them and put them through some sort of a rehabilitation process.

Others will have to be sorted through in terms of whether they might be tried in Article 3 courts, whether they might be tried under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or whether they might be still tried under the military commissions or some kind of modification to the military commissions or something else.

Those are the issues that I think we have to take on. I think one of the toughest issues that we all are going to have to face is what about whatever the relatively small number is who probably cannot be brought to trial and yet are quite open about saying that if they're released, they will find ways to kill Americans, and we're going to have to come to grips with that.

But I think the other side of the coin is that the United States is in an ideological struggle with these extremists and I think that the announcement of the decision to close Guantanamo has been an important strategic communications victory for the United States and the response of the Europeans, their statements to the effect that -- by some of them -- that they would perhaps be willing to take some of these detainees, the reaction elsewhere in the world, I think, creates opportunities for us.

So I know that having a deadline is a concern to some people, but frankly, as I put it to somebody the other day, without it, we just keep kicking that can of worms down the road, and I think we need to come to grips with it and deal with it.

(UNKNOWN)

So if I may, to close, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, with respect to -- let's categorize them as the hardcore, the Khalid Sheik Mohammeds and others, that it is likely that we will have an alternative road to prosecution that will not include bringing the most dangerous of the dangerous to our own shores and in a place where we don't repeat the, I think, mistakes of after the first World Trade Center bombing, trying people in American civil courts that divulge the kinds of intelligence information that clearly inured to the benefit of those who wish the worst for this country.

Is that a fair statement?

GATES:

I think that what happens to the hardcore who cannot be tried is one of the issues that the executive order lays out needs to be addressed and resolved over the course of the next year.

(UNKNOWN)

Well, let me say I wish you the best in that and I don't make any apologies for the fact that many of us are concerned about what that alternative path may take and that I would have been far more comfortable with a decision, had we those in decisions in place before ordering the closure.

But I appreciate your perspective on it and, as always, Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for your leadership and for your willingness to serve. We deeply appreciate that.

And with my gratitude, Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.

SKELTON:

Thank the gentleman.

Let me recapitulate very, very quickly. There are five categories of detainees in Guantanamo. Category number one, those that we are willing to turn loose now and there's a problem in who will accept them or if they went back to their country of origin, they might well meet with serious trouble, torture or worse. Categories two, three and four would be those categories for which they may be tried in a court-martial, military court-martial; second, in a federal court in the United States; third, before the commissions, such as the commission that is now in existence.

The fifth category is the one where you have the hardcore, those that you know full well will go back and fight Americans and our coalition partners and what do you do with them. And you don't have evidence at hand to actually try them under the first -- the previous three trial categories.

That's a serious problem. Now, suppose, legally, they can be held as prisoners of war as long as there is an ongoing war, which, of course, in my opinion, will be a generational thing or more.

Am I correct in categorizing those five categories?

GATES:

I think that's correct, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Thank you.

Solomon Ortiz?

ORTIZ:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. It's nice to see you again and see that you're recovering.

As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, I am concerned that Congress has not been able to identify the single entity or person in the department for a whole picture view of how reset equipment leaving Iraq integrates with what the combatant commanders will need to carry out continuing operations in Afghanistan, while, at the same time, meeting the equipment requirements of a larger <Army> and Marine Corps.

I was just wondering what the administration is doing to address this apparent gap within the Department of Defense regarding the integration of reset planning and involving combatant commander requirements and operational planning.

Maybe you can give the committee a little overview for now.

GATES:

Mr. Ortiz, I think that, principally, the responsibility rests with the respective service secretaries; so principally, the secretary of the <Army> and, also, the National Guard Bureau and General McKinley.

GATES:

I think that's where the greatest bulk of the reset equipment is in the <Army> and in the National Guard. And so I would say the principal responsibility rests with the secretary of the <Army>.

ORTIZ:

What do you believe the Department of Defense role is or should be in public diplomacy and strategic communications. I know this has been a change of trying to get involved with other countries that for many reasons in the past we never engaged, we never talked to. Do you think that's going to be changing now?

GATES:

Well, there are two categories geographically that I would refer to. One is we are actively engaged in military activities and combat such as in Iraq and Afghanistan where strategic communications and information operations are an integral part of military operations and in terms of identifying the Al Qaida threat, the insurgent threat, what we are trying to accomplish with our partners and allies and so on.

There is the strategic communications aspect also in other places where Al Qaida has metastasized, whether it's North Africa and places like that. But it seems to me that on a global basis and outside of the special operations and combat operations arenas the principle lead in strategic communications ought to lie with the Department of State. And they ought to be the ones who formulate the principle themes of U.S. strategic communications and dealing with the rest of the world.

ORTIZ:

And going back to the -- I just saw a quote that maybe I should not repeat. But somebody from the State Department said that they had more band (ph) members in Department of Defense than they did in the State Department. Maybe that needs to be balanced out. I don't know where that statement came from or whether you saw it or not.

GATES:

I've heard that a number of times. I may have even used it once or twice. I don't know whether that's a true statement or not. But I do know one thing. If you took all of the foreign service officers in the world, they would not be enough people to staff one carrier strike group.

ORTIZ:

Thank you for your service, Mr. Secretary.

GATES:

Thank you.



ORTIZ:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GATES:

Mr. Chairman, I might, just for the record, correct on your first category of detainees. They would not be people that would be turned loose, but rather people who would be transferred to other governments and where we would have certain expectations in terms of monitoring or rehabilitation programs and so on.

SKELTON:

Thank you for that clarification.

Mr. Thornberry, the gentleman from Texas?

THORNBERRY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to actually continue along the line in some areas you've referred to in this new or at least added dimension of warfare. And I want to use as an example an incident that was written about in this current issue of Military Review, not because it's the only incident, but because it's been talked about publicly and I can ask you about it.

Some of our special operations folks with some Iraqi special operations folks conducted an operation against a JAM death squad in Iraq. And our folks were good. There was a shootout. You know, we didn't lose anybody. There were several of the JAM folks who were killed.

But before our folks could get back to base, there already appeared on the Internet photographs and a story line about what happened. And they had removed the weapons from the JAM folks. They had rearranged the bodies so it looked like they were praying when they were shot. And the story line was Americans broke into a mosque and killed these poor Iraqis while they were praying.

That all happened, was out on the Internet within 45 minutes to an hour, picked up then by wire services and American and Iraqi media, of course, before we had anything to say about it. As a matter of fact, I understand our response didn't come until three days later. And it had to be a Pentagon press conference.

This was before your time. But the issue, which you've talked about in a strategic sense, also gets down to a very operational level with strategic consequences, it seems to me. And so, I'd like your

thoughts on the importance of having a media, press communications element to every operation we conduct. And especially I'm interested in your views about the speed with which we deal with those issues.

If we've got to wait for something to go up the chain of command and get approved by this, that and the other folks, we will never keep up with these folks who regard this element of warfare. In some people's minds, they think that's the primary element and the physical results are second.

I see a quote here from David Kilcullen who says, "Information side of Al Qaida's operation is primary. The physical is merely a tool to achieve a propaganda result." It seems like we're going to be always behind if we don't have decision making at a lower level with the speed that's necessary to respond.

GATES:

First of all, in Iraq I think we do have the -- have devolved the decision making in terms of being able to respond to some of these things to lower levels. But the reality is, you know, we often speak disparagingly about our adversaries. But the reality is that when it comes to strategic communications, they are very 21st century. And they are far more agile than we are.

They tend to be able to operate inside our decision curve. And this is a big problem for us.

I will tell you that I think it's an even bigger problem for us in Afghanistan. And one of the problems there is when there are -- let's take the usual case where the Taliban have used civilians as shields or mingled among them and civilians are killed in the course of a coalition operation. That information is all out on the Internet and very widely distributed. And our approach in the past has been, well -- it's actually been very American. Well, let's go figure out what the facts are, and then we'll decide what to do.

And the guidance that -- what I told President Karzai the last time I saw him early this winter and what my guidance to General McKiernan was we've got to reverse the way we do this. The instant we believe there may have been civilian casualties, we have to be out there.

And instead of arguing how many there were or whether there were any, we need to say if there were innocent civilian casualties, then we deeply regret this. And we will make appropriate amends. Then go investigate it.

GATES:

Then find out the facts. And if we need to do something for some additional people, fine. And if we've overpaid somebody or paid somebody we shouldn't, that's the price of strategic communications, in my view.

But we need to be out there faster than the Taliban in characterizing these incidents. And so, as I say, I think the problem actually is worse in Afghanistan, certainly, now than it is in Iraq now. And it's something that I know General McKiernan and others are really working hard on to increase our agility.

SKELTON:

Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Taylor?

TAYLOR:

Secretary Gates, I want to first thank you for taking this job. I want to thank you for staying in the job. I think you've done a great job.

GATES:

Thank you, sir.

TAYLOR:

I applaud your forge towards acquisition reform, and so I would like to bring to you a specific instance. Last year, Congress authorized and appropriated about \$960 million towards LPD-26. We have a nation where steel mills are shutting down. We all know that the price of steel has really tanked in the past few months. We've gone from probably paying way too much to a very reasonable price.

Of the \$963 million that Congress authorized and appropriated, I'm told only \$10 million has been put under contract. I would ask you to encourage your acquisition folks to take advantage of these low prices.

And I would also point out to you that if there is something in the code that is keeping our nation from taking advantage of low steel prices, low aluminum prices, low copper prices, commodities that just a year ago were sky high that are very reasonable now, things we're going to need for the next generation of LCSs, carriers, amphibious assault ships, I would certainly welcome your recommendations and your help to find ways where we can get some bargains for the taxpayer.

The second thing I'd ask you to do. We've both been around this town for a while. The beginning of any effort is always very extensive, whether it's a fighter or a mine-resisting vehicle. The tail end of that run, we always get our best bargains. I am frustrated that the <Army> that's asked that we train as we fight, well into this conflict and several years after we started a major acquisition of MRAPs that you were very, very helpful on, still has almost none of them at our major training installations.

For a great many soldiers who are going into Iraq and Afghanistan, the first time they see an MRAP is either in Kuwait or when it's delivered to their base in Afghanistan or Iraq. And I'm afraid that we are needlessly losing troopers to non-combat accidents that could be avoided with the proper training.

Given the fact that we have manufacturers that are the tail end of that run that I think would be willing to make a -- some decent prices on these vehicles, I would again ask you and your acquisition folks to let's find a way that we can take advantage of the situation, get these vehicles to the training installations where they're needed, and do it in a way that not only is the best for the troopers but it's the best value for the taxpayer.

And if you have time to comment on either of those, I would welcome your remarks.

GATES:

I think it's really important -- now that we've got a lot of MRAPs in the theater, it is important to get them to our training facilities.

I would say the same thing, once we reach a certain level of capability with intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance platforms, we need to get some of those to places like Twenty-Nine Palms and to Fort Polk and places like that so that the first time that a battalion commander actually has -- trains with a real Predator or a real Reaper or something like that, is not when he's in theater having just basically done a simulator before that.

So I think getting these kinds of capabilities which, frankly, I have been pushing to the theater as fast as possible. Now that we have reached really critical mass on the numbers, particularly, on MRAPs, I think getting -- I think getting them to the training facilities is important because you have put your finger on a real problem.

These are amazing vehicles, but they are hard to drive, and we've suffered needless casualties among or troopers because of that.

TAYLOR:

How about on the -- on the LPD-26? I realize I'm catching you cold, but this is money that's been authorized, appropriated. I realize there's some reluctance within the Navy to say, well, you know, you haven't funded the whole ship.

GATES:

Yes. Let me find out.

TAYLOR:

In my book, \$960 million is one heck of a down payment and a heck of a statement by Congress saying that we're going to build this ship. And it really is frustrating that given the fact that steel mills are shutting in our country, that someone isn't taking advantage of these prices and getting this moving.

GATES:

I will look into it. I'm not aware of the specifics. I will say -- I don't think that there's a problem in the law. I don't want to step on into a debate about the F-22, but one of the things we have used the advanced procurement money for that the Congress authorized was to buy the titanium for all -- for -- a full buy for ten of the F-22s because if we -- if the new administration decides not to buy the F-22s, there are a lot of other airframes we can use that titanium for.

TAYLOR:

Lastly, what do you anticipate your shipbuilding request will be? Again, I think you've done a great job, but I've sat here for many years in here and the administration -- the previous administration said they wanted a 313-ship Navy but only asked for seven ships a year. The real life of that ship is 30 years. That only gets you to a 210-ship fleet.

And I would hope that this administration is going to take the steps to actually get us to a 313-ship Navy.

GATES:

Mr. Taylor, I'll have to wait and see what the -- what the top-line number for the defense budget for FY '10 is before I can really answer that question.

SKELTON:

Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Akin from Missouri?

AKIN:

Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman as well, just had a quick question. It's along the lines of some of the specifics that we get involved in, one of them on sea power. We've got a bunch of aircraft carriers, but if they don't have any planes to go on top of them, they're not quite as effective.

And I guess we're running out of F-18s. We've got the joint strike fighter coming along, but it still isn't there. Does it make sense to pick up some F-18s in a multi-year so that we don't end up with three aircraft carriers with no planes on the decks? Have you thought about that question or of that problem?

GATES:

I'll have to check and get back to you for the record. But my impression is that the Navy is interested in looking into doing that.

AKIN:

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes?

REYES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me add my thanks to you, Mr. Secretary, for your past service and agreeing to stay on.

REYES:

In your foreign affairs article, you state that we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as those that we're involved in today.

How do you envision institutionalizing a counterinsurgency focus within the department? And as a subset of that question, can you elaborate on the closeness with which DOD is working with our intel agencies and where that -- where you see that going?

And, also, the last part is when do you need from us in Congress to ensure that you have the -- all the necessary parts of support from us to make that happen?

GATES:

First of all, Mr. Reyes, I would say that I think there are two approaches to institutionalizing what we have learned in Iraq and Afghanistan so we don't forget again, as we did after Vietnam. The first of these is putting the kind of leadership in place that gets it and is prepared to fight for it.

And I'm enough of an old Kremlinologist that I believe in putting the right people in the right places. So I think General Casey is providing good leadership in this regard in the <Army>, but, also, the placement of General Corelli as his deputy, as the vice chief; General Dempsey as the commander of Training and Doctrine Command for them; General Petraeus at CENTCOM; General Odierno in Baghdad.

And <Army> officer can outlast one or two people he doesn't disagree with. It's a lot harder to outlast five or six. And so I think, first of all, institutionalization comes with having leadership that believes in the importance of what we're doing.

Second, with respect to institutionalization is figuring out the way to build institutional capability within the Department of Defense in which to fight and wage current wars. Right now, the -- as I indicated in my opening statement, one of the lessons learned is the Department of Defense is very good at preparing plans for wars. It's very good at preparing and, perhaps, waging short wars. But it has very little capability to wage long wars.

And so all of the really significant achievements that we have had in terms of trying to protect our soldiers, whether it's MRAPs or additional ISR capability or even the counter-IED organization all had to be done outside the regular bureaucracy of the Department of Defense through special task forces or organizations created by the secretary.

So we have to figure out a way, how can we, inside the department, inside the bureaucracy, have parallel capabilities of people and institutional that are committed to waging the wars we're in as well as planning for wars we might be in, in the future?

With respect to fusion of intelligence and the military, I'll just share with you that the first time I was in Baghdad with the Iraq Study Group in September of 2006, I spent about an hour or so with our chief of station. And I said, so how's the cooperation with the military. And he rather candidly said, oh, sir, you cannot believe how much better it is than when you were director.

The truth of the matter is there has been a revolution in the cooperation between the military and intelligence in Iraq and now in Afghanistan and a fusion for operational activities between intelligence and the military that I think is unique in the history of warfare. And, frankly, this is another thing that I think needs to be institutionalized so we don't forget about it.

Finally, in terms of what we need that you all might provide, I think that to this point, the Congress has been very generous when we have come up here with a need whether it's MRAPs or ISR or money for caring for our wounded warriors, you all have provided what we have asked and often more.

As we prepare the final part of the '09 supplemental and the '10 budget, I'm sure there will be capabilities and needs that we identify that we will be coming back to you for.

SKELTON:

Thank you.

The gentleman from Virginia, Randy Forbes?

FORBES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I want to echo what the chairman said in appreciating your article on foreign affairs especially when you talked about setting priorities. And many members of this committee that I have spoken with have a difficult time sometimes understanding how the Pentagon sets its priorities and, especially, with the Navy, how it sets those priorities, what calculus is used in what those priorities are.

Specifically, I'm concerned that many officials said that the 313-ship Navy is really an aspiration and sort of some changes in the way business is done. It can't realistically -- we can't get there.

Admiral McCullough, as you know, recently has said that the service could not afford to buy the ships and aircraft it needs. We know three major priorities, a backlog of shipyard maintenance, a hundred percent need that we have. We know a shortage of naval aviation aircraft, 100 percent need. And we know serious trouble in the Navy shipbuilding budget, 100 percent need.

The question I have for you is: As to the decision to move a carrier from Norfolk to Mayport, Admiral Robert Thomas, the director of Navy strategy and policy decision, who wrote the strategic disbursal analysis that was used as the primary basis of making that recommendation has specifically stated that no one, not you, not the secretary of the Navy, no one asked him to quantify the probability of risk that something would happen that would justify having to move that carrier down there.

And my question is don't you feel that it's a critical aspect of making those kind of decisions when we are setting our priorities today to at least ask the question about the probability of risk that we're trying to avoid. And if we're not asking those kind of questions, how do we have much confidence that we're making the proper allocations when we have such limited resources?

GATES:

I think that asking for an evaluation of the risk is certainly legitimate. I do know we have two home ports for aircraft carriers on the West Coast. I do worry about everything being concentrated in one on the East Coast which does receive a lot of hurricanes.

We had an aircraft carrier in Mayport until the John F. Kennedy was decommissioned. But I am absolutely confident that this issue, first of all, it's six or seven years in the offing, and I am absolutely



confident that this issue and the kinds of questions you're asking are certainly to be reviewed by a new Navy secretary. And I will review them as well.

FORBES:

And Mr. Secretary, I would thank you for that, but I just, again, want to point out that I think it's imperative we ask those kind of questions before we make the decision. And, secondly, when you ask Admiral Thomas, who wrote the plan, again, who should be the person to ask, if you ask him, he would tell you that the risk was so small that it was less than a 10 percent risk.

FORBES:

And they're the kind of questions I think we just need to ask before we're spending upwards of \$1 billion when we have so many other priorities that we have to have. So I just ask you to perhaps ask that question and get it in the calculus.

And with that, I'd like to yield to the gentleman from New York.

MCHUGH:

Well, Mr. Secretary, would you like to respond to the gentleman from Virginia before I make a couple of comments?

GATES:

No, please, go ahead.

MCHUGH:

I want to revisit just very briefly the very lucid description -- and I mean that sincerely -- that our distinguished chairman made with respect to the categories of our potential detainees, our detainees, in fact. What concerns me is the uncertainty that has been created here.

Boumedienne decision extended the right of writs of habeas to all of these prisoners. The added uncertainty, it seems to me, in the absence of being able to find nations that will accept these 50, 60, however many eligible detainees for release suggests that the possibility of their release by the courts into the United States is dramatically increased.

The other thing I would suggest to you, Mr. Chairman and respectfully, Mr. Secretary, the fact of the matter is our legal authorities, as I understand them, are clearly defined with respect to holding people

taken on the battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan. I mentioned the possibility of picking up Osama bin Laden in Pakistan for a very purposeful reason. And that is I would suggest our legal authorities in Pakistan are far less certain.

And I think, again, that uncertainty suggests that we need to have a policy in place. And a plan without a policy doesn't meet that objective. And uncertainty as we have right now is not tantamount to increased security.

So you may wish to comment on that, but I think the underscoring of the message is we have to begin to establish these policies, agree with or not, that the Bush administration had in place so that we can be assured that bad people won't be released into the United States and equally important when we take high-value targets, dangerous people off what we would consider battlefield, be it in Iraq, Afghanistan, be it in Jabuti (ph), be it in Pakistan to keep America safe. And I would hope you'd agree with that.

GATES:

And the only comment that I would make, Mr. McHugh is that I can't imagine a situation in which detainees at Guantanamo who were considered a danger to the people of the United States would simply be released here.

MCHUGH:

I would say I respect that, Mr. Secretary. And I'd also note that according to DOD statistics, we have in excess of 10 percent who were deemed safe and have returned to the battlefield. So there is no certainty. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Let me make it clear. In my descriptions, none of them would be returned or allowed to be released here in America. At least that's according to the information I have.

Before I call on Dr. Snyder, let me make a comment about the size of the ships.

There seem to be more recent, Mr. Secretary, challenges that have not been there before which calls for substantial navies, not just for America, but for our friends and allies, that the spectrum (ph) of the piracy in different parts of the world, particularly along the Horn of Africa. And that seems to call for keeping the high level of ships that have been proposed and wanted by this committee intact.

Dr. Snyder?

SNYDER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. I appreciate your service. I recall last year we had a very good discussion here with you and Secretary Rice. And if Chairman Skelton invites you and Secretary Clinton to come and continue that discussion about inter-agency issues, I hope you will take advantage of that because I think those are very important long-term issues.

I have several questions I wanted to ask. And I'm going to err on the side of brevity if you'll err on the side of brevity in your answers. First of all, the issue -- whether we're talking about a 16-month withdrawal of Iraqi forces moving into certain areas and replacing U.S. forces in Iraq, the issue of who protects our PRTs is a present one. Do you think that issue has been adequately solved, or is that an ongoing discussion about how best to protect our PRTs in those areas where U.S. troops are no longer the lead force?

GATES:

The plans that General Odierno has developed in conjunction with Ambassador Crocker foresees that as we consolidate our forces, we would also consolidate our PRTs in the civilian side of the presence in Iraq so that the two would be stationed together and our forces would be in a position to continue to protect the civilian element, including the PRTs.

SNYDER:

We had the issue come up last year that President Bush attached a signing statement to the defense bill. Mr. Skelton received assurances from Secretary England at that time that the Department of Defense would comply with everything that was in the defense bill, it was their intent to do so. Is it fair to say that your intent is to follow the defense bill as it was written, that we don't have to worry about sections of it being ignored?

GATES:

Certainly not from my standpoint, sir.

SNYDER:

Right. Thank you. I wanted to ask. The issue has come up -- and you're in this unique position, Secretary Gates, as you have often been in your life. The issue has come up about the term burrowing. A political appointee is towards the end of an administration. And it's happened to both Democratic and

Republican administrations, finding positions in the permanent civil service when they began as political appointees.

You're in a position to let us know -- I'm going to do this as a question for the record. If you think that it's been a problem in the Department of Defense where political appointees who really should be replaced by other political appointees have managed to interject themselves into the permanent workforce. Would you respond to that for the record, please?

GATES:

Sure.

SNYDER:

Thank you. The issue in Afghanistan, one very specific issue as we talk about what's going on now and additional U.S. forces coming in is what do we do with the poppy crop. And I know that one of the suggestions being discussed is spraying poppies.

SNYDER:

And I'm one of those who has great concerns if it's U.S. personnel and U.S. equipment that were to be involved in the spraying of the poppy crop. I think that has a lot of ramifications for our relationship with the Afghan people. Bad things can happen. What are your thoughts right now about the possibility of U.S. troops being the people that would actually try to destroy a crop of poppies?

GATES:

I think, certainly, kind of a coherent strategy or being done on an organized basis, U.S. troops are not involved in destroying the crops.

What they have been authorized to do and where both the NATO defense ministers last December and I, in a change of rules of engagement a few weeks ago, what we have done is, at the request of the Afghan government, where we have evidence that a specific drug lord or a lab is being used by the Taliban or supports the Taliban directly, we have the authority to go after the drug lord and the lab, but not the crops.

I would tell you, my personal opinion, crop eradication without having crop substitution in advance recruits Taliban. You can't go in and destroy a man's crop and give him nothing to replace it with or no cash with which to live until the next crop season and not expect him and his sons to work for the Taliban.

Our allies are opposed to spraying. President Karzai is opposed to spraying. My view is the likelihood of any significant spraying program is pretty remote at this point.

(UNKNOWN)

I would think that a loyal Aggie could figure out a way of something to do with a set commodity process for wheat or something to solve that problem. I appreciate your comment.

The last thing I wanted to ask about, more as a comment, is the issue that you've talked about at length in your report about acquisition reform, and it seems like we have the same problem on the congressional side.

It gets punted down the road. We all talk about it. Maybe one of the issues that we need to think about is maybe we all need to be doing it together more from the beginning.

You all try to do things. We all talk about it. Maybe we're going to have to have more of a commitment to kind of try to work along together, at least informally, because it seems like we've got a lot of work to do and a lot of money that could be saved.

I appreciate your comments. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service.

SKELTON:

Thank the gentleman.

I am told there are two votes, with the possibility of three, but let's keep going for several minutes.

Mr. Miller of Florida?

MILLER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, we're in the process now of debating an \$800 billion-plus stimulus bill.

Can you give any rationale as to why the Department of Defense did not take advantage -- more advantage of the opportunity in that package for military construction dollars?

It looks woefully small in comparison to some of the things that you probably could've asked for. Was there a reason why DOD did not do that?

GATES:

The guidelines we were given were that the projects needed to be those where the work could actually begin and the money be spent within six months or so.

As we looked at it, we gave -- we did come up with a pretty robust list that included additional work on military hospitals in situations where a lot of the preliminary work had already been done or construction was underway and could be accelerated, barracks and clinics and child care centers.

So we actually did provide a multi-billion dollar list to the White House. I would tell you -- and I've had many conversations with Chairman Edwards of the Mil Con Committee -- I am very interested, over time, in making a substantial new investment in our military hospitals here in the United States and particularly on large consolidated military posts.

I think that as we've focused on wounded warriors and so on, we also need to focus on the soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen who are stationed stateside in these large bases and sometimes the difficulty they have in getting access to high quality health care, and I think this is an area where we can make a contribution in a number of different ways.

But most of those are long-term kinds of projects and the environmental impact statements and other things that are required make them long lead time issues.

MILLER:

I'm specifically talking about some of the BRAC issues. You know, we have a 2011 deadline for implementation and it looks like some of the BRAC moves may be forced into a position where they may have to be phased in and may have to ask for some extension of time.

It looks like we may have missed a window to have completed a lot of these construction projects prior to that 2011.

And one other question. You talked about punting and now being the receiver. You talked a little bit about the tanker program earlier and you said, basically, once the procurement folks are confirmed and back in place.

What kind of timeframe do you think we're talking about, once they're in place, of getting this project up and running again?

GATES:

I would hope that we could get this process going by early spring.

MILLER:

And do you have any idea how long the RFP process is going to take?

GATES:

I think that what we have had in mind as a planning number is probably sometime, I hope, soon after the first of next year.

MILLER:

There are several programs, like the F-22s, the DDG-1000 future combat systems and missile defense, that all have been talked about being on the chopping block.

You're going to be asked to help prioritize some of these projects and programs. Can you let us in on what your thought process there is going to be in regards to -- you talked about the spigot being turned off.

But how are you going to determine what programs are scaled back or eliminated?

GATES:

I haven't gotten into the specific programs yet, but in meeting with the senior defense leadership, the philosophical approach that I have outlined to them is that I believe, as I have said in the foreign affairs article, that the most likely kind of conflict we will face in the years to come will be a spectrum of conflict from complex hybrid kinds of conflict down to a guy with an AK-47 or basic counterinsurgency.

GATES:

Some of our adversaries are now in a position to be able to buy from near peers the kinds of high end technology that we might not have expected to encounter unless we were in a conflict with one of those near peers, for example, some of the air defense systems.

So the broad philosophical approach that I have outlined is I want us to look for systems that have the maximum possible flexibility across the broadest possible range of conflict. In other words, I want stuff that is usable in a number of different kinds of environments, including, potentially high end as well as low end.

And I also want to go willing to go for low-end technology, for example, some of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platform we're putting into Afghanistan. But that broad philosophical approach is the underpinning to whatever analysis I will carry out.

SKELTON:

Before calling Mr. Smith, at some point, for the record, Mr. Secretary, would you give us some examples of the type of systems of which you speak on the high end that could be used in a more broad sense?

Mr. Smith?

SMITH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Appreciate your being here, and I really appreciate you continuing on as secretary of defense. No small task. It's very important to have the continuity that we have, and we really appreciate your service and that decision.

Just two things I want to touch on. You had mentioned in answer to a question by Representative Reyes the fusion between the intelligence community and the DOD in Iraq and also in Afghanistan. And I completely agree.

The system that has been set up there is working amazingly well. And I think it's an excellent model for inter-agency cooperation. I give particular credit to General McCrystal for having a lot to do with pulling that together. But I know others have involved and would simply suggest that, that would be a great model for some other areas where we need inter-agency cooperation.

Specifically, as I understand it, strategic communications was raised earlier. There are so many different players involved in that. In our government, finding a way to get them to work together more carefully could improve that. And I'm also very interested in the economic development piece of counterinsurgency.

Again, many different agencies involved. Some in the State Department and in the development world are concerned the degree to which the Department of Defense is getting involved in that. I think it's fine, but we have to try to pull all those pieces together. And I would just say that that's an excellent model to work off it.

The one question I have is on Afghanistan and, specifically, NATO's role and how we can work towards more cooperation and coordination. I think you would agree that there's been a lot of disparate opinions and missions in terms of our European allies and that we could get more out of the resources that are being implemented and we could do more to get everybody on the same page.

And I just wanted to hear a little from you about how we were going to get our allies and us closer to working better together on the Afghanistan challenge.

GATES:



I think that the -- our allies can help us in three ways. First is, obviously, additional military forces, preferably without caveats and national caveats. There's some indication from public statements and other things that we've heard that some of our allies, in fact, are prepared to be responsive to a request from our new president for additional help.

Frankly, I don't think the numbers will be huge, but I think they are prepared to do some more.

The second area in which they can really help us is in civilian trainers, both for the police and the <army> but also on the whole civil sector of society, rule of law and so on, governance and so on.

And then the third area is a financial contribution in helping to cover the cost of the rapid and accelerating expansion of the Afghan National <Army> and police.

SMITH:

Do you sense a willingness to do that? Do you think that there's an opening here with a new administration on our side to try to get some of that cooperation? Because I know you've been very pointed in asking for that help, and I appreciate that. But it hasn't yet come.

Do you think there's reason that we can have more success now?

GATES:

I think that -- I think that having -- that with the advent of a new president, I think there are some new opportunities.

SMITH:

And I also wanted to follow up on Mr. Snyder's question on the poppy eradication. And I support your answer. During the couple of trips that I've made over there, however, there are some within our government that are given a slightly different answer that seem to be more supportive of eradication. Now, I've also spoken with General Jones about this. He gave the exact same answer that you gave.

I just want to make sure you're confident that everybody, including the ambassador over there, is on the same page about how we proceed with that very important issue.

GATES:

Well, the Drug Enforcement Agency and those that it is working with do have a different mission and their mission is to bring about a significant reduction in the -- in the narcotics growth. Now, I'm not sure, frankly, where DEA stands now on the eradication issue.

The reality that we face is that 98 percent of the poppies in Afghanistan now are grown in eight provinces and they happen to be the ones where the security is the worst. So the nature of the problem has changed, I think. And one of the things that's been interesting is in some of the provinces where there was poppy growth even though it wasn't a huge problem, good governance has led to the eradication of the poppy crop in those provinces, and that's why there's been this concentration, principally, in RC South.

SMITH:

Right. And that is, obviously, I think, a much better approach to moving them off of the dependency on poppy is to give them an alternative, as you said.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SKELTON:

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will rush and vote courageously twice and come back as soon as we can so you can meet your deadline of 5 o'clock.

GATES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(RECESS)

SKELTON:

We will have a hard stop at 5 o'clock. The secretary will be leaving then. So let's proceed, five minutes, to five minutes.

Mr. Bartlett, you're -- Mr. Wilson instead of Mr. Bartlett, five minutes.

WILSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your past service and for your current service.

In particular, as a 31-year veteran of the <Army> National Guard, four sons serving in the military, three in the National Guard, two have served in Iraq, I have a great interest in the National Guard and I'm very proud of what the National Guard is doing and has done.

I've never been prouder. My former unit, the 218th Brigade, served for a year and completed last year training Afghan police and <army units. So I know the extraordinary capabilities of our National Guard and their dedication and their appreciation of serving.

But as we look ahead with the new administration, can you give us a view as to whether the National Guard and the Reserves will be used as an operational force, as they have for the past six years, or will they revert back to the historical role as a strategic reserve?

GATES:

Sir, I think that they will continue to serve as an operational reserve. We need them. They have, in particular, skill sets that we are very short of in the regular force.

However, I think that our obligation to them is to continue with our programs that will get us back to the one-year deployed, five years dwell time at home.

I think that my sense from talking to Guardsmen is that they have welcomed, for the most part, the opportunity to serve and feel good about the contribution that they have made.

So I foresee keeping them as an operational reserve.

One other aspect of keeping them as an operational reserve is that for the first time, as we backfill and reequip the Guard, we are equipping them with the same materiel, the same equipment that we're giving the active force.

So that instead of receiving sort of secondhand clothes, secondhand equipment, if you will, they're going to receive the same level of technology, the same kind of equipment that the active force has and I think that, in its own rite, will probably contribute to morale on the part of the National Guard, because they will be seen -- they will see themselves as an integral element of the entire national security team.

WILSON:

And on my visits, nine times to Iraq, seven times to Afghanistan, I agree with you, and then in visiting with Guard members upon return, they are very, very grateful and proud of their service.

And indeed, with the increase of operational temp and the blurring of the lines, the distinction between Guard, Reserve, active, do you believe that there should be a relook at the compensation package, which is different between the Guard, Reserve and active duty forces?

GATES:

I certainly am willing to take a look at that. This is the first time that somebody has raised the compensation issue with me. So perhaps we can get some particulars from you in terms of their concerns so we can look at it.

WILSON:

And part of the compensation, Mr. Secretary, would be the retirement and how it's applicable to age 60 and then we did make, I think, a significant first step of providing for less than age 60 for persons who have been deployed for a period of time.

And so I look forward to working with you on that.

Additionally, the circumstance in Afghanistan, you have recently changed the rules of engagement relative to the narco-terrorist drug lords. What has prompted that change and then what has been the response by our NATO allies?

GATES:

Actually, the change in the rules of engagement started with our NATO allies and a request by General McKiernan for the authority to be able to -- and General Craddock -- for the authority for NATO forces to be able to go after some of these drug lords and these labs that are providing the funding for the Taliban.

The NATO defense ministers, in December, agreed unanimously to a request from the Afghan government for help along these lines, when we could show that there was a link between the drug lord or the lab and the Taliban.

So when it came time, as those NATO ROEs were being put in place, some of our own people thought that our U.S. rules of engagement were not as forthcoming as what NATO had approved and so there was a need to go back and clean that up so that the U.S.-only forces had the same authorities as the NATO forces.

WILSON:

Thank you.

SKELTON:

Thank you.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews.

ANDREWS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your patience today and for your exemplary service to our country.

In today's statement, you say that -- I'm quoting -- "There is little doubt that our greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan."

And in your foreign affairs article, I think you're probably referring to Afghanistan, although it's a broader reference, when you write "Where possible, what the military calls 'kinetic operations' should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the disconnected from whom terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies."

I think that's incredibly well said. What tools do you think this committee could provide you with in the bill that we do each year that would help you win those quiet victories that accumulate over time?

Within our jurisdiction, governing the conduct of the department that you lead, what tools do you presently lack and how would we provide them to you?

GATES:

There are perhaps, sir, some specific areas where we could use additional help. But to tell you the truth, the real deficiency that the whole of government approach that I described in that article requires are principally in other departments, principally in the Department of State, USAID, but also creating an expeditionary capability in the Department of Agriculture and Commerce and Treasury.

And these are the places that have the expertise that bring those quiet victories that I was talking about.

We also don't have a way -- I've talked about the difficulty of coordinating all the different civilian organizations and various organizations, Iraq and Afghanistan.

One huge opportunity that I think we haven't figured out how to use to the maximum extent possible, something that I feel strongly about, is the number of universities we have that work in Afghanistan in agriculture and various other places, a lot of our land grant universities have people there.

How do we harness that with the U.S. government efforts and USAID and so on? So I think it's more on the civilian side of the U.S. government where we lack the capacity to bring all of the tools of national power to bear.

This committee and your counterparts in the Senate have really given the Department of Defense, I think, most of what we need.

ANDREWS:

Mr. Secretary, if you weren't burdened by the burdens of jurisdiction, and no disrespect intended to those who have run these other departments and agencies, what changes in the PRT structure would you make to make them more effective in the field in Afghanistan, in particular?

GATES:

Well, principally, it would be the addition of civilian expertise. Particularly in Afghanistan, a considerable percentage of the PRTs are actually staffed by people from the Department of Defense, often, many of them from the National Guard.

ANDREWS:

I recall a visit to Khost Province in Afghanistan about a year ago, where I believe we had two people that we met that were not DOD employees or military personnel.

They were doing a very good job, but it was almost by accident, because there were some agricultural skill sets that the soldiers had that, again, I think purely more by accident than anything else.

GATES:

I will tell you that our PRT leaders, the brigade commanders who work with the PRTs will tell you that even the handful of civilians pay huge dividends.

With their expertise, the kinds of things they do every day, they are a huge value added.

ANDREWS:

Well, we would certainly, to the extent that we can, encourage you and Secretary Clinton and Secretary Vilsack and others to work together and do that, because I think that your remarks are so insightful and so welcomed, and we thank you for delivering them.

SKELTON:

It may be of interest, I know the secretary knows this, that National Guard troops, particularly from Missouri, are helping a great deal in the area of agriculture.

And I spent Thanksgiving with them and there's a staff sergeant, part of the National Guard, that is a full professor at the University of Missouri School of Agriculture as one of the assistants that are helping the Afghan folks learn more about growing things.

GATES:

Maybe we should do this on a league basis, where you have a Big 12 PRT and a Big 10 PRT and...

(UNKNOWN)

Will there be an Ivy League PRT?

SKELTON:

Just so Missouri wins.

Mr. Franks, please.

FRANKS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Gates, for being here. I think you have a very challenging job transitioning from one administration and one commander-in-chief to another, because of the divergent views between different administrations and presidents.

And I want you to know I admire that. I think you were a tremendous leader in the previous administration and I thought you were very effective at advocating for the European missile defense site.

So I guess I have to ask you. What advice will you give the new president on the European site and what, in your opinion, are the implications for our strategic partnerships in Poland and in Czech Republic and even Russian perceptions if we delay or abandon this initiative?

GATES:

Well, I think the place to start is by acknowledging that the NATO heads of government unanimously, last April in Bucharest, endorsed the idea of the importance of missile defense for Europe and, in particular, a layered defense.

So I think we need to start with the reality of what our NATO allies have supported and what they have indicated they would do.

As I indicated in my testimony this morning before the Senate, I think that in parallel with that, there are perhaps now some new opportunities in terms of trying to persuade the Russians to participate with us in this program.

That would clearly please the Europeans, please our NATO allies, and, frankly, I think, the Russians -- in my conversations with President Putin and in other conversations that we've had with their military, I think they're actually -- if you put the politics aside, there's actually some interest in this.

So my hope would be that we could -- we need to remember where the alliance is, but I think there are also some opportunities in terms of reassuring the Russians with respect to the site in Europe, but at the same time, perhaps getting them to partner with us.

They've indicated interest in things like the joint data center in Moscow, joint use of radars. I think part of their problem is that they have a different perspective on how soon the Iranians can have a missile of enough range to reach Russia and most of western Europe, and, frankly, I think their intelligence is just bad, because I think our view is that they could have a missile with that kind of range in two or three years.

The Russians talk in terms of 10 or 15 years, and I just think that's wrong.

FRANKS:

Well, I think that's a critically important distinction, because the big thing about the European site is it potentially has the ability to devalue an Iranian nuclear program if it is brought online soon enough and I think that's a critical consideration to the world.

In your testimony, you stated "One of the greatest dangers that we face in the toxic mix of rogue nations is terrorist groups and nuclear, chemical or biologic weapons, and North Korea and Iran represent uniquely vexing challenges in this regard," and, of course, I couldn't agree with you more.

For nearly two decades, Western strategy on the Iran nuclear issue has emphasized the denial of supply and you mentioned other potential nonmilitary ways that you suggest the new administration should attempt to blunt Iran's power.

So my question is this: What we have not done in the last decade, what do we plan to do in the next two to three years to turn this around? In other words, what have we not done that we should have done and what do we plan to do in the next two or three years to turn it around?

FRANKS:



And if we find three years from now that Iran has just gained more time and more fully developed their capability, perhaps even to the point where they have become a nuclear power, which I think is a profound threat to the human family, what will we do then, Secretary Gates?

GATES:

Well, first of all, I think that there are still opportunities available to us. What we really require is for the Iranian government to determine of its own accord that pursuing nuclear weapons is not in their own national security interests.

One way to do that is to make it an extremely costly program for them. I think that the sanctions that we have put in place both internationally and -- and unilaterally and in bilateral partnership with some of our partner nations have had a real impact in Iran and I will tell you that -- that impact has been magnified dramatically by the drop in the price of oil from \$140 dollars a barrel to \$40 dollars a barrel.

It has just magnified the impact of those sanctions and they have serious internal economic problems, but I think we also need to talk to the -- talk about what are the consequences for Iran's security if they spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. What if other countries surrounding them decide that they also must have nuclear weapons?

I think under those circumstances, is Iran's security advanced by having nuclear weapons or is it -- is it degraded and I think we have a compelling case that we can make.

(UNKNOWN)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Secretary Gates. I hope we don't underestimate their resolve.

SKELTON:

Thank for the gentleman -- the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen.

LARSEN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gates, I want to ask some questions about China and change the pace a little bit and think a little bit more long term.

As recently as last week the Chief PLA Spokesperson cited a time of difficulties in the U.S.- China military relationship primarily caused by the Chinese opinion of U.S. arms sales in Taiwan. Short of reversing U.S. arms sales in Taiwan, which I don't think anybody -- very few people from congress would support -- what steps can U.S. and China take to demonstrate the desire for continued military to military exchanges in that military to military relationship, which seems to be cut short a little bit by the Chinese response.

GATES:

I think that we have some real opportunities. When I -- we just opened a direct hotline between myself and my Chinese counterpart about six months ago we agreed to when I was in China a little over a year ago.

I think that we -- we have had a number of military officers visit China. We started this strategic dialogue for the first time talking about strategic intentions and kind of where we're headed. This was something that I had proposed when I visited there as well.

Reflecting back on the value and importance of the dialogue we had with the Soviet Union during the SALT talks, if we had a better understanding of each other thinks about these strategic issues then maybe we can avoid mistakes and miscalculations.

So those things are going forward and I think here's another place where a new -- new administration here, a fresh start perhaps creates opportunities to -- to reopen the aperture if you will on military to military contacts.

There's no -- they've made their point about the arm sales to Taiwan. They warned me about it when we went there. They knew that it was going to happen and it's just -- it's just a matter of getting past that and on to the longer-term interests of both states.

LARSEN:

Yeah. And I think even -- well -- I think both -- both opinions are reflected in their white -- PLA's white paper: a criticism of it, but also a discussion about their military to military relationship with the U.S.

On that -- on that point one issue you discussed was cyber security and cyber infrastructure and not to -- not to point fingers, but it seems to me that the damage -- the damage to relations between 2 countries -- say U.S. and China -- seems to be greater than the damage than -- than -- greater than the damage caused by any cyber attacks against U.S. cyber infrastructure.

That -- that seems to be my view. I don't know if that's your view as well and if you could talk about the DOD's attitude to these intrusions and then for the record you can get back to us about concrete efforts for doing this -- doing to address that.

GATES:

I would say though in the context of the range of weapons systems and capabilities that we've been talking about here today and my view of them and sort of questions about high tech -- my view is one of the highest priorities that we need to focus on going forward and will be working with the committee on is the need to strengthen our cyber capabilities and particularly our defensive capabilities.

LARSEN:

Increasingly we've seen PLA forces involved in military operations other than war such as the peace seeking operations and the DU in offices (ph) and recent deployment of Chinese naval to largely off Somalia.

Does the DOD have an assessment about this particular direction the PLA and a -- do you see a day when U.S. and PLA forces might be serving side by side in some of these kinds of operations?

GATES:

I think that's conceivable. I think that the engagement of China and U.N. peacekeeping operations and the kind of multi-national anti-piracy activities off the coast of Africa -- this is -- this is constructive engagement in the international community and -- and I think we should do what we can to encourage it.

LARSEN:

Finally you mentioned the time-line -- this is a separate issue that KC-X Tanker you mentioned the time-line about an RFP in perhaps early spring and then maybe decision by early next year.

Late last year you responded to a letter from members of congress about your views regarding a split buyer or dual buy concept with the KC-X saying that -- I don't recall if your letter specifically said you were against it, but yeah -- it was basically the tone of your letter was a split buy would be more expensive.

It would be problematic to implement. Do you envision your view will change with the new administration or is that going to be -- is that -- will that be consistent with this administration as well -- no split buy on the KC-X?

GATES:

This -- this is not an issue that -- that I've had the opportunity to discuss with the new administration. I will tell you that I think that the idea of a split buy is an absolutely terrible idea and a very bad mistake for the U.S. taxpayer not to mention for the U.S. Air Force.

LARSEN:

Did you mean more...

GATES:

Mark me down as...

SKELTON:

Could you be more clear for the committee please?

LARSEN:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

SKELTON:

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 2 minutes and Secretary Gates, you're gone.

NYE:

Thank you, sir.

SKELTON:

Go ahead.

NYE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates, thank you for being with us today and congratulations on your reappointment. We are glad to have you on board.

I want to refer back to your foreign affairs article where you stated that we mustn't be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflict such as those the United States are in today and I was wondering how do you envision institutionalizing a counter insurgency focus within the Department of Defense and what do you think you need from congress to ensure the United States has all the necessary military in soft power to achieve these objectives?

GATES:

Well I think -- I think 2 ways. First of all by appointing the right people to positions where they can institutionalize the thinking about counter insurgency and low end or irregular warfare if you will, but second I think it -- that we need to think there is strong institutional and bureaucratic support in the services and elsewhere for the long term conventional and strategic capabilities.

We need to figure out how to build within the structure of the services and the Department of Defense in general the structural capacity to be able to -- to wage war on a current basis where we settle for 75% solutions in a matter of days -- a matter of months or weeks rather than the long lead time.

So I think it's both personnel and it's structure.

SKELTON:

John McHugh has a word.

MCHUGH:

Well, Mr. Chairman, as I understand that the Secretary has to leave us now and I just wanted to express my and on behalf of our side our deep appreciation if they gave purple hearts to civilian members you'd receive one for your stamina here today through two sessions in both houses and if I may, Mr. Chairman, I would just ask that those good members who stuck with us through this and have obviously important issues they'd like to raise with the secretary the opportunity to submit questions for the record.

SKELTON:

Certainly that goes with out saying. So we thank you. We appreciate it. We hope you have a speedy recovery.

GATES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CQ Transcriptions, Jan. 27, 2009

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# Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report



January, 2009

## Front Cover Image Credits

*Top Row*

#1 A fully armed MQ-9 Reaper taxis before a mission in Afghanistan.  
*U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Brian Ferguson*

#2 U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bainbridge Island stands watch over the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor.  
*U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer Mike Lutz*

#3 An Afghan engineer talks with a member of the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan.  
*Photo by Staff Sergeant Joshua T. Jasper, U.S. Air Force*

*Second Row*

#4 Wideband Global SATCOM satellite.  
*Air Force Image*

#5 SEALs in from the water.  
*U.S. Navy SEALs Photo*

*Third Row*

#6 The first Joint Cargo Aircraft presented to the U.S. Army.  
*L3, Alenia North America, Global Military Aircraft Systems*

#7 Operations center in Qatar.  
*U.S. Air Force photo by SrA Brian Ferguson*

#8 Soldiers in their M1A1 Abrams tank in Iraq.  
*Photo by Pvt. Brandi Marshall*

*Bottom Row*

#9 Marines conduct a security patrol in Husaybah, Iraq.  
*AP Photo/ U.S. Marine Corps, Cpl Michael R McMaugh, 1st Marine Division Combat Camera, HO*

#10 A B-52 Stratofortress flies past the USS Nimitz with two U.S. Navy F/A-18 Hornets.  
*U.S. Navy photo*



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## FOREWORD

Since September 2001, our Nation has been engaged in a multi-theater, long-term conflict against militant extremists who seek to erode the strength and will of the United States, our partners, and our allies through irregular and asymmetric means. As the Department of Defense continues to engage in ongoing operations, we must also prepare for our future challenges by learning from the past, building on the present, and taking advantage of opportunities to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of our institution. During the inaugural Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, we have leveraged previous defense reviews and lessons from recent operations to determine how we should change to better meet our institutional responsibilities and improve support to our national security partners.

In accordance with section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, this report identifies the Department's Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies. Additionally, this report describes how the Department's civilian and military leadership reviewed the rapidly-evolving roles, missions, and capabilities associated with irregular warfare, cyberspace operations, unmanned aircraft systems, and intratheater airlift. Together, we have concluded the Department must improve how we organize, train, and equip our forces for these areas.

Of course, the Department of Defense cannot address our Nation's complex security challenges alone. One of the most important lessons from recent operations is that military success does not equate to victory. As a result, during the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review we considered opportunities that will help strike a better balance between our Nation's hard and soft power capabilities. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review concludes we must improve our soft power: our national ability to promote economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, internal reconciliation, good governance, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more. Doing so requires exploring whole-of-government approaches for meeting complex security challenges.

While the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review lays a foundation for understanding the Department's roles and responsibilities in today's complex security environment, there is still much work to be done. As we move toward the Quadrennial Defense Review, we must continue initiatives that establish the right balance between winning today's wars and preventing tomorrow's conflicts while improving our whole of government ability to promote stability and security at home and abroad.

  
Robert M. Gates  
*Secretary of Defense*





## I. INTRODUCTION

**Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Objectives.** The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review (QRM) offered a unique opportunity for the Defense Department to further our strategic priorities by assessing responsibilities of individual components and evaluating improvements to the way we do business across our enterprise. Completed toward the end of the 2006 QDR implementation cycle, the 2009 QRM capitalized on changes the Department has made to its responsibilities, processes, and capabilities since 2006 and direction for the future established in our latest strategic guidance documents, including the 2008 *National Defense Strategy*.

From the onset of the Review, teams of senior civilian and military leaders from the Military Services, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Office of the Secretary of Defense worked together to develop a framework that defines and links the Department's Core Mission Areas with its Core Competencies and Functions of the Armed Forces. Additionally, teams of civilian and military experts worked together to assess high-interest issue areas and propose actions to achieve the Department's primary objectives for this inaugural QRM:

- Increase synergy across the Department's Components.
- Improve the effectiveness of joint and interagency operations.
- Ensure the Department continues to efficiently invest the Nation's defense resources to meet the asymmetric challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

This approach stems from our understanding that dealing with long-term security challenges requires the Department to operate with unity, agility, creativity, and in concert with our partners across the U.S. Government.

**QRM Report Overview.** Section II of this report describes a framework developed by the Department for assessing potential future roles and missions changes. This framework, which integrates traditional missions with new and emerging military activities, is the first of its kind developed during a defense review. Section III defines the Department's Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies, as required by section 941 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. Section IV summarizes the Department's insights and initiatives for four specific roles and missions focus areas: Irregular Warfare; Cyberspace; Intratheater Airlift; and Unmanned Air Systems / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance. Section V addresses the need for increased emphasis on effective interagency operations to address complex national security challenges.


During the QRM, the cohesive efforts of our civilian and military leaders and their desire to address security challenges from a Departmental perspective provided a solid foundation for continued cooperation in these and other roles and missions issue areas. While this report captures 2009 QRM results, they should not be viewed as the final solution for roles and missions challenges the Department and its partners face in today's dynamic security environment. Continued progress will depend on the capacity of the Department and its partners to take advantage of real-world lessons learned and our ability to work together to better integrate all instruments of national power.



## II. ROLES AND MISSIONS FRAMEWORK

The framework in Figure 1 summarizes results of the Department's efforts to define its Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies. As the framework illustrates, Core Mission Areas and Core Competencies provide guidance to the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command on the appropriate mix and scope of roles and functions to meet priorities of the *National Defense Strategy* and *National Military Strategy*:

Figure 1: Department of Defense Framework for the QRM



**Core Mission Areas** are broad Department of Defense military activities required to achieve strategic objectives of the *National Defense Strategy* and *National Military Strategy*. A Core Mission Area is a mission for which the Department is uniquely responsible, provides the preponderance of U.S. Government capabilities, or is the U.S. Government lead for achieving end states defined in national strategy documents.

- Each of the Department's Core Mission Areas is underpinned by a Joint Operating Concept (see Section III) that identifies desired effects necessary to achieve operational objectives, essential capabilities to achieve these objectives, and relevant conditions under which capabilities must be applied. Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) are a visualization of future operations. They describe how a commander, using military art and science, might employ capabilities necessary to meet future military challenges. In practice, JOCs establish context for the Department's force development planning and resourcing activities. This helps the Department identify military problems and develop innovative solutions that go beyond merely improving the ability to execute missions under existing standards of performance.



- Although JOCs underpin the Department's Core Mission Areas, they are not entirely Department-centric. For example, the Department informally coordinates with the Department of State and other agencies on concepts for irregular warfare, cooperative security, and stability operations. As we continue to evolve JOCs, there will be additional opportunities for interagency cooperation.

**Core Competencies** are groupings of functionally-organized capabilities associated with the performance of, or support for, a Department of Defense Core Mission Area. The Department's Components perform tasks and activities that supply these functionally-organized capabilities.

- The QRM determined the Department's Core Competencies correspond to the nine Joint Capability Areas (see Section III) established following the 2006 QDR. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs) are groupings of related capabilities that support strategic decision-making, capability portfolio management, and joint analyses of capability gaps, excesses, and major tradeoff opportunities. JCAs also provide a common capabilities language for use across the Department's activities and processes.

**Functions** are the appropriate or assigned duties, responsibilities, missions, or tasks of an individual, office, or organization as defined in the National Security Act of 1947, including responsibilities of the Armed Forces as amended. The term "function" includes purpose, powers, and duties. Specific Functions of the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command are captured in Department of Defense Directives.

**Roles** are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and U. S. Special Operations Command were established by law.

### III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CORE MISSION AREAS, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND FUNCTIONS

#### A. Core Mission Areas

The QRM defined five key attributes for the Department's Core Mission Areas: they represent relatively enduring missions; they are necessary for achieving strategic end states derived from the 2008 *National Defense Strategy*; they constitute a broad military activity; they describe a unique Department of Defense capability and capacity; or they identify a mission for which the Defense Department is the U.S. Government lead and/or provides the preponderance of U.S. Government capabilities. In compliance with section 941 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, the Department has established six Core Mission Areas:

1. **Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HD/CS)** operations help ensure the integrity and security of the homeland by detecting, deterring, preventing, or, if necessary, defeating threats and aggression against the United States as early and as far from its borders as possible so as to minimize their effects on U.S. society and interests. The Department also may be directed to assist civilian authorities in order to save lives, protect property, enhance public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. The Department provides many unique capabilities that can be used to mitigate and manage the consequences of natural and man-made disasters and must be prepared to provide support to federal, state, and local authorities.
2. **Deterrence Operations** are integrated, systematic efforts to exercise decisive influence over adversaries' decision-making calculus in peacetime, crisis, and war to achieve deterrence.
3. **Major Combat Operations (MCOs)** are the conduct of synergistic, high-tempo actions in multiple operating domains, including cyberspace, to shatter the coherence of the adversary's plans and dispositions and render him unable or unwilling to militarily oppose the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives.
4. **Irregular Warfare** encompasses operations in which the joint force conducts protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeat them through direct conventional military confrontation. Irregular warfare emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support.
5. **Military Support to Stabilization Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations** is assistance to severely stressed governments to avoid failure or recover



Two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from 2nd Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, fly the commanding general of U.S. Northern Command General Victor Renuart Jr. and his staff over Galveston, Texas and surrounding areas during an aerial assessment of damage left in the wake of Hurricane Ike.

Photo by Sgt. Nathan J.J. Hoskins, 1st ACB, 1st Cav. Div. Public Affairs

from a devastating natural disaster, or assist an emerging host nation government in building a new domestic order following internal collapse or defeat in war.

6. **Military Contribution to Cooperative Security** describes how Joint Force Commanders mobilize and sustain cooperation, working in partnership with domestic and foreign interested parties, to achieve common security goals that prevent the rise of security threats and promote constructive regional security environments.

## B. Core Competencies

The Department's Core Competencies, expressed as Joint Capability Areas, establish the link between the operational perspectives of our Core Mission Areas and the Department's capabilities development processes. In practice, Joint Capability Areas translate current and future operational needs to capability priorities, and form the functional structure used to prioritize, assess, develop, and manage capabilities across all the Department's Components. In compliance with section 941 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, the Department has defined nine Core Competencies:


1. **Force Application** – The ability to integrate the use of maneuver and engagement in all environments to create effects necessary to achieve mission objectives.
2. **Command and Control** – The ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander or decision maker over assigned and attached forces and resources in the accomplishment of the mission.
3. **Battlespace Awareness** – The ability to understand dispositions and intentions as well as the characteristics and conditions of the operational environment that bear on national and military decision-making.
4. **Net Centric** – The ability to provide a framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all Defense Department users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand and act on with confidence, and protects information from those who should not have it.
5. **Building Partnerships** – The ability to set the conditions for interaction with partner, competitor or adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities to affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities.
6. **Protection** – The ability to prevent/mitigate adverse effects of attacks on combatant and non-combatant personnel and physical assets of the United States, our allies, and friends.



Electronic warfare officers monitor a simulated test in the Central Control Facility (CCF) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The Air Force uses the CCF to oversee electronic warfare flight testing.

U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Carrie Kessler, 53rd Wing Public Affairs

7. **Logistics** – The ability to project and sustain a logistically-ready joint force through the deliberate sharing of national and multi-national resources to effectively support operations, extend operational reach, and provide joint force commanders the freedom of action necessary to meet mission objectives.
8. **Force Support** – The ability to establish, develop, maintain and manage a mission-ready Total Force, and provide, operate, and maintain capable installation assets across the Total Force to ensure needed capabilities are available to support national security.
9. **Corporate Management and Support** – The ability to provide strategic senior level, enterprise-wide leadership, direction, coordination, and oversight through a chief management officer function.



Marines with 1st Platoon, Echo Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment conduct a security patrol in Husaybah, Iraq, during Operation Steel Curtain.

AP Photo/ U.S. Marine Corps, Cpl Michael R. McLaughlin, 1st Marine Division Combat Camera. HC

### C. Integrating Core Mission Areas & Core Competencies into DOD Processes

As described in the 2006 QDR Report, the Department has expanded its use of integrated capability portfolios to balance risk and conduct strategic-level capability trade-offs. Accordingly, the Department has organized its governance structure for managing its capability portfolios around the nine Core Competencies/Joint Capability Areas. A pilot program started during the Fiscal Year 2009 budget process validated using JCAs as part of an integrated portfolio management framework. The current defense budget development cycle considered all nine JCAs, with specific program elements mapped to appropriate lead and supporting JCA portfolios. Additionally, the Department has assigned oversight responsibility for each of the JCAs to a Senate confirmed official paired with a senior military co-lead. The Core Competencies/Joint Capability Areas structure is now a significant part of the Department's requirements process. For example, the Joint Capability Integration Development System will direct all requirements documents to be associated with appropriate JCAs. As the Department fully integrates the Core Competencies/Joint Capability Areas structure, it will be able to better illustrate capability investments across the Department.

### D. Functions of the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command

The QRM examined responsibilities assigned by U.S. Code and the Secretary of Defense to the Services and other Department Components. A major aspect of this assessment was a thorough review of Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components." This document was modified to ensure functions are identified and assigned to appropriate organizations. These modifications stress the Department's continued emphasis on joint warfighting, and incorporate recent and emerging responsibilities in such areas as special operations and cyberspace operations.



## IV. ROLES AND MISSIONS FOCUS AREAS

During the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review, the Department of Defense assembled teams of experts to address specific roles and missions issues in the areas of Irregular Warfare; Cyberspace; Intratheater Airlift; and Unmanned Aircraft Systems / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.<sup>1</sup> The following sections capture the Department's common vision for each area and initiatives underway to increase synergy across the Department's Components; improve effectiveness of joint and interagency operations; and ensure the Department continues to efficiently invest our Nation's defense resources to meet the asymmetric challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

### A. Irregular Warfare

**Executive Summary.** The Department currently defines irregular warfare as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.<sup>2</sup> The Department continues to make steady progress toward incorporating irregular warfare into its force planning construct, influencing the size of the force and the capabilities needed to ensure the joint force is as effective in irregular warfare as it is in conventional warfare. Both the 2008 *National Defense Strategy* and the 2006 QDR codified this commitment to irregular warfare. The Department will continue to inculcate irregular warfare priorities into policy, doctrine, training, and education at all levels, while developing and sustaining a balanced investment strategy to field needed capabilities and capacity. General Purpose Forces (GPF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) each have roles and responsibilities for irregular warfare missions, with the force composition mix depending largely on the risk and character of the operational environment. To support maturation of our national ability to conduct irregular warfare, the Department, in collaboration with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, will explore alternatives that promote interagency cooperation, and improve the efficiency, flexibility, and responsiveness of funding lines and legislative authorities.

*The Department's vision is to shape the future joint force to be as effective in irregular warfare as it is in conventional warfare.*

**Irregular Warfare Challenges.** Historically, the Department has focused its efforts on the ability to defeat a state adversary's conventional military forces. However, the 2006 QDR assessed that while conventional threats will remain and U.S. Armed Forces must maintain the capacity to defeat them, current and future adversaries are more likely to pose irregular and asymmetric threats. The Department therefore developed a force planning construct (Figure 2) that recognizes the need to maintain capabilities to defend the homeland and prevail in conventional campaigns while concurrently developing a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which our armed forces have achieved for conventional warfare. This

<sup>1</sup> The Defense Department's leadership and members of the 2008 U.S. House Armed Services Committee Roles and Missions Panel identified these areas as high interest.

<sup>2</sup> In this definition, the term "violent" refers to the nature of the conflict and is not necessarily the prescription for a U.S. response.

assumes added importance, especially during an era when the character of warfare is blurring and military forces are likely to engage adversaries who use hybrid warfare which simultaneously blends conventional and irregular methods. Given this likelihood, the Department must determine the most efficient and effective balance between homeland defense, irregular warfare, and conventional warfare priorities.


The primary irregular warfare activities addressed by this report – foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and stability operations – occur across the spectrum of irregular and conventional warfare operations. None of these

activities are new to the Department of Defense. Many of the capabilities required to execute them are resident in some parts of the joint force, but may not exist in sufficient capacity to meet expected demand. In other cases, the Department needs to develop new capabilities, such as foreign language and cross-cultural communication skills, to address emerging and future challenges.

During the QRM, an Irregular Warfare Issue Team led by U.S. Special Operations Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities addressed initiatives to improve effectiveness of joint operations and create opportunities for efficient investment of resources for irregular warfare. The team examined irregular warfare roles and missions across Special Operations Forces and General Purpose Forces; the balance of responsibilities across the Active and Reserve Components; identified mechanisms to further institutionalize irregular warfare across the Department; and how to better integrate defense capabilities with those of our interagency partners and allies.

**Background.** DOD has achieved some success in institutionalizing irregular warfare across the Department in recent years. The Department has established irregular warfare as one of its six Core Mission Areas, and completed a formal Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept describing how joint commanders might employ capabilities to meet future irregular warfare operational challenges. The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept recognizes the protracted nature of irregular conflict and how it can occur in both steady-state and surge scenarios, just as partner capacity building can occur in both. At

Figure 2: DoD Force Planning Construct



Graduates of the first Ministry of Interior National Police Command Special Forces platoon perform a demonstration during their graduation ceremony at the Iraqi Police Academy in Kirkuk, Iraq. Irregular warfare increases demand for capabilities to organize, train, and equip foreign security forces.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ave I. Pele-Sizelove

the component level, all Services and several Combatant Commanders have established irregular warfare-related training and education centers. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has initiatives underway to institutionalize irregular warfare in the joint force, working with the Services, Joint Staff and several interagency partners. The Department is currently conducting a study of irregular warfare-relevant requirements in the steady-state, as well as in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare surge scenarios used for defense planning. Study results will allow the Department to identify and institute additional long-term changes to address irregular warfare capabilities and capacity priorities, resulting in a force that is better trained, equipped, and educated to handle the full range of missions across the spectrum of operations.

While these efforts reflect progress, the Department acknowledges it has more to do to achieve its irregular warfare vision. Gaps still exist in institutionalizing irregular warfare concepts and capabilities needed for future joint operations, and for operating in concert with our interagency partners. The Department will continue to develop a resource investment strategy that achieves the right balance of capabilities to meet future challenges across the spectrum of operations. While more remains to be done, institutional transformation requires time and appropriate resources. With the continued support of Congress, the Department will steadily improve critical irregular warfare capabilities to meet the challenges of a rapidly evolving security environment.

**Vision: Responsibilities for Irregular Warfare and Continued Institutionalization.** The Department's irregular warfare vision is to equip the joint force with capabilities, doctrine, organization, training, leadership, and operating concepts needed to make it as proficient in irregular warfare as it is in conventional warfare. The Defense Department's goals for the future joint force include two main elements:

1. A Department with increased and balanced capability and capacity to address all future security challenges, including irregular warfare; and
2. A Department that can better integrate with interagency partners to leverage all elements of national power to meet national security objectives.

#### Decisions and Initiatives.

**SOF and GPF Roles and Missions for Irregular Warfare.** The Department reviewed the roles and missions for SOF and GPF and concluded each has significant responsibilities for irregular warfare. As a result, the Department is continuing to define how Services develop and apply capabilities in different environments. For example, U.S. Special Operations Command, acting as the Department's joint proponent for security force assistance, is collaborating with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Joint Forces Command, Services, and Geographic Combatant Commanders to develop global joint sourcing solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces for validated security force assistance requirements.



A 7<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group Soldier instructs his Colombian counterparts in urban-warfare techniques. DOD will continue to institutionalize irregular warfare capabilities in SOF and General Purpose Forces.

Department of Defense file photo



- As noted in the 2006 QDR, General Purpose Forces will continue to support and play a leading role in stability operations and counterinsurgency, and a greater role in foreign internal defense. For steady-state operations, GPF will have an increased role in training, advising, and equipping foreign security forces, deploying and engaging with foreign partner security forces, supporting civil-military teams in stability operations, and conducting integrated irregular warfare operations with SOF. To do this effectively, General Purpose Forces will need a greater degree of language and cultural instruction to train and advise indigenous forces.
- The SOF and GPF force mix for conducting future operations will largely depend on the risk and character of the operational environment, not simply by the task at hand. For example, when operational environments dictate that the joint force presence remains unobtrusive, SOF will play a leading role. General Purpose Forces will continue to play a leading role in operational environments where a large-scale presence is warranted to provide security to a population.

Balancing Active and Reserve Components for Irregular Warfare. The global, protracted nature of irregular warfare will continue to place more demands on the Department's Active Component, Reserve Component, and civilian Total Force. To address this challenge, the QRM assessed the appropriate Active/Reserve Component balance to meet future irregular warfare-related operational demand. The Department concluded that persistent presence and sustainment of irregular warfare activities require increasing specific capabilities across the Total Force, including civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities in the Active Component force.

Key Mechanisms to Institutionalize Irregular Warfare.

- Oversight. The Department's Components have matured their understanding and execution of irregular warfare. While the Department assessed the need to designate a lead component for oversight of institutionalizing irregular warfare, we have determined it is more advantageous to use existing oversight structures and mechanisms for institutionalizing irregular warfare across the joint force rather than create new ones.
- Guidance. Despite gains achieved since the 2006 QDR, the Department has determined efforts to transform capabilities are not uniform across all of its elements. As a result, the Department has finalized a Directive that provides a policy framework and designates responsibilities for irregular warfare. This Directive will help lay the foundation for investments that will continue to build capabilities needed to balance near-term risk and long-term force development goals.
- Component Responsibilities. The Department is revising DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components, to incorporate irregular warfare responsibilities.
- Planning Construct. In order to further ingrain irregular warfare key elements into planning for the range of military operations, the Department will assess revisions to its

current campaign planning construct<sup>3</sup> to account for complexities of the environment and incorporate irregular warfare concepts for influencing relevant populations.

**Mechanisms to Integrate with Interagency Partners.** Meeting challenges of current and future security environments requires the concerted effort of all instruments of U.S. national power. Achieving unity of effort within the U.S.

Government is often complicated by organizational “stove-piping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well-suited for addressing the range of irregular challenges that cut across organizational expertise of different U.S. Government entities. Additionally, many interagency processes are oriented toward responding to crises, or surge scenarios, rather than supporting steady-state activities.

- The Department will continue to promote and participate in efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare in interagency planning. Initiatives currently underway include development of the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization led by the Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and the National Counter Terrorism Center’s efforts to lead interagency steady-state and surge planning for the war on terrorism.



A soldier from the 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division speaks with an Iraqi man while visiting a home for the elderly in Kadhimiya, Iraq. Earning the trust of the local population is critical to successful counter-insurgency operations.

Photo by Staff Sergeant Manuel J. Martinez, U.S. Air Force

**Looking Forward.** While significant progress is being made today toward achieving the Department’s vision for irregular warfare, there are still challenges to overcome. The Department must continue to address related issues with the interagency outlined in the “Interagency Opportunities” section of this report. With the continued support of Congress, the Department will achieve its objective of ensuring irregular warfare capabilities are firmly integrated into all aspects of the Department’s future force.

<sup>3</sup> The Department’s planning construct consists of six phases: Shape; Deter; Seize Initiative; Dominate; Stabilize; and Enable Civil Authority.

## B. Cyberspace

**Executive Summary.** Cyberspace is a decentralized domain characterized by increasing global connectivity, ubiquity, and mobility, where power can be wielded remotely, instantaneously, inexpensively, and anonymously.

Amidst the rush of technological advancement, the Department seeks cyberspace capabilities that maintain our freedom of action and that of our allies and partners while ensuring superiority over potential adversaries in militarily-relevant portions of the domain.

This environment presents enormous challenges and unprecedented opportunities to forces charged with defending national interests and advancing U.S. policy.

*The Department's vision is to develop cyberspace capability that provides global situational awareness of cyberspace, U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace, the ability to provide warfighting effects within and through cyberspace, and, when called upon, provide cyberspace support to civil authorities.*

The Department is continuing to transform to meet the challenges of this dynamic domain. As part of the 2009 QRM, the Department set out to define its roles, missions, and objectives in cyberspace through the year 2030. In particular, the 2009 QRM focused on the Department's roles and missions related to:

- Developing capable forces, equipped with requisite skills, training, education, and experience.
- Structuring forces and associated processes and procedures to effectively and efficiently execute Defense Department policies and priorities in cyberspace.
- Employing those forces to achieve desired effects across the full range of military operations.

The Department has determined it is appropriate for each Service to develop capabilities to conduct cyberspace operations. Improvements are needed in training and education to field a professional force, and in command and control for cyberspace operations. Initiatives described in this report represent current Defense Department responsibilities and challenges in this evolving domain. More remains to be done before the Department is able to fully meet its vision. Accordingly, decisions and initiatives reported in this section should be considered as waypoints to chart the Department's progress toward achieving our cyberspace vision.


**Cyberspace Challenges.** Our national security is inextricably linked to the cyberspace domain, where conflict is not limited by geography or time. The expanding use of cyberspace places United States' interests at greater risk from cyber threats and vulnerabilities. Cyber actors can operate globally, within our own borders, and within the borders of our allies and



A U.S. Air Force network systems technician reacquires the Global Broadcast System, which is part of keeping an uninterrupted flow of information streaming to a Combined Air Operations Center.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Christina Syer, 30th SW

adversaries. The complexity and amount of activity in this evolving domain make it difficult to detect, interdict, and attribute malicious activities.



Although cyberspace presents unique challenges to military operations, the Department has made significant progress in defining its roles, missions, and objectives in cyberspace. Additionally, cyberspace offers the U.S. military unprecedented opportunities to shape and control the battlespace to achieve national objectives. Because adversaries operate in the same shared environment, U.S. forces have the

ability to use non-kinetic options with new levels of global reach and immediacy against a variety of targets.

**Background.** The Department has officially defined cyberspace as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.

Experience from recent operations and global cyberspace incidents underscore the critical role cyberspace capabilities play in preventing conflict when possible, and supporting full-spectrum military operations when necessary. The Department has made significant progress in operations in support of Combatant Commands and in working cyberspace issues collaboratively within the U.S. Government. Interagency forums allow the Department to leverage authorities in an integrated fashion and to understand equities in the earliest stages of planning. These operations are governed by U.S. domestic and international law. Additionally, our understanding of threats to the Global Information Grid and the development of defensive measures has progressed.

The findings of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2006 *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations* (NMS-CO) laid the groundwork for many areas where the Department has made significant progress on cyberspace challenges.

- The 2006 QDR highlighted the Department's ability to operate effectively in cyberspace as a critical facet of our long-term strategy. The QDR set out several imperatives for the Department, including: capabilities to locate, tag, and track terrorists in cyberspace; capabilities to shape and defend cyberspace; and the strengthening of coordination of defensive and offensive missions in cyberspace across the Department.
- The NMS-CO and associated Implementation Plan provide a comprehensive strategy for the U.S. military to achieve military superiority in cyberspace. Combatant Commanders, Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and other Department Components use the NMS-CO as a reference for planning, resourcing, and executing cyberspace operations.

Outside the Department, we continue to work with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to better delineate roles and missions and enhance the Nation's ability to protect and

advance national security objectives both in cyberspace and using cyberspace tools. The Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (CNCSI) provides an important framework for U.S. Government cooperation and division of labor.

**Vision.** U.S. national power and security depend on our ability to access and use the global commons. As such, the Department seeks the ability to achieve superiority in military-relevant portions of cyberspace. In an environment characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid technological change, vulnerability, and minimal barriers to entry, the Department seeks strategic, operational, and tactical cyberspace capabilities that provide:

- U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace, to include freedom from unwanted intrusions and the ability to deny an adversary's freedom of action in cyberspace.
- Global situational awareness of cyberspace.
- The ability to provide warfighting effects within and through the cyberspace domain that are synergistic with effects within other domains.
- The ability, when called upon, to provide cyberspace support to civil authorities.

**Decisions and Initiatives.** During the QRM, a Cyber Issue Team co-led by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and U.S. Strategic Command addressed cyberspace issues related to developing, structuring, and employing the cyberspace force. To achieve the desired end states of our cyberspace vision, the Department has decided to pursue the following initiatives.

#### Developing the Cyberspace Force.

- The Department has decided to develop a professional cyberspace force able to influence and execute cyberspace operations with the same rigor and confidence as traditional Department operations in other domains.
- To mature this force, the Defense Department intends to learn from the new, innovative capabilities and experiences of our counterparts across the U.S. Government, in the private sector, and internationally.
- Internally, the Department is changing its Joint Professional Military Education curricula to include more classes and information on cyberspace to improve knowledge of this domain throughout the force and among civilian employees.
- For Computer Network Operations (CNO) specialists, the Department is increasing basic training capacity in the coming years. Our goal is to double the capacity of Department CNO training facilities to 1,000 students per year.

### Employing the Cyberspace Force.

- Internally, the Department is establishing adaptable, agile, and responsive organizational structures and processes that ensure resource coherence, integration of core functions, and optimization of cyberspace capabilities, while preserving Services' ability to field tactical CNO elements into their force structure.
- Externally, the Department will continue its robust cooperation with a broad range of cyberspace stakeholders. Consistent with the objectives of preserving U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace and denying an adversary's freedom of action in the domain, the Department seeks to build stronger partnerships with Congress, Federal Government departments and agencies, alliance and coalition partners, industry, academia, and other non-government organizations. Greater integration of cyber policies, operations and activities into exercises, discussions with allies and partners, within the U.S. Government and with industry is necessary to better understand the requirements and effects of military operations in this domain. The Department has much to build on within the framework of the CNCI and from ongoing international efforts.



### Developing Cyberspace Capabilities.

- The Department has determined its acquisition processes for cyberspace capabilities should be more responsive to warfighter requirements. While we have continuously sought to increase capabilities and capacity for achieving effects in and through cyberspace, we will continue to seek new ideas through diverse venues and forums, including combatant commander senior warfighting forums and experimentation, to define future opportunities and develop creative solutions for warfighters' needs.

**Looking Forward.** In a cyberspace environment of constant change, the Department must continually review its posture. It is clear we cannot accomplish all we desire in this evolving domain without significant assistance from a broad range of partners from academia, industry, and other governments. Collectively, with the support of Congress, the Department will:

- Continually assess emerging threats and existing vulnerabilities.
- Exercise our abilities to anticipate, predict, prevent and respond to cyberspace attacks.
- Build capacity and capability to take advantage of the opportunities and limit challenges inherent to cyberspace.

- Organize ourselves, within the U.S. Government, to defend national interests and advance national policy through cyberspace.

Thanks to a strong basis for private sector, interagency and international cooperation, the



Department of Defense photo by R. D. Ward

Estonian Minister of Defense Jaak Aaviksoo, left, talks about how he views the threat of cyber terrorism during discussions with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in the Pentagon.

Department's roles and missions in cyberspace will continue to mature. As the U.S., our alliance and coalition partners, and our adversaries learn to employ these capabilities in all phases of collaboration, cooperation, and conflict, we anticipate that the demand for effects in and through cyberspace will grow. This will require corresponding growth of the technical Defense Department workforce, expansion of our scientific and technological capabilities, and potential shifts in our traditional culture. Our approach to cyberspace must remain flexible as our understanding of the domain continues to mature, and as U.S., alliance, coalition partners, and

adversary capabilities to operate in cyberspace increase. The Department remains steadfast in our commitment to achieve superiority in the military-relevant portions of cyberspace.

## C. Intratheater Airlift

**Executive Summary.** The 2009 QRM assessed alignment of Service responsibilities for conducting intratheater airlift operations. Airlift operations performed within a theater span the traditional division between “general support,” which is normally provided for the joint force by an Air Force component commander through a common-user airlift service, and “direct support” conducted by all Service component commanders employing their Services’ organic airlift assets. At the conclusion of the QRM, the Department determined Service responsibilities for intratheater airlift operations are appropriately aligned, and the option that provided the most value to the joint force was to assign the C-27J to both the Air Force and Army. However, based on lessons learned from recent operations, there are areas for improvement. By changing internal policy, updating doctrine, and maturing concepts of operations to better reflect our intratheater airlift vision, we will improve effectiveness, increase joint synergy and minimize duplication of effort for this mission

*The Department’s vision is to provide both general and direct support intratheater airlift by maximizing the use of aircraft that have significant multi-use capabilities and are able to alternate between these missions.*

**Intratheater Airlift Challenges.** Responsibilities for the intratheater airlift mission have evolved over time to respond to the changing operating environment and fielding of enhanced capabilities. Most recently, lessons learned from airlift support to Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF) have reshaped our intratheater airlift vision. During the QRM, an Intratheater Airlift Issue Team co-led by the Office of the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and U.S. Transportation Command addressed all fixed-wing airlifters with significant theater capabilities, including the C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft being acquired by the Air Force and Army through a joint program.<sup>4</sup> The team’s objective was to identify potential changes to responsibilities, policies, doctrine, and concepts of operation to improve effectiveness, address current and future challenges, increase joint synergy, and minimize duplication of effort between the Services for the intratheater airlift mission.



Airmen finish signing forms after conducting a preflight inspection on a C-5 at Balad Air Base, Iraq. Strategic airlift aircraft effectively support intratheater movements for OIF and OEF.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ricky A. Bloom

### Background.


**General and Direct Support Airlift.** Intratheater airlift operations span the traditional division between general support, normally provided by an Air Force component commander using a

<sup>4</sup>The QRM assessed intratheater airlift operations conducted under Title 10, including Reserve Component forces operating as gained Title 10 forces. Traditional missions that are clearly organic to a Service component were not addressed (i.e., helicopter or small fixed-wing aircraft operations in direct support of a Service component in a “combat zone”).



centrally-managed common-user airlift service, and direct support conducted by Service component commanders usually using Service component organic airlift transportation assets (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: General Support and Direct Support Airlift**



**Evolution of Airlift Responsibilities.** The Army and Air Force first reached agreement on airlift responsibilities in the early 1950s. A series of memoranda removed restrictions on Army helicopter development and allowed the Army to conduct air operations for transport of Army supplies, equipment, and small units within the combat zone. In 1966, the Army and Air Force agreed the Army should fully develop helicopter capabilities, but barred the Service from major fixed-wing airlift roles. In 1986, another Army-Air Force agreement identified the Army as the executive Service for aircraft in units organic to the land force and employed within the land component's area of operations. The Air Force continued as the executive Service for aircraft that are most effective when organized under centralized control for theater-wide employment. Today, Service responsibilities for intratheater airlift missions generally remain aligned along the tenets of the 1986 agreement, as reaffirmed by an Army and Air Force Joint Cargo Aircraft Memorandum of Agreement signed in 2006.

**OIF and OEF Observations.** Recent operations in OIF and OEF highlighted three airlift issues of relevance to the QRM:

- The operational agility achieved by using airlift aircraft that alternate between intertheater and intratheater missions is a true transformation in airlift employment

concepts. This flexibility is achieved by improving the visibility of requirements and exploiting previously untapped capacity gained through arrangements with U.S. Transportation Command to support theater airlift operations as needed. This new, combat-tested approach is a model for improving intratheater airlift across the full range of general and direct support operations.

- Increasing distances in a more dispersed and non-contiguous operational environment challenge our ability to supply distributed forces. While this evolving operational environment challenges the capabilities of helicopters to provide direct support to ground forces, the need for direct support remains unchanged. As a result, the Department has determined it must look for new ways to employ time sensitive/mission critical airlift in theater.
- Starting with U.S. Central Command in 2004, the Department has been integrating a Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) into every Combatant Command's operating structure to coordinate and synchronize logistical movements and ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency of intratheater airlift operations. A success story from the U.S. Central Command's JDDOC is the ability to meld commercially contracted intratheater airlift options into the mix of airlift capabilities. Commercial contracts/tenders offer a flexible means to quickly expand and reduce capacity to meet the ebb and flow of movement requirements in theater. Commercial contract and tender options range from short-takeoff and landing aircraft for moving small loads and servicing outlying airfields, to large transport aircraft moving palletized cargo and rolling stock. In collaboration with the Air Force, the U.S. Central Command's JDDOC provides the means to manage airlift requirements and funnel demand to military or commercial lift providers based on expected capacity.<sup>5</sup>

**Vision for Future Intratheater Airlift Operations.** Future joint operations will continue to require robust general and direct support intratheater airlift. The Air Force, through a common-

L3, Alenia North America, Global Military Aircraft Systems



The first Joint Cargo Aircraft was presented to the U.S. Army on September 25, 2008. The C-27J offers significant utility to provide both general and direct support to warfighters.

user airlift service, will provide intratheater general support, while each Service will provide its own direct support using their "organic" transportation assets. The evolving operational environment, characterized by increasingly distributed operations and longer lines of communication, requires a suitable fixed-wing aircraft for intratheater airlift roles traditionally performed by helicopters. Mission-capable fixed-wing aircraft in a direct support role will complement other airlift assets and allow the entire intratheater airlift fleet to be employed more efficiently. Conducting simultaneous general and direct support missions using a fleet of cross-Service airlift capabilities will

<sup>5</sup> USTRANSCOM provides the contracting oversight for commercial contracts/tenders to ensure compliance with contracting requirements.

take full advantage of aircraft with significant multi-use capabilities. Some fixed-wing direct support aircraft, like the C-23B Sherpa, have limited payload and range and cannot support common-user airlift operations theater-wide. The C-27J, which is replacing the C-23B, has significantly greater capability and will be employed to maximize the overall utility for the joint force in either role.

**Decisions and Initiatives.** The QRM Intratheater Airlift assessment determined that Service responsibilities for intratheater airlift capabilities are appropriately aligned. However, there are opportunities to improve effectiveness, increase joint synergy and minimize duplication of effort between the Services for this evolving mission.

Supporting Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/MC) Movement Requirements. The Department has determined theater TS/MC movement requirements will continue to drive a need for Service-organic aircraft to conduct direct support missions. These requirements reflect supported commanders' immediate priorities for delivery of equipment, supplies, and personnel. In support of the QRM, the intratheater airlift issue team created a definition of TS/MC movement requirements (see Glossary) that states dedicated airlift capacity must be available and extremely responsive to meet supported commanders' immediate operational or tactical priorities:

- Accordingly, the Department concludes joint force commander direct support airlift requirements for a theater of operations cannot be routinely satisfied through a common-user airlift service.

Maximizing Use of Today's Airlift Assets. The Department evaluated four options for how intratheater airlift responsibilities could be assigned to the Services. These options ranged from assigning all significant fixed-wing airlift (such as the C-27J) to the Air Force for both general and direct support, to the Army employing all Joint Cargo Aircraft exclusively in direct support of Army forces.

- The Department found the option that provided the most value to the joint force was to assign the C-27J to the Air Force and Army. This will allow all C-27J aircraft to conduct operations identified in the Joint Cargo Aircraft Concept of Operations, with the ability to alternate between either role, regardless of Service alignment, similar to how strategic airlift aircraft alternate from intertheater to intratheater airlift.<sup>6</sup> A challenge to this approach is a need to gain requirement visibility and access to available/allocated airlift capacity.

Increasing Visibility of Airlift Requirements and Capacity. U.S. Transportation Command recently conducted an assessment of organizational options for Operational Support Airlift aircraft, which normally perform organic direct support missions.

- An assessment recommendation accepted by the Department is to employ the Joint Airlift Logistics Information System – Next Generation across all Geographic Combatant

<sup>6</sup> The Joint Cargo Aircraft Concept of Operations specifies the Air Force provides a common-user pool, while the Army provides Time Sensitive/Mission Critical direct support to Army forces.

Command theaters to standardize the airlift process and gain visibility over direct support requirements and available capacity. Shared visibility and joint oversight maximizes potential use of airlift assets while ensuring they remain under Service component control to meet TS/MC movement needs. Although this effort focuses on improving visibility of Operational Support Airlift operations, expanding it to increase the enterprise-wide visibility of *all* airlift requirements and operations is the Department's desired objective.

Common Deployment and Distribution Control Mechanisms. The Department recognizes the need for improving mechanisms to control deployment and distribution operations at the theater level to maximize airlift potential.

- To meet this need, U.S. Transportation Command, in conjunction with the Services and Geographic Combatant Commanders, is pursuing common supporting capabilities to enhance airlift aircraft employment and data visibility as part of a joint, integrated enterprise. One successful initiative is implementation of the Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers within Geographic Combatant Command structures to better integrate and optimize distribution operations.



U.S. Air Force photo by SrA Brian Ferguson

Operations centers, such as this one in Qatar, enable the flexible use of airlift aircraft to alternate between mission areas. The USCENTCOM Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center in Kuwait has significantly improved the ability to effectively and efficiently coordinate movement operations.

Updating the Joint Cargo Aircraft Concept of Operations.

As a result of the QRM, the Air Force, Army, and U.S. Transportation Command are updating the Joint Cargo Aircraft Concept of Operations and revising the Services' Joint Cargo Aircraft Memorandum of Agreement to fully embrace multi-use of the C-27J across traditional Service employment roles. Specifically, the Air Force will make necessary adjustments to ensure the Air Force C-27J can conduct Army direct support missions when requested, and the Army will make certain its C-27J variant can be fully integrated into a common-user airlift system when available/allocated.

Adapting Airlift Policy and Doctrine. Finally, the Department will take action to ensure its airlift vision and need to maximize the utility of intratheater airlift aircraft, including contracted airlift, is addressed through changes to policy and doctrine, including Department of Defense Instruction 4500.43 (*Operational Support Airlift*); Joint Publication 3-17 (*Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*); and Joint Publication 3-30 (*Command and Control for Joint Air Operations*).

**Looking Forward.** The 21<sup>st</sup> Century operational environment demands responsive theater airlift capabilities. The ability to provide a balanced application of airlift across the theater is the key to operational flexibility. Developing common capabilities and processes for sharing movement requirements and accessing airlift capacity provides the means to optimize scarce intratheater airlift assets, and will be a focus in the future. Continuing to bridge traditional boundaries for airlift general support and direct support requires sustaining the ongoing partnership between the Services and Geographic Combatant Commanders, and the support of Congress, to enhance joint operations and maximize warfighter support.

## D. Unmanned Aircraft Systems / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

**Executive Summary.** Persistent reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provided by Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) have proven invaluable force multipliers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, the Department has experienced a dramatic increase in operational demand for UAS assets. In response, the Department has significantly increased investment in new Unmanned Aircraft Systems / Intelligence,

*The Department's vision is to integrate UAS/ISR capabilities seamlessly into the Intelligence Enterprise in support of warfighters and the nation.*

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, sensors, payloads and architectures. Concurrent with growing demand for UAS/ISR systems, the rapidly evolving operational battlespace has led to new and emerging mission sets which present challenges and opportunities for developing, acquiring, and employing UAS/ISR capabilities.

The Department has determined it is appropriate for each Service to develop, acquire, and




U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Amanda Jackson

An Army infantryman with 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg NC prepares to launch a RQ-11 Raven UAS into the air. The Raven is a Group 1 UAS (see Glossary for UAS category description). UAS are employed at all echelons of command to meet reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition needs.


operate unmanned aircraft systems, while developing and implementing improvements to increase jointness and interoperability of UAS/ISR capabilities. During the QRM, a UAS/ISR issue team, co-led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and U.S. Strategic Command, developed steps to address challenges associated with UAS/ISR planning and direction; Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED); data standards and interoperability; communications architecture; and airspace access. These initiatives, which address improvements in oversight, integration, and interoperability of

UAS/ISR capabilities, will collectively achieve significant increases in the Department's warfighting effectiveness.

**UAS/ISR Challenges.** Warfighter demand for UAS/ISR capabilities has increased exponentially over the past several years, due in large part to the unique operational needs of ongoing irregular warfare operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These operations often require General Purpose Forces and Special Operations Forces operating in tandem to find and track mobile, elusive and fleeting targets, rather than traditional imaging of fixed, structural targets. Given their ability to provide a persistent aerial reconnaissance and surveillance capability against these highly perishable targets, UAS are increasingly tasked to support irregular warfare missions. UAS have surpassed 500,000 flight hours supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alone. The



**Growth in UAS Investment**



**Growth in UAS Deployments**

significant increase in demand for UAS/ISR capabilities is also driven by our military's ability and need to engage targets with high precision around the globe. The Department continues to progress toward meeting increased demand for UAS/ISR capabilities. For example, the number of deployed UAS has increased from approximately 167 aircraft in 2002 to over 6,000 in 2008, while defense investment in UAS capabilities has dramatically grown from \$284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to \$2.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2008. While it is clear warfighters understand the essential capabilities

UAS deliver to the fight, it is also clear that new missions and future applications present long-term challenges and opportunities for the development, acquisition and employment of these critical systems.

**UAS/ISR Vision.** The future vision for UAS/ISR capabilities is in concert with the 2008 *Defense Intelligence Strategy*, which calls for a fully and seamlessly integrated Intelligence Enterprise. To achieve this vision, UAS/ISR capabilities must be developed, acquired, and operated in a manner which allows full integration of collected intelligence from the tactical to national levels. The Department will continue to provide direction and advocacy to coordinate UAS/ISR development and acquisition across the Services, Combat Support Agencies, Combatant Commands, and our interagency partners. Future UAS/ISR capability enhancements will focus on increasing aircraft performance and improving communications, data links, and weapon and sensor payloads.

**Decisions and Initiatives.** The Department has determined the following initiatives hold the most potential for significantly enhancing warfighting effectiveness and avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.

Planning and Direction for ISR Support to Warfighters.

The Defense Department has well-established processes for determining joint force priorities. However, the highly dynamic environment of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with other new and emerging requirements, have stressed our ability to plan for and provide sufficient UAS/ISR capabilities. Recognizing this, the Department has developed new, more responsive oversight, guidance development, and planning structures and processes. These changes will help the Department better define joint UAS/ISR priorities and integrate multi-mission capable UAS/ISR collection, processing, exploitation, analyses and dissemination activities.



An RQ-8A Fire Scout (Group 4 UAS) Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) System prepares to land aboard the amphibious transport dock ship USS Nashville (LPD 13).

U.S. Navy photo by Kurt Lengfield

- In concert with the Department's Joint Capability Integration and Development System, the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management process identifies and mitigates ISR capability gaps. Leveraging these processes, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and U.S. Strategic Command, as the warfighters' ISR

proponents, work together to champion resources needed to meet Combatant Commanders' UAS/ISR priorities.

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to lead a UAS Task Force to develop initiatives that will enhance operations, enable interdependencies across the Department's Components, and streamline UAS acquisition. Additionally, the Department chartered the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint UAS Center of Excellence to support Combatant Commanders and Military Departments by facilitating development and integration of common UAS operating standards, capabilities, doctrine and training.



A fully armed MQ-9 Reaper (Group 5 UAS) taxis before a mission in Afghanistan. The MQ-9 Reaper provides persistent surveillance and target engagement capabilities to warfighters in Iraq and Afghanistan.

U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Brian Ferguson

- A Department of Defense ISR Task Force is focused on leveraging all elements of the Intelligence Community to rapidly acquire and deploy ISR assets in support of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Central Command operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ISR Task Force is integrating ISR and strike capabilities while working toward mainstreaming and institutionalizing UAS/ISR related processes in the Department's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution cycle.
- U.S. Strategic Command is leading efforts to develop an ISR Force Sizing Construct for the Department. This initiative will develop a sound analytical foundation for future ISR allocation and procurement decisions.
- The Department has completed a Persistent ISR Joint Capabilities Document which identifies needed improvements to provide joint force commanders with more effective capabilities. The two highest priority capability gaps identified are attaining broad visibility and traceability throughout the intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution process, and improving multi-intelligence collection strategies in support of joint force commanders.
- In October 2007, the Department took a major step toward improving the Defense ISR Operations Enterprise by integrating functions performed by U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Functional Component Command for ISR and the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center to form the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC). The DIOCC is responsible for validating, recommending priorities, and registering defense intelligence collection requirements, including UAS/ISR requirements, with the Intelligence Community. As the DIOCC continues to mature, its alignment with the National Intelligence Coordination Center will improve their rapid synchronization and timely operational support to Combatant Commanders.

**Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (TPED).** TPED comprises the people, processes, and systems that transform collected data into operationally executable intelligence.

TPED enables warfighters to request collection and intelligence products tailored to meet their operational needs. TPED is vital to the effectiveness of any ISR system, and TPED implications must be considered when planning UAS acquisition and employment. Currently, requirements for UAS-derived actionable intelligence outpace TPED capacity, and future projections suggest this mismatch will continue temporarily. Over time, multiple TPED processes have been created to support UAS operations.

Furthermore, the breadth of current and emerging UAS/ISR missions have caused TPED processes and systems associated with each intelligence discipline (signals, imaging, etc.) to differ across the Services, Combat Support Agencies, and from national to tactical assets and applications. As a result, the Department's ability to accurately define TPED mission needs has not kept pace with the rapid development and employment of UAS/ISR capabilities. Accordingly:



An imagery analyst at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia reviews previous damage assessments from Hurricane Katrina between contingency taskings from U.S. Central Command. Reach-back exploitation analysts provide tailored intelligence products to customers including SOF and domestic disaster relief agencies.

U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sergeant Steve Goetsch


- The Department is leading a comprehensive effort to redefine TPED in order to enable Services and Combat Support Agencies to develop and operate the various TPED systems using common standards and rule sets. The Joint Staff, as part of the ISR Task Force, is addressing TPED issues and concerns across the Services, including capacity, manpower, storage requirements, technology, and exploitation/dissemination timeliness. The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint UAS Center of Excellence will work with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to review UAS TPED-related tasks to establish basic training qualifications, standards, and objectives. Ultimately, the Department will establish a community-wide definition of TPED to support development of concept of operations, joint doctrine, and capability requirements documentation.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the Services, is sponsoring an annual Empire Challenge capability demonstration that provides a venue for UAS, ground station and TPED interoperability assessment. Empire Challenge provides a key opportunity to identify and correct interoperability issues uncovered during this month long series of test events.

**Data Standards and Platform Interoperability.** As Services and Defense Agencies develop UAS/ISR capabilities, collected data formats and transmission protocols must be standardized to ensure UAS/ISR platforms become truly interoperable with joint and service TPED architectures. Effective sensor data and metadata formats and standards will promote interoperability between the databases and ground stations—such as the Distributed Common Ground System—used by Combat Support Agencies, Services, Intelligence Community, and interagency partners. These systems are crucial to sharing data from national to tactical levels of operation.



- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in concert with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is developing a joint acquisition approach to satisfy warfighter requirements. This approach will capture the benefits of standardized platforms, communications and logistics.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and UAS Task Force, is addressing the need for a Joint Capabilities Document for UAS Interoperability to resolve UAS/ISR interoperability issues. This document will create the foundation that will lead to identification of information and communications architectures, sensor data and interoperability standards and provide a link to a Joint UAS Concept of Operations.

Communications Architecture. UAS/ISR relies heavily on communications to command and control aircraft and sensors for disseminating collected data. As the number of deployed UAS increase, more communication links, bandwidth and spectrum, and protected communications paths are required. Meeting the resultant frequency spectrum demand is a significant challenge. Furthermore, to meet increased warfighter demands for ISR support, the Services have developed methods for employing UAS tailored to their individual operating environments. However, one Service's methods may not be consistent with other Service or joint communications architectures. While Service-specific methods have delivered capability to warfighters, a more comprehensive approach will ensure communication demands are better managed to improve interoperability and cross-Service support, especially when satellite support is constrained or not possible. Accordingly:



Airmen prepare to land an MQ-1 Predator (Group 4 UAS) at Ali AB Iraq. UAS/ISR operations rely upon robust communications architectures for command, control, and data dissemination.


U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Christopher Griffin

- The UAS Task Force has identified the need to: (1) ensure effective spectrum planning and guidelines are incorporated into all UAS development efforts; and (2) Service and joint oversight verify compliance with these guidelines.
- The Department is expanding its Airborne Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Model to include all those entities requiring connection to the communications architecture. This change will better enable the Department to model and plan for dynamic communications architecture requirements.

Airspace Access for Operational and Training Missions. Combat effectiveness of our joint warfighters requires UAS to operate safely, efficiently, and have readily-available access to the National Airspace System. By 2013, the Services estimate they will require over one million flight hours for UAS operational and training missions. Due to high mission demands and limited restricted airspace availability, the majority of UAS flight hours will be accomplished outside of restricted airspace. Accordingly, the Department is seeking to better define technological, procedural, and standardized training qualifications to ensure UAS have access to appropriate classes of airspace to fulfill Service and national needs. This effort will require a

concerted approach by the Department working alongside federal, state and civilian organizations. In support of this objective:

- The UAS Task Force is developing an 18 month plan that focuses on alleviating flight restrictions for all classes of UAS and supports near-term Service operational and training requirements in the National Airspace System.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint UAS Center of Excellence is leading a coordinated review of current and future Department UAS airspace access requirements for all classes of UAS, and leading a Service review to develop a minimum set of UAS pilot/operator qualification requirements and/or standards to operate in the National Airspace System.
- U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint UAS Center of Excellence has identified three areas necessary to ensure access to applicable classes of the National Airspace System: (1) Airworthiness Certification; (2) establishment of standardized basic UAS qualifications consistent with Federal Aviation Administration guidelines for each class of airspace; and (3) development of sense and avoid technology. Working with the Services, the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint UAS Center of Excellence will ensure these areas are addressed during UAS development.



An RQ-4 Global Hawk (Group 5 UAS) unmanned aerial vehicle is towed back to its hangar following a mission at a deployed location in Southwest Asia. The Global Hawk requires access to all classes of airspace for the conduct of operational and training missions.

U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sergeant Jason Tudor

**Looking Forward.** Capabilities provided by UAS are essential to today's warfighters. With newly emerging UAS missions and still-maturing ISR applications, the Department is aggressively pursuing opportunities to improve development, acquisition and employment of UAS. The Department's vision of seamlessly integrating UAS/ISR capabilities into the Intelligence Enterprise requires developing interagency and Congressional partnerships to increase airspace access and improve communications connectivity around the globe. Additionally, the Defense Department must better integrate its capabilities with growing UAS efforts of other federal agencies and partner nations. With the support of the Congress, the Department will continue to appropriately resource UAS platforms and associated TPED support to meet growing warfighter demand for ISR capabilities.



An RQ-7B Shadow (Group 3 UAS) begins its landing sequence following a flight to provide troops operating in Iraq with another set of eyes. Shadows are employed by the Marine Corps and Army.

U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Amanda McBride



## V. The Road Ahead: Interagency Opportunities

Today's complex security environment places increased demands on the capabilities and resources of departments and agencies across the U.S. Government. Individually, departments and agencies are not as effective as when we unify our actions toward achieving a common vision. The Department


strongly supports initiatives to increase unity of effort across the government for addressing our common national security problems. While significant progress toward this end has

*The Department's vision is to support maturation of whole-of-government approaches to national security problems. Solutions to address strategic and operational security challenges will be based on employing integrated flexible, mutually-supporting interagency capabilities.*

been made over the past five years, continued improvement requires a sustained focus on developing whole-of-government strategies and plans, as well as addressing operational seams between military and civilian agencies. During the QRM, the Department explored interagency issues and problems associated with key national security challenges, including cooperative security, stability operations, irregular warfare, and homeland defense and civil support. While these activities are core mission areas for the Department, they require substantial military and civilian interaction. QRM results affirm our need to continue to strongly support initiatives to build a cohesive, whole-of-government approach to our Nation's enduring security challenges.

**Vision.** The Department supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing national security challenges. The desired end state is for U.S. Government national security partners to develop plans and conduct operations from a shared perspective. Toward this end, the Department will continue to work with its interagency partners to plan, organize, train, and employ integrated, mutually-supporting capabilities to achieve unified action at home and abroad.

- An essential element of this vision is establishing a coherent framework for developing whole-of-government approaches for addressing national security challenges. A framework that includes commonly understood strategic concepts, operational principles, relationships between agencies, and roles and responsibilities would help delineate how to best coordinate and synchronize efforts as well as transition between military-led and civilian-led activities during operations.
- As proposed by the 2006 QDR, whole-of-government national security planning would be facilitated by publishing an authoritative national-level strategic guidance document that addresses interagency roles and responsibilities, resolves seam issues between agencies, and establishes priorities for planning and development of each organization's capabilities.



An Afghan engineer talks with a member of the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team at a metal working shop in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. The team assesses community needs and builds schools, government centers, roads, medical facilities and basic infrastructure throughout the area.


Photo by Staff Sergeant Joshua T. Jasper, U.S. Air Force

- Perhaps the most important critical element of this vision is the human dimension – developing a federal workforce trained and educated in a manner that fosters mutual understanding across agencies, expands knowledge of other agencies’ roles and missions, and increases opportunities for building relationships across the Federal Government as well as with state and local governments.

**Initiatives.** As summarized throughout this report, the Department is pursuing initiatives to address our internal roles and missions issues. However, QRM results also reinforce the need for the Department to continue to work with our national security partners on complex roles and missions seam issues. To advance whole-of-government solutions, the Department strongly supports the following initiatives.

Strategic and Operational Planning. Several ongoing initiatives will improve how the interagency conducts national level planning.

- The Department of Defense and Department of State, in coordination with other agencies, are building an interagency planning framework to provide a prevention, response, and contingency capability to address foreign states at risk or in the process of instability, collapse, or post-conflict recovery.
  - This initiative to develop a whole-of-government planning approach and supporting tools are the result of National Security Presidential Directive 44 (and is now authorized under Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act). Led by the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, this planning framework is supported by the Interagency Management System (IMS), which provides a structure for civilian planning and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization activities at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. The IMS structure is also built to interface and integrate with existing military organizations when necessary. The capacity for the IMS is provided by the Department of State’s as yet fully implemented or funded Civilian Stabilization Initiative, of which the Civilian Response Corps was recently partially funded via supplemental appropriation.
- The Department is working with the U.S. Agency for International Development to improve collaboration, coordination, and synchronization of existing foreign-based strategic guidance and operational plans to take advantage of lessons learned from recent operations. The newly published U.S. Agency for International Development “Civil-Military Cooperation Policy,” which calls for improved coordination with the military, demonstrates significant potential. The Department of Defense will continue to support this positive step towards creation of mutually supportive development-based and military-based plans.



A Civil Affair unit member with the Parwan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) hands out toys at a school opening in Kabul, Afghanistan.

U.S. Army photo by Spc. Thomas Bray

- For homeland security, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are establishing a pilot Task Force for Emergency Readiness consisting of a small group of interagency planners to develop plans that ensure a whole-of-government response to disasters. The task force will integrate local, state, and federal organizations, as well as the private sector. The pilot task force will begin in five states within the next calendar year.
- At the national level, the Department supports development of a whole-of-government strategic planning document that outlines national objectives, priorities and specific actions for improving interagency coordination and operational planning.

**Concept Development.** Over the last several years, the Department has developed Joint Operating Concepts that propose future interagency activities, including concepts for cooperative security, irregular warfare, stability operations and homeland defense and civil support. These JOCs were developed in informal collaboration with the Department of State and other agencies. Although they incorporate a broader interagency perspective than previous Department-centric documents, there are opportunities for continued improvement, to include conducting comprehensive whole-of-government capability and capacity gap analyses across all lines of operation.

- The Department of Defense advocates establishing a formal forum for collaborating with other elements of the U.S. Government on Joint Operating Concepts. The objective is to continue to evolve JOCs into truly whole-of-government concepts that would better define responsibilities across the whole-of-government, such as border security, disaster relief operations abroad, and domestic counterterrorism security programs, among other shared security challenges.

**Authorities and Resources.** Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act Section 1206 “Global Train and Equip” and Section 1207 “Security and Stabilization Assistance” authorities have proven highly effective at combining assets to address urgent national security problems. These programs recognize the need to augment, not supplant, what other agencies can bring to the table – particularly the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development – with Defense Department capabilities that address mutual needs in the field.



A member of the U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) provides medical care during hurricane relief operations in Haiti. The Department of Defense advocates expanding whole-of-government collaboration on concepts such as disaster relief operations abroad.

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Hileanne Buda/Released

- Internally, the Department will continue developing capabilities for stabilization, reconstruction, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency operations supported by force growth initiatives, new doctrine, operational concepts, adjusting roles of the civilian work force, and enhancing training and education.

- Externally, the Department will continue to collaborate with the Congress and Department of State to explore new authorities that would better integrate capabilities and funding priorities for these shared missions.
- The Department of Defense strongly supports the State Department's Civilian Stabilization Initiative budget request to continue development of expeditionary civilian capabilities in eight U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Interagency Secure Communications Challenges. While all agencies can communicate on unclassified networks, not all agencies and departments required to plan and conduct operations together are able to communicate with each other on classified networks. For example, information sharing between Federal Government departments and local/state entities involved with homeland security is predominately over unclassified networks. Similarly, information sharing concerning other threats, emergency and disaster management, planning, and other domestic security and response is underdeveloped.

- In cooperation with its interagency partners, the Department will continue to aggressively pursue solutions that ensure it can communicate over classified networks with critical domestic partners.

National Security Professional Development. Many lingering challenges between interagency staffs may be partially attributable to a lack of understanding and appreciation of each others' organizational cultures, priorities, requirements, and practices. Traditionally, civil servants and military members have few formal opportunities for interagency training, education, and professional development. Beyond rudimentary familiarization at staff courses, personnel systems have not typically encouraged professional development that fosters a deep understanding of other agencies. In 2007, the President directed the creation of a "National Security Professional Development" system to address these cross-agency challenges.

- In support of national security professional development, the Department is working proactively with its partners to provide more students from other agencies access to courses at Defense Department educational institutions, notably the National Defense University.

### **Future Opportunities.**

Conducting Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. Today, military forces are conducting a wide range of civil-military operations and activities, including security and policing assistance, humanitarian relief, reconstruction, governance, civil capacity building, medical and security cooperation. Hardly new to the Department, military forces have performed these missions for more than a century and likely will continue to do so in the future. However, recent operations have exposed gaps between civilian and military capabilities, and highlighted a need to develop a better understanding of how civilian-military efforts must be mutually supportive and when operations should transition between military-led and civilian-led activities. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 "*Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*" and Title XVI of the 2009 National Defense Authorization

Act have made a substantial first step in building interagency capabilities and conducting strategic and operational planning.

- While NSPD-44 and Title 16 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act broadly define responsibilities of various departments during foreign stabilization and reconstruction operations, full realization of the ongoing capabilities development for these types of operations will not be realized without full funding of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.

Resources to Increase Civilian Expertise. Lessons learned in recent operations stress the critical need to further develop deployable civilian expertise for conducting stabilization, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. Today, civil agencies and departments have insufficient resources for carrying out missions associated with transition from violence to lasting stability.

- Accordingly, the Department supports establishing a better balance between the civil and military instruments of national power by significantly increasing resources needed for governance, strategic communication, security assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development.

Strategic Communication. The Department of Defense recognizes strategic communication as a process through which information activities (including public affairs, psychological operations, information operations, public diplomacy, and policy) are harmonized and synchronized with other operations. The Department will continue to improve the alignment of actions and information with policy objectives to integrate strategic communication into defense missions and to support larger U.S. policies as well as the State Department's public diplomacy priorities.


- The Department has significant capabilities and resources to support strategic communication priorities, particularly to counter ideological support to terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are committed to using our operational and informational activities and strategic communication processes in support of the Department of State's broader public diplomacy efforts. This cooperation will better enable the U.S. Government to engage foreign audiences holistically and with unity of effort.
- The Department of Defense and Department of State will expand our partnership to conduct strategic communication planning in support of the Global War on Terror, building partnership capacity, and regional issues. This partnership encompasses the full range of information and Theater Security Cooperation activities to synchronize efforts; improve regional and cultural expertise; develop and deliver information products; and train international partners to build their information networks.

Authorities and Oversight. Funding and authorities dedicated solely to individual agencies may not be sufficient to ensure that the activities of multiple agencies are fully integrated and that all seam issues between organizations are addressed. "Stovepiped" funding and authorities could have the unintended effect of encouraging the development of uncoordinated approaches to national security challenges as well as unneeded competition between departments and agencies.



- The Department recognizes the need for authorities and approaches to funding for whole-of-government operations.

**Looking Forward.** In summary, the Department of Defense places a high priority on integrating whole-of-government capabilities to deal with shared challenges to our Nation's security. Future conflict will require integrated planning and implementation efforts as well as smooth transitions between our military forces and civilian counterparts, not just to win wars, but to prevent them and mitigate the underlying causes of conflicts and instability. In order to plan and execute essential national security tasks at home and abroad, we seek to increase defense and civil support and building partnership capacity in addition to fielding fully-ready joint forces. Since our Nation's future security depends equally on interagency cooperation, coordination, and integration efforts, building unity of effort requires us to expand the concept of jointness beyond the Department of Defense. To help establish the right balance between our Nation's capabilities, we strongly support increasing resources and capacities in other departments and agencies, notably the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development.



A Coast Guard Petty Officer from Winthrop, MA mans a M-240 machine gun aboard a rigid hull inflatable boat as the conventionally-powered aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) moves into port.

U.S. Coast Guard photo by Public Affairs Specialist 3rd Class Lisa Hennings

## GLOSSARY

The following information on specific concepts, processes, and definitions supplement text in the Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Issue Team sections.

### A. Irregular Warfare Key Terms and Concepts

- **Counterinsurgency (COIN):** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
- **Counter-terrorism (CT):** Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.
- **Foreign Internal Defense (FID):** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.
- **General Purpose Forces (GPF):** All forces except Special Operations and Strategic Forces. General Purpose Forces are not limited to any one domain (i.e., General Purpose Forces are not only ground forces).
- **Irregular Warfare:** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.
- **Special Operations Forces (SOF):** Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.
- **Stability Operations:** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
- **Unconventional Warfare (UW):** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.

## B. Cyber Key Terms and Concepts

- **Cyberspace:** A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology, infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
- **Global Information Grid (GIG):** The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems.

## C. Intratheater Airlift Key Terms and Concepts

- **Time Sensitive / Mission Critical (TS/MC) Movement Requirements:** Justification for organic transportation assets to conduct direct support mission are based on need to satisfy TS/MC requirements. TS/MC requirements create a demand for delivery of equipment, supplies, and personnel that are generally non-routine in nature and must be delivered to the point of need or point of effect in an accelerated time period. These demands require the lift capacity to be supremely responsive to the supported commander's immediate operational or tactical priorities. TS/MC demands cannot routinely be accommodated via planned resupply and movement processes where efficiency is the primary consideration. (Note: Although no specific response time is specified, depending on the operational scenario and unit mission, TS/MC movement requirements are usually conducted with less than 24 hours notice.)
- **Point of Need:** A physical location designated by the JFC as a receiving point for forces or commodities, for subsequent employment, emplacement, or consumption.
- **Point of Effect:** A physical location designated by the functional component commander, Service component commander or a subordinate commander to support operations normally within the combat zone.
- **Port of Debarkation (POD):** The geographical point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements; it may or may not coincide with the destination.
- **Port of Embarkation (POE):** The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. This may be a seaport or aerial port from which personnel and equipment flow to a port of debarkation; for unit and non-unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the origin.

## D. Unmanned Aircraft Systems / Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Key Terms and Concepts

- **Command and Control:** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2.
- **Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS):** The system, whose components include the necessary equipment, data communication links, and personnel to control and employ an unmanned aircraft. The unmanned aircraft system is composed of six components: the aircraft, payloads, data communication links, ground control stations, ground support equipment, and ground operators.
- **JUAS Categories:** A classification system for current UAS based primarily on a categorization schema that groups UAS according to three enduring attributes: UA weight, normal operating altitude, and speed.
  - **Group 1 UAS.** UAS typically less than 20 pounds in weight and normally operate below 1,200 feet Above Ground Level at speeds less than 250 knots
  - **Group 2 UAS.** UAS in the 21 – 55 pound weight class and normally operate less than 3,500 feet Above Ground Level at speed less than 250 knots.
  - **Group 3 UAS.** UAS weigh more than 55 pounds, but less than 1320 pounds. They normally operate below 18,000 feet Mean Sea Level at speeds less than 250 knots.
  - **Group 4 UAS.** UAS weigh more than 1,320 pounds and normally operate below 18,000 feet Mean Sea Level at any speed.
  - **Group 5 UAS.** UAS weight more than 1,320 pounds and normally operate higher than 18,000 feet Mean Sea Level at any speed.

## E. Interagency Opportunities Key Terms and Concepts

- **Strategic Communication:** Focused U.S. Government processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, plans, programs, and actions synchronized with other elements of national power.

# Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report



February 2010

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

February 1, 2010

The protection of the United States from the threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national security priority. The threat to our deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly. This threat has significant implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail.

At the same time, the ability of the United States to defend against many forms of this threat is also growing rapidly. The research and development activities of recent years have generated new capabilities, as well as some significant opportunities for future breakthroughs.

I have made defending against near-term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, programs and capabilities. I have also directed that we sustain and enhance the U.S. military's ability to defend the homeland against attack by a small number of long-range ballistic missiles. This strategy has required careful analysis of the threat, reprioritization of investments, and improvements to the management of the program.

This review, directed by the President and mandated by Congress, reflects my continuing effort to give focus and direction to the ballistic missile defense program. If fully implemented in coming years, the plans reflected here will significantly improve the security of the United States and its allies while also enhancing international stability.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to be "Robert M. Gates". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looped "G" at the end.



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The Department of Defense conducted the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review from March 2009 through January 2010. Mandated by Congress, and guided by a Presidential directive, the review comprehensively considered U.S. BMD policies, strategies, plans, and programs. The review was co-led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also involved participants from the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, the National Security Staff, and the Office of Management and Budget.

### The Ballistic Missile Threat

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. Such capabilities could be significant sources of military advantage during a conflict. But they may be equally significant in times of relative peace, when they undergird efforts to coerce states near and far. Regional actors such as North Korea and Iran continue to develop long-range missiles that will be threatening to the United States. There is some uncertainty about when and how this type of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat to the U.S. homeland will mature, but there is no uncertainty about the existence of regional threats. They are clear and present. The threat from short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs) in regions where the United States deploys forces and maintains security relationships is growing at a particularly rapid pace.

### Strategy and Policy Framework

Following guidance from the President, this review has set the following policy priorities:

1. The United States will continue to defend the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.
2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, while protecting allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves.
3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions.

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term.
5. U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change.
6. The United States will seek to lead expanded international efforts for missile defense.

### Defending the Homeland

The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks. This is a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and the number of ground-based interceptors now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.

Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate at which it will mature, it is important that the United States maintain this advantageous position. But doing so does not require that the United States develop these capabilities at the same accelerated rate or with the same level of risk as in recent years. Rather, the United States will refocus its homeland ballistic missile defense program as it began to do with the fiscal year (FY) 2010 budget—maintaining the current level of capability with 30 ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and further developing proven capabilities that will enhance homeland defense should a new threat emerge.

Toward that end, the United States will:

- Maintain readiness and continue to develop existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
- Complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely to hedge against the possibility that additional deployments become necessary.
- Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the United States by Iran or other potential adversaries in the Middle East.
- Invest in further development of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat matures.
- Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures.
- Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements, develop next generation missile defense capabilities, and advance other hedging strategies including continued development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based interceptor.

## Defending Against Regional Threats

Over the past decade, the United States has made significant progress in developing and fielding capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These include increasingly capable PATRIOT batteries for point defense, the AN/TPY-2 X-band radar for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries for area defense, space-based sensors, and sea-based capabilities such as the SM-3 Block IA interceptor.

However, these capabilities exist in numbers that are only modest in view of the expanding regional missile threat. Accordingly, in the FY 2010 budget, and continuing across the FY 2011–15 time frame, the Department of Defense will further invest in these deployable assets while developing new capabilities such as a land-based SM-3 system (tentatively called “Aegis Ashore”) and airborne infrared sensors that will make possible the simultaneous detection and tracking of ballistic missiles by unmanned aerial vehicles. Looking out over the longer term (i.e., in the 2015 to 2020 time frame), the Department is pursuing even more capable SM-3s and persistent overhead sensors in space capable of detecting and tracking large raid sizes.

## Integrating Capabilities Regionally

As threats have advanced and technical solutions have matured, it has become increasingly important to think strategically about the deployment of low-density, high-demand missile defense assets in a regional context. Such deployments must be tailored to the unique deterrence and defense requirements of each region, which vary considerably in their geography, the character of the threat, and the military-to-military relationships on which to build cooperative missile defenses.

Several principles will guide how BMD is used in the development of these regional approaches to deterrence and defense:

1. The United States will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures, which must be built on the foundation of strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing.



*PRESIDENT ANNOUNCES NEW APPROACH TO MISSILE DEFENSE.* President Obama directed a comprehensive review of ballistic missile defense policy and programs. The review's findings related to Europe were announced on Sept. 17, 2009. Official White House photo by Pete Souza.

2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach to missile defense within each region that is tailored to the threats and circumstances unique to that region.
3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are mobile and relocatable.

These three principles will be applied on a region-by-region basis. The Department will rely on the Global Force Management process to assist in decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces. For the European region, the Administration announced the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in September 2009, following the unanimous recommendation to the President by the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the prior plan for missile defense protection in Europe be revised.

#### Strengthening International Cooperation

Another key objective is to lead expanded international efforts and cooperation on missile defense. The United States seeks to create an environment in which the development, acquisition, deployment, and use of ballistic missiles by regional adversaries can be deterred, principally by eliminating their confidence in the effectiveness of such attacks. Toward this end, the United States seeks broad-based international cooperation.

Strengthening cooperation with allies and partners to develop and field robust, pragmatic, and cost-effective capabilities is an important priority. In Europe, the Administration is committed to implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach within a NATO context. In East Asia, the United States is working to improve missile defenses through a series of bilateral relationships. The United States is also pursuing strengthened cooperation with a number of partners in the Middle East.

The Administration also seeks to engage Russia and China on missile defense. With Russia, it is pursuing a broad agenda focused on shared early warning of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even operational cooperation. With China, the Administration seeks further dialogue on strategic issues of interest to both nations, including missile defense. As it pursues these discussions, the Administration will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on U.S. ballistic missile defenses.

#### Managing the Missile Defense Program

The Administration is committed to deploying capabilities that have been proven under extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over the long term.

To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps are being taken. Working in close partnership with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as requested by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency announced a new approach to testing in June 2009. This program sets

out test activities over the full course of each system's development, not just two years into the future as under the former program. These activities include a comprehensive set of ground and flight tests designed to demonstrate operational performance and validate models used to support an evaluation of system effectiveness. The new master plan is to be reviewed and updated semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated after one year of experience (June 2010), and any necessary adjustments will be made at that time.

To ensure adequate oversight of the missile defense program, DoD has enhanced the roles and responsibilities of the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB). Established in March 2007, the MDEB provides oversight and guidance in a collaborative mode involving all missile defense stakeholders in DoD and some from outside DoD. The Board's work on requirements is supplemented by the work of the Warfighter Involvement Process, which is chaired by U.S. Strategic Command. The MDEB also oversees the Ballistic Missile Defense System Life Cycle Management Process, which is used by DoD to identify requirements, allocate resources, and provide departmental insight to control costs.

After careful study, DoD has come to the conclusion that it does not see benefit in bringing MDA into the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the full DoD 5000 acquisition reporting process at this time. There is, however, benefit in further innovation in management of the program, and DoD is pursuing the creation of additional hybrid MDA/Service program offices.

# Quadrennial Defense Review Report



February 2010

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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February 1, 2010

This Quadrennial Defense Review represents an important step toward fully institutionalizing the ongoing reform and reshaping of America's military—shifts that rebalance the urgent demands of today and the most likely and lethal threats of the future.

This is truly a wartime QDR. For the first time, it places the current conflicts at the top of our budgeting, policy, and program priorities, thus ensuring that those fighting America's wars and their families – on the battlefield, in the hospital, or on the home front – receive the support they need and deserve.

In addition, the QDR recognizes that we must prepare for a broad range of security challenges on the horizon—ranging from the military modernization programs of other countries to non-state groups developing more cunning and destructive means to attack the United States and our allies and partners.

Given this threat environment, the United States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. Toward this end, the Department must continue to reform the way it does business—from developing and buying major weapons systems to managing our workforce.

The FY 2010 defense budget represented a down payment on re-balancing the department's priorities in keeping with the lessons learned and capabilities gained from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those shifts are continued in the FY 2011 budget and institutionalized in this QDR and out-year budget plan.

To meet the potential threats to our military's ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners, this QDR directs more focus and investment in a new air-sea battle concept, long-range strike, space and cyberspace, among other conventional and strategic modernization programs.

Furthermore, this review brings fresh focus to the importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies and partners, along with better integration with civilian agencies and organizations.

Finally, I would like to thank the members of this Department—military and civilian—along with our interagency and international partners, whose hard work and rigorous thought led to this important and historic document.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert M. Gates".

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The mission of the Department of Defense is to protect the American people and advance our nation's interests.

In executing these responsibilities, we must recognize that first and foremost, the United States is a nation at war. In Afghanistan, our forces fight alongside allies and partners in renewed efforts to deny Al Qaeda safe haven, reverse the Taliban's momentum, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces. In Iraq, U.S. military personnel advise, train, and support Iraqi forces as part of a responsible transition and drawdown. Above all, the United States and its allies and partners remain engaged in a broader war—a multifaceted political, military and moral struggle—against Al Qaeda and its allies around the world.

Furthermore, as a global power, the strength and influence of the United States are deeply intertwined with the fate of the broader international system—a system of alliances, partnerships, and multinational institutions that our country has helped build and sustain for more than sixty years. The U.S. military must therefore be prepared to support broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and promoting the common good.

With these realities in mind, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review advances two clear objectives. First, to further rebalance the capabilities of America's Armed Forces to prevail in today's wars, while building the capabilities needed to deal with future threats. Second, to further reform the Department's institutions and processes to better support the urgent needs of the warfighter; buy weapons that are usable, affordable, and truly needed; and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely and responsibly.

The strategy and initiatives described in the QDR will continue to evolve in response to the security environment. Using the QDR as its foundation, the Department will continually examine its approach—from objectives to capabilities and activities to resources—to ensure its best alignment for the nation, its allies and partners, and our men and women in uniform.

### A Complex Environment

The United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The distribution of global political, economic, and military power is becoming more diffuse. The rise of China, the world's most populous country, and India, the world's largest democracy, will continue to shape an international system that is no longer easily defined—one in which the United States will remain the most powerful actor but must increasingly work with key allies and partners if it is to sustain stability and peace.

Globalization has transformed the process of technological innovation while lowering entry barriers for a wider range of actors to acquire advanced technologies. As technological innovation and global information flows accelerate, non-state actors will continue to gain influence and capabilities that, during the past century, remained largely the purview of states.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) continues to undermine global security, further complicating efforts to sustain peace and prevent harmful arms races. The instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations.

Other powerful trends are likely to add complexity to the security environment. Rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or exacerbate future conflicts.

### America's Global Role

America's interests are inextricably linked to the integrity and resilience of the international system. Chief among these interests are security, prosperity, broad respect for universal values, and an international order that promotes cooperative action.



*President Barack Obama holds a briefing on Afghanistan with senior national security leaders including Vice President Joseph Biden, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Situation Room at the White House on Oct. 30, 2009. Official White House photo by Pete Souza.*

Consistent with the President's vision, the United States will advance these interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power, engaging abroad on the basis of mutual interest and mutual respect, and promoting an international order that advances our interests by reinforcing the rights and responsibilities of all nations.

America's interests and role in the world require armed forces with unmatched capabilities and a willingness on the part of the nation to employ them in defense of our interests and the common good. The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale operations over extended distances. This unique position generates an obligation to be

responsible stewards of the power and influence that history, determination, and circumstance have provided.

### Defense Strategy

In order to help defend and advance our national interests, the Department of Defense balances resources and risk among four priority objectives: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. These priorities shape not only considerations on the *capabilities* our Armed Forces need but also the aggregate *capacity* required to accomplish their missions now and in the future. Our approach to achieving them must evolve and adapt in response to a changing security environment.

*Prevail in today's wars:* We must ensure the success of our forces in the field—in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world. Along with our allies and partners, we have renewed efforts to help the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and eliminate its safe havens within both nations. In Iraq, years of effort have helped enable that government to take the lead in protecting its people and providing essential services. As the responsible drawdown of the U.S. military presence proceeds, U.S. forces will continue to play important roles advising, training, and supporting Iraqi forces. Elsewhere, U.S. forces work with partners and allies to locate and dismantle terrorist networks.

In the near term to midterm, substantial numbers of U.S. forces will likely be operating in Afghanistan and U.S. forces in Iraq will continue a responsible drawdown. These efforts will substantially determine the size and shape of major elements of U.S. military forces for several years. In the mid- to long term, we expect there to be enduring operational requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies.

*Prevent and deter conflict:* America's enduring effort to advance common interests without resort to arms is a hallmark of its stewardship of the international system. Preventing the rise of threats to U.S. interests requires the integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense, along with intelligence, law enforcement, and economic tools of statecraft, to help build the capacity of partners to maintain and promote stability. Such an approach also requires working closely with our allies and partners to leverage existing alliances and create conditions to advance common interests.

Our deterrent remains grounded in land, air, and naval forces capable of fighting limited and large-scale conflicts in environments where anti-access weaponry and tactics are used, as well as forces prepared to respond to the full range of challenges posed by state and non-state groups. These forces are enabled by cyber and space capabilities and enhanced by U.S. capabilities to deny adversaries' objectives through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD, a resilient

infrastructure, and our global basing and posture. Until such time as the Administration's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is achieved, nuclear capabilities will be maintained as a core mission for the Department of Defense. We will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal to deter attack on the United States, and on our allies and partners.

While U.S. forces are heavily engaged in current wars, the Department's prevent-and-deter activities will be focused on ensuring a defense in depth of the United States; preventing the emergence or reemergence of transnational terrorist threats, including Al Qaeda; and deterring other potential major adversaries. In the future, as our forces transition into a period of less-intensive sustained operations, the Department's force planning assumes an ability to undertake a broader and deeper range of prevent-and-deter missions, acting wherever possible as part of a whole-of-government approach and in concert with allies and partners.

*Prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies:* If deterrence fails and adversaries challenge our interests with the threat or use of force, the United States must be prepared to respond in support of U.S. national interests. Not all contingencies will require the involvement of U.S. military forces, but the Defense Department must be prepared to provide the President with options across a wide range of contingencies, which include supporting a response to an attack or natural disaster at home, defeating aggression by adversary states, supporting and stabilizing fragile states facing serious internal threats, and preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.

In the mid- to long term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors, but we must take seriously the need to plan for the broadest possible range of operations—from homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, to deterrence and preparedness missions—occurring in multiple and unpredictable combinations.

Operations over the past eight years have stressed the ground forces disproportionately, but the future operational landscape could also portend significant long-duration air and maritime campaigns for which the U.S. Armed Forces must be prepared.

*Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force:* Years of war have significantly stressed our military personnel and their families. Given the continuing need for substantial and sustained deployments in conflict zones, the Department must do all it can to take care of our people—physically and psychologically. For too long, the health of the All-Volunteer Force, the civilian workforce that supports it, and the processes by which the Department provides needed equipment and platforms have been underemphasized priorities. The prolonged wartime period since 2001 has greatly elevated their importance, and the consequences of failure have accordingly become more serious. To reflect the urgency that the Department's leadership places

on these issues, the QDR has striven to include them as core components of our policy, planning, and programming considerations.

Our preserve-and-enhance efforts will focus on transitioning to sustainable rotation rates that protect the force's long-term health. The Department plans that in times of significant crisis, U.S. forces will be prepared to experience higher deployment rates and briefer dwell periods for up to several years at a time and/or to mobilize the Reserve Component. This will typically be necessary if the United States is engaged for long periods in more than one large operation, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Department will also expand its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) to augment the military effort as required.

These four priority objectives are at once timely and enduring. They capture the Department's key priorities and drive considerations about the size and shape of America's Armed Forces now and in the future. Successfully balancing them requires that the Department make hard choices on the level of resources required as well as accepting and managing risk in a way that favors success in today's wars.

#### Rebalancing the Force

In order to successfully protect and advance U.S. interests while balancing the priority objectives outlined above, the QDR makes a series of recommendations aimed at helping to rebalance America's Armed Forces to better enable success in the following missions critical to protecting and advancing the nation's interests. Required force enhancements were identified by examining ongoing conflicts as well as the performance of the current and planned force through combinations of scenarios spanning the range of plausible future challenges. Significant enhancements were directed in the following key mission areas:

*Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home:* The rapid proliferation of destructive technologies, combined with potent ideologies of violent extremism, requires sustaining a high level of vigilance against terrorist threats. Moreover, state adversaries are acquiring new means to strike targets at greater distances from their borders and with greater lethality. The United States must also be prepared to respond to the full range of potential natural disasters.

The QDR directs a series of enhancements, including:

- Improve the responsiveness and flexibility of consequence management response forces;
- Enhance capabilities for domain awareness;
- Accelerate the development of standoff radiological/nuclear detection capabilities; and
- Enhance domestic capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

*Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations:* The United States must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments. In order to ensure that America's Armed Forces are prepared for this complex mission, it is vital that the lessons from today's conflicts be further institutionalized in military doctrine, training, capability development, and operational planning.

QDR initiatives include:

- Increase the availability of rotary-wing assets;
- Expand manned and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
- Increase key enabling assets for special operations forces (SOF);
- Increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency and capacity in general purpose forces;
- Increase regional expertise for Afghanistan and Pakistan; and
- Strengthen key supporting capabilities for strategic communication.

*Build the security capacity of partner states:* Since the end of World War II, DoD has worked to build the security capacity of allied and partner states and to ensure that the Armed Forces of the United States have ample opportunities to train with and learn from counterpart forces. As ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq make clear, these dimensions of U.S. defense strategy have never been more important.

Key QDR initiatives in this mission area include:

- Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance;
- Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability;
- Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces;
- Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training; and
- Create mechanisms to expedite acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces.

*Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments:* U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states. This capability is fundamental to the nation's ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions.

In the absence of dominant U.S. power projection capabilities, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.

The QDR directs the following enhancements:

- Expand future long-range strike capabilities;
- Exploit advantages in subsurface operations;
- Increase the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure;
- Assure access to space and the use of space assets;
- Enhance the robustness of key ISR capabilities;
- Defeat enemy sensors and engagement systems; and
- Enhance the presence and responsiveness of U.S. forces abroad.

*Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction:* The potential spread of weapons of mass destruction poses a grave threat. As the ability to create and employ weapons of mass destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to detect, interdict, and contain the effects of these weapons. Deterrence of such threats and defense against them can be enhanced through measures aimed at better understanding potential threats, securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible, positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeating the agents themselves.

Through the QDR, the Secretary of Defense directs the following:

- Establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations;
- Research countermeasures and defense to nontraditional agents;
- Enhance nuclear forensics;
- Secure vulnerable nuclear materials;
- Expand the biological threat reduction program; and
- Develop new verification technologies.

*Operate effectively in cyberspace:* The security environment demands improved capabilities to counter threats in cyberspace. In the 21st century, modern armed forces simply cannot conduct effective high-tempo operations without resilient, reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace. DoD must actively defend its networks.



DoD is taking several steps to strengthen capabilities in cyberspace:

- Develop a more comprehensive approach to DoD operations in cyberspace;
- Develop greater cyber expertise and awareness;
- Centralize command of cyber operations; and
- Enhance partnerships with other agencies and governments.

#### Guiding the Evolution of the Force

In combination and over time, the initiatives described in the QDR are designed to significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance U.S. interests in both the near and longer term. In addition to better preparing our own forces for the future, these initiatives will improve the Department's ability to build the capability and capacity of partners.

Changes directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:

- U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.
- U.S. naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions.
- U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will need greater average range, flexibility, and multimission versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also enhance our air forces' contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding within our broader inventory aircraft that are well-suited to training and advising partner air forces.
- The United States will continue to increase the capacity of its special operations forces and will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support assets in the general purpose forces.
- The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack capabilities, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber defenses.

Of course, many of these enhancements will be costly. The QDR report describes some of the tradeoffs that DoD's leaders have identified to enable the rebalancing of U.S. military capabilities. More such tradeoffs could be necessary in the future.

Early in the QDR and as part of the process of completing DoD's budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in the years that follow it. Those decisions included ending production of the F-22 fighter, restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Future Combat Systems programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, and stretching out procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier. The Air Force is substantially reducing its fleet of older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to shut down production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, having completed the planned procurement of those aircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and to extend the life of existing command ships, cancel the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled the Department to redirect resources into the high-priority areas outlined above.

Where it has not been possible to set in motion initiatives to meet certain future operational needs, the Secretary has identified vectors for the evolution of the force, calling on DoD components to devote sustained efforts toward developing new concepts and capabilities to address those needs. Assessments of future operating environments will continue, with an eye toward refining our understanding of future needs. At the same time, the Department will continue to look assiduously for savings in underperforming programs and activities, divestiture, technology substitution, less-pressing mission and program areas, and other accounts so that more resources can be devoted to filling these gaps.

### Taking Care of Our People

America's men and women in uniform constitute the Department's most important resource. Multiple long deployments are taking a significant toll on our people and their families, and the Department remains focused on their health and welfare. As part of this focus, the QDR has elevated the need to preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force and included this priority in our force planning and in our strategy



*U.S. Army Sgt. Noel Rodriguez shares a moment with his two daughters—Emily, left, and Noemi, right—and wife Lily during a homecoming at Victory Field, Calif., Aug. 18, 2009. U.S. Army photo by Cpl. Nicole Lavine.*

deliberations. In order to better take care of our people, the Department is focusing on several fronts.

*Wounded warrior care:* Our wounded, ill, or injured service members deserve every opportunity to return to active duty following their recovery, or to make a seamless transition to veteran status if they cannot be returned to active duty. Apart from prevailing in current conflicts, caring for our wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality care that reflects their service and sacrifice. The Department is improving the treatment of our wounded warriors in many ways, which include:

- Increasing funding for wounded warrior initiatives across the Military Departments;
- Improving health benefits and adding additional personnel for wounded warrior support programs; and
- Broadening the scope and quality of information sharing between the Department of Defense and Veterans Affairs to strengthen continuity of care and benefits delivery for military members.

*Managing the deployment tempo:* Doing everything possible to better manage a complex deployment tempo is an important aspect of the Department's commitment to our personnel and families. We must strive to provide them and their families with greater clarity and predictability regarding current and planned deployments. To this end, the Department continues to work toward increasing time spent between deployments to two years at home for every one deployed for the Active Component and five years demobilized for every one year mobilized for Guard and Reserve units.

*Recruiting and retention:* Our recruiting efforts are long-term investments that can yield generational gains. In this challenging wartime environment, the Department continues to meet its recruiting and retention goals. The Department must continue developing innovative programs to attract qualified young men and women into the Armed Forces, and to retain them. Examples of recent efforts include:

- Revising bonus policies to allow the Military Departments to pursue innovative ways to retain quality personnel; and
- Offering more flexible ways for military personnel to serve, by implementing programs designed to better enable transitions between Active and Reserve Component service.

*Supporting families:* We have a critical and enduring obligation to better prepare and support families during the stress of multiple deployments. Access to robust single member, spouse, child, and youth services is no longer a desirable option, but necessary, as these are services essential to maintain the health of the All-Volunteer Force. Examples of recent efforts include:

- Increasing resources devoted to institutionalizing service member and family support programs across the Department;
- Replacing or renovating a majority of DoD Educational Activity schools by 2015; and
- Continuing efforts of the Military Departments to improve family and community support services.

*Developing future military leaders:* The Department will continue its work to ensure that America's cadre of commissioned and noncommissioned officers are prepared for the full range of complex missions that the future security environment will demand. DoD will continue to place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies. Examples of efforts in this area include:

- Building expertise in foreign language, regional, and cultural skills;
- Recognizing joint experience whenever and wherever it occurs in an officer's career; and
- Ensuring that the Department's educational institutions have the right resources and faculty that can help prepare the next generation of military leaders.

*Developing the total defense workforce:* The demands of a complex and uncertain security environment require the Department to assess whether it possesses the right workforce size and mix of military, government civilian, and contractor personnel. As part of these efforts, DoD will take the following steps:

- Improve the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, which provides deployable civilian experts to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theaters; and
- Work to reduce the number of support service contractors, thereby helping to establish a balanced workforce that appropriately aligns functions to the public and private sector.

### Strengthening Relationships

Achieving the Department's strategic objectives requires close collaboration with counterparts at home and with key allies and partners abroad. Through its foreign defense relationships, the United States not only helps avert crises but also improves its effectiveness in responding to them. Moreover, by integrating U.S. defense capabilities with other elements of national security—including diplomacy, development, law enforcement, trade, and intelligence—the nation can ensure that the right mix of expertise is at hand to take advantage of emerging opportunities and to thwart potential threats. The Department will take the following steps:

*Strengthening key relationships abroad:* America's power and influence are enhanced by sustaining a vibrant network of defense alliances and new partnerships, building cooperative approaches with key states, and maintaining interactions with important international institutions such as the United Nations. Recognizing the importance of fostering and improving military and defense relations with allies and partners, the Department continues to emphasize tailored approaches that build on shared interests and common approaches.

*Evolving U.S. global defense posture:* The United States is a global power with global responsibilities. Including operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, approximately 400,000 U.S. military personnel are forward-stationed or rotationally deployed around the world. The United States will continue to tailor its defense posture to enhance other states' abilities to solve global security problems, and to address challenges including ongoing conflicts, the proliferation of nuclear technology and theater ballistic missiles, anti-access and area-denial capabilities, and maintaining secure access to the global commons.

*Improving unity of effort:* The Department remains committed to further improving a whole-of-government approach to national security challenges. From improving our partnership with the Department of State in conflict zones, to our enduring relationship with America's intelligence community, to supporting civil authorities at home through our partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense will closely cooperate with other U.S. departments and agencies to better protect and advance America's interests.

### Reforming How We Do Business

Years of war have demanded that America's Armed Forces rapidly innovate and adapt—the Department's institutional base must do the same. The QDR highlights several issues requiring particular attention.

*Reforming security assistance:* Despite the recognition that our security is increasingly tied to building partner capacity, our security assistance tool kit has not kept pace. America's security assistance efforts remain constrained by a complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, unwieldy processes, and a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts. The Department is working to improve its internal efforts, ensure that urgent warfighter needs are met—through such means as the Commander's Emergency Response Program, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and the Iraq Security Forces Fund—and work with interagency partners to create new and more responsive mechanisms for security assistance.

*Reforming how we buy:* The conventional acquisition process is too long and too cumbersome to fit the needs of the many systems that require continuous changes and upgrades—a challenge that will become only more pressing over time. The Department will improve how it matches requirements with mature technologies, maintains disciplined systems engineering approaches,

institutionalizes rapid acquisition capabilities, and implements more comprehensive testing. We must avoid sacrificing cost and schedule for promises of improved performance. Our efforts must also include reforming the U.S. export control system for the 21st century, and spurring continued improvements in the provision of rapid logistical support to our forces abroad.

*Strengthening the industrial base:* America's security and prosperity are increasingly linked with the health of our technology and industrial bases. In order to maintain our strategic advantage well into the future, the Department requires a consistent, realistic, and long-term strategy for shaping the structure and capabilities of the defense technology and industrial bases—a strategy that better accounts for the rapid evolution of commercial technology, as well as the unique requirements of ongoing conflicts.

*Reforming the U.S. export control system:* Today's export control system is a relic of the Cold War and must be adapted to address current threats. The current system impedes cooperation, technology sharing, and interoperability with allies and partners, hindering U.S. industrial competitiveness. The Department will work with interagency partners and with Congress to ensure that a new system fully addresses the threats the U.S. will face in the future.

*Crafting a strategic approach to climate and energy:* Climate change and energy will play significant roles in the future security environment. The Department is developing policies and plans to manage the effects of climate change on its operating environment, missions, and facilities. The Department already performs environmental stewardship at hundreds of DoD installations throughout the United States, working to meet resource efficiency and sustainability goals. We must continue incorporating geostrategic and operational energy considerations into force planning, requirements development, and acquisition processes.

### Balancing for a Complex Future

The priorities advanced in the QDR, coupled with both the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets reflect the Secretary's consistent emphasis on ensuring the Department does everything possible to enable success in today's wars while preparing for a complex and uncertain future. This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department's key priority objectives, providing context and recommendations regarding capability development and investment portfolios; and second, to communicate the Secretary's intent for the next several years of the Department's work. The QDR thus serves as a critical capstone document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America's men and women in uniform today, and building the policy and programmatic foundation for security in the years to come.

## Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure

Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security environment, the requirements of U.S. defense strategy, the need for enhancements to key capabilities across a wide range of missions, and the need for forces with sufficient aggregate capacity to meet the criteria laid out above, DoD has determined that U.S. forces, for the duration of the FY 2011–15 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), will conform to the general parameters outlined below. Where ranges of force elements are provided, these reflect variations in force levels that are planned across the FYDP.

### *Department of the Army:*

4 Corps headquarters

18 Division headquarters

73 total brigade combat teams (BCTs) (45 Active Component [AC] and 28 Reserve Component [RC]), consisting of:

40 infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs)

8 Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs)

25 heavy brigade combat teams (HBCTs)

21 combat aviation brigades (CABs) (13 AC and 8 RC)

15 Patriot battalions; 7 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries

### *Department of the Navy:*

10 – 11 aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings

84 – 88 large surface combatants, including 21 – 32 ballistic missile defense-capable combatants and Aegis Ashore

14 – 28 small surface combatants (+14 mine countermeasure ships)

29 – 31 amphibious warfare ships

53 – 55 attack submarines and 4 guided missile submarines

126 – 171 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft (manned and unmanned)

3 maritime prepositioning squadrons

30 – 33 combat logistics force ships (+1 Mobile Landing Platform (MLP))

17 – 25 command and support vessels (including Joint High Speed Vessels, 3 T-AKE Class dry cargo/ammunition ships, 1 mobile landing platform)

51 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels

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The formations and platform types shown here generally encompass only the major combat elements of each of the military departments. Nuclear forces, which will be detailed in the report of the Nuclear Posture Review, are not shown here.

## Main Elements of U.S. Force Structure (continued)

## 3 Marine expeditionary forces

- 4 Marine divisions (3 AC and 1 RC)

- 11 infantry regiments

- 4 artillery regiments

- 4 Marine aircraft wings (6 fixed-wing groups, 7 rotary-wing groups, 4 control groups, 4 support groups)

- 4 Marine logistics groups (9 combat logistics regiments)

- 7 Marine expeditionary unit command elements

*Department of the Air Force:*

- 8 ISR wing-equivalents (with up to 380 primary mission aircraft)

- 30 – 32 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents (with 33 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)

- 10 – 11 theater strike wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)

- 5 long-range strike (bomber) wings (with up to 96 primary mission aircraft)

- 6 air superiority wing-equivalents (with 72 primary mission aircraft per wing-equivalent)

- 3 command and control wings and 5 fully operational air and space operations centers (with a total of 27 primary mission aircraft)

- 10 space and cyberspace wings

*Special Operations Forces:*

Approximately 660 special operations teams (includes Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha[ODA] teams, Navy Sea, Air, and Land [SEAL] platoons, Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams, and operational aviation detachments [OADs])

- 3 Ranger battalions

- 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft

The above parameters rightly reflect the heavy demands being placed on portions of the force by today's wars. As these demands evolve, so too may the appropriate size and mix of forces.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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**Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright**

**February 10,  
2009**

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### **Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Gen. James E. Cartwright at the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, Va.**

SEC. GATES: Before taking your questions, I'd like to just say a few words about where we are with the budget process.

In recent weeks, we've been working with the Office of Management and Budget to prepare for the submission of the president's fiscal year 2010 Defense budget. The discussions have been cordial and productive.

Irrespective of what the budget top line ultimately is, as I indicated in my congressional testimony last month, this department faces difficult choices among competing priorities and programs. I believe we must make those choices. In doing so, we will be looking at the budget in terms of efficiencies to be realized, programs with serious execution issues, and strategic reshaping to make sure the budget reflects the need to balance current and future capabilities and the president's priorities.

With respect to supplemental appropriations, Congress has made clear its desire that the department should migrate as much as the predictable war cost as possible into the base budget. The department's budget proposal put together last year with a much higher top line was an attempt to begin this process.

It is now clear that with today's economic realities, we are unable to place as much as the war cost as we would have liked as soon as we would have liked into the base budget. Nonetheless, there is broad agreement that that's the direction we should go, and I'm confident that over time we will get there.

In closing, I want to thank the Senate for acting on the confirmation of three senior Department of Defense officials: Michele Flournoy as undersecretary for policy; Jay Johnson as general counsel; and Bob Hale as the Defense comptroller. They reported for work this morning and are hard at it.

Q Mr. Secretary, the president today ordered an interagency policy review on Afghanistan and Pakistan ahead of the April NATO summit. And I'm just wondering -- this is one more review on this issue, and I'm wondering, do you foresee additional U.S. brigades on the ground in Afghanistan before that NATO summit?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think the president will have several options in front of him, and I think he will -- he will make those decisions probably in the course of the next few days. I think that there is a realization that some decisions have to be made before the strategic review is completed, if -- if only because if he does decide to send at least an additional brigade combat team, even just one, the next one to go would need to be notified pretty quickly. So I think there will be a need for decisions before the strategic review is completed, but he has several options in front of him.

Q Have you made a recommendation to the president?

SEC. GATES: I have, and that has been a -- those recommendations have been the subject of discussion by the principals and by the deputies committee. I think it's a very constructive, deliberative process. This is -- this is the first time that this president has been asked to deploy large numbers of troops overseas, and it seems to me a thoughtful and deliberate approach to that decision is entirely appropriate.

Q A question for both of you.

The president said last night that the central government in Afghanistan seems detached from what's going on there. Is it your view that the right choice for the U.S. going forward is a strategy that essentially bypasses the central government in favor of more local contacts?

SEC. GATES: I have felt since I took this job that -- that we needed to focus not just on the central government, but also on the provincial and district governments; that -- that -- that these have always played an important role in Afghan history. That doesn't mean we walk away from efforts to help build a more effective -- help the Afghans build a more effective central government, and one that provides services and security, but I think it does mean also that we focus our attention also on government in both the -- at both the district and the provincial level. I don't think it has to be one or the other.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: And I'd just add that just going one way or the other makes you very predictable. You'd like to get at both ends of the spectrum, so to speak, here: get a presence out there that allows you to establish local security as well as work the central government piece, and then start working them toward each other.

Q I have a budget question, since you opened up with that. What was your initial reaction when OMB came back to you with this \$527 billion top-line figure? Were you disappointed, accepting, happy about it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think it was a place to begin a dialogue. We have had that dialogue. There are questions of definitions -- does -- do certain things belong in the supplemental or do they belong in the base budget? Where do certain kinds of health costs go?

So that's been sort of the thrust of the dialogue over the last couple of weeks. And as I said, I think it's been a constructive one. I'm certainly satisfied with the process.

Q One follow-up. Is it fair to anticipate that the (2)010 budget will have some program terminations versus cuts or reductions? You implied some programs that weren't executing properly -- I mean, program cut kills versus just cuts?

SEC. GATES: I think I would leave it the way I did in my opening statement, that one of the three areas we will be looking at as we develop the details of the '10 budget is programs that are having difficulties being executed.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you about the nagging case of next-war-itis that continues in the building. In this morning's Washington Post, there was a full-page, full-color ad calling -- by the builders and unions of the F-22 to continue production of that plane, to keep the country safe. Nearly half the Congress has written to President Obama, saying we need to keep buying this plane and 183 is not enough. You yourself have said 183 is about the right number. How do you convince these folks that you're right and they're misguided?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, there have been no decisions made in this building about the F-22. It's obviously one of the programs that, along with a number of others -- many others -- that we will be looking at.

It is my hope that we can present a budget to the president and then to the Congress that addresses all three of the areas that I talked about: efficiencies, in terms of reducing cost; dealing with programs that are being poorly executed or having execution problems; and then strategic shaping to ensure the balance between current and future needs.

My hope is that if we present a coherent whole, a holistic approach to the budget that demonstrates seriousness of purpose, that people will see the logic in what we've put together and conclude that it's in the best interests of the country as a whole. But that doesn't -- I don't want to foreshadow any of the decisions I'm going to make. But the strategy is to approach it from all three of these avenues and try and make a compelling case that as a -- what serves the nation best is this combination of measures in all three of these areas.

Q Can we talk about -- just go back to the numbers of troops in Afghanistan, which I'm sure you think we're obsessed with. But I know Admiral Mullen mentioned 30,000, and that would be about it. I think you've been careful to talk in terms of brigades. Is 30,000 accurate? And if so, if you'd explain again, why stop there?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, there is no cap, and -- but what I have said is that -- and I think it is better to focus on units and capabilities as we talk about this. But I have said, and I said as recently as the testimony two weeks ago today, that -- that once we had -- if the president agreed to -- ultimately to satisfy the standing request from General McKiernan, I would be deeply skeptical about further troop deployments beyond that.

I worry a lot about the size of the foreign military footprint in Afghanistan. And so, you know, I don't want to get into the specific numbers, but once we have satisfied General McKiernan's request, if that is the president's decision, then I think -- and I hope that the strategic review that's under way will sort of point a path forward in terms of what we think the right number or the right size of the -- of the foreign military presence in Afghanistan should be, depending on the conclusions of the review.

Q And the goal of those troops is what?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think in the short term, the goal of those troops is -- is to -- at least the initial ones that would deploy -- is to bring greater security in places like Helmand by being a permanent presence there -- by being a long-term presence rather than flying out by helicopter for a day's operations or a couple of days' operations and then flying back to their base, they would be a continuing presence, and thereby, along with their Afghan partners, enhance the security of the population. I think that's important in terms of particularly the elections coming up. But in terms of the mission for those troops long term, I think that's what will be recommended by the strategic review.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I would just add, you know, in addition to the local security are the local Afghan forces and the Afghan army, and bringing them into the mix, training them in the area, getting their proficiency up. That's what's going to relieve the stress on our forces. The sooner we can do that, the sooner our forces can come down.

Q Mr. Secretary, there are reports that the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has reached out officially to President Obama and asked for a meeting with President Obama. Can you confirm that that has occurred through official channels or that the Iranians have reached out to other senior American officials at this time?

And, General Cartwright, how concerned are you about the satellite launch? How close are the Iranians to having a ballistic missile capability? Is there any potential for a military-to-military relationship with the Iranians in the near future?

SEC. GATES: Any kind of official outreach from Ahmadinejad to the president or to other senior U.S. officials is news to me.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The space launch that occurred -- a space program and the technologies associated with a space program are technologies that are compatible with/commensurate with an intercontinental ballistic missile-type capability. So we have to worry about the transfer of that technology or the use of that technology for ballistic-missile-type capabilities that in range could basically range the United States and many of the European allies and the regional partners that we have. So you have to be concerned about that.

That's not an automatic. It doesn't happen in a day or two. And the work that they have done thus far is, at best, rudimentary -- very low orbit, very minimal energy to get up there. This is not a long-range missile, but it is the path toward that, so we have to worry about that.

Q And military-to-military relationship, any potential in the near future that you see as an icebreaker potentially?

SEC. GATES: With Iran?

Q Yes.

SEC. GATES: Not at this point.

Q The other half of the Afghan buildup is the Iraq drawdown. How close is the president to making decisions on either his 16-month withdrawal plan or some of the other options that you've presented to him?

SEC. GATES: I think that the review of options for Iraq -- well, the review of options for Iraq has not really begun yet. The focus so far has been on Afghanistan. I expect that to -- that review to take place fairly soon. I think that the situation on the ground in Iraq allows us to make the next series of decisions with respect to Afghanistan with greater flexibility.

Q Mr. Secretary, last night the president said that the White House will was in the process of reviewing the Pentagon's policy on the return of remains to Dover, in conversations with the Pentagon. Clearly, over your two-year tenure, you have maintained the policy of allowing no coverage of the return of remains at Dover. Can I ask you why that is, since it's been seen in the past? After all these years of the war, why not let Americans see this ceremony and the final full measure?

SEC. GATES: I actually asked about possibly changing the policy at Dover probably a little over a year ago. The answer that I -- that I got back -- and partly it was the result of contacts with the families -- is that if the news media were at Dover, many of the families would feel compelled to be there for those ceremonies for their fallen hero. And for some families, this would delay the return of the remains home. For others, it would be a financial hardship to get to Dover. And there were some privacy concerns.

I think that looking at it again makes all kinds of sense. I have asked that we review it again, in response to the president's interest and the president's statements. And we will do so, and I've put a fairly short deadline on that effort.

Q Can we ask you a little more? Did you ask for that today, since the president -- subsequent to the president making his remarks last night?

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q When will you -- when have you asked for an answer by? And can you envision any method in which Americans could be allowed to see this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- you know, from a personal standpoint, I think, if the needs of the families can be met and the privacy concerns can be addressed, the more honor we can accord these fallen heroes, the better. So I'm pretty open to whatever the results of this review may be.

Q Have you ever been up there to see one of these?

SEC. GATES: Actually, I was scheduled to go and had to cancel.

Q Mr. Secretary, the president has outlined, at least in very broad strokes, a very aggressive arms control agenda going forward. Can you say whether or not you have been a participant in discussions with him on this sort of series of things that he wants to do, not just with the Russians but a fissile cutoff treaty, perhaps stopping development of a new nuclear warhead? The list goes on. Have you talked to him about it? And what do you see as your role here in the Pentagon in helping to execute that very aggressive, ambitious agenda?

And perhaps, General Cartwright, you could comment on it, too.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think what you've laid out is an agenda. It's not surprising that, three weeks into the administration, serious reviews of these issues has not yet begun. This department will be an integral player in those discussions, as it has been ever since we started arms control with the Russians. And it'll be our job to identify pros and cons of various proposals and identify -- and help identify options for the president with the risks and benefits of each of those options for his decision. But we clearly will be an integral player.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: And I would -- I would just add, there -- as you say, there are some trigger events that are coming -- START and some of the other treaties -- that need to be looked at. But to look at this in isolation would not give us the best look.

So again, going back to the three principles the secretary laid out of our reviews, doing this in the context of our conventional forces. of our irregular warfare responsibilities. what's the appropriate balances? How does this fit? How do these bilateral treaties fit in a

global construct -- all of those questions need to be addressed this time around?

Q Mr. Secretary and General, do you think that General McKiernan needs all the troops that he's asked for, regardless of what strategy is adopted? And if not, what strategies are under serious consideration that might allow him to get by with fewer troops?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that's exactly the purpose of the strategic review, is to identify what those -- what those alternatives might be.

Within the framework of the mission that he currently has, as I have done with the commanders in Iraq, I give great deference to the commander in the field as to what he needs. And it's my job to try and satisfy those needs. If his mission changes, then the number of troops or the capabilities that he would need, would change one way or the other as well. So I think we just have to wait until the conclusion of the strategic review in terms of the -- of the strategies going forward.

Q But briefers have suggested that regardless of the strategy, you need to improve the security, which you said would be the goal -- the primary goal with the troops. So is there some strategy out there that would not require that?

SEC. GATES: (Laughs.) That's what the strategy review is about, is to find -- it seems to me, is to find that out. What are the options open to the president in terms of our longer-term approach in Afghanistan?

Q Mr. Secretary, when you talked about the president is expected to make a decision in the next few days, is that for all the troops you recommended going to Afghanistan or a portion of them?

SEC. GATES: I think it -- it -- the options before him give him several ways of going forward, including the pacing of troops going to the -- going to Afghanistan. So the answer to your question will depend on the decisions he makes.

Q Well, as a quick follow up, it's getting warmer in Afghanistan. In a month it will get even -- you will get to the point where there's the seasonal uptick in attacks. How many troops -- or what is the thought of putting as many troops as possible in Afghanistan ahead of the fighting season?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to prejudge the decisions that the president's going to make. We've laid out the options, we've discussed them, and he'll make his decisions.

Q Just in December, you were in Kyrgyzstan speaking about what an important transit point Manas Air Force Base is. We haven't heard anything official, but it seems pretty apparent it's going to close in the next six months or so. Can you talk a little about whether you see -- how you see this impacting Afghanistan, any possible other transit locations that are under negotiations right now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say that Manas is important, but not irreplaceable. We are looking at alternatives. We have not foreclosed the possibility that Manas would remain open. We're looking at whether, given the importance that Manas plays and the likely growing importance of Manas, whether there is something we ought to do differently in terms of compensation.

By the same -- by the same token, we're not prepared to stay there at any price. And so, as I say, I think we're exploring a variety of options, and I think we have some alternatives. But clearly Manas is important to us.

Q Do you still -- or do you consider the negotiations still open at this point?

SEC. GATES: I think so, yeah.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As you know, North Korea seems to be ready to fire Taepo Dong missile, capability to reach West Coast of the United States. What do you think their intention is?

SEC. GATES: Well, since the first time that they launched the missile -- it flew for a few minutes before crashing -- the range of the Taepo Dong II remains to be seen. So far, it's very short.

I'm not going to get into intelligence reports, but it would be nice if North Korea would focus on getting positive messages across to the -- to its negotiating partners about verification and moving forward with the denuclearization.

Q Mr. Secretary and General, when you launched the surge and increased deployment lengths to 15 months, that was done so at the risk of potentially overstretching or overstressing an already strained force. We've still seen indicators throughout the times since then -- divorce rates, suicide rates and so forth being up -- that there are strains in the military. What's your assessment of the health of the force since you've taken -- taken the office?

And, General, you too; I'd like your comments as well, since you took over and from that point forward to now.

SEC. GATES: Well, there's no question in my mind that the 15- month tours were very, very hard on our troops and on their families. And I think we moved to get back to 12 months deployed just as quickly as we could.

My hope is that we will begin to see a lengthening of the dwell times beyond a year, perhaps toward the latter part of this year. And I think it will incrementally lengthen over time. We won't go straight from one year deployed to two years at home; we'll more likely go from one year deployed to 15 months at home to 18 months at home and so on.

And I think with the growth in the end strength of both the Army and the Marine Corps, the draw downs likely to come in Iraq that we will see that situation improve over the next couple of years. We have put a lot of effort -- the services have put a lot of effort into efforts to help the families, particularly in the last two or three years, and to address some of the stresses that we're dealing with.

I think that part of problem in terms of the strains that you describe, whether its divorce rates or suicides -- or I would say PTSD -- that these are a manifestation also of repeated tours. It's not just the length of the tour, but the fact that so many have gone back for two and three and even four rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I think it's a combination of all of those things.

I think that the force as a whole is incredibly resilient and their families incredibly strong. But there's no doubt that there is additional stress.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I would just add, one, having experienced, when I was younger, 15-month tours -- and they are very, very difficult -- it's very different -- very difficult to be sitting in a tent and realize that next year you'll be there too. That's first.

And second, even though we have stopped the 15-month tours -- we're not doing those anymore -- not all of them have come home yet.

So the cumulative effect is very important to understand, number one. And number two, we aren't done with the 15-month tours. They're not home yet. And so that's another benchmark that we've got to cross before we can expect to see some of this work -- some of these rates start to move in a positive vector.

But I think the bigger issue here is the cumulative effect. We've got to start to understand, whether it's 12 months or 16 or 15 months, what's the cumulative effect, how many of these tours, and when do we start to cross? Is it 15 months at home versus a year deployed? Is it two years?

We've got work to do there to understand this long term. And we're watching this very closely. The services are watching it very closely.

Q General, what's your assessment of the current state of readiness of the force?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: A great force -- resilient, motivated. Every time I go to the theater -- and that probably shouldn't be a benchmark because when somebody like me shows up, they're going to show you the best face they can -- but when you talk to the families, when you close the doors, you still get a very strong, very resilient force.

The uptick most recently in the suicide; very troubling. We're trying to understand that, for the Army. This is the first time that the Army has come up to the level of its counterpart, the civilian sector, so to speak. And so we're trying to understand, is this cumulative? Is there -- is there something that is a trigger event here? And we're working with several agencies on the national health side to try to understand this.

But I believe the force is very resilient and very much ready to do the job.

MR.

: Last question.

SEC. GATES: Okay, two last questions. (Laughter.)

Q Okay. The last time the North Koreans tried to shoot a Taepo Dong, the missile defense system was put on alert and the U.S. was prepared to shoot it down if it came in the direction of American territory. Do you intend to do the same if the North Koreans proceed with their preparations?

SEC. GATES: I certainly intend to make sure that my colleagues -- the secretary of State, national security adviser, president and vice president -- understand what our capabilities are, and that that's an option out there should -- should we deem it necessary.

Q And Mr. Secretary, going back to Kyrgyzstan for a second, the Russians obviously --

SEC. GATES: I would rather not. (Laughter.)

Q The Russians obviously put pressure on Kyrgyzstan to close the base. And yet, in the same breath, with Admiral Mullen, they volunteered to help with logistics for coalition forces in Afghanistan. That's mixed signals, to say the least. What do you think is happening there?

SEC. GATES: I think those are mixed signals. (Laughter, laughs.)

Q Can we ask how you're feeling since your surgery, sir?

SEC. GATES: I'm feeling fine. Thank you very much for asking.

CNN

February 10, 2009

## Gates: Critical Decisions Ahead On Afghanistan

The Situation Room (CNN), 4:00 PM

WOLF BLITZER: New signs of urgency within the Obama administration about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan -- the defense secretary, Robert Gates, saying, critical decisions will have to be made over the next few days.

Let's go to our Pentagon correspondent, Chris Lawrence. He is working the story for us.

He spoke out earlier today. What's the bottom line, Chris?

CHRIS LAWRENCE: The bottom line is this, Wolf.

The defense secretary says, in the next few days, President Obama will probably make a decision on deploying more troops to Afghanistan.

(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Aim! Fire!

LAWRENCE (voice-over): General David Petraeus says Afghanistan is heading into a downward spiral. But, before committing more troops, President Obama is conducting a broad strategic review, including military options and the risks involved. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is defending the president's approach.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: This is the first time that this president has been asked to deploy large numbers of troops overseas. And it seems to me a thoughtful and deliberative approach to that decision is entirely appropriate.

LAWRENCE: But Secretary Gates indicated the need for some troops is urgent.

GATES: Some decisions have to be made before the strategic review is completed.

LAWRENCE: Gates says, even if the president decides to send just one brigade, they would have to be notified quickly.

Senior Pentagon officials say thousands of ground combat Marines and an aviation unit could be the first to go. And it could take roughly two months to be on the ground. Violence is spiking in Afghanistan. A Taliban bombing killed two NATO soldiers on Tuesday, just 48 hours after two U.S. soldiers were killed defusing another bomb.

The U.S. commander has asked for roughly 30,000 more troops. But Gates seemed to open the possibility of not sending all of them.

GATES: So, if his mission changes, then the number of troops or the capabilities that he would need would change, one way or the other, as well.

LAWRENCE: Senior Pentagon officials say, there's been discussion of sending two additional Army brigades. If President Obama adds all the requested troops, the U.S. force will be roughly one-third the size of the Soviet Union's army during its Afghan effort.

GATES: I worry a lot about the size of the foreign military footprint in Afghanistan. (END VIDEOTAPE)

LAWRENCE: Now, the U.S. military has a nearby air base in Kyrgyzstan. But that nation recently told American officials they have got to close it down. That means losing a strategic supply route into Afghanistan.

But Secretary Gates said, in his mind, it's not a done deal, and suggested the U.S. could pay more to Kyrgyzstan to keep it open -- Wolf.

BLITZER: Thanks very much, Chris Lawrence, at the -- at the Pentagon.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**No. 102-09  
February 17, 2009**

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### **DoD Announces Afghanistan Force Deployment**

Pursuant to President Obama's decision today, Secretary Gates ordered the deployment of two additional combat units, totaling more than 12,000 troops, to Afghanistan. The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), from Camp Lejeune, N.C., with approximately 8,000 Marines will deploy to Afghanistan in late Spring 2009.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Ft. Lewis, Wash., will deploy approximately 4,000 soldiers to Afghanistan in mid-summer 2009. This Stryker Brigade and the MEB will deploy to increase the capabilities of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Approximately 5,000 additional troops to support these combat forces will receive deployment orders at a later date.

DoD will continue to announce major unit deployments when they are approved. For additional information on the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, contact Marine Corps Public Affairs at (703) 614-4309. For additional information on the Army brigade, contact Army Public Affairs at (703) 614-2487.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO POLAND

February 18 – 20, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

February 18, 2009

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### Secretary Robert Gates Enroute to Krakow

SEC. GATES: (In progress) -- microphone since we're not flying.

MR. : Right. This is actually nice.

SEC. GATES: Just very quickly, a word about the minister's meeting. I think the two central themes are clearly going to be Afghanistan and preparations for the 60th anniversary summit in April. There are a lot of other -- I mean, it's a full agenda. We've got meetings of both the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Georgia Commission. We'll have a session on capabilities where we'll talk about strategic aviation initiative, the allied ground surveillance system and UK-French helicopter initiative. We'll talk about the NATO response force and how we can do a better job on that of meeting the requirements.

And we'll probably talk some about headquarters reform. I know that we are certainly very supportive of some of the proposals to give the Secretary-General more authority to move people around to manage his budget like the executive of a large organization. And there are some differences within the Alliance in terms of whether to try and keep the consensus rule only at the North Atlantic Council level and try and make the committee structure more efficient by allowing majority and minority opinions to come forward or at least be surfaced to the North Atlantic Council so things can get done more efficiently. So we'll see how that turns out.

But I don't want to get hung up on the consensus issue. There are some other things that can be done on NATO reform. And then we'll be probably talking about the nature of the declaration to be issued at the end of the 60th anniversary summit. So there's a lot to talk about, and there will be a number of pull-asides and bilateral meetings as well.

So why don't I stop there.

Yeah, Tom.

MR. : Do you mind sitting here so people can all -- David -- no, David -- why don't you sit right here? Do you want to sit up here so you can hear?

Q (Inaudible) -- expressed concern before that to the extent the U.S. stepped forward and fulfilled the shortfall on troops for Afghanistan, that would let the pressure off the allies. With the announcement yesterday, what will you do to keep the pressure on allies to contribute? And what specifically are you looking for today from the NATO allies as far as (troop strength)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that, clearly, we would like to see plus-ups in the forces that are already there in the period before the election to bring greater security for the election and to ensure that the election can take place in a way that allows the Afghans actually to turn out and vote. So we will continue to ask the allies to provide even a short-term plus-up in their forces to provide security in the pre-election period.

But I think really the focus of what I'm going to say is that where the allies can make a significant, longer-term contribution is particularly on the civilian side at this point. And on governance, training of the police, development -- governance first of all -- but development, training of police, rule-of-law issues, corruption,

counternarcotics, I mean, these are all areas where civilian contribution can be made. And again, I return, I think that governance is the most important where we can help.

I also think it's more congenial for our allies in terms of their domestic constituencies that, I mean, there is a lot of talk about a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. And we really need additional help on the civilian side. There needs to be a civilian strengthening on the civilian side as we are strengthening on the military side. And frankly, I think that it may be -- I hope that it may be easier for our allies to do that than significant troop increases, especially for the longer term. I still want to see more of them there in the pre-election period, more troops from our allies. But for the longer term, what I think we would really like to see is some significant commitments on the civilian side.

I would also say there is a significant shortfall among the allies in providing these Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and especially as we expand, as the size of the Afghan national army expands. So these OMLTs, the short-fall in these OMLTs is important. And that needs to be -- the allies need to step up to the plate on that one as well.

Q How many (small forces ?) do you think you need for the election?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, you know, whatever people can provide. I don't think anybody is going to be giving our allies specific numbers, but we're just asking. There is a requirement out there that had been put out there by NATO in terms of, you know, just the desire to have people sign up for additional troops during that period. And frankly, the response so far has been kind of disappointing. And so my hope is that we can address this issue in the meetings.

Q Dick, is the NRF potentially an avenue for additional troops?

SEC. GATES: Well, there's frankly a disagreement in the Alliance over that. I mean, we believe the NRF ought to be deployable. And I think that it's hard to get people to commit definitely to meet their NRF responsibilities if there's no notion that they'll ever be used anywhere. So it becomes a paper exercise.

And so my view is this pre-election period in Afghanistan is a very good example of where the NRF could provide a temporary strengthening of NATO's capabilities in support of the Afghan government and the elections.

Q Mr. Secretary, as someone who advised both the previous administration and the current one, what difference do you think the addition of the troops announced yesterday will do for the U.S. mission going forward that the previous administration with its troop commitments wasn't able to do?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think the big difference -- and General McKiernan probably went into this in great detail today; I don't know -- but I think the big difference is that the additional numbers, particularly in RC South, will allow us to remain in the field and help protect the population in a better way than when we would sort of come out, do an operation and then go back to a base. And so I think that these additional numbers give us a better chance to provide the kind of security for the population that is necessary, frankly, for economic development and for governance to take hold and so on. So I think this plus-up is really a piece of that.

Q Was it purely a question of adding troops or of changing strategy?

SEC. GATES: I think the president made very clear in his remarks yesterday or in the statement that these decisions do not prejudge the outcome of the strategic review. And so how this goes as we look to the future, I think, depends very much on the outcome of the strategic review.

Q Does your emphasis on the civilian side with the NATO allies mean that you've essentially decided that it's just not doable to get them to increase troop levels, particularly over the long term?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think the likelihood of getting the allies to commit significant numbers of additional troops is not very great. I mean, the fact is, over the -- I mean, to give credit where credit is due, the allies have increased the number of non-U.S. Troops by about 15,000 over the last year or so. So it's not like nothing has happened, or that there's been no response. And our allies have essentially fulfilled the commitments that they have made. The question is whether additional commitments beyond that can be made, and I think there will be some, but I don't think they will be big numbers.

Q Do you (foresee ?) anything that would change that dynamic?

SEC. GATES: Probably not.

Q Today General McKiernan talked about a three-to-five-year horizon for the sort of U.S. plus-up of troops. Is that the sort of horizon you're working with? Is that what you're talking to the allies about in terms of a civilian commitment? What do you see in terms of how long this increase in forces will be needed?

SEC. GATES: Well, again, I think that really depends on the outcome of the strategic review and the president's decisions following the completion of the review. So I think those are all kind of open-ended questions until the review is done.

Q Do the additional troops for Afghanistan also fall into that category, or do you consider that the fourth brigade that General McKiernan wanted is still approved as far as your -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: I lose track of how many brigades and what. Which brigade are you talking about? The Strykers?

Q Well, you asked for four brigades, and you got one from the Bush administration, now two more or two equivalents. And so he indicated today that he --

SEC. GATES: Well, he's also got a combat aviation brigade and --

Q Right. We're talking about a ground maneuver brigade. He also said something about a training brigade.

MR. : Training brigade.

SEC. GATES: The training brigade is in abeyance until the completion of the strategic review. And I'll make no recommendations with respect to that until after the review is done.

Q So you consider that the long-standing request from General McKiernan has now been responded to, this is what he's getting for now?

SEC. GATES: No, he has that outstanding request for that training brigade, and it's there. But it is not necessary to make a decision or a recommendation on that before the completion of the strategic review. And I see no reason to do so.

Q He also mentioned that he wanted, in addition to the training brigade, he mentioned either another BCT or a Marine regimental combat unit that would -- (inaudible) -- (early next year?).

SEC. GATES: I think that was new to me.

Q Sir, General Conway made it clear that if Marines are to go massively to Afghanistan, which is, I mean, apparently the case with 8,000 more Marines by this summer, he's going to need to, you know, to pull out some Marines from the Anbar province.

SEC. GATES: Who said that?

Q General Conway. So have talks started in this regard? Is there talks about actually starting to pulling out some Marines from the Anbar province to let them go to Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that there was mention in the press this morning about the fact that both of these units, the Marines and the Stryker brigade, are being re-missioned from Iraq. Yeah.

Q (Inaudible) -- but maybe they (cleaned?) out some more? Because there are still like 20,000 Marines there.

SEC. GATES: Well, there --

Q So do you think that's -- I mean, just the fact that they're re-missioned is -- it means that they're --

SEC. GATES: Well, that means that there are 8,000 Marines that are going to presumably at some point come home from Anbar that are not going to be replaced.

Q On NATO or allied contributions, have you given any more thought to non-NATO contributions, particularly

on the civilian side? If NATO can't step up, are there other American allies in other parts of the world that --

SEC. GATES: Absolutely. And I would say there is another area that is very important, and that is financial support for the expansion of the Afghan National Army. The Afghan government cannot afford to sustain an army -- on its own cannot afford to sustain an army of 134,000 people or more than that, potentially. And so they're going to require international help for some period of time to do that -- at least as long as they face an active insurgency. And so I think that the notion of other allies who cannot commit troops for whatever reason, not only making a contribution on the civilian side but also contributing to the trust fund to support the expansion of the Afghan National Army is really important. And I think we will be looking at people -- and in fact we've made some asks along those lines to non-NATO allies.

Q (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: Well, we've talked to the Japanese; we've talked to the South Koreans; we've talked to a number of people -- the Gulf states.

Q Mr. Secretary, what role does Ambassador Kai Eide play in this whole strategic review? I mean, he was the guy who really is supposed to be putting together the civilian support to govern -- (inaudible) -- the economy.

SEC. GATES: I think clearly there is an interest in making sure that Ambassador Eide is involved in this, that we get his input. I mean, at a certain point we do -- because we are an alliance in Afghanistan, we will complete our strategic review, but that's why we're reaching out to our allies and to Kai Eide and to non-NATO partners who are working with us in Afghanistan, to get their input in the review. It's why we want the Afghans and the Pakistanis to be involved in the review and get their input, so that what we have really represents a broad view of the way ahead in Afghanistan. And I mean, I -- it seems to me that Kai Eide is the central coordinating figure on the civilian side of this campaign in Afghanistan for -- under the auspices of the United Nations, and anything we can do to help him and to help strengthen him, we will do. And I think frankly that our -- the expressions of concern by a number of people and a number of countries that he was not being adequately resourced by the United Nations has helped light a fire in New York and get him more people and more resources to do the job that he needs to do.

Q Mr. Secretary, General McKiernan said that he thought that there needed to be this kind of sustained commitment for three to five years. Is that what you and the president are thinking, that -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, it -- the -- again, I think that remains -- the timelines and the goals remain to be seen as a result of the strategic review.

Q Could I just ask you to --

Q Sir, this is your first trip to NATO as Defense secretary for the new Obama administration. The ministers know you; the Secretary-General knows you very well. I'm curious, can you pull back the curtain? Did the new president give you a message, something different to say? Sure, it's the same Robert M. Gates, but you're now working for a new boss.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that what is new is -- I mean, the message is that it is a new administration, and the administration is prepared -- as the president's decision made clear yesterday -- is prepared to make additional commitments to Afghanistan, but there clearly will be expectations that the allies must do more as well. And I think this was the vice president's message in Munich, and it basically will be my message in Krakow.

Q Do you expect that NATO expansion will come up at all in any sort of forum? Maybe not formally, but -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: I don't expect it to be -- as I said at the outset, I think that Afghanistan and the 60th anniversary will be the focus. The two commissions will meet, and the commissions are really all about how do we help both countries move forward with the reform process, with entrenching democratization -- in short, all of the things that are necessary in terms of eventual membership in the Alliance. And I -- but I think other than the commission meetings themselves, in terms of how we can encourage those things, I don't expect it to be a central issue.

MR. : I think we'll take two more, and then we'll --

Q When you meet the Polish defense minister, what will you tell him about the status of the missile defense system?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm basically -- will say -- so you want my talking points before I ever meet with the

guy? (Laughter.)

Q I'd be delighted. Thank you very much. (Laughter.)

Q If you could, please. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: I think that the message will be the same message that the vice president delivered in Munich: We are concerned about the Iranian missile threat and as long as that threat exists we will continue to pursue missile defense, as long as we know it will work, as long as we can make sure it works and that it's cost effective, and we want to pursue it in partnership not only with our NATO allies but also with the Russians. And frankly my -- I am hopeful that -- with a new start that maybe there are some opportunities with the Russians that we can pursue.

Q How do you think that will sit with the Polish government in light of the -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, it's just -- it's a fact of life. I mean, the other fact of life is that by law we cannot begin construction on either the site in the Czech Republic or in Poland until both the SOFA and the missile defense agreements are ratified by both of their parliaments. So even if we had a different policy, we couldn't do anything until they do something.

Q (Inaudible) -- on the Taliban truce in the Swat Valley -- how confident are you in the assurances that this will not give the Taliban greater reach? And were you aware of it ahead of time?

SEC. GATES: Well, hope springs eternal. We have some experience with these agreements. Maybe this will buy some breathing space for the Pakistani army, but I would say we'll wait and see.

Q Were you aware of it ahead of time?

SEC. GATES: To tell you the truth I can't remember. (Laughs.) I mean, I may have heard that the Pakistani government was thinking about pursuing this, but I don't remember.

MR. : All right, last one. (Inaudible.)

Q Sir, Vice President Biden -- and you touched a little bit on it -- said something about resetting the U.S.-Russian relationship. Is that something that you are going to be -- I notice there's no meeting with the Russians on the schedule I got, and there usually is that NATO-Russian meeting.

SEC. GATES: Well, there has not I think been a NATO-Russia Council meeting since the Russians went into Georgia.

Q Right

SEC. GATES: And I think clearly probably on the sidelines there will be some discussion about the way forward with the Russians. But again, I think that needs to be -- for at least our government, that needs to be the result of a review of the relationship led by the NSC that involves the State Department and so on in terms of where we go from here, in terms of the relationship. But I -- you know, obviously, there is a desire.

There are Russian behaviors that are a concern to us. We also need the Russians in other areas, and so we need to work this relationship through, I think, in a constructive way that allows us to move forward. But at the same time, mindful of some of their actions that still give us a problem. And you know, I mean, just as an example, I think that the Russians are trying to have it both ways with respect to Afghanistan, in terms of Manas. And the question is, on one hand you're making positive noises about working with us in Afghanistan, and on the other hand you're working against us in terms of that air field, which is clearly important to us. So how do we go forward in that light?

Q Are you still hopeful that Manas will not be closed to U.S. forces?

SEC. GATES: I think that would be a good way to put it. I am hopeful that it will not be closed.

MR. : Okay.

SEC. GATES: Thank you, all.

Q Thanks.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you, sir.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

February 19, 2009

### Roundtable With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in Krakow, Poland

SEC. GATES: I'm just going to say a quick word and then take your questions. I think we had a very good set of meetings today. The focus was principally on Afghanistan: first in the operations session this morning -- or early this afternoon -- and then -- or at the lunch, I guess -- and then in the late afternoon session, which was a meeting of all of the contributing nations in Afghanistan. A lot of focus on the run-up to the Afghan elections in August and the importance of added security, what more people can do, but also on the civilian side.

I think it was a good exchange of views. We got this evening a report from Minister Wardak in terms of his view of the situation. And my personal view was it was very important to hear from him. It's very important to hear from the Afghans, their perspective on how things are going because it's fundamentally their fight and we are helping them. And the more we see them in leadership, the better it is.

Talked a little bit about -- in my bilateral meetings with a number of people -- about the review of U.S.- Afghan policy and strategy that is going on, stressing the inclusiveness of that effort. There will be Afghan and Pakistani teams coming to the U.S. to work with us on it. I think Ambassador Holbrooke will be going to Brussels to meet with the North Atlantic Council and the participating nations that are not in NATO are also being consulted. So it's a very inclusive process that includes our allies, not only our allies in NATO but people in the region and our other partners.

So why don't I just stop there and take your questions? Yeah.

Q Mr. Secretary -- (inaudible) -- of the Czech Republic. With regard to the missile defense and all these considerations like economic factor and technology and diplomacy tools, Iran and Russia, do you think it could be expected that the U.S. would retreat from the treaty signed with Poland and the Czech Republic?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that as the vice president said in Munich, we continue to be very concerned about the Iranian missile threat, particularly as they continue work on what we believe are weapons of mass destruction. Their launch of a satellite shows that they are increasing their ability to build missiles or rockets with considerable range. And both in the context of cost effectiveness and technology, we will continue to move forward. But we are also going to work with our allies. We have a NATO commitment that was made at Bucharest by all of the heads of government. And we also are very interested in continuing to pursue our efforts to persuade the Russians to partner with us in this endeavor. And my hope is that now, with the new administration, the prospects for that kind of cooperation might have improved.

MR. : Sir, one second. We're going to alternate between American press and the visiting press. We'll come right to you. Yes?

Q Following on that, Mr. Secretary, your Polish counterpart said after the meeting today that he had wanted to hear from you whether the U.S. planned to go forward with partnership with Poland and that he hoped that that would happen. What is your view about whether the current structure of the missile defense program should continue as it is?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think again -- I think the key is keeping in mind what the threat is. And the reason that we are pursuing -- have pursued a third site is because of the Iranian missile programs. I told the Russians a year

ago that if there were no Iranian missile program, there would be no need for the missile sites. So one approach would be to see if we can get better Russian cooperation in dealing with some of the activities that are going on in Iran.

The fact is that between the economic crisis, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the administration has not yet reviewed where it is on a whole range of issues, including relationships with our allies, the missile defense program, the relationship with the Russians. These things are all, in many respects, tied together, including Iran. And so I think the answer is, we're just asking. What I told the defense minister today was they just have to give us a little time to review these things.

MR. : Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary of Defense, there have been lots of talk about the new strategy in new U.S. administration. You have been part of the old and new administration. Can you explain this strategy, if not the overall strategy, at least the military part of it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that first of all there was a recognition toward the end of last year even in the Bush administration that we needed to take another look at our strategy. And in particular, the conclusions there were we needed to think in shorter terms than 20 or 30 years from now. We needed to think in terms of how do we improve, help the Afghan people and government improve the security and social situation, governance situation in Afghanistan over the next three to five years. And what are realistic attainable goals? So I think that those are some of the same questions that are being asked as part of the strategy review that's underway by the new administration. And essentially, the old administration handed off its review to the new administration as -- to be one of the elements involved in the more comprehensive review by the new administration. And so I think that it really is focused on how, how can, how can we help Afghanistan, we and our partners, in the nearer term, in terms of not only their security but in terms of governance, in terms of economic development and so on? And the review is still underway. I expect it will take several more weeks, in part because we are trying to be inclusive and get the views of everyone. And so we'll just have to wait and see when the review is done what the conclusions are.

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. : I'm going to -- I'm sorry, but time -- I'm going to have to -- we have time for a follow-up, we'll come around. Yeah, Tom?

Q On the question of supply lines for Afghanistan, Kyrgyz's party today voted in the mid-afternoon from the U.S. that they have to close the base at Manas in six months. What is your sense, Mr. Secretary, of how great a loss that would be? And can you please update us on planning for alternative routes?

SEC. GATES: Well, as I have said, it's a -- Manas is important, but it's not irreplaceable. And we are going to continue to work the problem with the Kyrgyz. We have not resigned ourselves to this being the last, the last word. We are clearly -- as I said, we have looked at alternatives and have been talking to a number of different, a number of different countries, and you know, I think, I think we are speaking now, for myself, since the Department of Defense will have to pay the bill, I think we are prepared to look at the fees and see if there is justification for a somewhat larger payment. But, but we're not going to be ridiculous about it. It's -- we're prepared to do something that we think is reasonable. So I haven't written us off yet, and my hope is that we can walk this back with the Kyrgyz and continue the arrangement. As I say, it is, it is an important base, but it's not so important that we're going to waste taxpayer dollars paying something that's exorbitant.

Q: Martin Arigoto (ph) with El Pais, from Spain. You started your -- in your position just a couple of years ago. I sat in this kind of informal meeting in Seville at the time, and I remember vividly that that moment was considered a big success, having something like 35,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, because Europeans -- (inaudible) - saw this and finally we decided to put -- there were some -- everybody was happy. Now we are on the brink of arriving to 80,000, and we are not sure what is going to happen. What is going to happen? What has changed in these two years? Were we too frivolous in our strategies that we need to change because after five years fighting, we were unable to find the right strategy -- (inaudible, cross talk).

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think so, I think that the circumstances -- in many respects, the circumstances have changed. During the period of 2000, we began to see a significant upsurge in -- or a growth of violence in Afghanistan to new levels beginning about 2006. And when I first came to the job, to this job in December of 2006, what we were anticipating was a new Taliban surge, or a new Taliban offensive in the spring of 2007.

And we decided that it would become our offensive instead, and so I extended an American brigade, I added another American brigade, but what we also saw during this period during the mid-part of the decade was



the Pakistanis arriving at some of these agreements on the, on their side of the boarder in Waziristan and some of these other places that actually gave the -- they basically stopped fighting these guys, and it gave them, in essence, a safe haven. And what we have seen is a steady increase in violence, really since that time.

And so you have -- the main circumstance that has happened, I think, has been that, that you have seen a safe haven, to a considerable extent, for the Taliban, and they've been joined not only by al Qaeda but by sort of affiliated groups, groups like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqani network, that are all now working together. And they're coming across the border and creating problems, and so we've been pleased to see the Pakistani military come back to that area over the last year and begin working it. But there's, there's no question that the level of violence has increased steadily for the last two or three years, and so I think the circumstances have changed.

And one of the problems that we have had is that as that violence has increased, we have had -- we have increased the number of troops fairly substantially. In fact, our NATO and non-NATO partners have increased their troop contribution by about 15,000 over the past 15 months or so, 18 months. And we have increased, obviously steadily increased our presence as well. What we have not had, though, is particularly in the south, enough troops to be able to hold onto areas where we had cleared the Taliban out before. And so what we are doing with this troop increase is that we hope that this will create a situation in which we can have a more or less continuing presence with our Afghan partners, the Afghan national army in particular, in terms of bringing security to the population, first in the lead-up to the election and then after that, because without that kind of security, economic development is very difficult.

So I think it -- what we have seen is, circumstances changed on the Pakistani side of the border, there was a safe haven, the Taliban and others used that as an opportunity to begin coming back. Frankly, the difficulties that the Afghan government has faced in getting services and things to the people have probably contributed. There have been huge increases under the current Afghan government, there have been significant increases in health care and the building of schools, in the number of children going to school, especially the number of girls going to school. So there have been a number of advances, but the security situation has just gotten more challenging, and that's what we're dealing with.

MR. : Julie.

Q Dr. Gates, yesterday you spoke of asking the allies for more civilian contributions to the Afghanistan war effort. I wonder if you had a chance to talk to any of them about that, and I wonder if in response, today or separately, did they give you any indication of what they want to see out of the strategy review, what kind of input -- what they would like to see the strategy be?

SEC. GATES: I think that the short answer to your answer is no. We really didn't discuss the content of the review, either in the larger sessions or in my bilateral meetings. But I did, in my remarks at the larger meetings, talk about the importance of contributions, and contributions very soon, particularly in the security arena, to try and get additional capability there before the elections to provide security so the Afghan people can vote in August. But I talked about more of a contribution in terms of governance, in terms of economic development, rule of law, all of these things where we can help -- where we can partner with the Afghan government and help make it more effective.

MR. : Right here.

Q Secretary, John Hutton this morning said he'd not been asked for any -- to send any more troops to Afghanistan. Will you be asking --

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry, who?

Q John Hutton, Secretary, U.K. secretary of defense, said he'd not been asked to send any more troops to Afghanistan. Will you be asking him to send any more troops and how do you feel that our troops -- the British troops have done -- (inaudible, cross talk)?

SEC. GATES: I don't believe that we have made any specific asks at this point. I think one of the subjects that is being pursued in tandem with the Strategic Review is, what precisely do we want to ask different countries to do? And so I think that may come, but we have not done it yet.

Q And how do you feel the British have performed in the South?

SEC. GATES: I think the British have done tremendously. They've been very courageous; they've been out there. I think that British soldiers -- I mean, all of -- particularly those who -- let's face it, most of the toughest fighting

is going on in RC-South, and all of the nations down there, I think, have done of tremendous job and shown tremendous courage -- the British, Canadians, the Australians, the Danes, the Dutch. I just think that they're -- the Poles -- have made a terrific contribution.

MR. : David?

Q Mr. Secretary, how receptive do you think NATO partners have been to your expression of the need for further security forces -- (inaudible, background noise) -- and what bearing did Minister Wardak -- (inaudible) -- have on that issue -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, again, I haven't really had an opportunity to talk with very many people about the specifics, but I would say, just based on the comments that others made at the table, I think that there is a shared belief that we need to do more in terms of providing security in the run up to the Afghan election. There is very strong support for the expansion of the Afghan army. There was a lot of talk today about what more we could all do in terms of helping train the Afghan national police.

I think all of us see the Afghan national army and the Afghan national police as, really, being the institutions that, over time, take leadership of this struggle for Afghan security. And we're already partnering particularly with the ANA in a lot of our operations. But I think that there was a -- particularly with respect to the police, I think, more than I have heard in the past -- there was an expression of the importance of helping train and expand the Afghan national police.

Q And Minister Wardak -- what did he say about the current situation?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that he and Ambassador Kai Eide have both made reports late this afternoon, and I would say that both reports were very realistic. I thought they were balanced. Minister Wardak, as always, expressed the gratitude of the Afghan people for the help they're getting from all the different countries and entities around the world. And I think his focus, clearly, is on the expansion of the Afghan national army and getting that done as quickly as possible. And I think everybody, including him, believes they're ahead of schedule on that.

Q (Inaudible). Mr. Secretary, whether there was an agreement on missile defense -- (inaudible) -- already signed the declaration of -- (inaudible) -- with Poland. And if the project for missile defense is put on hold or cancelled, will the United States be ready to implement the declaration in its full text?

SEC. GATES: I think, in fact, the next -- I think, and if I remember correctly, the next consultative meeting that was set up by that will take place between now and the NATO summit, and we will have the first high-level security group meeting later this year. So the answer is yes.

Q Secretary, how does the global financial crisis color your deliberations -- the overall deliberations as the first defense minister -- (inaudible) -- when the economy has changed quite as much as it has?

SEC. GATES: Actually, there was less focus on -- less mention of that today than I would have expected. There have been a few people -- I won't name names -- but there have been a few who've said that they are not cutting back on their commitment but they are unable to increase their commitment as much as they would like because of budgetary pressures. A number of these ministers of defense are taking some pretty good budget cuts. But what I found impressive, actually, today, was, by inference at least, the fact that people aren't using the economic crisis as an excuse to cut back on their contributions or to walk away from their commitments in Afghanistan, which I found very encouraging, frankly.

Q (Inaudible.) I was wondering, part of the change of strategy in Iraq was arming local militias; do you think this is an option for Afghanistan, too? And secondly, what, in concrete terms, could be done to change the situation in the tribal areas in Pakistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that the -- in the first place, taking the second part of your question -- the Pakistani army has been in the fight in along that border. They have taken a lot of casualties. They have been fighting steadily for a number of months. And I think that they have clearly, as we would say, be in the fight. In terms of the -- what was the first part of your question again?

Q Arming local militias.

SEC. GATES: Oh, I think what we want to be very careful about -- first of all, there are very significant differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, and trying to apply lessons from one to the other too precisely, I think, is not very helpful. On the other hand, it is clear that, as I suggested today, that we not only need to continue working

with the central government in Kabul, but we also need to do a better job of working with the provincial and district governments in Afghanistan.

The last thing the Afghans want is for us, in some way, to recreate warlords. And so the question is, how can you engage the local population in defense of their own population -- of their own schools and things like that? And that's what we're exploring, I think, with our Afghan partners. And how do you tie whatever that is to the central government, to the provincial government, so that it's not sitting out here as a warlord coming along -- as a new kind of warlord. So I think we're very mindful of that history and determined to do our best to avoid it. But I think there does need to be outreach at the local and provincial level, as well as cooperation at the national level.

Q But how would you do that in practice? Is this kind of a neighborhood watch program?

SEC. GATES: Well, frankly, we're still working it. I mean, as was the case, I think -- and now, I am going to draw a parallel to Iraq -- you know, one of the things you don't have to worry about in either country is arming anybody. And so this is really more of a matter of how you partner with people and how you engage with them. And I think that General McKiernan and Minister Wardak and others in the -- and the interior minister -- are all working together to figure out what's the best way to try and do this.

MR. : Yeah, Ken?

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to Manas for a moment: You said that your working the problem with the Kyrgyz government; are you also working the problem with the Russian government, and if so, what is your sense of what the Russians may be interested in?

SEC. GATES: I think the way I'd prefer to leave it right now is that we are talking to a number of governments about access. And that includes the Russians.

Q But the Russians specifically with regard to access to Manas?

SEC. GATES: I'm not sure that we have directly engaged the Russians on Manas, yet.

MR. : Yes, sir?

Q (Inaudible) -- from Polish radio RMF FM. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the future of the alliance: Is the U.S. administration ready to support this year the candidate from new NATO members for a post of secretary general?

SEC. GATES: I will give you an honest answer, and that is I have not had one word of conversation with my colleagues in the American government about that subject yet.

Q And what's your opinion?

SEC. GATES: I think that we want the best possible candidate, and the one that will have the broadest support within the alliance. There's a lot that needs to be done. I'm a strong supporter of headquarters reform in the alliance, in terms of allowing the secretary-general, giving the secretary general more authority to move money and people around. So we need a strong executive. And -- but I have not had a single discussion about it at this point.

MR. : Daphne

Q Mr. Secretary, now that President Obama has decided to increase troops in Afghanistan, and so Afghanistan was his first priority, his dedication now will be towards reviewing the strategy in Iraq, and when should we expect a decision regarding further withdrawals in Iraq?

SEC. GATES: Well, the review of -- in Iraq -- the review of our strategy and approach in Iraq is underway, and frankly I don't know when it will be done, but I presume sometime next month, maybe earlier. It's hard to tell.

MR. : Brian (ph)?

SEC. GATES: To follow up on one of your answers, one of the criticisms in Afghanistan, the operation, has been a lack of unity of command between the NATO forces and the U.S. forces. Can you talk about whether or not, number one, that has come up in your discussions today, but also just give us your view on how additional American forces -- but, as you would make also some additional NATO capabilities, could be brought together to bear in a more effective way, since there has not been a unity of command in some areas, and also if you can

address the caveat issue, which has come up many, many times. How do you crack that?

SEC. GATES: Last fall, I made a change in the command structure. And double-hatted -- General McKiernan -- not only as a commander of ISAF, but also as commander of all U.S. forces Afghanistan. And so he now has under his authority virtually all of the forces inside Afghanistan, and frankly, since I made that move, I have not heard a single complaint from any of our allies about command problems or difficulties with respect to unity of command.

With respect to -- and so I think that problem has largely been addressed. With respect to caveats, it continues to be a problem. We've been singing this song ever since Riga, and it -- and every meeting, we say, we really wish you guys would take your caveats off. At the Bucharest Summit last year, some countries did either remove their caveats or diminish their impact. But there are still a number, and I can't remember if General Craddock used a number today, but there are still something like 40 or 50 caveats among the different nations that have them. And it's obviously a complication.

MR. : AI, pass it.

Q Mr. Secretary, how does the troop-buildup coming out in Afghanistan affect the importance of Manas and how much you might be willing to pay for it, and do you believe that missile defense is technologically feasible and cost effective?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- first of all, that's a twofer, isn't it? (Laughter.)

Q Yes, it was. Thank you for noticing.

SEC. GATES: (Chuckles.) I think -- I think that the, the thinking and planning that has been done in terms of alternative networks takes into account the increase of U.S. troop levels and the requirements that they will impose over and above what we already have. With respect to missile defense, I think that because that's such a leading question -- (laughter) -- and because this issue hasn't been reviewed by the administration yet, I think I'll punt.

MR. : Okay? I think that's everybody.

Q (Inaudible) -- one of my colleagues?

MR. : I'm sorry?

Q You give evaluation and -- (inaudible) -- of that one -- you were saying that there is no -- (inaudible) -- in the structure -- the military structure of the command, that there -- (inaudible, cross talk).

SEC. GATES: Correct.

Q -- but -- (inaudible) -- are trying to emphasize the civilian side of the operation, and in that field, there is no connection at all between the military side of the civilian side of the operations -- (inaudible, cross talk).

SEC. GATES: Actually --

Q What is your thinking about that?

SEC. GATES: Actually, that's not right. There is a connection, and it is Ambassador Kai Eide. And he has -- he has developed a very close relationship, a very good relationship with General McKiernan, and I think that we have -- because Ambassador Eide has finally been given substantial additional resources, both people and money, by the U.N., just in recent months, his ability to do the job that he was given, that he was asked to take on, has significantly been improved and enhanced. And so I think -- I think you're seeing a significant improvement in the coordination of the civil-military arena.

Part of the problem that ambassador Eide is, he doesn't know what everybody's doing. The countries that are engaged in the -- not on the military side, on the civilian side, he doesn't know who is spending what kind of money on what kind of projects. So that they're -- so that he can do the kind of coordination and sharing of best practices and so on that we -- that he would like to do.

I'm a big admirer of Eide, and I think that he's been given a very tough job, and I think he's doing it with a great deal of patience and a great deal of skill. And I am very encouraged. I met with General McKiernan the other day, before I left Washington, and he was talking about his relationship Eide and how they're working together

closely. I met with Eide here today, and he said the same thing on the military side. So I'm actually more encouraged -- quite a bit more encouraged about this civil-military coordination than I was even as recently as the Budapest meeting last fall.

MR. : Okay, thanks.

SEC. GATES: Thank you. Thank you all.

ALL: Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF TRIP TO KRAKOW, POLAND

Feb. 18-20, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, listens to questions from members of the press aboard the National Airborne Operations Center aircraft before departing for Krakow, Poland, Feb. 18, 2009. Gates was headed to Poland to meet with NATO defense ministers.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is greeted by Kurt Volker, ambassador, U.S. Permanent Representative of NATO during a recent visit to Krakow, Poland, Feb. 19, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates signs a memorandum of understanding with Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich at the II Mech Corps Headquarters during a recent visit to Krakow, Poland, Feb. 19, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, signs a memorandum of understanding with Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich at Poland's II Mechanized Corps Headquarters in Krakow, Poland, Feb. 19, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates walks with Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich at the II Mech Corps Headquarters during a visit to Krakow, Poland, Feb. 19, 2009. Gates was in Poland to attend to Krakow Defense Ministry Conference.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates gives his remarks and answers questions during a press conference in Krakow, Poland, Feb. 20, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates awaits the start of the NATO Defense Ministers meeting during a recent visit to Krakow, Poland, Feb. 20, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Press Availability with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates following the NATO Meeting in Krakow, Poland

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates February 20, 2009

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Press Availability with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates following the NATO Meeting in Krakow, Poland

SEC. GATES: Let me start by thanking Poland for hosting this gathering. And let me also thank my fellow ministers for productive meetings these past two days covering many issues, from headquarters reform to Alliance capabilities. Our main focus was Afghanistan -- the greatest challenge we face, and a clear threat to international stability. As we've learned, this will not be an easy fight, or a short one, but I'm convinced that NATO and other partner nations are committed to meeting the challenge and meeting it squarely.

During our meetings we all agreed that we must intensify our efforts to bring security and stability to Afghanistan and to ensure that the Afghans were capable of sustaining themselves. It is, after all, their country, their fight and their future. In the near term, it is critical that the alliance provide enough troops to ensure that the August elections are credible. Part of the reason President Obama chose -- (audio break) -- upwards of 17,000 additional U.S. troops to the theater.

We also must accelerate the growth and size and capability of the Afghan National Army and police, a key goal that still requires more resources from member nations. At the same time, we cannot neglect the need for a long-term increase of civilian contributions and the necessity to improve coordination between civilians and military components.

On that note I have been greatly encouraged in recent days by conversations about the strong relationship between Ambassador Kai Eide and General McKiernan. I also believe that President Obama's comprehensive review of our strategy, which will be undertaken with our allies and rely heavily on their input, will yield concrete, attainable objectives that will then focus and guide our overall strategy.

As you know, our discussions were largely in preparation for the April meeting of the heads of state, the 60th anniversary of NATO. Looking back over those six decades, it is clear that the alliance has faced many challenges and met them. I believe we are facing a very tough test in Afghanistan, but I have no doubt that we will rise to the occasion, as we have done so many times before.

Thank you.

Q Mr. Secretary, Uzbekistan issued the formal eviction notice -- excuse me, Kyrgyzstan issued the formal eviction notice today for the Manas base. Yesterday you seemed to indicate that there was still some hope that the U.S. could retain use of that base. Do

you think today that no means no? And also, is there a new deal for resupplying through Uzbekistan? 210

SEC. GATES: I don't want to get into specifics on alternative routes, but I continue to believe that this is not a closed issue, and if there remains the potential at least to reopen this issue with the Kyrgyzs and perhaps reach a new agreement. If we're not able to do that on reasonable terms, then, as I have suggested, we are developing alternative methods of getting resupply and people into Afghanistan.

Q Thank you. The question is about Ukraine. The former president of the United States supported Ukraine integrity to NATO. Will Mr. Obama support Ukraine to take part in alliance? Thank you -- I mean in that way Bush did it.

SEC. GATES: I think that the alliance -- all the alliance members, including the heads, in Bucharest last year acknowledged that Ukraine, at some point, would be in NATO. We are now proceeding on a path in that direction. The annual national plan that is being put together by the Ukrainians is an important step on that road. I think it's become clear that the -- it was clear at the foreign ministers' meeting in December that this is a long path in front, and quite frankly, there needs to be greater unanimity of view in the Ukrainian government itself about the next steps, not to mention the resources for modernization of Ukraine's military.

And so I think that all of the members of the alliance have made this commitment. They made it at Bucharest, and the path forward was made out in December, and I don't think that the new administration has a significant quarrel with the path that was laid out at the December foreign ministers meeting.

Q Yes, thank you. (Off mike) -- Associated Press. Secretary Gates, Mr. Hoop Scheffer said he thinks the NRC should be used also to discuss conflicts with Russia -- so, in other words, that meetings ought to be resumed. Do you share this view, and when should this happen?

SEC. GATES: I think that -- I mean, the NATO-Russia group exists. I think that everyone has assumed that it will resume being a venue for dialogue between the alliance and Russia. I think the question is at what point that happens. And, frankly, the Obama administration has not yet looked comprehensively at its policies with respect to Russia, and so I think our position on that, on what that ought to happen, is not yet settled. I would, though, reiterate what Vice President Biden said in Munich, that this administration does believe the time has come to reset the relationship with Russia and move forward.

Q Canadian Television. You've spoken about increase in the civilian component to the Afghan mission. I wonder if you would find it acceptable for those nations that aren't able or unwilling to send more troops -- whether that would be a suitable alternative. And in the Canadian context, if the Canadian mission is set to end in 2011, could you see an increased civilian role being a replacement in --

SEC. GATES: I think that all of the nations who are engaged in Afghanistan ought to contribute what they can contribute. A number are doing both. We are doing both. The Germans are doing both, in a significant way. The British are doing both -- both the civil and the military side. We are making a substantial addition to the military side, and if other countries are unable to transfer their military commitment but they are willing and able to make a contribution on the stability side, on the development side, those contributions would be very welcome.

I think it's also a point worth making that, you know, the review that the administration has underway is going to be a -- it's not only a comprehensive review in Afghan strategy, it's an inclusive review that includes our allies, non-NATO partners and

others. It includes the Afghans and the Pakistanis and others. And in parallel with 211 will be developing what we believe other nations might be able to contribute. And so I think a point worth making is that our new president has not yet asked anybody for anything. We are trying to develop, through this review, what those needs are most likely to be, and at that point, I believe before the NATO summit, we will be making those requests, but as yet they're not resolved.

Q Thank you. Mr. Scheffer said that NATO supports territorial integrity of Georgia, but still the Russian bases are on the territory of Georgia. After adopting the USA-Georgia charter, how do you think it will strengthen cooperation with Georgia, its defense and security system, or not?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have a continuing security relationship with Georgia. We're involved in training. We are involved in military reform in Georgia. So this is an ongoing relationship and it is a relationship that we are pursuing, both bilaterally and within the framework of our NATO allies, and through the vehicle of the U.S.-Georgia Commission. So I think it's proceeding as we had planned.

Q Thomas Larsen from the Danish newspaper Politiken. There is a lot of talk here in Europe really now about who's going to be the next secretary general from NATO. When would you like to see this issue resolved, and what do you think about the possible candidacy of the Danish prime minister, Mr. Rasmussen?

SEC. GATES: I have a lot of respect for the prime minister. I also have a lot of respect for the defense minister. But there are a lot of capable people, and I would hope that we would have this resolved in time for the NATO summit so that there could be agreement there. Frankly, I think that what's important, from my standpoint, is simply that we have somebody who has the broadest possible support across the alliance, and, frankly, somebody who has the executive experience to run a very large and complex organization.

Q For the Italian Television, Mr. Secretary, do you believe the new U.N. report about the Iranian nuclear activity will accelerate the United States' plans for an anti-missile defense system?

SEC. GATES: I haven't read the U.N. report yet so I'm not really in a position to comment, but I think that, as I have said before, the primary reason for the third site in Europe is to deal with the Iranian missile threat, and the fact that they have just launched a space satellite I think is indicative of the continuing and steady progress that they are seeing in developing these missile capabilities. So I think we need to take that into account, along with their continuing unwillingness to go along with the U.N. Security Council resolutions, with respect to enrichment.

Q (Off mike) -- Report. Mr. Secretary, I would like you to say how many countries have, until now, declared to improve troops in Afghanistan, and if you could give examples of countries who are that. The second thing is this casts the issue -- the subject of a missile defense project and the new attitudes of the American government towards this subject, and what could you explain about it? Is America going to continue the project in Poland? And the third thing --

SEC. GATES: No, no. (Laughter.) First of all, I think there are 46 countries that have -- over 40 countries are engaged in Afghanistan right now. And countries are making new commitments on a fairly steady base on both the civilian and the military side. And as I indicated in answering an earlier question, I expect that there will be significant new commitments on either the civilian or the military side in connection with the NATO summit.

We did talk about missile defense in my talks with Prime Minister Tusk and Defense Minister Klich. I basically told them that we needed some time for this

administration to review the plans for the third site, to look at it in the context of our relationship with both Poland and the Czech Republic, our relationship with the NATO alliance, the commitments we have made as members of the alliance in terms of European missile defense, and also in the context of our relationship with the Russians. And we need to look at all of that, and I simply asked the Polish leaders for a little time for the administration to be able to do that.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, the president is confronting an economic crisis. We're going through an Afghan review. We are going to be -- we're also involved in a review of a way forward in Iraq for American forces. My hope would be that these other issues can be taken up very soon.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the desire for NATO countries and non-NATO countries to contribute more on the civilian side. Did you make any specific requests? Did you press your colleagues on specific things they could contribute? Did you get any commitments over the last few days?

SEC. GATES: I did not make any specific requests of any specific country. There have been some new commitments made on both the civilian and the military side over the last couple of days. About 20 countries -- 19 or 20 countries announced at one point or another in the meetings that they would be increasing their contribution either on the civilian or the military or the training side, so I consider that a good start as we begin to look toward the summit.

Q Mr. Secretary, my name is -- (off mike) -- with the Luxembourg Report, the largest newspaper in Luxembourg. Why does the United States feel that there is a need for a new strategic concept that is to be launched at the summit in Strasbourg -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: It's been 10 years since the NATO strategic concept was last -- was promulgated, and frankly I think a great deal has happened in the world over the last 10 years. And I think that the idea of taking a fresh look at it makes all kinds of sense.

Last question. Yes, sir?

Q (Off mike) -- Television, Pakistan. The ministry of Pakistan has signed a deal with the Pakistani militants in Swat Valley -- and a lot of criticism is coming from Washington particularly Mr. Holbrooke is criticizing that, and there are some voices in Afghanistan that have been saying the same, along the line that there should be some operation or some sort of discussion with Taliban locals. If Pakistan succeeds in that particular area to pacify the militant activity, will the United States allow the Afghans to make a similar type of agreement?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have said all along that ultimately some sort of political reconciliation has to be part of the long-term solution in Afghanistan. And so I think that if there is a reconciliation, if insurgents are made to put down their arms, if the reconciliation is essentially on the terms being offered by the government, then I think that we would be very open to that. There is going to have to be some political component of reconciliation before this all ends.

Thank you all very much.

CNN

February 23, 2009

## Budget Axe Hits Pentagon

**The Situation Room (CNN), 5:00 PM**

WOLF BLITZER: In the meantime, I want to go to Barbara Starr, our Pentagon correspondent.

She's working a story involving some potentially deep cuts in the Pentagon's budget in the coming years. And we just heard the president suggest, you know what, he sort of likes Marine One the way it is. He's not exactly convinced he needs a new generation of a helicopter over at the White House after John McCain pointed out the cost overruns of that helicopter project.

What's going on? Are they bracing for some major cuts in spending at DOD, Barbara?

BARBARA STARR: You bet, Wolf. All over the hallways, the word is it's time to start scrimping and saving. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is telling everyone get ready for some big cuts in weapons spending.

But behind-the-scenes – no surprise – defense contractors are already exerting their political muscle, saying it means jobs on their shop floors.

The new supersonic Lightning 2 fighter jet uses the world's most advanced technology.

But is it worth the \$950-billion price tag? And how about \$200 billion for these armored vehicles and communications gear?

Thousands of military industry jobs are at stake. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is about to swing the budget axe and tell Congress to kill off some of the Pentagon's most treasured and most expensive programs.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: This moment also presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements.

STARR: With the military bogged down fighting insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, big ticket items like new fighter jets and warships may no longer be needed as much as they once were. So Gates is eyeballing some major weapons programs, such as the Lightning 2, built by Lockheed Martin; the Army's Future Combat System, built by Boeing; and General Dynamics' and Northrop Grumman's Virginia class attack submarine.

Winslow Wheeler worked on defense spending issues for Congress for 30 years.

WINSLOW WHEELER [Center for Defense Information]: We're going to have lots of fights in the next two or three months over various parts of the defense budget.

STARR: Already, powerful defense contractors are lobbying Congress to keep their programs intact. But Wheeler points out the jobs argument may be a losing argument.

WHEELER: For every billion dollars, the Pentagon generates significantly less jobs than mass transit or education or even health care.

STARR: Another program on the potential hit list, Wolf, is the F-22 fighter. The Pentagon is looking at possibly trying to save \$8 billion by trimming that program. But the defense industry says that would mean 12,000 jobs in more than 40 states. That's one, Wolf, you're going to hear a lot about in the coming days. Wolf?

BLITZER: All right. We'll hear a lot about some of those cuts at the Defense Department. Thanks very much, Barbara, for that.

DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen  
February 26, 2009

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DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen

SEC. GATES: I'd like to address two subjects today.

First, I would like to make an announcement regarding the department's policy toward media coverage of the return of our fallen heroes at Dover Air Force Base. As you know, the president asked me to review this policy. After receiving input from a number of sources, including all of the military services and organizations representing military families, I have decided that the decision regarding media coverage of the dignified transfer process at Dover should be made by those most directly affected: on an individual basis by the families of the fallen. We ought not presume to make that decision in their place.

I've tasked a working group to quickly come up with a plan to implement this new policy. Further, I've tasked the working group to examine ways in which we might further assist the families of those who have made the supreme sacrifice for our country.

Second, earlier today, the White House unveiled the federal government's fiscal year 2010 base budget for the Department of Defense, the remaining FY 2009 supplemental figure, and the fiscal year 2010 war costs budget. The remaining '09 supplemental of \$75.5 billion will allow us to continue to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, including the ongoing shift of forces in both countries.

The 2010 war cost estimate of (\$)130 billion is our best estimate at this point for the next fiscal year. The FY 2010 base budget of almost \$534 billion represents a 4 percent increase over the FY 2009 appropriated level of \$513 billion. This figure resulted from a productive series of discussions with the Office of Management and Budget. I'm confident that this funding level will allow the department to meet its long term institutional priorities of taking care of the troops and their families, rebalancing our capabilities for conventional and irregular warfare, completing the growth of the Army and Marine Corps, and preserving essential modernization programs.

Over the past few months, different figures for the department's base budget top line have been the subject of speculation and debate, including a draft budget of more than \$580 billion. That last figure represented a notional effort I authorized to begin shifting war costs in a significant way from the supplementals to the base budget, additional procurement, and anticipated real costs in terms of health care benefits and pay. That proposal was not formally submitted anywhere outside this building. The number that matters is the one announced by the president today, and it represents an increase of more than \$20

billion over last year's Defense appropriation. In our country's current economic circumstances, I believe that represents a strong commitment to our security.

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The president's budget also provides placeholder figures over a 10-year horizon, both for war funding and base budgets. These estimates will no doubt change over time, based on evolving strategy and force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. The base budget projections may also be modified in accordance with the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Having settled on a top-line figure, we are now engaged in determining the detail of the FY 2010 defense base budget. This process includes efforts to realize cost efficiencies, reassess all weapons programs -- especially those with serious execution issues, and rebalance investments between current and future capabilities.

In the days to come, any information you may receive about budget or program decisions will undoubtedly be wrong because I intend to wait until the end of our review process before making any decisions. Putting together a budget package this large, complex and interrelated requires a coherent and holistic process -- a process that would be undermined if decisions about particular programs are made piecemeal or before the assessment is complete.

As I told the Congress last month, we will be making tough choices to ensure that this department's budget priorities best position our military to deal with the most pressing threats and security challenges facing America today and tomorrow.

Andrew.

Q Mr. Secretary, I understand you haven't made any decisions on specific programs, but have you decided, or is it inevitable, that your procurement budget -- your investment accounts must drop because personnel costs rise every year? Is it fair to surmise that there will be less money for that this year?

SEC. GATES: Well, I wouldn't -- I wouldn't want to make that assumption, but it is a -- it is an accurate statement that our personnel costs are rising every year and consume a larger percentage of the budget. This is particularly true of health care, where the percentage of the budget is increasing at what I would call almost an alarming rate in terms of the future. So that obviously is a consideration we have to take into account.

Yeah.

Q Thank you. Earlier -- last month, you told the Congress that the spigot of defense spending that opened on 9/11 is closing. Does this budget represent the first closing of the spigot?

SEC. GATES: I think so. But I would tell you that I think that -- I mean, it does put some pressures on us, but the reality is, as I -- I think Admiral Mullen will testify, late last summer, just because of the economic circumstances facing the country -- and they were a lot better then than they are now -- I believed that if we could get the '09 budget plus inflation we would be doing very well. We've done somewhat better than that.

So I think we've been given a little more space than I anticipated, and I'm grateful for that. But I think we are still going to have to make some hard choices.

Q One follow-up. Can you tell me how much in the base budget represents shifts from the supplemental, money that was going to be in a sup shifted to the base? Is it about 8 (billion dollars) to \$9 billion?



SEC. GATES: I don't know a figure. I know that -- I'll give you three <sup>217</sup> examples of things that, under the new rules, have been -- have been shifted that we had covered in supplementals before. One would be the cost of building the end strength in the Army and Marine Corps. Another would be new programs for taking care of the wounded and their families. And a third would be JIEDDO, elements of the IED organization.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to your opening statement. What was your personal thinking behind the decision to lift the outright ban on media coverage of the Dover (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would have to -- I would have to tell you that where I've come out is where I went in in terms of my personal feelings about it. I just -- I think that the thing we always have to keep at the forefront of our minds -- and I invite Admiral Mullen to comment on this because it involves our men and women in uniform and their families -- but I think that foremost in our thinking about issues like this should be the families and giving them choices, not just on this but on a lot of other things.

ADM. MULLEN: That's -- for me, Jim, that really has been the driver as well. We've seen so many families go through so much, and in that, they have been extraordinarily strong. And meeting their needs, their requests in the most dignified, respectful, focused way we can was very much a driver for me in supporting this change.

Q And do you agree or disagree with critics who say that the ban was originally intended as a political statement to avoid the kind of reaction that the public might have -- erode public support for any kind of armed conflict once the images of the returning war dead are seen publicly?

SEC. GATES: As you all have pointed out, this policy was first put in place, I think, in 1991 or at least during the first Bush administration. As far as I'm concerned, that's ancient history, and I'm not going to try and figure out the motive.

Q On Dover, will the families themselves be allowed to be there when the coffins come home? And will you provide transportation or chaplains or services if they're there when they see the coffins?

SEC. GATES: All those are the issues that the working group has to work through. And we'll see how it works --

Q Secretary Gates, the president's budget also calls for more military aid to Pakistan and, of course, Pakistani officials are here this week. And some of them have suggested -- they've asked for drone aircraft from the United States. Do you think that's a good idea?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think one of the themes that, certainly, in my meetings with Pakistanis -- and I invite Admiral Mullen to comment -- has been, how can we work more closely together? How can we help them be effective? How can we help ourselves by helping them?

Clearly, more intelligence is an important aspect of that. In terms of the drones specifically, that hasn't come up in our -- in my talks, but figuring out ways to help them have better intelligence to guide their operations, I think, is a positive thing and we ought to do as much as we can.

ADM. MULLEN: I would only add to that comment that we've -- I think it's very important that we help resource them and develop this comprehensive strategy with Pakistan over a number of years. And I'm delighted to see that kind of support in the '10 budget.

In addition, that -- the kind of capabilities -- not just drones but other military capabilities support more precision, faster reaction, better operations, which is one of the things we focus on to try to assist the Pakistani military for a long time -- certainly, newer -- new capabilities, as we learn lessons. 218

They do ask for those kinds of things, and I think we need to be mindful of that in trying to help them get better.

Q What kind of capabilities are you looking at?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, it's -- in this case, it's the full spectrum of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, but it's what we've learned and used and how can we best, in the future, assist them in their operations with those kinds of capabilities.

All right.

Q Admiral Mullen, I wanted to ask you -- this week, CIA Director Leon Panetta said he's starting to give the president a daily briefing on economic intelligence issues. And you've spoken about this in the past. In your mind, specifically what are the security concerns that you see about the world financial and economic crisis?

And I would also ask, people are noting that, just on our own border, the Mexican drug cartel violence certainly is on the rise as well, in part.

ADM. MULLEN: Sure.

Q And the people of Mexico are suffering from this. Could you talk about your concerns?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, the broad concerns are with the financial -- global financial crisis. It will certainly put governments in much weaker positions, and in a way -- not in a way; I'm concerned about that, those positions essentially creating increased security across a broad range of possibilities.

So, focusing on parts of the world that are really going to struggle, I think from -- an intelligence standpoint with respect to those struggles is going to be very important. I'm not trying to be specifically predictive here. I'm more concerned about the increase over time. And it -- I don't necessarily think it's next week or next month, but, you know, I -- that in the crisis, and depending how long it lasts, that there's great potential here.

And we need to pay attention to it, as resources dry up, and the impact on populations, security, borders, those kinds of things and how they're resourced and how government's taking care of them, how we -- and how we do this together with other countries.

So I've had a specific focus on this for a number of months and want to keep an eye on it as time goes on here in this crisis.

Q Do you think Mexico is possibly becoming more of a concern because of the rising violence now?

ADM. MULLEN: Mexico is certainly more of a concern to me. In fact, I'm -- I take a trip next week to Latin America and end up in Mexico specifically. And I -- certainly, with the deaths, the drug issues, the kinds of things that we've seen grow dramatically over the last year and -- I know that we're looking for ways to assist them in terms of addressing this kind of threat.

SEC. GATES: I would just add one thing on the first part of your question **219**  
And that is, a robust, healthy American economy on the -- over the long term is a prerequisite for sustaining our national security capabilities. It's just as simple as that.

Q Secretary, your -- your --

Q In the (\$)130 billion figure for FY '10, what is the assumption in terms of when U.S. troops will be withdrawn, combat troops? And how many troops will be left there?

SEC. GATES: The part of the -- of that estimate that covers Afghanistan, I think, is -- basically includes only the forces that the president has approved be sent at this stage.

Q And Iraq?

SEC. GATES: In Iraq, it -- in Iraq, I'll wait until the president makes a speech tomorrow.

Q Could I just ask you to expand on that a bit? A hundred and thirty billion (dollars), you said, is your best estimate. It isn't particularly wildly different than this year's spending of 140 (billion dollars). So I mean --

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: Yeah, it would be -- in this year, '09, if we get what we -- what the president will ask for, it will be about 144 (billion dollars).

Q But -- Okay. The president is going to lay out his plan tomorrow. And assuming that involves a decrease in combat forces in Iraq, I think a lot of people are going to wonder how come we're spending nearly as much one year over the next when there will be fewer fighting forces there.

SEC. GATES: Well, the truth of the matter is, you're still going to have a fairly robust presence, fairly significant presence in Iraq, regardless of what the president's decisions are, at least through FY '10, or part of FY '10.

And at the same time, we will be funding an increase in Afghanistan. And in contrast to Iraq, where there is a better infrastructure and where we have access to surrounding countries with infrastructure, we are essentially having to build that infrastructure for our forces in Afghanistan. So there are additional costs with that.

Finally, the point that I would make and I think is important for folks to remember as they think about forces coming down in Iraq, withdrawing those forces is going to involve an added cost of its own, because, for the last while -- I don't know the exact time, but the last several years -- the forces -- the soldiers and Marines we have sent to Iraq have basically fallen in on equipment that has been left there.

Now we're talking about pulling them out, not only the troops, but the equipment as well. And so there's an added cost associated with that as well.

Q Sir -- (off mike) --

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry. (Chuckles.) Lost my place.

Q A number of key jobs remain unfilled in the Pentagon. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the challenge of filling those jobs. And as you -- as the

building tries to get its collective head around this budget, how much does it hamstring you as you to try to go forward? 220

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, the pace of the naming has begun to pick up this week, so I'm obviously pleased about that. But I mean, the question you ask is precisely the reason why I asked for the authority to allow people to remain in place until their successors were named or confirmed, depending on whether confirmation was required.

And I would say, by way of comparison, we're doing pretty well, compared to a number of other departments in the government.

But a lot of people have been willing to stay on. And that has provided us the kind of continuity necessary to keep things going and to do things like this very detailed budget process we're going through right now. We would be in serious -- have serious issues, I think, if a lot of those folks hadn't stayed on.

Q Do you have a sense of when you're going to get this next rung filled, this next layer?

SEC. GATES: Well, once they're named, then the confirmation process begins. And that always holds uncertainties.

Q The president's proposed budget calls for a 2.9 percent pay increase for troops. For this fiscal year, the pay increase was 3.9 percent. Can you talk why it's less for this upcoming fiscal year?

SEC. GATES: Well, we're just -- again we're dealing with a more constrained economic environment. Inflation is a factor in terms of how that's calculated. I would say that the history of this has been, at least since I've been here, is that two years ago, we went to the Hill with about the same request. It was 3 percent. And last year, we went with a request for 3.5 percent. In both cases, the Congress added to it. But it's not all that different from what we submitted in the past.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I ask you about this, more clarity in the timing of when the president asked you to review the Dover policy? And how much time do you envision before this working groups comes up with its recommendations or guidelines for the families to choose?

And Admiral, if I could ask you, sir, what was your thinking on this policy? Has it evolved over time?

SEC. GATES: I had asked about changing the policy in Dover over a year ago. And although I -- when I got the response that I did, which recommended no change, I accepted that at the time. I must say, I was never comfortable with it.

When I heard the president express his concern and desire to have it reviewed, I started the process the next morning. The working group -- I used the words quickly in my opening remarks. I am a firm believer in getting things done promptly. Short deadlines are critical. I have a deadline in my head. And I expect them to meet it.

ADM. MULLEN: I mean, my views have evolved in the sense that I have been to Dover several times. I've seen the ceremony there. And it is an extraordinarily well-run, dignified, respectful ceremony.

And those men and women who do this at Dover know that, execute it and are very proud of what they do. And I am comfortable. Any American who saw that would be very proud of how that is executed there.

In terms of evolution on whether we should have done -- you know, done this or not -- had a policy, as it was for many years. It really -- this review, you know, gave me an opportunity to certainly make my views known. And I believe -- I believe in the outcome that the secretary has described very strongly. And again, because it is family-centric here, more than anything else, I'm very, very supportive.

Q But Mr. Secretary, why do you personally think the policy should be changed?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think I -- I think I answered that. I think these kinds of decisions should be up to the families.

Q Mr. Secretary, you were the secretary of Defense in the old administration. Who told you you couldn't change the policy?

SEC. GATES: Nobody. And --

Q The answer came back from -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: No, the answer came back from within this building. I'm sorry. I asked for a review of it a little over a year ago, and got a different answer than I got a few days ago. And I was much happier with the answer I got this year.

Q Mr. Secretary, we were told the other day that you were going -- you left some folks in the building on this issue, but you were going to talk with some family members or family groups subsequently. Have you had those meetings in the last couple of days?

SEC. GATES: I have not done it personally, but -- but the folks that handle family matters in Personnel and Readiness reached out to them and talked to them. And I got a report back on those conversations.

Q Is that report something that ultimately changed your mind to lift the outright ban?

SEC. GATES: I would say that the reaction we got from the organizations associated with the families strongly reinforced the decision of where I was heading.

Q Mr. Secretary, back to Iraq, reports are that a residual force of some 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq after major draw-downs occur. Some comments -- Democrats are already pushing back on this, saying that's too large a force. That said, what's the purpose of the residual force? And can it be effective if it's less than 50,000?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to get into the numbers, because I'm not going to preempt the president's announcement. What I will say is that the thinking all along had been that -- that any force left after we stopped combat operations would be focused on the counterterrorism mission, on training, advising, assistance and that sort of thing. So it's a very different mission than -- than we have now.

I would say that whatever number the president approves, as of the date he approves, is a way station, because if there is no new agreement, under the SOFA, that number has to be zero at the end of 2011.

So I think that -- I think it needs to be seen as a -- as I say, as a way station rather than as a steady state.

Q But for some time you're going to need a force there, before the end of 2011. What are you recommending that number be?

SEC. GATES: I'll tell you after I've -- after the president's made his decision.

Q How concerned are you about the agreement in the Swat Valley and how that influences or not the situation in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: (To Admiral Mullen) Why don't you take that? (Laughter.)

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, General Kayani is here this week, who is the head of the Pakistan army. And he's visiting -- actually, he's on a counterpart visit with General Casey, his counterpart, but I've spent some time with him. And there's been a lot of discussion and, obviously, stories about the Swat agreement.

The one thing that -- that actually -- it has been characterized as a peace agreement. That's not necessarily accurately stated from the Pakistani perspective. And one of the things that I take away from this is a continued need to try to understand each other, listen to each other and understand each other.

Clearly, there's a history here -- actually, there's a history here that goes back a couple -- more than a couple of decades in Swat that I think we need to pay some attention to and understand. It'll be very evident, I think, in the near future whether this is a peace agreement with the terrorists or with the Taliban and -- and what its outcome could be.

So where I am on this is to wait; you know, to watch it clearly, pay attention to it, and to see where it evolves. This is a sovereign country that gets to make decisions like this.

But I haven't -- I don't believe everything I read, and I don't understand everything I need to understand about what's going on in Swat or in that part of Pakistan. So it encourages me to dig a little deeper and to -- and to watch it closely.

SEC. GATES: And I would say that's exactly where I am.

Q Secretary Gates, I'm still a little bit confused about your -- your call one year ago. You're looking into the Dover decision one year ago. Who opposed it here in the building? And couldn't you have made it happen anyway? And did you get any feedback or was there any communication at the -- with the White House?

SEC. GATES: There was no communication with the White House at the time. It was a product of my own -- my own concern.

I think that there was a feeling that -- what I got back was -- from personnel and readiness was basically an expression of the complications potentially for the families and a concern for the privacy of the families. And -- and I demurred, on receiving that advice.

I reached out more broadly this time. I talked directly with the senior leadership of the services and solicited their views. And I would say -- I'll be perfectly honest about it. There was a division in the building. And I thought that the -- and I sided with those who thought that the issue ought to be up to the families.

Q And so what changed? Is there not still a division?

SEC. GATES: No, I'd say there still is a division, but not anymore.

Q And Admiral Mullen, are you one of the ones who was opposed, or --

ADM. MULLEN: I'm very supportive of the change.

Q But did you change your position at all?

ADM. MULLEN: Before -- a year ago, I wasn't involved in -- I wasn't personally involved in the review. That doesn't mean my staff had not been. I just -- I honestly don't know that.

I mean, I really think it's the right decision. It focuses on the right piece of this, which are -- the right people, who are the families. And I think, in that regard, it'll serve us all very well.

SEC. GATES: And let me be clear, you know, when I talk about a division or a disagreement within the building, everybody was trying to do what was best -- what they thought was best for the families. And I'm not questioning the motives of those who opposed a change in policy at all. They were doing what they thought best served the families of our fallen. My view -- my conclusion was we should not presume to make the decision for the families. We should actually let them make it.

So that -- I mean, I don't want to impugn anybody's motives here. People were all trying to do what was right by the families. It just seemed to me that we ought to let the families make that decision.

Q Nonetheless, you became more assertive this time, than -- about what you wanted?

ADM. MULLEN: He's pretty assertive normally.

SEC. GATES: (Laughs.) Well, I -- you know, I was very open to what I was going to get in the review. But -- for example, I got a very compelling Army -- memorandum from the Army in favor of this change of policy. And since that involves the largest number of our fallen, that obviously had an impact on me.

Q (Off mike) -- and they before opposed it?

SEC. GATES: I honestly don't know whether they were consulted a year ago.

Q And do you also agree that the nation has the right to grieve and honor for our war dead, such as they do in Great Britain and Canada?

SEC. GATES: I believe that the American people would defer to the wishes of the families of the fallen. I honestly believe that they think that the parents, the husbands, the wives, the next of kin, that the families ought to make that decision. That's where I think -- that's where I would wager a lot of money the overwhelming preponderance of the American people are.

Lita?

Q Mr. Secretary, back on Pakistan for a minute. Can you say whether there have been also discussions about expanding the U.S. efforts to train the Frontier Corps and whether that is something that the Pakistanis have indeed also asked about, talked about?

ADM. MULLEN: Train what? Sorry.

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Q The Frontier Corps.

ADM. MULLEN: That training is now a few months old. We're in our second group. It's gone very well. And the leadership there, and particularly the head of the Frontier Corps, the Pakistani two-star general, is very pleased with what's happened. And we continue to do that.

I think the rate of expansion or level of expansion is not -- I mean, it isn't significantly changing at this particular point in time. But the Pakistani military leadership is very pleased with what they've gotten in a relatively short period of time, given that we just started the training.

Q But have they expressed an interest in having it grow?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, not significantly at this point in time. I think we'll kind of take that, you know, one step at a time over time.

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: Last question?

Q Yeah, on the Dover policy again, I just wanted to follow up on that last point. You know, has there -- as you've been having these discussions and -- have you been focusing on, like, how the new policy will be created in terms of -- is there going to be a restriction that families can then impose to say, you know, "We don't want cameras here"? And when will that take effect? When are you starting --

SEC. GATES: As soon as the working group gets back to me. But the thrust of this is that if the family of one of the fallen says that they do not want media coverage of the return, of the dignified transfer process, then that will be the decision. There will be no media coverage. If they say that's okay with them, then it will be available.

Q And if the families themselves are divided --

SEC. GATES: That's the kind of thing that the working group is looking into.

Last question?

Q Yes, sir. In the president's budget, it says on acquisition reform that you would not be allowing programs to proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the risk of cost growth and schedule slippage.

In programs where you don't have fully complete technology such as missile defense, airborne laser, Kinetic Energy Interceptor and European missile defense, would that mean that those programs would be frozen until some later year in which technology was fully mature?

SEC. GATES: Well, you have clearly read the president's budget more thoroughly than I have at this point.

What I would say is that one of the things that we have been moving toward in terms of acquisition reform is ensuring that technology was more mature before moving to full-scale production. And there will -- and if we decide to take a risk with technology, it needs to be a conscious decision that we're going to take that risk and that everybody knows



we're taking a risk for a specific reason, rather than stumbling into it and getting into production and realizing there were problems with the technology.

I think we just -- there needs to be greater discipline in the process, particularly with respect to the maturity of technology, before we begin full-scale production.

Q (Off mike) -- apply specifically then to any particular program, as far as this general rule is concerned?

SEC. GATES: Not that I'm aware of.

Thank you.

Q Thank you, sir.

Press Conference Call with Secretary Gates on President Obama's Troop Withdrawal Plan

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      February 27, 2009

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Press Conference Call with Secretary Gates on President Obama's Troop Withdrawal Plan

OPERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for standing by. And welcome to the briefing by Secretary Gates. At this time, all participants are in a listen-only mode. Later, we'll conduct a question-and-answer session. Instructions will be given at that time.

If you need assistance on today's conference, please press star and then zero. I will now turn the conference over to White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest.

Please go ahead.

JOSH EARNEST (deputy White House press secretary): Good afternoon, everybody. It's Josh Earnest. Thank you for jumping on the call. As Rob mentioned, we'll hear some brief remarks from Secretary Gates and then we'll open it up for questions. We're running tight on time so we'll move quickly. And we won't have any follow-up questions. So you'll just get one bite at the apple here.

But Secretary Gates, do you want to start us off?

SEC. GATES: Sure. I'll just start with a couple of comments.

First of all, the atmosphere here at Camp Lejeune, for the speech, was very warm, very enthusiastic. And I would also say that the welcome has been pretty extraordinary. The -- I think that the speech was very well received. There were a number of interruptions for applause, as you may have all seen.

On the substance, I obviously am very supportive of the option that the president has chosen, the decision that he has made, as is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Frankly this is -- both the chairman and I thought this should come out. And it was a very thorough, deliberative process where a lot of different options and a lot of different analysis were examined.

So with that, why don't I just go straight to questions?

MR. EARNEST: Thank you, Secretary.

Rob, why don't we go ahead and take some questions now?

OPERATOR: Yes, sir. Ladies and gentlemen, if you'd like to ask a question, please press star-1, star, then 1 on your touch-tone phone. 227

Okay. It will be just a moment as people queue up.

All right. The first question is from Martha Raddatz of ABC News. Please go ahead.

Q Secretary Gates, one of the things that surprised me in the speech was the -- flat-out saying all troops would be out by 2011, at the end of 2011. And I know he referenced the status of forces agreement, but he seemed quite definitive about that. Can you explain what he meant? And is that what he meant -- everybody's out by 2011, no matter what?

SEC. GATES: I think what he was referring to was that under the terms of the status of forces agreement, which is what we are operating under now, all U.S. forces must be out by the end of 2011. It will require a new agreement or it would require a new agreement, a new negotiation, almost certainly at Iraqi initiative, to provide for some presence beyond the end of 2011. So in the absence of that agreement, the absence of any negotiation for such an agreement, it is in keeping with the SOFA that -- to say definitively that we will be out at the end of 2011.

MR. EARNEST: All right, Rob. We'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: Yes, sir. Okay. The next question is from Tony Capaccio of Bloomberg News. Please go ahead.

Q Hello, sir. What difference did the three months make for you going from 16 months to 19 months? And what problems did you have with the 19 -- with the 16-month issue in the first place?

SEC. GATES: I think that the view of commanders in the field, particularly General Odierno, was that the real concern -- I'm going to interrupt myself -- the real concern has been how do we get through this year and all of the elections that will take place, beginning with the district and subdistrict elections early in the summer, the national elections at the end of the year, and have a period of adjustment after those national elections to make sure people are accepting the results and so on, and that we would have the maximum force presence during -- through the end of this year and early into next year.

And if you go along that timeline, even if there are some reductions during the course of this year, as there will be, it provides a -- the maximum available force for General Odierno during that sensitive period. And to try and get everybody out by May would have -- if you do that -- then really would present some significant logistical and security issues.

And so the extra two months or so was considered to be important in terms of just the logistics of how you do this.

Q Thank you.

OPERATOR: Thank you, sir.

MR. EARNEST: Rob, we'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. The next question is from Andrew Gray of Reuters. Please go ahead.

Q Hi, Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to follow up on the first question about the possibility of forces remaining after the end of 2011. You've said in the past that you foresee where that could happen and, in fact, could be useful to assist the Iraqi forces. Does that remain your view, if the Iraqis are interested in doing it, that it would also be in the interest of the United States to do it? 228

SEC. GATES: Well, I think we'll have to wait and see. I mean, it's a hypothetical. The Iraqis have not said anything about that at this point, so it remains to be seen whether they will take an initiative. I think that we should be -- my own view would be that we should be prepared to have some very modest-sized presence for training and helping them with their new equipment and providing, perhaps, intelligence support and so on beyond that.

But again, it's hypothetical, because such a -- there -- no such request has been made, and no indication that it will be, at this point.

OPERATOR: The --

MR. EARNEST: We'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from Brian Montopoli of CBS News. Please go ahead.

Q Hi there, sir. I just wanted to get a little clarification on the difference between the combat and non-combat troops. Once the U.S. has pulled all combat troops out by August 31st of next year, the remaining troops will be non-combat. But they will presumably be combat-capable. Will there be a real significant difference in what troops are doing today and what the troops will be doing, you know, once they're officially designated non-combat?

SEC. GATES: Yes. All of the combat units will be out of Iraq by the end of August, and -- of 2010 -- and those that are left will have a combat capability. There will be, as the president said, targeted counterterrorism operations. There will be continued embeds with some of the Iraqi forces in a training capacity and so on.

So there will be the capability, but the units will be gone, and, more importantly, the mission will have changed. And so the notion of being engaged in combat in the way we have been up until now will be completely different.

MR. EARNEST: Rob, we'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from Michael Martin of ABC News.

Please go ahead, excuse me, Rachel Martin.

Q Close.

OPERATOR: Sorry about that.

Q That's okay.

Secretary Gates, how flexible is this plan? Can you describe? The president has suggested often that he is partial to decision-making based on conditions on the ground.

In light of that, how fluid and nimble is this timetable projection? And if it is so nimble and fluid, why set a date at all?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that first of all, because he said that he would. And I think it is important to have a date, in terms of the conclusion of one mission and the beginning of another mission. And I think that the date provides a way of delineating when one mission in Iraq ends and a completely new and different one begins.

So I think that the date is important. It's important for our troops to know. It's important for the Iraqis to know. And so I think in terms of flexibility, I mean, the president has made clear that he's the commander in chief and retains the flexibility to make changes.

He clearly does not anticipate having to do that. He has balanced the risks of staying longer or coming out sooner and has come out in this direction. And I think it is the expectation of all of us involved, in that process, and above all him that we will meet these timelines.

Q Thank you.

MR. EARNEST: Rob, we'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from James Meek of New York Daily News.

Please go ahead.

Q Hi, Secretary Gates. I'd like to ask you about the shift. President Obama said twice in his speech about refocusing on al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

We've got 17,000 troops going over. People are calling it a surge. But it seems like a buildup. Can you talk a little more about how you see that force, in terms of how long they're going to be -- you know, I guess, it will be 55,000 troops by summer in Afghanistan -- if you see that force getting larger in the coming years?

A surge tends to imply that these folks would -- you know, those numbers would come down in a couple of years, as they did in Iraq. Do you see that force remaining, a large force, for years to come? Do you see that force getting larger than 55,000?

How do you foresee that scenario in Afghanistan with the troops?

SEC. GATES: First, no one involved in the process has, to my knowledge, ever referred to the additional troops going into Iraq as -- I mean, into Afghanistan as a surge.

I think that the question about how long the additional forces will be there is a question that will be addressed. And whether additional forces would be sent is to be determined by the review that is going on right now and the decisions the president will make once that review is over. And I think that there won't be a real sense of the ultimate size of the force or the duration of its presence until he has made those decisions subsequent to the conclusion of the review.

Q Thank you. Thank you, sir.

MR. EARNEST: We'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from Dan Sagalyn of the NewsHour. Please go ahead.

Q Thank you. Forgive me if I'm asking a question that already answered. I got disconnected. 230

I wanted to go back to the issue of the 35(,000) to 50,000 troops that are going to remain in Iraq after 18 months. You've said they're not going to be combat brigades, but are you going to take combat brigades that are in the United States and sort of rename them, re-designate them or are you going to create new units for this specific mission?

And if I could ask a separate question on Afghanistan, the Marines that are - that Barack -- the president spoke to today, what will their mission be when they get to Afghanistan? Will it be population security, to mentor Afghan forces, to hunt the Taliban? If you could talk a little bit about specifically how they'll be used.

SEC. GATES: Well, with respect to the second question, I think it's probably all of the above. My understanding is they will be deployed principally into the south, and so it will be combating the Taliban; it will be population security.

And with respect to the 35(,000) to 50,000, you know, I think that that's a question probably better directed at General Odierno. But the clear idea is to consolidate U.S. forces into a few places where both civilians and military would be -- in other words, our folks would provide protection for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other civilians working in Iraq. And in terms of whether those are new units or whether they are re-missioned units that are already there I think remains to be seen.

But if they are forces that are already in Iraq that remain at that point, then they will be re-missioned to the new, much more limited mission that we've been talking about.

MR. EARNEST: All right, Rob. Ready for the next one.

OPERATOR: All right. Sure. And the next question is from Jason Austin (sp) of Fox News Radio. Please go ahead.

Q Hi, Secretary Gates. If the situation in Iraq were to take a turn for the worse, has the president mentioned discussing how many troops he'd be willing to send back to the country, in addition to the troops that are there as noncombat forces? And would that affect the troop levels being built up in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think that's really pretty hypothetical. I think, you know, we are being -- we feel that we have -- the decisions the president has made have taken into account the risks that have been identified both by Ambassador Crocker and by General Odierno surrounding the elections. And one of the reasons that General Odierno wanted to maintain as many troops as he could just beyond the end of 2009 was in fact to be available for those kinds of contingencies.

I think that, you know, the truth of the matter is the Iraqis are going to have to step up to their responsibilities in this. And I think you saw with the performance of the Iraqi security forces in the provincial elections that they really did a superb job of maintaining security.

So I think the general view is that we will proceed on this -- on this time line and the approach the president has identified. And I don't think anybody's talking about sending more troops back in there if -- if there are problems.

MR. EARNEST: Thank you.

All right, Rob, we'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from Julian Barnes of the Los Angeles daily -- excuse me, the Los Angeles Times. Please, go ahead.

Q Secretary Gates, I was wondering if there was -- you talked a little bit about the draw-down being sort of back-loaded to 2010, to make sure there's enough troops for the elections. I wonder if you could say, first, how many units we should expect to come out this year, just sort of roughly? And also, if you could talk a little bit about the movement of air assets, and if we should see -- expect a lot of surveillance and attack aircraft moving from Iraq to Afghanistan, and when we might see that.

SEC. GATES: I think that the two theaters are clearly separate. And frankly I don't know the answer to your question, about air assets and so on moving from one place to the other.

We are adding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in Afghanistan at this point. Up to this point, most of what we've been adding, in Afghanistan, are new assets.

They have not been assets transferred from Iraq. But as we draw down in Iraq, some of those enabling assets may move from one theater to another. We'll just have to wait and see.

In terms of the number of troops coming out, this year, I think, we'll just have to wait and see what General Odierno's specific recommendations are. But again the general approach is to try and -- there will be drawdowns this year of combat brigades. But in terms of how many and when, I think, we'll wait and get the specific recommendations from General Odierno.

MR. EARNEST. All right, Rob, we'll take the next one.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And the next question is from Anne Gearan of Associated Press.

Please go ahead.

Q Hi, Mr. Secretary. Anne Gearan at the AP.

Can you tell us what happened to the 23-month option? You said this came out where both you and the chairman thought it should. But at one time, there were some pretty strong voices arguing for a longer timeline. How did you settle on the 19 months, versus a slightly longer version?

SEC. GATES: (Off mike) -- General Odierno about his views, to General Petraeus about his views, to the Chiefs. And then obviously the chairman and I talked to him separately or independently.

So, but, and I think in this whole process, there was really, with each of the options that was being examined, 16 months, 19 months and 23 months, the, and all of those dated from the inauguration basically, was a weighing of the risks involved, the risks of progress, with respect to sustaining progress in Iraq, but also issues relating to stress on the force and the need for additional capability in Afghanistan.

All these things were taken into account. And I think that the -- I think that General Odierno and General Petraeus are comfortable with the option that the president has decided on, and both the chiefs and -- as well as the chairman and myself are very supportive of the -- of that option as well.

MR. EARNEST: All right, Rob. We have time for one more question.

OPERATOR: All right, sir. And that question is from Spencer Ackerman of -- I believe it's the Washington Independent. Please go ahead.

Q Thanks very much. Mr. Secretary, in his speech, President Obama talked about a training mission for Iraqi security forces that was conditioned on them being non-sectarian. Can you talk a bit about what mechanisms you'll have in place going forward to adjudicate whether or not certain units act in a sectarian fashion that might require the withdrawal of American support?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that we have been very pleased by the progress in Iraq and the development of the Iraqi army as a non-sectarian force. And it has operated as a non-sectarian force, as illustrated by the offensive several months ago in Basra. And so I think we have a pretty good feel that this is -- that the Army is developing along non-sectarian lines, is operating on non-sectarian lines. And so that's -- that really is the premise from which we start.

We have close enough relationships with these units and so on, both as advisers and occasionally as embeds, that I think if we saw concerns like that, we would be aware of them and be able to bring them to -- that some unit was acting in a non -- or in a sectarian fashion, that we would be in a position to bring that to the attention of the Iraqi leadership.

MR. EARNEST: Secretary Gates, thank you very much for your time today, sir, and thanks to everybody for jumping on the call.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all.

OPERATOR: Okay. Thank you, Secretary Gates, and thank you, Deputy Press Secretary Earnest. And that does conclude our conference for today.



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## Interview With Secretary Gates

**Meet The Press (NBC), 10:00 AM**

DAVID GREGORY: Mr. Secretary, welcome back to "Meet the Press."

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES: Thank you.

GREGORY: For the first time Camp Lejeune in North Carolina on Friday, the president talked about a date certain for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. This is what he said?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: (From videotape.) By August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end. I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.

GREGORY: Now, the president talks about the combat mission being over by August of 2010, the idea being that we are currently at about 142,000 troops. That residual force would be roughly 50,000 troops, but those forces left in Iraq will still be in harm's way, there will be some fighting, they will be dying. This war will go on beyond August of 2010?

GATES: They do have a very different mission, but that mission will be principally a training, assistance, advisory role. There will be a limited counterterrorism operations aspect to it, and we will still have some soldiers embedded with Iraqi units as part of the training effort. But it's a very different kind of arrangement, and our soldiers will be consolidated into a limited number of bases in order to provide protection for themselves and for civilians who are out working in the Iraqi neighborhoods and countryside as well.

So I think that the way General Odierno plans this -- that the risk to our troops will be substantially less than certainly it was last year, and it has gradually declined.

GREGORY: So that mission, then, changes with a smaller force. How do you describe it generally? Is this a situation where U.S. forces are standing down and Iraqi forces are finally standing up in that principal position?

GATES: Well, the Iraqi forces already are standing up in a significant way. They basically organized the security for the provincial elections last month and did a very good job. We were in the background, helped them with some planning and so on, but it is a very different kind of mission. And the units that will be left there will be characterized differently. They will be called "Advisory and Assistance Brigades," they won't be called "Combat brigades."

GREGORY: But nevertheless, we say the combat mission is over. U.S. troops will still be in harm's way?

GATES: Yes, but at a very different level than in the past. ›

GREGORY: Some Democrats, supporters of the president, critics of the war, like the president, who was opposed to the war in Iraq, think that the size of the residual force of 50,000 troops is too big. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was interviewed on MSNBC this week by Rachel Maddow. This is what she said:

HOUSE SPEAKER NANCY PELOSI: (From videotape.) I don't know what the justification is for 50,000 -- the presence of 50,000 troops in Iraq. I do think that there is a need for some, and I don't know that all of them have to be in country. I would think a third of that, maybe 20,000, a little more than a third, 15,000 or 20,000.

GREGORY: Does this agreement represent, on the part of the president, a concession to his commanders on the ground to keep a larger force that perhaps he originally wanted for fear that the country might come apart without a significant U.S. presence?

GATES: No, I don't think it was a concession. I think that there was a lot of analysis of the risks that were involved. I think that if the commanders had had complete say in this matter that they would have preferred that the combat mission not end until the end of 2010. And so having a somewhat larger residual or transition force, mitigates the risk of having the combat units go out sooner.

So it was really a dialog between the commanders in the field, the joint chiefs here, myself, the chairman, and the president in terms of how you mitigate risk and how you structure this, going forward.

I think the important thing to point out, though, is that the president has said that that will be a transition force of 35,000 to 50,000, and it's a way station. As he pointed out, in the absence of any new agreement with the Iraqis, we have to be at zero by the end of 2011. So that 50,000 or 35,000 is a way station on the way to zero.

GREGORY: The president did not want to extend that combat mission until the end of 2010, as his commanders wanted. Why not?

GATES: Well, first of all, there were the joint chiefs and others who felt that if you look at the risk, and also you look at the strain on the force and the need for additional forces in Afghanistan, and looking more broadly at our forces, there were those in the Department of Defense who were arguing very strongly for the 19-month period. So I think this really was the product of a dialog between the president and the chiefs and the commanders.

GREGORY: You've always said it's important to be a realist about Iraq. President Bush originally thought that the U.S. would be able to get down to 30,000 troops by September of 2003. Tom Ricks, the author, as you know, of "Fiasco," and now "The Gamble," who has covered the Pentagon in this war extensively said this about the plan to end the combat phase: "I don't think it's going to happen. Why doesn't he [President Obama] just say, 'As they stand up, we'll stand down.' He is walking the failed footsteps of his predecessor, which is being persistently over-optimistic about Iraq."

Let's be clear here, has the president said that if things get worse, if things go bad, that all bets are off -- that he would stop the withdrawal?

GATES: What the president has said is that, as commander-in-chief, he always retains the flexibility and the authority to change a plan or adjust it if he thinks it's in the national security of the United States. The fact is, I don't think any of us believe that that will be necessary.

GREGORY: But, again, it's possible if there is a deterioration, he reserves that right to end the withdrawal?

GATES: I would characterize the likelihood of significant adjustments to this plan as fairly remote.

GREGORY: Fairly remote -- well, let's talk about where there are potential flashpoints in Iraq. People I've talked to say there are three real areas: In the North, you've got tension between the Arabs and the Kurds; the prospect of the Kurds perhaps trying to split off from Iraq. In Mosul, a large al Qaeda in Iraq presence; in the South, in Basra, oil-rich area, as you know, militia groups fighting over that oil revenue.

In your judgment, what are the prospects of civil war once U.S. forces come out in large numbers?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think it's important to remember we have another 18 months, and we are going to have a substantial force there. I would disagree that there is a significant instability in Basra. I think Basra is one of the real success stories from Prime Minister Malaki's offensive down there last year.

So I -- Mosul is a problem. The Arab/Kurd tensions are a problem. The need to get an oil law is a problem. So there are problems. We have the concerns associated with a national election at the end of this year is one of the reasons why General Odierno wanted to keep those troops there as long as possible -- or a significant number of troops.

So there is no question -- we've had a significant military success. There has been real progress on the political side, but there is, clearly, unfinished business in that arena as well. But we will still be there with a significant presence for another 18 months, and as we've seen, just over the last six to 12 months, what we have mostly seen is significant progress, and I think most of the people most closely associated with that, expect -- with Iraq -- expect that progress to continue.

GREGORY: There is an agreement between the United States and Iraq to pull all forces out by 2011, that's what the president alluded to. What are the prospects that, in fact, U.S. forces remain in Iraq beyond that date? Which is possible if you renegotiated that deal; if the Iraqis said, "Please stay."

GATES: It's really not a renegotiation. It would be a completely new negotiation, I guess, as it would be at the instigation of the Iraqis, and we would just have to wait and see. At this point, it's completely hypothetical. We have a signed agreement with the Iraqis that says we have to be out of there by the end of 2011, and that's what we're all planning on.

GREGORY: General Odierno has said he expects and would want, in fact, U.S. forces there at some level, perhaps 35,000, at least until 2015.

GATES: Oh -- I also have said that I thought perhaps we would need to have troops there beyond that time. That was all -- what -- certainly, my remarks were before the SOFA was signed and before we made a commitment to be out of there by 2011. If we're there beyond that, it will be because of a new agreement negotiated with President Obama and based on what he thinks is in the best interests of our country.

GREGORY: When the United States finally leaves Iraq, will it have achieved victory?

GATES: I think that we have -- as I said, I think we have had a significant success on the military side. There is still -- the political side is still a work in progress in Iraq, and, frankly, I think before you start using terms like "won" or "lost" or "victory" or "defeat," those are the kinds of things that I think historians have to judge. But I think that, from the standpoint of the military mission, we will have enjoyed significant success.

GREGORY: Is it fair to say that when the U.S. leaves, President Obama will not be able to declare either victory or defeat -- that it will be something of a muddle?

GATES: The question is -- what kind of position is Iraq in at the time that we pull out? If Iraq is basically stable, if the level of violence remains at the relatively low levels that it is now, if they have had national elections, if they are an ally of the United States, I would call that a substantial success.

GREGORY: I want to turn to Afghanistan and Pakistan. You have said that, in fact, the greatest military challenge right now is Afghanistan. The president has said that he will commit 17,000 additional U.S. troops. This is how you described Afghanistan recently: "This is going to be a long slog," you said, "and, frankly, my view is that we need to be very careful about the nature of the goals we set for ourselves in Afghanistan." That was in January.

Back in December, you said about Pakistan that "it is on top of the list when it comes to problems and challenges that the U.S. faces." Now, most of the security risk is posed from that border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan where jihadists and the Taliban are resurgent. In that area, and as you look at the whole picture, what worries you most?

GATES: I think it's the safe havens on the Pakistani side of the border, not just for al Qaeda but for the Taliban for the Hakani network, for Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and these other affiliated groups that are all working together -- they're separate groups, but they're all working together, and I think as long as they have a safe haven to operate there, it's going to be a problem for us. And Afghanistan, after all, 20 years ago I was on the other side of that border as deputy director of CIA fighting the Soviets, and we had the safe haven in Pakistan, and let me tell you, it made a big difference.

GREGORY: Is it sustainable, this policy of covert operations targeting the Taliban and other jihadists through covert measures at a time -- and doing so, as I say, through covert measures at a time when the Pakistani leadership thinks it's destabilizing country?

GATES: I'm not going to get into any intelligence operations. I will just say that I think that the key here is our being able to cooperate with and enable the Pakistanis to be able to deal with this problem on their own sovereign territory.

I believe, based on my talks with the Pakistanis here in Washington this week, this past week, that they clearly now understand that what's going on up there in that border area is as big a risk to the stability of Pakistan as it is a problem for us in Afghanistan.

GREGORY: The overall consequence -- the trouble and consequences of jihadists making significant gains in either Afghanistan or Pakistan is perhaps more acute in Pakistan given its nuclear potential, true?

GATES: Well, as long as we're in Afghanistan and as long as the Afghan government has the support of dozens and dozens of countries who are providing military support, civilian support, in addition to us, we are providing a level of stability in Afghanistan that at least prevents it from being a safe haven from which plots against the United States and the Europeans and others can be put together so that border area, particularly on the Pakistani side, is the most worrisome.

GREGORY: Let me ask you specifically about Afghanistan -- former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, wrote in The Washington Post Thursday about what the U.S. strategy has been up until now. "To create," he says, "a central government, help it extend its authority over the entire country and, in the process, bring about a modern, bureaucratic and democratic society. That strategy cannot succeed in Afghanistan." How does the strategy have to change in Afghanistan?

GATES: First of all, we're reviewing exactly that in the administration right now -- that's what the Pakistanis and the Afghans were in town for -- was to participate in that review. We're talking to the Europeans, to our allies, we're bringing in an awful lot of people to get different points of view as we go through this review of what our strategy ought to be, and I often get asked, "Well, how long will those 17,000 be there? Will more go in?" All that depends on the outcome of this strategy review that I hope will be done in a few weeks.

GREGORY: Let me turn to Iran. David Sanger from The New York Times in his book, "The Inheritance," talks about the legacy of the Iraq War with regard to Iran, and he writes this: "It may turn out that one of the great post-Iraq paradoxes was that in crying wolf about Iraq, the American intelligence community found itself unable to raise the alarm about Iran." And his point is there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and yet Iran has been able to progress with a nuclear capability short of a nuclear bomb, but with kind of a virtual bomb, which is just being on the brink of having an actual weapons stockpile.

The question is this: Is it possible to get Iran to abandon its weapons program short of some kind of grand bargain? In other words, bigger carrots and bigger sticks?

GATES: Well, first of all, I don't think that whatever -- however one might criticize the war in Iraq, I don't think that either the last administration or the current one have been distracted from the growing problem with Iran and its nuclear program in the least over the last number of years. We worried about it well before even the Bush administration.

So I think that there has been a continuing focus on how do you get the Iranians to walk away from a nuclear weapons program? They are not close to a stockpile. They are not close to a weapon at this point. And so there is some time, and the question is whether you can increase the level of the sanctions and the cost to the Iranians of pursuing that program.

At the same time, you show them an open door -- if they want to engage with the Europeans, with us, and so on -- if they walk away from that program. Our chances of being successful, it seems to me, are a lot better at \$35 or \$40 oil than they were at \$140 oil because there are economic costs to this program, they do have economic challenges at home.

GREGORY: You do see the need, though, for some kind of strategic relationship between the U.S. and Iraq?

GATES: I think that's really up to the Iranians. As I like to say, I've been in this search for the elusive Iranian moderate for 30 years. I'm still looking.

GREGORY: We've got a few more minutes, and I want to go through, as quickly as we can, some other really important topics. The first is Mexico -- a major threat on the border with Mexico because of a widening drug war there. The Economist magazine wrote this startling synopsis, and they call it, "Who's in Charge? The police chief in Ciudad Juarez on Mexico's border with America resigned after drug gangs, who had murdered his deputy, threatened to kill one of his officers every 48 hours until he quit." What's going on there and how big of a national security threat is this for the U.S.?

GATES: Well, I think what is important is that President Calderon of Mexico perhaps, for the first time, has taken on the battle against these cartels and because of corruption in the police and so on, he sent the federal army of Mexico into the fight. The cartels are retaliating. I think we are beginning to be in a position to help the Mexicans more than we have in the past. Some of the old biases against cooperation between our militaries and so on, I think, are being satisfied.

GREGORY: You mean providing military support?

GATES: Providing them with training, with resources, with reconnaissance and surveillance kinds of capabilities, but just cooperation including an intelligence.

But it clearly is a serious problem, and -- but what I think people need to point out is the courage that Calderon has shown in taking this on because one of the reasons it's gotten as bad as it has is because his predecessors basically refused to do that.

GREGORY: The global economy -- director of national intelligence, Dennis Blair, said, in fact, that the global recession and economic turmoil and instability had outpaced terrorism as the most urgent threat facing the United States. What's your assessment?

GATES: Well, I wouldn't disagree with that. I think that they are both very real, but the global economy is clearly a much broader kind of threat to international stability and international cooperation. Terrorism is a much more, I think, limited and defined threat. They are both real. The economic threat, clearly, affects many, many more people and countries.

GREGORY: Where is Russia going?

GATES: That's a good question. That's not entirely clear. As I said in the last administration, for the first time in American history you had a secretary of state and a secretary of defense both

with doctorates in Russian history, and we didn't have a clue what was going on. I personally believe that the Russians are trying to come back from what they considered the ultimate humiliation of the collapse not only of the Soviet Union but of the Russian Empire, and I think Prime Minister Putin feels this more acutely than Medvedev -- maybe it's an age thing -- but he is clearly determined to assert Russia's role as a key international player and as a country that can block anything that it doesn't like and, in many areas, if we don't go through Russia, they won't cooperate with us.

So I think Russia is a real challenge. I think, like the vice president said in Munich at a security conference, there is a chance to reset the relationship because there are a number of areas where we have common interests, for example, arms control.

So I think we'll be looking at that, we'll be looking at opportunities to see if we can make some progress with the Russians, but it's been tough.

GREGORY: How long will you stay as secretary of defense under President Obama?

GATES: Well, I think that's probably up to the president.

GREGORY: In your mind, though, would you stay for his entire first term?

GATES: That would be a challenge.

GREGORY: Do you have a date certain in your mind of when you would like to go?

GATES: No.

GREGORY: There's some said you might say maybe a year and a day, and that's it.

GATES: No date in mind.

GREGORY: What's the difference between working -- what's different about working for President Obama versus President Bush.

GATES: That sounds like the subject of a good book.

GREGORY: Is that a book you're planning on writing? Are they different presidents? Do they have different styles, different temperaments?

GATES: Oh, sure.

GREGORY: What's the major difference to you?

GATES: It's really hard to say. I think that probably President Obama is somewhat more analytical, and he makes sure he hears from everybody in the room on an issue, and if they don't speak up, he calls on them.

GREGORY: A marked difference from his predecessor?

GATES: President Bush was interested in hearing different points of view, but didn't go out of his way to make sure everybody spoke if they hadn't spoken up before.

GREGORY: Secretary Gates, we look forward to reading that book and talking to you about it. Thanks for being here.

GATES: Thank you.



Media Availability With U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and French Minister of Defense Herve Morin

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates March 03, 2009

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Media Availability With U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and French Minister of Defense Herve Morin

(Minister Morin's remarks are provided through interpreter.)

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. It's a pleasure once again to welcome Minister of Defense Morin to the Pentagon. When he was last here, a little over a year ago, I remarked that Franco-American relations had entered a new era. That has been borne out by the cordial and candid meetings we have had since then, including today's.

Minister Morin and I discussed many aspects of our relationship, in particular the mission in Afghanistan and the NATO summit next month. France will be co-host, along with Germany, and the meeting will be held on their border. It is a choice of location with great historical significance, for this will be NATO's 60th anniversary.

Since the founding of the Transatlantic Alliance, we have seen a Europe transformed, with independent democracies replacing captive nations in Central and Eastern Europe, and a democratic Germany re-incorporated into the heart of Europe.

France, which has contributed so much to the transformation of Europe, is becoming more integral to NATO. Americans are glad that that is the case, and I look forward to ever closer cooperation with the minister and the French government on a broad range of issues.

Mr. Minister, thank you very much for being here today.

(Cross talk.)

MIN. MORIN: Well, just a word, if you will, confirming what my friend Robert Gates was saying.

We have known each other for almost two years. So we're an old marriage of sorts. And we did indeed discuss the strategy for NATO in Afghanistan.

We also mentioned -- (inaudible) -- of the Iranian nuclear program and its impact on the rest of the world. And of course, I felt an obligation to mention a future call for tender, regarding an American tanker.

I reminded my counterpart that opening had to take place in both directions, 242  
you can't be a supplier of military equipment while at the same time thinking that their  
reciprocity was not possible.

Also we of course mentioned a topic which, for the French and Americans, is  
really something that we approach in a very similar manner. And that is the construction of  
defense, for Europe, and the fact that Europeans need to take at least partially control of  
their defense.

I say "partial" because of course it is a long way between now and the situation  
where Europe would be able to guarantee its own safety by itself.

So that would be for our conversations. Thank you.

Mr. Asquin (sp).

Q (Through interpreter.) Well, I would like to speak to Mr. Gates. Mr. Gates,  
a few weeks or months ago you mentioned the efforts made by 20 countries in Afghanistan, and  
are you a little disappointed by the fact that France is not contributing additional troops?

And if you will allow me, I'd like to ask a second question. Mr. Morin yesterday  
suggested we set a date for the withdrawal of international troops in Afghanistan. Is that  
also something that you wish -- withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well -- (chuckles) -- the problem with two-part questions is, I  
always forget the first part. (Laughter.)

(Chuckles.)

Q (Through interpreter.) I don't mind asking that same question again. I was  
just reminding you that not too long ago --

SEC. GATES: I got it. The -- first of all, I think it's important to recall that  
France has over 3,000 troops in Afghanistan at this point and so is making a significant  
contribution.

I think that my focus, particularly beginning at the Krakow meeting, was really  
more to encourage our partners to consider civilian experts. This is an area where we have  
very limited additional capacity in the United States, and so my focus at Krakow for all of  
our partners was really more on what could be done in terms of civilian capacity, whether to  
help governance or police training or economic development and so on. And so that was -- to  
the degree we discussed it, that's pretty much what we talked about.

With respect to a date, I think that one of the -- we would all like to have a  
situation in which our mission in Afghanistan has been completed and we can bring our troops  
home. I do not see that happening any time in the near future. And I think it's impossible to  
put a date on when you might firmly say all the troops are coming out.

I think that the objectives that we have and milestones, in terms of measuring  
achievement of those objectives, is really a principal focus of the strategy review that is  
under way, on the American side, and where we have been consulting with our partners. And I  
think we will have a much better idea of the way forward, at least as far as the United  
States is concerned, when that review is complete.

Andrew.

MIN. MORIN: I never mentioned a withdrawal date per se. What did I say? <sup>W 243</sup> said is that we will stay as long as necessary. And so I've been able to note that every time I talked, with a partner, we were able to underscore the capacities and the talent of the French military in this operation.

Also the president often mentioned that we do not want to stay forever. And that is the work that we are doing today, in order to try to see to it that Afghanistan can have security and sovereignty.

Regarding the processes, we viewed it as taking place within the Obama administration -- (inaudible) -- NATO. What we were both saying, during our meeting, is that we need a process which is military and civilian.

We need a development process. We need means and capacity to make it possible for Afghanistan to really take control of its own security in its many facets. And we also needed to set objectives, goals. We needed to set milestones for ourselves, with goals that are clearly defined, for the different topics.

Thereby we would be able to show public opinion that these mid-term goals are being met and that as this takes place, we have an avenue, a perspective which is defined and which is presented to public opinion. And we are able to see that one day, we will be able to indeed withdraw from Afghanistan.

That is what I explained yesterday and which I can repeat today. We will stay as long as necessary. As the president of the republic said, and as we all say here, we do not want to stay forever.

Thirdly, with regards to what is going on at an American administration level or within the alliance, we need qualitative and quantitative goals, as well as intermediary steps. This makes it possible to define a perspective and tell our public (watching us ?) that one day we will, indeed, be able to let the Afghans manage their country. That is what I said. And what I was actually seeing is that this was perfectly in line with the thinking of the American administration -- objectives and milestones, right?

SEC. GATES: (Andrew ?)?

Q Mr. Secretary, question for each of you on Afghanistan. First of all, for you, Mr. Secretary, Minister of Defense Wardak, who was here last week, as you know, said that the increased talk in the United States of modest goals of (luring ?) expectations from Afghanistan worried Afghans, reminded them of the 1990s, when they were abandoned. What do you say to that criticism of this increasing talk from you and others of being more modest about your goals?

And then for the minister, following on from the secretary's discussion about increased civilian help for Afghanistan, are you willing to offer more civilian help, such as a provincial reconstruction team, which I believe France doesn't have in Afghanistan at the moment?

SEC. GATES: When I met with Minister Wardak last week, he raised this concern. And I think that his -- and by the time I talked to him, which was -- actually, I didn't talk to him until Monday -- yesterday. And I think that the conversations that he had here in Washington last week provided considerable reassurance to him that nobody was talking about abandoning Afghanistan, but rather we were trying to come up with shorter-term goals where we could measure progress. And I think that he was considerably reassured by that.

MIN. MORIN: I don't really have anything to add. What is our objective? I have said this yesterday. There's really a simple objective. Our objective is for Afghanistan to

be a sovereign nation that can provide for its own security over the long term, provide for the security of the Afghan people, that the Afghans can live in peace. 244

Q (Off mike.)

MIN. MORIN: I've already answered that question a number of times. We have already contributed an additional 1,000 troops over the past 12 or 18 months, 250 or 300 within the framework of OMLT; that is, training of the Afghan army. And that's exactly what we're talking about over lunch. For us to be able to leave Afghanistan one day, we need to have an emergence of all those elements which are indeed factors for the sovereignty of a country. We made an effort vis-a-vis the Afghan army. We also need -- that a significant effort is necessary for the Afghan police. We know that there are significant shortcomings there.

Now, France contributed almost 300 people for training purposes, and almost 1,000 troops within the framework of our new responsibilities in the eastern region, in the Kapisa Valley. So this is something which is actually unmet by any other European country. There's no other European country that made such an effort over the course of the past 18 months. And so we feel that we have already done part of our job, if you will.

As far increasing civilian means, it is an avenue that the European Union should explore. And this actually is evidence of the potential for complementarity between NATO and the European Union.

Sir?

Q Over the past year, France has expressed a desire to reintegrate NATO. Is this something that you discussed? Where do we stand? Is this already something that has been solved? And if so, what are the terms?

SEC. GATES: I think that this is a matter that is still under discussion in the French government, and that's probably a question better directed to Minister Morin.

All I can say is that as we contemplate the possibility of France's full participation, in the alliance, we welcome it with open arms.

MIN. MORIN: I've already answered this question 20 times. I mean, do you want me to answer for 21st time? I get the feeling I'm repeating myself over and over and over. And now you get my feeling. (Laughter.)

Should I ask that question again? No, no, no.

Q President Obama said today that he had sent a letter to Russia, regarding missile defense. Are you trying to essentially put Russians on the spot here and say, you know, all right, go ahead and do something to lessen the Iranian threat, and we will then take away the missile defense program that Russia so detests?

And are you concerned at all about the message this sends, to Poland and the Czech Republic, not to have a final answer from the U.S. yet, as to whether you will in fact go ahead with the commitments you've already made in those countries?

SEC. GATES: I told the Russians a year ago that if there were no Iranian missile threat that there would be no need for the third site in Europe, the third missile defense site in Europe.

I don't think at all that this is trying to put the Russians on the spot. I think it is trying to reopen a dialogue and say, we are open to talking with you, about how we address this problem and how we can move forward. And obviously one approach would be, if we can persuade the Iranians not to go forward with their ballistic missile program, if we'd do that together. 245

Another alternative is, as we have talked with the Russians before, of incorporating them in a partnership that makes them a full partner in missile defense, because the reality is that the missiles that the Iranians are testing can reach a good part of Russia, as well as Eastern Europe and part of Western Europe.

These missiles cannot reach the United States at this point. This is part of our commitment to a European missile defense. And so I don't think anybody was trying to put the Russians on the spot.

This really was about saying, look, here's the cause of the concern; can we do something about the cause? And if not, then what can we do together to deal with a potential threat to you, the Russians, as well as Western and Eastern Europe?

Q And the message to Poland and Czech Republic?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that the message that I gave Prime Minister Tusk was, give us a little time. The administration has not had an opportunity to look comprehensively yet at our relationship with Russia and arms control and all the different aspects of the relationship, which includes the potential for a partnership in missile defense.

So I think that, I mean, my sense was that the Poles were somewhat reassured. They obviously would like to see us go forward quickly and strongly. But it is a new administration, as is evident. There are many critical issues on the president's plate right now. And this is one that we'll get to as quickly as we can.

MIN. MORIN: Thank you very much.

SEC. GATES: One more.

Q I wanted to ask you, back on Afghanistan, about Hamid Karzai, your concerns now that he has called for early elections. Everyone virtually says it will be very difficult, because you can't register Afghans, and that security will be problematic if he wants elections by April 21st.

Can I ask for your assessment, your assessment about Karzai right now? What do you think he is up to? And do you still agree with President Obama's last statement, that the Afghan leadership appears disconnected from what's going on in their country?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would just say this. I think that President Karzai is trying to deal with the reality that the Afghan constitution says that his term of office is over on May 22nd. And he is very concerned, as best I can understand it. He is very concerned about, if he remains as president, after that time, a concern about the appearance, at least the appearance if not the reality of illegitimacy in that office.

Now, you have the international elections group as well as ourselves saying that we think it would be difficult to arrange a fair and free election and a relatively secure election, in Afghanistan, before August. And so I think what is in -- what is happening here is an effort to try and figure out what is the best way to bridge the period from May 22nd to an election in August.

And I think it's a legitimate concern on the president -- on the part of President Karzai. And I think the international community, as well as the different elements in the Afghan government and parliament, are trying to figure out the right way forward here.

Q (Off mike) -- just a few weeks away. Are U.S. troops going to be fighting in a country when we're not really sure who's running the country? Do you think if he stays past April 21st, he will have a legitimate government? What's the U.S. position on this?

SEC. GATES: I believe that -- I believe that there will be a government in Afghanistan after May 22nd that has legitimacy and has support for that legitimacy from different elements of the country and government.

We've had such a long-standing relationship as countries. Canada and the United States have historic relations that go back to their very beginnings. And we look forward to working with the new administration. I would convey directly to the president the wisdom that he demonstrated in keeping Secretary Bob Gates in place, that not only shows continuity for the ongoing efforts there through our NATO and ISAF missions, but it demonstrates as well the great confidence that the president has in the work of Secretary Gates.

I look forward to again welcoming Bob Gates back to Canada. He's visited my home province of Nova Scotia. We have a lot of common interests in working to enhance and buttress NORAD and our protection of citizens in both Canada and the United States. And look forward to continuing what has been a very strong and solid working relationship.

Thank you.

SEC. GATES: I think the game is one question for each of us.

Ma'am.

Q Can you tell us what you discussed about the new administration's Afghanistan/Pakistan security review? Mr. Secretary, you're extending the time for that. Mr. Minister, what would you like to see the United States do differently as a result of that review?

SEC. GATES: I basically told him that the review is a work in progress, that we are still eagerly soliciting ideas from our allies and friends, as we did from the Afghans and Pakistanis last week. This isn't a pro forma exercise. We are genuinely interested in other people's thinking on the way forward in Afghanistan.

I told him that, frankly, we weren't at a point where I could offer even preliminary conclusions to him, but I talked about some of the issues that were being addressed -- for example, the size of the foreign military presence, how we get better civilian-military coordination, and so on. And we really didn't talk about the deadline.

Q Under what circumstances --

MIN. MACKAY: Just -- just to respond briefly, we -- as the secretary has lined out, we talked about, from a Canadian perspective, what we might add to that review, and we've had very good interaction. We have experience in Pakistan as well, in addition to what we're doing in Afghanistan. I think Canadians recognize, as do others, that this review helps put in context the regional challenges; that this obviously goes beyond any one country.

We touched briefly on the involvement of India within that context. And certainly that is also an important country, a very major player within the region. The comprehensive approach that Canada has taken in building capacity of the government of Afghanistan, we think through that prism we should also be looking at ways that we can help the Pakistani people as well and building their capacity in certain regions. Certain concerns about the situation in the Swat, in the FATA. We're watching, of course, very closely what's developing inside Pakistan. And I expect that this review, upon completion, will be a very important -- not a restart, but a continuation of the ongoing strategy.

(Airplane flies overhead.)

We have an airport around here. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: I hope so. (Laughter.)



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Press Advisories

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No. 018-09

March 04, 2009

### Secretary of Defense and Canadian Minister of Defense Media Availability

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Canadian Minister of Defense Peter MacKay will conduct a media availability on the steps of the Pentagon River Entrance, Thurs., at 4:15 p.m. EST. following the the first formal bilateral meeting in Washington D.C. under the new administration.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Canadian Minister of Defense Peter Mackay  
March 05, 2009

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Media Stakeout with Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Canadian Minister of Defense Peter Mackay outside the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon, everybody.

Minister MacKay and I had yet another very good meeting. I began by expressing our condolences to the Canadian government, and through them to the families of the three Canadian soldiers who were killed in Afghanistan just a couple of days ago.

We talked about Afghanistan, and also talked about the need to get together and discuss the broader agenda of U.S.-Canadian security issues. And so we're probably going to plan a meeting together that focuses principally on a lot of other issues, from the Americas to NORAD to the Arctic and so on.

And so I think we had a good meeting, and it's always a pleasure to see the minister.

Peter?

MIN. MACKAY: Thank you very much. I'm delighted, of course, to be here with my friend, Secretary Gates.

And Bob and I did discuss, as we very often do, the situation in Afghanistan. I was extremely appreciative of the condolences I will convey to the family -- families of the Canadian soldiers. Clearly, we are often finding ourselves expressing sympathy and solidarity in what is a challenging mission in Afghanistan. This has been a number-one priority for our country, both in terms of our military presence there and our diplomatic efforts as well, and our ongoing attempts to build stability and support for the Afghan people and their government.

MIN. MACKAY: I mean, we're like a lot of countries. Of course, this review going to be of critical importance as we make our way forward both in Afghanistan, but of course Pakistan is a country that you absolutely have to include on the way forward and on the plans that will eventually lead to improved status for both countries. 248

SEC. GATES: Anybody here from the Canadian press that wants to ask?

Q Might this review persuade you to ask parliament to extend Canada's involvement in Afghanistan in a combat role?

And I'd also like you to comment on what the prime minister said last week. He said that the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be defeated. Could you discuss that? And what difference does it make in terms of how you go forward?

MIN. MACKAY: Well, let me start with what the prime minister said. I think he very much echoed the comments of both President Obama and others who have said that essentially military might alone is not going to do it when it comes to Afghanistan. It's going to require much more. It's going to require obviously an effort to build the capacity of the Afghan government to deliver more for their people; to do more on the training of the Afghan security forces, police and army; to essentially take the approach that many, including Canada, have -- have undertaken, and that is to what we've described as a whole-of-government approach, others have used a comprehensive approach. And that is very much in keeping with what the United States and others are doing, the 40-plus countries that are there working inside Afghanistan today.

With respect to Canada's role post-2011, this is something that, as you would know, was a decision of parliament. It came after an extensive consultation involving an independent panel that traveled and gathered information, and referred back to parliament advice on where Canada should be in Afghanistan. So we can't -- we can't attempt to build democracy and institutions in Afghanistan and not respect our own. And so Canada post-2011 will play a role. We will absolutely be in Afghanistan performing important tasks. We will reconfigure what the face of that mission looks like. We will be involved in consultations with our allies. But we will always respect the parliament of Canada.

Q And that's not up for review?

MIN. MACKAY: Pardon me?

Q And that's not up for review?

MIN. MACKAY: Well, look, it's not up for review without parliament, and parliament has pronounced itself on this. We respect that decision. And 2011 is a fixed date to the end of combat. There is much more that can be done in Afghanistan beyond combat, and I suspect quite strongly that Afghanistan will look much differently in 2011.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all very much.

Q (In French.)

Q They'd like you to speak a little bit of French. (Laughter.)

MIN. MACKAY: (In French.)



NPR  
March 10, 2009

## Interview With Defense Secretary Gates

### All Things Considered (NPR), 4:00 PM

ROBERT SIEGEL: We start this hour with an interview with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. I spoke with him earlier today at the Pentagon about Iraq and mostly about Afghanistan.

MICHELE NORRIS: More U.S. troops are bound for Afghanistan. Vice-President Biden today asked the NATO allies to provide more help, and President Obama has said it's possible the U.S. might reach out to some elements of the Taliban. Those facts raised questions about the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.

SIEGEL: Is the mission still to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban or is it to gain a strong enough position to cut a reasonable deal with the reasonable elements of the Taliban?

GATES: Well the specific mission is clearly one of the subjects under review by the administration right now and I think we have to wait until that's done to have real clarity on that. But I would say that at a minimum the mission is to prevent the Taliban from retaking power against the democratically elected government in Afghanistan and thus turning Afghanistan potentially again into a haven for al Qaeda and other extremist groups.

SIEGEL: Is it realistic to count on NATO committing any more combat troops to Afghanistan or is that ultimately going to be a U.S. role?

GATES: I think that they are committing additional troops to provide security for the election. I'm not sure that they'll be there for a prolonged period of time, but they certainly would be there through the August elections. I'll leave it to them to make the announcements but I think others - that they are going to send more troops. You know, the allies have sent all the troops that they have committed to send. It hasn't been that they have failed to follow through on their commitments. It's that the need is greater than the commitments that have been made to this point. And so we would like more help, but I would say that really where we need the help is on the civilian side, whether it's agricultural specialists or people who can help with governance, economic development and so on.

SIEGEL: Just like you to elaborate on a phrase that you used in Senate testimony when you dismissed the idea of transforming Afghanistan, an extremely poor country, into some kind of central Asian Valhalla -- your phrase. One interpretation of that is, "look, so long as they don't harbor terrorists, or they don't harbor people that menace other countries, so be it. They may remain tribal, they may remain misogynist, they may remain not very democratic, that's OK with us."

GATES: What I was really referring to was that we need to have goals at least in the near to mid term that are achievable and where there are some benchmarks where we can measure whether we are actually making progress and getting to a better place in Afghanistan in terms of security,

in terms of credibility of the government and so on. How are we doing in our partnership with the Afghans, both the government and the people. So really what I was trying to differentiate was goals that are 10 or 20 or 30 years in the future in terms of a completely democratic, corruption free, fully economically developed ally –

SIEGEL: -- that's the Valhalla you were talking about....

GATES: -- that's the Valhalla, and I think that's a little ways in the distance.

SIEGEL: But it seems very late in the game in Afghanistan to even use the phrases "short term versus mid term gains." Isn't this already the long term?

GATES: Well, we've been there close to, I guess, seven years at this point. But the reality is that this situation really began to go downhill again about 2005, 2006, as the Taliban began to take advantage of their safe haven on the Pakistani side of the border to begin to re-infiltrate into Afghanistan and create security problems. And we've really just been responding to that.

SIEGEL: So you would see this more as two different acts here, two different phases of the war in Afghanistan: the relatively successful first phase and then the resurgence of the Taliban after that?

GATES: I think that's reasonably fair.

SIEGEL: And Act III is now supposed to commence, at least containing the Taliban or pushing them back?

GATES: Well I don't know whether it's Act III or just the prolongation of Act II, but clearly we all still have our work cut out for us.

SIEGEL: I'd like to ask you about Iraq. In his speech at Camp Lejeune, President Obama said this: "Under the Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government, I intend to remove all U.S. troops from Iraq by the end of 2011." And later that day you said we should be prepared to have some very modest sized presence for training and helping them with their new equipment and providing perhaps intelligence support and so on. Do you believe that all U.S. troops will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011, and are you and the President on the same page here?

GATES: Well, we certainly are on the same page. The fact is that if there is no new agreement with the Iraqis there will be zero U.S. troops in Iraq after the end of 2011. What I was alluding to is that I think it's at least possible that the Iraqis in 2011 will come and say, "We need some logistical support; we need some intelligence support. Can you provide us some very limited help?" I don't know whether that will happen. That's pure speculation on my part. But the President's statement is absolutely clear and it conforms to our current commitments. And that is according to the agreements we've signed we will have everybody out of Iraq at the end of 2011. And unless something changes that's exactly what will happen.

SIEGEL: And something would have to change on the Iraqi side, their desire to have us stay on?

GATES: I think it would have to be at the Iraqis' initiative. And we would have to determine whether, the President would have to determine whether he wants to do that.

SIEGEL: I want to ask you a little bit about intelligence. In two huge jobs that you've held in Washington, you've encountered the issue of bad intelligence. When you were at CIA, you've been faulted for having not foreseen the collapse of the Soviet Union, having overestimated perhaps their strengths. Here you've been part of the cleanup brigade after Iraq where there were many intelligence misjudgments. Where does this leave you in terms of your thinking about intelligence, about going to war and about the wisdom that we have about the world?

GATES: Well, if intelligence has its flaws, and it does, so does most of the writing about intelligence. As, for example, the fact that the Agency missed the collapse of the Soviet Union –

SIEGEL: You dispute that analysis –

GATES: At length, and I think that the record demonstrates that we were preparing for the collapse of the Soviet Union at least two or three years before it actually happened. But I think that a big part of the issue is how intelligence is used by policymakers. Intelligence – and this has always been a difficult message to convey to intelligence professionals – do a so-so job of predicting the future. They really do a very good job of telling you what's going on right now around the world. But forecasting – the truth of the matter is they're not a lot better than anybody else. And I think policymakers need to understand that.

SIEGEL: Right now, do you think we're getting a good picture of what is happening in Iran, say, the country that many of us are very concerned about?

GATES: Well, obviously some targets are much more difficult than others. Iran is a very difficult target, North Korea is a very difficult target. Cuba has been a very difficult target. I mean, the truth of the matter is, for decades our intelligence hasn't been terrific on some of these places. I think there's a lot of effort to try and make it better. But there's still a lot of uncertainty out there.

SIEGEL: Secretary Gates, thank you very much for talking with us today.

GATES: My pleasure.

#### **Unaired portion of the interview from NPR.org**

SIEGEL: There have been debates in Washington for forever over whether we are capable of waging two wars at one time, whether we have a military large enough for that, having inherited this situation when we were at war in both Iraq and Afghanistan. What's the lesson, is two wars at once perhaps biting off more than we can effectively chew even if we're willing to spend a trillion dollars at it?

GATES: Our military planning for a number of years has – and I would say going back at least 20 years – has been to have the ability to fight two major combat operations simultaneously. One where it would be an aggressive effort and another where you might have to hold for a while and then finish the job. I think one of the central questions that this department will face in the Quadrennial Defense Review, which will begin shortly, is whether that model makes any sense in the 21st century and whether what may have fit in a Cold War environment or an immediately post-Cold War environment really has application to today's world.

SIEGEL: And the experience of the past few years suggests some rethinking is need there in terms of what our doctrines are?

GATES: I think so.

PBS

March 11, 2009

## Interview With Defense Secretary Robert Gates

**Tavis Smiley (PBS), 10:00 PM**

TAVIS SMILEY: Robert Gates was appointed secretary of defense by President Bush back in 2006, and now of course continues in that role under his second commander-in-chief. Prior to his current post, he served as president of Texas A&M, which followed his distinguished career at the CIA. He joins us tonight from the Pentagon.

Secretary Gates, delighted to have you on the program. Thanks for your time, sir.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: Thank you very much. I'm happy to be here.

SMILEY: Let me start with what some might regard as an unorthodox place to commence our conversation. I've got a few questions for you about the challenges you face as the defense secretary, to be sure. That said, since you have now been the defense secretary under two presidents, I'm curious, for starters, as to what your personal milestones are. What are you happy about with regard to what you've been able to do as secretary of defense? And then we'll talk about some of these challenges. But what are you happy about right now?

GATES: Well, first I would say I think that, clearly, the war in Iraq is in a better place than it was when I took this job, and I think I've had some part in that. There are a lot of people responsible for it as well, especially General Petraeus and others, so I'm very happy about that.

I'm happy that we've been able to do some things to help the warfighters. These heavier armored vehicles that have significantly reduced the number of our men and women in uniform who have been killed by these IEDs. We've given them more surveillance, intelligence, reconnaissance capability. I think we've made some major changes to take care of our wounded warriors. I think all of those things I feel pretty good about.

SMILEY: Before I get into the details then, what, as we sit here right now for this conversation, do you regard as your greatest challenges right now as defense secretary?

GATES: Clearly, the war in Afghanistan is our biggest current challenge and getting the strategy right on that, having a path forward, and having clear and attainable goals I think is the biggest challenge that we face right now.

SMILEY: I don't want to read too much into this, but I do want to get your take on it. It seems to me that the violence – the spike in violence in Iraq, the place that you're happy about the progress we've made, but the flip side of that is in the last week or so, as you know of course, violence has spiked in Iraq right around the time, interestingly, that Mr. Obama announced what the withdrawal plan was going to be for Iraq. I don't know if there's a connection – don't want to read too much into it, but how should the American people read the spike in violence in Iraq of late?

GATES: I don't think that there is a correlation between the president's announcement and the spike in violence. I think it's tied more to the successful completion of the provincial elections and al Qaeda trying to disrupt the positive impact that the elections had around the country. And even with the violence in the last couple of weeks, the level of violence in Iraq is dramatically lower than it has been, really from a year ago or from six months ago or anytime since 2004. So I think that our commanders see these as isolated incidents.

We've always said that al Qaeda retains the lingering capacity to try and have these spectacular events, but in terms of sectarian violence or broader violence of Iraqis against Iraqis, the levels of violence are really at their lowest levels since 2003-2004.

SMILEY: So you don't see any correlation between what may happen, what might likely happen when we start the pullout, given what's happened over the last week with the increase in violence?

GATES: No, I really don't. I think it's more tied to trying to counter the positive aspects of the provincial elections, and I think these are still localized attacks. It's going to be a long time before there are no attacks in Iraq and before the terrorists there are completely brought under control, because we do believe – the commanders do believe most of this violence is being caused by the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq.

SMILEY: I want to talk more about Iraq. Before I do, though, let me play a clip from this program last night. Thomas Ricks, as you know a longtime military correspondent for "The Washington Post" was our guest on this program last night. These two books that Americans seem to be eating up – about what he's writing at least – "Fiasco" and his new book "The Gamble." Here's what he had to say last night about the way forward in Iraq. Let's take a listen. I want to get your thoughts on it if I might, sir.

THOMAS RICKS: I worry that President Obama talking about getting out of Iraq quickly is not departing from President Bush, but repeating the mistake Bush made of being overoptimistic. So Obama says he'll end the combat mission by next summer, August of 2010, but Bush didn't invade Iraq saying, I've got a great idea, let's go get stuck somewhere for 10 years. Bush also thought he could get out quickly. And I don't think that Bush was right in thinking he could get out quickly, and I don't think President Obama is going to be able to get out half as quickly as he thinks.

SMILEY: Your thoughts Mr. Secretary?

GATES: I have a lot of respect for Tom Ricks, but I think, first of all, the president is not getting out what I would call quickly. It'll be 18 months between now and when our major combat units come out. We will still have 50,000 troops there and I think our commanders – particularly General Odierno, the commander in Iraq, our commander in Iraq is pretty comfortable with where we are, especially with the mitigating impact of those 35,000 to 50,000 troops still there.

I think that we have seen a significant improvement in the quality and capability of the Iraqi security forces, especially the army. They did a good job of organizing security around the provincial elections. So I think we have seen a lot of progress, but all of our commanders – to Mr. Ricks' point, all of our commanders point out that the situation is fragile. There still are

Arab-Kurd tensions; there still has not been a solution to passage of a hydrocarbon law; there's still al Qaeda there trying to stir things up.

So there are periods of danger ahead, and I think one of the reasons why President Obama agreed to leave the bulk of American forces in there past the end of 2009 is because most people see the national elections in December as a potential time for an escalation of the violence. We will still have significant combat presence in Iraq at that time, and I think they see that as the period of maximum risk, and we will have a lot of forces there at that time.

SMILEY: You mentioned Afghanistan earlier, Mr. Secretary. Let's travel there quickly. I don't mean to make you political in this sense – we all know and acknowledge you were not part of the Obama campaign. President Obama, once elected, asked you to stay on, and you agreed to serve and I'm honored to have you on the program. That said, there were expectations that many Americans had about how he was going to handle Iraq, how he was going to handle Afghanistan. Many Americans who voted for him didn't think that meant sending 17,000 more troops to Afghanistan. How should the American public contextualize that decision?

GATES: I think that what the president has decided is really quite consistent with what he said during the campaign. I think that he made clear during the campaign he intended to send more troops to Afghanistan. I think he made clear he was going to draw down our troops in Iraq. He had a 16-month period that he talked about in Iraq. He also said he would listen to the ground commanders, and it was based on that dialogue that he agreed to 19 months instead of 16. So I think that he has kept the commitments that he made during the campaign, but he has shown some flexibility in terms of the realities on the ground, I think, in both places.

SMILEY: What does it mean that everybody in authority in Washington, in the White House, in Congress, in the Defense Department – everybody agrees that we are simply not winning in Afghanistan? What does that mean?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think that the situation is more complex than that in the sense that there are areas in the country, particularly in the north and the west, that are relatively peaceful and where there has not been a significant spike in violence. The eastern area is not in bad shape. The biggest problem that we face is in the southern part of Afghanistan, which is sort of the Taliban homeland. So we have a different situation in different parts of the country, and I would say it's in the south where we would all agree we are not winning, and that's one of the reasons that we are going to increase our troop presence there, as well as the civilian presence.

SMILEY: The White House has floated – Mr. Obama, President Obama himself, Vice President Biden – they have floated this notion of perhaps working with the Taliban trying to get those who are disaffected, those who have a different point of view after all this time, working with those members, certain members of the Taliban, to help us fight al Qaeda. Your thoughts on that?

GATES: I think almost all insurgencies in the end game involve political reconciliation. The issue is it needs to be on the terms of the government of Afghanistan. This is a matter mainly between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban. There are elements of the Taliban that are absolutely irreconcilable and frankly will have to be killed. But there may be other elements that are willing to and maybe a majority who do it because it's a job, because they get paid.

There may be some who do it for other reasons, but I think there is the potential for reconciliation. I think the key is it must be organized between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban, and I believe it needs to be on the terms set by the government of Afghanistan.

SMILEY: What would be the incentive for those who chose to fight with us against al Qaeda – what would the incentive be?

GATES: Well, to bring peace to the villages and towns and countryside of their homeland of Afghanistan. There's some evidence that a fair number of the Taliban are not committed Islamists or extremists, so they may be able to be wooed away.

SMILEY: Two questions I want to ask now that kind of require you to kind of look back for just a second, if you will. And I recognize again and acknowledge up front you were not there at the beginning of President Bush's administration when these decisions were made, but you did of course decide, for whatever reasons personally, to come on personally to be a part of that team.

In that regard, then, two questions: As we look back on it now, what did the Defense Department learn about this notion of thinking that we can shock and awe people into the behavior that we want them to have?

GATES: Looking back, it seems to me that almost everybody, including those who were in the administration at the time, agreed that the assumptions were that this would be a very quick, largely conventional kind of conflict. Saddam would be put out of power and then the situation turned back over to the Iraqis themselves.

I think that most people would agree that there was clearly inadequate planning for the situation not turning out that way and for us to be involved for a protracted period of time. And I think that was perhaps one of the biggest mistakes that was made. I think we just didn't anticipate, or they didn't anticipate at the time that this could be a protracted counterinsurgency kind of challenge, and it clearly turned out to be that.

SMILEY: It was a big mistake. I hear the point you are making Mr. Secretary. I guess what I'm asking you is whether or not at this point the Defense Department, the military, understands, has spent time, has started to wrestle with, marinate on – pick your own term – what those lessons were from what we thought? I hear your point of what we thought was going to happen. Are there lessons that the Defense Department, under your watch, has learned from that and are enacting as a result of that mistake?

GATES: I think very much so. In fact, I'd brag a little bit and I'd say the Department of Defense and particularly our leaders in uniform, our men and women in uniform, have probably learned better and faster because their lives have been on the line, than anybody else in the government or in the world. And what we've had to relearn for the first time since Vietnam is how to do counterinsurgency; that this isn't a conventional conflict. It's not like taking on the Soviet Army in Europe or something that requires a totally different set of skills.

I think that we have institutionalized those. And one of my goals is to make sure that lessons that we have learned are not forgotten and that they are in fact institutionalized into our training and doctrine so that officers 10 or 15 years from now still have access to the lessons that have been

learned.

SMILEY: Let me go back, Mr. Secretary, again, for one more question. Then I'll come forward. Again, not trying to make you overtly political here, but your opinion on these matters does in fact matter. Is there a need for a real rigorous debate in Washington, and for that matter outside the Beltway, about this so-called Bush doctrine? It came up a little bit during the campaign, but not much.

Is the time now for the debate about the Bush Doctrine? In other words, this notion of if we think you're going to hit us, if we think you have something, we hit you first; if we find you didn't, we say, "Oops, our mistake;" but this whole notion of launching first, of hitting people first if we think they're going to hit us – is it time to rethink this Bush Doctrine?

GATES: I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is that if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack, you had better be very, very confident of the intelligence that you have. And I think that the lessons learned with the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction and some of the other things that happened will make any future president very, very cautious about launching that kind of conflict or relying on intelligence.

He's going to ask a lot of very hard questions, and I think that hurdle is much higher today than it was six or seven years ago. And my personal view is that any future president – this current president or any future president – while they have to retain if they have very solid evidence that we are about to be attacked that we be in a position to prevent that. I think, though, that the barrier, first of all, will be are we going to be attacked here at home, as one of the thresholds. And then the quality of intelligence would be another.

SMILEY: Speaking of being attacked at home, there are many who argue it's not a matter of if, but when – do you share that view – no matter what we're trying to do to stop that? Do you share that opinion?

GATES: I don't believe in inevitability. I believe that if you had asked nearly all Americans on September 12, 2001, seven and a half years later, do you think there will have been another terrorist attack, 99 percent of people would have said, "Of course." But here we are, seven and a half years later, and there has not been another successful attack.

The fact is, though, that there have been a number of plots that have been disrupted, both here and overseas, of people planning, people conspiring to do these things. So we've seen enormous improvements in law enforcement and intelligence and cooperation and sharing of information both internally in the United States and with other countries. The threat is always out there. We have to be aggressive in taking it on, but I don't think there's – I personally do not believe in inevitability in history.

SMILEY: You used to work, as we all know, at the CIA and we know that should – if and when the president have to make a decision about war or combat, that you're going to be at that table. He's going to ask your opinion. He's going to seek your counsel, your advice. Since you talked about intel earlier, are you comfortable – can you tell me and the American people that you're comfortable in 2009 that if and when you should be called upon to give that kind of advice that you are comfortable with the intelligence that you would be sharing and passing on to the



president?

GATES: I think it would very much depend on the circumstance. I will tell you that I've been at this business since 1966 – 40, almost 43 years ago. In very few crises is the intelligence unambiguous – do you have a clear cut indication of what's going to happen. So you take the best intelligence you have and then you have to make judgments about that.

My own experience – President Obama is the eighth president I've worked for. The one thing we know and seem to have to learn again and again is that war is inherently unpredictable, and I believe that we need to be very, very cautious about getting into conflicts because it's always easier to get in than to get out.

SMILEY: Yeah. I hear your point that intelligence is always – you know, is never unambiguous. To your point, I guess the question is what's the threshold? At what point does Robert Gates as Defense Secretary – every Defense Secretary I suspect has to answer this question for himself, but given your point about ambiguity, what is the threshold for you, the level at which you feel comfortable sharing intel with the president and making a judgment call about that intel?

GATES: Well, first of all, it's the responsibility of the director of national intelligence to be the one to present intelligence to the president after it's been reviewed by the different intelligence agencies. Based on my own experience, I'm prepared to give the president my evaluation of the quality of the intelligence that he's seeing and make recommendations based on that, but it always depends on the precise situation that you're talking about.

SMILEY: Let me come now – thank you for indulging those questions – looking back, I want to come forward again now, Mr. Secretary, and ask a few questions now about some contemporary issues. You have made it part of your mission at the Defense Department – you've been talking about this lately – in your word, to “reprogram” the Pentagon. It's been operating under a set of rules and regulations for a long time, under certain strategies, and you've been talking about reprogramming the Pentagon. Unpack that word for me. What does that mean?

GATES: One of my biggest frustrations here is that this is a building that for a long time has been more focused on planning for future war than effectively fighting current wars. One of my concerns is that there is no institutional base inside the Department of Defense where people come to work every morning asking, “What can I do today to help the war-fighter in Iraq or Afghanistan be more successful and come home alive?” And most of the innovations that we've had to make, whether it's more heavily armored vehicles or new ways of doing intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, we've had to do outside the bureaucratic structure of the department through some ad hoc arrangement.

What I want to be able to do is have a Department of Defense that can do both of those things, where we have a balance between an ongoing ability to fight the kind of irregular conflicts we're in in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, and at the same time be prepared for and have the capability to deter and, if necessary, fight a more conventional conflict with larger states.

SMILEY: While you work, Mr. Secretary, to reprogram the Defense Department, I've seen some bragging of late – and I – (inaudible) – on the part of the military about recruitment numbers being up. I guess the question is why those numbers are up. Please tell me it has nothing to do

with the lessening of standards.

GATES: No, actually the standards – we've been able to ratchet up the standards – I'm happy to report that the Army's latest report indicates that over the last couple of months the number of high school graduates among their new recruits is now at about 92 percent. It has been at about 79-80 percent for the last year or so; so the new recruits are actually meeting, beating our standards, if you will. It's obviously very good news. Sad to say, I think part of the reason for it is our economic difficulties.

SMILEY: You talked earlier, Mr. Secretary, about taking care of our wounded warriors. On my radio program – our public radio program I guess a couple of weeks ago I did an entire show – an entire segment about the proliferation – if I can use that word – of Websites and reading material talking about the fact that we are not treating our veterans as we should, that we still have not learned the lessons of Vietnam and other conflicts about how to treat our veterans. Some persons have gone as far to say that there is a war against veterans. Talk to me about how we ought to be treating our veterans and what you make about the way we are in fact treating our veterans as they come home.

GATES: Well, I think what you cited goes way too far. I think there have been dramatic improvements in the way we treat our wounded warriors over the last couple of years. It may have taken the firing of the secretary of the army to get things started, but there are – when you talk about the proliferation of Websites and papers and things like that, I thought you were going to talk about all the new support groups that have been established both in and outside of the military, the new facilities that have been created for warrior transition units at our military facilities, the programs that have been initiated to support their families.

Have we got it just right now? No, and nobody in this building would say that. But we have made enormous strides over the last couple of years and, frankly, with a lot of help from the Congress that has given us the resources to be able to do this, and we're going to keep working at it.

They are our heroes. My mantra here is that after the wars themselves, we have no higher priority than taking care of our wounded warriors.

SMILEY: A quick word from you about Iran?

GATES: A real problem. I think it's one of the significant challenges that we're going to face over the next several years.

SMILEY: I think now of a biblical verse, and I'm offering this not to cast aspersion, but just to provide some backstory here – a biblical that says we can't serve two masters. And I guess the question is, how do you find your own comfort level having worked for one president who had one view about military policy – had one worldview – and another president, who has a diametrically different viewpoint about how we ought to engage the world, and you're the guy that stays with both of them. How do you do that every day?

GATES: Well, first of all, as I indicated earlier in our interview, President Obama is the eighth president of the United States that I've worked for. I've worked for both Democrats and

Republicans in the White House, on the National Security Council staff. You only have one president at a time. This president is the president elected by the American people to protect their national security and it's my job to carry out his policies and help him formulate those policies and I'm quite comfortable with that.

SMILEY: Secretary Gates, I know how busy your schedule is and to give us an entire show, I so appreciate, and you being honest and sharing your insights. Delighted to have you on. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.

GATES: It's been my pleasure. Thank you.

SMILEY: Thank you, sir.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 169-09  
March 16, 2009

### DoD and OPM To Review National Security Personnel System

The Department of Defense and the Office of Personnel Management announced today that they will undertake a review of the National Security Personnel System.

The decision by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn was made after consultation with the Office of Personnel Management. "This administration is committed to operating fair, transparent, and effective personnel systems, and we are undertaking this review to assess whether NSPS meets these objectives," said Lynn. With new leadership under a new administration, DoD and OPM will engage with key stakeholders in examining NSPS. "We recognize that varying viewpoints exist regarding NSPS, and given the scope and complexity of the system, it is important for leadership to conduct its own review of the program," Lynn added.

DoD will delay any further conversions of organizations into NSPS pending the outcome of this review. This affects roughly 2,000 employees in organizations scheduled to convert to NSPS this spring. Those organizations are adjusting their plans accordingly. During the review, organizations already covered by NSPS will continue to operate under current NSPS policies, regulations, and procedures.

DoD and OPM leadership are engaged in discussions with key personnel in the administration to determine the overall framework, scope, and timeline of the review, including identifying an appropriate individual to lead the review. It is expected to take several months for a review team to gather the necessary information and data, reach out to stakeholders, and develop recommendations for leadership consideration.

NSPS implementation began in 2006, changing the way DoD civilians are hired, compensated, promoted, and rewarded. The system currently covers approximately 205,000 DoD employees.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 176-09  
March 17, 2009

### Fiscal Year 2008 DoD Sexual Assault Report Released

Today the Department of Defense released the "Fiscal 2008 Report on Sexual Assault in the Military." The report on sexual assault, prepared by the Sexual Assault Prevention Office (SAPRO), provides Congress with an overview of the Sexual Assault Prevent and Response Program and data on alleged sexual assaults involving members of the armed forces.

In fiscal 2008, the department received a total of 2,908 reports of sexual assault involving service members, representing an eight percent increase from fiscal 2007. There were 753 restricted reports filed in fiscal 2008. The restricted reporting option allows a military member to obtain care confidentially without initiating an investigation. This year 110 victims converted their report from restricted to unrestricted.

"We believe the increased number in reporting means service members feel more comfortable reporting the crime and are getting the care they need," said Gail McGinn, deputy under secretary of defense (plans).

The report also showed that court-martial actions substantially increased from 30 percent in fiscal 2007 to 38 percent in fiscal 2008, meaning that military commanders referred eight percent more cases to trial.

The department remains committed to aggressively pursuing increased reporting of sexual assault, providing first-class victim care and using researched-based prevention strategies to eliminate this crime from the



**U.S. Department of Defense**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**No. 179-09**  
**March 18, 2009**

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### **End to Stop Loss Announced**

The Department of Defense announced today a comprehensive plan to eliminate the current use of Stop Loss, while retaining the authority for future use under extraordinary circumstances. This is an important step along the path in adapting the Army into an expeditionary force.

The Army Reserve and Army National Guard will mobilize units without employing Stop Loss beginning in August and September 2009, respectively. The Regular (active duty) Army will deploy its first unit without Stop Loss by January 2010.

For soldiers Stop Loss during fiscal 2009, the department will provide a monthly payment of \$500. Until the department is able to eliminate Stop Loss altogether, this payment will serve as an interim measure to help mitigate its effects.

“Stop Loss disrupts the plans of those who have served their intended obligation. As such, it is employed only when necessary to ensure minimal staffing in deploying units, when needed to ensure safe and effective unit performance,” said Bill Carr, deputy under secretary of defense for military personnel policy. “It is more easily rationalized in the early stages of conflict when events are most dynamic; but tempo changes in this war have frustrated our efforts to end it altogether.”

The department intends to provide Stop Loss Special Pay to eligible service members until the point of separation or retirement, to include that time spent on active duty in recovery following redeployment. Stop Loss Special Pay will begin on the date of implementation, and will take effect for those impacted on or after Oct. 1, 2008.

Stop Loss Special Pay implements the authority granted by Section 8116 of the “Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriation Act, 2009.” The appropriation is available to secretaries of the military departments only to provide Special Pay during fiscal 2009.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

March 18, 2009

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DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates From the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. Today I have three major announcements to make. First, since assuming this position, I've wanted to dramatically reduce the number of soldiers who are stop-lossed. As of the end of January, there were 13,200 soldiers in stop-loss. I am pleased to announce that I have approved a plan to eliminate the use of stop-loss for deploying soldiers. Effective this August, the U.S. Army Reserve will no longer mobilize units under stop-loss; the Army National Guard will stop doing so in September; and active Army units will cease deploying with stop-loss starting next January.

Our goal is to cut the number of those stop-lossed by 50 percent by June 2010 and to eliminate the regular use of stop-loss across the entire Army by March 2011. We will retain the authority to use stop-loss under extraordinary circumstances.

In addition, the Army will begin a number of incentive programs to encourage additional soldiers to voluntarily extend their enlistments and thus mitigate the impact this change may have on unit strength and unit cohesion. Effective this month, the department will provide special compensation of \$500 per month to soldiers who have been stop-lossed. This special compensation will be applied retroactively to October 1st, 2008, the date when Congress first made it available.

While these changes do carry some risk, I believe it is important that we do everything possible to see that soldiers are not unnecessarily forced to stay in the Army beyond their end-of-term-of-service date. Being able to operate without stop-loss is another step in the ongoing transformation of the Army into an expeditionary force.

Second, regarding the department's policy toward media coverage of the return of our fallen at Dover Air Force Base, the working group I tasked to come up with an implementation plan has reported back, and we will put a number of its recommendations into action starting next month. As I said earlier, the overriding principle is that decisions about media coverage should be made by those most affected: the families.

For example, if there are several fallen troops arriving on the same flight, the media will be permitted to cover only the dignified transfer of individuals whose families have given permission. Further, should immediate family members wish to be present for the arrival of their fallen hero at Dover, and this can be done without unduly delaying a fallen's return to his or her own hometown, we will facilitate that travel and we will fund it.

We are committed to seeing that America's fallen heroes -- fallen heroes are received back to their loved ones and their country with the honor, respect and recognition that they and their families have earned. 263

Third, I have recommended to the president that he renominate for a second two-year term both the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, and the vice chairman, General James Cartwright. I've also recommended to the president that he nominate three flag officers to key geographic commands.

Admiral James Stavridis, who currently heads Southern Command, is being recommended to lead European Command. Air Force General Douglas Fraser, currently the deputy at Pacific Command, is being recommended to lead Southern Command. And Admiral Robert Willard, current commander of the Navy's Pacific Fleet, is being recommended to take the helm of Pacific Command.

While these officers, if confirmed, will take up their posts over the next several months, I would like to thank the outgoing combatant commanders, General John Craddock at EUCOM and Admiral Tim Keating at PACOM, for their decades of dedicated service.

Their replacements have the mix of military acumen, strategic vision and diplomatic and inter-agency skill that their posts require. I should note that, if nominated and confirmed, Admiral Stavridis would be the first Navy officer to head EUCOM, and General Fraser would be the first Air Force officer to lead SOUTHCOM. This is but one more indication of how joint our military leadership has become, and how much America's global-security arrangements have evolved since the end of the Cold War.

Be happy to take some questions. Ann ?

Q Mr. Secretary, on stop-loss, what do you consider to be extraordinary circumstances under which the policy might be used again? Who decides? And doesn't it sound like a loophole that you're allowing that to be an eventuality?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say that it would be some kind of an emergency situation where we absolutely had to have somebody's skills for a specific limited period of time.

But I think the goals -- the goals are as stated, to reduce by half by June and entirely by March of 2011. That's our objective, is to get this down as close to zero as we can.

Q Who decides?

SEC. GATES: Well, you know, I think that decision would probably ultimately be up to the Secretary of the Army.

Q A couple budget questions. I know you can't get into detail. But there's a lot of hyperventilating in Washington over whether you're going to cut -- cancel major programs or simply trim around the edges. Can you give any feel for whether we should expect some kind of cancellations in the '010 plan?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q Can I ask a follow -- on a different subject, the tanker --

SEC. GATES: Good question.

Q -- the tank, that came up again last week. It's the long- running story. Congressman Murtha and Congressman Abernethy both advocate a split versus a winner-take-all. Are you still opposed to a split? And if so, why? 264

SEC. GATES: I am. I think it's bad public policy and I think it's bad acquisition policy. It would require the Air Force to maintain two different logistics -- two different logistics trains, two different kinds of training. Everything would have to be duplicated in the support structure, and I see no -- I just think it's a bad deal for taxpayers.

Q Do you have any sense of how much it would cost, roughly, given that the two plans are fairly well known?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't.

Q One of the -- have you gotten any direction from the White House to delay the tanker purchase, the contest by as many five years --

SEC. GATES: No.

Q -- as some news stories suggested?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q No.

SEC. GATES: Andrew?

Q Mr. Secretary, looking particularly at Admiral Stavridis appointment, what in particular are you hoping that he brings to the NATO job? And is there anything from his experience in SOUTHCOM that you're expecting him to bring with him to --

SEC. GATES: I think Admiral Stavridis has done a spectacular job at SOUTHCOM in strengthening our military-to-military relationships throughout Latin America.

I think it's -- it's a challenging job, and I think he has done it extraordinarily well. He will take to Europe a knowledge of French, Spanish, Portuguese. I would say that Jim Stavridis, both in terms of knowledge of how things work in the inter-agency here in Washington, but also in terms of his diplomatic skills, is probably one of the best senior military officers we have.

Tom?

Q On the topic of challenges and risk in Europe, as somebody who's watched the Kremlin for a very long time, what is your assessment of comments this week from the Russian president that they will be greatly modernizing and expanding their military? Is this something new? Are you worried? What is your assessment?

SEC. GATES: Well, as best I understand it -- and I don't study it as closely as I used to -- as I read between the lines, the first message that he was giving to the Russian military was, "Don't expect any new equipment for two years. Modernization will begin in 2011."

I think you also need to appreciate that there is a -- a significant reform of the Russian military that is being carried out by my counterpart, Minister of Defense Serdyukov. They are looking at shrinking their conventional force by several hundred thousand. They are cutting a significant -- perhaps as many as 200,000 or more officer



billets. So I think that -- and he is talking about -- my impression of what he was talking about was a Russian military that is more expeditionary, and not so focused as in the past on taking on NATO. 265

The military is not very happy about this -- especially losing the billets. And I think there is some resistance to the structural changes that Serdyukov is making but -- but my impression is he's pressing ahead, and is being pretty effective.

Q Mr. Secretary, the argument for stop loss has always been, at least in public, unit cohesion. So, what changed so that unit cohesion is no longer an issue and you can bring stop loss to an end? Or is it simply that the demand for troops in Iraq is going down?

SEC. GATES: I think it's a combination of several things. First of all, the unit cohesion still remains very important. The Army is reaching its increased end strength sooner than expected, 547,000. Retention is up, and, my impression is, fairly significantly. And we are expecting the tempo of operations to be reduced over the next 18 months or so as we do draw down in Iraq. We will -- as best I understand, we will be drawing down in Iraq, over the next 18 or 19 months, significantly more than we are building up in Afghanistan, in terms of the Army.

So I think all of those factors together have made it possible. And I wanted to have a program that put us on a path to getting rid of stop loss, and I was prepared to give the Army some time to -- in order to mitigate risk, precisely so we wouldn't undermine unit cohesion. As I indicated in my prepared remarks, there is some risk, but we think -- I think that the way the Army is approaching this mitigates those risks, so that I feel comfortable with this plan.

Barbara?

Q Can I ask you, on a different subject, as you look at forming the Defense budget, defense spending and spending on the war, tough economic times for almost all Americans these days, how does that play into your thinking, if at all?

You have talked about the need to cut Defense spending. You've talked about the need for a healthy economy as the best national security solution there is. But it's very tough times that you're looking at, and awful lot of money's still going out the front door in terms of the budget and the war. Can you just give us a feel for your thinking about the economic situation plays out in your mind?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, it's not irrelevant that the Defense Department hires -- employs almost 3 million people. It is not irrelevant that our modernization procurement alone is something on the order of 100 billion dollars for fiscal year '09 and is not likely to go down much in fiscal year 2010.

So the military budget -- and a significant portion, I might add, of the supplemental -- is spent in the United States as well. So I think that there is a real economic impact both in terms of the people that we hire but also the programs that we fund.

But that said, I believe it's my responsibility to provide the president with a recommended budget that meets the national security needs of the United States, to protect the American people, and that's what I intend to do.

The president will then have the opportunity to make adjustments in that, obviously, and then of course the Congress will play a big part in the package. But I believe it's my responsibility to offer to the president a budget that is singularly focused on

what's in the best national security interest of the United States and protecting the American people. **266**

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Secretary Gates, just on China, do you think the U.S. Navy should make a policy of sending destroyers, warships to accompany surveillance ships in the South China Sea?

And just a second part: Do you think the Chinese navy is trying to push the 7th Fleet out of that area?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think that they're trying to push the 7th Fleet out of that area.

And I hope, based on the diplomatic exchanges that have taken place, since the aggressive acts against the Impeccable, will mean that there won't be a repetition of this. So it would make it unnecessary to send warships.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you, if I could, about military suicide, more specifically within the Army. Admiral Mullen has linked it, the rise that the Army has seen, in the last year and a half or so, specifically to repeat deployments. General Chiarelli has suggested that repeat deployments may not be the cause.

How do you come down on that? And secondly do you think that policies like stop-loss and the strains that motivate a stop-loss program going in, in the first place -- did that help cause the rise in suicides?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know the answer to the latter question.

I think that, well, first of all, about a third of the suicides are members of the military who have never deployed. What I am told is that one of the principal causes of suicide, among our men and women in uniform, is broken relationships. And it's hard not to imagine that repeated deployments don't have an impact on those relationships.

So I don't have -- I don't have data to support what I just said. But it just seems, to me, common sense that repeated deployments have got to weigh very heavily on relationships.

Frankly I think I will always feel -- again I don't have any data. But I will always feel that the 15-month deployments were a real strain on many of the -- many of our men and women in uniform as well.

But this is a problem that we -- that we take very, very seriously. And I -- you know, one is too many. And I think the Army is aggressively, the Army in particular -- all the services are addressing this problem. But the Army in particular, I think, is really going after it in a very aggressive way.

In terms of helping NCO, very much like PTS, in terms of educating NCOs and soldiers and so on to recognize the symptoms, of people who are appearing disconnected from all their friends, of people -- the kinds of actions that sometimes suggest somebody's thinking about suicide, so that -- so that they can seek help.

And I've seen some of the training materials that they have provided, and I think that they're doing the appropriate things.

Yeah?

Q So is there yet consensus across government about the way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan? And if so, when do we expect from the White House some specifics on that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think you'd have to ask the White House that. I think people are coming together pretty well, in terms of the strategy. We still have more meetings involving the principals. We've had a couple this week. And we'll have -- we'll have more.

Q Is there a sense of -- that the end state is still ill- defined in terms of what the ultimate goal is there? I mean, is that the sticking point or --

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to get into the details. I don't think the end state is the sticking point. I think there are just -- it's a difficult problem and trying to come up with new approaches and new initiatives that enhance our prospects for success is hard work, frankly.

And this has been an area where I've had -- unlike Iraq and some of the other problems, this is an area where I've been somewhat uncertain in my own mind what the right path forward is. I've been very concerned about an open-ended commitment of increasing numbers of troops for a variety of reasons, including the size of our footprint in Afghanistan and my worry that the Afghans come to see us as not their partners and allies but as part of their problem. And so these are -- these are very tough issues. And frankly, my view is it's been a very collegial and a very productive process.

Q Yes, Mr. Secretary, on that review process, there was a story today that some consideration is being given to an extra emphasis on Baluchistan in Pakistan, because some al Qaeda figures may have fled from the northern regions down to that area; and could there be increased drone strikes there? Even if you can't talk about whether you're considering it as part of the policy or the review, what is your concern in that regard?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I think we all have a concern about the Quetta shura and the activities of the Taliban in that area, but I think this is principally a problem and a challenge for the Pakistanis to take on. And as we have indicated, we are prepared to do anything we can to -- to help them do that.

Yes?

Q Well, along those lines, there's a sense that the Pakistanis are helping a lot with information on al Qaeda in Pakistan, and also Baitullah Meshud. They're not offering as much information on the Taliban in Pakistan. Is that your assessment?

SEC. GATES: I'm not going to get into that.

Yes.

Q If I could follow up on the question about the Afghan strategy review, given all those complicated issues that are in front of Afghanistan, and that we've sort of heard a little bit about what the plan is ahead, adding 17,000 troops and trying a more bottom-up reconciliation, can you talk a little bit about how prescriptive this review will be?

SEC. GATES: How do you mean, prescriptive? In terms of saying what we ought to do?

Q How detailed it'll be, how much it will sort of spell out point by point what needs to happen in Afghanistan, versus a sort of broad assessment about the issues there and the U.S. goals. 268

SEC. GATES: Well, my sense, looking at the drafts, is it's pretty specific.

Q Actually, a question about the chain of command. How satisfied are you now with the current chain of command and how it's working in Afghanistan? Did making McKiernan the top commander of ISAF and Combined Joint Task Force 101 solve all the problems?

SEC. GATES: Well, nothing will solve all the problems, but I am satisfied with the change in the command -- chain of command arrangements in Afghanistan. I think it has made a difference, in particular by bringing CSTC-A, bringing the training mission under General McKiernan. It had basically operated independently of General McKiernan, basically reported back to CENTCOM. And so I think the arrangements that we've changed have brought a considerable improvement and unity of command in Afghanistan.

Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, the president during the campaign had pledged to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. His name doesn't seem to come up too much any more. But I was curious if you could give us, to the extent you can, your assessment for -- of why the United States has not been able to track him down.

And then if you can, give us some insight into whether the emphasis has changed in the new administration. Are you doing things differently? Is there any sort of reassessment on this hunt?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- you know, to a certain extent I think too many people go to too many movies. Finding these guys is really hard, and especially if they have some kind of a support network.

I'll just give you two examples. Look at how long it took the FBI to find Kaczynski, the Unabomber. Years and years. In the United States. We never did find our hostages in Beirut, despite all of the efforts of the American government applied to a very -- relative to Afghanistan -- to Afghanistan or northwestern Pakistan -- with all the assets that we had, we never did find the hostages or get information on them in a way that would allow us to carry out a successful rescue mission. So this is a lot harder than it looks.

And I can just tell you that -- I mean, we have, I think, done some serious damage to al Qaeda over the last number of months, and everybody continues to look for number one and number two. And we will continue that effort. And I think everyone's hope is that one of these days we'll be successful.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, Jim?

Q What do you think of this budget proposal that would require veterans with war or service-related wounds and injuries to begin paying for their VA health care with their own personal, private insurance?

SEC. GATES: All I know is the headline I read in the newspapers this morning. I haven't read anything about it. So I think it would be inappropriate for me to comment.

Yes?

Q On China, have you utilized the defense hotline with the Chinese authority regarding the Impeccable incident? And how do you evaluate the level of military-to-military cooperation or contact with Chinese? 269

SEC. GATES: I did not use it. And I think that one of the concerns that I have about Impeccable is that my impression was that the military-to-military relationship was steadily improving. And I would like to see us put this behind us, not have another incident like it, and continue that improvement in the relationship.

Yeah.

Q A couple nights ago, you made a visit to Dover Base. Could you tell us, in your own words, what that experience was like, for you, and your own feelings and thoughts?

SEC. GATES: Actually no. I will tell you that it was very difficult.

Q Sir, regarding stop-loss, you directed in 2007, January 2007, that the practice be minimized. Why did it take this long for it in fact to be minimized? And what's your principle concern about it?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, stop-loss was at about 7 or 8 -- about 7,000, I think, when I took this job, the number of those stop-lossed. The surge, surged stop-loss as well. It was really the surge and the increase in op tempo that led to a significant expansion of stop-loss and got it up to 12, to about where it is now.

It has taken -- you know, my question was, okay, the surge is over. The surge brigades are out, or the five -- the increase in five BCTs is over. Why isn't it coming down? Well, because the op tempo in Afghanistan was going up at the same time.

So that's the reason that I've tried to give the Army some time to plan for this. And in the meantime, like I said, we're going to take full advantage of the authorization the Congress gave us, to pay these men and women.

Q What's your fiscal concern about it? Is it an issue of fairness or strain on the force?

SEC. GATES: I just -- you know, we have the legal authority to do it, but -- or the regulatory or whatever it is. But I would just tell you, I felt particularly in these numbers that it was breaking faith.

It wasn't a violation of the enlistment contract. But I believe that when somebody's end date of service comes up, to hold them against their will, if you will, is just not the right thing to do. And so it has been a focus, for most of the time that I've been here. And I get regular reports on it. And all the arrows were pointing in the wrong direction for a long time.

But I just felt that there will always, probably always be a need to do this with a relatively small number of people who have special skills. But I would like to get it down to scores, not thousands.

Q Sir, can we clarify one thing? And we don't mean to cause you any problem. But your answer on Dover was rather abrupt. And military families could be watching and wondering.

Is it -- with all due respect, is it simply just too -- was it too emotional to talk about, or can you help us understand, since now it will be open to the news media and the public will be able to see it? 270

SEC. GATES: If the families agree.

Q If the families agree. Certainly, sir. But people might wonder -- is this just too hard to talk about?

SEC. GATES: I -- well, I will add a sentence or two. I went to the back of the plane by myself and spent time with each of the transfer cases. (Pauses.) I think I'll stop there.

Q Can you give us an update on the review of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy? Are there discussions moving in some direction?

SEC. GATES: We have had -- I've had one brief conversation with the president about it at this point. It's a subject that Admiral Mullen and I are discussing in terms of what to do next and how to move forward. And those discussions are still ongoing.

Yeah?

Q Mr. Secretary, tomorrow is the sixth anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What could you say to the Iraqi people? And do you believe that by 2011 the mission will be accomplished?

SEC. GATES: (Chuckles, pauses.)

(Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: I think that what I would say to the Iraqi people is that the past six years have been very difficult for them and very painful for them and very difficult for us as well. But I believe that the Iraqi people today, with all that pain in the past, have a future that they have probably never had before, where they actually have a say in who governs them, where there is the opportunity for people to live under a government that operates under the law, and the opportunity for economic growth and prosperity that makes life better for all Iraqis.

I think that we will be in a much better place in 2011.

I think that the Iraqis and our -- and our own people in Iraq would say that the roots of democracy or representative government, if you want to call it that, in Iraq are still relatively shallow. There is still a need for further reconciliation and ensuring that things like the hydrocarbon law get passed and that some of the issues between the Arabs and the Kurds are resolved peacefully.

So there are the challenges that General Odierno has talked about. And it will probably take some considerable period of time for the Iraqis to work their way through all that. But I think that -- I think the big difference is that the prospects seem to be -- get better every day that the Iraqis will solve these problems politically and not with guns. And that's a much different kind of life.

(Cross talk.)

Q A follow-up on Iraq, sir. Has there been any official contact with the Turkish government with regards to the drawdown and if the troops can use the Turkish route, the Habur gate? And there are some reports in the Turkish press about PKK putting down arms

and turning in to -- them in to maybe the American forces in terms of reconciliation. Can you confirm or deny?

SEC. GATES: Well, this is an unfortunate question to end on, because the answer to both of those is I don't know. (Chuckles.)

Q Mr. Secretary, here's a question you may be able to answer. On Afghanistan, President Obama is going -- this building has estimated it'll cost about 17 billion (dollars) to expand the Afghan forces to 134,000. Do you expect him to come back with a big check from Europe?

SEC. GATES: I haven't -- I haven't heard that figure from anybody. It sounds high to me and it sounds -- and I don't know how many years it covers. That's higher than any figure I've heard. And we certainly hope that our allies and partners and others around the world will contribute to the Afghan trust fund at NATO to help sustain these forces over time.

Thank you all.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates March 27, 2009

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Secretary Robert Gates Interview with Pentagon Channel

SGT. MACDONALD: Well, sir, first off, I'd like to thank you very much for taking the opportunity to sit down with us here at the Pentagon Channel.

SEC. GATES: Happy to do it.

SGT. MACDONALD: President Obama has announced his much-anticipated new -- his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan -- (audio break) -- appears that it's taking? And do you believe that it's going to give us a greater likelihood of success?

SEC. GATES: I believe it'll provide a greater likelihood of success, because it's a more comprehensive approach to the problem, whether it's dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan as a common problem in the threat that they both face from al Qaeda and its allies, the internationalization of the problem, the additional trainers and acceleration of the growth of the Afghan army and police, the significant civilian surge. We've been calling for that for a long time here in the department. I know that the State Department and AID intend to add hundreds of people, and we're going to be asking our allies to provide more. So I think in all of the different facets of it that it's a more comprehensive approach and kind of deals with all of the aspects of the challenge in Afghanistan.

SGT. MACDONALD: You know, Mr. Secretary, the mission as described by the president is to "disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat" al Qaeda in its safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Will the administration and our allies around the world commit the necessary resources to meet those objectives?

SEC. GATES: Well, the president clearly has indicated that the United States will provide the resources. The 17,000 troops that he has already approved sending over there, the 4,000 additional trainers that he spoke about this morning, the increase of several hundred civilians from the United States government from State and AID -- I think it's clear we will provide the resources. And we will work hard to try and persuade our allies to provide other capabilities that will augment our own, both on the military and the civilian side, and I would say especially on -- in terms of training the Afghan police.

SGT. MACDONALD: Well, the announcement was 4,000 additional troops to train the Afghan army, Mr. Secretary, to hopefully double the size of the Army by 2011. Is that enough? Is that enough trainers?



SEC. GATES: I think it makes a big -- I think it will make a big dent in the problem. After all, a lot of the troops -- of our troops that are out there already are doing training, and to the degree we have joint operations with the Afghan army, that in itself is a training activity. So I think the commitment of this -- a full additional brigade will make a significant difference.

SGT. MACDONALD: Okay, sir.

The president said that al Qaeda's number one and number two may be hiding out in Pakistan. Will American troops have the go-ahead to go and -- go in and get them? And if not, do we think that more money is going to get the Afghan and Pakistani governments to address the problem?

SEC. GATES: I don't anticipate that U.S. troops would be going into Pakistan in that way.

A big part of what the president announced today is a new kind of partnership with Pakistan, including both economic assistance but also our willingness to help train their forces and provide the gear that would allow them to improve their own capabilities in counterinsurgency. I think what is key here is the regionalization of the problem and getting Afghanistan and Pakistan to work together on both sides of that border to go after al Qaeda and their allies.

SGT. MACDONALD: And about our NATO allies, sir, you've always been very vocal in saying that the NATO allies need to contribute more to this mission. Do you -- is there any reason to hope that this new strategy will induce them to pony up more money, equipment, even soldiers?

SEC. GATES: I think that the focus of our request on civilian expertise and police trainers frankly is easier for the Europeans politically at home than to send more soldiers and to be actually more in the fight. Now of course some of them already are in a major way -- the British and the French, the Dutch, the Danes, along with non-allies -- or non-NATO members like Australia -- and the Canadians, by all means.

But I think that the kinds of things we're going to be asking them for will be easier for them politically, and I hope that despite their economic problems at home, that they will in fact meet those needs.

SGT. MACDONALD: Now I understand that we're kind of -- we're taking -- we're focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. They're two countries, but they're one challenge for us. How is this holistic approach towards strategy going to work?

SEC. GATES: I think that the way the president framed it in his speech this morning is that al Qaeda operates on both sides of that border, and if you -- you really have to go after al Qaeda and its allies on both sides of that border. And what's required here is just greater coordination and collaboration, first of all between the Afghans and the Pakistanis, but also between each of them and ourselves.

So both on a bilateral basis and a trilateral basis, I think we have to go after these guys on both sides of the border, but the Pakistanis are absolutely critical on their side.

SGT. MACDONALD: Okay. One final question for you, Mr. Secretary. If you could say anything to the 38,000 troops already serving in Afghanistan or the 22,000 troops that are going to be en route shortly, what would you tell them their exit strategy is? When will they know that the mission has been accomplished in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say that first -- two points. First, I would say that the exit strategy in Afghanistan is the same as the exit strategy in Iraq, and that's success. And I think success is when the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police are able to take over the security functions in their own country and perform those really with very little help from us.

And I think the acceleration of the army and all of the other aspects of the strategy will make that day closer than, perhaps, it was before.

SGT. MACDONALD: Outstanding, sir. Thank you very much, once again, for taking the time to sit with us.

SEC. GATES: Thanks. My pleasure.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### **Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society Ball (Washington, D.C.)**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington Hilton, Washington, D.C., Saturday, March 28, 2009*

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It's a real pleasure to be here this evening. It's especially good to get out of the Pentagon for a few hours – especially at the height of the budget season.

First, let me thank Admiral Steve Abbot, the president of the Relief Society, and everyone who has had a hand in making this such a spectacular event, year in and year out. It does so much to sustain the incredible work of the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society – an organization that, for more than a century, has supported the men and women of our sea services through myriad programs at home and abroad.

Of course, the founding of the Relief Society has somewhat inauspicious roots for this gathering. The original funding for the Relief Society actually came from the proceeds of the 1903 Army-Navy football game. (Applause) Hold your applause. (Laughter) You do not remember the score. (Laughter) The score was 40 to 5. In front of this crowd I won't say who won. (Laughter) But, I'm happy to say that in recent years times have been kinder to the Navy. (Applause) In fact, I had a chance to go to the game in December. That was a real nail-biter. (Laughter)

Well, I'd like to keep my remarks on the short side – which reminds me of a story about the playwright George Bernard Shaw. Shaw once told a speaker that he had 15 minutes to speak. And the speaker replied, "Fifteen minutes? How can I possibly tell them all that I know in 15 minutes?" And Shaw responded, "I advise you to speak very slowly." (Laughter)

There's also the story that Ambassador Bob Strauss, former chairman of the democratic party, told me a long time ago – actually, over drinks in Moscow – about a dinner speaker who was notoriously long-winded. There'd been a lengthy reception with lots of cocktails and lots of wine with dinner. Sounds kind of familiar. (Laughter) The speaker was at one of those table-set podiums, people seated to both sides. And the speaker, as expected, rose to his feet and droned on and on. And finally the drunken guest on his right got up – fed up – and grabbed an empty wine bottle, and swung it at the speaker. (Laughter) But he missed. And he hit the chairman of the event who was seated to the left of the speaker. (Laughter) The chairman fell to the ground, bleeding profusely. The drunk got down on his hands and knees, crawled over to the chairman to apologize. And the poor guy opened one eye and said, "Hit me again – I can still hear the son of a bitch." (Laughter)

Then there are the perils of drinking at public events. A European foreign minister who shall remain nameless and who was a notoriously heavy drinker, was on a trip to South America and he showed up quite drunk at a reception in Peru. There was music playing and he invited a passing guest to dance. The guest somewhat haughtily replied, "First, sir, you are drunk. Second, this is not a waltz – it is the Peruvian national anthem. (Laughter) Third, I am not a woman. I am the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima." (Laughter)

I want to express gratitude tonight to the three groups of people we celebrate: The Relief Society, the Navy, and the United States Marine Corps.

During my tenure as secretary of defense and on visits to bases and communities around the nation, I am constantly amazed by the commitment of time and energy that so many citizens make to improve the lives of our military families. It takes a special kind of person to be so devoted to that cause – to help during their deployments and when they return home.

The Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society does just this with its numerous programs and thousands of volunteers. Whether through grants and loans – more than \$1 billion worth since its

founding – or counseling and nursing, this organization's reach is incredibly long.

Reading some of the testimonials of families who have been helped, one sees a theme: dogged determination by the Relief Society volunteers to help families who are often too proud to ask for it. There are countless stories of your good deeds: service members who have needed a helping hand with loans or repairs to their house; family members who have been able to get an education; injured troops who have gotten transportation for doctors' appointments; or just the spiritual nourishment of a kind word or a good deed. For those whose lives the Relief Society has touched, every gesture, no matter how small, has a tangible impact. Your work lifts spirits in the face of dangers and stresses of the battlefield and at home.

I know you all do this because you feel, as I do, a deep pride in a new generation of Americans who, when faced with extraordinary challenges, have answered a call to duty, honor, and country. Wherever sailors and Marines are deployed – even to the far corners of the earth – it is a safe bet that the Relief Society is there in some form or another. And so to everyone involved in this great organization, thank you on behalf of the American people.

Now let me turn to the men and women of the Navy – aviators, surface warriors, submariners, and all the rest. Right now, sailors are deployed across the globe, from Iraq to Afghanistan to the littorals and the deep blue sea. Every time I visit the war theaters, I am struck by the number of sailors on the ground – one of the great under-appreciated stories of this war. Indeed, in the Central Command AOR, there are 50 percent more sailors deployed on land than on ships. Along with the SEALs, there are “devil docs,” riverine crews, engineers, logistics experts, ordnance disposal specialists, and countless others who are making this mission a success and helping to ease the strain on our ground forces – and doing so without fail and without complaint.

At the same time, the Navy is always at work defending America's vital interests and responsibilities in other parts of the globe. With our ground forces so committed to the campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia, the weight of America's strategic military strength has moved to our air and naval forces. Despite the removal of many of our Cold War bases and garrisons, the U.S. military – and in particular, the Navy – is probably engaged with more countries in more productive ways to build relationships and improve security than at any time in our history. This pattern is reflected in the range of activities around the world that would no doubt leave Alfred Thayer Mahan spinning in his grave: partnership stations in Africa; coordination with Indonesia and Malaysia to secure a vulnerable shipping lane; sailors leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; and the work of sailors who have treated some 320,000 patients in Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa.

And then there's the traditional role the Navy plays in keeping sea lanes across the planet open and secure – highlighted in recent months by the acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia – an enduring mission for America's sea services that goes back to the earliest years of our republic. The need to show presence and project power from a piece of sovereign territory called a United States Navy ship will never go away.

Of course, ships and shipbuilding are all tied up in politics – from homeport decisions to the health of domestic shipyards. I take some comfort from the fact that this has been so since America's founding. When Henry Knox, the first secretary of war, ordered the first six heavy frigates for the Navy – for the accountants among you – the total cost was \$688,000. They were built in six different shipyards, in six different shapes. ... So you know, some things just never change. (Laughter)

Ironically, the value of the Navy was perhaps best and most succinctly described by United States Army General Ulysses S. Grant. In his memoirs, Grant wrote, “Money expended in a fine navy not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime.” Admiral Roughead, that sounds like a good quote with which to begin your first congressional testimony this spring. (Applause)

Now, I'm guessing we have a few “devil dogs” with us this evening. Since 9/11, more than a quarter million Marines have been deployed to battlefields large and small. To put the figure in some perspective, there are only 240,000 Marines total – active and reserve, representing about 10 percent of all military personnel. That's what I call punching above your weight – but that's what Marines have always done.

In recent years, the Marines have been operating essentially as a second land army in both Iraq and Afghanistan – evolving to become one of the most effective counterinsurgent forces ever. As General Conway has noted, we now have young, battle-hardened Marines with multiple Iraq tours who have never seen the inside of a ship. Their contributions to the war we are in have been extraordinary stories of valor that will go down in the annals of military history: victories won in places like Fallujah –

often block by block, house by house, and, too often, hand by hand. As we speak, a new chapter is beginning in your storied history with major Marine deployments to Afghanistan, as we focus on that war.

Your successes have not been without great loss. Too many Marines have given the last full measure of devotion. Like many of you, I have sat at the bedside of injured Marines at Bethesda. I have hugged moms and dads and husbands and wives who have received a folded flag. Those wearing the "eagle, globe, and anchor" on the front lines of freedom deserve to know how much the country – how much all of us – appreciate their dedication, their service, and their sacrifice. (Applause)

Just a few weeks ago, President Obama visited Camp Lejeune to pay tribute to members of the military – all the services – and pledged to support our troops and their families on a wide variety of quality-of-life issues, from child-care and job-training, to implementing a 21st century bill for veterans – the GI Bill – that will, in his words, "help our veterans live their dreams." He also promised a pay raise, which I must say got the biggest applause of the entire speech. He called these past years for our military "one of the most extraordinary chapters of service in the history of our nation" – a sentiment with which I could not agree more.

In closing, right around the time of that football drubbing I mentioned earlier, Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most forceful advocates of American naval power, had a chance to meet with members of the Naval Academy's 1902 graduating class. That evening he spoke at a here at a banquet in Washington and paid tribute to "those gallant Americans wearing the uniform of the American Republic who ... uphold gloriously the most glorious traditions of the past." A few years later, at another event, he said, "I believe in what counts most in the Navy – the officers and enlisted men – the man behind the gun, the man in the engine-room, the man in the conning tower, the man, whoever he is, who is doing his duty."

Serving as the president of a great public university actually has made doing this job much tougher for me. For four-and-a-half years, I watched young Americans aged 18 to 25 going to class, with t-shirts and shorts and backpacks, following their dreams. And now I see 18 to 25 year olds in full body armor in Fallujah, and in Kandahar and elsewhere. I see them wounded and in our hospitals – at Walter Reed, at Bethesda, or Brooke, and elsewhere. And I see the price of freedom. With each condolence letter I write, I know the price. And I know the sacrifice.

And so all of our sailors and Marines who are doing their duty – and all of our service members across the globe and the families who support them – you have our deepest gratitude. You have the respect and admiration of all Americans. They know that because you put your lives on the line, because of your service and your courage, your contemporaries – those your age – are safe, secure, and free to pursue their dreams.

Thank you.

Secretary Robert Gates Interview with Fox News

Mon, 30 Mar 2009 10:43:00 -0500

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates March 29, 2009

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Secretary Robert Gates Interview with Fox News

CHRIS WALLACE: I'm Chris Wallace, and this is "FOX News Sunday."

All right now on "FOX News Sunday."

(Intro music ends.)

And hello again from FOX News in Washington.

This week, President Obama took ownership of the war in Afghanistan. Here for an exclusive interview on the new strategy, as well as other tough challenges around the world, is the secretary of defense, Robert Gates.

And Mr. Secretary, welcome back to "FOX News Sunday."

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES: Thank you, Chris.

WALLACE: Let's start with President Obama's mission statement Friday on the new strategy in Afghanistan. Here it is:

OBAMA: (From tape.) ☐ that we have a clear and focused goal ☐ to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

WALLACE: President Bush used to talk about building a flourishing democracy. Has President Obama narrowed our mission and, if so, why?

GATES: I think the near-term objectives have been narrowed. I think our long-term objective still would be to see a flourishing democracy in Afghanistan.

But I think what we need to focus on and focus our efforts is making headway in reversing the Taliban's momentum and strengthening the Afghan army and police and really going after al Qaeda, as the president said.

WALLACE: I'm going to pick up on that. The president said that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks against the U.S. homeland. Does al Qaeda still have that kind of operational capability to plan and pull off those kinds of attacks?

GATES: They certainly have the capability to plan and, in many ways, they have metastasized, with elements in North Africa, in the Levant, in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere.

And they aren't necessarily directly controlled from al Qaeda in western Pakistan, but they are trained there. They often get guidance from there and inspiration from there.

So I think they do have those capabilities. They clearly have been inhibited by all the things that have been done over the last six or seven years.

WALLACE: When you say they still have those capabilities to pull off an attack on the U.S. homeland, do you still regard them as a very serious threat?

GATES: I still regard them as a very serious threat, yes.

WALLACE: U.S. commanders in the field wanted more combat troops than the 17,000 that President Obama committed. Why did he decide against committing all of those additional combat troops, and will there be enough for the kind of counterinsurgency living among the population, protecting the population, that was so key to the success of the surge in Iraq?

GATES: Well, let me be very clear about this. The president has approved every single soldier that I have requested of him. I have not sent any requests for units or troops to the president so far that he has not approved.

Now, the reality is I've been at this a long time, and I don't think I've ever, in several decades, run into a ground commander who thought he had enough troops. That's probably true in all of history.

But we have fulfilled all of the requirements that General McKiernan has put down for 2009. And my view is there's no need to ask for more troops, ask the president to approve more troops, until we see how the troops we've already approved are in there, how they are doing, what the Europeans have done. And we will be reviewing that, come the end of the year.

WALLACE: And are there enough for the kind of counterinsurgency tactics, living in the population, protecting the population, that we saw so successful in Iraq?

GATES: Well, based on the requirements that have been levied by General McKiernan for 2009, that would be his view, I think.

And the reality is there already are a lot of troops there. This will bring us, when all is said and done, to about 68,000 troops plus another 35,000 or so Europeans and other partners.

WALLACE: What kind of long-term commitment has the president given you? Has he promised you that he will stay in Afghanistan until the Taliban, in fact, are defeated and al Qaeda are defeated?

GATES: He has clearly stated he clearly understands that this is a very tough fight, and that we're in it until we're successful that al Qaeda is no longer a threat to the United States and that we are in no danger of either Afghanistan or the western part of Pakistan being a base for al Qaeda.

By the same token, I think he's been clear and, frankly, it was my view in our discussions that we don't want to just pursue and settle on this strategy and then pursue it blindly and open-endedly.

And that's why I felt very strongly that toward the end of the year or about a year from now we need to reevaluate this strategy and see if we're making progress.

WALLACE: But the strategy is subject to review. The commitment to defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban, is that subject to review?

GATES: I don't think so.

WALLACE: That is the commitment?

GATES: Certainly to defeat al Qaeda, and make sure that Afghanistan and western Pakistan are not safe havens for them.

WALLACE: There were reports this week that elements of Pakistani intelligence, the ISI, are providing the Taliban and other extremists with money, supplies, even tips on allied missions against them.

One, is it true? And two, if so, can we stop it?

GATES: Well, the way I would answer is to say that we certainly have concerns about the contacts of [redacted] between the Pakistani intelligence service and the [redacted] and some of these groups in the past.

But the reality is the Pakistanis have had contacts with these groups since they were fighting the Soviets 20 or 25 years ago when I first was dealing with the Pakistanis on this. And, I must say, also helping make sure that some of those same groups got weapons from our safe haven in Pakistan.

But with people like Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and the Hakani network, the Pakistanis have had contacts with these people for a long time, I think partly as a hedge against what might happen in Afghanistan if we were to walk away or whatever.

What we need to do is try and help the Pakistanis understand these groups are now an existential threat to them, and that we will be there as a steadfast ally for Pakistan, that they can count on us, and that they don't need that hedge.

WALLACE: There's a NATO summit coming up next week in Europe. Have we given up on the idea of getting our allies to send more combat troops to fight alongside the U.S. in Afghanistan?

GATES: No, we haven't. And in fact I think some of our allies will send additional forces there to provide security before the August elections in Afghanistan.

But I think what we're really interested in for the longer term from our partners and the allies is helping us with the civilian surge in terms of experts in agriculture and finance and governance and so on, to help us improve the situation inside Afghanistan and give a sense of forward progress on the part of the Afghan people.

Also, police trainers. The Carabinieri, the Guardia Civil, these various groups in Europe are really very good paramilitary-type police. And I think they could do a good job in the police training, so those will be probably the principal focus of our request.

WALLACE: New subject. North Korea says that it will launch a communications satellite some time in the next few days. They have, in fact, even moved a missile out to the launch pad.

Several questions. Why are we so troubled by an activity that the North Koreans say is civilian?

GATES: I think that there [redacted] I don't know anyone at a senior level in the American government who does not believe this technology is intended as a mask for the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

WALLACE: Do we believe that they now have the ability to put a nuclear warhead on top of a missile, as the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Maples, suggested? 280

GATES: I think that we believe that that's their long-term intent. I personally would be skeptical that they have the ability right now to do that.

WALLACE: The commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, Admiral Keating, says that we are, quote, "fully prepared to shoot down this missile."

Are there any circumstances under which we will do that?

GATES: I think if we had an aberrant missile, one that was headed for Hawaii that looked like it was headed for Hawaii or something like that, we might consider it. But I don't think we have any plans to do anything like that at this point.

WALLACE: What if it were headed for the West Coast, for Alaska?

GATES: Well, we I don't think we believe this missile can do that.

WALLACE: And what about the Japanese? Obviously, they have some of our technology. Do we believe they're going to prepare to shoot this down?

GATES: Well, again, based on what I read in the newspapers, what the Japanese are saying is that the if that missile fails and it looks like it's going to drop debris on Japan, that they might take some action.

WALLACE: Is there you're basically discussing this, Mr. Secretary, as if it's going to happen.

GATES: The launch?

WALLACE: Yeah.

GATES: I think it probably will.

WALLACE: And there's nothing we can do about it?

GATES: Nope.

WALLACE: And what does that say to you?

GATES: Well, I would say we're not prepared to do anything about it.

WALLACE: There are reports well, let me I want to stay with that.

What does that say to you about the North Korean regime, that we and the rest of the world can all say that this is a provocative act, and unlawful act, and they thumb our (sic) noses and we're not going to do anything about it?

GATES: Well, I think it's very troubling. The reality is that the six-party talks really have not made any headway any time recently. There has certainly been no

If this is Kim Jong Il's welcoming present to a new president, launching a missile like this and threatening to have a nuclear test, I think says a lot about the imperviousness of this regime in North Korea to any kind of diplomatic overtures.



WALLACE: There are reports that the Obama White House has asked you to cut \$2 billion from the next budget for missile defense, roughly 20 percent. Is this president less committed, is he less convinced that this program will work than President Bush was? 281

GATES: Well, I don't know about the comparison. I would say I would tell you that I have not received any specific requests from the White House in terms of our budget.

We'll be talking about that. We have the top-line number. We received what we call a pass-back from the Office of Management and Budget, but I considered the suggestions that they made, simply those suggestions. I've taken some of them, and some of them I haven't.

WALLACE: But do you regard there is a new skepticism in the part of the White House towards missile defense?

GATES: I think that I think one of the things that we need to do is sit down and go through the capabilities that we have, the tests that we've been through, and focus on where we need to sustain development, where we need to sustain a commitment to have a capability.

WALLACE: So it sounds like that's under review.

GATES: I think so.

WALLACE: There are so many trouble spots around the world that I want to do a lightning-round tour of the horizon. I know this not your thing, Mr. Secretary, but let's try to do quick questions, quick answers.

Iraq: Do you see any development so far that might cause you to have to slow down President Obama's time line to pull out of the major cities by this summer and to get our combat troops out by August of 2010?

GATES: I haven't seen anything at this point that would lead me to think that there will be a need to change the time lines.

WALLACE: Iran: You said recently you said recently that they are not close to a nuclear weapon. Admiral Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, says that they have enough material to make a bomb.

Is there a contradiction there?

GATES: No. What they have is probably enough low-enriched uranium from their centrifuges at Natanz to give them the capacity, should they then enrich it more highly, to proceed to make a weapon.

They don't have the capability at this point to enrich. We are suspicious they may be building one clandestinely. We do not believe they are doing enriching beyond a low level at Natanz, and the IAEA is in there, so we will know if they tried to do that.

So I guess the point, the bridge between what Admiral Mullen said and what I've said is they do have enough low-enriched uranium that if they should then proceed to enrich it more highly, they could build a weapon.

WALLACE: You expressed, I think it would be fair to say, extreme skepticism about the ability of diplomacy to alter the behavior of the North Koreans. Do you feel the same way about the Iranians?

GATES: Well, I think I think, frankly, from my perspective, the opportunity for success is probably more in economic sanctions in both places than it is in diplomacy. 282

Diplomacy, perhaps, if there is enough economic pressure placed on Iran, diplomacy can provide them an open door through which they can walk if they choose to change their policies.

And so I think the two go hand in hand, but I think what gets them to the table is economic sanctions.

WALLACE: Couple more questions for the lightning round.

Mexico: The Pentagon issued a report in November on the growing drug violence there that said this, "An unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States."

Mr. Secretary, how likely is that scenario, that the Mexican government loses control of part of the country?

GATES: I don't think that's a likely scenario at this point. I think that a lot of the violence is among or between the cartels, as they strive for control of certain areas in Mexico.

I think President Calderon has acted with enormous courage and forcefully in sending troops in to try and get control of that situation. And I think that

As I think Admiral Blair testified just in the last couple of days, I think that the chances of the Mexican government losing control of some part of their country or becoming a failed state is are very low.

WALLACE: In January, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs gave a one-word answer, yes, when asked if this president is going to end the policy of don't ask/don't tell for gays in the military.

Where does that stand, and why is there currently money in the 2010 budget to keep enforcing that policy?

GATES: Well, it continues to be the law. And any change in the policy would require a change in the law. We will follow the law, whatever it is. That dialogue, though, has really not progressed very far.

At this point in the administration, I think the president and I feel like we've got a lot on our plates right now, and let's push that one down the road a little bit.

WALLACE: And finally and we have just a minute left President Bush used to talk about the global war on terror.

This administration, this White House, seems to steer away from that. In fact, in his speech on Friday, President Obama talked about a campaign against extremism.

Beyond the words, is there a strategic difference between the way these two presidents see the fight?

GATES: I think that they both see al Qaeda as a threat to the United States, al Qaeda and its extremist allies. And I think they both have made clear their determination to go after it.

We have the opportunity now that perhaps we did not have before to apply the kind of resources, both military and civilian, against it, and a broader kind of strategy that we did not have before.

WALLACE: But the difference between saying war on terror or campaign against extremism?


GATES: I think that's people looking for differences where there are none.

WALLACE: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you so much for coming in. We got through everything. (Chuckles.)

GATES: (Chuckles.)

WALLACE: Thank you. Please come back, sir.

GATES: My pleasure. Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Swearing-In of Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn (Washington, D.C.)**  
*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Monday, March 30, 2009*

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Admiral Mullen, thank you for that introduction.

A special welcome to the entire Lynn family – especially Bill's wife Mary, and his daughter Catherine.

Thank you all for coming. Senator Warner, thank you for being here this afternoon. It is a real honor to say a few words about Bill Lynn – a man who has devoted his professional career, both in and out of government, to our nation's defense.

The post of deputy secretary has monumental responsibilities: as the chief management officer, it is Bill's job to run the day-to-day operations of the Department of Defense, an organization with a half-trillion-dollar annual budget and more than three million employees across the globe. As I like to say, the largest organization on the planet.

He comes to this job with many years of relevant experience, and a long list of professional accomplishments. For those of you who don't know Bill's background, he has held some of the most critical positions within the Pentagon – special assistant on budget matters for Secretary of Defense Les Aspin; director of PA&E as Mike indicated; and as comptroller, the Department's top budget man. All told, he's spent eight years in the building already – that he's coming back for more shows Bill to be either a man of great dedication and patriotism or a real glutton for punishment.

As much as his time here in the 90s gives him insight into the Department of Defense and its programs – he played key roles in defense-finance reform and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review – it is his other experiences that make him a unique person to take on the responsibilities of the department's chief management officer.

Bill has seen defense issues from the perspective of every major stakeholder in Washington – from the inside of the Pentagon and the administration, to the chambers of Capitol Hill, to the halls of industry and from our most respected think tanks and defense universities. This knowledge – this familiarity with who will be impacted by his decisions and in what ways – is what led the president and me to choose him for this position. I know that he possesses a first-class intellect that will yield well-informed decisions.

This is all the more important as we survey the challenges the Department faces: two wars overseas, one winding down, the other entering a new phase; a budget situation that will force the Department to make tough choices; an acquisition process in need of reform; and a bureaucracy that still needs to be streamlined and better organized to fight wars and support our men and women in uniform while they're deployed and when they return home.

As you know, we're in the heart of the budget season, and we're moving ahead quickly on the QDR. I have been extremely impressed by Bill's depth of knowledge about all issues we face – on management and strategy alike.

On a personal note, I have also been impressed by Bill's desire to work with other senior officials as a team. I have long believed that, in government, organization charts are far less important than personalities. With the new team here – the deputy secretary, Under Secretary Michele Flournoy, Comptroller Robert Hale, General Counsel Jeh Johnson, and I hope many others very soon – I am confident that together we will be able to make the necessary changes to the Department to win the wars we are in and to keep the nation safe for decades to come.

Bill, thank you for taking on this assignment at a critical time for our nation. I look forward to working with you.

Financial Times

April 2, 2009

## Israel Expected To Hold Back On Iran

By Demetri Sevastopulo, Washington

Robert Gates, US defence secretary, has said Israel is unlikely to attack Iran this year to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear weapon.

In an interview with the Financial Times, Mr Gates said there was still enough time to persuade Iran to abandon what is widely perceived to be a nuclear weapons programme.

Mr Gates said he does not expect Israel – which believes the US estimate for when Iran could develop a nuclear weapon is too sanguine – to take military action this year.

“I guess I would say I would be surprised...if they did act this year,” said Mr Gates.

As he was sworn in as the new Israeli prime minister this week, Benjamin Netanyahu warned that the greatest danger to Israel was Iran’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons. But asked whether Iran would cross a nuclear “red line” this year, Mr Gates said: “I don’t know, I would guess probably not”.

“I think we have more time than that. How much more time I don’t know,” said Mr Gates. “It is a year, two years, three years. It is somewhere in that window.”

Israel raised the spectre of war last year by conducting a large scale military exercise that some experts saw as a practice run for an attack on Iran. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the US joint chiefs, later delivered an unusual public warning following a visit to Israel, saying “this is a very unstable part of the world, and I don’t need it to be more unstable”.

Speaking before US President Barack Obama meets Nato leaders in France and Germany this weekend, Mr Gates urged Europe to boost its commitment to Afghanistan in the wake of the new US strategy.

Mr Gates, who has made multiple frustrated trips to Europe to get more combat troops, said the US would request resources that were more politically palatable to the European public. He urged Europe to provide money for the expansion of the Afghan army, civilian experts in areas such as agriculture, health and clean water, and trainers for the Afghan police.

“We’re interested in providing trainers for the Afghan national police. And here the Europeans really have some special skills,” said Mr Gates.

“The [Spanish] Guardia Civil, the [French] Gendarmerie, the [Italian] Carabinieri, all of these kinds of police forces in Europe have the kind of skill sets that the Afghan national police want and need. It may be easier for the Europeans to provide police trainers than military trainers.”

While urging Europe to provide more resources, Mr Gates said European leaders had not done enough to convince their publics that success in Afghanistan was crucial to their own security.

In a high-profile speech in Munich in February last year, Mr Gates lamented that “many Europeans question the relevance of our actions” in Afghanistan. He said he wanted to “speak directly to the people of Europe” about the threat posed by Islamic extremism. A year later, Mr Gates conceded that his efforts had not borne much fruit.

”I have not seen the kind of effort that I would have hoped for in terms of European governments trying to persuade their people that attacks such as those that took place in Madrid and London... emanated from the Afghan-Pakistani border area,” said Mr Gates.

“This problem out there is as big a threat to the Europeans as it is to us... The British do a good job of making that case to their people, but on the continent I have not seen that kind of effort.”

Mr Gates suggested that having a new US president would make it easier for Europe to provide some of the resources for Afghanistan sought by the US. He also sought to avoid exacerbating divisions within the alliance, saying Europe had made a significant contribution to the more than seven year war.

Some US military experts and officers have questioned whether Nato’s contribution is worthwhile given the associated cost that comes with coordinating different militaries, including several that impose restrictive caveats on what their soldiers can do on the ground.

“There is a point that needs to be made, which is that the Europeans for all of the commentary, including from me...have done a lot.”

Mr Gates also called for contributions to a \$500m “starter fund” to help increase the size of the Afghan army from 80,000 to 134,000 soldiers. He said the expanded army would ultimately cost about \$2-3bn a year to maintain. Washington last year asked Tokyo to provide \$20bn to fund the expansion, but Japan opted to provide money for police training.

Mr Gates, who ruffled feathers last year by suggesting that some allies were not sufficiently proficient at counter-insurgency operations, said he agreed with criticisms that some Nato members were not letting the Afghan security forces take the lead in operations, which is considered crucial for their training. But he stressed that the US also had to do a better job.

“We have tried to do a lot in terms of partnering with the Afghans and putting the Afghans out front but...we need to do more of that and particularly as they increase their numbers.”

As the Obama administration debated its Afghanistan strategy, some officials argued for a doubling of the Afghan army and police to about 400,000. Asked whether the Afghan army would need to ultimately number 400,000-500,000 soldiers – as the US counter-insurgency doctrine crafted by General David Petraeus would suggest – Mr Gates said “I don’t know the answer to that”.

“I don’t think Afghanistan can sustain an army that size, and I don’t think the international

community is prepared to pay to sustain an army that size.”

Mr Gates said the key was for the Afghans and coalition forces to regain control of the parts of the country where the Taliban is active, while trying to prevent extremists coming across the border from safe havens in Pakistan.

“At that point it seems to me that a significantly larger Afghan army than they have now, and maybe larger than 134,000, together with the Afghan national police, together with local police, should be in a position to maintain control of the country, to keep the country secure,” said Mr Gates.

Mr Gates said the campaign in Afghanistan was going to be a “multiyear undertaking”, while stressing that the US would change course if the new strategy was not working. He said the US would consider a range of benchmarks – such as how many civilians were sent to Afghanistan, or how cooperative the Pakistani government was being in tackling extremists – to measure the success of the new plan.

Mr Gates also said the US should not make capturing or killing Osama bin Laden a condition for eventually leaving Afghanistan.

“If it were up to me, I would not make that benchmark just because we have been looking for the guy for 8 years,” said Mr Gates. “I just think that that is probably not an appropriate benchmark...I mean it is going to require a lot of luck as well as hard work. And I would just as soon not have benchmarks based on things that are principally luck.”

Mr Gates said the Pentagon had not decided whether the US should send more troops to Afghanistan next year. General David McKiernan, the top US commander in Iraq, has asked for an additional 10,000 troops for 2010, but Mr Gates said it was too early to tell whether they would be necessary.

“My view is that before we add more troops, before I ask the president for more troops, let’s see how this strategy is working,” said Mr Gates.

“As you know, I am very nervous about too big an American footprint. And so I think we can take this a step at a time. We have fulfilled all of General McKiernan’s requests for 2009, so let’s see how it goes.”



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Press Advisories

No. 029-09

April 03, 2009

### Procedures To Obtain Media Access To Dignified Transfers Of Remains At Dover Air Force Base Announced

Journalists will be granted access to Dover Air Force Base, Del., to view the dignified transfer of the remains of service members returning from overseas.

This new policy is effective on April 6, 2009. Media will be notified of and permitted to view transfers when the family consents to such coverage.

Notification of dignified transfers will be sent via email as promptly as possible. Due to the expedited return of casualties from overseas and the requirement to gain family consent for media coverage, notification may often be on short notice and at all times of the day or night.

The notification email will include the date and time of the dignified transfer, the time and location media representatives will be required to meet with the AFMAO Public Affairs officer to be escorted onto Dover Air Force Base as well as the identification of the deceased service member to include name, rank, military service, home town and theater where death occurred.

Dignified transfers take place at all hours and in all weather conditions. Media members will be required to transport themselves to Dover at the place and time specified in the notification email for escort onto Dover Air Force Base. News media will be required to adhere to established ground rules at Dover Air Force Base while recording the event.

Notification of dignified transfers at Dover Air Force Base will be emailed to journalists who register with the Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations Center Public Affairs office at the following email address: AFMAO.PA@Dover.af.mil. Media representatives are required to provide the following information in their email:

- Full Name
- Media organization with which credentialed
- Email address (Note: initial and any follow up notifications will be done by email)
- Name, phone number, and email of immediate supervisor for credentialing verification

Due to space and logistic constraints at the site of the dignified transfer, if a significant number of media outlets express interest in covering the dignified transfer, media members may be required to pool coverage. AFMAO Public Affairs will notify media as early as possible if pooling will be required.



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates April 03, 2009

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Secretary Robert Gates Interview with Afghan TV

Q Thank you, Mr. Gates -- Secretary Gates, to give us the time to have an interview.

SEC. GATES: (Inaudible.)

Q Mr. Secretary, the first question I'm going to ask you about is civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The civilian casualties in Afghanistan is day-by-day increasing. And we know the people as being in an anger somehow in rural areas of Afghanistan. What do you think how does the -- (your new ?) strategy can address that problem in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think one of the ways that it will address the problem is that by having more forces partnering with Afghan forces, there will be less of a requirement for air power. Usually air power is called in when units, ours or our coalition partners or Afghan troops, get into trouble. And I think having more troops on the ground will make a difference in this.

This is a source of great concern to us. As I said when I was in Kabul last time, we are deeply, deeply regretful of any casualties, any civilian casualties. Our aim is to try and go after those who are hurting the Afghan people, the extremists and the insurgents, and they mingle with innocent people and make it very difficult sometimes.

And so what we have tried to do is change our strategy and make sure that we apologize if there's any chance that someone innocent has been hurt or killed, and make amends, and then do an investigation. So both our change in approach as well as the change in our strategy we very much hope will lead to further reductions in civilian casualties.

I think it's worth pointing out it is a great regret when there are civilian casualties, but when they are the result of our operations, they are accidental. The violent extremists kill these people -- kill innocent Afghans on purpose. 290

Q There seems to be a lack of understanding also between the U.S. military objectives and the Afghan people over there. It has been almost like eight years of conflict back there since 2001 that the Taliban regime was ousted by U.S. and its allies' forces. What needs to be done to convince the people to be more patient? And can you assure them that the end is near?

SEC. GATES: I think first of all that the new strategy, involving significant additional development assistance and a large number of civilian experts in agriculture and veterinarians and physicians and lawyers to help with governance issues, all will, hopefully, working with the Afghan government both at the national level and at the provincial and district level, show the Afghan people that their life will be better, that life will improve thanks to these international efforts. And I expect we will have significant additional resources along these lines.

It has been a long struggle. The Afghan people have suffered for a long time from people trying to tell them how to run their lives -- the Soviets and now the Taliban and the extremists. And we're there as partners with the Afghan people to help them be able to govern themselves, and without somebody from the outside telling them how to do it.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a good point, the things that happened politically are not visible to those people who are living in rural areas. The most concerning -- the big concern that the people of Afghanistan are having nowadays is about the security, which has been worsening since 2001. How you can (comfort ?) them that security will get better, because it has not been improved yet?

SEC. GATES: I think that there are two things. The most important thing is for us to help the Afghan people expand their own army and police. After all, Afghans must protect their own security, when all is said and done. And so we want to help them do that. And we are sending a lot more trainers. We are going to provide money to expand the army and the police so that they can, in partnership with us, provide better security for the Afghan people in the near term.

Ultimately, it will all be the responsibility of the Afghan army and the Afghan police. We have no desire to be in Afghanistan any longer than we have to to help Afghans make their own country secure.

Q So when will the United States forces leave Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think we will leave when the Afghan forces are strong enough to ensure security in Afghanistan itself.

Q So can you -- (inaudible) -- a definition for ensuring the security for the Afghan people, when they're going to be -- feel -- I mean, feeling secure?

SEC. GATES: Well, my hope is -- and I think that it certainly is the president's hope -- that with the additional forces we are sending in, with the additional police training that the Europeans are going to provide and with the expansion of the Afghan army, that they will begin to see an improvement in security fairly soon. That certainly is our hope.

Q Mr. Secretary, the new Obama administration policy calls for increased engagement with the people in order to overcome this trust deficit. Can you talk about some of the concrete ways the U.S. plans on overcoming this challenge in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Clearly, we want the Afghan people to trust us and to trust our coalition partners that we are there to help them, not for purposes of our own other than the same purpose that the Afghan people have, which is for Afghanistan not to be a safe haven for terrorists who kill them and want to kill us. And so we need to build the trust that we are in this together, that we are partners and that we have no objectives in Afghanistan other than helping the Afghan people secure their own country.

Q And Secretary Gates, what concerns the U.S. about Pakistan's agreements with the Pakistani Taliban in Swat Valley?

SEC. GATES: Some of the agreements in the western part of Pakistan are a concern to us. In fact, it was some of those agreements in 2006 -- 2005, 2006 that we believe led to the increase in the number of violent extremists coming across the border into Afghanistan. They no longer had to worry about Pakistani troops because of the deals were -- that were made under President Musharraf.

I think the Pakistani government is coming to understand that what is going on in western Pakistan is as great a danger to the government in Islamabad as it is to Afghanistan. And they have -- the Pakistani army has been doing a lot of fighting. A number of -- thousands of Pakistani soldiers have died in the western part of the country fighting these extremists. And one of our goals in this new strategy is to see how we can improve cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, who have a common interest in getting rid of these extremists.

Q President Obama called on Pakistan to take stronger action against insurgents and terrorism. What could the U.S. actually do to push Pakistan into a more effective policy within its territory or within its borders? 292

SEC. GATES: Well, like Afghanistan, Pakistan is a sovereign country, and so we will need to partner with them as well. What we are doing is making clear to them that we are prepared to be a long-term ally and partner of Pakistan, that we will help them deal with their security problems. We're prepared to provide gear and training to enhance their counterinsurgency capabilities there in the western part of the country.

We're also prepared to try and provide additional economic assistance to Pakistan, because they face a number of challenges in that area as well. So I think the key here is the partnership with Pakistan and the partnership with Afghanistan.

Q So, Mr. Secretary, what kind of pressure do you think U.S. would put on ISI to stop cooperating with Taliban?

SEC. GATES: The ISI's contacts with some of these extremist groups -- with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Haqqani network, Commander Nazir (sp) and others -- are a real concern to us, and we have made these concerns known directly to the Pakistanis. And we hope that they will take action to put an end to it.

Q And a question about U.S. drones. Are U.S. drones flying from Afghanistan to hit militant hideouts in Pakistan territory?

SEC. GATES: Well, I can't talk about our military operations, obviously. But the president has made clear that we will go after al Qaeda and their planning cells and their training centers, wherever they are in the world.

Q But I will ask you this question, because President Karzai has assured Pakistan that he's recognizing and-- respect the sovereignty of Pakistan, and that's why if drones are flying from Afghanistan, and if they attack Pakistan, the hideouts of Taliban (in there ?), wouldn't it be a disrespect or a disloyalty to Pakistan from President Karzai?

SEC. GATES: Well, all I can say, again, is that our priority is going after al Qaeda. And we will go after them wherever they are.

Q Secretary Gates, you have now served both Presidents Bush and Obama. Is the Obama administration less supportive of President Karzai than the previous administration? 293

SEC. GATES: The government of the United States supports the government of Afghanistan. Who is president of Afghanistan is up to the Afghan people, and whoever they elect, the United States will support and work with. Our interest is in having free and fair elections in Afghanistan.

Q In Afghanistan, it appears that the Obama administration is kind of less tolerant of Karzai government, even to being like a -- the strategy to be a little bit more tough on the President Karzai government in there?

SEC. GATES: No, I wouldn't characterize it that way. I think that -- that the U.S. government has been straightforward with the Afghan government about the need to improve governance, and particularly in the provinces and the districts; to deal with the narcotics problem; and to deal with corruption. But I would tell you that the Bush administration made those same points.

Q So about corruption, as you know, corruption is an ongoing problem in Afghanistan. President Obama has said that we cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith on their leaders. What can you tell me about a proposed regimen with the Afghan government to crack down the corruption in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: What we are trying to do and what our strategy is with respect to narcotics is really focused on the drug lords, the drug kingpins and the laboratories that provide money that support the violent extremists. And that really has been the focus of our efforts. We're less interested in individual farmers than we are those who are profiting from their efforts and supporting the extremists. So that's the focus of our strategy.

Q And the Obama administration has said it's willing to negotiate with the Taliban, with those kind of Taliban which are so-called good Taliban, or low-level Taliban. And Karzai has also said that, but Karzai has asked even Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, to come on the negotiation table. Will the Obama administration, or the U.S. administration, follow this order? Because Mullah Omar has been named as a terrorist.

SEC. GATES: Yes, I -- I don't know about Mullah Omar, but it is clear that -- to us, that there are a number of Taliban who fight mainly because they get paid, but they are not ideologically committed. They are not extremists, if you will. They do it because they get paid. And there is some hope that if there is alternative employment, if there are alternatives for some of these people, that in fact we could reconcile.

Our position has been very fundamental, though. Any reconciliation must be on the terms of the Afghan government, and has to be on terms that recognize the sovereignty of that government and its monopoly on the use of force within the country.

Q President Karzai endorsed the new Obama plan; call it more than Afghan expected. It includes 4,000 U.S. troops to help train Afghans, on the top of 17,000 new U.S. combat troops. But it also calls for contribution from other countries. Basically, what specific countries, what type of contributions can Afghanistan expect? And when will the training end?

SEC. GATES: I think that the contributions will come in several forms. First, we're asking for contributions to the NATO trust fund for sustaining Afghan National Army and police over the long term. So we're asking for money for that trust fund.

Second, we're asking them to provide particularly police trainers. The Gendarmerie, the Guardia Civil, the Carabinieri in Italy, these different European police forces have the kind of capabilities that we believe the Afghan National Police need. And I believe that you will see these European countries making some commitments to provide those kind of trainers.

A third area that we're asking for help is civilian experts -- I mentioned earlier in the -- in our interview -- people who are experts in agriculture, veterinarians, people who can help with governance and making government more effective, providing potable water and so on. And so we are asking for a substantial increase in the number of experts in these areas that can come in and actually help improve the lives of the Afghan people.

Q Mr. Secretary, about Iran role in Afghanistan, there are some reports that Iran is supporting the Taliban somehow, with money or arms, in order to undermine United States influence in that area. How will the -- (inaudible) -- United States-Iranian relationship affect U.S. strategy in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm struck by the fact that the Iranians apparently are sending a representative to the conference in The Hague, where we will be talking about assistance for Afghanistan. So I think that the Iranians are interested in good relationship with the government of Afghanistan, but there's no doubt that they also are providing at least limited support for the Taliban in an effort to create problems for the U.S. and for our coalition partners.

Q And you talked about the new strategic stresses on narcotics and drug dealers and the strategic stress on the importance of breaking the link between narcotics and the insurgency. And it's also calling for the focus to shift from farmers to drug -- to drug lords. Now, why is it important and how will it be achieved? And what's the importance of

this? Why has it not been done before? Because it was the poppy eradication file lds process going on since 2005 and 2006. But how you can -- how you can follow drug lords now? **295**

SEC. GATES: I think that we require good intelligence, which we often get from our Afghan partners in terms of finding out who these people are. It is important to identify the labs -- where are the drug labs.

The narcotics trade is a concern for two reasons: First, it provides money for the extremists. Estimates range anywhere from 70 to \$100 million a year that the extremists get, the Taliban and others get, from the drug traffic. The second concern is that the narcotics trade in Afghanistan, just like in every other country in the world, feeds corruption and undermines the legitimacy of government. And so for both of those reasons, it's important to go after this.

As far as eradication is concerned, my opinion is that unless farmers are provided with alternative means of earning a living and unless they're provided with the resources to get them through the winter, until a new crop of wheat or whatever they're growing is able to be harvested and marketed, unless you can provide the resources for those people, to make a living and support their families, crop eradication only radicalizes people. And so I think it has to be done very carefully and in a way that provides an alternative means of living for the farmer.

Q And I understand that a major component of the new narcotic strategy, in Afghanistan, involves sending dozens of drug enforcement agents to that country, to battle the drug-finance elements of the insurgency.

How will these agents be fit into Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I hadn't heard about that part of the strategy. But I'm sure that it will be to partner with the Afghan army and the Afghan police, in trying to deal with this problem, because the army has its own unit to deal with -- its own units to deal with -- the Afghan army has its own units to deal with narcotics.

Q About the American strategy towards Afghanistan, do you believe Americans are supporting the action of the government?

SEC. GATES: Yes, I do.

Americans remember that Afghanistan was dominated, ruled by the Taliban. It was a safe haven for al Qaeda, for the people who attacked this country and killed 3,000 of our citizens. And so I think Americans have continued to be supportive of our efforts, to try and help ensure that a democratically elected Afghan government is not threatened by the extremists who were once overthrown. 296

Q There are some sayings that the Americans are divided into two parts, one supporting sending troops to Afghanistan and keeping them there, and the others, that they are not supporting it.

What would it be like, one day, they should call for a stop? And what would Afghanistan do on that day?

SEC. GATES: I don't think that that's likely to happen anytime soon. I think the president has laid out a very strong strategy. I think most of the political leaders, in our country, have come out in favor of this strategy and in support of it. So I think that the Afghan people can count on the partnership and the commitment of the United States for a long time.

Q President Obama has said that after years of assistance to Pakistan, the U.S. will not provide a blank check. Pakistan must demonstrate its commitment to rooting out al Qaeda and the violent extremists in its territory.

He also talked about the use of soft power, like the pending -- (inaudible) -- legislation that links economic assistance to -- (inaudible) -- eliminating militants. But will you please talk about this two-pronged approach?

SEC. GATES: Well, clearly we want to make sure that the money we are spending, both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, is being spent to good effect and to deal with the threats to both countries. And one of the things that is new about the strategy is that we are going to create benchmarks or criteria by which to evaluate the success of the efforts that we are making, the efforts the Afghan government is making in recruiting soldiers to its army and its police, as well as the effectiveness of the Pakistanis in dealing with the problems in their western part.

Q And about Karzai asking cooperation from Russia, I'm going to ask you, like, in response to a request that Karzai made to Russia, the Russian government has said that they're willing to equip Afghan military forces or Afghan army, beside that the United States is training Afghan forces. How do you think United States will come on this (conflict/contact ?) from Russia in that time?



SEC. GATES: Russia is concerned about instability and the threat to the government of Afghanistan, as are we. They are particularly concerned by the amount of drugs coming out of Afghanistan and into Russia, which has become a problem for them. So I think they are willing to help. They are providing us with some assistance in getting our supplies into Afghanistan. So I think that they can play a constructive role here. 297

I think the real issue is the eagerness of the Afghan people and government to engage once again with the Russians. They have some long experience in that respect.

Q It wouldn't be a conflict of two different strategies, Russian strategy and U.S. strategy in Afghanistan? It wouldn't be a conflict again in there?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think if they were going to be training, clearly we would have to work together to make sure that there was consistency in the process, just as we do with our other coalition partners.

Q And one more question about the narcotics. Why do you think Helmand has been a bit -- being the second-largest producer of narcotics in Afghanistan, and there are British forces located there, why it is happening Helmand is not getting better?

SEC. GATES: Well, part of the problem is that a lot of extremists are coming across the border from Pakistan into Helmand, and security has been a big problem in Helmand. That's one of the reasons why a number of the new U.S. forces will go into Helmand, to help the British and to help the Afghan army as well down there.

I think a big reason that Helmand has been a particular problem is that it is where the Taliban had been the most entrenched, and it would be the most difficult to get them out of there.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you the last question, and it will be on Iraq. A lot -- what are the main challenges that lie ahead for Iraq to stand on its own militarily, politically and economically? And what are the key benchmarks to hit for U.S. troops to come home?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, U.S. troops are coming home. And they -- we are bringing out two additional brigades. We are down from a high of 20 brigades to -- we'll be at 12 a little later this summer. And we have to be out of the cities by the end of June this year and out of Afghanistan altogether by the end of -- out of Iraq --

Q Iraq.

SEC. GATES: -- by the end of 2011. The president has announced that all of our combat units will be out by August of 2010. So we are coming out of Iraq, and I think it's a manifestation of our confidence in the progress that has been made there.

They do have problems. They still need to get a hydrocarbon law passed in terms of sharing the revenues from their oil. There clearly are challenges ahead in terms of reconciliation. This is a brand-new democracy. But I think we were very heartened by the outcome of the provincial elections in January.

So they're making good progress. They still have some challenges ahead of them.

Q And do you think in addition to training Iraqi (forces ?) it would -- I mean, is rebuilding infrastructure a part of that equation, is also (why ??)?

SEC. GATES: Well, at this point, the Iraqis are responsible for rebuilding their infrastructure. And I think they're partnering with some Western companies, Western governments in that respect. But that's fundamentally an Iraqi responsibility at this point.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. GATES: My pleasure.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      April 06, 2009

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DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Today I'm announcing the key decisions I will recommend to the president with respect to the Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget. The president agreed to this unorthodox approach -- announcing the department's requests before the White House submits a budget to the Congress -- because of the scope and significance of the changes.

In addition, the president and I believe that the American people deserve to learn of these recommendations fully and in context, as the proposed changes are interconnected and cannot be properly communicated or understood in isolation from one another.

Collectively, they represent a budget crafted to reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment. If approved, these recommendations will profoundly reform how this department does business. In many ways, my recommendations represent a cumulative outcome of a lifetime spent in the national-security arena, but, above all, questions asked, experience gained and lessons learned from over two years of leading this department and, in particular, from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I reached the final decisions after many hours of consultations with the military and civilian leadership of the department. I have also consulted closely with the president. But I received no direction or guidance from outside this department on individual program decisions.

The Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete accord with these recommendations.

The Chairman is traveling abroad, but he has provided a statement that we will distribute at the end of the briefing, along with the text of my remarks.

My decisions have been almost exclusively influenced by factors other than simply finding a way to balance the books or fit under the top line, as is normally the case with most budget exercises. Instead these recommendations are the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs for the purpose of shifting this department in a different strategic direction.

Let me be clear. I would have made virtually all of the decisions and recommendations announced today regardless of the department's top-line budget number.

The decisions have three principal objectives:

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First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset.

Second, we must re-balance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and finance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy; meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

So first, people. With regard to the troops and their families, I will recommend that we first fully protect and properly fund the growth of military and strengthen the base budget. This means completing the growth in the Army and the Marine Corps, while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. Accomplishing this will require a nearly \$11 billion increase above the FY '09 budget level.

Second, continue the steady growth in medical research and development by requesting \$400 million more than last year.

Third, recognize the critical and permanent nature of wounded, ill and injured; traumatic brain injury; and psychological health programs. This means institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget, and increasing overall spending by \$300 million. The department will spend over \$47 billion in health care in FY '10.

And fourth, increase funding by \$200 million for improvements in childcare, spousal support, lodging and education.

Many of these programs have been funded in the past by supplementals.

We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Thus we have added money to each of these areas and all will be permanently and properly carried in the base budget. Together they represent an increase in the base budget funding of \$13 billion from last year.

Second, home for the warfighter. As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the Defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences and reward structures of America's Defense establishment -- a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern navies, armies and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect and care for the man and woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget.

Put simply, until recently, there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today's warfighter. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY '10 budget to begin this process.

First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include fielding and sustaining 50 Predator and Reaper class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY '11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from a year ago.

We will increase manned ISR capabilities such as the turboprop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of Task Force ODIN in Iraq. We will initiate and -- research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield. 301

Second, we will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to increase our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters, a capability that is in urgent demand in Afghanistan. Today the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots, so our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Third, to boost global-partnership-capacity efforts, we will increase funding by \$500 million. These initiatives include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

Fourth, to grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,800, or 5 percent, and will buy more special-forces-optimized lift mobility and refueling aircraft.

Fifth, we will increase the buy of littoral combat ships -- a key capability for presence, stability and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions -- from two to three ships in FY '10. Our goal is eventually to acquire 55 of these ships.

Sixth, to improve our inter-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of joint high-speed vessels from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

Seventh, we will stop the growth of Army brigade combat teams, BCTs, at 45 versus 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength of 547,000. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop-loss.

This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

Third, conventional and strategic modernization. Even as we begin to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current wars and other potential irregular campaigns, the United States must still contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries, from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads.

Last year's national defense strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term, given current trends. This year's budget deliberations focused on what programs are necessary to deter aggression, project power when necessary and protect our interests and allies around the globe. To this end, I will recommend new or additional investments and shifts in several key areas.

One -- first, to sustain U.S. air superiority, I am committed to building a fifth-generation tactical fighter capability that can be produced in quantity at sustainable cost. Therefore, I will recommend increasing the buy of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from the 14 aircraft bought in '09 to 30 in FY '10, with a corresponding funding increase from \$6.8 billion to \$11.2 billion. We would plan to buy 513 F-35s over the five-year defense plan, and ultimately plan to buy 2,443. For naval aviation, we will buy 31 FA-18s in FY '10.

Second, we will retire 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY '10.

Third, we will end production of the F-22 fighter at 187, representing 183 planes in the current program, plus four recommended for inclusion in the FY 2009 supplemental. 302

Fourth, to better protect our forces and those of our allies in theater from ballistic missile attack, we will add \$700 million to field more of our most capable theater missile defense systems; specifically, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD, and the Standard Missile 3 programs.

Fifth, we will add \$200 million to fund the conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic-missile-defense capabilities.

Sixth, to improve cyberspace capabilities, we will increase the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year in FY '11.

Seventh, to replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer.

Eighth, with regard to our nuclear and strategic forces, in FY '10 we will begin the replacement program for the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine program. We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement and the technology. We will examine all of our strategic requirements during the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and in light of post-START arms control negotiations.

Ninth, the healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs. We will shift the Navy aircraft carrier program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in 10 carriers after 2040.

We will delay the Navy's CG(X) next-generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy. We will delay amphibious-ship and sea-basing programs, such as the 11th landing platform dock ship and the mobile landing platform ship, to FY '11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.

Tenth, with regard to airlift, we will complete the production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s, with the 205 already in the force and currently in production.

In today's environment -- fourth, acquisition and contracting reform. In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps. First, this department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries, not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions that I am proposing accomplish this step. & nbsp;

Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs. Again, my decisions act on this principle by terminating a number of programs where the requirements were truly in the exquisite category and the technologies required were not reasonably available to affordably meet the program's costs or scheduled goals.

Third, realistically, we must estimate, realistically, program costs provide program stability for the programs we initiate, adequately staff the government acquisition team and

provide disciplined and constant oversight. We must constantly guard against so-called requirements creep, validate the maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates and demand stricter contract terms and conditions. 303

I am confident that, if we stick to these steps, we will significantly improve the performance of our defense acquisition programs. But it takes more than mere pronouncements or fancy studies or reports. It takes acting on these principles by making tough decisions and sticking to them going forward. I welcome the legislative initiative of Senators Levin and McCain to help address some of these issues, and look forward to working with the Congress in this regard.

This budget will support these goals by increasing the size of -- defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 contractors to full-time government employees and hiring 9,000 more government acquisition professionals by 2015, beginning with 4,100 in 2000 -- in FY '10.

Fully reforming defense acquisition also requires recognizing the challenges of today's battlefield and constantly changing adversary. This requires an acquisition system that can perform with greater urgency and agility. We need greater funding flexibility and the ability to streamline our requirements and acquisition-execution procedures.

The perennial procurement and contracting cycle, going back many decades, of adding layer and layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build, must come to an end. There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies, enough hand-wringing, enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action. First, I recommend that we terminate the VH-71 presidential helicopter. This program was originally designed to provide 23 helicopters to support the president, at a cost of \$6-1/2 billion. Today, the program is estimated to cost over \$13 billion, has fallen six years behind schedule and runs the risk of not delivering the requested capability.

Some have suggested that we should adjust the program by buying only the lower-capability Increment 1 option. I believe this is neither advisable nor affordable. Increment 1 helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five to 10-year useful life. This compares to the current VH-3 presidential helicopters, that are 30 to 40 years old. We will promptly develop options for an FY '11 follow-on program.

Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with a single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

Third, we will terminate the \$26 billion transformational satellite program, TSAT, and instead will purchase two more advanced extremely high-frequency satellites as alternatives.

Fourth, in the area of missile defense, we will restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska, as had been planned, but we will continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats, a threat North Korea's missile launch this past weekend reminds us is real.

We will cancel the second Airborne Laser Prototype Aircraft. We'll keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems, and the program's proposed operational role is highly

questionable. We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. 304

Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.4 billion.

Fifth, in this request we will include funds to complete the buy of two Navy destroyers in FY '10. These plans depend on being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at the Bath Iron Works in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis destroyer program at Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. Even if the arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the third ship, and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.

If our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51.

If the department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.

Sixth and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army's Future Combat Systems program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades.

However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I'm also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles -- where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency and greater information awareness are expected to compensate for less armor -- do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close-quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The current vehicle program developed nine years ago does not include a role for our recent \$25-billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

Further, I am troubled by the terms of the contract, particularly in its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over \$87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.

Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, reevaluate the requirements, technology and approach and then re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process.

An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But, because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.

A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated: Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support-service contractors from our current 39 percent of the Pentagon workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY '10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years.

So these are the principal recommendations I will make to the president. There are a number of others that I have not mentioned, including classified programs. This is a reform



budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world now and in the future. 305

I know that in the coming weeks we will hear a great deal about threats and risk and danger to our country and to our men and women in uniform, associated with different budget choices.

Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitively belies that claim.

But it is important to remember that every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

As I told the Congress in January, this budget represents an opportunity; one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity, to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements, those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead; an opportunity to truly reform the way we do business.

I will close by noting that it is one thing to speak generally about the need for budget discipline and acquisition and contract reform; it is quite another to make tough choices about specific systems and Defense priorities based solely on the national interest and then stick to those decisions over time.

To do this, the president and I look forward to working with the Congress, industry and many others to accomplish what is in the best interest of the nation as a whole.

General?

GEN. JAMES CARTWRIGHT (USMC, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff): Thanks, Mr. Secretary.

As we went through this evolution of developing our program, at each step in the way, we looked at each other and tried to understand why now and why these choices.

And the belief from the commanders and the service chiefs is that we at a crossroads. We have under our belt the experiences of 9/11, the war in Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, the emergence of things like cyber, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We all believed that we need the capabilities to prevent conflict or conclude it on terms that are favorable to the nation, now and in the 21st century. This submission represents the best balance of the most likely conflicts and the most dangerous conflicts we will face. It has been informed by the warfighters, and the challenges they face today and are likely to face as we move to the future.

No one's crystal ball is perfect, but I, as a warfighter, believe if we don't change, history will not judge us kindly.

SEC. GATES: Ann?

Q I expect the e-mails are already coming out from Congress complaining about cuts to programs that various lawmakers support.

A question for both of you. Do you feel like you're walking into a buzz saw here? And do you assume that certain parts of this " budget program" are basically DOA? 306

SEC. GATES: Well, there's no question that a lot of these decisions will be controversial. My hope is that, as we have tried to do here in this building, that the members of Congress will rise above parochial interests and consider what is in the best interest of the nation as a whole

I set out here to develop a budget and a program, really, that I thought best served the national security interests of the United States. And I, frankly, decided that I would not take the political issues associated with any of these programs into account; I would just do what I thought was best for the country. And my hope is that in the months ahead, that, first, the president will approve this budget, and then second, that the Congress, after careful deliberation, will support as much of it as possible.

Q Can you tell us a little bit more, Mr. Secretary, about the analysis that went into these decisions? Even over the weekend there was some criticism that such bold decisions before the QDR, before this top-to-bottom review, perhaps don't have the analytical framework that would be required Can you give us sort of the 1-2 about how this all was put together?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that there is a very sound analytical basis for these decisions because they emanate directly from the National Defense Strategy, which involved a great deal of analysis on the part of both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs. So there is a strong analytical base.

There are a number of decisions -- a number of these programs that I described as being delayed in many cases are in fact going to be programs that are examined in the QDR to see whether there is a -- what the need is going forward. I mentioned that with respect to our nuclear and strategic delivery capabilities, particularly a follow-on bomber. I mentioned it in terms of our amphibious capability. There's a list out -- that came out of this exercise of probably 10 or a dozen or more major issues that will be examined in the QDR.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think also the work of the past few years associated with the conflicts that we have in Iraq and Afghanistan, this department and the DNI have undertaken several analytic efforts, the operational availability effort inside the department, that starts to get at what Joint Forces Command has developed as a robust lessons-learned system, taking those lessons learned, putting them in an analytic framework and then working with them.

On the intelligence side, the work that we've done with operational research analysts out in the field on our ISR systems, not just the platforms but how we move data and how we inform warfighters inside of decision cycles, these analytic pieces make this as quantitative as ever I have seen in one of these budget developments.

Q The F-22 decision is going to get scrutinized now that your budget has emerged from the shadows, so to speak. Can you give a sense of whether this was a close call or a no-brainer, in one -- and why couldn't you have bought more? Why wouldn't it fill the role that the Joint Strike Fighter will be filling that you outlined?

SEC. GATES: For me, it was not a close call. And the basic conclusion was that, first of all, we have fulfilled the program. I mean, it's not like we're killing the F-22. We will have 187 of them. That has -- the 183 of that has been the program of record, as I recall, since 2005. So we are completing the F-22 program. And the military advice that I got was that there is no military requirement for numbers of F-22s beyond the 187.

Q What about the Air Force advice? They've been badgering you with all sorts of analysis that they need 60 more.

SEC. GATES: That was their advice as well.

Q Excuse me. It was their advice as well that --

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q -- that you didn't need more than 187?

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q Really? Okay.

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could ask you to elaborate on one of the things you talked about and clarify a couple of other things. The \$500 million to increase rotorcraft capabilities -- how's that money going to be spent? Is that -- is that for procurement or is that all crew training? And then I'd like to ask you two other things, please.

SEC. GATES: Well, one question to a customer.

First of all, one of the things that I was most focused on going into this exercise was the need for more helicopters. Everywhere I go, I hear about the need for more helicopters. What became clear in the analysis that was being done was that the principal shortfall was not in air frames, but in crews. And so, as I recall, virtually all of this money or most of it is going to go to accelerate the training of helicopter crews and pilots.

Q They'll be for the Army?

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q Then, just -- did I understand correctly that you want to restart the presidential helicopter competition, write new requirements, or --

SEC. GATES: Yes. We will -- we need -- there needs to be a new presidential helicopter. There's still good service life left in the ones that are in the fleet right now. So we have time to do this. And so we will begin a review of the requirements with the White House as soon as the FY '10 budget is submitted.

Q On CSAR-X, is that the same case? Will you --

SEC. GATES: We will -- we are cancelling the Air Force program. We will look at whether there is a requirement for a specialized search and rescue aircraft along the lines that the Air Force had in mind and whether it should be a joint capability.

Q Mr. Secretary? You said before this you tried not to allow political considerations, especially from the Hill, to weigh into this calculus.

That said, last time you spoke at this same venue, you talked about the Pentagon's role as a major employer in the country, as a major acquirer in the country. Given the current economic conditions, did you have any hesitation recommending program cancellations, given the job loss that they'll almost certainly -- result from those decisions?

SEC. GATES: No, because as I mentioned -- I mean, I am concerned for the possibility that these decisions will have an impact on individual companies and workers around the

country. By the same token, as I indicated, there are a number of these programs where we will see increases in the program. 308

And let me just give you an example. One of the concerns is particularly with respect to the F-22. Well, employment -- direct employment, according to the numbers that are available to us on the F-22, is about 24,000 this year. It'll decline to 19,000 in '10 and about 13,000 in FY '11. The last F-22 rolls off the line toward the end of 2011.

But the joint strike fighter, the F-35, in '09, already has 38,000 people working in direct employment. It will go to 64,000 in FY '10 and 82,000 in FY '11. So -- and these decisions on shipbuilding, I think, do a pretty good job -- I think -- of taking care of the industrial base there and trying to even out things in terms of employment and the workforce.

But -- so -- you know, we cannot be oblivious to the consequences of these decisions. But nonetheless, we have to make them as a whole in terms of what's in the best interest of the country.

Q Dr. Gates, you famously complained about next-war-itis. Does this proposal cure this building of next-war-itis? And if so, how?

SEC. GATES: Well, it certainly doesn't cure it. That may be incurable.

I mean, the reality is that -- and let me put this very crudely -- if you broke this budget out, it would probably be about 10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities.

So this is not about irregular warfare putting the conventional capabilities in the shade. Quite the contrary: this is just a matter -- for me, at least -- of having the irregular-war constituency have a -- have a seat at the table for the first time when it comes to the base budget.

Q As far as ground-based missile defense, it sounds like no more interceptors. ABL, you cut it off at the present experimental plane. There will not be a second tail in the buy. What about European missile defense, kinetic-energy interceptor and PAC-3s?

SEC. GATES: First -- well, why don't you go ahead and take that one?

(Laughter.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: See if we can start it backwards, anyway. Try the math here.  
(Laughter.)

PAC-3 is in production and continuing to be in production, so that system's working. The SM-3 and the THAAD are coming out of their testing and are moving towards full-rate production. We need those assets. You can see just in the past weekend the value of THAAD and having its system.

For the third site and the Ground-Based Interceptor at the third site, the discussion right now is that there is sufficient funds in '09 that can be carried forward to do all of the work that we need to do at a pace that we'll determine as we go through the program review, the quadrennial defense review, and negotiations with those countries.

Q On KEI, what is happening there?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The Kinetic Energy Interceptor? Looking at the boost phase is going to be an area that we're going to do more R&D. Clearly, there is great leverage in working in

missile defense in the boost phase, because you catch it before you have the sophisticated threats or capabilities that might emerge, decoys and things like that. But we've got to figure out what the right way forward is, what the right balance is between the mid-course and the terminal. We've got now a good mid-course. We've got a good terminal capability. What do we need in the boost phase? What kind of attributes does it have for mobility and location, etcetera? Those are the things that we've got to understand before we go any further with the boost phase.

Q Is that the only one --

Q What's your latest thinking on how to break this political logjam that's holding up the Air Force's acquisition of aerial refueling aircraft? You say you want to go ahead and solicit big this summer, but there's movements in Congress -- there's movement in Congress to split up the buy. You've opposed it in the past. What's your latest thinking?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've had conversations with Congressman Murtha. We've talked about it. I obviously have a lot of respect for him. I still believe that it is not the best deal for the taxpayer, to go with a split buy. I think the only reason people are pursuing the idea of a split buy is -- is that they think it's the only way that we can move forward in getting any kind of a tanker; that the competitors will be in such a place with respect to Capitol Hill that we just won't be able to move forward. My view is that if we do this right, if we structure this fairly and we carry out the process by our own rules, the way we're supposed to, that even if there's a protest, there's no assurance that that protest would be upheld by the GAO. After all, in the last time we went through this, the GAO examined about 110 different items in the contract, and found problems with, I think, eight.

So if we do this right, there's no reason a protest would be upheld, and we could move forward with the -- with an approach that is the best deal for the taxpayer and also the best deal for the Air Force in terms of not having to maintain dual logistics trains, dual training systems, dual maintenance, all the things that go along with them.

Q And how do you look at the idea of acquiring them more quickly? Murtha's proposal is to double to 24, I think, a year, the number that would be purchased. Is that consistent with your --

SEC. GATES: Well, we could do that with one tanker, too.

Q Yeah, we sure can. Is that consistent with your thinking to what might be --

SEC. GATES: I would be very happy to look at accelerating the build if -- along those lines.

Q You mentioned that you only looked at threats, not politics. If North Korea's missile test had been more successful, how would it have changed your view on this budget, specifically with missile defense?

SEC. GATES: It actually would not have changed it at all. I think that, as General Cartwright said, we had -- for the terminal phase we had the THAAD missiles in Hawaii, prepared to protect Hawaii. And if we had -- if it had been a -- an intercontinental ballistic missile, the ground-based interceptors in Alaska could have taken care of that challenge as well.

So I think we have in place, as the -- as the general said, we're in a pretty good place in terms of -- with respect to the rogue missile -- rogue country missile threat, in terms of the ground -- in terms of midcourse and terminal phase. What we're looking at and doing -- continuing the R&D on is the boost phase.

Q Mr. Secretary, two items on missile defense. You mentioned the issue about threats, focusing on threats. MDA has consistently said that they see a threat of multiple incoming warheads around the middle of the next decade, 2015-ish. Does the termination of MKV call that threat assessment into question? And then I have a follow-up as well, on ABL.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think it acknowledges the fact that the threat will evolve and become challenging. But it also acknowledges the fact that there's probably greater leverage in the boost phase to go after that type of threat than trying to address it individually in either the midcourse or the terminal phases.

Q Okay. So then along the lines of ABL, the issue of poor program execution being one of the main criteria for getting the program killed, ABL's a classic non-execution program. What saved the ABL? And is this a stay of execution until the QDR, or do you expect to really make that into a serious program later in the year?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Well, the key attribute of ABL is that it's directed energy. And so if it's in the right place at the right time, it has the capability of catching an -- I'm sorry -- ICBM in the boost phase. Okay.

But it is kind of at the rudimentary level of our understanding of directed energy.

It is what we have today. It needs to go further. We need to worry on -- work on weight and power and cost, and work off the risks of that technology. It was our judgment that this technology needs to continue in the R&D phase but it is not ready for production.

Q I was going to ask you about -- if you have any estimates about the overall cost savings down the road for these decisions, what the impact will be. And for both of you on North Korea: Do we see this weekend's launch as a significant improvement in their capabilities, or we have any indication that this launch was, as you said, as NORTHCOM said, came up short, I mean that the missile will actually explode in air?

SEC. GATES: Well, in terms of the cost savings across the FYDP, we will have to -- as I said, there are a number of other decisions, including classified programs, that I've made that I have not talked about here today. We will have to sit down with all of those. We only handed these decisions to the comptroller last Thursday, and so a lot of this work now has to be done in detail to get the detailed budget to OMB. And I think only when we've done that and they've completed their work and sent the budget to the Hill will we be in a position with some clarity to talk about how much we have either saved or how much more is involved in the Five-year Defense Plan.

Q On North Korea?

SEC. GATES: North Korea.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: There's two things that we look at on the North Korean missile. One is their ability to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying a weapon of mass destruction, and the second is their desire to potentially proliferate that and sell it around the world.

On the first, the technology they were seeking after the first two failures was the ability to stage; in other words, transition from one stage of boost to the next. They failed. On the idea of proliferation, would you buy from somebody that had failed three times in a row and never been successful?

(Laughter.)

Q On the destroyer, Mr. Secretary, it sounds like you've put the ball in the industry's court. Could you say in a little more detail what's going to constitute the success they need to achieve to get to the whole three-ship --

SEC. GATES: Well, I haven't -- I mean, other than the broad decision, I haven't been involved in detail, and certainly haven't talked to the contractors. But the people here in the building believe that building individual prototypes in two different shipyards with one-offs is about as inefficient and cost-ineffective an approach as you can have. So if you can put all three of these ships in one shipyard, then we think that the cost, actually, of all three would not be -- it would be greater than two being built separately, but not at the equivalent of a -- the third would not be as expensive as either of the two -- first two prototypes.

So we think that from a shipbuilding standpoint, that having all three built by the same company in the same shipyard would lead to a much more efficient and cost-effective approach.

That said, if we do that, as I indicated in my remarks, we would then -- this is also contingent on seeing if we can smoothly restart the DDG-51 program in Pascagoula.

Q If I heard you right the first time. You -- on missile defense, with all these changes that you're making right now, do you foresee the regular missile defense acquisition going back into the regular acquisition process, or will those programs still be having their own special form of buying things?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The intent will be -- what the powers are that we gave to missile defense, MDA, in order to move forward was the ability to focus in a very narrow area, in this case ballistic missiles, long-range ballistic missiles, and to keep that focus in the program and allow them to move forward and to let that be the site of the requirements that they worked against. That won't change. Keeping that focus has really served us well.

Q What will change?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: What will change is we're going to start to shift and understand in that first phase what the leverage and potential opportunities are in the boost phase, focus on the threats. Remember, the idea here was protect the homeland, then protect allies, deployed forces and friends. We're going to focus on our deployed forces, our allies and friends.

So the systems that are considered operational -- SM-3, THAAD, Patriot -- building them out in quantity so that we can deploy them and move forward quickly there while we start to reassess what it is we can do in the boost phase for long range.

Q Mr. Secretary --

SEC. GATES: And I just -- and I would just underscore that if there is a shift of emphasis here, it is sustaining the work that is going on with the ground-based interceptors in Alaska and the continuing R&D and effort to improve those capabilities over time.

But we are adding a significant amount of money in terms of trying to provide tactical or theater missile defense. We are basically maxing out the production lines for the SM-3 and the THAAD. We are -- as I indicated, we're going to convert six additional Aegis ships to have ballistic missile defense. So I think that's a real focus here.

Q Secretary Gates, the South Korean prime minister this morning said that South Korea may need to start developing long-range missiles, and the Japanese have talked about developing a preemptive capability. Are you concerned about a new arms race in Asia?

And if I can ask General Cartwright, did the second stage and the third stage of the rocket fall into the same place in the Pacific?

SEC. GATES: You know, one of the -- one of the questions that it has seemed to me that both North Korea and Iran ought to consider as they go forward with their missile and nuclear programs is whether those programs actually, in the long run, enhance their security or detract from it.

And the reality is, in both cases, that if they spark a -- an arms race on the part of their neighbors because they feel threatened, then I would submit that their security has not been improved, but has diminished. And I think that's an aspect of this that they ought to think very carefully about.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Relative to the second and third stages, we're still going through the data, but what fell to Earth wouldn't resemble second and third stages anyway. I mean, it --

Q (Off mike)?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: We can't tell how much, but they're very close together.

Q Secretary? Secretary Gates, I understand that in this budget you have included some military assistance for Mexico to fight the war down south, the border. Can you explain about this support?

And I understand also that, by -- the first time, the military -- (off mike) -- is going to participate with military forces from U.S. -- (off mike) -- exercises.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I'm sorry, I couldn't catch the last part.

Q I understand there's going to be -- Mexico, by the first time in the history, is going to take part in some military exercises in Florida, as I understand.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Right. I just hosted my counterparts in the Mexican military last week up here. We worked through several areas where we're going to start to cooperate in ways that we have not done in the past, both at the service level, for training, and then at the operational level, with the Commander of NORTHCOM, for support in the drug conflicts that they're working their way through, but also for general support in their ability to defend their country. I think that that will be more robust than it has been in the past, by a significant amount.

The work that the service chiefs are doing -- service to service -- is very significant, both in helping their government -- the Mexican government -- grow their forces, but also make this transition towards what we have talked about here as being irregular warfare and in the training and the equipping that goes with that, which they need some help with.

Q The F-35 -- you know, you talk on the one hand about wanting to reform that position process, but in accelerating that, didn't the GAO warn recently that you'd be getting ahead of the testing on that and that that would put that program more at risk, to accelerate it?

SEC. GATES: Actually, what we've done, while we're increasing the buy, we have taken a more cautious approach to the ramping-up of production over the course of the next five years. So we actually, in the five -- I think I mentioned 513 aircraft by the end of the five-year defense plan. That's actually, I think, several dozen aircraft fewer than the original planned buy.



We have tried to do this in a way that keeps the numbers at a level that the cost to our allies and partners in this program do not go up. And so we are very mindful of the risk of rushing too fast to large-scale production. I don't think people feel concerned about that, going from 14 to 30.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Also, part of the increase is to buy more test articles, so there'd be more aircraft available for the test program.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that this reform was based on lessons learned in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, and that you're concerned about under-investment which could lead to potential vulnerabilities. Based on that, do you believe that the president achieved -- or that he could with our allies in Europe, specifically NATO -- putting enough troops and money to help us in terms of winning the war in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Actually, I think that what came out of -- what came out of the NATO summit in terms of commitments was for me a pleasant surprise. I have believed for some time that there was not much likelihood of a significant increase in the number of troops, and I took the approach in Krakow that what we were really interested in with the other defense ministers was civilian expertise and paramilitary police trainers. And so for the Europeans to have pledged an additional 3,000 or so troops plus the trainers I think was a significant achievement. I think there were some major commitments made in terms of the NATO trust fund to sustain the Afghan force. So I think that the -- I think the summit was actually more successful than I expected in what we were able to get.

Q Sir, what you have mentioned all favor a growth -- well, going from 48 to 45 Army DCTs, and you talked about the benefits, such as that would reduce the use of stop-loss. Are there trade-offs, such as does it possibly delay the Army's plan to increase dwell time?

SEC. GATES: I don't think it will. And, I mean, we talked about this a lot, and I think, you know, I would be -- I think the Army does have some concerns about this, but there's a fundamental logic for me in this process. If you have -- the Army has trouble filling some of the units that they already have, in terms of deployments. They have problems with dwell, and they have problems in terms of the number of people not available to be deployed. It seems to me that if you keep expanding the force structure, with the same number of people, you're going to get thinner in the ranks. And it seemed to me that at least as an intermediate stage, let's stop at 45; thicken the ranks; make sure these units have the people that are needed to deploy, along with all those that are out training and doing other things.

At some point, perhaps the Army would resume the increase in the force structure, especially if they got more people, or if they got more people out of the institutional Army or out of the categories of people who are individually assigned and so on.

So, you know, I'm not saying that that's where the force structure will stay forever, but it seems to me that until we get rid of stop-loss, until we get these ranks thickened, that it makes sense to stop at 45.

STAFF: Mr. Secretary, you probably have time for one more, maybe.

Q Sir, I'm wondering, aside from the Air Force, which was -- which you discussed last year, regarding the nuclear enterprise, I'm wondering what changes will be reflected in the budget dealing with changes you're making to nuclear oversight or stewardship across the DOD enterprise based on the recommendations of the Schlesinger task force's -- report?



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### Defense Budget Recommendation Statement (Arlington, VA)

As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, April 06, 2009

Today, I am announcing the key decisions I will recommend to the president with respect to the fiscal year 2010 defense budget. The president agreed to this unorthodox approach – announcing the department's request before the White House submits a budget to the Congress – because of the scope and significance of the changes. In addition, the president and I believe that the American people deserve to learn of these recommendations fully and in context, as the proposed changes are interconnected and cannot be properly communicated or understood in isolation from one another. Collectively, they represent a budget crafted to reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment. If approved, these recommendations will profoundly reform how this department does business.

In many ways, my recommendations represent the cumulative outcome of a lifetime spent in the national security arena and, above all, questions asked, experience gained, and lessons learned from over two years of leading this department – and, in particular, from our experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. I reached the final decisions after many hours of consultations with the military and civilian leadership of the department. I have also consulted closely with the president. But, I received no direction or guidance from outside this department on individual program decisions. The chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete accord with these recommendations. The chairman is traveling abroad but he has provided a statement that we will distribute at the end of the briefing.

My decisions have been almost exclusively influenced by factors other than simply finding a way to balance the books or fit under the "top line" – as is normally the case with most budget exercises. Instead, these recommendations are the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs for the purpose of shifting this department in a different strategic direction. Let me be clear: I would have made virtually all of the decisions and recommendations announced today regardless of the department's top line budget number.

The decisions have three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset;
- Second, we must rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.
- Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

With regard to the troops and their families, I will recommend that we:

1. Fully protect and properly fund the growth in military end strength in the base budget. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and the Navy. Accomplishing this will require a nearly \$11 billion increase above the FY09 budget level.
2. Continue the steady growth in medical research and development by requesting \$400 million more than last year.
3. Recognize the critical and permanent nature of wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs. This means institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget and increasing overall spending by \$300 million. The department will spend over \$47 billion on healthcare in FY10.
4. Increase funding by \$200 million for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education. Many of these programs have been funded in the past by supplementals. We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Thus, we have added money to each of these areas and all will be permanently and properly carried in the base defense budget. Together they represent an increase in base budget funding of \$13 billion from last year.

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Programs to directly support, protect, and care for the man or woman at the front have been developed ad hoc and funded outside the base budget. Put simply, until recently there has not been an institutional home in the Defense Department for today's warfighter. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. I intend to use the FY10 budget to begin this process.

1. First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include:

- Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago.

- Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq.

- Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

2. We will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to increase our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters – a capability that is in urgent demand in Afghanistan. Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

3. To boost global partnership capacity efforts, we will increase funding by \$500 million. These initiatives include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counter terrorism and stability operations.

4. To grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,800 or five percent and will buy more special forces-optimized lift, mobility, and refueling aircraft.

We will increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY 2010. Our goal is to eventually acquire 55 of these ships.

5. To improve our inter-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) ships from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

6. We will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) at 45 versus 48 while maintaining the planned increase in end strength of 547,000. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

Even as we begin to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current wars and other potential irregular campaigns, the United States must still contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads. Last year's National Defense Strategy concluded that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. This year's budget deliberations focused on what programs are necessary to deter aggression, project power when necessary, and protect our interests and allies around the globe. To this end, I will recommend new or additional investments and shifts in several key areas:

1. To sustain U.S. air superiority, I am committed to building a fifth generation tactical fighter capability that can be produced in quantity at sustainable cost. Therefore, I will recommend increasing the buy of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter from the 14 aircraft bought in FY09 to 30 in FY10, with corresponding funding increases from \$6.8 billion to \$11.2 billion. We would plan to buy 513 F-35s over the five-year defense plan, and, ultimately, plan to buy 2,443. For naval aviation, we will buy 31 FA-18s in FY10.

2. We will retire 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10.

3. We will end production of the F-22 fighter at 187 – representing 183 planes plus four recommended for inclusion in the FY 2009 supplemental.

4. To better protect our forces and those of our allies in theater from ballistic missile attack, we will add \$700 million to field more of our most capable theater missile defense systems, specifically the terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) System and Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) programs.

5. We will also add \$200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities.

6. To improve cyberspace capabilities, we will increase the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by FY11.

7. To replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial re-fueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer.

8. With regard to our nuclear and strategic forces:

- In FY10, we will begin the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine program.

- We will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology.

- We will examine all of our strategic requirements during the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and in light of Post-START arms control negotiations.

9. The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several major surface combatants and other maritime programs.

- We will shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a five-year build cycle placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in 10 carriers after 2040.

- We will delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy.

- We will delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) SHIP to FY11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.

10. With regard to air lift, we will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production.

In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I believe this needed reform requires three fundamental steps.

First, this department must consistently demonstrate the commitment and leadership to stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. Our conventional modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries – not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. I believe the decisions I am proposing accomplish this step.

Second, we must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the department to successfully execute the programs. Again, my decisions act on this principle by terminating a number of programs where the requirements were truly in the “exquisite” category and the technologies required were not reasonably available to affordably meet the programs’ cost or schedule goals.

Third, realistically estimate program costs, provide budget stability for the programs we initiate, adequately staff the government acquisition team, and provide disciplined and constant oversight.

We must constantly guard against so-called “requirements creep,” validate the maturity of technology at milestones, fund programs to independent cost estimates, and demand stricter contract terms and conditions. I am confident that if we stick to these steps, we will significantly improve the performance of our defense acquisition programs. But it takes more than mere pronouncements or fancy studies or reports. It takes acting on these principles by making tough decisions and sticking to them going forward.

I welcome the legislative initiative of Senators Levin and McCain to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with the Congress in this regard.

This budget will support these goals by increasing the size of defense acquisition workforce, converting 11,000 contractors and hiring an additional 9,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 – beginning with 4,100 in FY10.

Fully reforming defense acquisition also requires recognizing the challenges of today’s battlefield and constantly changing adversary. This requires an acquisition system that can perform with greater urgency and agility. We need greater funding flexibility and the ability to streamline our requirements and acquisition execution procedures.

The perennial procurement and contracting cycle – going back many decades – of adding layer upon layer of cost and complexity onto fewer and fewer platforms that take longer and longer to build must come to an end. There is broad agreement on the need for acquisition and contracting reform in the Department of Defense. There have been enough studies. Enough hand-wringing. Enough rhetoric. Now is the time for action.

First, I recommend that we terminate the VH-71 presidential helicopter:

- This program was originally designed to provide 23 helicopters to support the president at a cost of \$6.5 billion. Today, the program is estimated to cost over \$13 billion, has fallen six years behind schedule, and runs the risk of not delivering the requested capability.

- Some have suggested that we should adjust the program by buying only the lower capability “increment one” option. I believe this is neither advisable nor affordable. Increment One helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five- to 10-year useful life. This compares to the current VH-3 presidential helicopters that are 30 to 40 years old.

- We will promptly develop options for an FY11 follow-on program.

Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

Third, we will terminate the \$26 billion Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, and instead will purchase two more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites as alternatives.

Fourth, in the area of missile defense:

- We will restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat.
- We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund continued research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – a threat North Korea’s missile launch this past weekend reminds us is real.

- We will cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable.

- We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement.

- Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.4 billion.

Fifth, in this request, we will include funds to complete the buy of two navy destroyers in FY10. These plans depend on being able to work out contracts to allow the Navy to efficiently build all three DDG-1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine and to smoothly restart the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program at Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. Even if these arrangements work out, the DDG-1000 program would end with the third ship and the DDG-51 would continue to be built in both yards.

If our efforts with industry are unsuccessful, the department will likely build only a single prototype DDG-1000 at Bath and then review our options for restarting production of the DDG-51. If the department is left to pursue this alternative, it would unfortunately reduce our overall procurement of ships and cut workload in both shipyards.

Sixth, and finally, we will significantly restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. We will retain and accelerate the initial increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades. However, I have concluded that there are significant unanswered questions concerning the FCS vehicle design strategy. I am also concerned that, despite some adjustments, the FCS vehicles – where lower weight, higher fuel efficiency, and greater informational

awareness are expected to compensate for less armor – do not adequately reflect the lessons of counterinsurgency and close quarters combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current vehicle program, developed nine years ago, does not include a role for our recent \$25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

Further, I am troubled by the terms of the current contract, particularly its very unattractive fee structure that gives the government little leverage to promote cost efficiency. Because the vehicle part of the FCS program is currently estimated to cost over \$87 billion, I believe we must have more confidence in the program strategy, requirements, and maturity of the technologies before proceeding further.

Accordingly, I will recommend that we cancel the vehicle component of the current FCS program, re-evaluate the requirements, technology, and approach – and then re-launch the Army's vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process. An Army vehicle modernization program designed to meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict is essential. But because of its size and importance, we must get the acquisition right, even at the cost of delay.

A final recommendation that will have a significant impact on how defense organizations are staffed and operated. Under this budget request, we will reduce the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replace them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,000 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 30,000 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years.

So these are the principal recommendations I will make to the president. There are a number of others that I have not mentioned, including classified programs. This is a reform budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future. I know that in the coming weeks we will hear a great deal about threats, and risk and danger – to our country and to our men and women in uniform – associated with different budget choices. Some will say I am too focused on the wars we are in and not enough on future threats. The allocation of dollars in this budget definitely belies that claim. But, it is important to remember that every defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk – or, in effect, to “run up the score” in a capability where the United States is already dominant – is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take.

As I told the Congress in January, this budget presents an opportunity – one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity; to critically and ruthlessly separate appetites from real requirements – those things that are desirable in a perfect world from those things that are truly needed in light of the threats America faces and the missions we are likely to undertake in the years ahead. An opportunity to truly reform the way we do business.

I will close by noting that it is one thing to speak generally about the need for budget discipline and acquisition and contract reform. It is quite another to make tough choices about specific systems and defense priorities based solely on the national interest and then stick to those decisions over time. To do this, the president and I look forward to working with the Congress, industry, and many others to accomplish what is in the best interest of our nation as a whole.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright

April 07,  
2009

### Media Roundtable with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Selected Reporters

SEC. GATES: A couple of things to lead off. The announcements that I made yesterday are basically an outgrowth of the positions that I have been taking in speeches for the last 18 months and that in many respects were codified -- many aspects of the themes yesterday were codified in the national defense strategy last fall that we issued. So, there is continuity here. These are principles or approaches and problems that I've been talking about almost ever since I got this job.

This process will continue. There were a number of issues that -- as we look at the full range of programs, that I didn't feel I had enough analysis and understanding to make decisions, and so I delayed programs in most cases either because -- to allow the technology to mature a little more, or so that we could review them in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. And then those -- that work will then contribute to shaping the FY '11 budget.

I guess the only other thing I would say is that, as I indicated yesterday, all of this debate and discussion and the decisions that were made really emanated entirely from within this building. There was -- I got no outside steers or direction or guidance.

I reviewed -- I told -- I got the president's agreement some weeks ago to go out with this package of -- with a package of changes before the budget was actually submitted to the -- to the Congress. And I explained why, as I did yesterday, in terms of wanting to put it all in a context. But, having gotten that approval from him to take this unorthodox approach some weeks ago, I actually only reviewed where I was headed on these programs with him for the first time a week ago yesterday. So this really has all come from within this building.

And so with those two points, I'll stop and let you start.

Q You mentioned the advice you got on the F-22 said no military requirement for more than 187. I'm curious, was that mainly a COCOM requirement, or was that an Air Force requirement?

SEC. GATES: It was both, as I recall.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I mean, the COCOM side of the equation was the need for that capability, that generation of capability, against a limited number of threats. And the time and the urgency and the scenarios were, in fact, limited, I mean, for utility and also tended to span the gap between the aircraft that we have today, which are very capable, and the emergence of the F-35.

And so the question here is -- they don't do the same thing, but the pairing of the F-35 and the F-22 gives you something that is significantly better than the pairing of the F-22 and, let's say, the F-18, F-16, F-15 crowd.

And so if we can get numbers in one, and the niche capabilities that the F-22 brings that the F-35 may not have as -- quite as good a qualitative advantage in, then modeling tells us that, against the threats that we believe we have today and the threats that we believe will emerge in the future, that that mix -- numbers in the F-35 and the qualitative edge of certain -- in certain areas of the F-22 -- that was the mix that came out.

Q As recently as a few weeks ago, Air Force leadership was still publicly saying 260, 265. When did that change for them?

SEC. GATES: Well, you'll have to ask them. (Chuckles.)

Q That 250 announcement of the tactical fighter retirements in fiscal '20 alone. Is that assuming you're going to take some risks in, like, 2010 through 2014 before you get JFCS numbers?

SEC. GATES: No. The analysis that we were shown indicated that we had -- in tac air, with all of the different kinds of aircraft we had, that what -- that the force that we had was significantly excess -- or not significantly -- was excess to the requirement. And therefore, the Air Force -- this was actually an Air Force recommendation, to take 250 -- and I think they're mostly F-16s --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah.

SEC. GATES: -- out of the force.

Q (Off mike) -- that we've heard about, is that --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Well, the --

Q (Inaudible.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: No. It was also an acknowledgment, though, that the Predator has come online. The Reapers are beginning to come online. And they're starting to supplant some of that mission space. And heretofore, they were not included in the analytic side of the mission space that the F-16, F-15, F-15E were occupying.

And now you start to bring that capability on, and particularly with the Reaper, it's just an incredibly capable platform. And given that the conflicts that we're in and likely to be in for the next couple of years are conflicts in which being on station for extended periods of time, not delivering maximum loads every sortie, those platforms really do, in fact, give you a qualitative edge.

SEC. GATES: These UAVs are a new piece of the equation, it seems to me, in terms of their capabilities. It's not just Predators doing strikes. It is long distances, long dwell. And that -- if I recall correctly, an F-16 has a range of about 500 miles. The Reaper has a range of about 3,000 miles. And so this is, I think, going to be an increasing part of the Air Force arsenal going forward.

I would just add, in terms of kind of looking at tac air and the -- and the ramp on the F-35, the intelligence that I've gotten indicates that the first IOC for anything like a fifth-generation fighter in Russia would be about 2016, and in China would be about 2020.

Q Let me ask you a couple of acquisition accountability questions. You highlighted the fee structure in the Future Combat System as not -- you know, not as tough as you'd probably like. It's the first time I ever heard a -- somebody of your level talk about a fee. What was your rationale for that? And going forward with this massive program, what do you want to do in terms of tightening up the criteria under which Boeing gets paid?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I don't want to get into any more detail on the contract than I did yesterday. But I would just say that I think that -- I would tell you that the FCS decision, of all the decisions I made -- and there were probably about somewhere between 50 and 60 program decisions that I made -- FCS was the toughest, and it was the last decision I made. And I spent a lot of time with General Casey and with Secretary Geren, and a lot of briefings. But at the end of the day, the principal concern that I had, beyond the cost, was that I felt that a program that had basically been first designed nine years ago had not really fully integrated the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan into the vehicle part of the buy.

I've always been impressed by the front end of this program. I saw it down at Fort Bliss. And so we're not just spinning that out to three or five BCTs, which was the original proposal, but to the whole force. But that was -- that was the principal factor for me on the FCS.

Q The fee portion, now, do you --

SEC. GATES: I just don't want to get into that.

Q Okay. Can I ask you a second accountability question? When Ash Carter is confirmed by the Senate, there's going to be questions about what steps you took to make sure he recuses himself from any contacts with his defense consultants that he acknowledged he had at his nomination hearing.

Just wanted to ask you straight up, I -- is that being reviewed so there is no -- even appearance of a conflict of interest, in terms of his clients?

SEC. GATES: I assume so. I have pretty much stayed out of the confirmation business, but I know that they've been working that -- those kinds of issues for whoever comes on board, both with our general counsel and with the -- and with the White House counsel, to make sure that there's no question of a conflict of interest.

Q So you don't got any specifics on that -- (off mike).

Q When you say that the U.S. has not fully integrated the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, well, what lessons are those?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, the key was the -- there was a tradeoff in terms of -- and General Cartwright's probably going to have to help me here -- but a -- the -- there was a -- there was basically a reliance on the situational awareness of the vehicle -- of the vehicles that was, to a considerable extent -- and a couple other factors -- that were traded off against armor.

And I -- it looked to me like the -- and, for example -- and I give -- I give General Casey and Secretary Geren credit for this -- when they started looking at this -- and there have been adjustments to FCS over the last 18 months or so -- but one of the things that they pointed out to their own folks was that the infantry fighting vehicle had a flat bottom and was 18 inches off the ground. And so the question is -- and then they start looking at, well, how much additional armor can you put on this?

And it just -- it just seemed to me there was -- it was necessary to stop, take a deep breath, and kind of look at this whole thing freshly, based on the experience of these two wars.

I don't know if you want to add any to the --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I mean, the survivability piece, the realities of what the fight we're in brings to the game, the changes over the last five years, independent of IEDs, of the shaped explosives and their ability to really start to penetrate hard armor -- so what you find, if you go take a look at the units in Iraq and Afghanistan today, they generally will have three sets of vehicles. They've got their up-armored humvees. They've got their Bradleys. And then they've got their MRAPs.

And the question here is, can one vehicle really cover that span? At the low end, you're trying to be offensive and move very quickly through any kind of terrain. At the very high end, you're moving slowly, you're probing, you're accepting the fact that you're going to take on heavy fire and that you're going to have to withstand it. So can one vehicle really span all of that?

And we'd like to say the technology's there to do that, but already we saw, you know, almost a 40 and 50 percent increase in weight that was going to be piled on the original axle designs in order to accommodate survivability. And the idea was some of it would be permanent, some of it would be temporary. But think about maneuvering, what that does to transmissions and axles and all of those things. And you start to wonder, can it really take that? And is that original design going to be able to handle that span of activity? And so that's what started to make a lot of the questions about a vehicle -- a single vehicle to do this really questionable.

At the end of the day, the heavy brigades would not be as heavy as the heavy brigades of today -- that was a conscious decision -- which is okay as long as you're willing to have something that can go out there and persist where you're going to have either IEDs or very energetic projectiles, et cetera. And that was not going to be the case without really heavying up something that was not designed to be that heavy.

SEC. GATES: And the way I would put -- add to what General Cartwright said from -- kind of using my layman's language is, I didn't think the program had integrated the operational experience that we have had in Iraq and Afghanistan, where, as the general said, a commander has a menu of vehicles that he can draw on in any given unit, depending on what the mission is. And so that, plus the other factors that we were talking about, were the principal considerations.

Jim?

Q Sir, just the -- for years now you've talked about the warfighter not having a place at the table. I'm just wondering, how's -- how -- maybe, how does your -- how do your decisions give the warfighters a place at the table? And how does that continue in the future? How does that get institutionalized?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say in several ways. First, it puts some of these capabilities, like ISR in the battlefield, in the base budget. For the last several years they have been in the supplementals -- the greater helicopter capacity, the things that we're doing for the special operations forces. I mean, all of those things being in the base budget rather than in supplementals, they will be a part of a services budget at this point. And we know how good the services are at defending their budgets.

I would say another factor is, again, the -- over the last couple of years, the increase in end strength and a lot of the medical and quality-of-life initiatives have all been paid for by the supplementals.

By putting those in the base budget, I think that it -- it provides a -- it becomes a permanent part of the Defense Department's budget going forward, rather than dependent on whether we get a supplemental next year or not.

In terms of institutionalizing what I'm trying to do, those are a couple of things, but there's a third that I think is maybe even more important, and maybe it's because I'm an old Kremlinologist. I think the real institutionalization comes through the appointments of people. And I have the places where General Casey, General Corelli, General Dempsey, General Petraeus, General Odierno, General Austin -- the places where these people have been assigned provide, I believe, the opportunity to institutionalize in the Army the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are all war fighters, and their appointments were not accidents or just happenstance.

What I have tried to do is -- is put people in positions where -- you know, the institution can always beat one or two people, but it's very tough to beat four or five or six. You can't outlast that many, for the most part.

MR. : No, but they'll try. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: But I am assuming these guys will then recommend appointments behind them that -- and it goes to the Army Brigadier General Board last year that General Petraeus headed, and some of the people who were being promoted. So that's a big piece of the institutionalization as well.

Yes?

Q (Off mike) -- in terms of I was wondering if you could -- (off mike) -- some of President Obama's reactions to your plans, or does he have any kind of additional concerns or any kind of pushback on the suggestions that you have made or whether he -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I want to give him some space. He has not -- OMB has not reviewed this in detail. OMB got the details yesterday, about the same time you all did, and we will be providing the other details to them over the course of the week. And I -- and then the president will look at that. So I don't want to say that the president has approved all of this in detail.

But I would say, as I did yesterday, I consulted very closely with him. And I think that he is supportive, certainly in the -- of the general direction in which we're going. And I think, for the most part -- the program decisions, specifically -- that I want to leave him some space.

Yeah?



Q And then, if I may, on the presidential helicopter -- because everyone has something -- (off mike) -- what is the plan for 2011? I mean, are you starting a new competition on that?

SEC. GATES: Yes. Yes, we will.

Yeah?

Q Going back to the -- a quick follow-up on the Army vehicle modernization efforts. Is there going to be any money in FY '10 for an S&T effort or an R&D effort to get this started, restarted? And then I had a separate question about termination costs and if there was any estimate on these programs that will be terminated, what it's going to cost.

SEC. GATES: I think we don't know the answer to the last question. I would say -- the way I would put it is I believe I -- as I said yesterday, I think an Army -- a -- an Army vehicle modernization program is essential. And it is a very high priority. And I think we have an obligation -- I have an obligation -- to make sure that the money is there for the Army in '10, '11, '12, to get on with a new modernization program.

Yeah.

Q Can you just give examples of program decisions you decided to defer until the QDR and explain why it made sense to do so?

SEC. GATES: Sure. The decision to delay the 11th LPD and the Mobile Landing Platform; both because I want to -- I want the QDR to examine, as we look at the 21st century, how much amphibious capability do we need?

And I don't know the answer to that. We need it, but how much do we need?

A second would be a follow-on bomber. And that, as I indicated yesterday, we'll look at that after the QDR, after the nuclear program review and after -- and in the context of the arms -- post-START arms control negotiations.

Q What about the EFV? Does that fall in that category?

SEC. GATES: Well, I didn't make any decisions on the EFV. And so that program is continuing as is. But clearly, that would be a part of the amphibious review, it seems to me.

Yeah.

Q Secretary Gates, I want to ask you about the long-term budget picture. So you put in a lot of extra money for the troops and their families, but you know that personnel costs are rising. At the same time, a lot of procurement decisions you made will eventually have to be paid for. In the out years, these budgets are going to cost us. So I'm wondering what can you -- how do you kind of square that circle? How do you plan to keep the costs -- aside from acquisition -- (inaudible) -- will this budget restructure TRICARE fees? Will this budget do other things to fix some of those long-term problems that we all know are ahead?

SEC. GATES: What we're trying to do is begin -- first of all, begin a dialogue with the Hill in terms of TRICARE. We've gone up there three years in a row seeking an increase in the premiums -- a very modest increase, I might add, in a program where there's been no premium increase since the program was conceived or started, 10 years ago, 12 years ago.

And I think we just need to lay out for the Congress how health care is eating the department alive. As I said yesterday, we will spend in FY '10 \$47 billion on health care. We will spend on health care what the entire foreign affairs budget is.

And so we have to have that conversation with the Hill, because I think they understand this, as well as we do it. But it is a tough issue.

I also will be making the case that I don't think that the department can sustain the programs that we have with flat growth. And therefore I believe that we need at least 2 percent real growth going forward. And that will be my case, and I'll make it as well as I can.

Q So you're simply saying you will request a TRICARE increase again this year?

SEC. GATES: No, we are going to full -- we are going to for the first time -- you know, hit us over the head with a two-by-four three times, and we're beginning to get the message.

Q (Chuckles.)

SEC. GATES: So we are fully funding it this year. And we are not going up with that \$1.2 billion hole in the budget.

But we are going to begin the -- we figure maybe we'll have a better chance of having a serious dialogue with the Hill if we go ahead and fund it and then begin the conversation. So we'll keep our fingers crossed.

Q So really the question is, personnel increases -- you've sped up the end-strength increase. There are calls for another end-strength increase. Is that off the table, or are you in part still considering another additional --

SEC. GATES: I think that, you know, we have -- we have increased the size of the ground forces, counting both the Army and the

Marine Corps, by 92,000. Let's get there, see where we are with that. I think calls to expend it -- extend it beyond that are premature. I would not say that they're wrong. I just think they're premature.

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Q Do you have a plan to curb service lobbying? (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: That's the -- the word "Sisyphean" comes to mind. (Laughter.)

I think that -- I think -- I will say this. I think that based on everything I've heard and some of the things that I've seen, that there has been a deterioration of discipline in the way this building approaches the Congress about budgets.

And while I know that the chiefs feel the obligation to give their individual -- their professional military advice when asked, that does not hold true of everybody in the building. And so I think we're going to try and be more disciplined about it, going forward.

Yes.

Q Secretary, I spoke with several lawmakers yesterday who were very concerned about and critical of the proposals yesterday. I wanted to ask you what is your -- what strategy are you devising to address those concerns? And are you worried about any congressional pushback and, you know, the gravity of that pushback and what that might be?

SEC. GATES: Oh, I think there'll be a lot of pushback. I anticipated it from the very beginning. These are not -- these are not easy issues, and they affect some -- some members a lot. There are members who are concerned because of jobs in their states and districts. There are members who are dedicated and committed to certain of these programs, because they believe in them.

And we will just have to -- I think we have to have a dialogue. We have to sit down and talk to various members. I think that on the part of -- on the jobs aspect of it, I think we have to appeal to people, as I said yesterday, to rise above the parochial or local interest, and consider what's in the best interest of the country as a whole.

Where there are those who have substantive issues with the decisions, I think we just need to sit down and walk through the analysis with them. In other words, just to give you an example, I haven't seen the letter from Senator Lieberman and Senator Kyl and others on missile defense, but I think when I -- if we can sit down and show them what we're doing with THAAD and SM-3s on -- or THAAD on terminal phase, if we can show them what we are sustaining with the ground-based interceptors for midcourse, and the research and development that we have continued with respect to the boost phase, perhaps we can persuade them that all is not as bad as they had -- as they seem to think.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you were talking yesterday about what you called complex hybrid warfare, you mentioned that the U.S. may face an adversary with an AK-47 and a supporting element with a ballistic missile. And I'm wondering, could you elaborate what kind of groups are you talking about; and how does this budget position the Defense Department to fight them?

SEC. GATES: Well, one example would be Hezbollah. Hezbollah has more missiles and rockets than most countries, and some pretty sophisticated equipment to go with it, and yet also has a fairly basic terrorist and, as we say, irregular warfare capability. So that's one example.

I think one of the examples that we have seen in Iraq is some pretty sophisticated explosive penetrating devices that can take out some pretty significant armor on our side. And so I think those are the kinds of things that I'm talking about.

Q So how does this budget help the United States fight these adversaries?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think by providing the full range of capabilities, but also making sure that we have -- that we have -- really it's not so much -- and I'll invite General Cartwright to speak here. It's not so much the specific capabilities in the budget as it is the recognition that the irregular side of this threat has to be in the base budget, along with the programs to deal with the more modern kinds of systems, which have been in the base budget forever.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think the --

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think the -- kind of the key here is there's been a lot of discussion about the nexus between an extremist organization and WMD and the proliferation of that WMD in ways that -- in the past only sophisticated nation-states could have hoped to have these kind of weapons, and that time is quickly coming to an end.

And so what we acknowledge here is that the entire span of military operations is now extremely lethal. And so if we just concentrate at one end or the other, we leave ourselves exposed to what used to be considered the most dangerous threat.

And so the -- this activity, this budget and the capabilities we're advocating for here try to span a much greater range of that military operations and acknowledge the fact that the lethality is significant at both ends.

Q What people have taken away from the 2006 war with Hezbollah is that the Israelis were too focused on counterinsurgency; they weren't ready to fight Hezbollah's conventional force, which used IEDs to put them in kill zones and then used conventional tactics to kill them. Is that -- does the Pentagon take that away from the 2006 war as well?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Took that away from the lessons learned. And certainly, the Israelis have been very vocal about that since in our discussions.

But again, it comes back to we would never have thought about having to use a tank or heavy armor in a counterinsurgency. And so the lethality here is across the entire span. So back to the vehicle discussion, you need all three types of vehicles we have out there today. Even though the threat is considered relatively unsophisticated, the lethality of the threat is sophisticated.

And that's what – that's what this acknowledges is – so we used to say, two major theater wars, whatever the construct, everything else being a lesser included case. That reality is gone now.

The span of the lethality is just so pervasive, and the opportunity as we go into the future for things like projectiles that can penetrate thick armor, for weapons of mass destruction, when it starts to get out into things like cyber and bio and chem – and these are, unfortunately, as the technology proliferates, going to become some of the realities of the battlefield.

SEC. GATES: You.

Q Yes. Secretary, you talked earlier about some discipline breaking down with regard to the Hill, and I wanted –

SEC. GATES: Not the Hill's discipline. Our discipline. (Laughter.) I just want to be very clear about that.

Q Well, I was wondering if you could elaborate on that a little bit, and also talk about your nondisclosure agreement. Was that an attempt to impose more discipline on the process? And did you have to discipline any individuals in going through this exercise?

SEC. GATES: No, because there were no leaks – in case you hadn't noticed. (Chuckles.)

No, I must say, everybody that I know, and me, have – actually have been astonished by the discipline that was shown in this process, which has been – which started about three months ago. And I think it's – I think it's mainly – you know, the disclosure – signing the nondisclosure thing, the – was kind of an afterthought that – I can't even remember who suggested it to me. (Laughter.) And – (chuckles) – and I think what you have is a building, fortunately, with men and women in it who, when they put their name to something saying they won't do something, have the character and integrity to stick with it.

So I didn't have to say – I didn't have to say a word to a soul through this whole process. And what – and I've – the thing that is important is to reinforce that, within the building, that there – in terms of dealing with the Hill, that there is a chain of command, and once the decisions are made with – I've tried since I got here to get everybody the maximum possible opportunity to voice their views and to guide me, to advise me, to counsel me, to try and change my mind about things.

But once the decision is made then – and particularly, once the president signs off on the budget, then there needs to be discipline about people not conducting guerrilla warfare against decisions the president has made.

Q And how many people were involved in this budget process?

SEC. GATES: Gosh, I have – what? – what do you figure overall? I would guess –

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I don't know, a hundred and – 100, 150? When you talk about the principal staff plus their two or three people that do the paperwork and the actual work, mostly inside the comptroller and the PA.

Q Can I ask you a couple of follow-ups on the budget, questions that have come out? The 47 billion (dollars) in health care, did that drive some of your decisions on programs?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q Did Obama approve conceptually your approach on the FCS – he being a Chicago native who talked about this during the campaign?

SEC. GATES: No. Didn't discuss it specifically.

Q Okay.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: No – well –

Q Oh, sorry.

Q Sir, I know you said that you made these decisions in a sense apolitically. Hoping you can take this question divorced from –

SEC. GATES: As opposed to naively? (Laughter.)

Q Well, call it what you will. But I hope you can take this question divorced from politics, because industrial base can be political, but it doesn't have to be. I'm curious – what, if at all, about the industrial base went into these decisions? What do you want the industry

message to be, a takeaway? There are some people that say, oh, it's like a wake-up call for industry, but obviously, there have been plenty of program formations in the past few years that you can say were wake-up calls. So what's the message? 324

SEC. GATES: It did not play a significant role in -- in most of the decisions. You guys know better than I do that most of these companies have multiple programs with us. And I guess I'd just leave it at that.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You know, I mean, if anything, the move -- and we used this word yesterday -- to move from exquisite to quantity, given the diversity of the threat that we're going to face, trying to get away from exquisite to quantity, because the reality is we're going to need quantity, that should be actually an advantage for the industrial base. Having stable funding, have programs that are funded at effective, efficient quantities of record, and then just the idea, like with the F-35, that we're going to go for quantity as well as quality.

I mean, the exquisite is the piece, it was the -- in the discussion yesterday, was, you know, to get to the point where you're building one ship for each coast or one airplane for each coast, we've got to get away from that. The problem is, we can't have 10 or three or something every place that needs. We've got to have an order of quantity, so LCS, on the shipping side, the F-35 on the air side, the idea of multiple vehicles but an expensive/inexpensive and affordable rate. So if industry takes anything from that, it is we've got to get back to economic quantities, orders of quantity. We've got to get to stable funding platforms that don't get strung out artificially. We build them, we build them efficiently, and we get them out there.

SEC. GATES: So quantity becomes quality of its own at a certain point. And the truth is, if we can get this acquisition process in a better place, I think that it will be a significant advantage for the industrial base for defense, in no small part because it will afford greater stability and predictability.

Q Okay. And a takeaway on the tac air side then that JSF really is the future for the industrial base in the tactical aircraft side. -- bombers tabled for now -- F-18 might have a few more years if you guys did a multi-year, but there's really not a sustainable argument for keeping St. Louis in business outside --

SEC. GATES: JSF and Reaper.

Q Pardon?

SEC. GATES: JSF and Reaper.

Q Okay.

Q (Off mike) -- returning a lot of the civilian staff back to the Pentagon, and taking responsibility from the contractors. A lot of people have talked about contract management and oversight for a long time. Of course, the reason that they were originally contracted out was so that the department could have flexibility. So I'm wondering if you worry about taking away that flexibility. And also, how do you define what is an inherently governmental function?

SEC. GATES: Well --

Q Where do you draw the line? What should be contracted civilian and what shouldn't?

SEC. GATES: First of all, one of the reasons we have so many contractors, particularly in the acquisition arena, to help us is because the numbers of acquisition professionals were slashed during the 1990s. The Defense Contract Management Agency went from 27,000 professionals to about 9,000. Those involved in procurement generally in the department went from 5(00,000) or 600,000 to less than half that number.

And so, you know, will we be able to get rid of all the contractors? No. I mean, the point -- the point yesterday, we're just going from 39 percent back to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent, is the goal over the fit-up. So there will probably be a continuing role for contractors.

But the truth of the matter is -- and this is one area where I think practically everybody on the Hill agrees -- we have to restore a professional acquisition cadre both in the services and in the department as a whole, and enough people to provide government employees who are overseeing this. There's just -- the Hill has a problem -- and I understand it and agree with it -- with us hiring contractors to oversee contractors.

Q And what is the inherently governmental function and what are the functions?

SEC. GATES: I think that when it comes to acquisition, I think, above all, the oversight of the process is inherently governmental.

How far down the chain you go beyond that, I think, is a judgment call.

Ma'am?

Q LCS and the Joint Strike Fighter are two programs that have had a lot of problems in development. So how do you justify continuing to ramp up those two, the purchase of those two systems, when at the same time the presidential helicopter program's getting the axe for not meeting its goals?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, it's my impression -- and I don't have the history on this as well as General Cartwright, so I'll say something and then I'll invite him to comment -- my impression is, there -- clearly the developmental phase of the Joint Strike Fighter has had its problems and has been expensive. My understanding is that most of those problems are behind us at this point, as we're going

forward.

And similarly, I think that the initiation of the LCS was a challenge, given the nature of the ships. But I think this is one of these places -- it's a little bit like the proposal to build all three DDG-1000s in Bath. When you're building one, it's -- it -- there are going to be huge inefficiencies, and you don't have this -- you don't have the workforce skill set and so on. If you're going to build several, then you're going to make the investment not only in the workforce but you learn from the mistakes that you've made.

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And so -- and I think that people believe that a fifth-generation fighter is critical and that the Joint Strike Fighter is better to be the one you buy in numbers than the F-22, and the same way in the Navy with the LCS. But --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think all of those points and also in the ramp are additional assets for tests, which we didn't have, and so it's going to let us have a more robust test program.

Rather than having one or two platforms, we're actually going to buy several, now, and branch that out. And generally, for the aircraft side, we have a set -- aircraft for the attack mission, a set of aircraft that are associated with the air-to-air mission. And so we're going to have, now, that ability so that we can get that done. That'll allow us to have fewer changes in a shorter period of time.

And so in other words, if you find, you know, 10 problems across that, rather than stretching that out over five years, which means now you got to go back and retrofit five years' worth of aircraft, get it done in two or three years so you're retrofitting less and moving the fleet forward.

We're doing the same in the LCS program, with the different variants. It'll give us a much better idea, much more quickly, of what our challenges might be in production as we move to that stage.

STAFF: Okay, sir, we've gone our 45 minutes. Let's take two more.

Q Mr. Secretary, the defense -- national defense strategy calls for taking risks in areas of excessive overmatch in conventional capabilities. Do you think the budget decisions announced yesterday address that fully? Or do you think the services need to assume greater risk in that -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: I think that the one thing -- and let me answer, then again ask General Cartwright. I think the one area where -- that I've talked about where we really haven't done as much as we should in assessing capabilities across the services and seeing where you might be able to take more risk in one service, in a program, a given program, because you have a program in another service that mitigates that.

One of the problems that we have -- and it's one of the reasons why I canceled -- recommended canceling the CSAR-X -- is we do -- we have really come to a point where we do extraordinarily well in terms of joint operations. But we do not do well in terms of joint procurement. It is still very service-centered. And that's an area where, both analytically and then in the way we actually conduct our business, I think we need to do better.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: In some places where we clearly had a qualitative and quantitative edge that was overmatch, we made decisions now. Many of the decisions talking about risk and whether -- how to shift and manage risk were moved to the QDR.

Because if you change your strategy -- if we rebalance the force for a broader spectrum of conflict -- that also, then, changes the mix. And you've got to take a look then: Where do you want to consciously take your risk?

And as the secretary said, let's just take a bomber versus an aircraft carrier. If I put 10 bombers in the Pacific instead of an aircraft carrier, is that a reasonable match? And if I bring the bombers out and put a carrier in, is that a reasonable match?

Are there capabilities like this that have synergy against the types of threats we think we're going to face? And do we need to pretend that the only thing that exists is either the bomber or the carrier? And we can't really afford that any more.

SEC. GATES: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

Yeah?

Q How far will you go in your fight against whatever Congress may do with the changes in this? I know they're saying it's their prerogative to make changes obviously, but how far are you going in your fight to protect your plan, and does President Obama agree to it?

SEC. GATES: Well, there's different pieces to the process, as you well know. The Congress, as a coequal branch of government, will, I am confident, be active in shaping the budget in a way that they think is appropriate. But there is a final part of the process, and that is when that bill comes back to the president. And we'll just see.

I am an optimist. I am -- I believe that because there is support on the Hill for acquisition reform, because we have announced this package of changes, it is, I think, a little more difficult for a member to say, "I'm all for acquisition reform and doing these things better, and all that stuff is really good; but this one thing that happens to be in my state should be an exception." And so I think that I just -- I think we will have a very productive dialogue over the next number of months, and I'm optimistic.

You know, you never get 100 percent of what you ask for. And I think we'll just have to see how the dialogue unfolds. But like I say, I'm an optimist. I think -- I think the members of Congress want to do the right thing.

Q Sir, can I ask you a quick Iraq question?

STAFF: (Off mike.)

Q Well, but the situation in Iraq, how do you interpret this -- the uptick in violence of Iraq?

SEC. GATES: I think General Odierno's view is that the violence level is still at very low levels. These are still basically 2003 levels. These are spectacular events that are basically al Qaeda's last gasp, I hope.

Q Thanks a lot, sir.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: That's at OMB now, actually.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright      April 07, 2009

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Department of Defense Conference Call with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. James Cartwright with Military Bloggers (Corrected Title)

SEC. GATES: (In progress) -- a brief opening comment.

The -- what I announced yesterday is really in many respects the next step, following up on the speeches that I started giving about 18 months ago, which culminated in many respects in the National Defense Strategy that was issued last fall. The next -- this -- we will do this budget, and then the next step in this process is the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and then, of course, the '11 budget. So this is kind of a continuum. I think that the principles that I talked about yesterday and the basic objectives are those that I've been talking about for about 18 months, and so it sort of didn't spring all of a sudden full grown out of the brow of Zeus in the last three months.

So with that, let me invite your questions.

Q     Mr. Secretary, this is Fred Kaplan with Slate. Good afternoon.

SEC. GATES: Hi.

Q     Obviously, you said this has been in the works for quite a long time. You stayed home instead of going to the NATO conference -- obviously it wasn't to make your checklist; it was to work out presumably some internal politics. I'm wondering if you can shed some light on that. And also, when you present this to the Congress, is this going to be presented as sort of a package? In other words, if they say, "Well, we're going to keep the F-22 going for another year," will you say, "Well, that means you won't get the extra F-35s that I've added onto the budget" -- something like that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- you know, we'll just have to take it a step at a time. I think -- I stayed home partly because I had not yet completed my decisions. The most difficult of all of these for me was the FCS program and I actually didn't make up my mind once and for all on it until this weekend. But -- and we were also involved in drafting the statement.

But, you know, we -- what will go to the Hill will be a full scale presidential budget that encompasses these and a number of other decisions that I made. I think all

together there were somewhere between 50 and 60 specific program decisions. And all of those will just be reflected in the budget itself, which will go up as one entity. 327

Q Mr. Secretary, hi, it's David Cloud with Politico. I wanted to just follow up on that last comment of yours about the FCS. I'd be interested in hearing you sort of explain a little bit more about why it was the most difficult decision. I mean, in some ways it is the one that captures most of all the tradeoffs that you're talking about between current wars and potential future wars. And it's also -- there's also a tradeoff there between sort of -- in terms of the vehicles between deployability and the speed of deployability and protection for soldiers in terms of armor on vehicles. I wondered if you could just expand on if those factors played into your decision and just more on why it was so difficult.

SEC. GATES: Well, I guess one reason why it was so difficult was because the Army felt very strongly about it. I spent a lot of time with General Casey and Secretary Geren -- probably more time with them on this particular issue than on any other single issue with anybody else in the building. And I'll respond to your question and then invite General Cartwright to chime in.

Fundamentally I concluded that the program, which was designed nine years ago, had not really adequately integrated the lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq into the program going forward.

And there were several aspects to it: first of all, the vulnerability of lighter armor to EFPs and IEDs; the design of some of the vehicles in terms of learning some of the lessons in protecting the troops, and so on. But it also did not reflect, as far as I could tell, the lessons learned of operational realities in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the commanders on the ground actually have a range of vehicles available to them that they can use depending on the menus -- or depending on the mission, rather -- so that you have a commander who can -- rank who can use an up-armored humvee or a striker or an MRAP or a tank or a Bradley depending on what the mission is. He's got a collection of vehicles. And the point that General Cartwright has made before -- trying to build the capabilities of that range of vehicles into a single vehicle -- really we hadn't gotten there yet. And the question is whether you even can do that.

So those were some of the issues that -- where I just -- I concluded that the program hadn't sufficiently integrated those lessons-learned. But let me ask General Cartwright to add.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think we've captured most of the issues, but the survivability, the mobility side of the equation to try to get all the way from what we would call a hybrid warfare to the high end of conventional warfare, things that we would normally use in a heavy brigade and things that we would use in infantry in lighter formations -- trying to bring that all into one class of vehicles. They had a flat bottom that they had to redesign to take into account, as the secretary said, the realities of things like IEDs. To move to a heavier capability and a more lethal environment, they were adding on armor that was starting to weigh it down and make it questionable whether the axles, the transmissions, all of those things would in fact be able to function for extended periods of time in a heavy configuration.

All of these started to bring into question whether one class of vehicles could in fact cover the range of operations that we envision are going to be the reality of the future.

So when you put all that together, what we're asking is for the Army to step back, revisit the so-called requirements, revisit the realities that we've discovered over the last nine years in the development of this program -- do they really fit? Can we really

adapt the basic chassis to that broader range of activities and expect these vehicles to last and survive? 328

Q Could I just -- quick follow up -- was the Army argument essentially that by taking this step on FCS, you are sort of potentially jeopardizing the -- their ability to respond to the high end, you know, conventional warfare side in the, you know, obvious near future?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think their -- I think their pushback at least -- and I'll add my two cents and let the secretary jump in -- but the initial pushback was not that the high end was compromised but that they needed vehicles at what they call the midrange, and that from that midrange they could adapt down or up on a single vehicle. And they believed -- and rightfully so -- I mean, they believed that that was an approach.

The problem was that you couldn't get -- today you cannot get to either extreme. You cannot get to the very heavy without putting on so much armor that it becomes a very difficult vehicle to maneuver on the battlefield, and nor can you get down to what was the humvee level that we're using today and still have these vehicles really have that much maneuverability and still keep the survivability that we need.

Q I see.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: You could not bring in MRAPs into the equation either.

And so we're trying to understand what a formation's going to look like, how much applicability it has across a range of military operations. Their feeling was if they captured the center piece, that would be good enough. The problem is the lethality exists both at the high end of conflict and at the low end today. These shaped charges, the EFPs -- they're very lethal and they're very able to be employed by non-nation states, in counterinsurgencies, and just bringing that fat reality into the equation makes it very difficult to come with a single class of vehicles.

Q Mr. Secretary -- sorry -- Mr. Secretary, this is Gordon Adams. One question that did not come up much in yesterday's presentation but I know is probably on your mind is the distribution of responsibilities and roles between Defense and State, especially as concerns the kinds of operations that we're involved in now. Have you given any thought to what you might be prepared to do this year with respect to authorities like Section 1206 and CERP, in terms of leaving them temporary or seeking to put them in permanent law?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have a -- on both 1206 and 1207, those have now been authorized for a three-year period by the Congress. And they were plussed-up for FY 09, and I have added for -- I think, 1206 is \$500 million. Is that right?

MR. : Yes.

Q That's in the 2010.

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q Okay.

SEC. GATES: And initially 1207 was in for \$100 million, and I increased that to \$200 million.

Q And will you seek permanent Title X status for that -- just a quick follow up -- or will you leave it in the temporary category for the time being?



SEC. GATES: Well, I think we'll see how things develop on the Hill and see if the Congress -- I mean, my hope is that the Congress will begin to embrace the greater resource for State and also give State the kind of flexibility that we have in the way we use these funds. And that has been a problem for State in the past. So I think, you know, we have this three-year extension, and I think we'll take that and then see how the resources develop for the Department of State.

Q Thank you.

Q Mr. Secretary, it's Spencer Ackerman with the Washington Independent.

How confident are you that you've adequately enlisted the services' buy-ins for these cuts? Some of them gone -- like the FCS, like for the F-22 -- to some of the most valued and desired programs that they have. To what extent are you going to be on the lookout for services kind of going to favored members of Congress and trying to undo them, or do you feel -- do you actually have everyone on the same page? And if so, what did you do to get to that point?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- let me answer and then invite General Cartwright.

I -- first of all, these decisions -- there are one or another decisions that did not leave smiles on the faces of the different services, clearly. But I will say we had a process that was very inclusive, that included not only the chiefs and the secretaries of the services, but also included the commanders. And we had a lot of meetings and a lot of dialogue over the past three months on all of this. And so I think everybody knows that they had a chance to put their oar in and to make their case. In some cases the services proposed some of these options themselves.

Q Could you give some examples of that?

SEC. GATES: (Laughs.) If you can give me long enough. It's late in the day. Sorry. Let me come back -- if I think of one, I'll come back to it.

But I would -- well, let me go ahead and just say that one of the concerns that I have had in the past has been the discipline in this building after decisions get made. And I think that -- you know, I understand that the chiefs in particular can give their professional military advice to the Congress and to the president if they disagree with these decisions, but the fact is that for everybody else, and, frankly, for them, in terms of executing the program, once I've made my decisions and once the president has made his decisions, then that is the position of this department and they are expected to execute those programs. And I've made it pretty clear to everybody that I don't want to see any guerilla warfare on these programs. We have a chain of command and that's what it's all about.

General?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think -- I guess the first thing that -- I might just rephrase your question a little bit, but, you know, these are not cuts. This is a reshaping of our basic capability and the capability that the combatant commanders in particular are advocating for, that they need in order to be able to do their job out there. So there are as many pluses as there are reductions. And, you're right; you know, people will focus on the reductions.

The things the combatant commanders and service chiefs basically uniformly endorsed -- the termination of the F-22 at the number that we all agreed on; the 187; the increase in the numbers of the F-35 and the transition to the F-35 as early as possible; the value that we've seen in the battlefield of the Predator class and now the Reaper class as it

emerges -- all are things that the service chiefs and the combatant commanders agreed <sup>needed</sup> to be reshaped and moved in a direction that made sense based on where we were going. 330

So, I think, you know, this is a lot about the war fighters, the combatant commanders, and the reality of the fights that they're in and the reality of the fights that they are trying to prevent all around the world, and the capabilities you need.

And in the earlier discussion about 1206, 1207 and CERP -- these are the kinds of things that really will help us prevent war and move us in a direction that we believe is reasonable and responsive as we go to the future.

Q Quick follow-up on that --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Sure.

Q Do you feel you've gotten everyone's agreement and consent on the basic strategic construct? Both of you made the point yesterday that we needed to stop thinking so much about conceivable, hypothetical threats and focus on a vision of war fighting and of deterrence and defense based on something more like what we see now. Do you feel you've got buy-in on that front?

SEC. GATES: Well, again, we'll do the one-two. I think the one place that there seems to me to be broad buy-in is that the -- this black-and-white division of conventional and irregular warfare is something of a fiction that does not reflect the real world; that in fact there is a spectrum of conflict where even at the low end -- the general was talking about lethality at the low end. And so you have -- in an insurgency you have a guy who's carrying an AK-47, but he may also be planting an EFP that can take out a million dollar-tank or MRAP. And you're going to have cyber involved in all of this in a way that hasn't been before, and that could happen at any place along that spectrum.

And so I think that there is an understanding that preparation for what we are calling complex hybrid warfare can range up and down this scale from counterinsurgency to a regular conventional conflict where, even in a conventional conflict, they will use irregular kinds of resources, whether it's cyber or something else.

So I think there is broad agreement to that. And frankly I haven't heard any pushback on -- from the chiefs about -- or really anybody else who's participated in this -- about integrating -- about institutionalizing the capabilities needed for irregular conflict in the base budget.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I would add just two points. The cyber point -- that is universally acknowledged by all the combatant commanders and the service chiefs as an area that we needed to put more investment in, that was worth cutting in other areas to ensure the investment was there, and we did that.

The other point is that each year the combatant commanders submit what's called an integrated priority list. It's those things that they feel they most need to do their job. The correlation between those lists and these changes is amazing, and they weren't put together -- in other words, we held off the integrated priority lists. But when you look at them now, all of the things that the combatant commanders have been asking for -- not only the ones that are engaged in conflict but the ones who are trying to prevent conflict out there -- are in this program. And the correlation is very significant.

SEC. GATES: To go back to the 1206, 1207 discussion and sort of global posture, one of the areas where we have plussed-up is in the funds going to combatant commanders and into the train-and-equip piece of this -- sort of the Phase Zero stuff where the investment is intended to try and prevent us from having to deploy our troops at some point.

Q Secretary Gates --

Q Mr. Secretary, this is Max Boot from the Council on Foreign Relations. I wanted to ask you about where we are in the overall size of the Defense budget because I believe you said this was roughly a 4 percent increase in the Defense budget. But now Congressman McHugh has put out a statement where he makes the point that apparently a lot of the supplemental spending is going to go into the base budget, and so he says that "if implemented, this proposal will be tantamount to an \$8 billion cut in Defense spending." Now, is Congressman McHugh right?

SEC. GATES: Well, the math is as follows, as far as I'm concerned: The FY 09 budget, which was \$513 billion, submitted by President Bush, had a figure for FY 10 in it of \$524 billion for the Defense Department. The -- we got roughly \$10 billion more than that.

We made the decision to put the full cost -- to cover the full cost of the increase of the end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps and holding the strength of the Navy and the Air Force into the base budget. We probably could have put some of that into the supplemental or into the -- the supplemental for '09 and the overseas contingency operations for '10. So some of these things that we have put into the base budget we elected to put into the base budget to send a signal to the troops that these things were going to be a permanent part of our budget; we weren't going to be dependent on supplementals for them. That included some -- the plus-ups in the medical research, in quality of life issues for the troops, in several of these things that amounted altogether to about \$13 billion. We probably could have justified a significant portion of that going into the supplemental. We elected to put it into the base budget.

So, you know, how you count where we are depends on your view of the whole thing. And so you can come out with a bunch of different numbers. I think that the 4 percent is simply what we got compared to what was in the '09 enacted legislation. So the 533.7 (billion dollars) or whatever it is, is 2 percent real growth over where we were in FY 09. How you then beneath that calculate in what we chose to put in that could have been in the supplemental and so on is probably how Mr. McHugh gets to his numbers.

Q Well, if I could just follow up -- I mean, I'm a little bit puzzled by the sort of austerity being imposed by the administration here at the same time that we're seeing massive economic stimulus bills being signed and we're talking about a need for stimulating the economy, creating more jobs and so forth, and at the same time it seems like we are squeezing Defense spending. And you can argue about whether it's a slight increase or a slight decrease, but at any rate it's not -- you're having to make some very difficult trade-offs, which you've been talking about. I mean, where do you see the need for that coming from?

SEC. GATES: I tell you as I said yesterday, virtually every decision that I announced yesterday I would have made regardless of what our top line was. If our top line had been \$581 billion, I would have made the same decisions that I made and announced yesterday because they went to what should be in the base budget; they went to program a rebalancing of getting more of the irregular -- the resources for irregular warfare into the base budget; putting a cap on programs where there was no military requirement for additional resources; and then killing programs where the budget was out of control or they were overdue or the technology was too great a risk.

So I -- you know, the top line number debate aside, in terms of the decisions I announced, I would have made those decisions regardless of how much money we had been given.

Q Mr. Secretary, it's Noah Shachtman with Wired Magazine. Speaking of programs with budgets out of control, there's a couple programs that have been pretty heavily

criticized, like the Marine EFV and like the Littoral Combat Ship, that seem to have budgets out of control, too. Why did you decide to keep those while cutting the others? 332

SEC. GATES: Well, on the LCS -- and I'll ask the general to join in -- on the LCS I think it has a capability we just have to have. And I think that the program has had some difficulty at the outset. I think that we'll get it right and get a cap on the cost of those ships, and then our intent is ultimately to build 55 of them. This is a good example of where getting the prototypes right and then being able to buy them in numbers and with a multiyear program will help bring down the cost or keep the cost under control.

On the other vehicle, it seems to me that one of the issues that I kicked to the Quadrennial Defense Review is the size of the amphibious capability that the country needs, and obviously the vehicle you mentioned is a part of that, although I didn't single it out. But I have delayed the 11th LPD till after the QDR so that -- and also the Mobile Landing Platform -- so that we can assess how much amphibious capability we need.

I think one of the questions that has to be addressed in the QDR also is the --

Q The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle.

SEC. GATES: Yeah. The EFV is a part of this, and how much are you prepared to spend to get from the ship to the shore? And so I -- while I haven't -- while I didn't go after it in this budget, I think it's a piece of the analysis for the QDR.

General?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think the LCS certainly represents the type of capability we -- that the Navy and certainly the department believes we need. Putting it on a footing where we're getting enough of the vehicles -- or, I'm sorry, the ships early enough to be able to understand its capabilities, assess in a test environment what it can do and what it can't do, and then move forward at an economic rate of production with a stable industrial base, is going to be critical. But at the heart of it, it is a capability that we believe we're going to need, and in quantities that we believe are going to have to be significant.

The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle -- exactly. This is really a question about how much amphibious warfare capability does the nation need, and a lot of what we'll do on the analytic side of the QDR is try to understand, one, how we're going to rebalance the force; two, what capabilities we need in what quantity; and then three, many of our capabilities have -- are duplicative in many cases. Conversation that we had earlier today which was, if you have bombers in the Pacific, then do you also have to have aircraft carriers, or can it be an either/or for much of the time? Do we always have to have everything in every service? How much of this do we really need, especially given the situation that we face, which is a much broader spectrum of conflict over a much greater geographic dispersal than we've had to face in the past? And we just can't afford to have everything in every service.

Q Quick follow-up, then -- what's the risk in your -- in this plan to rebalance the force? You know, when -- obviously every program's got risk, so what sort of kept you up at night here? What risks did you have in this one?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: The question -- I'll certainly kick off first -- but the question that certainly keeps you thinking is, where is the sweet spot, so to speak, and how stable is the sweet spot? Is it going to change quickly on you? These are capital investments, and they're going to be around for a while. Are they going to be able to work at the high end, so to speak, and the low end of conflict with the significant lethality that's coming? We know there's going to be a nexus between terrorism and WMD. We know that these

kinds of threats are coming. Are these platforms going to carry us into the future? Are they going to be as viable as -- in 20 years as they are in five or 10? 333

Those are big issues that certainly, for me, you look at. But I believe -- and I said this in the press conference -- I believe these are the right choices. These are going to put us in a position of advantage as we move to the future and rebalancing this force.

SEC. GATES: I think one of the risks that I see is an endemic problem with Defense programs, and that is, how can you put in place a program that can be maintained -- can be kept stable and sustained for a protracted period of time, given how long it takes to develop most of these weapons systems or capabilities? And when you have -- when things change from secretary to secretary, from administration to administration, from Congress to Congress, one of the reasons I think that there is so much cost in some of these capabilities that can be avoided is because they keep -- people keep pulling these programs up or changing these programs on a fairly regular basis. And anytime that the programs get changed, you have to -- you add cost, it seems to me.

So I think the key to this process is first of all -- just as an example, I believe that an Army vehicle modernization program is absolutely critical. It will take 15 years or more to implement that program. We need to get agreement on -- with the Army -- and kind of broad agreement on what the program ought to look like and then build it out and get it -- start bending steel just as soon as we can and keep that program going.

So I think that what is important here is to reach a level of, if not consensus, at least agreement looking forward by the principle figures on what these programs ought to look like, and then let them go forward. And this -- and frankly when we keep changing the requirements is when the cost begins to get out of sight and when the delays get built in.

MR. : Is Matthew on the line?

Q Yes.

MR. : I wanted you to -- I think you're the last one who hasn't asked a question. Is that correct?

Q Excellent. Yes.

Could I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to say what specifically about the LCS capability is so compelling?

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry?

Q Which capability specifically that the Littoral Combat Ship has did you find so compelling, as you referred to before?

SEC. GATES: Its ability to work in coastal areas, in, as we call it, green water; to move in close. It is the kind of capability that would have enormous value against fast boats, for example, in the Persian Gulf. It would have -- you don't need a \$5 billion-ship to go after pirates. You don't need a \$5 billion-ship necessarily to do a humanitarian mission. And so I think its flexibility and its ability to get into tighter places than other ships that make it so attractive.

I don't know, General, if you want to --

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think all of those, and I would add the modular design -- the ability, one, to design the modules in today for things like mine hunting and rockets and naval gunfire, and to start to look to the future about the problems we don't know we're

going to have, and have a hull form and a ship that can be adapted for the future. So its got the agility we're going to need to change as the warfight changes.

MR. : One more question?

Q Gordon Adams again -- I'll leap in here, Mr. Secretary. What -- you've talked about discipline in the building and you've talked about making sure that this goes through the process in a way that sends a very clear signal. What arguments would you make to the Congress, to the members who are going to be tempted to -- obviously to try to put some of the things that you have terminated or cut back on back into the budget? What's the most compelling argument that you're going to deliver to them about why they should stick with your program?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that there are probably two levels of concern -- two kinds of concern in the Congress. One is the concern of people who are worried about losing jobs in their states and in their districts. And I think the other problem is people who have genuine concerns about the decisions that we've made for substantive reasons -- for example, Senators Lieberman and Kyl and so on, on ballistic missile defense.

And in the former case, my hope is to try and persuade them to look beyond the parochial interest and do what's in the best interests of the nation as a whole. If we -- I mean, there isn't a single program -- everybody agrees on the need for acquisition reform, but the reality is you can't change a single program in this building, in this entire Defense budget, without affecting somebody's district or somebody's state. And so trying to get them to look more broadly at the national interest is my hope on the first.

On the second, we just have to sit down and work with them and talk to them about what we are doing, why we've made the decisions we have, what we've done to mitigate risk, and so on, and just have that dialogue with them and trying to persuade them that the direction that we're pointing is a good one and that the concerns that they have have been addressed and mitigated in some way.

You know, one of the other things that I think -- one area that -- where we will get total support on the Hill based on past experience -- we haven't talked about this at all -- the one area where we get total support is in putting all of these programs affecting our troops, our wounded and their families, into the base budget. These have been carried in the supplementals for the last umpteen years -- the last number of years since we went to war, and to put all this into the base budgets sends a powerful signal about the fact that our highest priority is taking care of our people. As Admiral Mullen has put it, "If we don't get the people part of this right, none of the other decisions that we make will matter." And so I think one of the areas -- one of the points I think in leading off on this in dealing with the Hill is -- that's a place where I think everybody will be in agreement.

Thank you all very much.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you.

Q Thanks.

PBS

April 7, 2009

## Interview With Defense Secretary Gates

**Jim Lehrer Newshour (PBS), 7:00 PM**

JUDY WOODRUFF: Secretary Robert Gates, thank you very much for talking with us.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES: My pleasure.

WOODRUFF: As we sit here at the Pentagon in Washington, President Obama is right now in Iraq talking to the troops, meeting with Iraqi leaders. What is his message to the Iraqis?

GATES: I think, first of all, his message to our troops is one of appreciation and gratitude for their dedication and their service. I think his message to the Iraqis is, almost certainly, keep on doing what you're doing; keep on resolving problems politically; keep on working at reconciliation; get ready for your elections. We are going to keep our side of the bargain in terms of the agreement, in terms of draw-downs of troops and you have to step up to your responsibilities now, too.

WOODRUFF: You've obviously been in Iraq many a time. What would you hope the president would take away from this visit?

GATES: Well, I hope that he will be successful in encouraging the Iraqi leadership to continue working together. And I hope that he will – in fact, I am confident that he will come home impressed by the caliber of our men and women in uniform out there.

WOODRUFF: The violence has been escalating recently. In fact, there was a car bomb today, I guess, in a Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad. The U.S.'s pledge to get most of the troops out - 19 months, most of them will be out by next year. But if this violence were to step up considerably, is there a contingency plan?

GATES: I think the president always has the authority to, as commander-in-chief, to change his plans. But I think the view of our commanders is that, while there are some of these spectacular attacks, overall, the level of violence continues to be quite low compared with, particularly, 2007 and the first part of 2008, in fact, at levels not seen since 2003.

I think what we're seeing is al Qaeda trying sort of as a last gasp to try and reverse the progress that's been made through these attacks. But these car-bomb attacks generally are the signature kind of thing that al Qaeda in Iraq does.

WOODRUFF: Are they reversing the progress?

GATES: I don't think so, no. And, in fact, I think it's been quite impressive how people, how resilient people have been in Baghdad, in Iraq in general.

WOODRUFF: President Obama has used part of this overseas trip not only to emphasize he's different from his predecessor, but to reach out to the Muslim world, especially with that speech in Turkey. As somebody who's observed U.S. national security up close for three decades, do you think this is something that's going to pay dividends?

GATES: I think it will. I think that - I gave a speech last year in which I made the comment that, how can it be that the nation that discovered public relations is being out-communicated by a guy in a cave? The reality is, I think we probably have not done as well as we should have in terms of reaching out to Muslims and making clear that what we're concerned about are violent extremists. This isn't the war against Islam. And I think the president is communicating that message.

I think the challenge for the rest of the government is to figure out how we do that on a more comprehensive and continuing basis.

WOODRUFF: Is that process underway?

GATES: Yes, it is.

WOODRUFF: Anything you want to flesh out about it?

GATES: Well, I mean, it's basically under the auspices of the State Department. We do a fair amount in theater in Iraq and Afghanistan and our commanders have the capability to do some of the strategic communications, but, fundamentally, it's a State Department responsibility.

WOODRUFF: Let's talk about the Robert Gates defense budget that you unveiled yesterday. Now, the United States is in the middle of two wars and a serious recession. Is this the right time to haul out a major, dramatic overhaul of not only defense spending, but military strategy?

GATES: Well, the reality is, this is nothing new. I've been talking about this for 18 months; it is the heart of the national defense strategy that was issued last fall in the Bush administration that I issued and it's really more about simply recognizing the enduring requirement for the capabilities to fight these irregular or hybrid conflicts than it is a major strategic shift. It's really, as I put it yesterday, fundamentally, the modernization programs of our traditional strategic and conventional weapons still account for about half of our budget. Dual-purpose capabilities that work in any war scenario count for about 40 percent.

And what I'm trying to put at the table are representatives of those who spend about 10 percent of the budget. Their work has been funded principally through supplementals over the last six or seven years. I want to get that capability into the base budgets so that it will continue and we don't forget, as we did after Vietnam, how to do what we're doing right now so successfully in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

And it's really not as much about cuts; I know that there's a lot of focus on cuts because of four or five major programs. But it's really a rebalancing: How do we sustain the capability not only to fight the wars we are in, but also, how we preserve the hedge to fight any future conflict.



WOODRUFF: So, practically, when it comes to Afghanistan, how does this change what the U.S. is able to do over the next two to five years in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, the wars themselves are still being funded principally in 2009 by a supplemental and in 2010 with an overseas contingency fund. But what we are putting into the budget, for example, \$2 billion worth of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that are at the heart of our success in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

We're increasing our capacity for helicopters, which are in huge demand in Afghanistan. We are doing a lot to build up the special operations forces, more people, more special operations-oriented lift and mobility. So there are a number of aspects of this that are going into the base budget as long-term capabilities for the United States that obviously will pay dividends in Afghanistan as well.

WOODRUFF: At the same time, the president clearly made an effort on this trip overseas to talk to our allies in Europe about giving the U.S. more help in Afghanistan. There's a lot of words of support but not much support in terms of people and materiel. How can the U.S. achieve the goals that your administration has set out for Afghanistan without that additional help?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think it's important and probably no one has been more outspoken than I have in terms of asking the Europeans to do more. The truth is the Europeans have fulfilled all the commitments they have made; it's just that the requirement goes beyond the commitments they've made. And, frankly, I was surprised, pleasantly, by the outcome in France of the NATO summit because I had not anticipated that they would provide additional combat troops, perhaps some small numbers for election security.

But not only did they commit several thousand more troops, but hundreds of police trainers; they committed to a lot of civilian experts. They committed resources to the Afghan trust fund, the NATO trust fund to sustain the Afghan military forces. So I think that they actually came through with a quite a lot compared, I guess, to my expectations based on the defense ministers' meeting in Krakow last month.

WOODRUFF: Is that enough?

GATES: Well, it's never enough, but it is a significant contribution, I think.

WOODRUFF: You are calling, as you said, for more money to fight the terrorists, the irregular warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq and less for so-called conventional warfare preparation, theoretically places like China and Russia. But some experts we're already hearing expressing concern about the conventional military buildup in China, considered the one nation that could eventually seriously challenge the United States. Is this a prudent time to reduce emphasis on conventional warfare?

GATES: I think what we're trying to do is not reduce emphasis on conventional warfare, but be more selective about the weapons systems that we fund to fight that kind of a fight. I'm not cutting the F-22; I'm not recommending the F-22; I'm simply recommending that the program set in 2005 was to build 183 of these aircrafts. I'm simply saying, let's finish that program and then let's focus on buying large numbers of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35, which has 10- to

15-year newer technology, has some capabilities that the F-22 doesn't have.

The F-22 is a great airplane, all you have to do is ask the pilots who fly it, but – and it will remain in the inventory, but there is no military requirement for more than 183 of them, 187 with those that are in the supplemental. So we're doing that, we're building additional ships, we're doing more in the way of theater and tactical ballistic-missile defense. We're converting more ships to have ballistic-missile defense that would help against China. So I think there's kind of a misunderstanding of exactly what it is we're trying to do here. We're trying to be more selective about systems that actually work and that can be delivered in a reasonable period of time than some of these exotic systems.

WOODRUFF: But by ending production in – down the road, of the F-22 Raptor, I'm already reading that shutting it down is going to mean the loss of tens of thousands of jobs. Was that something that weighed on you as you made that decision?

GATES: Well, we can't be oblivious to the impact that these decisions have on people, but the information that's available to us shows that the direct employment of the F-22 will go from about 32,000 in – I'm sorry, from about 24,000 this year to about 11,000 in 2011. But Joint Strike Fighter will go from 38,000 people working this year to 82,000 people that work on that plane in direct support in 2011. So there are puts and takes. I think we've done a good job of taking care of the industrial base in the shipyards and the workers there in the decisions on the shipbuilding.

So we're not oblivious to the employment aspects, but to be perfectly honest, there isn't a single defense program anywhere, procurement program, that doesn't have an impact in somebody's hometown and somebody's state. And so if you're going to bring any discipline to the Defense Department budget, if you're going to try and make any selectivity, have any selectivity in terms of what you fund and don't fund, it will have an impact somewhere.

WOODRUFF: Well, speaking of that, so many defense secretaries before you have tried to cut this or that or change this or that weapon system. Congress has essentially patted them on the head and said, fine, and then gone off and done exactly what they wanted to do. We were already hearing resistance from the Congress; what makes you think it's going to be different this time?

GATES: Well, for one thing, there's a big push in Congress for acquisition and procurement reform in the Department of Defense, and so I think we'll keep that upfront and say, you know, it's all well and good to talk about acquisition reform, but that means tough decisions have to be made. Like when programs are out of control, when they're six years late, when they're twice the cost that they were originally forecast, something has to be done. Something has to give. My hope is that because of the economic circumstances at home, because of the magnitude of the decisions that we're making and recommending, that in fact, the Congress will put aside parochial interest and do what's in the best interest of the country as a whole.

WOODRUFF: Quick question on missile defense. You are not cutting the entire thing, but there are significant cuts. Already, though, we're hearing senators both sides of the aisle, members of Congress saying this is going to hurt national security, hurt homeland security. What do you say to them?

GATES: We have two threats: theater and tactical ballistic missiles and ballistic missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states like North Korea. We are significantly increasing the missile defense capabilities to deal with the theater and tactical threat, from Iran or Hezbollah or others like that, in a number of different ways – a lot of money being added to the budget.

We are not cutting the number of interceptors in Alaska. We are going to fund – robustly fund research and development to keep enhancing their capabilities. We are keeping alive the airborne-laser program, we are just not buying a second research platform. We're going to make do with one 747 to do this research. The procurement program was completely out of control. It was 20 747s and so on and so forth. So I think we are doing a lot. We do very well with terminal defense, with THAAD and the theater missile. We do very well at midcourse with the ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California.

Now, we're continuing to do research work on the boost phase, where they're just coming off the pad, and we have several programs, some of them classified, that are aimed at taking care of that. So I think we have really strongly supported missile defense, and I think that what we have taken out of the budget, frankly, were some experimental capabilities that were really not intended for the rogue-state missile threat, but rather a much larger threat. So I'm trying to conform our program to our policy. Our policy is to have a missile defense and it was – as it was in the Bush administration, our policy is to have a missile defense against rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea. That's what our program does.

WOODRUFF: Two other quick things: So when it comes to Bob Gates versus the Congress on this, how do you stack each one up?

GATES: Well, first of all, I don't think it's me versus the Congress. I think there's going to be a lot of debate in Congress on these issues, and I think that there are a lot of people up there who are going to look very seriously and analytically at this, and my hope is that – and I will work with them. These things are always have to be worked out jointly, between the administration and the Congress, at the end of the day, and I'll work with them. But I think that we clearly need to move in a new direction. My guess is there's more support for doing that and for the kind of discipline I'm talking about than would appear from some of the press statements.

WOODRUFF: And finally, we started out talking about President Obama. You are the only holdover in the cabinet from the Bush administration. You've worked – is this now your eighth president?

GATES: Yes.

WOODRUFF: You've worked for – I think people are really curious to know, what is working for this president like compared to the – all of his predecessors you've gotten to know?

GATES: Well, I try to not compare the ones that I'm working for currently with ones I've worked for in the past. Someday I'll –

WOODRUFF: Well then just, what's it like –

GATES: Someday maybe I'll do that.

WOODRUFF: Well then, as a standalone, what's it like working for President Obama?

GATES: I've been very impressed at how well the national security team has come together. He's very thoughtful, he's very analytical and I find him willing to listen. And he said he would listen to the commanders, with respect to both Iraq and Afghanistan, he has. So it's a pleasure working for him.

WOODRUFF: And as a Republican working for a Democratic president?

GATES: Well, you know, I've tried always to do this job and the jobs that I've had in government, at CIA and elsewhere, in a completely nonpartisan way. I continue to do that and I don't find it awkward.

WOODRUFF: Secretary Robert Gates, we thank you very much for talking with us.

GATES: My pleasure.

# Remarks With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith, and Australian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon

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**Hillary Rodham Clinton**  
Secretary of State, Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, DC  
April 9, 2009

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** Before I get started and talk about the important and substantive meeting we had today, I want to say a word about the situation involving the *Maersk* ship. Secretary Gates and I are fully engaged in this matter. We consider it a very serious matter. These people are nothing more than criminals. And we are bringing to bear a number of our assets, including naval and FBI work in order to resolve the hostage situation and bring the pirates to justice. Piracy may be a centuries-old crime, but we are working to bring an appropriate 21<sup>st</sup> century response.



Today, it's been a great pleasure to host not only my colleague, Secretary Gates, but also Foreign Minister Smith and Defense Minister Fitzgibbon for this year's Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations. As President Obama said a few weeks ago when he met with Prime Minister Rudd, there are few countries that have been closer than the United States and Australia. And I think holding this AUSMIN meeting during the Obama Administration's first 100 days underscores the importance we attach to our alliance and our belief in the strength of our partnership to meet bilateral, regional, and global challenges.

We had a far-reaching discussion that was indicative of the shared values and common approaches we take on many issues. We talked about our cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, how we will intensify our efforts to defeat extremism, strengthen the rule of law, and promote economic development. We look forward to discussing these issues with the international community at the April 17<sup>th</sup> Pakistan donors conference in Tokyo.

We also discussed Iran and the ongoing efforts of the international community to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. We discussed the important goal of nonproliferation and a world without nuclear weapons, and how we will work together to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime.

And of course, we talked a lot about Asia. The United States is back engaged more fully in Asia. We need to expand our partnerships in the Asia Pacific region to address a wide range of concerns, from security issues to the economic crisis to climate change. We appreciate the constructive advice of our friends, and we are listening. Our commitment to a more rigorous, persistent engagement with the countries of Asia goes hand in hand with the work we do together with Australia. And our conversation underscored what a valuable partner Australia is in this endeavor, how we can use smart power to achieve shared security and shared prosperity.

The AUSMIN communiqué, which has been agreed upon and distributed, highlights several other outcomes of the meeting today. But let me just conclude by saying what a pleasure it was for me personally to host this important meeting, how very pleased I am with the discussions we had, and how much I'm looking forward to building on our valuable and enduring friendship. So thank you both very much and your delegations for coming, and now let me ask Foreign Minister Smith to address you.

**FOREIGN MINISTER SMITH:** Well, Madame Secretary, thank you very much for that. And on behalf of the Australian

the very positive and constructive and substantive conversation we've had today.

Mr. Fitzgibbon and I have been in the United States, in Washington, for the last two days. Yesterday, we had a series of bilateral meetings, as you and I did. And today, of course, we had the formal AUSMIN Consultations. The AUSMIN Consultations underline the importance of the alliance relationship between Australia and the United States. This is an alliance relationship that has served us very well for 60 years or so, and it remains an indispensable part of Australia's security, strategic, and defense arrangements.

We've been having AUSMIN meetings since 1985, so next year in Australia will be the 25<sup>th</sup> AUSMIN that we conduct in 2010. And it has become the important premier organizational institution so far as the alliance is concerned.

In addition to the importance of the relationship between Australia and the United States, as Secretary of State Clinton has indicated, we traversed the array of important global issues, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, including Iran, including our shared commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, the abolition ultimately of nuclear weapons, and our concern about proliferation, particularly North Korea and Iran.

We talked extensively about the importance of the United States engagement in the Asia Pacific, and we welcome very much – welcome very much – the very strong message from the new Administration that the United States wants to enhance its engagement in the Asia Pacific. And the Secretary of State's first visit to Indonesia, China, Japan, and Korea reflected this, and we welcome that very much.

Mr. Fitzgibbon and I were very pleased with the positive and constructive conversation that we had. Of course, we spoke about Afghanistan, and within the context of the overarching strategic review conducted by Mr. Riedel, which was effectively – which is effectively now, following the Afghanistan meeting in The Hague last week, now we believe an international consensus to pursue a greater military contribution, but importantly a greater civilian capacity-building and training contribution, and at some stage, the need for political dialogue amongst the Afghanistan leadership.

In that context, of course, we had a discussion about what, if anything, more Australia could do in the civil reconstruction or training area, in military contribution, and also, importantly, any temporary contribution we could make for the election in August of this year. Those discussions were very helpful, and Mr. Fitzgibbon and I will take the benefit of those discussions back to Australia to discuss with the prime minister and our other cabinet colleagues. No decisions were made, no requests made, and no commitments given, but it was a very helpful discussion so far as the Australian Government coming to a conclusion about what, if anything, we can do further to help. And as I've indicated publicly over the last couple of days, we expect that that decision will be made in a matter of weeks. So we expect in the very near future to be able to make and announce a formal decision on that matter.

Madame Secretary, thank you very much for your hospitality and for the constructive and positive dialogue that we've had today. And we look forward to welcoming you and Secretary of Defense Gates to Australia next year for the AUSMIN Consultations. And of course, in the meantime, as is always the case, both of you are welcome warmly to attend Australia anytime you feel like it. Thank you.

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** Thank you very much.

**MR. WOOD:** The first question will be from Matt Lee, Associated Press.

**QUESTION:** Hi, Madame Secretary and gentlemen.

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** Hello.

**QUESTION:** I'm wondering if Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton could be a little bit more specific about the – what the U.S. is doing in this pirate situation right now in terms of this individual incident. But also, I'm wondering if I can ask all of you what exactly can and should be done to address what seems to be the root cause of this, which is the instability and insecurity in Somalia.

**SECRETARY GATES:** Let me take the first part of the question and ask Secretary Clinton to take the second part.

I really don't have a lot to add to what Secretary Clinton said. We are monitoring the situation, obviously, very closely. The safe return of the captain is the top priority. We obviously have a naval presence in the area and other assets, and we are obviously looking at our options. But again, foremost in our minds is the safety of the captain.

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** With respect to the general problem posed by piracy off the Horn of Africa, the State Department has been in the lead in helping to put together an international task force. There are a number of nations now, ranging

increase the effectiveness of what we are doing, including the recruitment of additional partners to be part of the surveillance work that is done. But we also understand that the instability in Somalia is a contributing factor to those who take to the seas in order to board ships, hijack them, intimidate and threaten their crews, and then seek ransom.

If there is any good news in this, it is that, thus far, these matters have not resulted in loss of life and violent conflict. And that is an important consideration, which is why, as Secretary Gates said: we are following this carefully and monitoring it. We have an American citizen who is currently being held hostage by the group of individuals in a lifeboat. So we are watching this and intend to do all we can to make sure there is no loss of life.

I guess I would conclude by saying that this is an old scourge. One of the very first actions that was undertaken by our country in its very beginning was to go after pirates along the Barbary Coast. And it's important that we come up with an international resolution of this, and we will be consulting closely and widely to determine what else other countries are willing to do and what further steps the international community believes should be taken.

**MR. WOOD:** The next question Michael Rowland, Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. Secretary Gates, when you do get around to asking formally for more Australian help in Afghanistan, will you be seeking combat troops as well as military trainers and civilians? And Minister Fitzgibbon is that something Australia will countenance?

**SECRETARY GATES:** Well, let me just make two observations. First, Australia has been there with us throughout and has been in the thick of the fighting, has lost too many of its sons. And I think that the way that I would put it is the way I described our goals when I was at Krakow for the defense ministers meeting, which is, obviously, in all of these areas, civilian, military, military training, police training; we and the Afghans can use all the help we can get. What Australia is prepared to do is clearly up to the Australians.

**FOREIGN MINISTER FITZGIBBON:** I'd like just to preface my answer by thanking Secretaries Clinton and Gates for making themselves available so early in the period of the new Administration. We had very fruitful discussions today. We appreciated it very much.

Look, we did have also a very productive discussion about Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of course, the discussion today gave both Minister Smith and I a greater appreciation of the new strategy and how it will work, and we again come out of the meeting with a conclusion that this is a good strategy, it's a welcome strategy, and Australia certainly supports that strategy.

Of course, we talked about what the partner nations more generally can do to further promote progress in Afghanistan. We talked about the military side. We talked about the civil side. We talked about the reconstruction side. From Australia's perspective, we would always, of course, consider any request from our closest and most important ally. The important thing from our perspective is: Would an additional contribution from us in concert with additional contributions from other partner nations further progress -- further achieve a progress in Afghanistan and, on that basis, allow us all to go home sooner rather than later?

**MR. WOOD:** The next question will be from James Rosen of Fox News.

**QUESTION:** Thank you very much. A question for each of the American officials: Secretary Gates, on the day when the Obama Administration is announcing its request for \$83 billion in supplemental war funding, I wonder what you make of the criticism that has arisen both specifically of this request, but more broadly of the President's expansion of the war by democratic lawmakers in Congress.

But first, Madame Secretary -- (laughter) --

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** I was getting to feel left out, James.

**QUESTION:** Never. Just one day after the United States announced its latest overture to Iran, specifically the agreement of Ambassador Burns to sit in on all P-5+1 contacts with Iranians, the regime in Iran has made a huge display today of announcing that it is currently operating 7,000 centrifuges. That is approximately 1,500 more centrifuges than what IAEA nuclear inspectors claimed to have observed in February in their latest report. So first, do you believe this claim about 7,000 centrifuges, and do you see it as a rebuff?

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** Well, James, first of all, we don't know what to believe about the Iranian program. We've heard many different assessments and claims over a number of years. One of the reasons why we are participating in the P-5+1

We do not attribute any particular meaning with respect to the range of issues that we are looking to address with the Iranians from this particular statement.

**SECRETARY GATES:** I believe that there is very broad, bipartisan support in the Congress for the decisions the President has made with respect to both Iraq and Afghanistan. There's always a full range of views on the Hill, but I believe that the overwhelming majority approve of these decisions and the policies the President has approved.

Reality is, the alternative to the supplemental is a sudden and precipitous withdrawal from the United States of both places – from both places. And I don't know anybody who thinks that's a good idea. The reality is it would put everything we have achieved in Iraq at tremendous risk, and it would, I believe, greatly endanger our troops, some kind of a precipitous withdrawal. So I think the kind of timetable that the President has laid out in Iraq, I think the approach that he has taken in Afghanistan not only are the right ones, but I think they have very broad support. And all I can say is that I hope on behalf of both Secretary Clinton and myself that the Congress acts on the supplemental as quickly as possible.

**MR. WOOD:** The last question will come from Bernie Lagan of the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

**QUESTION:** Thank you. Yes, I have a question for Madame Secretary and Minister Smith. Given recent reports of cybersecurity issues related to China, issues with both our countries, are you considering putting those issues on the agenda in the trilateral security dialogue with Japan?

**FOREIGN MINISTER SMITH:** Well, can I say that when I'm asked about cybersecurity, I don't identify one particular incident, one country, or one threat. This is a issue which Australia has made it clear we address generally, and there are very strong references to the need to apply appropriate resources to protect against cybersecurity in our recent national security document. This is an issue which all modern nation-states confront. Other than very strongly supporting the ongoing trilateral security dialogue between Australia, the United States, and Japan, we haven't got to what might be on the agenda for that.

But can I say questions of information security have been the subject of discussion between Australia and Japan in the past. But cybersecurity is a growing issue of concern for all of us, for all nation-states, and that was certainly one of the matters that we spoke about today.

**SECRETARY CLINTON:** I have nothing to add to the minister's comment, other than to underscore how important this issue is, and it will deserve and receive a great deal of attention from both of our governments.

**MR. WOOD:** Thank you all very much.


**SECRETARY CLINTON:** Thank you.




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF TRIP TO AUSTRALIA WITH SECRETARY HILLARY CLINTON

Apr. 9, 2009



U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomes defense and foreign affairs leaders to the Australian Ministerial at the U.S. State Department, April 9, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Left to right: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton welcomes Australian Defense Minister Joel Fitzgibbon, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith to the U.S. State Department during the Australian Ministerial, April 9, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 233-09  
April 10, 2009

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### Quadrennial Defense Review To Determine Aircraft Carrier Homeporting In Mayport

The Department of Defense (DoD) announced today that the final decision on whether to permanently homeport an aircraft carrier in Mayport, Fla., will be made during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR will assess the need for carrier strategic dispersal in the broad context of future threats, future Navy force structure, and likely cost effectiveness.

The DoD intends to dredge the Mayport channel in fiscal 2010 to allow the Navy port to dock a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. This action would provide an alternative port for a carrier on the East Coast if a manmade or natural disaster or other emergency closes the Navy's base in Norfolk, Va., or the surrounding sea approaches.

The dredging of the Mayport channel will support any future decisions to permanently homeport a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Additional work to permanently homeport a carrier would include follow-on wharf improvements, infrastructure upgrades for nuclear propulsion plant maintenance facilities, as well as any changes needed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act. The DoD will carefully review these potential costs and will assess the potential benefits associated with an additional homeport on the East Coast before committing to any future direction.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO ALABAMA, PENNSYLVANIA, AND RHODE ISLAND

April 14 – 17, 2009

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      April 14, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates at Ft. Rucker, Alabama

SEC. GATES: Well, thank you all for being here this afternoon. I had a great afternoon here at Fort Rucker. These amazing people here who are training people how to fly helicopters that are so much in demand everywhere, but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, these people are doing something that is in direct support of our warfighters. They do everything from lift to protection to medevac. They do it all.

I came here partly to see what they were doing, but partly also to recognize the role that rotary lift plays in support for our warfighters. And a big part of what I'm trying to do in our budget for fiscal year '10 is recognize the importance of this kind of support for our warfighters and to see how we can increase it and also institutionalize it in the base budget of the Department of Defense.

And so I've added, for fiscal year '10 -- I've recommended the president adding an additional \$500 million to increase the throughput of pilots and maintenance crews for our helicopters, for our rotary lift capability. And that will be -- that will help us train more instructors, help with the infrastructure, probably get some additional airframes, and at the end of the day what's most important, get us more well-trained pilots that can support our warfighters.

Before taking a few questions, I'd just like to add how much I appreciate the local communities around here for their support to the men and women at Fort Rucker. The relationship is always important, and we are deeply indebted to the support that the communities provide for our men and women in uniform. They are the best in the world, and we appreciate what you all do to help take care of them.

So with that, I'll take a couple of questions.

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know. That's a good question. Probably a local reporter, right? I don't know how much. But as the central place for the training of Army helicopter pilots, I would say Fort Rucker will get a significant share.

Q Secretary Gates, the people of Alabama were pretty happy about getting that refueling tanker -- (off mike) -- Mobile. Would you support splitting that contract between Northrop Grumman and Boeing? And what kind of criteria are you -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: I would not support splitting the contract. I think that the -- that's not in the best interest of the taxpayer. Just over the next five years, if we were to split the contract it would probably increase the development costs from somewhere around \$7 billion to \$14 billion. We don't need two different logistics trains, we don't need two different training systems and we don't intend two different maintenance systems.

So I think that we ought to have clean competition, and in terms of the criteria for the competition, I will leave that to our acquisition folks in the Air Force to put those requirements together. We will share those requirements, those criteria, with interested parties, particularly the congressional delegations of the states that have an interest in this, get their input and then make our decision about going forward.

I have announced that I have put money in the FY '10 budget to begin that competition this summer. We're not going to delay it, as has been suggested by some. And so my hope is that we can get on with this, award the contract perhaps early next year, next summer, in 2010, and then get on with building these tankers. They're desperately needed by our Air Force.

Q What is your assessment of Army aviation?

SEC. GATES: Well, I had a very instructive 45 minutes or so with 11 instructor pilots. It's clear that from their standpoint that there is a need for some further infrastructure improvements here at Fort Rucker. Classrooms too crowded, Not enough -- as the helicopters themselves become more high tech, the classrooms have not kept up with that, although I saw an amazing simulation facility here today.

So, infrastructure, more pilot - more instructor pilots. I've been told that there is a need for more up-to-date maintenance facilities. So I got a pretty good list of the wants.

Q Sir, you talked about moving forward on the tankers program -- (off mike). (Off mike) -- the nominee to be the new undersecretary for AT&L now is being held up in Congress. You know, there haven't been nominations even announced yet for some of the acquisition stuff. Is that an impediment to moving forward on -- (off mike) -- programs? Are you meeting with anyone in Congress to discuss this?

SEC. GATES: I have every hope and expectation that Dr. Carter's nomination will be moved in the near future. At a time when most in the Congress believe there is a need for acquisition reform in the Department of Defense, to delay the confirmation of the person who is supposed to lead that effort clearly is counterproductive. And we have a secretary of the Air Force, we have a chief of staff of the Air Force, and so I'm confident that we'll have the people in place that we can go forward with this.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said earlier today that you were pleasantly surprised with the reaction to the budget on Capitol Hill, that you hadn't heard directly from any members of Congress. But in many parts of the budget, you've taken away from one program and given it to another, for example, for Lockheed Martin, taking away from the F-22 and giving to the F-35.

Now, my question is, how much did you try to mitigate concerns from Congress by allocating resources that way?

SEC. GATES: I did something perhaps a little strange in Washington. I did this without regard for the politics or trying to balance. I tried to make the decisions based on what I thought with consultation, in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the concurrence of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I tried to make decisions that I thought best served the national security interests of the United States, and everything else was secondary.

STAFF: Last one. Last one here.

Q Secretary Gates, are you aware of an investigation into the use of troops -- (off mike)? And do you have any comment?

SEC. GATES: I just learned about it today for the first time, and no, I don't have any comment.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you hear anything today that would give an indication of, if approved, how soon this \$500 million will translate into actual pilots-- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I talked to some of the pilots in there that are in training, and, you know, if they go through the several segments of training, it can be up to 25 weeks, so -- but my hope would be that -- well, first of all, the FY '10 budget doesn't start until next October. So that's going to give us some time. But my hope would be we could use that time between now and October to figure out exactly how that money can be best spent so that we can begin seeing some results within a few months. 352

Q That's after the --

SEC. GATES: After the fiscal year begins.

STAFF: Thank you.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I ask you to clarify a statement you made on missile defense? You mentioned that you wanted to end emplacement of additional GBIs at Ft. Greely. Does that necessarily translate into ending production of the orbital vehicle? And if that's the case, does that basically eliminate the -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: I don't think I -- I don't think I took an action on that. My view is that we kept in place and strengthened programs having to do with each aspect of missile defense. Terminal defense, we've added money for both THAAD and SM-3, Standard Missile 3, a significant amount of money to maximize production there. For mid-course, we will sustain the 30 interceptors in Alaska and California and, as I said, robustly fund continuing R&D so that those capabilities can continue to improve. And we have a number of programs, some of them classified, that deal with the boost phase.

I've kept alive the airborne laser. It's clear that that program doesn't make any sense to go to a full procurement, but we are keeping alive the first 747 research vehicle and we will continue to put money into that program because we think high energy or directed energy has some real potential for that.

So I think we -- for those who think we've slashed missile defense and so on, I think we have kept robustly funded each of the three elements of missile defense that makes sense. I would say that we have shifted emphasis perhaps somewhat in keeping the ground-based interceptor program where it is with additional funds for research and development, but we have put substantial funds into the terminal phase, into THAAD and SM-3, in no small part because they provide significant additional protection for our troops in the theater and that are deployed, the same thing with the six destroyers that we will convert to having an Aegis missile defense capability.

So anybody who thinks that we're not taking missile defense seriously, that we do not take seriously the North Korean launch and what North Korean capabilities are developing, I think has not looked carefully enough at the program.

Thank you all.



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates April 15, 2009

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Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

SEC. GATES: As you may know this week, I'm visiting each of the service war colleges to discuss the budget recommendations I made to the president. Those recommendations have three principal objectives.

First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, then none of the other decisions we make will matter.

Second, to rebalance the Department of Defense's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we're in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul to our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

During my visit to Quantico on Monday, I was asked why I decided to go to the war colleges to discuss this topic. What I said then and repeat now is that these recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the United States military thinks about and prepares for the future. Fundamentally, proposals are about how we think about the nature of warfare, about how we take care of our people, about how we institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term, about the role of the services and how we can buy weapons jointly, a jointly as we fight, about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

These are just the kind of basic questions you will be dealing with as you go on to staff and command positions. So with that in mind, for the next few minutes I want to give you some more insight into the thinking and analysis behind my budget recommendations and then give you a chance to ask questions and share your views.

In many ways, these recommendations are really a reflection of my experiences in this job for the last two-plus years. Starting with the roll out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win and to survive, while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they return.

And whether the issue is fixing outpatient care, getting better armored vehicles or sending more ISR capability into the theater, I kept running into the fact that the

Department of Defense, as an institution which routinely complained that the rest of the government wasn't at war, was, itself, not on a war footing, even as young Americans were fighting and dying every day. For too long, there was a view or a hope that Iraq and Afghanistan were exotic distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon, the regimes toppled, the insurgencies crushed, the troops brought home. Therefore, we should not spend too much or buy too much equipment not already in our procurement plans or turn our bureaucracy and processes upside down. 354

As a result, the kind of capabilities that were most urgently needed by our war fighters in the theater were, for the most part, fielded ad hoc and on the fly, developed outside the regular bureaucracy and funded in supplemental appropriations that would go away when the wars did, or sooner. The wars we are in clearly have not earned much of a constituency in the Pentagon as compared to the service's conventional modernization programs. That was the root of my frustration when I came here to Maxwell a year ago and spoke about pulling teeth to get more ISR.

And this situation applied as well to programs to care for and reduce the stress on people, the troops and their families, as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. This did not mean that conventional capabilities and preparing for other contingencies were not important. It was a matter of balance. I just wanted to see that the needs of the war fighter on the battle fields, at home or in the hospital had a seat at the table when priorities were being set and long-term-based budget decisions were being made.

And one of the things I've learned since entering government 43 years ago is that the best way to ensure that an organization really cares for and fights for something, as a lioness does for her cubs, is to put that thing in its base budget. So the top-priority recommendation I made to the president was to move programs that support the war fighters and their families into the service's base budget where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and long-term funding. This includes, among others, more funding for medical research and treatment for TBI and post-traumatic stress, improved childcare, spousal support, lodging and education. In addition, priorities such as expanding the ground forces and halting Air Force and Navy manpower reductions were all put in the base budget, as was increased funding for Special Operations, helicopter support and ISR.

With regard to ISR, I would be remiss in this setting if I did not give credit where credit is due for what has been accomplished over the past year. We've seen a dramatic increase in UAV orbits in theater from 23 combat air patrols 12 months ago to 34 today. The Air Force also stood up a second schoolhouse and created an operational specialty for unmanned systems pilots. Due to that second schoolhouse, we are projected to reach 50 combat air patrols by fiscal year 2011.

With Task Force ODIN deployed in Iraq and now Task Force Liberty in Afghanistan, we've seen how a modest expenditure to mate advanced sensors to turbo-prop aircraft can make a huge difference to the men and women at the front. This year's budget recommendations include more funds for hardware and operations support in the area of ISR processing, exploitation and dissemination. These proposals then begin the effort to establish an institutional home in the Department of Defense for today's war fighter as well as tomorrow's.

Another theme underlying my recommendations is the need to think about future conflicts in a different way, to recognize that the black-and-white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range along a broad spectrum of operations and lethality, where near peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics and non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles as well as AK-47s and RPGs. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum-possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Now, even with this in mind, and perhaps especially with this in mind, we cannot ignore the risks posed by the military forces of other state actors. This is a particularly salient issue for this group as the weight of America's conventional and strategic strength has shifted to our air and Naval forces. This brings me to some of our conventional and strategic modernization programs which continue to make up the overwhelming bulk of the department's procurement, research and development accounts.

Broadly speaking, there were several principles or criteria that governed, either in total or in part, most of my major program decisions. The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising but unproven technology while continuing to produce and, if necessary, upgrade systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the transformational satellite program and instead build more advanced, extremely high frequency satellites, the cap the Navy's DDG-1000 ships at three while increasing the buy of Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and to halt the airborne laser at the R&D phase while increase funding for the THAAD missile defense program.

Furthermore, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat or to accomplish roughly the same mission, we should look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the last two decades, procurement remains overwhelming service-centric.

The combat search and rescue helicopter had major development and cost problems, to be sure, but what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the service's modernization portfolios.

Another important thing I looked at was whether modernization programs, and in particular the ground modernization programs, had incorporated the operational and combat experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem with the Army's future combat systems vehicles was that a program designed nine years ago did not adequately reflect the lessons of close-quarter combat and improvised explosive devices that have taken a fearsome toll on our troops and their vehicles in Iraq.

And finally, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, quantity has a quality all of its own.

This was a major consideration with ship building and air superiority. I recommended accelerating the buy of the littoral combat ship which, despite its development problems, is a versatile vessel that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big blue-water surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don't necessarily need a \$1 billion ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates.

I also believe these budget recommendations demonstrate a serious commitment to maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American military strength for more than six decades. This budget increased funding from 6.8 (billion dollars) to \$11.2 billion for the fifth-generation F-35, accelerating the development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and begin rolling out these aircraft in quantity, more than 500 over the next five years and more than 2,400 total for all the services.

When examining the issue of air supremacy, we had to ask, what is the right mix of weapons to deal with the span of threats? What are the things that the F-22 and only the F-22 can do? And where would it be required? There is no doubt the F-22 has unique capabilities that we need, the penetration and defeat of an advanced enemy air defense and fighter fleet. But the F-22 is, in effect, a niche, silver-bullet solution required for a limited number of scenarios to overcome advanced enemy fighters and air defense systems. In assessing the F-22 requirements, we also considered the advanced stealth and superior air-to-ground capabilities provided by the fifth-generation F-35s now being accelerated in this budget, the growing capability in range of unmanned platforms like the Reaper and other systems in the Air Force and the other services.

I also considered the fact that Russia is roughly six years away from an initial operating capability of a fifth-generation fighter, and the Chinese 10 to 12 years away. By then we will have more than 1,000 fifth-generation fighters in our inventory. In light of all these factors and on the recommendations of the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff, I concluded that 183, program of record since 2005, plus four would be a sufficient number to meet the F-22 requirement. To be clear, the F-22 program of record is codified in the FY 2005 budget. And all budgets since will be completed, not cut, as many have said and written.

Looking forward, the goal of our weapon-buying is to develop a portfolio, a mixture of weapons whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies on or beyond the horizon. Focusing exclusively or obsessively on a single weapon system to do a specific job or confront a single adversary ignores what a truly joint force can and must do in the 21st century.

Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I've made specific recommendations. In other areas, however, I believe that we need to develop a more rigorous, analytical framework before moving forward, the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review. I should note that this will be the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons learned on the battlefield these last few years, lessons about what tactics future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue, especially given our conventional dominance in the air and at sea.

Again, as noted earlier, the one thing that is clear is that going forward, the distinction between high-end and low-end war, between mechanized battles and stability operations are blurring to the point where the old definitions of conventional and unconventional are no longer useful. War in the future will often be a hybrid blend of tactics where a nation state might deploy a mix of crude and advanced weapons to limit options, disrupt freedom of action or deny access to key assets such as forward air bases.

We started to address these developments in the budget recommendations. The QDR, as well as other reviews such as the Nuclear Posture Review, will examine these issues more closely. That's one reason I delayed some decisions to do with, for example, amphibious operations and the next-generation cruiser, to develop an intellectual construct through which we can more precisely determine requirements and capabilities which will be needed in the future.

A few examples relevant to the Air Force. Before continuing with a program for a next-generation manned bomber, we should first assess the requirements and what other capabilities we might have for this mission as well as the outcome of post-START arms control negotiations. We know that the future will see an increase in unmanned systems of all kinds, with further reach and more capabilities. What are the implications of this reality on the number and types of manned fighters we need since the UAVs must be considered a key component of our air capabilities? And since UAVs do not need to refuel midair, how will this affect the number of tankers we buy? Having said that, I'm committed to moving forward on the rebid for the Air Force's KC-X tanker as quickly as possible, hopefully by this summer. Our aging

tankers, the lifeblood of any expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement, <sup>357</sup> as you all know better than I do.

As we look toward the future, I've directed the QDR team to be realistic about scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be required. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the wars we're best-suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries with unlimited time and resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we've built on land, sea or air to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

While there are many other issues that arose and many other decisions that were made, I'd like to provide time for some questions, so I'll close with a final thought. Throughout its history, the Air Force has constantly reinvented itself to meet evolving threats, one of the primary reasons we have such air dominance today. Indeed, all of the services are challenged to find the right balance between preserving what is unique and valuable in their traditions while at the same time making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and to be prepared for future threats.

With this budget, I've tried to make a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs across the services. I ask you to do the same, to look outside of your area of specialty and outside your military branch, to look forward with the certainty that the battlefield is constantly evolving and that the Air Force and the joint force must always be evolving with it.

Thank you for your time this morning, and thank you for your service to our country.

(Applause.)

And I'd be happy to take some questions. Yes.

Q Sir, Lieutenant Colonel Bill Higgins.

It concerns me these days that most Americans seem more likely to know who won "American Idol" than who won the Medal of Honor. And I've had the opportunity on an ad hoc basis over the last few years to go out and speak to several high schools and civic groups and most Americans really have little impact with folks in uniform these days, which is also I think, troubling.

My question is whether the DOD has any thoughts or plans to institutionalize an outreach program to link up the American people with men and women in uniform?

SEC. GATES: I think that the way we do that best -- I think one of the worries all along about the all-volunteer force -- although, first I'll tell you that I don't know a single senior military officer, and have never known one in the last 15 years, who does not think the all-volunteer force is the best military the United States has ever had and wouldn't trade it for a draft for anything.

That said, one of the worries, I think, has been: Does an all-volunteer force create some kind of an elite element that has no connection to the American people as a whole? And what I would say is that our best connection to the American people and to communities is in fact the reserve component -- the National Guard and the Reserves. And the fact that they have been turned into an operational reserve and have served in Iraq and Afghanistan and go back to their communities, I think, has had a huge impact.

And I think that if you think that the military has been -- has become too detached from the American people and the American people too unappreciative of the sacrifices that people in the military make, all you have to do is read about what happens in towns and cities when our fallen come home where the whole town turns out and the Boy Scouts and everybody with flags and lining the streets and so on. 358

So I actually think that there is a good connection there. And frankly, it was one of the reasons why I made the decision -- if the families agreed -- to allow media coverage at Dover so that the American people could see in the most real and graphic possible terms the sacrifices their sons and daughters are making.

So I -- this is actually, as I go around the country and so on, this is something I had worried about. But I think the reality is -- particularly with the Guard and the Reserve and just the general feelings of the American people for the military -- this is not a concern that I have, frankly.

I got an e-mail from a friend of mine who was the vice president for Student Affairs at Texas A&M when I was there. And he was in the Dallas Airport in one of the terminals. And some guy came into this crowded terminal and shouted: "There's a bunch of guys coming back from Afghanistan downstairs!" And he e-mailed me that the entire terminal emptied as everybody went down to greet them. So I don't think this is a problem.

Q First of all, sir, I'd like to say that I appreciate your budget and I think that it's appropriate. There's just one question I have with it and that is we've got 19 B-2s at Whiteman and we're going to buy about 1,700 Joint Strike Fighters.

Given the strategic imperative -- both of nuclear deterrents and conventional power projection and the flexibility -- you mentioned both strategic and flexibility -- that the bomber provides for all phases of conflict, the B-2 was used in the initial phases of the war, B-52s would be ones that have been used extensively in Phase IV now -- doesn't it make sense to re-shift some -- pare down some of that Joint Strike Fighter so that we can buy more of the long-range persistent strike threat?

SEC. GATES: Well, this is one of the questions that I have that I think that the Quadrennial Defense Review has to address.

You know, there are a lot of decisions that I made that I haven't talked about publicly. For example, I decided not to make any change in the 76 deployed B-52s. That force will remain.

But the question is, depending on where post START ends up, if we go down significantly in the number of nuclear weapons that we have deployed, the question is whether the traditional triad makes sense anymore and I think we have to address that.

Also, when you're looking for a long-range persistent capability, maybe a manned bomber isn't the answer. An F-16 has a range of about 500 nautical miles. Reaper has a range of 3,000 miles. It has a long-dwell capability. And as you all know, we can load them up with weapons.

So I think these are the kinds of issues that we have to look at in the QDR as we look forward to a very different environment than we had during the Cold War.

Q Sir, Lieutenant Colonel Looney (sp) from the Air War College. I'm an HH-60 pilot from the Alaska Air National Guard.

The advocacy for Air Force rescue seems to have been sidetracked by the CSAR acquisition program to the detriment of our mission itself.

While I recognize the arguments that drove your recommendation to cancel the CSAR-X, I know that Air Force rescue is not a single -- or does not merely have a single purpose itself.

As you know, we've performed thousands of joint and coalition recoveries in CENTCOM, largely because the operational flexibility of our profession transcends the risk capability of other recovery forces and allows often -- often provides the best chance, if you will, to recover a wounded soldier from the point of injury back to effective trauma care within the golden hour.

Given the dichotomy between the current issues and that objective, can you clarify for us please what is your vision for Air Force rescue as a core function of the Air Force and what would be a more sustainable approach at this time?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think if you look back at the last time we had a pilot down in hostile territory it was in the Balkans. And it ended up involving several services, including the Special Forces, to rescue that pilot.

The notion of -- the design of CSAR-X was basically to have a helicopter with the range to rescue a downed pilot 250 miles inside enemy territory. Frankly, the notion of an unarmed helicopter going 250 miles by itself to rescue somebody did not seem to me to be a realistic OPCON.

So what I want is a joint effort. We're also not just talking about Air Force pilots here. So what I want -- and we will start in FY '10 -- is to look at what we do next in combat search and rescue. It is an area where we need more capability. There's no question about that. But this is an area a little bit like the presidential helicopter where the acquisition and the requirements process got out of control.

And so I think that we need to take a hard look at it and a joint look at it and then go ahead and try to do something that we can bring to fruition. But again, I think it needs to be a joint capability.

And nobody cares more than I do about that golden hour. And one of the things that I've been devoting a lot of time to over the last several months is how do we get our troops in Afghanistan within that envelope of the golden hour? And we polled grade 60s from around the country and we added 10 helicopters a couple of months ago to give us the kind of -- and three additional field surgery -- surgical hospitals to Afghanistan to make sure that we could provide that capability for the troops there. That need will be met when the next -- when the combat aviation brigade deploys in May.

So I feel very strongly about giving our troops on the ground the assurance that somebody will be there within an hour for them. And we will provide that capability, but we will provide it, I think, more on a joint basis and an affordable one.

Q Sir, I'm Colonel John Stabilo, Seminar 14 from the Philippines.

On the aspect of operational tempo, based from your operational program budget, what are the expectations of the Northeast and Southeast Asian region?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think this is an area where we've had some -- this is where our Section 1206, 1207 money comes in in terms of building partnership capacity.

I think one of the major themes in the Department of Defense over the past couple of years that is codified in my FY '10 budget recommendations -- and probably will be as well in the QDR and in a number of the plans that have been put forward by the combatant

commanders -- is how do we build partnership capacity? How do we leverage our capabilities -- both our people and our equipment -- in order to strengthen our allies and our partners in a way that makes it unnecessary for us to deploy forces? 360

I think we've had a good program in that respect in the Philippines. We have programs like that in a number of countries in Southeast Asia. I think that's the key for us.

I might just say it's -- it's not responsive to your question, but speaking of Southeast Asia: I think it's interesting, as we look at the piracy problem, to see how Southeast Asia had handled it compared with the problem that we have around Somalia.

There was a huge piracy problem in the Strait of Malacca and hijackings were almost as frequent as they are now off of Somalia. But our partnering -- first of all, because of the actions of governments in the region -- Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and others -- combined with our help, our training and our equipment, they have basically significantly reduced piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

The problem is that in the Somali area, we don't have governments like we had in Southeast Asia to be able to deal with the problem. And I think that's what makes Somalia a particularly difficult issue for us.

But I think that the OPCON in Southeast Asia, obviously, will depend -- I mean the operational tempo in Southeast Asia, obviously, will depend on what's going on there. But it seems to me right now the focus of our efforts is on building this partnership capacity.

Q Good morning, sir. Welcome to Air War College. My name's John Rogers from Seminar 13.

Question: Last year, the DOD identified cyberspace as a war-fighting domain. And since then, many of the components that are currently the Air Force, Army, Navy have been struggling with working in that domain.

Is there any discussion at the DOD level of establishing a new department for that domain -- for cyber domain?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the things that we're looking at right now is whether to -- there's a major review of this going on under the auspices of the National Security Council. But one of the things that I'm looking at is establishing a sub-unified command STRATCOM for cyber and that would encompass NSA and various other capabilities.

One of the things this budget does that I haven't talked about very much is significantly increase the throughput of training of experts in cyber. We graduate about 80 students a year from our cyber schools right now. We're going to quadruple that by FY '11. And the services have -- the service chiefs have basically been told that filling all the slots in the cyber school is their first priority.

We are desperately short of people who have capabilities in this area in all the services and we have to address it. This is going to be one of the significant new realms of conflict, in my view.

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Sherry Griffin from Air War College.

I'm a career acquisition officer and we've been reforming the acquisition process my entire career. But what I would like to ask is the part we always seem to ignore are those things outside of the service -- specifically, lack of competition and the fact that we have a very small base to work with, which creates lack of negotiation room on our part -- and



also, the influence of the lobbyists and the Hill, quite frankly. The dual tanker buy 361  
perfect example of that.

I wonder if you could comment on what we're doing in those areas. Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, I'm opposing the dual tanker buy -- (applause) -  
- laying my body down across the tracks. (Laughter.)

We have, I think, neglected both on the civilian and the military side proper attention over the last number of years to our cadre of professional acquisition officers. The Defense Contract Management Agency has gone from 27,000 people in the early '90s to 9,000 today. We have probably cut our acquisition and procurement professional force in half.

I think, I've been told, that we have something like 50,000 contractors helping us manage contractors and that's what I want to change in terms of beginning to put acquisition professionals -- civilian and uniformed -- in place. And our goal is to put about 20,000 professional acquisition officers in place by the end of the five-year defense plan, starting with 4,100 this year or in FY '10.

It's also not been the most promising career in any of the services. And the truth of the matter is, as a career field, contracting and acquisition nearly disappeared in the Army. And thanks to the efforts of General Casey and Secretary Geren, they have allocated several general officer slots to the acquisition career field.

We have a requirement, when I get the recommendations from the service secretaries for promotions from colonel to brigadier general, there is a requirement that acquisition people be considered and be given some preference in their career field. And if they don't meet the standard either for jointness or for acquisitions, then they get questions back from me about why not.

And so I think the key thing for us first is to strengthen our own capabilities in acquisition -- both numbers and professionalism. We will never get away from the outside influences on our procurement and acquisition programs.

Several months ago I read a biography of Henry Knox, the first secretary of War. And he commissioned the first ships for the Navy -- six heavy frigates including the Constitution, the Constellation and so on. They were built in six different shipyards in six different states. This is a problem that has been with us from the beginning of the republic and I don't think that I'm in any position, probably, to change it.

But I do think that we can take advantage of the concerns on Capitol Hill about our acquisition process and about some of the horror stories that have come out, frankly, to try and leverage that in making some changes and doing things that make sense from the standpoint of the services and the nation's defense.

And I've been somewhat surprised, frankly, by the lack of a stronger reaction to the proposals that I've made. And maybe, partly, that's because there are so many of them. And maybe partly it's because I'm in the eye of the storm and Congress is in recess, but I anticipate that the next few weeks will be fairly exciting on the acquisition front.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm Lieutenant Colonel Ed Bond with the Colorado Air National Guard, student here at Air War College.

Relative to the acquisition question, but not limited to that, you referenced turning the bureaucracy on its head. During your tenure, we've seen operations, procurement, war-fighter care successes where we first had to defeat our internal DOD bureaucracy before we could "benefact" the problem -- in some cases.

My question to you is, as my colleagues and I graduate from these Air Force leadership schools, what is your intent for us to be bureaucracy busters, if you will, or to go out into the system and make change?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, the leadership of the department and of the services has to create the conditions that make it possible for you to do that. And that's one of the purposes behind my putting a number of these programs in the base budget.

As long as they're funded in supplementals, as long as end strength is funded by supplementals, it is always going to be at risk. As long as these family-oriented, quality-of-life programs are funded in supplementals, they will be at risk.

As long as some of these capabilities that we need in the fight today, whether it's the anti-IED effort, whether it's ISR, whether it's wounded war (sic) care, whether it's MRAPS, any of those things. If they're done outside the bureaucracy and outside the system, as all of them have had to be done, they are vulnerable and testimony to, I think, the deficiencies of the regular bureaucracy.

What we have to figure out, and I confess that I don't have a full answer to your question, the Department of Defense is a place that -- where most people come to work every day planning and acquiring for the next war.

How do we establish within the Pentagon bureaucracy, the Department of Defense bureaucracy, the ability to walk and chew gum at the same time? The ability to plan for future war and, at the same time, having people come to work every single day saying, what can I do to help the war fighter today?

What can I do to fund an MRAP within the Department's budget, within the base budget, out of funds that we have, and deal with some of these other current needs of the war fighter?

Part of the problem, frankly, in my view, is leadership. It is the willingness of service heads and of the secretary and the deputy secretary and others to say, we're going to do this. You're going to do this. You're going to find room in your base budget to take care of these problems, and then seeing to it that it happens.

I don't know any other way to make it happen. It's not creating another office. It's not creating a parallel bureaucracy. I think that that is a formula for -- probably for, if not paralysis, disaster. So we just have to --

I think it's a matter of, at the end of the day, of leadership in making the system take into account the needs of the war fighter who is in the fight today. And that may -- and that means making very tough acquisition decisions. It means choosing this over that, because there isn't enough room in the budget for both.

And I -- and that's why it's so important to look across the services for joint procurement and joint capability so that a single service doesn't bear the full burden of completing a mission that actually will involve all of the services.

And so figuring out how to do that, I think, is the challenge that lies in front of us and, frankly, is a challenge that the Department has not met, in my view, up to now.

Yeah.

Q Good morning. Lieutenant Colonel Conway. I'm a Louisiana Guardsman, a student at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.

I have a health care question, and I'd like to give a little context.

For at least the past 20 years, service in terms of timeliness, options and transparency has steadily declined to the point that uniformed members receive worse service than Medicaid recipients.

In fact, TRICARE does not even require professional board certification for its physicians. Neither of the two pediatricians serving the huge Maxwell/Gunter community are board-certified.

It occurs to me that TRICARE takes advantage of a community that is unwilling and unused to complain.

What initiatives are afoot to get us back to the standards we enjoyed with uniformed health care providers were the norm and not the exception or, in any event, the standards enjoyed by other government employees, no less those who do not work at all?

SEC. GATES: TRICARE has been an interesting experience for me. (Laughter.) I live in parallel universes.

I get briefings at the Department of Defense, at the Pentagon, and I get shown surveys and data that tell me how well TRICARE is doing and how popular it is and how well it compares with private HMOs and others. And I leave the room feeling gratified.

And then, no matter what base or post or port I visit in the United States, I hear a very different story from every soldier, sailor, Marine and airman that I talk to. And I hear an especially different story from their spouses. And let me tell you, the spouses are never afraid to speak up. (Laughter.)

And it is a concern to me, because I hear a lot of complaints about TRICARE. I hear about long waiting lines; I hear about bureaucracy; I hear about having to travel significant distances to get appointments with specialists; the difficulty of getting appointments, and so on.

By the same token, I would tell you health care is eating the Department alive. We will spend \$47 billion on health care in the Department of Defense in FY '10. We --

The treatment of our wounded, the medical care of our wounded is the best in the world. It's the post- medical care, it's the outpatient care that was such a problem. Now, thanks to the --

One of the things that I've wanted to do while I was in this job was make a significant improvement in the quality of the hospitals on our major facilities. Thanks to the stimulus package, we are going to build two, I think, world-class hospitals at Fort Hood and at Camp Pendleton.

But I also want the services to try and find the money significantly to upgrade the hospitals at other posts.

Because it seems to me that if we have world-class hospitals on our posts, that A, we relieve some of the pressure on TRICARE, and maybe we'd get more retirees who are willing to come back on post or on base to use those facilities if they're world-class, and if they have the kind of physician care that people expect and want.

Another part of the problem is we cannot get any relief from the Congress in terms of increasing either co-pays or the premiums.

TRICARE is now about a dozen years old. There has not been a single premium increase allowed since the program was founded. What medical plan in the nation has not had a single increase in the premium or co-pay in the last dozen years?

And we're not talking about the active force, and we're not talking about the force that's qualified for Medicare. We're talking about the people who retire at 50 and are in their 50s and are not qualified for Medicare yet.

So they are mostly working another job, and employers will influence them to stay on TRICARE because it saves the employer money.

So the system, the health care system for the Department, I think, has -- we have incredible people working it, incredible people devoted to it, especially the nurses and the doctors and so on.

But there is no question that we have a systemic problem, in my view, with TRICARE, just because when the chairman and I go to any one of our military facilities, we hear exactly the same kind of concerns that you expressed in your question.

We're trying to deal with it. We're trying to find -- we are, as I said at the outset in my remarks, we're fully funding health care this year. We're not leaving any gaps for -- that we can't take care of. But it is a real problem.

And I know that's not a very satisfactory answer to your question, but it does tell you I know there's a problem, and we're trying to work with it.

Yeah?

Q Sir, Lieutenant Colonel Bradbury from Camp Seminar 11.

I was a PRT commander in Afghanistan a couple years ago, and my question concerns stability operations and command relationships.

We're continuing to see some of the same mistakes that we've been making for several years over there, most recently in January with American conventional and sometimes Special Forces conducting kinetic operations and raids without Afghan troops or police in the lead, or in some cases, apparently, even present.

My concern with this is not only do these things cause problems with our relationships with the Afghans, but they undermine the credibility of the government and the security forces that we're trying to build capacity in and connect to their population.

Has there been any thought given to redefining the supported and supporting command relationships within Afghanistan among provincial reconstruction teams and some of the other actors to maybe make the PRTs, because of their breadth of expertise, a coordinating authority within their provinces so that they can better synchronize non-kinetic capacity-building activities as well as provide some kind of oversight on the kinetic actions to prevent us from continuing to shoot ourselves in the foot?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that there are two measures that are being taken to try and address that concern. The first is General McKiernan has taken some significant steps in terms of changing the way we go about our operations in Afghanistan, including by the Special Forces, to try and take even further measures to avoid civilian casualties and to avoid antagonizing the local population.

This is something I worry about a lot. If we lose the Afghan people, we've lost the war. And it's one of the reasons I have concerns about the size of our military footprint. 365

Our forces, when we're completely built up, and NATO's forces, will be pretty close to 100,000 troops. The Soviets had 110 (thousand) to 120,000 troops. They didn't care about civilian casualties, and they lost the war.

And so I'm very concerned how do we keep the Afghan people on our side by helping them understand that we're on their side? And so one of the things that I've talked to General McKiernan about and that he's taking very seriously is how do we partner on virtually all of these operations so that if somebody's knocking down the door, it's an Afghan knocking down the door, not an American, or not a German or somebody else.

And I think we've made a lot of strides in that. And they are doing a lot more joint planning with the Afghans, and I think the kind of operational changes that he has made and that our commanders have made are going to make a difference in that respect -- and especially as we are able to train up more Afghans, so that there are more of them to participate with us.

The other thing that's being done is there is recognition of the need to have better civilian-military coordination.

So one of the things that the defense ministers of RC South have agreed on is to establish a civil cell in the RC South command structure so that there is better coordination between what the PRTs are doing and the other assistance programs, and what military operations are.

It's just being stood up. My hope is that if it works effectively, we can encourage the others in the other regional commands to replicate it, to get at the kind of problem that you're talking about.

But you've identified a serious problem. I do think General McKiernan has taken the proper steps to try and deal with it.

One more question?

Yes, sir. You get the last word.

Q Good morning, sir. Hap Arnold from the War College.

Manned airborne electronic attacks for the Air Force goes away around 2011, and the Navy's building enough Growlers just for fleet defense. What are your thoughts or vision for this particular mission area?

SEC. GATES: I think the honest answer to your question is I haven't addressed that yet. I don't know.

So that was quick, so I'll take one more. (Laughter.)

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I'm -- Dave -- (inaudible). I'm in the War College here, in Seminar 7.

Over the last year, we've had quite a thrashing, the nuclear community in the Air Force. And you've identified some bureaucratic trends that you fight with every day that affect us.

If the service doesn't make it a high priority in this situation -- you have a combatant command with myriad assigned mission areas that probably wasn't necessarily making it a high priority either, and then an office within your staff that's primarily assigned to provide oversight and watch over all these things and make sure you as the secretary don't get surprised. 366

Part of the principal problem, however, is that at a certain level everything becomes self-assessment and self-reporting. So as you've identified in the TRICARE example, it's hard for you sometimes to get the ground truth.

Has there been any indication or any thought that changing, at least in the nuclear arena, the reporting process or assessment process to give you an independent look? For example, the Federal Advisory Committee report you're going to get soon is largely staffed by people who work in those same offices, who normally provide the same self-reporting to you.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think in the nuclear mission there were several problems. And I think one of them was that from a career standpoint, as we began -- beginning, really, with Desert Storm and ever since, the career opportunities and the opportunities for rapid advancement were not in the nuclear force. They were in the fight. They were in the -- for people who were deployed and ultimately in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

And so there was -- a lot of good people left the nuclear mission in the Air Force to go to what appeared to be a more attractive and promising career field.

But another big piece of the problem was that because of the -- for many of the same reasons, the nuclear mission was denied resources and didn't have the kind of money necessary to fund, in many cases, the new maintenance equipment; to fund the kind of training, continuing training that was required; to fund new facilities, and so on. It was almost like the nuclear mission had been BRAC'd.

And so this year, for the FY '10 budget, I've put in \$700 million for nuclear surety, to try and begin to remedy some of these problems for the Air Force.

But the Air Force has -- Secretary Donnelly and General Schwartz, I think, have taken a number of steps to enhance the career field, to provide additional training, but also to change procedures, to change the approach, to change the mentality of folks in the nuclear mission, including going back to the --

When I was in the Air Force, I was in the Strategic Air Command. And every wing commander dreaded the ORI [operational readiness inspection] coming in, because they knew their career depended on whether they passed or not.

And the Air Force, the nuclear mission, is getting back to those kinds of independent assessments of how people are doing. And a lot of units have had trouble getting past those.

It's not because they aren't doing their jobs, but it's because the kind of rigor that those kinds of inspections brought 30 or 40 years ago are being re-instilled in the inspections that are going on now. And so people are being restored to a high level of performance.

So I think that the changes that the Air Force has made over the past year or so in the nuclear mission, the additional resources, give me a lot of confidence we're on the right track in that mission.

Thank you all very much.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates April 16, 2009

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Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pa.

STAFF: Take your seats. It is a rare privilege for an Army War College, any war college class, to be addressed by the secretary of Defense. We are very fortunate today to welcome the honorable Dr. Robert M. Gates. Before entering his present post, Secretary Gates was president of Texas A&M University, the Aggies, the nation's seventh largest university. He also served as the director of Central Intelligence, from 1991 until 1993. Secretary Gates is the only career officer in CIA's history to rise from entry-level employee to director. He served as deputy director of Central Intelligence from 1986 until 1989, and then as assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor at the White House from 1989 until 1991.

Secretary Gates is also the author of the memoir, "From the Shadows: the Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War," published in 1996. A native of Kansas, Secretary Gates received his bachelor's degree from the College of William & Mary, his Master's degree in history from Indiana University, and his doctorate in Russian and Soviet history from Georgetown University.

As we know well, Secretary Gates is presently responsible for planning and executing Defense Department responsibilities as it conducts operations overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously executing transformational changes throughout the entire department of Defense.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in a warm war-college welcome for our secretary of Defense, the honorable Dr. Robert M. Gates.

SEC. GATES: (Applause.) Good afternoon. Please, be seated.

It's a real pleasure for me to be here on my first visit to the Army War College. Glad to hear there are a few Aggies in the audience.

I understand that you've got the Jim Thorpe sports days coming up next week so -- (cheers) -- so best of luck in your competition against the other war colleges. Although in light of the "jointness" I'm going to talk about here today, I assume you'll appreciate, I can't play favorites. (Laughter.)

This week I'm visiting each of the war colleges to discuss the budget recommendations I have made to the president. Those recommendations have three principal objectives: First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which

in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter. 368

Second, to rebalance the department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

Earlier this week, I was asked why I decided to come to the war colleges to discuss this topic. What I said then and repeat now is that these recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the U.S. military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future, about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter over the long term, about the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight, about reforming the requirements and acquisition process. These are just the basic -- kind of basic questions you will be dealing with as you go on to staff and command positions.

So with that in mind, over the next few minutes I want to give you some insight into the thinking and analysis behind the budget recommendations, then give you a chance to ask questions and share your views.

In many ways, these recommendations reflect my experiences in this job for the last two-plus years. Starting with the rollout of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win and to survive, while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they come home.

During this period, I frequently heard from troops and commanders about what they needed most to complete their mission. I went to the hospitals and talked to the wounded, and I went to the bases and talked to the families. And I read about shortfalls and other problems in the newspapers. And then I raised some of the same issues at the Pentagon and heard the building's response about what could be done and how fast. And whether the issue was Walter Reed, fielding MRAPs or sending more UAVs and ISR assets to theater, I kept running into the fact that the Department of Defense as an institution, which routinely complained that the rest of the government wasn't at war, was itself not on a war footing, even as young Americans were fighting and dying every day.

For me, everything kept coming back to a simple question: Is this really the best we can do for our kids?

Much of the problem, in my view, stemmed from the fact that for too long there was a belief or a hope that Iraq and Afghanistan were exotic distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon -- the regimes toppled, the insurgencies crushed, the troops brought home.

Therefore we should not spend too much or buy too much equipment not already in our long-range procurement plans or turn our bureaucracies and processes upside down. I believe this was the issue with MRAPs, a million-dollar-plus vehicle not thought to have much use beyond Iraq.

As a result of these failed assumptions, the capabilities most urgently needed by our warfighters, were for the most part fielded ad hoc and on the fly, developed outside the regular bureaucracy and funded in supplemental appropriations that would go away when the wars did, if not sooner.



I concluded that the wars we are in had not earned much of a constituency in the Pentagon, as compared to the services' conventional modernization programs. This did not mean that the conventional capabilities and preparing for other contingencies wasn't important. It was a matter of balance. 369

I just wanted to see that the needs of the warfighter -- on the battlefield, at home or in the hospital -- had a seat at the table, when priorities were being set and sustainable, long-term, base budget decisions were being made.

And one of the things that I've learned, since entering government 43 years ago, is that the best way to ensure that an organization really cares for and protects something is to put that thing in its base budget.

So the top priority recommendation I made to the president, was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and sustainable long-term funding.

This shift, at a cost of \$13 billion, should be of special significance to our ground forces, which have borne the human and material brunt of the current conflicts.

In these latest recommendations, we put the growth of army end-strength in the base budget while capping the number of BCTs at 45. The purpose was to make sure that the Army has fully manned units ready to deploy, which should mean relying less on stop-loss.

We also boosted funding for helicopter support by \$0.5 billion, most of it for the Army, which from day one has been an urgent need in Afghanistan. I was at Fort Rucker on Tuesday and had a chance to see firsthand the outstanding work of the Army aviation community, which gave me a better understanding of the challenges they face, ramping up the Army's rotary wing assets.

Other shifts, of direct import to today's warfighter, include more funds for ISR, Special Operations forces, train-and-equip programs and inter- and-intra-theater lift.

Furthermore, this budget enhances and institutionalizes support for soldiers and their families. These programs include more funding for medical research and treatment for TBI and post-traumatic stress, improved child care, spousal support, housing and education.

These proposals, then, begin the effort to establish an institutional home in the Department of Defense for today's warfighter as well as for tomorrow's.

Another underlying theme in the budget recommendations is the need to think about future conflicts in a different way, to recognize that the black-and-white distinction between conventional war and irregular war is an outdated model. In reality, the future is and will be more complex, where all conflict will range along a broad spectrum of operations and lethality, where even near-peer competitors will use irregular or asymmetric tactics, and non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles.

In one sense, we have been living this reality for some time. In the opening days of Iraqi -- Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. armor and infantry units squared off against the Republican Guard at the front while being harassed by the Fedayeen Saddam in the rear. Last year Russia's relatively crude, though brutally effective, invasion of Georgia using armor and artillery was augmented with a sophisticated cyber-attack and a well-coordinated information operations campaign.

Future adversaries will continue to employ new, readily available technologies in sinister ways.

They will adapt and develop new tactics, techniques and procedures as fast as they can, imagine ways to gain any advantage over us, to get inside our decision cycle. This kind of warfare will require innovative, versatile leaders and capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility and agility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict. 370

Now, even with this in mind -- and especially, perhaps, with this in mind -- we cannot ignore the risks posed by the military forces of other state actors. This brings me to some of our conventional and strategic modernization programs, which continue to make up the overwhelming bulk of the Pentagon's procurement, research and development accounts.

Broadly speaking, there were several principles or criteria that governed, either in total or in part, most of the major program decisions. The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising but yet -- as-yet-unproven technology, while continuing to produce and, when necessary, upgrade systems that are best in class and that we know work.

This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the transformational satellite program and instead build more advanced, extremely high-frequency satellites; to cap the Navy's DDG-1000 ships at three while increasing the buy of Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers; and to halt the airborne laser at the research and development phase while increasing funding for the THAAD missile-defense program.

Furthermore, where different modernization programs within services exist to counter roughly the same threat or accomplish roughly the same mission, we should look more to capabilities available across the services.

While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. Combat search-and-rescue helicopter, for example, had major development and cost problems, but what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that, in the real world, is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the services' modernization portfolios.

Finally, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99-percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-percent solution, the multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, "Quantity has a quality all of its own."

This was a major consideration with shipbuilding and air supremacy. I recommended accelerating the buy of the Navy's littoral combat ship, which, despite cost and development problems, is a versatile vessel that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big blue-water surface combatants. As we saw last week, you don't necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates.

With regard to air supremacy, this budget increased funding for the fifth-generation F-35 stealth joint fighter by more than \$4 billion. This commitment will accelerate the F-35's development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and begin rolling out these aircraft in quantity: more than 500 over the next five years, and more than 2,400 for all of the services.

And finally, I looked at whether modernization programs had incorporated the experiences of combat operations since September 11th. This was particularly important to the ground services, which will be in the lead for irregular and hybrid campaigns of the future.

Parts of the Army's Future Combat Systems program have already demonstrated their adaptability and relevance. For example, the connectivity of Warfighter Information Network will dramatically increase the agility and situational awareness of the Army's combat formations. And we'll accelerate its development and field it, along with proven FCS spinoff capabilities, across the entire Army. 371

But the FCS vehicle program was, despite some adjustments, designed using the same basic assumptions as when FCS was first designed nine years ago. The premise behind the design of these vehicles was that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency and, above all, near-total situational awareness would compensate for less heavy armor -- a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan and that we are likely to see elsewhere as other adversaries probe for and find ways to turn our strengths against us.

Though the Army currently holds a comfortable margin of dominance over any other conventional ground force, the service clearly must have a new, modernized fleet of combat vehicles to replace the Cold War inventory. But before we spend 10 years and \$90 billion, and before we send young soldiers downrange, we had better be sure to get it right, or as close to right as we can. So I'm recommending that we cancel the existing FCS vehicle program, reevaluate the requirements, technology and approach in light of our combat and operational experience in two wars; and then re-launch a new Army vehicle modernization program.

There will be substantial money in the FY '10 budget to get started and to make sure this happens. My hope is that we can be ready to move forward in FY '11. And I have directed that all of the money for FCS in the out-years be protected to fund the new vehicle modernization program.

Looking forward, the goal of our weapons buying is to develop a portfolio, a mixture of weapons whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies and beyond the horizon. Focusing exclusively or obsessively on a single weapons system designed to do a specific job or confront a single adversary ignores what a truly joint force can and must do in the 21st century.

Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I've made specific recommendations. In other areas, however, I believe we need to develop a more rigorous analytical framework before moving forward, the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review. I should note that this will be the first QDR able to fully incorporate the numerous lessons learned on the battlefield these last few years; lessons about what mix of hybrid tactics future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue.

We've started to address these developments in the budget recommendations. QDR, as well as other assessments, such as the Nuclear Posture Review, will examine these issues more closely. And there's one reason I delayed some decisions to do with, for example, amphibious operations and the next-generation cruiser: to develop an analytical construct through which we can more precisely determine future requirements and what capabilities will be needed.

As we look toward the future, I've directed the QDR team to be realistic about the scenarios where direct U.S. military action might be required; where, for example, it would be necessary or sensible to send a large conventional ground force. The QDR will also take a look at the Army's force mix of heavy and light, active and reserve, and assess whether shifts are needed.

In all, we have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the wars we've traditionally been best suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who also have limited resources.

And as I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built on land, sea and in the air to stop the Soviets during the Cold War. 372

While there were many other issues that arose and many other decisions that were made, I'd like to give you plenty of time to ask questions. And so I'll close with a final thought.

Behind my desk at the Pentagon are portraits of two Army officers -- Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Marshall. During the Second World War, Marshall said, "We must do everything we could to convince the soldier that we were all solicitude for his well-being. I was for supplying everything we could, and only then requiring him to fight to the death when the time came. You couldn't be severe in your demands unless the soldier was convinced you were doing everything you could to make matters well for him."

These budget recommendations are a start at turning that sentiment into long-term institutional commitment.

Eisenhower and Marshall, of course, had the industrial muscle of a fully mobilized United States behind them during the Second World War. We do not have that today, and will not in the future. But looking ahead, even without Rosie the Riveter, victory gardens and bomb drives, we must find a way to institutionalize a sense of urgency and higher levels of responsiveness in our defense bureaucracies.

The challenge is balancing support for the warfighter in an era of persistent conflict, where good-enough solutions are needed in months, weeks, or better yet, tomorrow, with an entirely different dynamic for conventional and strategic programs, which can take many years to achieve the desired level of technology overmatch. Reconciling these two paradigms is one of the most vexing challenges facing our military institutions, but one I am committed to tackle.

All of the services are challenged to find the right balance between preserving what is unique and valuable in their traditions while at the same time making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and being prepared for future threats. With this budget, I've tried to make a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs across the services. I ask you to do the same, to look outside your area of specialty and outside your military branch, to look forward with the certainty that the battlefield is constantly evolving and that the United States Army, as part of a joint force, must always be evolving with it.

Thank you for being here this afternoon. Thank you for your service to our country. Thank you. (Applause.)

Now I'd be happy to take some questions. (Pause.) I was assured you wouldn't be shy.

Q Mr. Secretary, here in the back.

SEC. GATES: Okay.

Q My name is Jimmy Vaughn, a DOD civilian. Sir, what are some of the options that you are considering as it relates to piracy off the coast of Somalia?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't want to get too far ahead of our headlights here. We're thinking about this right now. The NSC is carrying forward frequent meetings, practically daily, in terms of looking at those options.

I think that the challenge that we face is -- I think I read somewhere the fact that we're dealing with about 400,000 square miles of ocean, and we hardly have enough ships in the whole Navy to be able to patrol that size area. We do have an international presence there. And I think there is a willingness to take action, more than there has been in the past. We saw that with the French action days before ours.

I think what's instructive is to look at the challenge that we faced not too long ago in the Straits of Malacca, where there was a significant and growing piracy problem. However, in that situation we were dealing with established governments with real capabilities -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and others. And on their own and with help from us, they developed surveillance and patrol capabilities that have significantly reduced the piracy problem in the Straits of Malacca.

So the core problem we have is the ungoverned space that is now Somalia. And one of the questions that I think we have to look at is, do we look at what we might be able to do with regional governments in Somalia; for example, the government in Puntland, which has more capacity than -- seems to me -- than perhaps the government in Mogadishu right now?

Obviously, we're also looking at military -- various military options. We already have our own people on merchant ships that are carrying all-military cargos, that we've chartered. And so the question is, where do you go from there? And we'll also be meeting with -- in fact, I think it's starting today -- meeting with the companies, the shipping companies, to see what they're prepared to do. This clearly has to be a partnership between us and them.

So I think there are a number of options. I think ultimately the solution has to come from the landward side, but the truth of the matter is the poverty is so great and the reward so tremendous and the future prospects for most of these young men so bleak that even if a fair number of them are killed or captured, I think the incentives for them to keep trying will continue to be there.

And so it's a question of how you raise the cost so high that perhaps it begins to diminish their enthusiasm, but at the same time see if we can't get some greater sense of order on land. But there's no question about it, it's a challenging problem.

You had a question back here.

Q Colonel Xavier Stewart. The reserve component, in particular the National Guard, has become an operational force deployed for numerous contingency and combat operations. What are you doing to ensure that the National Guard can fulfill its multi-mission homeland defense security role and provide the continuum of service when it has only 55 percent of its authorized equipment?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, the equipment levels is something that I've -- well, let me start at the broadest level. One of the concerns that I had when I came to this job 29 months ago was whether -- I had several basic questions when I arrived in the job. One was whether the end strength of the Army and the Marine Corps was big enough to accommodate the missions. Another was whether we were on the right path in Afghanistan, obviously had to deal with Iraq.

Another one that I had, though, was whether we had pulled a bait- and-switch on the Reserve component. For a long time, the Reserve component had been a strategic reserve, and we had, I think by inches, turned it into an operational reserve. And I think a lot of people who had spent some years in the Guard and the Reserve and were accustomed to summer training and to monthly meetings and helping in national disasters or in local and regional disasters suddenly found themselves deployed for 15 months to Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I think that that still is a concern for me, for people who have been in for a while. I think the youngsters that have joined since -- since 9/11, and particularly since 2003, have known full well what they were getting into. 374

We have in the -- from between FY '09 and FY '13, I think \$39 billion in the budget for equipment for the National Guard. And what is different about this buy for the National Guard is that, instead of getting equipment that the active force no longer uses, the Guard will be getting the same equipment that the active component is using. So there will be a level of capability in the Reserve component that we have not had before.

Our goal is to get the equipment fill -- the traditional equipment fill for the Guard, going back years, has been about 70 percent. And based on what I'm being told, we should be back at that level by about FY 2011. So there's a lot of attention being paid to the Guard. We've gone ahead, taken the recommendation of the National Commission on the Guard and Reserve, established the director of the Guard Bureau as a four star -- appointed Craig McKinley to that job, Air Force general.

So I think that we're taking a lot of steps to try and not only take care of the equipment fill, but deal with a lot of the implications of the operational role of the Guard.

I think one of the most important things we're doing now is this Yellow Ribbon project. One of the worries that I'd had, for example, with PTS with the Guard and Reserve is that, where in the component, in the active component, soldiers come back and are still around their NCOs and their company officers and so on, and so people are in a position -- and their buddies -- people are in a position to observe them and see if they are detecting any behavioral changes. When the Guard returns, it disperses. And so I think one of the benefits of this Yellow Ribbon program is for us to be able to reach -- have the resources and the capability to reach out and make sure that we're staying in touch with those young men and women as well.

So I think we're on the right path with the Guard and Reserve, but not just in the equipment. One of the questions that I have asked the Quadrennial Defense Review to look at is this balance, or this role for the Guard and Reserve between a strategic reserve and an operational reserve, and what should that balance be going forward. So that's a fundamental question I think that we have to look at. Yes, sir.

Q Good afternoon, sir. Lieutenant Colonel Roger Cott, and thank you for joining us this afternoon. As we study strategic leadership here, we've learned that many times a strategic leader makes decisions and policies that are often resisted by various stakeholders for political, financial and sometimes moral reasons. As a strategic leader, sir, what have been some of your greatest ethical challenges as a leader making decisions, and what recommendations do you have to us?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know if -- I would say I probably faced more ethical issues when I was director of CIA than as -- (laughter) -- the secretary of Defense.

I -- my watchword -- and actually, I suppose it's a function of having spent a lifetime in the CIA, or a good part of it -- I believe that the guiding star for me has always been adherence to United States law. And in recognition and embrace of congressional oversight, I have always believed that, as painful and frustrating as it can be, that congressional oversight, whether it's over intelligence or over the military, is absolutely essential to keeping us all on the right track.

I'm sure that we'll have some interesting conversations on the Hill over the next few weeks over a few of the decisions that I've made. I actually kind of look forward to that -- (laughter) -- because I think there is, in some areas, some misunderstanding about the nature of the decisions that have been made.

I think that, you know, in terms of the core of your question, in terms of ethical decisions, I think it's -- I guess I would put it in a different way. And what is -- what I have always observed about the president -- presidents, and President Obama is the eighth president I've worked for -- and I find to be the same case as secretary of Defense -- and that is that by the time a decision gets to the president, there are no good options.

If there was a good option, somebody at a lower level would have made the decision and taken credit for it. (Laughter.)

By the time a decision gets to the president or the secretary of Defense, more often than not, you're having to choose the least bad option. And you have -- and the question that is always difficult is sending people into battle and knowing the cost.

I think that has probably for me, in this job, that has been the toughest part of the job. The rest of it all pales by comparison. Knowing what I have to do but knowing the consequences; (audio break) toughest (audio break) not sure it's an ethical issue, but it is the toughest moral issue that I face.

Q (Inaudible.)

I'd like to get your thoughts on a recent Homeland Security document, as well as comments made by Secretary Napolitano, that returning soldiers coming back from the war could be a source of extremists, sort of alluding to perhaps terrorist activity.

SEC. GATES: Well, I've seen -- in fact, I just read about that in the newspapers for the first time this morning. And I haven't read the document. I haven't seen the document. I haven't been briefed on the document. And so having had things taken out of context more than a few times myself, (laughter) I think, before I comment on it, I'd probably better read it.

I realize that's an amazing practice in Washington. But -- (laughter, applause.)

Q (Inaudible.)

Sir, you talked about, you know, the force and focusing on personnel and mentioned several things in the medical arena and quality of life, in terms of taking care of personnel. And then you spent some time about the programs.

My question is, in terms of personnel, thinking more to human-capital development, things that help generate adaptability, versatility and leadership, and dealing with the complexities you laid out, what sort of programmatic changes or emphasis did you devote to improving human-capital development, if any?

SEC. GATES: Actually, I think that -- I think that the -- I think that particularly the uniformed services do an outstanding job of developing the human capital. So my decisions were basically -- or my recommendations have been basically focused on protecting the human capital, of making sure that we are taking care of the human-capital asset that we have in the military. I don't think there's any organization in the world that devotes more effort, more time, more money and more creativity than the American military to developing the men and women in it.

One of the areas where I am working on developing human capital is on the civilian side. For a variety of reasons, a good part of the civilian part of our business has been turned over to contractors. I discovered as we were doing these budget things that I actually have more contractors working for me in the Office of the Secretary of Defense than I do civil servants.

And so I have -- I -- and we are in much the same situation in the whole acquisition, contracting and procurement world. We have thousands and thousands and thousands of contractors helping us manage contractors. And so first thing we're going to do is we're going to rebuild the professional acquisition cadre in the Department of Defense, of professional civil servants. And we will probably, over the next five years -- over the five-year defense plan, our goal is to put in 20,000 professionals -- replacing contractors. And our goal is to try and do a little more than 4,000 of those in FY '10, to get a strong start. 376

But on the other side, on professional services and management support, we -- the same thing has happened to us. And so we're going to start trying to replace that or to replace contractors with civil servants in that area as well. And we're looking to replace contractors in FY '10 with as many as 13,000 civil servants, with a total of 30,000 civil servants over the FYDP.

So I think we have to turn our attention back, ironically, to developing our civilian human capital in the Department of Defense. And that's the area where, frankly, we can learn a lot from the uniform services.

Yes, sir.

Q Thank you, sir. Lieutenant Colonel Finney. Do you believe there's a need for reform, such as Goldwater-Nichols, to ensure the whole-of-government approach for dealing with domestic and international issues?

SEC. GATES: You know, the Goldwater-Nichols model came up when Congress was considering creating the director of National Intelligence job. And I wrote a -- I wrote Susan Collins and Joe Lieberman a 16-page, double-spaced paper back in 2004 on why I thought that was a bad idea -- which may help explain why I turned the job down in January of 2005. (Chuckles, laughter.)

The problem is Goldwater-Nichols works in the Department of Defense because, at the end of the day, everybody works for one person, and that one person can make everybody do what they're supposed to do. That is not the case with the intelligence community, and it certainly isn't the case with all of the different elements of the government involved, for example, in national security.

Everybody in the government does work for one person, at the end of the day: the president. But you can't make him the action officer. So -- so I think that, you know, this is an issue that this department has really wrestled with during these wars. And frankly, it's an issue that I have addressed on a number of occasions publicly, in terms of the need to balance our capabilities with greater capabilities on the civilian side.

At the end of the day, it seems to me, two things are required. First, you need structures in the government that allow -- that create an environment in which organizations do have to come together and integrate their work. And I think that the National Security Council is the right place, and I think they're moving in the right direction.

Second, you need to give the other side of -- you need to give the rest of the whole of government the resources they need to do their job. We will spend more on health care in the Department of Defense in FY '10 than the entire foreign budget of the government -- foreign assistance, State Department and so on. If you took every Foreign Service officer in the world, it wouldn't be enough to crew one aircraft carrier.

So until those capabilities are strengthened, the ability of the rest of the government to play their proper role is significantly inhibited. The problem in our government has not been a lack of will in the other agencies. It's been a lack of capacity.



I said I had two things. But I would say there's a third. You have to have leadership, at Cabinet departments and at the NSC, who are willing to work together, in a collaborative and cooperative way, who see themselves as a team. 377

This is a rare thing. For most of my career, the secretary of State and the secretary of Defense weren't on speaking terms. This matters. (Laughter.) In the Reagan administration, not only were the secretary of State and the secretary of Defense not speaking to one another, most of the time, they didn't speak to the national security advisor either. And they all hated the director of CIA. (Laughter.)

So I had said in the past, based on my experience, and I worked on the NSC for four presidents, what advice would I give to a president, in terms of putting together his government, particularly in the national security arena? And I've always said, "Don't hire a bunch of individuals. Hire a team."

Have some sense of how these people are going to work together and whether they will work together. Because if they won't, you will have a hard time being successful.

In a way, I think, President Obama, without us ever having had that conversation, has done that, using this model of team of rivals from Doris Kearns Goodwin's book.

And I would tell you that as was the case with the secretary of State and the national security advisor, in the last administration, I feel that the team we have, in this administration, is a team. I think it's come together very quickly.

And so I think there's a lot of potential to develop the kind of whole-of-government approach. But all three of those criteria need to be met, for it to work.

Yes, sir.

Q (Inaudible.)

I was wondering if you could talk about sort of, in light of the previous question perhaps, the complex contingency operation or nation-building, as I would call it, in Afghanistan and kind of what challenge that presents for the Department of Defense going forward, in terms of sort of who does that, how it should be done, how long it should be done, and the implications for cost and resources.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think if you talk to the -- as you -- as most of you in uniform know, that heretofore, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, a significant percentage of the provincial reconstruction teams have, in fact, been military.

And what I hear when I talk to the brigade commanders, when they do get professional civilians who -- whose lives have been spent figuring out how to help people in developing countries grow better crops or take better care of their animals or put in water systems or educational systems, they are a huge force multiplier. One civilian who knows what they do -- what they are doing and knows it well makes a huge contribution.

And so I hope that the first place -- and I think the first place where you will see this civilian surge in Afghanistan come is in the PRTs, to make those more robust and a higher percentage of civilians in them, people who do this as a profession. This kind of effort is, as everybody in this room knows, not a short-term effort, in terms of trying to bring stability and provide some kind of development.

My view is that the model that I think people should be studying, and probably will study, in terms of military-civilian teamwork and collaboration, is the relationship between Ryan Crocker and David Petraeus in Baghdad. I first joined the government 43 years ago, and

I've never seen anything like it. And they were a seamless team. And my hope is that we will have the same kind of thing in Kabul, because I think it's that kind of effort that's required. 378

But one of the -- one of the biggest challenges that we face in Afghanistan is the coordination of the civilian effort, and it's complicated by the fact that you've got 42 nations in there, not to mention, perhaps, hundreds of NGOs and others. I personally have a huge amount of confidence in Ambassador Kai Eide, and he has finally been given the resources by the U.N. that he needs to do this: a representative in every province, an ability to try and get people together and figure out what needs to be done and what works best.

But I think this is not something -- we finally got this part of it right toward the end of the Vietnam War, with CORDS. We forgot about how to do that. And when I talk about institutionalizing the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, it's not just the fusion of intelligence and operations. It's not just counterinsurgency. It is how you -- it is so we don't forget again, as we did after Vietnam, how to do this. Because it is hard. But, as General Petraeus likes to say, hard is not impossible. Yes, sir.

Q Sir, Colonel Mike Godfrey.

FCS: It's been strongly endorsed by Army leadership throughout the last few years. And it occurred to me, when you briefed everyone on your budget recommendations, that it appeared like a unilateral decision on your part. My question's twofold. One, did Army leadership have a conversation with you about FCS and your recommendation? Were they part of that decision? And two, if they were not, how do you make that decision without that buy-in from the Army service provider?

SEC. GATES: The approach that I had on this -- I -- I'm not smart enough to make decisions without a lot of input from a lot of people. We had meetings on the budget just about every single day from mid -- beginning with a senior leadership meeting in January that included not just the chiefs but the combatant commanders and senior civilians. And we probably had meetings almost every day for three months. I had meetings -- at least two meetings a week with the service chiefs as we went through this long array of programs.

I also -- and I wanted, in particular, for the service chiefs to see what we were doing in the other services. There's always -- there's always the risk that everybody -- each of the services feels like they're -- they are the ones that are being singled out. And I wanted them to see that it was -- that the pain was being shared, and to see the grimaces on the faces of some of their colleagues.

FCS was the hardest decision I had to make, and partly it was because the leadership of the Army was so committed to it. I had a number of meetings. In addition to the group meetings that I just talked about, I had a number of meetings with Secretary Geren and with General Casey. And we talked about it many, many times. And I made a decision that I think it's fair to say they disagree with.

But my view is there are -- I'll give you a couple of -- two or three things that made a big difference to me. First, for a program that had been designed nine years ago, it was either Secretary Geren or General Casey who pointed out within the last 18 months or so, "Gee, the infantry fighting vehicle has a flat bottom and is 18 inches off the ground" -- reflecting no lessons learned.

So they began to figure out how they could put a V-shaped hull on that.

Second, there was to be a common vehicle. And it was to be 30 tons. And we were going to start with a cannon. But as they began working on the infantry fighting vehicle and looking at the lessons learned, in Iraq and Afghanistan, they began adding armor to the



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## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

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### Remarks By Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates At The Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

(Applause.)

SEC. GATES: Thank you all. It's a pleasure to be here for my first visit as secretary of Defense. And based on the weather and the scenery, we may just have to move the Pentagon up here. (Laughter.)

As you may know, this week I visited each of the service war colleges to discuss the budget recommendations I have made to the president. Those recommendations have three principal objectives: First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter.

Second, to rebalance the department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

Earlier this week, I was asked why I decided to come to the war colleges to discuss this topic. What I said then and repeat now is that these recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future; about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term; about the role of the services and how we can buy jointly, as jointly as --how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight; about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

These are just the kinds of basic questions you will be dealing with as you go on to command and staff positions.

So with that in mind, over the next few minutes I want to give you some insight into the thinking and analysis behind the budget recommendations, then give you a chance to ask

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questions and share your views. In many ways, these recommendations are really a reflection **380** of my experience in this job over the last two-plus years.

Starting with the rollout of the Iraqi surge, my overriding priority has been getting the troops at the front everything they need to win, to fight and to survive, while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they come home.

And whether the issue was out-patient medical care or sending more UAVs and ISR assets to theater, I kept running into the fact that the Department of Defense, as an institution which routinely complains that the rest of the government was not at war, was itself not on a war footing, even as young Americans were fighting and dying every day.

For too long, there was a view, or a hope, that Iraq and Afghanistan were exotic distractions that would be wrapped up relatively soon: the regimes toppled; the insurgencies crushed; the troops brought home. Therefore, we should not spend too much, or buy too much equipment not already in our long-range procurement plans, or turn our bureaucracies or processes upside down. As a result of these failed assumptions, the kinds of capabilities that were most urgently needed by our warfighters in theater were for the most part fielded ad hoc and on the fly, developed outside the regular bureaucracy and funded in supplemental appropriations that would go away when the wars did, if not sooner.

I concluded that the wars we are in had not earned much of a constituency in the Pentagon, as compared to the services' conventional modernization programs. This did not mean that conventional capabilities and preparing for other contingencies were not important; it was a matter of balance. I just wanted to see that the needs of the warfighter -- on the battlefield, at home, or in the hospital -- had a seat at the table when priorities were being set and long-term base budget decisions were being made.

And one of the things that I've learned since entering government 43 years ago is that the best way to ensure that an organization really cares for and protects something is to put that thing in the base budget.

So the top priority recommendation I made to the President was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and sustainable, long-term funding. This includes, among others -- among other things, more funding for medical research and treatment for TBI and post-traumatic stress, improved child care, spousal support, housing and education. In addition, priorities such as expanding the ground forces and halting Air Force and Navy manpower reductions were put in the base budget, as was increased funding for special operations, helicopter support and ISR.

Another underlying theme in the budget recommendations is the need to think about future conflicts in a different way, to recognize that the black-and-white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality, where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths -- such as our ability to project power via carrier strike groups -- and where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles. This

kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Nonetheless, some people may think I'm too consumed by the current wars to give adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. In this respect, the lessons of the last few years have implications for all defense programs: lessons about preparing for the kinds of war we are most likely to face and not just the kinds we are best suited to fight; lessons about the limits of technology when faced with the fog, friction and ugly realities of an unpredictable battlefield; and lessons about our internal processes, and where they may come undone when faced with unexpected contingencies, evolving requirements and the prolonged strains of persistent conflict; not to mention the ability of an agile adversary to get inside our ponderous decision-and-acquisition cycle.

All of this goes far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. It goes to the heart of maintaining a defense posture rooted in real-world scenarios with real-world assessments of our capabilities and, perhaps most important, our limits, both institutionally and operationally. As I've said before in other settings, the responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars, not just constantly prepare for them.

Now, even with this in mind -- and perhaps especially with this in mind -- we cannot ignore the risks posed by the military forces of other state actors. This is a particularly salient issue for this group, as the weight of America's conventional and strategic strength has shifted to our air and naval forces.

This brings me to some of our conventional and strategic modernization programs, which continue to make up the overwhelming bulk of the department's procurement, research and development accounts.

Broadly speaking, there were several principles or criteria that governed, either in total or in part, most of my major program decisions.

The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising but as-yet unproven technologies, while continuing to produce and, as necessary, upgrade systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decision to cancel the transformational satellite program and instead build more advanced, extremely high-frequency satellites; to halt the airborne laser at the R&D phase while increasing funding for the THAAD missile defense program; to cancel other programs where costs and requirements creep had spun wildly out of control -- the President's helicopter being a prime example.

Furthermore, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat or accomplish roughly the same mission, we should look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. This was a major factor in the decision to cancel the Air Force's combat search and rescue helicopter, apart from its cost and development problems.

Another important thing I looked at was whether modernization programs -- in particular, ground modernization programs -- had incorporated the operational and combat experiences of

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Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem with the Army's Future Combat Systems was that a vehicle program designed nine years ago did not adequately reflect the lessons of close-quarter combat and improvised explosive devices that have taken a fearsome toll on our troops and their vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. **382**

Finally, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent exquisite, service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build and only then are deployed in very limited quantities.

With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solutions that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers.

As Stalin once said, quantity has a quality all of its own.

With regard to air supremacy, this budget increased funding for the fifth-generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter by more than \$4 billion dollars. This commitment will accelerate the F-35's development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and begin rolling out these aircraft in quantity, more than 500 over the next five years, and more than 2,400 for all services. We also will acquire 31 more FA-18s for the Navy in FY '10, and probably still more in FY '11.

Similar considerations guided my thinking on shipbuilding, though I'm aware that other factors come into play. A few months ago I was reading about Henry Knox, the first Secretary of War. He was charged with building the first American fleet to help combat, of all things, overseas pirates. To get the necessary support from Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six states. So some things never change. (Laughter).

Where the trend of future conflict is clear, I've made specific recommendations. For example, I hope to accelerate the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big, blue-water surface combatants.

As we saw last week, you don't necessarily need a billion-dollar ship to chase down a bunch of teenage pirates. The size of a ship in such cases is less important than having Navy SEALs onboard. To carry out the missions we may face in the future, whether dealing with non-state actors at sea and near shore, or swarming speedboats, we will need numbers, speed, and ability to operate in shallow waters.

We must also examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we're buying. The need to show presence and project power from a piece of sovereign territory called a United States Navy ship will never go away. But we cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000, where, since its inception, the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three, as costs per ship have more than doubled.

One of the things that I'm recommending in this budget is to upgrade and build more Arleigh Burke destroyers, still a best-in-class ship that has been the workhorse of the U.S. surface fleet

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for nearly two decades, and a ship that has proven that it can be upgraded rapidly with new capabilities and technologies.

The United States must not take its current dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms and personnel that will ensure that we remain preeminent at sea.

But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to develop a more rigorous analytical framework, before moving forward, the type of framework that will be provided by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow-on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities.

The purpose was to develop an analytical construct through which we can more precisely determine what will be needed, in coming years, to determine what kind of tactics and strategies future adversaries, both state and non-state actors, are likely to pursue. In this respect, it is important to keep some perspective.

For example, as much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk, since the end of the Cold War, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet, by one estimate, is still larger than the next 13 navies combined. And 11 of those 13 navies are American allies or partners.

In terms of capabilities, the over-match is even greater. No country in the rest of the world has anything close to the reach and firepower to match a carrier strike group. And the United States has and will maintain 11 until at least 2040. I might also note that we have a number of expeditionary strike groups as well, which will in the not-too-distant future be able to carry F-35s.

Potential adversaries are well-aware of this fact, which is why despite significant naval modernization programs under way, in some countries, no one intends to bankrupt themselves by challenging the U.S. to a shipbuilding competition, akin to the dreadnought arms race prior to World War I.

Instead we've seen their investments in weapons geared to neutralize our advantages, to deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action, while potentially threatening our primary means of projecting power: our bases, sea and air assets and the networks that support them.

This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where the loss of even one ship would be a national catastrophe.

We know other nations are working on ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet, whether by producing stealthy submarines in quantity or developing anti-ship missiles with increasing range and accuracy. We ignore these developments at our peril.

The Royal Navy's greatest defeat in World War II, the sinking of the capital ships HMS Repulse and the brand new Prince of Wales by Japanese aircraft, just days after Pearl Harbor, was due in part to a command with little application -- appreciation for airpower and in

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particular the threat posed by a single, air-delivered torpedo.

I've also directed the QDR team to be realistic about the scenarios where direct U.S. military action would be needed, so we can better gauge our requirements. One of those that will be examined closely is the need for a new capability to get large numbers of troops from ship to shore -- in other words, the capability provided by the marine Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. No doubt it was a real strategic asset during the first Gulf War to have a flotilla of Marines waiting off Kuwait City, forcing Saddam's army to keep one eye on the Saudi border and one eye on the coast.

But we have to take a hard look at where it would be necessary or sensible to launch another major amphibious action again. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, how much amphibious capability do we need?

Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and ships to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio, a mixture of weapons and capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies on and beyond the horizon.

While there were many other issues that arose, and many other decisions that were made in this process over the last few months, I'd like to give plenty of time for your questions, so I'll close with a final thought.

Right now, sailors around the world, at sea and on shore, in all kinds of settings, are doing extraordinary things to protect our country and defend our national interests, including a number of things that no doubt would have -- would have Alfred Thayer Mahan spinning in his grave. Indeed, all of the services are challenged to find the right balance between preserving what is unique and valuable in their traditions while, at the same time, making the changes necessary to win the wars we are in and, particularly in the case of the Navy, to be prepared for likely future threats.

With this budget, I've tried to make a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks, and needs across the services. I ask you to continue to do the same thing in your studies here and carry this kind of thinking to your future posts and commands.

Just over 50 years ago, Admiral Arleigh Burke wrote of his beloved service, "The Navy believes in putting a man" -- and today we would add woman -- "in a position with a job to do, and let him do it, and give him hell if he doesn't perform. We capitalize on the capabilities of our individual people, rather than make automatons out of them. This builds the essential pride of service and a sense of accomplishment. And if it results in a certain amount of cockiness, I'm all for it."

Looking forward to the challenges the American Navy will face in the years ahead, you have reason to be confident in your own abilities and in the traditions of leadership and excellence of this great institution. Thank you for your being here this morning. Thank you for your continued service to our country. Thank you. (Applause.)

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Now I'd be happy to take your questions.

Yes, sir?

Q Good morning, sir. Thank you, first of all. Captain Braswell, on the staff here.

Along the lines of what you're talking in competition, one of the things that's kept the Arleigh Burke best in class was the fact that it had two builders. I think the F-18 has probably exerted some downward pressure on the JSF costs. American Airlines and United don't fly just Boeing or just Airbus, and they didn't buy just their aircraft 50 years ago. So how is it that we can be sure that a sole-source, 50-year contract is going to get us the best Air Force tanker for the year 2060?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that, first of all is I would look at it from the other perspective, and that is what are the consequences and costs of having two tankers? First of all, the development costs alone over the next five years would probably grow from \$7 billion to about \$14 billion. Having a sole -- having a split buy offers no opportunity to increase competition, and for them to put pressure on each other in their initial bids or in the way that they put together their proposals.

I think that we are proceeding with a program that, once it gets started, actually is looking at three tranches of tankers: the KCX, and then the KCY and the KCZ. It seems to me that if we encounter problems -- the first buy is, I think, for 179 tankers. If we encounter problems with those, it seems to me you're in a position to reopen the competition and go forward from there.

But I think that if you go with -- if you go with a split buy and, in effect, guarantee everybody what they want, or guarantee everybody a piece of the action, any leverage that we might have in terms of cost control disappears.

Yes, sir?

Q Good morning, sir. Commander Jim Romano.

With your visitation of each of the war colleges this week, and your educational background, I'm curious, your feelings on the state of professional military education and how the services are doing at promoting jointness and joint leadership. Are we educating enough broad-scope, strategic-minded senior personnel able to lead in our future ambiguous fights of the future?

SEC. GATES: I think that the military professional education system probably has no parallel anywhere in the world. And frankly, I wish we had something comparable to it on the civilian side.

One of the major themes in my budget proposals is to try and replace contractors with professional civil servants, particularly in acquisition. The irony is, we have thousands and thousands of contractors supervising contractors, and particularly supervising acquisition.

And so our plan is, over the next five years, to probably place up to 20,000 civilians in the acquisition -- professional civil servants in the acquisition world, starting with about 4,000 in

I've discovered that I have more contractors in the Office of the Secretary of Defense than I do civil servants. So we're going to also try and change out contractors for civil servants, and we hope to do -- start with about 13,000 in FY '10, replacing contractors.

I go into all of that because I think that at a time when jointness and professional military education has never been better, we've allowed the civilian side of the department to atrophy and have lost capability there. And so I think that if we can make these hires and if we can try and figure out a way to replicate what the military does in terms of professional education, I think we'll be in a lot better place.

I think one of things that probably helps the service schools and certainly helps the civilian side of the government is the participation of civilians in the government in some of your programs. And I'm -- and I certainly encourage that.

But military education goes well beyond that, as you well know. I just spent part of the day Tuesday at Fort Rucker, looking at our efforts to train helicopter pilots, and to see how we can increase the throughput of helicopter pilots. And we probably have not made an adequate investment in places like Fort Rucker, in terms of modern classrooms and so on, to not only teach the current numbers but much less our ability to increase those numbers significantly.

So there are a lot of different ways in which professional military education is carried out, and it seems to me that it has done a remarkable job. And I think one of the things that is very positive is the continuing effort on the part of everybody involved to continue seeking to improve.

Yes, sir?

Q Good morning, sir.

Lieutenant Commander Schofield . Asking you to look even further ahead now in terms of budgetary decisions in the future, asking you to look to the Arctic, do you believe that there is a place in your future budget decisions for assets or programs that specifically address the Arctic?

And as Secretary Clinton was at a conference last week specifically addressing issues in that region; there was a presidential directive signed in January, you know, asking us to sort of harness our efforts in that region, do you see areas where the Department of Defense can actually bring something to the fight in that region, especially a region where ice melt is opening up transit lanes, shipping lanes, where we're going to have more of an Arctic maritime domain awareness, to some degree?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, I think -- I think clearly we're going to have to do that. I think we will -- we will need to do it in very close cooperation with the Canadians. My Canadian counterpart has invited me to go up to the Arctic area this summer for us to begin to talk about how we might cooperate in that area. So it's clearly -- with, as you say, the melt, the challenges up there and frankly the Russians' aggressive territorial claims and things like that make it an area that

we're going to have to pay close attention to.

Yes, sir.

Q Morning, sir. Lieutenant Colonel John Scott Logel, the Department of Strategy and Policy. You made several references to history in your discussion this morning. We use several historical cases in the strategy and policy course here. For example, this week we're looking at the decisions Great Britain made between World War I and World War II. Which historical cases or situations do you think are most useful to consider when you think about American policy objectives and strategy in 2009?

SEC. GATES: I think the most significant lesson for -- from the 20th century that has weighed on me throughout a good part of my career and especially as deputy director and director of CIA and at the NSC and now at the Department of Defense -- one of my favorite sayings is that experience is the ability to remember a mistake when you make it again. And -- (laughter) -- and one of the things that has happened to this country repeatedly in the 20th century is that at the end of a conflict or a war, we unilaterally disarmed. We did it after World War I. We did it after World War II. In certain significant ways, particularly with respect to conventional forces, we did it after Korea, we certainly did it after Vietnam and we did it at the end of the Cold War.

Today's Army, even with the increase in end strength, is 40 percent smaller than it was when I left the government in 1993.

So every time we have come to the end of a conflict, somehow we have persuaded ourselves that the nature of mankind and the nature of the world has changed on an enduring basis, and so we have dismantled both our military and intelligence capabilities.

And my hope is that as we wind down in Iraq, and whatever the level of our commitment in Afghanistan, that we not forget the basic nature of humankind has not changed and there will always be people out there who want to try and take our liberty away or the liberty of our friends and our partners, and that we sustain a level of investment in our national security capabilities that we can keep at a level to deal with a range of threats for as far into the future as we can see.

A former secretary of State referred to the United States as the indispensable nation. I believe it is. No matter what happens around the world, nothing will happen if the United States does not take a leadership role. We saw that in the Balkans in the early '90s, where the Europeans tried to handle it on their own and we basically had to come in. We've seen it time and time again. We're seeing it with the pirates right now. There is no significant international problem on which there can be real progress without the leadership of the United States, and that includes backing up our political leadership with the military might and the intelligence capabilities that make our political power real and possible.

We want to partner with people. There's a lot of things -- even though we are indispensable as a leader, we can't do most of what we want to do by ourselves, and so the need to have allies, the need to have partners is critically important. But we have to sustain -- I think one of the significant lessons for all of us of the 20th century is, we cannot disarm as we begin to see

these conflicts we're in today begin to wind down.

Yes, sir.

Q Good morning, sir. Lieutenant Colonel Waters. I was just wondering -- in the workup to this budget, there was a report from the Lexington Institute that talked about there was a small group with you, including the service chiefs, that you had sign nondisclosure agreements in terms of how it was put together. I was just wondering if that was true and if you are concerned that there's a perception of non-transparency in -- coming into this budget.

SEC. GATES: Absolutely. (Laughter.)

It will come as no surprise to anybody in this room that the Department of Defense leaks like a sieve. (Laughter.) And it seemed to me what was critically important, as we considered dramatic changes in the way we were going to procure things and programmatic changes to specific programs, that we be able to have those deliberations among the senior military and the senior civilians in the department without the newspapers printing, every single day, the results of our deliberations the preceding day. Because when those kinds of outside pressures come to bear, then the ability to -- of people to examine some of these issues, let's say, selflessly, outside the normal bureaucratic chain, if you will, I think is significantly inhibited.

I had -- we did not do this in a closed circle of a half a dozen people. We had multiple meetings involving the service chiefs, the senior military leadership, the joint chiefs and the combatant commanders, as well as the senior civilians and PA&E and the comptroller's shop and so on. We met probably three or four hours a day every day, virtually every day from January until April 6th, when I announced these decisions.

I felt it was very important for us to have a collaborative effort where people could be honest with one another across the table and not feel defensive. I also thought it was important for the service chiefs each to see that they weren't being singled out, that we were looking at the programs of all the services. And frankly, it also gave us an opportunity to look at these issues strictly from the standpoint of what is in the best national-security interest of the United States, without looking over our shoulder at contractors and Congress and everybody else, and trying preemptively to see how we would get around their objections.

My goal -- and what I told the president at the outset of this -- my goal is to present to him a budget independent of political considerations that focuses on what is in the best national-security interest of the United States. We'll get into the political tradeoffs and the -- those issues once the Congress starts looking at this budget, but I didn't want to concede all that preemptively. And I would have had to do a lot of that if people had been out leaking every single day.

So what happened was, mostly it was the large staffs, further down the chain of command, that did not participate in the process the way it had in the past. And I will tell you, a miracle happened. In three months, there wasn't a single leak of any of our deliberations.

And frankly part of my purpose also was to be able to announce all of the changes at once, so that the impact of it and the range of it would have some impact, on people, that we were

actually trying to do something different and that we were trying to make bold decisions that people had talked about for a long time. But nobody had ever been willing to bite the bullet.

And I wanted the maximum impact of announcing it all at once. And obviously if everything had dribbled out, over a period of weeks, that impact would have been lost.

I feel like I got great advice, for example, on Future Combat Systems, the whole front end of which, by the way, we are going to accelerate and deploy to the -- Increments 1A and 1B -- to the entire force, not just the original three brigades that were originally intended. But on that one, I had multiple meetings with Secretary Geren and with General Casey, as we talked about it.

So I think that the chiefs and the combatant commanders and the senior military leadership felt that they had a significant part in this process. And I would tell you that every decision that I have made, both the chairman and the vice chairman have concurred in.

Yes, sir.

Q Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Based on recent discussions -- Pat Gibbons, FBI.

Based on recent discussions by Secretary Clinton and others in the administration, concerning greater emphasis on smart power when dealing with allies, friends and adversaries, do you foresee greater participation of the civilian interagencies, to complement or perhaps replace current initiatives or training presently conducted by U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I certainly hope so. The problem is not a lack of will on the part of civilian agencies. It is a lack of capacity. We will spend more on health care in the Department of Defense, in FY '10, than the entire State Department and foreign assistance budget.

If you took every single Foreign Service officer in the world, you still would not have enough people to crew a single aircraft carrier. So the question is whether this part of the government, which has been starved for resources, for decades, will finally receive the resources that it needs.

When the Agency for -- when I left government in 1993, the Agency for International Development had 15,000 employees. They were expeditionary. And they were experts. Whether it was veterinary medicine or agronomy or digging wells or building schools and educational systems, they knew how to do all of that. And they expected to be deployed. And they had experience in developing in dangerous places all over the world.

Today, there are about 3,000 people in AID, and they're almost all involved in contracting. So we stripped ourselves of that resource.

The United States Information Agency was a huge factor, I believe, in our victory in the Cold War. And now it's just a small part of the -- of the Department of State. So the strategic communications capability of the government has been -- that played such a significant role in

the Cold War -- is a pale shadow of what it used to be.

Secretary Clinton has put in for these resources. There have been increases in the State Department budget over the past half-dozen years or so. Most of those budget increases, unfortunately, have been eaten up by increased security costs around the world for diplomatic installations and so on. So there is a desperate need for more resources for the Department of State.

But here's what happens: Last fall, when they were trying to pass the FY '09 budget, the Department of Defense, Veterans Affairs, Department of Homeland Security and military construction all received an '09 appropriation. The State Department was part of the continuing resolution, so no new programs could be funded for the Department of State until the passage of the omnibus bill just a few weeks ago -- couple of weeks ago. So despite all the rhetoric on the Hill about the need to build civilian capacity, about the fact that the Department of Defense and soldiers were doing things that more properly and better could be done by civilian professionals, despite all that rhetoric, they still ended up on a continuing resolution. So until they get the resources, the capabilities that everybody agrees we need for this country will not be forthcoming.

Yes, sir.

Q Good morning, sir. Lieutenant Commander McEwen . I'd like to ask a question regarding the number-one threat to U.S. national security according to Admiral Blair, and that's the global economic downturn. Last month, your office conducted a war game at Fort Meade in which the U.S. and other major world economic powers did an economic war. I'd like to know if you could share with us some of the results and lessons learned that we as future planners could take with us to our next tours. Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well, I haven't been briefed in detail on it. I think it was an eye -- but what little I do know about it is that it was an eye-opening experience and it also reflected some shortcomings in the ability and willingness of different parts of the government to share information openly.

And this is what often happens when we get out of our comfort zone in the national-security arena -- State, Defense, intelligence community. We begin to get beyond that with Treasury and some of the other departments, and there's not the kind of history of collaboration, for all of the ups and downs of that, even in our own community. And so I think that one of the things that General Jones is looking at doing in the National Security Council is figuring out how we can -- how we can bring to the national-security table more agencies that have a role in what we're doing and the things that concern us -- for example, Treasury -- and in a way that we can get better accustomed to dealing with one another.

Now, Treasury has played a really important role in helping develop many of the sanctions that we have put together against both North Korea and Iran. But in terms of dealing with some of the other, broader issues, the kind that you talked about, in terms of the overall economic threat and what are the risks to the stability of a variety of countries around the world, given the economic conditions, we need to do a better job of incorporating the agencies that deal with those issues into the national-security arena.

And I think, based on what little I know about the exercise, it illustrated some of the shortcomings in that and what we need to work on.

Yes, sir.

Q Good morning, sir. Commander Calvin Slocum. We all celebrated the results of the outcome of the piracy issue that just happened the past week. Do you see the problem being more of a maritime problem with a maritime solution, or is there opportunity for jointness? And also, because the heart of the problem seems to be corruption and the economic windfalls that these pirates get, how -- if we show leadership, are we going to stem this problem if the other countries continue to pay ransoms?

SEC. GATES: Well, part of the -- part of the problem is that -- the number of companies -- not countries, companies -- that are prepared to pay the ransoms as a -- as part of the price of doing business. And clearly, if they didn't pay the ransoms, we would be in a stronger position.

The impact of the dollars that these pirates get in their villages and for the individuals involved is staggering, because their home villages are unspeakably poor. And the infusion of millions of dollars into these -- into the area through -- and with the corruption and everything else makes it a very attractive career field for a lot of poor young men who have no prospects.

And so my view is, in terms of the availability of people to engage in this activity, we can put a lot in jail and we can kill a lot, but there'll still be more.

So I think there needs to be -- there needs -- it's a complex problem, and I think it involves both a maritime aspect that involves an enforcement and kinetic aspect. But I think until we can do something to provide some kind of stability on land that -- and some prospects for these people, it's going to be a tough problem.

And I think the analogy that I -- or the comparison that I used yesterday at the Army War College is that there was a significant piracy problem in the Straits of Malacca a few years ago, but there the bordering countries -- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and so on -- have strong governments and they are in charge of their own territory. And on their own with our help, both equipment and training, they brought to bear maritime surveillance, patrolling and so on that actually significantly reduced the piracy problem in the Straits of Malacca. Hasn't disappeared, but it's significantly reduced.

Unfortunately, we don't have a government like that in Somalia, and we nearly don't have a government in Yemen. So the surrounding territories are very difficult for us, in terms of having somebody to partner with. Now, one of the things that I've -- some of our experts in OSD have thought about is whether we should increase or strengthen our relationship with some of the local governments in Somalia, such as the government up in Puntland that has somewhat more authority than the government in -- in its own area, than the government in Mogadishu. But, you know, these are just some thoughts.

We are engaged in working our way through this right now at the NSC, and under their

auspices, in terms of what combination of strategies, both civilian and military, both private and public cooperation, we can do to at least make it a lot more dangerous and a lot tougher for the pirates, and then see if we can address the longer-term aspects of the problem.

I wish I could give you a -- kind of a one-two-three, here's what we're going to do; but the truth of the matter is, I don't think we know yet.

Yes, sir?

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm Commander Runi from Norway, one of the international officers here.

And I first would like to tell you that it's -- surely it's a privilege to be part of the war college, sir. It's a great war college you have here. And it's a brilliant idea of bringing in some many international officers on one spot.

And that is related to my question, because my question is about alliances. It seems to me that the United States is decreasing its reliance on alliances, increasingly to give way to ad hoc coalitions.

And my question is about NATO. How will the U.S. adjust its course towards NATO when it seems that the military cooperation within the EU seems to increase, and also especially now that France has decided to again join the military cooperation within NATO? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- I think the United States has actually been a stalwart in NATO. My concern, frankly, is the number of countries in NATO that don't seem to be willing to accept their responsibilities as members of NATO. Out of 28 countries now in NATO, I think six spend the requisite 2 percent of GDP on defense. Most are at a percent or a percent and a half.

We have a situation, for example, in Afghanistan where individual countries will put limits on how their forces can be used and whether they will even come to the aid of other forces.

So I think one of the things that I've been trying to do in what seemed to be a limitless number of defense ministers' meetings, of limitless duration -- (laughter) -- is to try and encourage our allies to accept their full measure of responsibilities; that we are prepared to act within the framework of the alliance every time we possibly can, but that depends on the other members of the alliance being prepared to step forward and fulfill their responsibilities as well.

Now, many have in Afghanistan, and it must be said that virtually every country in the alliance has fulfilled the commitments that they have made. But the need is greater than the commitments, and that's the part -- it's that delta, that difference between what is needed and what people have committed to, that we need to work on. And whether it's trainers for the police or contributing to the trust fund at NATO for sustaining and growing the Afghan National Army and Police, whether it is providing operational mentoring and liaison teams or Provincial Reconstruction Teams, there is a lot more that the alliance can do.

A lot of new commitments were made at the recent NATO summit. I'm confident those



commitments will be fulfilled. But I can assure you the United States' commitment to NATO has not diminished in the slightest.

On the other hand, there are a variety of problems around the world where NATO would not appropriately take action and where the United States will put together a coalition of countries that have a common interest in dealing with a particular problem. This is probably the way that ultimately we will deal with the pirate problem. It will be a coalition of nations willing to put ships in the area, and right now that includes Russian and Chinese ships, which is a good thing, in my view.

So I think there's a difference between sort of obligations and commitments within the framework of NATO and then the variety of other international challenges where you may have a shifting number of countries that have a common interest in dealing with these issues.

Yes, sir.

Q Sir, Major Sam Deputy. Could you briefly talk to your vision for employing unmanned and increasingly armed and autonomous systems into our doctrine, and your vision of how specifically the ground systems could be employed in the future?

SEC. GATES: Sure. I think that this is an area that we came late to. I would tell you that 20 years ago, when I was -- a little less than 20 years ago when I was the deputy director for Central Intelligence, we tried to interest the Pentagon, and particularly the Air Force, in developing and employing UAVs. And because it didn't have a pilot in it, there was no interest.

We've made up a lot of lost ground. And we have deployed a significant number of UAVs to Iraq and Afghanistan and a wide array of other platforms, both manned and unmanned, but often prop planes with sensor suites. So we're not going for the most elegant solution in the world, but one that works and one that we can get into the field right away. And I must say that over the last year or so, the Air Force has really stepped up to the plate in terms of increasing these assets, as has the Army.

I think they are a big part of our future. I mean, the reality is the Reaper -- back up. An F-16 has a range of about 500 nautical miles. A Reaper has a range of 3,000 nautical miles. A Reaper can dwell -- has a dwell time over a target that can allow it to find and fix a target and then attack that target, by staying over it for a period of hours.

Those are capabilities that I think, whether you're dealing with narcotics traffickers or border situations or the kinds of conflicts we're in in Iraq and Afghanistan, have huge potential benefits for us.

But I go back to what I was talking about in my prepared remarks. What we need is a portfolio of capabilities.

We need F-22s. We need about 187 of them. We don't need 381. But we also need the F-35. And we need the UAVs. And the combination of those three give the United States unparalleled airpower, tactical airpower. But we have to think of things not as individual

isolated systems or programs but a portfolio of capabilities. And that gives us the maximum opportunity.

I'll give you another example for the ground forces. One of the problems that I had, with FCS, with the vehicle program in FCS, was that a commander in the field, in Iraq or Afghanistan today, particularly in Iraq, as he thinks about the day's mission, has a choice between an up-armored humvee, an MRAP, a Stryker, a Bradley or a tank. And he can pick and choose a mix of those capabilities for whatever the mission is that day.

And if this kind of flexibility that we see, out in the field, that we need to figure out how to bring into our procurement systems and figure out how we design things, based on the requirements that we see. But the short answer to your question is, I think, UAVs are a big part of our future.

Yes, sir.

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Commander Scott Mineo.

With people as our number-one strategic asset, I was curious if I could get your comments on our current policies, which seem to be kind of at odds with that, specifically a new G.I. Bill, which is strongly motivating for junior enlisted personnel to get out of the Navy and get paid pretty well for doing that, as well as a combination, with selective reenlistment bonuses recently being significantly cut, which would again motivate them more likely, to get out of the military rather than continue and become those senior leaders we need in the future.

SEC. GATES: Well, one of my worries about the new G.I. Bill, when it was being discussed on the Hill, was exactly what you said, that it would provide such a generous education benefit that people would get out, as soon as they had fulfilled their commitments, and that we would have significant retention problems.

The argument on the other side was, well, it will help recruitment. But my problem is, and your problem is, we don't want a military that's made up of people who serve one enlistment. We need people who will stay for multiple enlistments.

So this was a concern that I had. I tried to deal with it in two ways. One, I tried to get a minimum of five years' service requirement for that education benefit. That would require at least one reenlistment.

I was not successful in that.

But I -- there was another thing that we tried to do where we were successful. And I actually had gotten the idea, initially, from a meeting with spouses at Fort Hood. And one of the spouses asked me why a person in the military could not assign their education benefit to a spouse or child. And I thought that was a terrific idea.

I talked to the president about it. He put it in his State of the Union message a year ago January. And after a lot of effort, we got that incorporated into the Webb bill. And so I think it helps, because it provides that by the time -- it helps us in retention in the sense that it -- a

member in the service can assign that capability, that benefit, to their children. And so that means by the time they have somebody of school age, they probably have been in the military - I mean of college age, they'll have children that have -- or they will have been in the military probably 20 years or so. So I saw that; I hoped -- and I hope today -- that that will be an offsetting factor.

In terms of reenlistment bonuses and so on, I think partly the services are looking at the marketplace right now, and I think we need to be very careful about this -- and this is something that I really haven't gotten much into -- but the -- to the degree I have, the variety of reenlistment bonuses, specialty bonuses and so on within each service and among the services are almost endless.

And so one of the things I learned at Fort Rucker is that Army flight pay for a helicopter pilot is significantly lower than Naval flight pay for a helicopter pilot. And so you have a problem with Army pilots wanting to join the Navy. Now, it's not a problem for the Navy, but it's a problem for the Army. (Laughter.)

So this whole area is one that I think we need to take a close look at, and particularly at a time when the economy is in trouble. It's obviously helped us with respect to enlistment, and the quality of our -- of those who are enlisting is basically at an all-time high. The last few months, the Army's high-school graduation rate for their enlistees is now back up above 90 percent -- well above 90 percent. So I -- it's a -- kind of a rambling answer to your question. But there's a lot of complexity in this bonus business.

And I think it's something that the chiefs and I probably need to take a look at.

One last question? Yes, sir.

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary. Commander -- Burke -- in the Joint Military Operations Department. An acquisition-related question: Are we taking advantage of commercial off-the-shelf technology enough? It seems in the past 10 years we've trended more towards looking for the brightest, the fastest technology out there, and that seems to be creating a dependency with contractors now in the maintenance and repair of those, where we're not able to train our own people to do that. Your comments on that, sir?

SEC. GATES: I think we are beginning to take what is commercially available more seriously in the -- in the acquisition and procurement arena. Frankly, I think that getting more civilian professional acquisition employees will create new opportunities for that. Obviously, there's a certain inherent conflict of interest when you have contractors managing contractors and the desire to get the most technologically advanced and, by happenstance, the most expensive capability that you can.

There are a couple of areas -- there were several areas, including in a couple of classified programs, as part of these budget decisions that I've just made where, in fact, we walked away from a very high-risk, high-technology capability and are going to buy something off the shelf that is commercially available. And so I think there are some very real opportunities there and I think we should pursue them, in no small part because the technology will be proven and we will be able to get it cheaper.

I will tell you that one of the interesting phenomena from my earlier career in intelligence was that until about 1984 or -5, the U.S. intelligence community and NSA and CIA in particular probably were the absolute cutting edge in terms of the use of computers with respect to data management. And by about the mid '80s, it became clear that we were being surpassed by Microsoft and a variety of others who were way ahead of us. And so 20 years ago or more, the intelligence community, and now the government more broadly, in a lot of software areas will buy off-the-shelf capabilities from the commercial world, because the truth of the matter is they're much more advanced than anything we could develop.

And I'll just give you an example: At one point we hired some guy from MIT who came to CIA. He came in and saw our computer systems and just started laughing, he -- I mean -- and you know why.

So I think there are lot of opportunities here and it's just a --partly a matter of mind-set.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

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## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

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### DoD Announces Winners Of The Secretary Of Defense Environmental Awards

The Department of Defense announces the winners of the 2009 Secretary of Defense Environmental Awards. A panel of judges representing federal and state agencies, academia, and the public has selected the following installations, teams, and individuals as the winners of this year's awards:

Camp Ripley Maneuver and Training Center, Minnesota Army National Guard  
Natural Resources Conservation – Large Installation

Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.  
Cultural Resources Management – Installation

Fort Drum Cultural Resources Team, Fort Drum, N.Y.  
Cultural Resources Management – Team/Individual

Environmental Management Division, Hill Air Force Base, Utah  
Environmental Quality – Industrial Installation

U.S. Army Garrison Bamberg, Germany  
Environmental Quality – Overseas Installation

Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.  
Pollution Prevention – Non-Industrial Installation

14 Civil Engineer Squadron Pollution Prevention Team, Columbus Air Force Base, Miss.  
Pollution Prevention – Team/Individual

Defense Depot Memphis, Tenn.  
Environmental Restoration – Installation

CBS  
April 21, 2009

## Secretary Gates On Computer Breach

**CBS Evening News, 6:30 PM**

KATIE COURIC: Now, to a very different government concern, this one involving national security. Computer spies have reportedly stolen information about the F-35, the fighter jet being developed for the Air Force, the Navy and several U.S. allies. The hackers stole data on the plane's design and electronic systems, possibly to build one of their own. Chinese spies are suspected.

Today, Defense Secretary Robert Gates downplayed the report when I interviewed him for an upcoming "60 Minutes" report.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: I would just address it generally. We are under cyberattack virtually all the time every day here. We think we have pretty good control of our sensitive information both with respect to intelligence and the equipment, systems. But we, like everybody else, is under attack. Banks are under attack, every country is under attack.

It's sometimes very difficult to figure out a home address on these attacks, so one of the things that I'm doing in this budget is significantly increasing the resources for cyber experts. We're going to more than quadruple the number of experts that we have in this area and we're devoting a lot more money to it. We're looking at some structural changes here in the building. This is going to be an enduring problem and it is going to be a challenge not just for the Department of Defense but for the entirety of the United States.

COURIC: This is a \$300 billion program, so how big a blow is this if a country like China accesses this information and can defend itself against these aircraft?

GATES: I think that, based on what I've been briefed, I'm not – I believe we still have security of the sensitive systems.

COURIC: So you don't believe too much information was gleaned by the Chinese?

GATES: Well, I don't know exactly how much information was gleaned, but I think that the sensitive elements have continued to be protected mainly because they're back here.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 269-09  
April 23, 2009

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### DoD Begins QDR, NPR Processes

Today the Department of Defense announced the commencement of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The processes will culminate in final reports to Congress due in early 2010.

The QDR, which is conducted every four years, is one of the principal means by which the tenets of the National Defense Strategy are translated into potentially new policies, capabilities and initiatives. "The purpose of the QDR is to assess the threats and challenges the Nation faces, and then integrate strategies, resources, forces, and capabilities necessary to prevent conflict or conclude it on terms that are favorable to the Nation now and in the future," said General James E. Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The QDR takes a long-term, strategic view of the Department of Defense and will explore ways to balance achieving success in current conflicts with preparing for long-term challenges," said William J. Lynn, deputy secretary of defense. "The review will also look at ways to institutionalize irregular warfare capabilities while maintaining the United States' existing strategic and technological edge in conventional warfare."

The process for the 2010 QDR will embrace a whole of government approach where the Department of Defense will consult with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and appropriate Congressional committees. There will also be consultations with key allies and partners. The 2010 QDR will address emerging challenges and explore ways to improve the balance of efforts and resources between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for future contingencies, while also institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance.

The QDR is a legislatively-mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 (a)) review of DoD strategy and priorities. Previous QDRs were conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2006.

The NPR will be conducted in consultation with the Departments of Energy and State. The purpose of the NPR is to establish U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy, and posture for the next five to 10 years and to provide a basis for the negotiation of a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). This report will be submitted concurrently with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The NPR is a legislatively-mandated (National Defense Authorization Act FY08, Sec 1070/Public Law 110-181) comprehensive review of the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy, strategy and force posture for the next five to 10 years. Previous NPRs were conducted in 1994 and 2002.





**U.S. Department of Defense**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Press Advisories

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No. 035-09


April 29, 2009

### **Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Fact Sheet Available**

The 2010 QDR Terms of Reference fact sheet is now available on Defense Link.

The QDR, which is conducted every four years, is one of the principal means by which the tenets of the National Defense Strategy are translated into potential new policies, capabilities and initiatives. The purpose of the QDR is to assess the threats and challenges the nation faces, as well as to balance the department's strategies, capabilities and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats.

The QDR is a legislatively-mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 (a)) review of DoD strategy and priorities. Previous QDRs were conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2006.



## **US Department of Defense**

### **2010 QDR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet**

**April 27, 2009**

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is a legislatively-mandated (USC 10, Sec. 118 (a)) review of Department of Defense (DoD) strategy and priorities. DoD is preparing now to conduct this review, which takes place every four years and will be provided to Congress in early 2010.

- **The QDR will assess the threats and challenges the nation faces and re-balance DoD's strategies, capabilities and forces to address today's conflicts and tomorrow's threats.**
  - The QDR is one of the principal means by which the tenets of the National Defense Strategy are translated into potentially new policies, capabilities and initiatives.
  - The QDR will set a long-term course for DoD to follow and will provide a strategic framework for DoD's annual program, force development, force management, and corporate support mechanisms.
  - Other strategic reviews, as well as day-to-day decisions will be carried out while the QDR is underway and will inform its deliberations.
  - Previous QDRs were conducted in 1997, 2001, and 2006.
  
- **The strategic environment we face is complex and the security challenges – both current and those on the horizon – are wide ranging. The global economic downturn adds to the complexity.**
  - Key security challenges include violent extremist movements, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, rising powers with sophisticated weapons, failed or failing states, and increasing encroachment across the global commons (air, sea, space, cyberspace).
  - U.S. strategy must also increasingly account for a series of powerful trends that are reshaping the international landscape and will dramatically complicate the exercise of American statecraft and overseas relations.
  - In addition to the current global economic downturn, these trends include climate change, cultural and demographic shifts, increasing scarcity of resources and the spread of destabilizing technologies.
  - The U.S. must prevail in current conflicts while preparing for future contingencies.
  - The 2010 QDR will address these emerging challenges and explore ways to improve the balance of efforts and resources between:
    - Trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for future contingencies, and
    - Institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces.
  
- **The specific areas of emphasis for this QDR include:**
  - Further institutionalizing irregular warfare and civil support abroad capabilities and capacities, to include building partnership capacity,
  - Addressing threats posed from the use of advanced technology and WMD,
  - Global Force Posture,
  - Strengthening DoD support to civilian-led operations and activities, and
  - Managing the Department's internal business processes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.

- **The QDR process embraces a “whole of government” approach. As such, DoD will consult with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and appropriate Congressional committees.**
- The QDR will be informed by similar reviews being conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (Quadrennial Homeland Security Review), the Director of National Intelligence (Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review), and incorporate guidance from relevant National Security Council (NSC) reviews.
  - In addition, a series of separate congressionally-directed reviews of the Department’s nuclear, space and missile defense postures will be closely coordinated with the QDR, but still provide separate reports to Congress.
  - The 2010 QDR process will also include consultation mechanisms with key allies and partners.
  - The Secretary of Defense has established a governance structure to manage the coordination of the QDR.
  - The QDR will be led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. OSD and Joint Staff leadership will work closely with representatives from the Military Services and Combatant Commands and across OSD components.
  - Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs will engage often in helping to shape issues and frame decisions for the review.

DoD Background Briefing

Thu, 23 Apr 2009 18:27:00 -0500

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Presenter: Senior Defense Official and Senior Military Official

April 23, 2009

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DoD Background Briefing

STAFF: We'll just go ahead and get this kicked off for us. Good morning. And thank you for your interest in this particular topic.

I would remind people that what we're here to talk about today is the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, two important activities of the department that are commencing now and will be going on through this year, with a report due to Congress by early next year.

The event here today is on background, so I would ask that you please refer to our two briefers as a senior defense official and a senior military official, to help us keep the transcript clean. We will publish a transcript for you afterwards and make it available.

And with that, I believe they're both going to give you a brief overview and then we'll get right into the questions.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Well, good morning. We wanted to take some time to give you some background on the both Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, as we expect the secretary will be signing out the terms of reference for both of those in a matter of days.

Let me just say a few introductory words about each one, but first the QDR. As you know, this is really a primary vehicle for the department to set its strategic direction. It's a design to address key emerging challenges, to bring focus to under-emphasized mission areas, to ensure that we align force structure with our strategic realities. And also it's an opportunity to launch new initiatives that are of importance either to the president or the secretary.

It's coming at a time when we face a particularly challenging security environment, with violent extremist movements, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fragile and failing states, changing global landscape, with some powers rising and others declining, tensions in the global commons -- sea, air, space and so forth, and a climate in which we're very likely to see hybrid forms of warfare.

So the question -- a lot of what the QDR focuses is on how do we balance dealing with the full range of these challenges and balance meeting our present requirements of current operations and also the need to prepare for complex challenges in the future.

Throughout the QDR processes, we will be seeking to capture and institutionalize the lessons we've learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere, and we're going to seek to further adapt our forces and capabilities to asymmetric and irregular forms of warfare.

We're taking a very whole-government approach to both reviews, actually. But in the QDR context, we're very mindful that the military is just one instrument of our national power; that security is not only dependent on the military, but really on leveraging the full capabilities of the U.S. government across the economic, diplomatic and other domains.

And so we'll be bringing some of our interagency partners into this review, we'll be bringing a number of our key allies into this review, and also drawing on expertise outside of the government -- from NGOs, think tanks, universities and so forth.

Let me say a couple words about the Nuclear Posture Review. I think this is slightly narrower in focus. It is really the first comprehensive review of our nuclear posture since 2002. It will address the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy and policy, looking at the role of nuclear weapons, international security strategy, the size and composition of our nuclear forces necessary to support the strategy, and the steps necessary to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture.

As President Obama said in Prague, which -- and his speech there was really a sort of -- a great strategic framework for this review -- we are placing a high priority on reducing nuclear proliferation. So in the NPR we'll be seeking to ensure that our nuclear policies help deter our enemies, reassure our allies and also further our nonproliferation agenda.

We'll also be conducting the NPR in close coordination with negotiations with Russia to reach a follow-on agreement to START, and those two processes will be tightly interwoven. 406

So to wrap up, you know, these are very important opportunities for the department to better align our ends, ways and means. It -- this is going to be a sort of all-hands-on-deck effort, a real focus not only for the department staff but most importantly for the leadership, for Secretary Gates, for Deputy Secretary Lynn and for others. And we expect that both of these processes will run through the summer and very much be contributing to and framing decisions that will be made in the FY '11 program and budget cycle.

Thank you.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Okay. Just from our perspective, I would just emphasize, you know, a couple points about the procedures, the processes that we'll follow doing -- actually, in both reviews.

And basically the -- Admiral Mullen, the chairman and Secretary Gates will be providing the direction for both reviews. We paired the deputy secretary, Secretary Lynn, with the vice chairman, General Cartwright, to provide sort of the direct oversight of QDR. And then there are subordinate levels below that, which include, you know, services and the combatant commanders' inputs throughout, you know, the processes.

So from the perspective of how the department's going to, you know, make recommendations associated with either the QDR or the Nuclear Posture Review, it will incorporate the wisdom of the department's leadership across all the combatant commands.

And really, over to you at this point. We're just starting to go on this. The processes are basically resolved. And we're essentially ready to get going.

So your questions.

Q (Off mike) -- Can you draw like a straight line in terms of '97, '01 and '06 and now this one? What are some of the consistent themes you see that will be reviewed? And then how will this one deviate from those prior three? What are some of the key break points?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think there have been a couple of consistent themes over the last several reviews. One is -- and it will continue in this review -- one is this

idea of balance, and particularly the idea of how do we balance investing in the capabilities that today's warfighter needs against investing in the capabilities that tomorrow's might need? 407

Sometimes we're lucky and there's good overlap between those two, and sometimes those things pull us in different directions and there are some hard trade-offs and choices to be made.

So I think that that is something we've been struggling, frankly, since the end of the Cold War, as sort of -- as the current operational tempo has gone up and the nature of the security environment has changed so profoundly.

I think, really, further adapting to irregular warfare, asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare -- this is a process that we've begun. It's an area where we're -- we have a lot of lessons learned from recent years. But the department is still -- you know, it's still a work in -- the adaptation of the department to those needs is still a work in progress, and I think this review will further that.

Q One follow-up. The 1997 QDR had major programmatic decisions in it: reduce the F-22, reduce the F-18E/F, I think some shipbuilding also. The either -- the prior -- '01 and '06 really didn't make any major programmatic decisions. Do you anticipate that this review will result in additional programmatic decisions beyond the secretary announced two weeks ago?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The review is designed to feed directly into the FY '11 program and budget build. And I -- we do expect that if additional programmatic changes are needed to support the strategy and the rebalancing, that those will be made. So the QDR is designed to be the strategic frame for the program and budget that goes forward in '11.

Yes.

Q Secretary Gates has talked about there being a list of a dozen or so issues that you'll look at in the QDR. Could you just tick off those issues?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I wish it was only a dozen. (Laughs.) I -- you know, and I think that, again, we're looking -- a lot of our analytic work will be focused on a number of key areas that are going to be -- that are highlighted in what we'll give out to you here: as I said, further institutionalizing irregular warfare and civil support capabilities, both at home and abroad, including building partnership capacity, which is a key theme of the defense strategy; assessing threats posed by the use of advanced technologies and WMD; global force posture, how our forces are arrayed around the world;

strengthening DOD support to civilian-led operations; and, of course, the perennial: managing the department's internal business processes to improve efficiency and effectiveness, which is an ongoing process. **408**

So there -- these are the kinds of things we'll be looking at. You know, we're still, frankly, in the process of sorting through, you know, the binning of which issues we'll address in the QDR and which issues we'll address in the more traditional program build and program review process.

Q Thank you.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yes?

Q On the Nuclear Posture Review -- this question is for both of you -- do you anticipate that it will have as a stated goal elimination of nuclear weapons, Global Zero, do you think? And do you think that that goal is achievable?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: In the president's Prague speech, he referenced that as an ultimate goal. He also said that until that time, as long as adversaries possess nuclear weapons, we will maintain a robust and credible nuclear deterrent. And so I think, you know, this NPR is being taken in the context that he lays out in that speech, which is a desire to really strengthen non-proliferation progress, if you will; explore the possibility of further reductions in our own arsenal; while also ensuring that we take the steps necessary, both in terms of the infrastructure and the forces, to ensure that we have a safe and secure and reliable deterrent. And so that -- that sort of three-pronged approach is really the conceptual frame, the starting point for the NPR.

Q So would that sort of make it a place-holder on the way to eventual Global Zero?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we are certainly looking to, in the post-START negotiations, go towards further reductions.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: But I don't know that I would speculate to say that that would be a goal. Right? I mean, it's -- this NPR, from our perspective, is one about deterrence, how should we deter. And deterrence involves more than just nuclear weapons. So there are other aspects of what the department does that need to be brought to bear to deter, you know, a potential adversary from using nuclear capability.



SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Let me -- this is a really important point that we probably didn't emphasize enough in the opening remarks. I think something that's different about this round of reviews is the extent to which we're going to try to take an integrated approach across the QDR, the NPR, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, which is also mandated by Congress, and the Space Review. Because all of these things, from a capabilities perspective and an effects perspective, they're very -- you have to take a very holistic view of these things. And I think we're approaching these reviews in a much more integrated fashion than has been done in the past.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: But that's a new challenge, also. (Chuckles.)

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It is a new challenge. Makes it harder. (Chuckles.)

Yes?

Q How will the QDR take into account the global economic crisis -- (off mike)?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I think it will take it into account in a couple of ways. First, you know, the global economic crisis is having profound impacts on the security environment. In some cases, it's sharpening or accelerating certain trends that will affect -- that will drive the demand for U.S. military forces in the future. It will also, of course, affect our own -- the fiscal guidance that's provided for the review and our own decision-making about how much as a nation we spend on defense.

Q Is it possible to get specific about, say, two or three issues, specific issues that you will be looking at as part of the -- looking at the economic crisis; for example, whether the department needs to pay service members as much, given their incentive to stay in the service?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: You know, I could speculate, but -- and we've asked people to take this into account -- but I don't want to get ahead of the actual results, because we haven't come up with those insights yet.

Yeah.

Q The Obama administration -- about missile defense, this administration doesn't seem to have quite made up its mind on the future of the third site. I was wondering

if this review might be the opportunity to actually formulate a position -- a pure position towards the future of the third site in Europe. 410

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The future of the third site in Europe will be part of what the missile-defense review addresses.

Q Hi. We already have the capstone concept, the Iraq and Afghanistan strategies and the budget the secretary just outlined. Would you anticipate that the QDR would sort of formalize a lot of that? Or do either of you anticipate breaking new ground, so to speak, in this document?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We're taking the national defense strategy as our point of departure for the review. But, as you know, that's a -- that is a document that's usually revised or updated on an annual basis. So I imagine that insights that come out of the further analysis and work that's done in the QDR may, in fact, contribute to the next version of that document. But the current NDS is very much the sort of conceptual foundation for this review going forward.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: I guess I'd add that a lot of the decisions that have been made thus far by the administration are reasonably short-time-frame decisions. The longest-term were really FY '10. And so we have to take those decisions and now reflect them across the projection for the future and align that to what we think the -- you know, the strategic environment's going to be. So there are the longer-term things that have to play out specifically in QDR and the nuclear posture review.

So picking up on something that was said in the opening, a lot of this is about balance: balance between near- and long-term risk; balance between exquisite systems and the -- having systems that are high-quality, lower-cost-type systems. So those types of issues have to be played out yet.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Yes, a quick clarification on the missile-defense review, which you said is mandated by Congress. Is there a -- is there a deadline on that? Is it the same as the QDR? Or is it --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think it's the same, yeah. My understanding is, it's the same as -- you know, all of these will be sent up to Congress, I guess, early next year, when we send up the FY '11 budget.

Q (Off mike.)

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: I think we will have decisions before that and insights before that. But the formal write-up won't go up until the budget. But I expect that we will have some decisions, on the European site issue, far before next year.

Q To what extent are you going to have a new national security strategy, before the QDR is done? And if so, will that inform the QDR? Is that going to come after?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I think that again the -- we're unlikely to have a published national security strategy before the QDR is done. But what we do have is an NSC process. One of the early policy reviews has been a national security priorities review. That is sort of the key insights that would be written up in an NSS. And that process will inform our work, as well as all the other strategy and policy reviews that have been ongoing.

So I would say that the NSC reviews along with the national defense strategy are, as I said, the sort of conceptual foundation. I expect that the first -- as is true for every new administration, the first NSS is always late, because it just takes time for people to come in and get organized and put it together. But I think we'll eventually catch up and be on cycle.

Q I understand the QDR is going to look at the Defense Department's need for amphibious equipment, amphibious forces. Can you describe a little bit about what exactly you will be looking at?

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Well, it basically gets into, what do we think the nation requires for amphibious capabilities? The secretary has talked a little bit about delaying a decision on an LPD, what he wants to do with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, which he has basically allowed to continue, in the review that's done to date.

And then we've got the MPF (Future) program that he elected to delay a component of, in the FY '10 decisions that he's already discussed. So we need to not, you know, take that and basically take that FY '10 discussion and determine what we're going to do, across the longer term.

So again I drop back. When I think about QDR, it's a balance issue, near/long-term. How do we want to shape risk?

Q For the layman, is it accurate to say the QDR is looking at whether the United States still needs the ability to land on a beach or whether wars will be fought far from the beach? 412

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I would say it differently. I'd say that we're taking these individual programmatic decisions and considering them in a much more strategic context that thinks about what kind of world -- what's the world going to look like? What are the challenges going to look like? What are the military missions going to look like? How much of what different kinds of capabilities do we need? Where do we want to -- when we can't do everything equally well, where do we want to accept or manage risk?

So I think that what QDRs do every four years is really give us a chance to step back and make sure that there's really strategic coherence in our defense programs.

Q What if you conclude that the United States really doesn't need as much amphibious capability? You're going to be going under the assumption that the wars for the next four years will be far from shore. Is that accurate?

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Well, there are other ways to put people on shore. I mean, you can go in through the surf, right? So you can have different capabilities to provide similar capacity. So it's a matter of trying to get --

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: And I -- the -- your line of questioning suggests we're much farther down the road on this than we are. I mean, we are taking a fresh look at this. And there are no conclusions yet.

Q You talked about future capabilities and looking ahead to see what possible threats may be. China is a country that, you know -- (a friend of ours ?) at the same time increasing its military capabilities. Should we look more to dealing with them on a diplomatic basis, like more mil-to-mil relations, perhaps, rather than every now and then it seems we have a blow-up, be it the EP-3 incident -- I think it was early in 2000 -- and then we had the thing going on with the -- we had another incident recently. And is that something we're going to look at more -- at more diplomatic or more Pentagon-Chinese military interface than in the past?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This is really -- this is a larger strategic question. But I think that this administration has started out with a very serious engagement with China, a clear-eyed engagement, also taking into account of their investments in military capabilities and so forth. But we are looking to enrich that relationship and open up different areas, including, you know, defense talks, mil-to-mil and so forth. So I think that is something we'll be exploring. That certainly informs the QDR, but it's certainly way beyond the QDR.

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: But it is a perspective for -- in the QDR, that we're going to try to bring the interagency, the other capacity of the rest of government into the discussion. So we're not looking at trying to look at this from a perspective of only DOD capabilities; it's what the whole of government can do to influence a situation. Relationships with other nations are clearly a piece of that.

Q There are certain missions that are sometimes associated with irregular warfare, like a cooperative security. And you have people now saying maybe you shouldn't refer to that as irregular warfare all the time, because allies get irritated by that term; interagency folks don't really like it. Do you see the review maybe taking missions like that a little further away from that irregular warfare moniker?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: There's lots of terminological debate. (Laughs.) I think what we're really trying -- one of the, you know, things we'll -- we're going to take a very pragmatic approach that says, you know, whatever you call this, building the capacity of partners and allies is a critical component of U.S. strategy. How do we do it better? What do we need to do it better? I'm less concerned with what you call it or whether which concentric -- you know, which part of the Venn diagram it falls on. We're about how do you create the authorities, the capacities, the capabilities to do it better.

Q (Off mike) -- means, you know, changing the language a little bit to make the mission go forward, so be it.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, I just -- again, I don't want to speculate on that.

Q The terms of reference. What, in layman's language, will the terms of reference consist of? And will you be able to provide an unclassified version of it?

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We have a fact sheet on the terms of reference, both of them, QDR and NPR, that we'll provide to you, which has the sort of core substance of it. But it includes some sense of, you know, the threats and challenges that we're facing, how we see the environment, what are the specific focus areas; you know, the governance for the process, who will do what. They're fairly telegraphic. I mean, I think --

Q (Off mike.)

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: (Laughs.) In past QDRs, they have been encyclopedic. (Laughs.) You know, I don't know, 57 pages or something. This one is -- you know, it's a

handful of pages. It's very -- it just lays out the process and the focus areas and really leaves the rest to be articulated in the actual review. 414

Q This is an NPR question. The 2002 NPR outlined the need for a non-nuclear deterrence capability; i.e., the conventional B-5 missile that Congress shot down two or three times when it was proposed. Will the NPR be -- were you looking at that in terms of whether there is a valid need or a non-nuclear Trident-launched missile?

SR. MILITARY OFFICIAL: Whether or not it looks at it, the idea of how we're going to do a strike -- conventional, nuclear, whatever -- is going to be part of this review. And I don't -- I said "this" review because I don't know if that will go to the QDR or the Nuclear Posture Review, but it's something that we will look at and try to determine, you know, where we want to go. But when we think about the Nuclear Posture Review, it is really about the larger deterrence issue. So things like conventional strike can provide capabilities that deter, you know, other adversaries.

Q One of the arrows in the quiver of deterrence.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Right. Exactly.

Q Okay.

SR. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Exactly.

STAFF: Okay, folks. Let's wrap it up here. We do have a news release that you'll get on the way out the door. The fact sheets that our senior defense official was talking about we will make available, I think, as soon as the (TOR ?) is signed, so it may be a day before that -- a day or so before that comes out.

Q (Off mike) -- signed.

STAFF: But as soon as that is done, we will get those to you also.

Again, just as a reminder, this has been a background briefing attributable to a senior defense and senior military official. And thank you for coming today.

DoD Announces Winners of the Commander In Chief's Annual Award for Installation Excellence

Thu, 23 Apr 2009 17:07:00 -0500

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 272-09  
April 23, 2009

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DoD Announces Winners of the Commander In Chief's Annual Award for Installation Excellence

Secretary of Defense Gates announced today the winners of the 2009 Commander in Chief's Annual Award for Installation Excellence. They are:

Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield, Hinesville, Ga.

Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Jacksonville, N.C.

Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka, Yokosuka, Japan

Hurlburt Field, Fort Walton Beach, Fla.

Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, Tracy, Calif.

The Commander in Chief's Annual Award for Installation Excellence recognizes the outstanding and innovative efforts of the people who operate and maintain U.S. military installations. The five recipients of this highly competitive Presidential award were selected for their exemplary support of Department of Defense missions.

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Media Availability with Secretary Gates Following visit with 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

Thu, 23 Apr 2009 18:00:00 -0500

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      April 23, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary Gates Following visit with 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, Camp Lejeune, N.C.

SEC. GATES: Good morning.

Had a great morning out here. I actually haven't given a press conference with that kind of a background since my first visit to Baghdad -- (chuckles) -- December 2006.

But -- now this has been a great visit, great opportunity to visit and talk with these Marines who are -- part of their unit is already deployed, and the remainder will be deploying in the next couple of weeks, over the next few weeks; an opportunity to watch their training in going after IEDs, in taking care of each other, in terms of medical care, and other aspects of getting ready to go.

They are incredibly impressive, and I was -- really welcomed the opportunity to thank each and every one of them for their service.

I'd also like to thank the local communities for all their support to Camp Lejeune and the families of those men and women in uniform who are deployed. Without that kind of local support, this all would be a lot more difficult.

I would just say one more thing before taking your questions, and that is that this visit and spending some time with these Marines who are about to deploy simply reminds me of one of the basic themes of what I'm trying to do in the fiscal year '10 budget. One dollar of pork in our budget is a dollar I can't spend to support these Marines. One dollar spent on capabilities we don't need is a dollar that I can't spend in getting ready



for future threats. One dollar spent for equipment excess to our military requirements is a dollar that I can't use to help protect the American people. **417**

And so I'm hoping that the Congress will take a careful look at this budget and the changes that we're trying to make, in no small part to provide the necessary support for these men and women who are about to go into combat.

So with that, I'll take some questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you confirm for us reports coming out of Iraq that the head of the Islamic State of Iraq has been captured in Baghdad?

SEC. GATES: I just heard actually from Geoff that that story was out there. I have no confirmation of it at this point. I literally heard about it five minutes ago.

STAFF: Anybody else? We don't have much time, so don't be bashful.

SEC. GATES: Ed?

Q With this deployment to Afghanistan, how does the strategy in Afghanistan become affected by what's going on in Pakistan at this moment? There are now reports the Taliban has moved beyond the Swat Valley, grave concern being expressed yesterday by the secretary of State.

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm -- my hope is that there will be an increasing recognition on the part of the Pakistani government that the Taliban in Pakistan are in fact an existential threat to the democratic government of that country. I think that some of the leaders certainly understand that, but it is important that they not only recognize it but take the appropriate actions to deal with it.

The stability and longevity of democratic government in Pakistan is central to the efforts of the coalition in Afghanistan, and it is also central to our future partnership with the government in Islamabad. We want to support them. We want to be helpful in any way we can. But it is important that they recognize the real threats to their country.

Q Mr. Secretary, we haven't spoken with you since the release of the Justice Department memoranda on harsh interrogation techniques. Given your experience as director of Central Intelligence and now, were you among those who advocated for their release? And now that they're out, what is your view of the calls in Congress for an investigation or for some sort of independent truth panel? 418

SEC. GATES: Well, my view in the discussions of all of this -- first of all, I deferred to the Justice Department on the extent of the redactions in the documents. I was in no position to make that evaluation or that judgment.

The things that I was most concerned about was, first and foremost, the protection of the CIA officers who were involved in the interrogations and who performed their duties in accordance with the legal guidance that they had been given by the Justice Department. And I wanted to make sure -- I felt very strongly the importance that they be protected, and against all different kinds of possible prosecutions.

I also was quite concerned, as you might expect, with the potential backlash in the Middle East and in the theaters where we're involved in conflict, and that it might have a negative impact on our troops.

All that said, you know, we just had a significant investigation release by the Senate Armed Services Committee. There are a number of suits that we're dealing with for detainee photographs and so on. And so there is a certain inevitability, I believe, that much of this will eventually come out; much has already come out. And therefore, I was focused principally on the potential impact on the CIA professionals and on our own military forces.

Q Secretary Gates, we're from Italy, and we'd like to know what kind of support and cooperation you're going to ask Europe in the coming months for Afghanistan.

SEC. GATES: Well, the -- there have been -- there has been a lot of discussion of that at the meeting at the Hague and at the NATO summit. I think that, if I'm not mistaken, Italy has volunteered to send a significant contingent of Carabinieri to do training.

This is actually something that I had proposed at a NATO defense ministers' meeting in Krakow some weeks ago. One of the real needs in Afghanistan is for, in effect, paramilitary police training, and it seemed to me that the Carabinieri and the gendarmerie and the Guardia Seville and others in Europe could make a real contribution there. So we're very grateful for that, and I think that the Italian government, if I'm not mistaken, has also indicated a willingness to send some additional troops in the period leading up to the elections in August.

What we continue to be interested in from all of our allies and partners is additional civilian capacity, people who are agronomists, veterinarians, who know how to put in water supplies, educators, accountants, lawyers and so on. And obviously anyone who can contribute there is welcome.

(Cross talk.)

Q A lot of the Marines that you spoke with today and saw and a lot more here, in Camp Lejeune, are on their fourth and fifth deployment. What do you think about that?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the things -- well, first of all, because they're on their fourth or fifth deployment, this is the most battle-hardened force the United States has probably ever had in its history.

It's also important to remember that every single one of these young men and women are volunteers. And in fact, one battalion commander here told me that he knew of a unit that was being assigned to Okinawa, and something like 200 Marines decided not to re-enlist. The unit's orders were changed. And the unit was shifted to Afghanistan. And something like 180 of the 200 came back and re-enlisted.

So I think these men and women want to be in the fight. Frankly for months, General Conway has been telling me that the Marines in Anbar province, in Iraq, are frankly bored and want to get into the fight. And that certainly was the impression that I got this morning.

By the same token, we're trying, by increasing the end-strength of the Marine Corps, by more than 10 percent, by 27,000, and with the drawdowns in Iraq -- our hope certainly is perhaps beginning, toward the end of this year or into next, to begin to lengthen the time at home for all of these units.

Q Are you concerned at all about their mental well-being?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that we are monitoring that very carefully. We've put a lot of new procedures in place. There's a lot more sensitivity to the potential impact of repeated deployments. And frankly the effort, to look out for each other, in the psychological as well as the physical realm, now is -- not only starts with Marine to Marine and soldier to soldier, buddies taking care of buddies, but then NCOs and then officers, and

then the processes that they go through, when they either -- prior to when they deploy and when they come back. 420

Q Secretary Gates, on the release of the recent interrogation memos, do you expect that to impair at all this unit or any other units going over to fight terrorism, moving forward?

SEC. GATES: Well, I certainly hope not. I mean, I think, that's kind of an unanswerable question. We don't know how -- we talked -- there was realization, in the discussions, that some of these disclosures could be used by al Qaeda and our adversaries.

But as I say, there are -- there are a lot of other documents coming out, including the leak of the International Red Cross -- Committee of the Red Cross with some pretty graphic information as well. So I think pretending that we could hold all of this and keep it all a secret even if we wanted to I think was probably unrealistic. So we'll just have to deal with it.

STAFF: Just a couple more now.

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q (Off mike) -- saw that Marines here are training to learn how to fight, but they're also receiving training from USAID to do humanitarian work. Are you at concerned about the balance of that mission that soldiers and Marines have to do when they go overseas?

SEC. GATES: No. In fact, one of the messages that I had for the Marines when I had the opportunity to talk to a group of them is the importance of making sure that the Afghan people know that we are there as their friends and their allies, and that we are there to help make their lives better as well as to protect ourselves and them from the Taliban and these other extremist groups.

I am concerned about the -- there have been some stories in the press the last few days -- I am concerned that we will not get the civilian surge into Afghanistan as quickly as we are getting troops into Afghanistan. And therefore, I've raised the possibility of whether we could provide a bridge, using our Reserve component -- not calling any units up but rather perhaps asking for volunteers who have specific skill sets along the lines of the ones that I just described a few minutes ago -- veterinarians, agronomists, accountants and so on -- who might serve as a bridge; getting them out there quickly and then bringing them back when their civilian replacements are hired and gotten in to the theater.

I just think we have a finite amount of time to show that we're going to make progress in Afghanistan. And I just don't want to see any delays, whether it's on our military side or whether it's on the civilian side.

421

Q What will victory in Afghanistan look like?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think victory in Afghanistan will be represented by -- it will look, in -- I suspect, in many respects, like success in Iraq, and that will be the Afghan national security forces increasingly taking responsibility for the security of their own people, both the police and the army, as we then move from a direct combat role, which we're very heavily engaged in right now, more into a support role and then eventually being able, as we are in Iraq, to draw down and leave.

Q Is it too soon to put a time on it?

SEC. GATES: Absolutely.

Q (Off mike.) Is it fair to say, despite your reservations, that you supported the release of those memos? And I also wanted to ask you about benchmarks for Afghanistan and what you see as being some of the key benchmarks.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- you know, I think that the White House and the president have been pretty clear that this was a very difficult decision for all the reasons that I just described.

And I think all of us wrestled with it for quite some time, in terms of where we were on it. As I say, my own view was shaped by the fact that I regarded the information about a lot of these things coming out as inevitable. And therefore, how do we try and manage it in the best possible way?

Q On the benchmarks for Afghanistan, I note that Michelle Flournoy spoke of devising those. What do you see as some of the key benchmarks for Afghanistan and Pakistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, you know, frankly, I haven't been involved in the drafting of them, so I'm not quite sure where they are. But I think it clearly has to do with if we authorize 134 or more thousand Afghan National Army, are they meeting the recruiting standards? Are they meeting the goals that we -- that they have set, in terms of how fast they build up the army? Same thing with the police.

I would say getting the civilian support out there, and perhaps actions against -- against the narcotics networks that help fund the Taliban -- I think all of those things -- those kinds of things need to be part of the measures of effectiveness.


STAFF: Okay. Thank you all.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF TRIP TO CAMP LEJEUNE, N. C.

Apr. 23, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to Marines after a demonstration at the Military Operations on Urban Terrain area while visiting Marines on Camp Lejeune, N.C., April 23, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has lunch with Marines at the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment headquarters while visiting Camp Lejeune, N.C., April 23, 2009.  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has lunch with Marines at the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment headquarters while visiting Camp Lejeune, N.C., April 23, 2009.  
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF PENTAGON FULL HONORS CEREMONY FOR KING ABDULLAH II

Apr. 24, 2009





Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, escorts King Abdullah II, left, ruler of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, into the Pentagon, April 24, 2009. Abdullah was welcomed with a full honors arrival ceremony on the Pentagon parade field and then met with Gates to discuss a variety of regional security issues.

*DoD photo by R. D. Ward*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, hosts a meeting with King Abdullah II of Jordan at the Pentagon, April 24, 2009. Joining Gates is Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, center.

*DoD photo by R. D. Ward*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, and King Abdullah II of Jordan watch as the the 3rd Infantry Regiment marches during a joint service, full honors ceremony at the Pentagon, April 24, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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## Gates Welcomes New Senior Civilian Officials to Pentagon

By Gerry J. Gilmore  
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, April 24, 2009 - Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates welcomed a group of recently appointed senior defense civilian officials during a Pentagon ceremony today.

Gates welcomed Michele A. Flournoy, undersecretary of defense for policy; Robert F. Hale, undersecretary of defense, comptroller; James N. Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy; Alexander R. Vershbow, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and Jeh C. Johnson, general counsel of the Department of Defense.

"I'm pleased to officially welcome five senior officials to the Department of Defense -- dedicated professionals, all," Gates said before a mixed military-civilian audience that filled the Pentagon's auditorium.

The new officials, Gates said, possess "a wide range of experience in strategic and international affairs, management, finance and law."

Gates also announced that Ashton Carter last night received U.S. Senate confirmation to become the next undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

The defense secretary said he and his senior management team "look forward to working closely" with these newly appointed leaders "on a host of critical decisions in the months and years ahead."

Flournoy "has been on the job now for some time," Gates said, noting that she has been busy addressing Afghanistan and Pakistan issues. He saluted Flournoy's expertise in strategic defense matters and said she's a leading expert on how to apply and integrate the military and civilian elements of national power and international cooperation during unexpected contingency operations.

"It is truly an honor to be standing with you all here today," Flournoy said during her remarks. Flournoy said she looks forward to providing "the best possible support to the men and women who serve" in America's military.

Turning to Hale, Gates praised the Pentagon's new top money manager for his "decades of financial and business management experience in the public and private sectors, much of that in the military setting."

During his remarks, Hale noted that he enjoys crunching numbers while managing the Pentagon's financial affairs in support of America's servicemembers and defense civilians. He added that he appreciates the work of the 50,000 members of the Defense Department's financial community, noting their efforts "are the key to making all of this work."

Miller is another accomplished defense expert, Gates said, who as Flournoy's top deputy "will provide advice on a wide range of national security issues likely to confront the department in the coming years," including assisting with the Quadrennial Defense Review process that's now under way.

"It is a great privilege," Miller said, to work with "talented civilian workers and with the men and women in uniform who put themselves in harm's way."

Vershbow, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, the Russian Federation and South Korea, brings his impeccable credentials in international security affairs, Gates said. The secretary also saluted Vershbow's multiple talents and his "great dedication and patriotism."

"I've come to respect the courage, the vision and the dedication of our armed forces and become a true believer in the importance of close civil-military coordination in meeting today's threats," Vershbow said during his remarks.

Johnson, the Pentagon's new senior lawyer, brings "a wealth of legal experience and expertise" as well as "an affinity for public service," Gates said of the former top lawyer for the Air Force. The secretary said he'll rely on Johnson's legal expertise and advice as the department closes the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while it continues to safeguard the American people.

"I know you want to help our men and women in uniform accomplish their missions for the American people," Gates told the new officials. "I also know that your talents and your persistence will be great assets to this department and our country."



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Opening Statement on the FY 2009 Supplemental Request to the Senate Appropriations Committee**  
*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building,  
Washington, D.C., Thursday, April 30, 2009*

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental Request.

I am honored to be here with Secretary Clinton. Our joint appearance symbolizes the continuing improvement in relationships and close collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense. As Secretary Clinton said, this is intended to be the last planned war supplemental request that the administration will make. Future budgets, starting with FY10, will instead be presented together – with money for overseas contingency operations clearly marked as such.

On that subject, some of you may have heard about my FY10 budget recommendations to the President. I look forward to coming back here next month to discuss some of those details with you.

Of the \$83.4 billion in this request, approximately \$76 billion is for the Department of Defense – most of it to directly support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This covers a wide range of activities, whose highlights include:

- \$38 billion for every-day costs associated with maintaining forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves. I should note that this supplemental takes into account planned reductions in troop numbers in Iraq this year, and increases in Afghanistan.
- \$11.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes money for four F-22s to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses.
- \$9.8 billion for force protection, which includes, among other things, money for lightweight body armor, surveillance capabilities, and \$2.7 billion for sustainment, retrofit upgrades, and new procurement of 1,000 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles to meet the latest requirements in Afghanistan.
- \$3.6 billion to expand and improve the Afghan National Security Forces. We have not requested, and will not request in the future, any money for Iraq's security forces. The government of Iraq has taken on that financial burden.
- \$1.5 billion to continue to deal with the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices – a threat that, considering its effectiveness, we should expect to see in any future conflict involving either state or non-state actors.
- [\$500 million] for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) – a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability.
- Finally, there is \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this unique authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan – for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires wartime and peacetime capabilities. General Petraeus, General McKiernan, and the U.S. ambassador on the ground have asked for this authority, and it is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

The supplemental also includes money for programs to support the warfighter and ease strain on the force:

Due to higher-than-expected recruiting and retention rates, we are well ahead of schedule to expand the Army and Marine Corps – which will help ease the burden on our troops and help reduce, with the goal of ending, stop-loss. Currently, we expect the Marine Corps and Army to meet their respective end-strengths of 202,000 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. The supplemental includes \$2.2 billion to that end.

There is also \$1.6 billion for wounded warrior care and programs to improve the quality of life for our troops and their families. On that note, I thank the Congress for funding in the stimulus bill programs that provided infrastructure improvements, including \$1.3 billion for hospital construction.

I should mention that in the FY10 budget, I am proposing to move funding for programs like these to the base budget to ensure long-term support for the programs that most directly affect our nation's greatest strategic asset: our troops, and the families that support them.

As was the case last year, the Department of Defense will have to be prepared for continued operations in the absence of the supplemental or another bridge fund. Currently, some operational funds will begin to run out in July – which has historically affected the Army and the Marine Corps first. After Memorial Day, we will need to consider options to delay running out of funds. We also expect to run out of money to reimburse Pakistan by mid-May. I urge you to take up this bill and pass it as quickly as possible, but please not later than Memorial Day.

As Secretary Clinton discussed, the supplemental also includes \$7.1 billion for international affairs and stabilization activities, including economic assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Needless to say, I strongly support this funding. As I have said for the last two years, I believe that the challenges confronting our nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They require instead whole-of-government approaches – but that can only be done if the State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission across the globe. This is particularly important in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where our ability to provide resources beyond military power will be the decisive factor.

One of the most interesting and thoughtful discussions I've had during a hearing was almost exactly a year ago when Secretary Rice and I sat before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss Section 1206 and 1207 authorities – both of which have improved levels of cooperation between State and Defense. Secretary Clinton and I are also dedicated to figuring out how best to bring to bear the full force of our entire government on the pressing issues of the day. So I ask you to continue supporting not just our men and women in uniform, but the men and women at the State Department who are just as committed to the safety and security of the United States.

Let me close by once again thanking you for your ongoing support of our troops and their families. I know you share my desire to give them everything they need to accomplish their mission – and to support them and their families when they come home.

Thank you.

S. HRG. 111-93

**THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 WAR  
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

**SPECIAL HEARING**  
APRIL 30, 2009—WASHINGTON, DC

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



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**THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2009 WAR  
SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST**

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met at 10:02 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye, Leahy, Mikulski, Kohl, Murray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Johnson, Landrieu, Reed, Lautenberg, Nelson, Pryor, Tester, Specter, Cochran, Bond, McConnell, Shelby, Gregg, Bennett, Brownback, Alexander, Collins, Voinovich, and Murkowski.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUE

Chairman INOUE. The committee will come to order. This morning, the committee meets to review the supplemental appropriations request for fiscal year 2009. The request by the administration totals \$83.4 billion, of which approximately 95 percent is to support military and related security efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

An additional 4 percent is requested for other security initiatives, with the remaining 1 percent related to other issues, such as wildlife protection and improved communication equipment for the Capitol Police.

To discuss the majority of the funding requests, the committee is pleased to receive testimony from the distinguished Secretaries of State and Defense, the Honorable Hillary Clinton and the Honorable Robert Gates. It is good to see both of you.

The members of the committee know each of you very well. We hold you both in great esteem and are familiar with and appreciate your candor. We look forward to your responses to the many questions, which I'm certain we will have.

As we review the request, I want to note first that I'm pleased that the President has indicated that this will be the last increment of funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that will be requested outside of the regular appropriations process.

While we recognize that no one can predict what other new requirements might emerge which would require the administration or Congress to seek additional funding, it is clearly a positive step that beginning in fiscal year 2010, we can expect to see the cost of these ongoing efforts will be contained in the regular budget.

I believe it is also a positive step that the request for this last increment is not listed as an emergency. For several years, led by

Chairman Byrd, this committee has urged the administration to get rid of that gimmick, declaring war supplementals as emergencies. We very much appreciate the willingness of the new administration to put these costs on budget.

In general, it is my belief that the Senate is likely to be supportive of this request. Funding contained in the proposal will provide very necessary funds to support our troops in harm's way, and almost as critical, provide funding to assist our allies and support the Governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

There are several areas, however, which I believe the committee will need additional clarification or justification before it can recommend funding. For example, many of my colleagues are concerned for the precise plan involved in the closure of the prison at Guantanamo.

We wonder about the potential plan to station our war-weary National Guard troops on the Southwest border, and we question the appropriateness of providing foreign assistance for Pakistan under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. So, too, will we be seeking assurances that the administration is not attempting to provide any assistance to Hamas.

Hopefully, these issues will be among those addressed either in your statements or in the questions which will follow. I would note to my colleagues that I recognize that there are many issues which you want to address, and remind you that today's hearing is on the 2009 supplemental request and not on the 2010 budget request, which we will be receiving next week. So I would urge my colleagues to refrain from trying to discuss items in the 2010 request.

We will be inviting both Secretaries back before the committee at later dates to discuss the 2010 budget. I thank both of you for appearing today. Without objection, your full statements will be made a part of the record. At this point, I would like to yield to the vice chairman of this committee, the Honorable Thad Cochran, for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

#### STATEMENT OF SENATOR THAD COCHRAN

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I'm pleased to join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, to our committee today as we consider the request for supplemental appropriations. These are national security issues of great import, and we are going to carefully review the request to be sure that we provide the resources needed to deal with these critical international challenges.

We're at a critical juncture for the future security of our country as we begin to draw down forces in Iraq and shift our focus to dismantling Al Qaeda and extremist networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The security environment in both Iraq and Afghanistan remain tenuous. In Iraq, we need to watch for signs the security situation does not degrade as our forces withdraw. I'm pleased to see the greater emphasis that the administration has placed on eliminating terrorist safe havens in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas using greater cooperation and counterinsurgency training of Pakistani security forces.

In considering the administration's request for overseas contingency operations, we must be mindful of our duty to provide our servicemembers and diplomatic officers with the resources needed to conduct their missions successfully. They're asked to do much in support of our national security, and we must provide them the resources necessary to accomplish their missions.

We look forward to the testimony today and your estimates, if you can provide us that, of when the Department will need these additional funds. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Before you proceed, the committee has received a statement from Senator Byrd that I will insert into the record at this point.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

Thank you, Chairman Inouye, for holding this hearing. Thank you, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, for coming today to discuss with the Committee the details regarding your supplemental request. The ongoing costs of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world, are important—not only for the goals that we aim to achieve in these volatile spots, but also for the nation and our economy here at home. It is even more important during these difficult economic times that funding requests be justified and clearly contribute to the national security of the United States.

I was pleased to learn that the fiscal year 2010 Department of Defense and Department of State budget requests are expected to include funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the co-author of the Byrd-McCain Amendment to the fiscal year 2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which required regular budgeting for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I will be glad to see this.

Like many Americans, I have grown increasingly concerned about the situation in Pakistan, which bears so heavily on the prospects for success in Afghanistan. I note that the supplemental request includes funding for assistance to Pakistan, and for increased diplomatic operations in Pakistan. I have also noted the increase in funding requested for additional diplomatic and civilian personnel in Afghanistan, to supplement the growth in the American military presence there. I will be watching their activities carefully. Recent press reports that many of these civilian positions might be filled by military reservists is something I find worrisome. Our military reserves have been stretched to the limit; to call them into a war zone because of their civilian background, rather than their military training, may cause fewer people to consider serving in the reserves. Surely, in this economic climate, many people with the right kinds of skills would be willing to consider work in Afghanistan. The bottom line, however, is that the systemic problems in both Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be solved simply by more activity, and more money. It must be smart activity, targeted and focused on achievable goals that fit within an overarching strategy that is not yet, I fear, clearly defined.

As the U.S. presence and activities in Afghanistan increase, and our troops redeploy from Iraq, I also expect to see that some of the lessons learned in Iraq transfer to Afghanistan. Much has been learned about force protection in Iraq that might usefully be applied in Afghanistan. Over the last few months, I have worked with the Department of Defense to correct deficiencies in emergency medical evacuation and forward surgical capabilities to treat wounded service men and women in Afghanistan. I thank you, Secretary Gates, for your personal attention to this matter. I will be carefully monitoring the changes you have implemented that will, I hope, greatly reduce the amount of time expended before wounded soldiers receive critical medical care.

I remain concerned, however, about the ground medical evacuation vehicle capability in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I understand that a majority of the ground evacuation vehicles in use were designed around 1960. Given the new realities of operating in an IED environment, this unnecessarily puts our wounded and our medical specialists in harm's way. Medical corpsmen responding to a roadside IED attack should be at least as well protected as other soldiers. I understand that consideration is being given to purchasing upgraded ground evacuation vehicles. In

fact, the Army had requested 323 such vehicles in the draft supplemental request, but that funding was not included in the request that was sent to Congress. I look forward to seeing that funding included in the fiscal year 2010 budget request.

I also urge both Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates to remain vigilant against corruption and contract fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last year, the Committee held a series of hearings examining corruption and contract fraud that is wasting taxpayer dollars and, even worse, might be financing the activities of our adversaries. I expressed concern then that inadequate resources were being put against this issue, and I challenged the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice to increase their investigative and capacity-building capabilities to address these extremely critical problems. I look forward to hearing from each of you what has been done to step up efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute individuals involved in fraudulent and corrupt activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, and the many other concerns before you, a new problem has emerged to challenge both the Department of Defense and the Department of State. That new, or reemerging, problem is that of piracy. The recent seizure of an American-crewed freighter by pirates off the coast of Africa raises new challenges for both of you. New or expanded international efforts must be undertaken to protect commerce and our citizens on the high seas, and new rules of engagement must be developed to address the activities of the pirates. The United States cannot, and should not, act alone in most instances, but our activities will require careful coordination with the other nations that have ships on patrol in those waters. Somalia, home to many of these pirates, is a lawless place with weak government control. I have doubts that the conditions in Somalia will allow the government there to effectively address the problem of piracy, and I would strongly caution those who think that we can do it for them. I know that you will both be struggling with this issue, as will the Congress. I suggest that the Administration work closely with Congress in addressing this challenge.

Chairman INOUE. It is now my pleasure and great honor to introduce the Secretary of State.

**STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee, former colleagues, and friends. I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you, and I also thank you for your stalwart support of the men and women of the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), who serve in critical and often dangerous missions in all corners of the world.

I'm honored to be here with Secretary Gates. I appreciate the partnership that we have developed in the first 100 days of this administration. And today, on day 101, I look forward to our further collaboration in the months ahead.

Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, let me just give you a brief update on how the State Department is supporting the Federal Government's response to the H1N1 flu virus.

We have established an influenza monitoring group within our operations center. We are tracking how other governments are responding to the threat and what assistance we might offer. We are constantly reviewing and refining our advice to Americans traveling or living abroad.

Our pandemic influenza unit set up in the last years is providing valuable expertise. Its director, Ambassador Robert Loftis, is keeping us apprised of their work and their interaction with health agencies and the World Health Organization (WHO).

Earlier this week, USAID announced it is giving \$5 million to the World Health Organization and the Pan America Health Organization to help detect and contain the disease in Mexico.

We will continue to coordinate closely with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the WHO, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other agencies, and I'm very cognizant of the role that we all must play in attempting to stem and contain this influenza outbreak.

Secretary Gates and I are here together because our departments' missions are aligned and our plans are integrated. The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplomacy, and development.

The men and women in our armed forces perform their duties with courage and skill, putting their lives on the line time and time again on behalf of our Nation. In many regions, they serve alongside civilians from the State Department and USAID, as well as other Government agencies, like the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

We work with the military in two crucial ways. First, civilians complement and build upon our military's efforts in conflict areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, they use diplomatic and development tools to build more stable and peaceful societies, hopefully to avert or end conflict. That is far less costly in lives and dollars than military action.

As you know, the United States is facing serious challenges around the world. Two wars, political uncertainty in the Middle East, irresponsible nations led by Iran and North Korea with nuclear ambitions, an economic crisis that is pushing more people into poverty, and 21st century threats, such as terrorism, climate change, trafficking in drugs and human beings. These challenges require new forms of outreach and cooperation within our own Government and then with others as well.

To achieve this, we have launched a new diplomacy powered by partnership, pragmatism, and principle. We are strengthening historic alliances and reaching out to create new ones, and we're bringing governments, the private sector, and civil society together to find global solutions to global problems.

The 2009 supplemental budget request for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development is a significant sum, yet our investment in diplomacy and development is only about 6 percent of our total national security budget.

For Secretary Gates and myself, it is critically important that we give our civilian workers, as well as our military, the resources they need to do their jobs well.

In Iraq, as we prepare to withdraw our troops, our mission is changing, but it is no less urgent. We must reinforce security gains while supporting the Iraqi Government and people as they strengthen public institutions and promote job creation and assist those Iraqis who have fled because of violence and want to return home.

Last weekend, I visited Iraq, meeting on the ground our new Ambassador who was confirmed the night before. We visited the leadership. We visited with a cross-section of Iraqis in a town hall setting, and clearly, there are signs of progress, but there is much work that remains.

In meeting with Iraqis who are working with our provincial reconstruction teams and our Embassy, I was struck by the courage and determination to reconstruct their country, not just physically, but really through the reweaving of their society.

We have requested \$482 million in the supplemental for our civilian efforts to help Iraq move forward—we want to create a future of stability, sovereignty, and self-reliance—and another \$108 million to assist Iraqi refugees.

In Afghanistan, as you know, the President has ordered additional troops. Our mission is very clear: to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy Al Qaeda. But bringing stability to that region is not only a military mission. It requires more than a military response.

So we have requested \$980 million in assistance to focus on rebuilding the agricultural sector, having more political progress, helping the local and provincial leadership deliver services for their people.

As President Obama has consistently maintained, success in Afghanistan depends on success in Pakistan, and we have seen how difficult it is for the government there to make progress, as the Taliban and their allies continue to make inroads. Counterinsurgency training is critical, but of equal importance are diplomacy and development, to work with the Pakistani Government, Pakistani civil society, to try to provide more economic stability and diminish the conditions that feed extremism.

That is the intent of the comprehensive strategy laid out by Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, which President Obama and I have endorsed and which the Senate will be considering in the next few days.

With this supplemental request, we are seeking funding of \$497 million in assistance for our work in Pakistan, which will support the government's efforts to stabilize the economy, strengthen law enforcement, alleviate poverty, and help displaced citizens find safe shelter. It will also enable us to begin to keep the pledge we made to Pakistan at the Tokyo Donors Conference earlier this month.

In addition to our work in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, we are committed to helping achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors and to address the humanitarian needs in Gaza and the West Bank.

At Sharm el-Sheikh last month on behalf of the President, I announced a pledge of \$900 million for humanitarian, economic, and security assistance for the Palestinian authority and the Palestinian people. Our supplemental request is included in that pledge; it is not in addition to it. And it will be implemented with stringent requirements to prevent aid from being diverted into the wrong hands.

Meanwhile, the current economic crisis has put millions of people in danger of falling further into poverty, and we have seen again and again that this can destabilize countries as well as sparking humanitarian crises. So we have requested \$448 million to assist developing countries hardest hit by the global financial crisis.

These efforts will be complemented by investments in the supplemental budget for emergency food aid, to counter the destructive effects on the global food crises; to try to help people who are undernourished; to succeed in school; participate in their societies. I'm

very pleased that the President has asked the State Department and USAID to lead a Government-wide effort to address the challenge of food security.

We must also lead by example when it comes to shared responsibility. So we have included in this request \$837 million for United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations, which includes funds to cover assessments previously withheld.

I was recently in Haiti, where the U.N. Peacekeeping Force led by the Brazilians has done an extraordinary job in bringing security and stability to Haiti. It is still fragile, but enormous progress has been made. It is a good investment for us to pay 25 percent of that kind of stability operation instead of being asked to assume it for 100 percent of the cost.

We're asking also for small investments targeted to specific concerns: international peacekeeping operations and stabilization in Africa; humanitarian needs in Burma; the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs, assuming that they come back to the Six-Party Talks; assistance for Georgia that the prior administration promised and we believe we should fulfill; support for the Lebanese Government, which is facing serious challenges; and funding for critical air mobility support in Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative.

Finally, if the State Department is to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda that safeguards our security and advances our interests and really exemplifies our values, we have to have a more agile, effective State Department and USAID. We have to staff those departments well. We have to provide the resources that are needed. We have to hold ourselves accountable. Our supplemental includes \$747 million to support State and USAID mission operations around the world.

Secretary Gates and I are also looking at how our departments can collaborate even more effectively. That includes identifying pieces of our shared mission that are now housed at Defense that should move to State.

With the budget support we've outlined in the supplemental request, we can do the work that this moment demands of us in regions whose future stability will impact our own.

Secretary Gates and I are committed to working closely together in an almost unprecedented way to sort out what the individual responsibilities and missions of Defense and State and USAID should be, but committed to the overall goal of promoting stability and long-term progress, which we believe is in the interest of the United States, and which we are prepared to address and take on the challenges and seize the opportunities that confront us at this moment in history. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. [The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity. On behalf of President Obama and the entire Administration, thank you for your support of the men and women of the State Department and USAID, who serve in critical and often dangerous missions in all corners of the world.



I am honored to be here with Secretary Gates. I appreciate the partnership we have developed in the first 100 days of this Administration—and today, on Day 101, I look forward to further collaboration in the months ahead.

Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, let me give an update on how the State Department is supporting the federal government's response to the H1N1 flu virus.

We have established a monitoring group within our Operations Center, which is tracking how other governments are responding to the threat and what assistance we might offer. We are constantly reviewing and refining our advice to Americans traveling or living abroad. And our pandemic influenza unit is providing valuable expertise. Its director, Ambassador Robert Loftis, is keeping me apprised of their work.

Earlier this week, USAID announced that it is giving \$5 million to the World Health Organization and the Pan America Health Organization to help detect and contain the disease in Mexico.

We will continue to coordinate with the Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, the WHO, and other agencies. The resources and expertise of the State Department are being fully mobilized for this vital effort.

Secretary Gates and I are here together because our departments' missions are aligned and our plans are integrated. The foreign policy of the United States is built on the three Ds: defense, diplomacy and development. The men and women in the armed forces perform their duties with courage and skill, often putting their lives on the line to keep our nation safe. And in many regions, they serve alongside civilians from the State Department and USAID who work with the military in two crucial ways. First, they complement and build upon our military's efforts in conflict areas like Iraq and Afghanistan. And second, they use diplomatic and development tools to build stable and peaceful societies—work that is far less costly in lives and dollars than military action down the road.

As you know, the United States is facing serious challenges around the world: two wars, political uncertainty in the Middle East, irresponsible nations with nuclear ambitions, an economic crisis that is pushing more people into poverty, and 21st century threats such as terrorism, climate change, and trafficking in drugs and human beings—all of which require new forms of outreach and cooperation.

To achieve this, we have launched a new diplomacy powered by partnership, pragmatism and principle. We are strengthening historic alliances and reaching out to create new ones. And we are bringing governments, the private sector and civil society together to find global solutions to global problems.

The 2009 supplemental budget request for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development is a significant sum—yet our investment in diplomacy and development is only about 6 percent of our total national security budget. For Secretary Gates and me, it is critically important that we give our civilian workers, as well as our military, the resources they need to do their jobs well.

In Iraq, as we prepare to withdraw our troops, our mission is changing—but it is no less urgent. We must reinforce security gains while supporting the Iraqi government and people as they strengthen public institutions, promote economic growth and job creation, and assist Iraqis who fled their communities because of violence and want to return home.

Last weekend, I visited Iraq. Despite recent acts of violence in Baghdad and elsewhere, there are clear signs of progress. But there is much work that remains. I met with Iraqis who are working with our Provincial Reconstruction Teams and our Embassy, and I was struck by their courage and determination to reconstruct their country—not just physically, but also by re-weaving the fabric of their society.

We have requested \$482 million in the supplemental budget for our civilian efforts to help Iraq move toward a future of stability, sovereignty and self-reliance, and another \$108 million to assist Iraqi refugees.

In Afghanistan, additional troops are being deployed to disrupt, dismantle and destroy al Qaeda. But bringing stability to that region is not only a military mission, and it requires more than a military response. We have requested \$980 million in assistance to help the Afghans move toward sustained economic and political progress.

As President Obama has consistently maintained, success in Afghanistan depends on success in Pakistan. We have seen how difficult it is for the government there to make progress, and the Taliban continues to make inroads.

Counterinsurgency training is critical. But of equal importance are diplomacy and development to provide economic stability and diminish the conditions that feed extremism. This is the intent of the comprehensive strategy laid out by Senator Kerry and Senator Lugar, which President Obama has endorsed and which the Senate will be considering in the coming days. With this supplemental request, we are seeking

funding of \$497 million in assistance for our work in Pakistan, which will support the government's efforts to stabilize the economy, strengthen law enforcement, alleviate poverty, and help displaced citizens find safe shelter. It will also allow us to begin to keep the pledge we made to Pakistan at the Tokyo Donors Conference earlier this month.

In addition to our work in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, we are committed to help achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors and to address the humanitarian needs in Gaza and the West Bank. At Sharm el-Sheikh last month, I announced a pledge of \$900 million for humanitarian, economic, and security assistance for the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian people. Our supplemental request of \$840 million is included in that pledge; it is not in addition to it. And it will be implemented with stringent requirements to prevent aid from being diverted to the wrong hands.

Meanwhile, the current economic crisis has put millions of people in danger of falling further into poverty. We have seen how poverty can spark humanitarian crises and destabilize countries. So we have requested \$448 million to assist developing countries hardest hit by the global financial crisis. This is not merely a moral imperative. It is an investment in our own security and prosperity.

These efforts will be complemented by investments in the supplemental budget for emergency food aid, to counter the destructive effects of global food crises; people who are undernourished are less able to hold jobs and earn incomes; succeed in school; or participate fully in their societies. I'm pleased that the State Department and USAID will be leading a government-wide effort to address this issue. We are committed not only to providing short-term food relief, but also to helping nations build their own capacity to meet their long-term needs.

We also must lead by example when it comes to shared responsibility. We have included in this request \$837 million for United Nations peacekeeping operations, which includes funds to cover assessments previously withheld.

We are asking for small investments targeted to specific concerns: international peace keeping operations and stabilization in Africa; humanitarian needs in Burma; the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program, assuming that they come back to the Six-Party Talks; assistance for Georgia that the prior administration promised and that we believe we should fulfill; support for the Lebanese Government, which is facing serious challenges; funding for critical air mobility support in Mexico as part of the Merida Initiative.

Finally, if the State Department is to pursue an ambitious foreign policy agenda that safeguards our security and advances our interests, we must begin with our own agency. We are committed to creating a more agile, effective State Department and USAID, staffing these departments well, and giving our people the resources they need to do their jobs. Our supplemental request includes \$747 million to support State and USAID mission operations around the world.

Secretary Gates and I are also looking at how our departments can collaborate even more effectively. That includes identifying pieces of our shared mission that are now housed at Defense and should move to State.

With the budget support that we've outlined in this supplemental request, we can do the work that this moment demands of us in regions whose future stability will impact our own.

I'm confident that I speak for both Secretary Gates and myself in saying that we are committed to working closely together in the months ahead to promote stability and long-term progress in key regions around the world.

Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Now, may I call upon the Defense Secretary, Secretary Gates.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request. I'm honored to be here with Secretary Clinton. Our joint appearance symbolizes the continuing improvement in relationships and close collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense.

As Secretary Clinton said, this is intended to be the last planned war supplemental request the administration will make. Future

budgets, starting with fiscal year 2010, will instead be presented together, with money for overseas contingency operations clearly marked as such.

On that subject, some of you may have heard about my fiscal year 2010 budget recommendations to the President. I look forward to coming back here next month to discuss some of those details with you. Of the \$83.4 billion in this request, approximately \$76 billion is for the Department of Defense, most of it to directly support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

This covers a wide range of activities, whose highlights include: \$38 billion for everyday costs associated with maintaining forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, from pre-deployment training to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves. I should note that this supplemental takes into account planned reductions in troop numbers in Iraq this year and increases in Afghanistan.

\$11.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn out, damaged, or destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes money for four F-22s to replace one F-15 and three F-16s, classified as combat losses.

\$9.8 billion for force protection, which includes, among other things, money for lightweight body armor, surveillance capabilities, and \$2.7 billion for sustainment, retrofit upgrades, and new procurement of 1,000 MRAP all terrain vehicles to meet the latest requirements in Afghanistan.

\$3.6 billion to expand and improve the Afghan national security forces. We have not requested and will not request in the future any money for Iraq's security forces. The Government of Iraq has taken on that financial burden.

\$1.5 billion to continue to deal with the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IED), a threat that, considering its effectiveness, we should expect to see in any future conflict involving either state or non-state actors.

\$400 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Program, a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability.

Finally, there is \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability.

I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing Program, but we are asking for this unique authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan, for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires wartime and peacetime capabilities.

General Petraeus, General McKiernan, and the U.S. Ambassador on the ground have asked for this authority, and it is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

The supplemental also includes money for programs to support the warfighter and ease strain on the force. Due to higher-than-expected recruiting and retention rates, we are well ahead of schedule to expand the Army and Marine Corps, which will help ease the burden on our troops and help reduce, with the goal of ending, stop-loss.

Currently, we expect the Marine Corps and the Army to meet their respective end-strengths of 202,000 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. The supplemental includes \$2.2 billion to that end.

There is also \$1.6 billion for wounded warrior care and programs to improve the quality of life for our troops and their families. On that note, I thank the Congress for funding in the stimulus bill programs that provided infrastructure improvements, including \$1.3 billion for hospital construction.

I should mention that in the fiscal year 2010 budget, I am proposing to move funding for programs like these to the base budget to ensure long-term support for the programs that most directly affect our Nation's greatest strategic asset: our troops and the families that support them.

As was the case last year, the Department of Defense will have to be prepared for continued operations in the absence of a supplemental or another bridge fund. Currently, some operational funds will begin to run out in July, which has historically affected the Army and the Marine Corps first. After Memorial Day, we will need to consider options to delay running out of funds. We also expect to run out of money to reimburse Pakistan by mid-May. I urge you to take up this bill and pass it as quickly as possible, but please, not later than Memorial Day.

As Secretary Clinton discussed, the supplemental also includes \$7.1 billion for international affairs and stabilization activities, including economic assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Needless to say, I strongly support this funding.

As I had said for the last 2 years, I believe that the challenges confronting our Nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require whole-of-Government approaches, but that can only be done if the State Department is given the resources befitting the scope of its mission across the globe. This is particularly important in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where our ability to provide resources beyond military power will be the decisive factor.

One of the most interesting and thoughtful discussions I've had during a hearing was almost exactly 1 year ago, when Secretary Rice and I sat before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss section 1206 and 1207 authorities, both of which have improved levels of cooperation between State and Defense.

Secretary Clinton and I are also dedicated to figuring out how best to bring to bear the full force of our entire Government on the pressing issues of the day. So I ask you to continue supporting not just our men and women in uniform, but the men and women at the State Department who are just as committed to the safety and security of the United States.

Let me close by once again thanking you for your ongoing support of our troops and their families. I know you share my desire

to give them everything they need to accomplish their mission, and to support them and their families when they come home. Thank you.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee: Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental Request.

I am honored to be here with Secretary Clinton. Our joint appearances symbolize the continuing improvement in relationships and close collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense. As Secretary Clinton said, this is intended to be the last planned war supplemental request that the administration will make. Future budgets, starting with fiscal year 2010, will instead be presented together—with money for overseas contingency operations clearly marked as such.

On that subject, some of you may have heard about my fiscal year 2010 budget recommendations to the President. I look forward to coming back here next month to discuss some of those details with you.

Of the \$83.4 billion in this request, approximately \$76 billion is for Department of Defense funding—most of it to directly support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. This covers a wide range of activities, whose highlights include:

- \$38 billion for everyday costs associated with maintaining forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves. I should note that this supplemental takes into account planned reductions in troop numbers in Iraq this year, and increases in Afghanistan.
- \$11.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes money for four F-22s to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses.
- \$9.8 billion for force protection, which includes, among other things, money for lightweight body armor, surveillance capabilities, and \$2.7 billion for sustainment, retrofit upgrades, and new procurement of 1,000 MRAP All Terrain Vehicles to meet the latest requirements in Afghanistan.
- \$3.6 billion to expand and improve the Afghan National Security Forces. We have not requested, and will not request in the future, any money for Iraqi Security Forces. The government of Iraq has taken on that financial burden.
- \$1.5 billion to continue to deal with the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices—a threat that, considering its effectiveness, we should expect to see in any future conflict involving either state or non-state actors.
- \$500 million for the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)—a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability.
- Finally, there is \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this unique authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan—for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires wartime and peacetime capabilities. General Petraeus, General McKiernan, and the U.S. ambassador on the ground have asked for this authority, and it is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

The supplemental also includes money for programs to support the warfighter and ease strain on the force:

- Due to higher-than-expected recruiting and retention rates, we are well ahead of schedule to expand the Army and Marine Corps—which will help ease the burden on our troops and help reduce, with the goal of ending, stop-loss. Currently, we expect the Marine Corps and Army to meet their respective end-strengths of 202,000 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year. The supplemental includes \$2.2 billion to that end.
- There is also \$1.6 billion for wounded warrior care and programs to improve the quality of life for our troops and their families. On that note, I thank the

Congress for funding in the stimulus bill programs that provided infrastructure improvements, including \$1.3 billion for hospital construction.

—I should also mention that in the fiscal year 2010 budget, I am proposing to move funding for programs like these to the base budget to ensure long-term support for the programs that most directly affect our nation's greatest strategic asset: our troops, and the families that support them.

As was the case last year, the Department of Defense will have to be prepared for continued operations in the absence of the supplemental or another bridge fund. Currently, some operational funds will begin to run out in July—which has historically affected the Army and Marine Corps first. After Memorial Day, we will need to consider options to delay running out of funds. We also expect to run out of money to reimburse Pakistan by mid-May. I urge you to take up this bill and pass it as quickly as possible, but not later than Memorial Day.

As Secretary Clinton discussed, the supplemental also includes \$7.1 billion for international affairs and stabilization activities, including economic assistance for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Needless to say, I strongly support this funding. As I have said for the last 2 years, I believe that the challenges confronting our nation cannot be dealt with by military means alone. They instead require whole-of-government approaches—but that can only be done if the State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission across the globe. This is particularly important in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where our ability to provide resources beyond military power will be the decisive factor.

One of the most interesting and thoughtful discussions I've ever had during a hearing was almost exactly a year ago when Secretary Rice and I sat before the House Armed Services Committee to discuss Section 1206 and 1207 authorities—both of which have improved levels of cooperation between State and Defense. Secretary Clinton and I are also dedicated to figuring out how best to bring to bear the full force of our entire government on the pressing issues of the day. I ask you to continue supporting not just our men and women in uniform, but also the men and women at the State Department who are just as committed to the safety and security of the United States.

Let me close by once again thanking you for your ongoing support of our troops and their families. I know you share my desire to give them everything they need to accomplish their mission—and to support them and their families when they return home.

Thank you.

#### GUANTANAMO FUNDING

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Noting the extraordinary attendance of members, I have instructed the staff director to utilize the clock, and we will be limited to 4 minutes per person.

If I may, I would like to begin the questioning by asking a question on a small item, \$50 million for the Department of Defense and \$30 million for the Department of Justice. This is on Guantanamo. Though small, it's been controversial and a matter of great concern. What is your precise plan to close Guantanamo? How are you going to utilize this money?

Secretary GATES. Well, let me start and then see if Secretary Clinton has anything to add. We are in the process—or the Justice Department, I should say, is in the process of reviewing each of the detainees at Guantanamo, their files, to make a determination whether we should try and find a way to transfer them to other countries that might take them, whether to try them under Article 3 courts, or what to do with the rest of them.

Those discussions are going on right now, and in fact, I think just this week, the discussions are beginning in terms of trying to decide where the detainees would go that are not transferred to other countries or are not tried in Article 3 courts.

Those discussions have just gotten started. There clearly will be a specific plan that comes out of this, but what we've had to await

is the determination, roughly speaking, of about how big a group of people we will be talking about. And so the review of each of these case files has had to precede the development of a specific plan, in terms of where the prisoners would go or the detainees.

And so we have put a plug in the budget for \$50 million, just as a hedge that would allow us to get started if some construction is needed to be able to accommodate those detainees. The other \$30 million is for the Justice Department as a part of the process of going through these determinations at Guantanamo.

Chairman INOUE. How many detainees are involved in this process?

Secretary GATES. I think that there are now about—I don't have the precise number, Mr. Chairman. We can get that back to you. But I think it's about 250.

[The information follows:]

There are currently 240 detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) by the Department of Defense. Per the President's Executive Order signed on January 22, 2009 the Department of Justice is tasked with determining the disposition of all 240 detainees at GTMO. While the review process is being conducted in an expeditious manner, it will not be completed until October 1, 2009. Throughout the review process, detainees will be transferred, released, prosecuted, or found to be in some other lawful disposition. The Department is supporting the Department of Justice review and will carry out any necessary action in accordance to the various disposition determinations.

Secretary GATES. And it's what the subset of that will be that we have to accommodate long-term that we're working on.

Chairman INOUE. So you have not determined as to whether these prisoners will remain in Federal prisons or elsewhere?

Secretary GATES. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. You have no hint to give us?

Secretary GATES. No, sir.

Chairman INOUE. Madam Secretary, anything to add?

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Gates outlined, there's a very intensive process underway, led by the Attorney General, and the determinations as to each detainee are being conducted by an intensive review of all files and other material available.

But as Secretary Gates said, we are not yet at a point where decisions to any great extent have been made. Speaking for the State Department, obviously, our role is circumscribed. What we are attempting to do is try to convince other countries to take back their own nationalities of detainees and perhaps even others. And we have an intensive outreach effort going on to that effect right now.

Chairman INOUE. One final question, Mr. Secretary. What will happen to the facility itself?

Secretary GATES. I suspect that the detention facility will be mothballed once all the detainees are removed. I don't think we've actually addressed that piece of it yet, but I suspect that's what would happen.

Chairman INOUE. I thank you very much. Mr. Vice Chairman.

#### SURGE OF CIVILIAN EXPERTS

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary. The submission to the committee contemplates what is called a surge of civilian experts who will be brought together by the administration

to help develop strategies and programs for economic and cultural development efforts in Afghanistan.

I'm curious to know if we have begun recruiting people or assembling people. Is someone in the Department of State identified to head this economic and agricultural development program? And how much of the request contemplates money going directly to this effort?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, this is our commitment to try to provide additional civilian experts and workers in fields like agronomy that we are in the process of recruiting Jack Lew, the Deputy Secretary of State for Resources and Management, working with Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke.

Really, it's a Department-wide effort, as well as with USAID, actually identifying where we need to put people, what kind of people. Now, our numbers are not yet determined because this is obviously a challenging recruitment, but we believe we can recruit—the latest figure was about 500 civilians.

The Defense Department, as part of our ongoing discussion about how to enhance the capacities of the State Department, which we are undertaking, but not yet have fulfilled, has talked about looking at some of their civilians and some of their Guard and Reserve members to perhaps help in specific areas.

Richard Holbrooke and General Petraeus have been planning very carefully at a local level what we're going to need. We are committed to coming up with our share of the civilians.

One thing I would add, Senator, which, of course, is a concern, is the safety and security of these civilians, because we're talking about direct American hires or contract hires. We will also, of course, cooperate with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other nations' civilian workers, locally engaged and hired nationals.

So what we're talking about is a small number of what we hope will be a large civilian presence coordinated and focused. But security remains a challenge here and in Iraq, and it's something that we are spending a lot of time looking at with the Department of Defense.

Senator COCHRAN. We noticed the request includes Department of Defense funding for this purpose, as well—well, \$141 million for the Department of Defense and \$104 million for the Department of State.

Mr. Secretary, is there a particular person you're putting in charge of this program at the Department of Defense to see that these funds are spent in an effective way?

Secretary GATES. The Deputy Secretary, Bill Lynn, is overseeing this and it's really, for our part, trying to see if we can't—we think this situation is urgent enough that it's important to get people into the field as quickly as possible.

And so as a bridging effort to get from where we are today to the full deployment of the resources under the State Department's auspices, we are looking at asking members of the Reserve component for volunteers. We'll have veterinarians, agronomists, accountants, and so on, who would serve for a period of months until the long-term State Department folks are there.



And it's our intent, I think, initially for those who will be out in the field to use the additional civilians or volunteers to plus up the provincial reconstruction teams, because there's already a structure that would provide security for them, as Secretary Clinton indicated.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you.

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, could I just add one additional point? In Secretary Gates' testimony, he referenced what has been a very effective program on the ground for our military, the CERP funds, the Commander's Emergency Response funds.

Every time I was in Iraq, I was struck by how these really smart, focused captains and majors were given significant funds to be able to make on-the-spot decisions. If some tribal leader's house was damaged, they could say, "Well, I'm going to give you the money. We'll rebuild it." Or some road was blocked, "Well, we'll get the money to clear it."

That was an incredibly flexible and useful tool. Nothing like that exists on the civilian side. And so when we talk about working through the authorities and the capacities between State and Defense, for a lot of reasons right now, Defense is able to be more agile and flexible, with streams of money that go right to the ground, into the communities.

And we're going to have to work with the committee and others to try to figure out how we get more of that kind of agility and flexibility in our Embassy and on the ground with our civilian workers.

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Leahy.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm delighted to see you both here. I think having both of you in the positions you are in is a tremendous service to our country, and we're fortunate that both of you are here.

Secretary Gates, I spoke to you earlier about the 1,800 citizen soldiers from the Vermont Guard that are going to Afghanistan. I'll have some written questions on particular armor and equipment for them, and I would ask if you or your staff could respond to that when you get the written questions.

Secretary GATES. Sure.

#### FLU FUNDING

Senator LEAHY. Madam Secretary, you mentioned the H1N1 flu virus. Earlier this week, the President requested an additional \$1.5 billion in the supplemental, but that goes to the Department of Health and Human Services.

WHO says this is becoming a global pandemic. Millions of Americans are traveling, studying, or stationed overseas. We know this is a virus that knows no boundaries. Should we have additional funding in here for unanticipated health emergencies outside the United States, much of which could impact Americans?

Secretary CLINTON. That's a very good question, Senator. You know, Mexico requested from us—and a number of other countries, as well as the World Health Organization—some help in getting access to the drugs that are needed, and we are working with our partners to try to help resolve that and assist the Mexicans. They

also needed additional kinds of diagnostic and technological expert help, as well, and we've sent people down to our Embassy in Mexico to work with the Mexican Government.

I do think that much of the work that we did in the Congress over the last several years on avian flu has put us in a better position than we would have been, but I think that we could very well require additional help to deal with the emergencies in other countries. Because what will happen—it's human nature—is that as the influenza spreads, people will be increasingly reluctant to share their supplies.

Senator LEAHY. So what you're saying is we may need additional funds?

Secretary CLINTON. I would like to get back to you with a specific request, Senator, because I think you're right to raise that.

[The information follows:]

We very much appreciate your interest in helping the Department fulfill its mission. The White House has already requested \$1.5 billion to enhance the capacity of the United States to respond to this emerging and unpredictable situation. This requested fiscal year 2009 supplemental money would be provided to a proposed new account, Unanticipated Needs for Influenza, in the Executive Office of the President. These funds would be available for transfer by the Office of Management and Budget to Departments and Agencies, including the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. To deal with similar situations in the future the President is asking Congress to approve a request of \$8.6 billion for fiscal year 2010—and \$63 billion over 6 years—to shape a new, comprehensive global health strategy, rather than continue to confront individual illnesses in isolation.

Senator LEAHY. I look at the diplomatic and development components of the administration's strategy for Afghanistan. I don't see it differing much from the previous administration's—it funds some of the same things. I worry that we have spent billions in Afghanistan and we have yet to see the results that you or Secretary Gates or I would like to see.

What goals are realistic? How does your supplemental request of \$980 million differ from what we've done before? What failed before? What's going to work now?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think that we're at a point now, Senator, where lessons learned are finally being acquired and listened to. There have been some successes in certain provinces and departments of the national government in Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army has proceeded to be built up so that it has the respect of the nation.

Some of our partners in the international security assistance force (ISAF), the Dutch, the British, and others in the provinces they were responsible for, have had positive results. This review that we engaged in was intensive and it was no holds barred. What works, what doesn't work? It was a joint military-civilian undertaking.

I can't tell you sitting here today that everything we're going to try is going to work, but let me give you one quick example about what we think can make a difference. We did not emphasize agriculture.

You know, Afghanistan used to be the garden of central Asia. If you go back 30, 40, 50 years, you see huge orchards. Now when any of us fly over, we see eroded, denuded landscape with hardly a tree in sight. And there was a real cry for the Afghans to please get

some help in doing this, but our principal objective has been to eradicate the poppy crop, and we never took seriously alternative livelihoods.

We believe, on both the civilian and the military side, that this is a great opportunity for us. We know that from our intelligence, a lot of the members of the Taliban are not there because they are ideologically committed, but because it's a job and, frankly, it's a job that pays better than being in the police, and it pays better than trying to scrounge around to make a living without any help out of the land.

So I think, Senator, we've got a view of what we think will work better, and we're going to recruit the people, and we're not going to be all things to all Afghanistan's population. We're going to have very discrete missions, and we're going to hold ourselves accountable.

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're going to need further discussions on this before the subcommittee takes it up, but thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. The Republican leader Senator McConnell has special responsibilities on the floor. In recognition of this and in the spirit of bipartisanship, Mr. Leader.

#### GUANTANAMO—MILITARY COMMISSIONS

Senator MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. Welcome, Senator Clinton—Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. Let me pick up on the subject matter that the chairman led off with, and that's Guantanamo.

Secretary GATES, as you know, we had a vote in the Senate 2 years ago, 94 to 3, on the issue of whether or not the detainees at Guantanamo should come to the United States—come to U.S. soil. I know the Attorney General—I've heard you both say the Attorney General's in charge of this review. But I do have some questions related to the \$50 million request for Guantanamo in the supplemental.

The first one, I guess, would be I didn't hear you mention the military commissions as a possible way to deal with these detainees. The Supreme Court, in effect, ordered us to pass military commission law, which we did a couple of years ago. Am I to conclude or are we all to conclude that the military commissions are now out, as a way of trying whatever detainees we cannot convince others to take and we have to deal with ourselves?

Secretary GATES. No, sir, not at all. And I should have included them as one of the alternatives. One of the areas that I think the Attorney General and the Justice Department are looking at is the military commissions, whether to go forward with the—I think there are nine cases that are already before the military commissions, whether—or not. And should there be any changes to the military commission law, if they decide—if the decision is made to retain the military commissions. But it still—the commissions are very much still on the table.

Senator MCCONNELL. As you've probably heard, various communities are beginning to discuss their interest in taking these, and so far, there isn't any. In fact, I believe some communities have ac-

tually begun to pass resolutions saying they don't want them. How do we solve this dilemma?

We know this about Guantanamo. Everyone who's visited there, including the current Attorney General, has said it's a good facility. They're being treated humanely, and we know no one has escaped from there. During all of these years, we know we haven't been attacked again since 9/11. It seems to me to be working.

A lot of our European critics will—see, I guess we don't fully know the answer whether many of them are willing to take any of these people. But we do know that some of the countries from which they have come haven't had a great record of keeping them incarcerated once we send them back. Many of them ended up back on the battlefield. What are your thoughts about—what are we going to do with these people?

Secretary GATES. Well, the question really is what are we going to do with those that cannot be returned home, either because we fear that they won't be kept under—they won't be monitored or kept under watch, or we worry that they'll be persecuted when they go home. For example, the Uighurs, the 17 Uighurs. So we're talking about probably somewhere between 50—

Senator MCCONNELL. Well, could I just interject on the Uighurs?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator MCCONNELL. I gather the plan is simply to release them in the United States, right?

Secretary GATES. Well, some of—

Senator MCCONNELL. Not to be incarcerated, but just to be released in the country?

Secretary GATES. I'm not sure a final decision has been made. What I've heard people talking about is our taking some of the Uighurs, probably not all. Because it's difficult for the State Department to make the argument to other countries they should take these people that we have deemed in this case not to be dangerous if we won't take any of them ourselves.

But the question is—to the core of your question is what do we do with the 50 to 100, probably in that ballpark, who we cannot release and cannot try, either in Article 3 courts or military commissions?

And I think that question is still open. The President has made the decision to close Guantanamo. It's something that his predecessor said should be done, something that I said should be done over 1 year ago. I fully expect to have 535 pieces of legislation before this is over, saying, "Not in my district. Not in my State."

Senator MCCONNELL. I think you can count on it.

Secretary GATES. And we'll just have to deal with that when the time comes.

Senator MCCONNELL. My time is up, but let me just say, in conclusion, I understand the dilemma. The previous administration, of which you were a part also, said they wanted to close Guantanamo. Both candidates for President last year said they wanted to close Guantanamo. The difference is that this administration's actually put a date on it and actually has to answer the question, what are you going to do with them?

And I think it is perfectly clear that many of them are going to return to the battlefield if they can, and the conclusion is going to

be with many of them that they need to be incarcerated, and the question then is when.

And we're going to have a continuing interest in this, in terms of your own facilities and whether they can successfully contain them as Guantanamo has for the last 7½ years. Communities are going to be upset about this.

This is a very important issue and it deals with public safety, as we all know. Now, we haven't been attacked again since 9/11. We like that, and we would like for that record to continue. Thank you very much.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Chairman, good morning. Well, President Obama certainly put together a turbo team for foreign policy, and it's a pleasure to welcome both of you. Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for your ongoing commitment to the warfighter, not only in the theater, but when they come back home.

We want to acknowledge within this supplemental request increased money for healthcare for the returning warfighters, and we will be looking at whether that's adequate. Because as we've talked about on so many occasions, they bear the permanent wounds of war, the permanent impact of war, as well as the Yellow Ribbon Integration Program. So we'll be working with you on this.

And Secretary Clinton, you've had your own 100 days. Twenty-two countries, 74,000 miles, 3 o'clock in the morning phone calls, and they go on 24 hours throughout the day.

But friends and colleagues, with this excellent presentation, know that I have very serious reservations about our Afghan policy, and my reservations are based on this, and then three specific things.

Number one, the fact that Afghanistan seems threatened not only by the Taliban, but by a government that's riddled with cronyism and corruption. And it's part of that cronyism and corruption that is also the whole issue of is Afghanistan on its way to becoming a narco-state.

And number three, and not at all least, something I know our Secretaries champion, is the role and status and safety and security of women. The fact that we have a government in Afghanistan that turns the other cheek when girls have acid thrown in their face when they go to school, and they actually codify domestic rape.

You see what the situation is, so I'm being asked to send in the marines, where they want to continue to grow poppies. The cronyism and corruption, which would then, in and of itself, be an unstable government, and the treatment of women.

So my question is not why should we go. I know you'll talk about it. But then dealing with those three issues, what do you see dealing with it? And Secretary Clinton, I'd like to start with you with the cronyism, the corruption, and also the treatment of women and what you think is in here, what you think is also in the policy that would reassure the people of America why should we send in the marines to do this?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I think those are all very legitimate questions. We've given them a lot of thought. With respect to the government, its capacity, its problems providing services, its

perception of being less than straightforward, transparent, honest, it's a problem. I'm not going to sit here and tell you it's not.

There are, however, significant pockets of progress that we want to build on. Several of the members of the current government's cabinet are doing an excellent job. The build-up of the Afghan National Army is proceeding in a way that engenders confidence to the people of Afghanistan.

But we have made it very clear that we expect changes and we expect accountability, and we're going to demand it. It's among the highest priorities of the team that we have sent to Afghanistan.

I swore in Karl Eikenberry, the former general who had served in Afghanistan twice, yesterday as a new Ambassador. He knows the people. He understands what it takes to move them. Obviously, the rest of the group that we have in place is equally committed, so we're tackling this and we are taking it on.

With respect to the narco-trafficking, that is why we believe we've got to support alternatives. I mean, this is not going to disappear just because we aerial-bomb it with pesticides. It's just too profitable. It is now the largest source of opium for heroin in the world, and we have to tackle it at the local level and provide alternatives and get people to reject it culturally, which is—

Senator MIKULSKI. Is Karzai committed to working with us to do that?

Secretary CLINTON. That is what we are demanding of him. Now, we are not taking a position in this presidential election. We are neither for nor against any candidate, including the President, and we have made it clear what we expect of anyone who's elected.

I mean, part of our problem is there are a lot of mixed messages sent over the last 7 years, and we have to have a very clear message from the highest levels of our Government, both the executive and the legislative branch, that certain behaviors are not accepted. We're going to go after them. We're imposing conditions that we think are both workable and leading to the changes we're seeking.

But let me just finish by saying something about women. I deeply share your concerns. The law that you referenced is being brought back by the Afghan Government and by the President. I've personally been involved in that. But the problems go much deeper, and we're going to continue to emphasize our support for girls and women for their education, for their healthcare, for their rights.

That is an integral part of our strategy, because we think it is a clear leading indicator as to whether there is a commitment to the future in a way that we can continue to support. So I can assure you that the women's issues are not just a side issue or a marginal one. They are core to the strategy that we have developed.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you. I know my time is up. What I—so there are many things that I liked about this testimony, but that this is the last supplemental that we could deal with this in a regular order in our committees, through DOD, through foreign operations. The whole idea that it's defense, diplomacy, and development. We look forward to working with this turbo team. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much. Senator Bond.

Senator BOND. Thank you. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, I commend you both for putting the emphasis on the strategy that

worked in Iraq, the counterinsurgency strategy clear, hold, and build. I believe it's been—I'm calling it smart power. I believe that with most of our military and intelligence leaders, that the war against terror is 10 percent kinetic and 90 percent development and governance.

For 2 years after getting a request personally from President Karzai and putting in money for USAID to send agricultural specialists to Afghanistan, not a single one showed up. In 2007, I worked with the Missouri National Guard. We got it cleared through the Defense Department in early 2008. The first agriculture development team went to Nangarhar province. It was tremendously successful. The second one is there now.

Eight other States have sent their National Guards. They are dependent upon the CERP funds that Secretary Clinton mentioned. Those worked in the Philippines and Mindanao. It is far better, particularly in Islamic countries which are friends of ours, that we put American sandals on the ground so we don't have to wait until a strike and put American boots on the ground.

I look forward to working with you on the details of this plan because we cannot afford to fail in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I want to address very briefly a couple of the issues, one of them that I hope could be addressed in the supplemental. I will discuss with you at much greater length, Mr. Secretary, the tremendous bathtub in the TACAIR that is going to leave our Navy without ships on carrier decks. It's going to leave the National Guard without anything except Cessnas to fly and air sovereignty alert, and it's even going to shortchange the Air Force itself. But we will go into that later.

#### SHUTTING DOWN C-17 LINE

The F-35 is way behind schedule, over budget. The F-22 doesn't do the job that the F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s can do. But I am very much concerned, after the great principles that were laid out for the Defense policy, that the President recommended shutting down the C-17 line. That's the last wide-body large military aircraft production line in the United States. Gives us the ability, the only one in the world to respond quickly and independently in any adversarial military activity or humanitarian needs.

And with the air mobility study due to be finished late summer, where I believe we will hear the need for continued air mobility support, the decision to shut the C-17 down now is a question of ready, fire, aim.

I would hope that you would rethink this and allow funding in the supplemental for the long lead time. Otherwise, we will not have the capacity to turn out the air mobility that we will need for military and humanitarian actions, and we're going to be left with a situation where we're going to be running around the world trying to buy cargo aircraft. C-5s are over their lifespan. C-17, to me, needs to be rethought. And I would ask for your comments on that, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I agree with all the good things you said about the C-17. It's a terrific aircraft. The Air Force believes, and transportation command believes, that we have more than necessary capacity for lift for the next 10 years or so.

One of the problems that we have in that context is that there is a legislative prohibition effectively against us decommissioning the A model of the C-5s. And so as we look at the capacity that we have with those 59 C-5As and we get more and more C-17s, we just are continuing to build excess capacity.

But the other side of it is that even if you lifted the prohibition on decommissioning C-5As, the Air Force has to look at what—if it has no need on the requirement side for greater capacity, then what are they going to give up? What are they going to have to give up in other programs in order to buy more C-17s?

It's a zero-sum game. If you had everything that is put in the budget that is excess to our requirements, means that there's something else we can't do. And what I'm trying to do is figure out how do you balance all of these things and have the maximum possible capability for the maximum range of potential conflict?

Senator BOND. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I look forward to working with you and this committee because I've got some ideas.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much. Senator Kohl.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton. Secretary Clinton, I would like to thank you for hosting yesterday's gathering on global food security. I believe that the USDA and our land grant colleges, as I said yesterday, have a vital role to play in fighting hunger and instability in developing countries, and I would like to work with you on that in the months to come.

The supplemental request before us provides \$300 million for Public Law 480, which is a key part of the overall food security effort. In terms of tonnage, has the global demand for food assistance changed from this time last year?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, as you know, there have been a number of food crises, and we do think that the demand and the need has increased. But we have a very careful analysis as to why this money in the supplemental should be sufficient through this fiscal year to be able to produce the response that we may be called on to make.

But I want to underscore—and thank you for your interest in food security—our current system is just not as effective as it needs to be. And that's why we want to shift our focus to agricultural sustainability, focusing on the small producers, helping them understand the value of GMOs, genetically modified organisms, to help them have drought-resistant crops, helping them with farm-to-market roads, the kind of approach that we actually did quite effectively in the 1960s and the 1980s.

So I think our capacity for the response set forth in the supplemental is fine, but we've got to go further than that, and that's what I'm looking forward to working with you on this committee to do.

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Secretary Clinton. Recently, the Taliban came within 60 miles of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, as you know. Now, if India's military was 60 miles from the capital of Pakistan, the entire country would have been on a total war footing. But as you remarked, Secretary Clinton, many in Pakistan seemed unthreatened by the idea of the Taliban imposing Sharia



law in the country because they're so unhappy with their own government.

So have the recent gains by the Taliban changed the views of the Pakistanis about how dangerous the Taliban are? Do the Pakistan people now see the Taliban as a real threat to their way of life, and not just a thorn in the side of the United States?

And finally, last night, the President, at his press conference, called the Government of Pakistan very fragile. He also said that he was confident that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would not fall into the hands of the Taliban. What would be our response if the Taliban forced the Government of Pakistan to fall, and how can the President be so sure that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal would be safe from the Taliban?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, let me start by responding that we do think that the Government of Pakistan, both civilian and military leadership, is demonstrating much greater concern about the encroachment by Taliban elements in parts of the country that had before then not been subjected to their presence and are not in the ungovernable areas that have been part of Pakistan going back even to the British Empire.

So we believe that we're getting a much more thoughtful response and actions to follow. And I think Secretary Gates might want to focus on the military piece of this. But it was heartening to see the military sent in to the Buner district and to begin to try to push the Taliban advance back.

With respect to the nuclear arsenal, I think that much of that would have to be in a closed session, Senator. But let me just reiterate that based on everything that we are aware of, the Pakistani military is very focused on the protection of their arsenal, and we have certainly kept our eyes very closely on that, and I think that's where the President's assurance comes from.

#### MOTIVATING PAKISTAN

Senator KOHL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, welcome to the committee. I'd like to pick up on the line of questioning about Pakistan that Senator Kohl has going. If Pakistan is, as some people have said, maybe a little more—and I think the President used the word fragile. Some people call it a ticking time bomb.

And it seems to me, although I've always supported and will support this supplemental with money and help, that the government and the army has lost the will, or seems to have lost the will to fight even for their own country. And I think some of this money would be used, I understand, Secretary Gates, for training of forces and so forth. Is that correct?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Senator SHELBY. But how do we impart the will to fight? That seems to be lacking there. And how do we help them, because we have been there—been helping them about 8 years now with a lot of money. And I think it was necessary, but they don't even have control of a lot of their territory. You know that, and they seem to be losing territory day after day. And we all know, as Senator Kohl

alluded, that they do have a huge nuclear arsenal. This could be a real, real problem to all of us; could it not?

Secretary GATES. Well, it certainly could. And I would say, Senator Shelby, that, I mean, my perspective on it is that the Pakistani Government has not seen what has been going on in the western part of Pakistan as an existential threat. Their view has been since their inception that India was the principal threat to Pakistan's continued existence.

I think that they have—the areas in much of western Pakistan have not really been under serious government control perhaps for most of Pakistan's history, if not all of it, and the Pakistani Government, Pakistani population is dominated by Punjabis. They dramatically outnumber the number of Pashtuns in the western part of the country and have always tried to deal with that situation out there, either by setting tribes against one another, working with individual tribes, cutting the kinds of deals that we've seen, and occasionally using the military.

And I think what has happened just in recent weeks and really since—beginning with the assassination of Mrs. Bhutto, is the reality dawning on the Pakistanis that what has happened in the west is, in fact, now a real threat to them. And I think that the Taliban moving into Bunair set off an alarm bell that may, in fact, begin to create a broader political consensus in Pakistan that would include not just President Zadari and Prime Minister Khalani, but perhaps the Shalifs and others, as well, including the army that, in fact, they now face a real threat.

I think they have seen the situation in the west as largely of our making as we drove the Taliban out of Afghanistan, and now they're beginning to see these guys have designs on the Pakistani Government itself. And so I think those realities that have begun to dawn on them, I think provide some grounds for—I won't go as far as optimism, but some grounds to believe that there is a growing awareness in Islamabad and in Pakistan that this is a threat to them.

And I would just use the analogy, you know, the United States was first attacked by Al Qaeda in 1993. Al Qaeda was at war with the United States for 8 years before we decided we were at war with Al Qaeda. And I think the same kind of thing has kind of happened in Pakistan. They have—the Pakistanis haven't realized the threat that has been posed to them over the last several years.

Senator SHELBY. If this is not a wake-up call, I don't know what could be; do you?

Secretary GATES. I agree.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you very much, Senator Murray.

Senator MURRAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to both of you. I just wanted to echo the comments of Senator Mikulski regarding the issues of women's rights in Afghanistan. I appreciate your response very much, Secretary Clinton.

Let me ask both of you—both of you have talked at great length about the need for smart power and elevating the role of development in our national security strategy. It appears from the President's proposed budget and from the supplemental appropriations request that the Obama administration is making a major effort to

rebalance national security strategy by giving civilian aid, diplomacy, and the non-military dimension of national security more strength and impact.

However, in order to make that work, we're not just talking about money, we're talking about people. Secretary Clinton, you mentioned in your remarks USAID and the need for more foreign service officers. I am an original cosponsor of a bill with Senators Durbin and Bond called the Increasing America's Global Development Capacity Act that would address this deficit. Can you talk a little bit about the need to have full-time foreign service officers and whether we have the capacity we need?

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Senator, and the short answer is no, we don't. We don't have the capacity. We don't have the authorities yet. And as you know, USAID has lost a lot of its capacity over the last years. It is viewed by many now as largely a contracting agency. There are only four engineers currently employed by USAID for the entire world. So we have allowed a lot of our capacity to just migrate out of the government.

And we don't get the accountability. It often costs more than it should in order to deliver the service that we're seeking. So we will be coming to you with a set of ideas. And I'm looking forward to consulting with all of you, and I appreciate the efforts made by Senators Durbin and Bond. We have to rebuild our diplomatic and development arsenal. We just don't have it.

And so it's awkward when people say, "Well, we need to be sending civilians out." And we have a hard time getting the people we need in language areas, just bodies on the ground, able to do the functions we're talking about.

When Senator Bond was talking about how difficult it was in agriculture development teams, I faced the same experience as a Senator. I was trying to get a project going to get fruit trees planted again in Afghanistan. I even had an interest in the market. We just couldn't do it. It was absolutely the most frustrating experience.

So we are trying to cut through the redtape and the bureaucracy. We're trying to get the resources that we need and to have a rebuilt diplomacy and development mission that can actually respond to the very good ideas that all of you have.

#### PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVILIAN HELP

Senator MURRAY. Secretary Gates, do you agree?

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. And I would just go back to a comment that Senator Kohl made. I think we also need to think creatively about public/private partnerships that can help us.

And I was really—as the former president of Texas A&M, I was glad to hear Senator Kohl talk about the potential role of land grant universities, because most of them have extension services that operate all over the world, and they have the expertise, and we can draw on them and work with them.

And A&M's had people in Afghanistan and Iraq for the last 4 or 5 years, and so we have a lot of assets in this country that aren't necessarily Government employees that I think we could harness, and those people would be willing to volunteer, or we could put them on contract.

But in terms of the need for more foreign service officers, I couldn't agree more. I've been arguing for it for 25 years. If you took every foreign service officer in the world, it wouldn't be enough people to crew one aircraft carrier.

Senator MURRAY. Okay. My time is out. And, Secretary Gates, I did want to ask you about how we're going to continue to have a competitive industrial base as we cut back our military. As I mentioned in our recent conversation, this is something that I want to continue to dialogue with you about. I appreciate both of your comments today. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Dorgan.

Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Secretary Clinton, let me deviate just a bit. I need to ask you about the journalist that's imprisoned in Iran. Roxana Saberi is someone who I know.

She, as you know, was born and raised and educated, sports all-star, all-star academic, Miss North Dakota top-ten finalist, and Miss America. Master's degree from Northwestern. Master's degree from Cambridge, England. Went to Iran and reported for National Public Radio and many other venues.

Now sits in a 10 foot by 10 foot prison cell, first accused of buying a bottle of wine, then next accused of reporting without a license, and then accused of espionage and sentenced to 8 years in prison.

It is an unbelievable miscarriage of justice, and I have been working on that case for several months. Can you give us some notion of what the activities are at State?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, I know you have. I've talked with you. I've talked to Senator Conrad. I've talked to the Governor of your State. We are also working very hard. We have great concerns about Ms. Saberi's health and well-being. She has arbitrarily been, in our view, held without any kind of transparency or process.

We have called on the Iranian Government, both directly and through other Emissaries, to release her. As you may know, she is extremely unhappy and quite rebellious about being held in such a horrible situation and is on a hunger strike. Her parents, as you know, have been there for several weeks.

We have reached out and are continuing to reach out in every channel that we know of, public and private. We obviously use the Swiss as our consular representative in Tehran. We hear mixed responses all the time from the government. They're going to let her out. They're going to let her out in 2 months. They're going to sentence her to 8 years. They're going to do an appeal.

I think it shows you how difficult it is to deal with this government in Iran, because they are impervious to the human rights and the civilized standards that one should apply. And so we are, I can assure you, doing everything we know to do.

Senator DORGAN. Madam Secretary, thank you for that. And I hope you'll obviously continue as much pressure as we can apply to the Iranian Government. First of all, let me thank you for all of your work and your travels and your representation of our country.

## OVERSEEING CONTRACTORS

Secretary Gates, I'm really pleased that you've stayed on, and I think you have an admirable record. And I do want to say this to you, though, that I've held 18 hearings on the subject of contract abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And I have just learned again, just in recent days, of award fees being given to contractors, very large award fees for excellent work, being given to contractors that have had level three corrective actions taken against them because their work was deficient.

I want to continue this discussion about the Army's sustainment command and others that are shelling out all of this money. \$38 billion of that which we're considering in this request is for ongoing support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. I assume that's the Logcap project and so many other things.

But I just hope that you will have a renewed effort to put a magnifying glass on these contractors and the amount of money that's going out, because there is unbelievable abuse and waste and, yes, fraud, and we just have to lace it up and stop it.

So I just—I say that to you again. I'm pleased you're where you are, but you and I have had discussions about it. I've had discussions with your deputy. But in recent months, once again, award fees have gone to contractors that have done insufficient and inappropriate and inadequate work, in some cases, resulting in the death of soldiers.

Secretary GATES. I would just say, Senator, that this is clearly a high priority for myself, but also for Secretary Lynn and our new Under Secretary Ash Carter. And I think that part of our effort—part of the problem that we have is the number of contractors we have who are overseeing contractors.

And I think that the initiatives that I've put forward for 2010 to significantly expand the number of professional acquisition procurement contracting officers who are full-time U.S. Government employees in place of contractors will put us in a better place, in terms of trying to deal with these contract problems.

Our goal will be to have 4,000 of those people on board during fiscal year 2010 and 20,000 over the course of the 5-year defense plan, and we're doing it also on professional services and management, and we hope to add 13,000 jobs in that category, displacing contractors in that category during fiscal year 2010, and 30,000 over the course of the 5-year defense plan.

But this is a very high priority and it goes to some of the discussion that Senator Bond and I had. We can't afford to spend a single dollar that we don't have to, and because it takes away from resources to do other things, and to spend it on contractors who aren't doing their jobs is not just waste, fraud, and abuse, it impacts our capabilities.

Senator DORGAN. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Bennett.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both of you for your service and your professionalism you bring to your jobs.

## HOW MANY F-22S ARE NEEDED?

Secretary Gates, you mentioned the F-22. You're familiar, I'm sure, with the comment made by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Schwartz, who said that the military requirement for the F-22 was 243 and not 187.

Now, I know the chairman doesn't want to get into a subject that isn't directly connected to the supplemental, but in the supplemental, you have some funds for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). And one of the problems with UAVs, particularly in Iran and Syria, if we are required to use them there, is that they do not have stealth capability, and the F-22 does.

So I'd be interested in your comment about the F-22. And I quote, Air Force leadership said that based on warfighting experience over the past several years and judgments about future threats, the Defense Department is revisiting the scenarios on which the Air Force based its assessment regarding the requirement for the F-22.

Could you explain the scenarios that are being revisited, when and what the results were that caused you to make the decision to take the F-22 down from 187 to—from 243 to 187?

Secretary GATES. First of all, Senator, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of the Air Force are on the record and, in fact, in the newspaper saying that the program of record of 183 plus the 4 in the supplemental meets military requirements and is a sufficient number in their view.

I think that the way the discussion about the F-22 has proceeded has been somewhat confused. The reality is that since 2005, the program of record for the F-22 has been 183 aircraft. That's under two different Presidents, two different Secretaries of Defense, two different Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

So there's no cutting of the program. There is a completion of the program of record that has existed under both President Bush and President Obama since 2005. We can get into the jobs issue or anything else, but this is one that—where I think there has been some mischaracterization of what we're doing here. We are not cutting the F-22. We are completing the program of record that was established in the Bush administration and, frankly, if my top line were \$50 billion higher, I would make the same decision.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. Secretary Clinton, the chairman mentioned a reference to U.S. funding to Palestine that could fund the possibility of funding Hamas. Could you discuss that with us?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, there is no possibility of funding Hamas. That is absolutely not possible under the language of the supplemental, nor is it possible under our administration's policy.

What we have said is that if there were to be, which at this moment, seems highly unlikely, a unity government that consisted of the Palestinian authority members from Fatah and any members from Hamas, the government itself, plus every member of the government, would have to commit to the quartet principles. Namely, they must renounce violence, they must recognize Israel, and they

must agree to abide by the former PLO and Palestine authority agreements.

And that has been our policy. That is what we have told our partners in Europe and elsewhere, which is why we've been very hesitant and quite unconvinced about any efforts to create a unity government, but so have the Palestinian authority. So there is no likely outcome that would present that, but if there were, the conditions are very clear.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to both of you, and my congratulations to the jobs that you're both doing. And Madam Secretary, it's a political delight for me to see you at this table, as you know, so thank you for being here.

#### MORE TROOPS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Secretary Gates, I've been trying to understand the number of troops that we have committed to Afghanistan. As I look at it, it's 63,000, with a request from General McKiernan for 10,000 more. Is that a correct analysis?

Secretary GATES. Senator, the level of troops that the President has approved to this point is 68,000.

Senator FEINSTEIN. And McKiernan's request is still out—

Secretary GATES. He has—the request is out there. It is for troops that would not go to Afghanistan until well into 2010. And CENTCOM has not—Central Command has not forwarded that additional request to the Pentagon at this point.

My own view is that before recommending those additional forces to the President, I think we ought to see how the forces that we are committing today, have already committed, are performing and what the real requirement is toward the end of this year or early next.

And particularly, given the fact that those troops or those forces wouldn't go, even if the President did approve them, until well into 2010, but it goes to a larger concern of mine that I've spoken about publicly, and that is that I worry a great deal about the size of the foreign military footprint in Afghanistan. The Soviets were in there with 110,000 troops, didn't care about civilian casualties, and couldn't win.

With our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other partners, with the troops the President has approved, we will be at about 100,000. And so I think we need to look very carefully at how our strategy is proceeding some months down the road before I would contemplate forwarding a recommendation for additional troops to the President.

#### SITUATION IN IRAQ

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you very much. I don't think most people in America know the size and number. And I think there's a real concern that we just get drawn in and drawn in, and we're into it like we were in Iraq over a substantial period of time, which raises the subject, and that is Iraq, and that's Sadr City, and

that's the five suicide bombings yesterday, the four last week, the very substantial loss of life.

And a sentence in this morning's New York Times—and let me read it to you and get your response—Mr. Maliki is torn between demands for the United States and some Sunni leaders to reconcile with some former members of the Hussein government and the Shiite partners who reject an accommodation. What is that all about?

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I think having just had a conference call with General Odierno a couple of days ago, or teleconference, his judgment and the judgment of his commanders is that most of the violence that we are seeing in Iraq today, these suicide bombings, are, in fact, the work of Al Qaeda in Iraq.

They are clearly—they have a campaign that they started about 6 weeks ago. There's even a name for it that Al Qaeda has, and I can't remember it. But they are clearly trying to take advantage of our drawdown and particularly our drawing back away from the cities to try and provoke a renewed round of sectarian violence.

So this has less to do with Maliki's political decisions and who he's reaching out to. I mean, the latest information we have is that he's reaching out to some of the Sunni groups. He does have a problem with the Ba'athist party and Saddam Hussein's—some of the people who worked for Saddam Hussein.

But he is reaching out to other Sunnis, in terms of political alliances. But the judgment of the commanders is this is an orchestrated effort on the part of Al Qaeda to try and provoke the very kind of sectarian violence that nearly tore the country apart in 2006.

Senator FEINSTEIN. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Alexander.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both Secretaries for your service and for being here. Senator Feinstein's questions provoked me to—and some of the others make me ask this question.

Do you think, Secretary Gates or Secretary Clinton, either that sometime within the next several months, that it would be appropriate for the President to present to us his strategy for Afghanistan and for there to be some sort of expression of support for it in the Congress?

I would start with Secretary Gates, because the war in Iraq became President Bush's war. And in the last few years of it, there was not bipartisan support in the Congress for conclusion. Several of us tried to take the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq study group, on which you served for a while, Secretary Gates, and we couldn't get agreement between the Senate leadership, Democratic, and the Republican President.

Upon that, even though we've ended up today with a conclusion in Iraq that is about the same as that envisioned by the Iraq study group some time ago, in which President Bush and President Obama both seem to agree on now, it would seem to me that it would be more effective—it would send a more effective message to our enemy and a more effective message of support to our troops if we made sure that the war in Afghanistan doesn't become Presi-



dent Obama's war in the same way that Iraq became President Bush's war.

And would not one way to help make sure that does not happen be for the President to take his time to develop a strategy before we move ahead with many more troops, for us to vote on it and say, "Yes, we agree with you, Mr. President. We want our enemies to know that, and we want our troops to know that."

#### SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN

Secretary GATES. Well, Senator Alexander, I think that that's basically a political call. I guess I would just say from my standpoint that anything that can be done that conveys strong bipartisan support for what the President is trying to accomplish in Afghanistan has value, because it is a fact of life that our adversaries, as well as our friends, read the press avidly, and they are very well aware of what's going on in this country.

I was stunned when I was in RC East and Khost province 1½ years ago, and a village elder, in his robes and everything, said he had read my Landon Lecture at Kansas State University on the Internet. I said, "Where do you plug it in?"

But I think—so they are watching, and anything that conveys a strong bipartisan support for what the President is going to do and that we will see this through to a successful outcome has value. What the best way to manifest that is, I think is for people who are more politically aware than I am.

Senator ALEXANDER. I wonder, Secretary Clinton, the words see through to the end whatever our mission is, is essential in support of our troops. What would be your response to that?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I do think that there's value in that approach, because I believe that the country needs to be engaged, along with our Government, in thinking through what is at stake here.

We did, in many ways, create the problem we're now coping with. During the 1980s in our struggle against the Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan, we created a funding stream. We trained. We armed Mujahaddin and their allies in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

And then once the Soviet Union retreated and fell, we were not paying attention. Others were. Most particularly, bin Laden, who knew that there could be a safe haven amidst that chaos in Afghanistan. So I think that there are many legitimate questions to ask about the situation we confront today.

And I hope that from both Secretary Gates and myself, you're not hearing any message, other than our recognition this is hard, and we are trying the best we can to come up with an integrated civilian-military strategy along the lines that many of you have referenced.

But I think it's important for the American people to be engaged, as well as the Congress. And this supplemental, of course, begins that discussion, and I think it could be quite helpful and productive.

Senator ALEXANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Landrieu.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary and Secretary Gates, your partnership here is extremely powerful. And it is immensely encouraging to me and to my constituents and to many of us about this new approach, this enlightened approach, and this hopefully successful approach that you all have outlined this morning.

Several of my questions have been asked. I want to associate myself with the Senator from Maryland and her questions about women and girls. I'm completely sure that you're the best person for that job, Madam Secretary, but let me ask this.

The National Solidarity Program (NSP), from some experts, is one of the most successful and cost-effective aid programs. I understand it operates in thousands of villages. Its method of electing councils mandating the inclusion of women, its literacy education, business training, I understand has been effective.

My question is, what is your view of this program? Is it as effective as I've been led to believe? Are there 20,000 shovel-ready projects ready to go, and is it being funded? And if not, what can we do to support it?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, I am absolutely in agreement with the tone and substance of your question. The National Solidarity Program is an important tool. It has been very successful. I want to reiterate that the United States Government funds the NSP through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. It's a facility managed by the World Bank.

And from fiscal year 2004 to 2008, USAID has given \$100 million to the NSP. In this 2009 supplemental, we are requesting \$85 million in additional funding for the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, which we intend to target toward the NSP. I think there is more we could do. It's exactly the kind of program that sort of makes our case. It's on the ground. It's Afghans in the lead, supported by technical assistance and expert liaisons. And it is, I think—I was last told 24,000 villages. So we are very strongly in support of this.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. And Mr. Chairman and ranking member, I would just ask you all to make special note of this particular program. It's small, but has such potential to make a difference, and we'll be following up as we go through this process.

My second question, Senator—I mean, Secretary Clinton, is about USAID. I know we've had several, but it's a different twist to it. I understand, and I'd like you to clarify for us, both of you, if this is correct.

I asked for a review about the dangers facing Afghan workers in Afghanistan. The casualty rate for USAID employees and locally engaged employees, I understand, is 1 in 10, as opposed to the casualties of our military, Secretary, 1 in 57. Can both of you comment about what we're going to do to provide the—if this is correct, what are we going to do to provide the security that our aid workers need to obviously carry out this mission that both of you have thought so clearly about and articulated this morning?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, those are the best numbers that we have available. Obviously, any loss of life of any of our young men and women in uniform is a matter of grave concern to us. Many of the casualties on the civilian side, as you rightly point

out, are non-U.S. contract employees, NGO employees, locally engaged Afghans.

But the numbers are quite disturbing, and it is a problem for us. And that's something that Secretary Gates and our respective teams are working on, how do we provide the security necessary?

You know, if you look at Iraq and the PRTs that have been embedded with our military, they've been very successful because they did have that security backup. In Afghanistan, we expect there will also be initially a lot of support from our military for our civilian workforce.

But we want to be effective, and we're going to go places that the military may not see as a high priority. And it is a concern to me personally, as I know it is to the rest of the Government, and we're trying to figure out the best ways to provide that.

I mean, these are war zones. I mean, it's dangerous for our military or our civilian personnel. But because our civilians are not armed and are not equipped to defend themselves unless there is a military presence or a contractor providing that support, we have to be very careful about how we proceed.

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up on Senator Mikulski's concerns about the treatment of women at a time when we're proposing to ramp up our economic assistance to Afghanistan.

The first time that I met Hamid Karzai was in 2003, and it was before he was president, but he had been brought back to Afghanistan. And I recall it so well because he seemed so committed to re-opening schools for girls, and pledged personally to me that better treatment of girls and women would be among his highest priorities.

Then you and I, on a subsequent trip to Afghanistan, met with a group of Afghan women, and it looked like real progress was being made. But now, Afghanistan is going backward in its treatment of women.

We've seen President Karzai sign a highly repressive law that, among other provisions, actually legalizes marital rape. And it's troubling to me that the American taxpayers are being asked to ramp up assistance to Afghanistan at a time when the treatment of girls and women is becoming more repressive.

So my question for you is are we conditioning this additional assistance on any standards for the treatment of girls and women?

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we are making it very clear that among our now more limited priorities, the treatment of girls and women stays right at the core of what we're doing. And as we are meeting with the Afghan Government and President Karzai next week in our second trilateral meeting with the Pakistani Government, we will be raising these issues and demonstrating clearly to them how seriously we take this.

I have to say too that I was very disappointed by that law going through the Parliament. I have spoken with a number of officials in the Afghanistan Government, and I think this is one of those where they viewed it as a request by a minority group, and with a straight face, were saying, "Well, no, we still support women. It's

just something that is demanded for this minority." And we made it very clear that that just was not acceptable, that we wanted clear, unequivocal commitments to the well-being of women and girls.

Now, in many ways, the situation has improved the number of schools that are operating. But as we look at our objectives in some of the most difficult areas of the country, certainly the Taliban uses intimidation against girls going to school—throwing acid in their face, burning their schools down, threatening their families if they send the girls to school.

And we're going to make it clear that the United States and our European allies and others who are working with us in this are just not going to stand by and let that happen.

Senator COLLINS. Good.

#### HELP FROM EUROPEANS

Secretary GATES. I would just add, Senator, that just to pick up on Secretary Clinton's last comment, this is an area where we actually have a lot of help from the Europeans. They are very conscious of not just the treatment of women and girls, but other kinds of repressive actions, such as the treatment—the criminal treatment of children, and other things like that, where they react very strongly to that, and they carry that message directly to President Karzai and other members of the Afghan Government.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you both.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Nelson.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here today. I think we're all encouraged by the partnership that you've been able to put together between State and Defense, and we wish you well in your endeavors to bring together the various activities, because they are interrelated.

And I'm encouraged, as well, that, Secretary Gates, you've made it clear from the very beginning that we will not win simply by military means alone. That's why it's so important you do this. Before we get mired down in the new budget, we probably ought to step back for a moment and look at the mission that we really want to achieve in Afghanistan.

As you know, I've been one who pushed for benchmarks or measurements that we can measure what it is that—what our success is in important areas we might proceed. I've been encouraged, as well, by the recognition that having the equivalent of benchmarks, if not by that name, the equivalent of some metric to evaluate how we're doing in these critical areas where we have goals that are set.

And I wonder if you might update us on what's going on, because some of them are obviously going to be State goals and some are going to be Defense goals. And I wonder if you might—I'll start with you, Secretary Gates, and then Secretary Clinton.

#### BENCHMARKS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Secretary GATES. The benchmarks are still—or I guess we're going to call them measures of effectiveness, are going to—are I think well advanced at this point, but still haven't come to the principal's level for approval and forwarding to the President.

But based on the preliminary looks that I've had, the measures fall into three categories: security, development, and governance. And they apply to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. And so those categories will be in each of the three.

And I think that one of the reasons that I have strongly supported this is that, before we can come up here, we need to be in a position to evaluate honestly and without sort of rolling the goals in front of us to see whether we're making progress 6 months from now on the issues that today we think are important.

And I think that there's a real commitment on the part of the administration to do this, and I think the benchmarks are going to be pretty elaborate when they're completed.

Secretary NELSON. Secretary Clinton.

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, I remember sitting, sometimes in this room, occasionally over in Hart in the Senate Armed Services Committee, and our constant effort to try to get some measures of performance, some metrics that we could judge. And it was a moving target, and it was very difficult. And you and others were real leaders in trying to achieve that.

We're going to start this effort with such metrics, I mean, exactly what Secretary Gates said, in the three big areas, but then broken down into much smaller bites. And we're going to be measuring from every perspective. Whether it's diplomatic and development efforts or military efforts or intelligence efforts or agricultural development, we are going to have a list of such measurements.

So I hope that the Congress will give us a chance to put these in place and then be able to brief you on them and report to you on them, because I think that it will be a better approach if we can do this within the context of the different departments and not legislatively mandated at this point.

But we really agree with you completely that this has to be part of our mission going forward to figure out how effective we're being, and they are pretty far advanced. And obviously, we'll be sharing them with you and seeking ideas or suggestions as well.

Senator NELSON. Will they be made public? Will the measurements be made public?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, some could not be because they would be classified and military mission-related, but we haven't made a final decision. Certainly they could be shared with the Congress. Whether they could be in some form made public is a question that we will try to answer affirmatively, because it's part of what we're hoping to do, which is to enlist broad support for what we're attempting.

Senator NELSON. It would help develop the support. I appreciate it very much. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Pryor.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Both your answers to that last question were really music to my ears because, like Secretary Clinton said, we've pushed hard over the last several years to try to get some way to measure success or progress in Iraq, and it's very difficult. And basically, from my standpoint, it never really happened.

## GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY ON PAKISTAN

Secretary Gates, let me ask you, if I may, and make sure I understand your previous answer. What you're saying is this is a pretty sharp departure from the previous administration, that you're trying to establish internally a real measurement of the effectiveness and of the progress that we're going to be making in Afghanistan; is that fair to say?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. And I felt fairly strongly—having been through the experience with Iraq 2 years ago, I felt it was very important that the administration take the initiative on this and say, "We will hold ourselves accountable, and here are the things we will hold ourselves accountable to."

Senator PRYOR. I think that's great. And as Secretary Clinton alluded to, if you could share that with the Congress, that would be most helpful, and whatever you can make public that would be appropriate, I think would help the American people understand what we're doing there.

Secretary GATES. Well, as Secretary Clinton said, there's no question about what we'll share with the Congress, and we'll make public as much of it as we can.

Senator PRYOR. That'd be very much appreciated. Let me ask also, Secretary Gates, about the request for \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund.

As I understand it, we have been giving Pakistan money in years past, but there hasn't been a lot of accountability, and my belief is that they've been taking at least some of our money, and maybe most or all of our money, and actually moving it over to the eastern side of the country, using it to beef up their defenses, et cetera, against India, rather than helping in the international effort that we wanted them to help on in the other parts of their country.

What sort of accountability will you put on this money in Pakistan to make sure that it is spent in accordance with the United States' purpose?

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, let me make clear the distinction between the coalition support funds that we have paid the Pakistanis over the past 7 years and this PCCF. The coalition support funds are all reimbursements of the Pakistanis. They make a claim to us. It's reviewed by our Defense office in the Embassy in Islamabad. It's then reviewed by Central Command. Then it's reviewed by the Comptroller at the Defense Department before the reimbursement is provided.

We have taken some steps after this became an issue last year. We tightened these procedures significantly in June 2008 to ensure that these measures were being—that the accountability issues were being applied consistently, that there was somebody clearly responsible, and that's the commander of Central Command. And then also, to ensure that the Pakistanis—that we provided some assistance to the Pakistanis so they could help meet our demands for accountability. There were just some capabilities, accountants and so on, that they didn't have.

So I think we're in a better place for that. And the reality is because it's a reimbursement, they then can spend the money however they want, because it's a claim that they filed with us.

On the PCCF, these are funds that we will be applying directly to border security, to training. The funds would be used, for example, to build the border coordination centers. They would be used for the training of the Frontier Corps, and so we know that the training camps are being built for the Frontier Corps. So these are things—the money that we will be allocating for this will be for things we can see and that we can document where that money has gone.

So I think it's a very different kind of thing, in the sense that it's not a reimbursement, but it is for training and equipping of the security forces and related counterinsurgency strategies. I know there's been some concern here on the Hill about whether this money ought to be in the State Department or it ought to be in the Defense Department.

And what Secretary Clinton and I have agreed that we would recommend very strongly to the Congress is let's do it this way for the fiscal year 2009 supplemental. Let's see if there's a way that we can—part of the problem is authorities and capacity in the State Department to be able to apply this money with the agility Secretary Clinton was talking about, like the CERP funds.

So then our proposal would be to see if we can work with the Congress to have a way that the money can be allocated, appropriated to the State Department in fiscal year 2010, but with the authority for an immediate pass-through to the Department of Defense to implement it. And then we would use fiscal year 2010 to build the capacity and get the Congress to approve the kinds of authorities that would give the State Department the capability to administer the money and manage the money beginning in fiscal year 2011.

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. And again, that gives me a lot of comfort, and I appreciate that. It's great to see you both. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to congratulate all of you on what I refer to as the Obama doctrine, and that is smart power. And it's nice to see the relationship the two of you have built. And I've had a chance to talk to General Jones last week, and I'm very pleased with what you're doing.

One of the things that's coming up more and more often when I go back to Ohio are people are asking me, "How can we continue to be Uncle Sugar to the world?" And the question they're asking is have we set priorities in terms of where we're going to invest our time and material and our men and women, and what is the capacity to respond financially to these challenges that we have?

If you look at this supplemental, if it passes, and probably will, this deficit for 2009 will be over \$2 trillion, 14 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Most people agree that in the next 5 years, we'll double the debt; triple it in 10 years.

We're really in a financial crisis here today in this country. People are out of work and they're wondering what's going on. How can we keep going?

And I would suggest to both of you, all of you that are in the non-entitlement programs in the silos, to talk to the President and

Peter Orszag about it's time for us to deal with entitlements and tax reform in this country. And if we don't do it, we're going to do away with our credibility, in terms of the rest of the world, and our credit will be zilch.

Now, that being said, and I think it's really important that we get at this thing right now, because people around the world are worried about what we're doing. Some of them can't even believe it. And the same people are asking us for help.

The question I have for Afghanistan is this. I remember in 2003, when I put my foot down and said we weren't going to have any more than a \$350 billion tax reduction, the President of the United States and Vice President and everybody else said, "Don't worry, George. The spending in Iraq's going to be taken care of. You don't have to worry about it."

#### LONG-RANGE STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN

Well, it wasn't. Now we're talking about Afghanistan. And what really worries me is do we have a comprehensive plan? I'm talking about long range. How long's it going to take? How much money is it going to take? How many of our military are going to have to be there? What kind of infrastructure are we going to have to build? In addition to that, what role are our NATO allies going to be playing? I've talked with the Brits. They said, "We're stretched. We can't do it." I've talked to the French. "We're stretched. We can't do it."

Now, Afghanistan was supposed to be a test of NATO, and we still have people over there with KVS. I'd like to know, has anybody really sat down and looked at where are we going, how long, and talk to our allies about what their responsibility is going to be, militarily, infrastructure-wise, humanitarian, and all the other stuff that we've talked about, or is this going to fall back right in our laps, for the most part, like Iraq has?

Secretary GATES. Well, Senator, in my view, I think we have looked at the longer-range strategy. I think we have set some clear priorities and clear goals that are more realistic. There is no question that this is a multiyear undertaking.

I would tell you that we all wish that our allies would do more, but the reality is, they are doing a lot. They have 32,000 troops in there. They are taking serious casualties. The Canadians, the British, the Danes, the Australians, the Dutch are in the fight in a big way, and now so are the French. And the north and the west are mainly quiet, but the Germans have thousands of troops there in the north and the Italians in the west, along with the Spanish.

They are responsible for more than one-half of the provincial reconstruction teams. They run 53 of the operational mentoring and liaison teams, and have promised to fund 103 by the end of 2011.

So do I wish they had more there? Sure. Do I wish they would donate more to the Afghan National—the trust fund for the Afghan National Army? Yes. But the fact is, they are participating and they are paying, and they are paying with blood as well as treasure.

I believe that an honest answer to your question is that we will have to have troops in Afghanistan for some period of years. I think the exit strategy for all of us is a more effective Afghan Gov-



ernment, but especially, an effective Afghan National Police and effective Afghan National Army partnering with us initially, and then taking sole responsibility over time, as well as some measure of improved governance, so that people who are sitting on the fence in Afghanistan come over on the government's side.

So this is hard. It's going to cost us more money. But the reality is, I think most Americans understand that we were attacked out of this country in 2001, and that if we don't see this thing through, then the same people who attacked us in 2001 will reestablish a safe haven there, where they have the capacity to plan sophisticated attacks against us.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Tester.

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of you for being here. We're getting toward the end of a fairly long hearing, but I appreciate your answers and your matter-of-factness.

A couple of things. The Yellow Ribbon Program, Secretary Gates, I appreciate you expanding that out. I think that's a great program, and I think it's a program that will serve our fighting men very, very well.

I want to say a little bit about agriculture very quickly. Secretary Clinton, you talked about it a little bit, and I would just say this. I don't know that culture. You guys know that culture far better than I do. But I can tell you this. As a farmer, to go in and douse the crops with a herbicide or pesticide and kill them, that's a far bigger loss than money can pay for. And so I hope that we're looking at the synergy between the farmer and the ground and all of that. I agree they're raising a crop that they need to replace it with something that's a consumable that'll help their country, but if you want to make somebody really, really mad for a long, long time, especially a farmer, just go in and take out their livelihood.

A couple of things. This kind of dovetails onto—one of the things that makes people anxious, I think, about Afghanistan is we're still in Iraq, and we saw we had people supposedly that were helping us, our allies, and pretty soon, it was a one-man band. So the points that Senator Voinovich makes, I think, are solid, how we keep our allies involved in a part of this equation. Because, quite honestly, the war on terror doesn't just apply to the United States. It applies to everybody in the world.

What about non-military costs? Are our allies stepping up to the plate in that realm? And either one of you can answer the question.

Secretary CLINTON. With respect to Iraq?

Senator TESTER. With respect to Afghanistan's rebuilding.

Secretary CLINTON. Afghanistan? Yes. In fact, what Secretary Gates just recited, in terms of the support that we are getting from our allies in Afghanistan, it's not just in military. In fact, I think every country that has troops on the ground also has civilian help on the ground, and some countries that don't have troops on the ground have come forth with civilian help. So we are seeing that.

Senator TESTER. Have those countries stepped up with monetary help also?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, they have. And, you know, as Secretary Gates said, not as much as we would want, but in some ways, more than we expected.

Senator TESTER. Is it about in the same proportion as the troops? You said 68,000 to 32,000. Is it about in that same proportion, as far as our effort compared to our allies' efforts?

Secretary CLINTON. You know, I don't know the answer to that, Senator. We'll find the answer and give that to you.

Senator TESTER. I appreciate that.

[The information follows:]

The United States has pledged approximately \$35.5 billion to Afghanistan since 2001, according to the Afghan Ministry of Finance (57 percent of total international contributions). After the United States, the United Kingdom, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Japan are the next largest donors, pledging a combined total of roughly \$10 billion. In total, the international community has pledged \$26.5 billion to Afghanistan since 2001 (43 percent of total).

The last Afghanistan donors' conference was held in Paris in June 2008, which resulted in over \$20 billion in pledges. Responding to our intensified civilian effort, many international partners have approached us to discuss expanding and targeting current and new assistance. Consequently, we are exploring holding another donors' conference, focused primarily on donor coordination.

Senator TESTER. We've got funding, \$800,000 for Pakistani—\$800 million, I'm sorry. \$800 million for U.N. peacekeeping, \$200 million for Georgia, several of them. Just curious why these aren't in the 2010 appropriations request, and why are they here and not in that?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I think on a number of those, these are commitments that were made that need to be fulfilled before we would finish the deliberations on the 2010 budget. What we've tried to do is be very, very careful about what we put in the supplemental. Because, as the chairman said at the very beginning, this is our last supplemental. We do not want to fund our Government in these important projects by supplemental. But there is a pipeline problem that we're trying to cure by getting the money where it needs to be.

Senator TESTER. So it's time sensitive, and it wouldn't be there in time if it was in the 2010 budget?

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, sir.

Senator TESTER. Okay. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both.

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretaries, welcome here. I'm glad to hear your speech at K-State got sent around the world, Secretary Gates. If you ever want to get a message out to the far corners of the world, just come to Kansas State University. It'll get out and get expressed.

#### RELOCATING DETAINEES

I wanted to let you know, on the Guantanamo Bay detainees, this is a hot topic in my State with Fort Leavenworth there, and it's a hot topic with your commander at that base, whose primary mission is educational.

And we've got 90 countries represented there, and we've had several Muslim countries already tell us if the detainees are moved to Fort Leavenworth, we're not sending Army officers to be educated at Fort Leavenworth, because they don't think they should be detained, period, let alone being at the same spot that they're going to put their future command officers.

So please, not at Leavenworth. I think you should look overall, and I'm glad you're looking at Europe with that. But it's a big topic in my State, and I think it really hurts the Command General Staff College at Leavenworth. And I would hope you would ask a number of Islamic countries, if you are even considering Leavenworth, the impact, because I really think it would have a negative one there.

Secretary GATES. I look forward to telling Secretary Sebelius that I, in fact, got her letter.

Senator BROWNBACK. Good. Second, on food aid, Secretary Clinton, I know you've been interested in this a long time. I have been, and I'm very frustrated about AID and food aid generally.

Let me just—an idea that we've been kicking around for some time that we're just not getting the bang for our buck on this, is looking at what the military does on a quadrennial review of food aid, and just requiring this every 4 years, so that you get some structure that more reflects the global situation.

We put a fair amount of money into this, and I just don't think we get where we need to on it, and I would love to work with you on something like that.

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, I would really welcome that, and we will send someone to brief your staff and yourself, if you would be willing to do so, about the approach that we're taking.

You know, I believe strongly in the old adage, better to teach someone to fish than to give them a fish, and I think what we're trying to do is to shift our focus back to where it was in the 1960s and the 1980s, when the United States led a green revolution. It's complicated. It has to be approached in a very thoughtful manner. But I think we've got some good ideas, and we'd love to have you involved.

Senator BROWNBACK. I think we probably need to institutionalize some of that. I also applaud your efforts on H1N1 and working with particularly like Mexico to head it off and help them with vaccines. The child that died in Houston was from Mexico, my guess is trying to get some assistance and help.

Finally, on North Korea, I am just beside myself on what has happened. I mean, they've launched a multistage missile. In the paper today, they're talking about detonating another nuclear weapon. And then in this supplemental, please, you're asking the Congress to put in nearly \$100 million of economic support for North Korea.

And I look at this and I think, "This is exactly the wrong message we should be sending." President Obama, when he was candidate Obama, said that North Korea doesn't perform, we should—and he said—I'm quoting this directly from a June 26 last year speech—"We should move quickly to reimpose sanctions that have been waived and consider new restrictions going forward."

My goodness, if they haven't done enough now to merit this situation, double state of missile, leaving the Six-Party Talks, kidnapping two U.S. citizens, restarting a nuclear facility, if they haven't done enough to merit putting the old sanctions back on and looking for that alone, trying to give them aid in this supplemental, I really think that's the wrong message for us to send.

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, let me assure you that that money is in there in the event which, at this point, seems implausible, if not impossible, the North Koreans return to the Six-Party Talks and begin to disable their nuclear capacity again. We have absolutely no interest and no willingness on the part of this administration to give them any economic aid at all unless they—

Senator BROWNBACK. Including fuel oil?

Secretary CLINTON. Absolutely. That is my very strongly held belief. I mean, they are digging themselves into a deeper and deeper hold with the international community.

I think they were shocked we were able to get the Chinese and Russians onto such a strong statement in the United Nations, specifically saying that their missile launch contravened the Security Council Resolution 1718. And then they were further shocked when we got the Chinese and the Russians to agree on tough sanctions on some of their financial institutions.

So we are very serious about trying to make it clear to the North Koreans that their recent behavior is absolutely unacceptable.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you.

Chairman INOUE. Senator Lautenberg.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank each of you for the work that you're doing and, Secretary Gates, the fact that you're carrying over and we're not discussing parties and things of that nature, I commend you for that.

And, Hillary Clinton, we miss you here, but we are so pleased that you're going on with the task that you are. You are firm without being a bully. You're intelligent without causing our allies, or the ones we need to develop friendships with, feeling like we're dismissing their needs. And we're proud of each of you.

And let me ask a question here. Last year, I wrote a law to establish an inspector general position for Afghanistan reconstruction. The nomenclature was CGAR. Congress has appropriated \$16 million for that post, and I'm pleased the President has added additional funds in the supplemental so this office can hire more staff and get to work.

What are the lessons that we've learned in Iraq that can help us prevent the abuses that were so obvious and abundant in Afghanistan?

Secretary CLINTON. If I could just—

Senator LAUTENBERG. In Iraq, I'm sorry.

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, sir. Thank you for those kind comments, Senator. I really appreciate them. What we're trying to do with our own internal measurement performances with more accountability, and I have personally told the Afghanistan inspector general's office that we don't want them to wait and just give us a report that something's going wrong. We want them to be an early warning signal. I mean, if they are doing investigations and they see something that is not appropriate, let us know. Don't let it go on.

We're going to try to have a very clear set, both of measurements and of early warning signals, so that we can get ahead of some of these problems that you've rightly pointed out.

Senator LAUTENBERG. We have to do that, because it's very hard to close that barn door once the horse is gone and expect any kind

of a result. I ask this question about Iran. And either one of you expressing an opinion would be of value.

The President stated any engagement of Iran would be limited, and if there's no progress, the United States will pursue serious sanctions. And while I hope those talks will be fruitful, I hope that we would be serious about imposing strong sanctions, including a loophole that has allowed subsidiaries of American companies to do business with Iran, establishing sham locations in the Caribbean, and then extending them so that we can do first-hand business.

Should we make sure that that door for American companies to be profiteering, as happened in Iraq while assaulting our people, shouldn't we close that door once and for all? Madam Secretary, what do you think?

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, we are operating on two tracks. We do have an intensive consultation effort going on with friends and like-minded nations, not only in the region, but elsewhere in the world, concerning the threats that Iran poses, not only with its nuclear ambitions, but its interference with the internal affairs of many countries, its funding of terrorism, and so much else that is deeply troubling. And we believe that our outreach and our consultation lays the groundwork for tougher international sanctions.

But I agree with you that we ought to look to make sure that we have our own house in order as to any of the sanctions that we should be implementing going forward.

#### OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH IRAN

Senator LAUTENBERG. And Secretary Gates—and I promise you, Mr. Chairman, this is it. Are we limited to two options to control what might be going on with Iran and the nuclear development? Is it sanctions or military engagement? What else is left to us, other than that?

Secretary GATES. I think that the one thing that's clear is that the Iranians hate being isolated. All of the information we get indicates that however imperfect the U.N. resolutions against Iran are, the Iranians hate it when one of those resolutions passes, because it makes clear how isolated they are in the world.

My view is that the only way to eliminate an Iranian determination to have nuclear weapons, in my opinion, is for that government to make that decision. Even a military attack will only buy us time and send the program deeper and more covert. How do we get them to decide that it's not in their interest to pursue nuclear weapons?

It seems to me partly it's economic pressures, partly it's diplomatic isolation, partly it's seeing their neighbors beginning to band together to collaborate on air and missile defense that is aimed only at Iran. It's one of the reasons I think there is value in pursuing a partnership with the Russians on missile defense in Europe and in Russia itself.

And I think all of these things, combined with a diplomatic door that they can walk through if they choose to do so, so that they don't feel like they've been backed into a corner and have no choice but to go forward, plus trying to persuade them that their security interests are actually badly served by trying to have nuclear weap-

ons, that they will spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, and they will be less secure at the end than they are now.

So I think there are alternatives to the military. The military option, as I say, is at the end of the day still only a temporary option. And so I think it's the panoply of these things put together in a coordinated policy and with the help of our allies and partners and, frankly, important countries like Russia and China, that I think offer the best chance. And I would tell you we've got a better chance of making it work on \$40 oil than we do on \$140 oil.

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, Madam Secretary, you have an enormous job, as we've just heard from the Secretary. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

#### ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Chairman INOUE. Thank you. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, on behalf of the committee, I thank you for your attendance and your testimony today. As you know, colleagues have submitted questions to you, and I hope that you can respond to them and return your answers by next Wednesday, to prepare ourselves for the markup.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to the hearing:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, should we expect to see any more war-related supplemental requests?

*Answer.* The President has stated that while emergency supplementals maybe required in the future, they should focus on truly unanticipated events and not be used to fund regular programs. However, as we implement the President's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it may become necessary to review the resources available for programs in these countries.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, will your fiscal year 2010 budget requests, which we expect to receive next week, contain detailed war funding justifications?

*Answer.* The fiscal year 2010 budget request reflects, in great detail, the Administration's commitment to strengthen diplomatic and assistance tools to address current and future challenges that impact the security of the United States.

The budget increases non-military aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan to revitalize economic development and confront the resurgence of the Taliban, and realigns U.S. assistance to Iraq to help responsibly end the war and enable Iraqis to assume more control of their country.

It puts the United States on a path to double U.S. foreign assistance. This funding will help the world's weakest states reduce poverty, combat global health threats, develop markets, govern peacefully, and expand democracy worldwide.

The 2010 request supports the worldwide operations of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, provides new resources to hire additional Foreign Service officers, and builds civilian capacity to meet the challenges of today's world.

It also provides additional funding for key programs that advance U.S. foreign policy goals, including significantly increasing funding for energy initiatives, programs addressing global climate change, and agriculture investments.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, how long should the United States expect to be in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* We cannot remain in Afghanistan for an indefinite period. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that we rapidly build the size and capability of the Afghan Government, including the Afghan National Army and National Police, to levels such that it is able to provide basic governance and security for the Afghan people. The United States and the international community will need to subsidize the Af-

ghan security forces for the foreseeable future, while the Afghans build an economy and government capable of sustaining their own forces.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, what is the United States doing to ensure greater NATO and United Nations participation in addressing the war in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* At the NATO Summit in Strasbourg, Allies endorsed our Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy's focus on defeating Al Qaeda. Our Allies reiterated their commitment to working with the Afghan people to defeat this common enemy and to improve the Afghan government's capacity to provide governance and security for the Afghan people. To support those goals, Allies committed to provide the forces necessary to help secure the elections, agreed to expand efforts to train and mentor Afghan National Security Forces, and agreed to broadening NATO's relationship with Pakistan.

We are working to ensure that NATO Allies fulfill commitments on necessary resources, both military and civilian. We have also initiated further consultations with NATO Allies, ISAF partners, and other possible contributors to match their capabilities with specific requirements needed to implement the new strategy.

The March 31 International Conference on Afghanistan in The Hague recommitted the international community to supporting Afghanistan and underscored the central role of the United Nations in international assistance efforts. Our strategy for Afghanistan makes clear our strong support of the U.N.'s coordinating role in Afghanistan. We particularly appreciate the U.N.'s assistance to the Government of Afghanistan in organizing the August 20 Presidential and Provincial Councils elections.

We also fully support the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and his Deputy, Peter Galbraith, in fulfilling their mission to help the Government of Afghanistan and coordinate international civilian assistance.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

*Question.* The supplemental request includes \$400 million for Pakistan to "help address Pakistan's economic crisis and balance of payment deficit" and to "supplement the Government of Pakistan's \$7.6 billion Standby Agreement with the IMF." You say these funds are to help "finance expanded social safety net programs, allow for higher spending on development programs, and finance foreign reserves through budget support."

What does that actually mean—who will get the money, and what will they do with it? Will any go directly into the Pakistani treasury as budget support?

*Answer.* The IMF estimates that Pakistan needs \$4 billion over 2 years from donors to help finance social safety net programs, allow for continued spending on development programs, and reinforce foreign reserves. These supplemental funds will support filling these IMF-identified gaps and help the Government of Pakistan meet IMF benchmarks, while also encouraging other donors to assist.

With the \$400 million we are planning to provide a mix of direct budget support and project support. Measures are being developed to ensure accountability and oversight. A portion of the budget support will be directed to an income support program for the poor, the Benazir Income Support Program. This puts funds directly into the hands of the most marginalized. Other direct support would cover the cost of electricity for schools and hospitals and teacher training. Projectized support will target internally displaced persons, rural infrastructure, and roads and agricultural schemes to generate local employment that contributes to development.

We share Congressional concerns on the imperative of positive outcomes and results from this assistance. As we finalize the specific allocation of funds, including measures of effectiveness for providing the funds, we will continue to keep you informed.

*Question.* Last year the Congress provided the previous Administration almost \$500 million for economic assistance for Pakistan, of which very little has yet been spent. I'm not faulting you for not spending it faster because we do not want to throw away good money after bad, but why do we need this additional \$400 million now?

*Answer.* The additional \$400 million requested in this Supplemental will be used very quickly in keeping with our larger strategy to help stabilize Pakistan's economy and meet social safety net needs, including addressing the crisis of displaced persons in the Northwest Frontier Province.

With the \$400 million we are planning to provide a mix of direct budget support and project support. Measures are being developed to ensure accountability and

oversight. A portion of budget support will be directed to an income support program for the poor, the Benazir Income Support Program. This puts funds directly into the hands of the most marginalized. Other direct support will cover the cost of electricity for schools and hospitals and some facility construction. Projectized support will target internally displaced persons, rural infrastructure, and roads and agricultural schemes to generate local employment that contributes to development. We share Congressional concerns on the imperative of positive outcomes and results from this assistance. As we finalize the specific allocation of funds, including measures of effectiveness for providing the funds, we will continue to keep you informed.

*Question.* You are requesting \$66 million for three Blackhawk helicopters for Mexico. This is more for the Merida Initiative, which was hastily put together with no prior consultation with the U.S. Congress or the Mexican Congress, in the waning days of the Bush Administration. Does the Administration have a new counterdrug strategy for Mexico and Central America, or is the Merida Initiative it?

*Answer.* Since assuming office, the Obama Administration has undertaken a review of our security and counterdrug cooperation efforts with Mexico and Central America. President Obama's mid-April trip to Mexico, as well as that of Secretary Clinton and Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano and Attorney General Holder, have all informed that review and our future direction of cooperation with Mexico. The Merida Initiative, developed in consultation with our Mexican and Central American counterparts, provides a foreign assistance framework to effectively address the threat to regional stability posed by illicit drug cartels and criminal activity. As we move forward, the Administration will evaluate the program's performance and look for ways to improve and build upon it.

The recently announced National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, for example, is putting additional resources and personnel from DHS, DEA, and other agencies, to work with local law enforcement in the critical southwest border area.

We see strong political will in the region to address the challenge of providing greater citizen security on an increasingly regional and cooperative basis. The assistance we provide through the Merida Initiative builds on this trend and enables the U.S. government to work collaboratively with the governments of Mexico and other Central American countries to strengthen their law enforcement and judicial capabilities and to promote greater cooperation between our respective law enforcement agencies.

We are making a major investment to strengthen the rule of law and build institutional capacity in Mexico, areas that are critical to Mexico's long-term democratic development and stability. We are assisting the Mexicans as they make improvements across the spectrum of civilian law enforcement activities from gathering information, building cases, making arrests, improving their legal system, training prosecutors, and making prisons more secure.

To successfully take on the violent, well financed and sophisticated drug trafficking organizations, Mexican forces must have the capability to deploy rapid reaction forces and interdiction teams to complement their other improving skills. To address this need, the Merida Initiative includes helicopter support to both the Secretariat of Public Security (SSP) and the Mexican Air Force.

After visiting Mexico and assessing SSP requirements and recommended solutions, a technical interagency team determined that Blackhawk helicopters were the appropriate aircraft to meet SSP needs because: (a) they met mission requirements (load, capacity, and speed—18 passenger transportation to anywhere in Mexico within 90 minutes); and (b) SSP has purchased seven Blackhawks, and the three provided by the United States will enable the SSP to form a fully functioning squadron.

After we understood what the Government of Mexico's anti-crime strategy was, and identified how best the United States could support it with training, equipment and new cooperative mechanisms, then we began consulting and continue to consult with respective legislative bodies. We greatly appreciate the spirit of consultation and cooperation we have had over the past year with Congress, and their appropriation of funds for the Merida Initiative thus far. We look forward to continuing consultations with Congress as our programs move forward.

*Question.* I strongly support helping Mexico which is facing real threats from heavily armed drug cartels, and is now dealing with the H1N1 virus. But why is the Merida Initiative different from past failed counterdrug strategies, and what can we reasonably expect it to accomplish, at what cost, over what period of time?

*Answer.* The Merida Initiative is a comprehensive approach fundamentally structured to strengthen the institutional capabilities of Mexican law enforcement and judicial agencies. It was jointly designed and agreed to in close consultation with the Mexican government.



This consultative process is designed to improve the effectiveness of our assistance and to develop greater buy-in from the receiving agencies in Mexico. Through this process we are encouraging greater law enforcement cooperation among Mexican law enforcement and judicial entities at the federal level. We are also promoting links between U.S. judicial and law enforcement agencies and their Mexican counterparts.

Through the Merida Initiative, we are making a major investment in strengthening Mexico's capability to enhance and enforce the rule of law. We are assisting the Mexicans as they make improvements across the spectrum of civilian law enforcement activities from gathering information, building cases, making arrests, improving their legal system, training prosecutors, and making prisons more secure.

These strategic goals will take time to accomplish. Originally, the Merida Initiative was envisioned to be a \$1.4 billion commitment for Mexico, over 3 years.

In fiscal year 2008, we requested \$500 million for Mexico and in fiscal year 2009 we requested \$450 million for Mexico, for a total of \$950 million. Congress appropriated a combined \$700 million for Mexico in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 under the Merida Initiative.

To accomplish the goals set out in the Merida Initiative, which are in our own national interest, we need full funding support from Congress.

*Question.* I want to commend you including in the supplemental the money we owe for United Nations peacekeeping. For many years we have been in arrears, even though the Administration votes for these missions and other countries—not the United States—provide the troops. It is an important investment, there are real costs, and we need to pay our share in a timely manner. Am I right that if we provide these supplemental funds we will be current in our payments?

*Answer.* The fiscal year 2009 supplemental request of \$836.9 million for Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA), together with the fiscal year 2009 CIPA appropriation will sustain our contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities through fiscal year 2009. These funds also will address arrears from calendar years 2005 through 2008 caused by the statutory cap on U.S. assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Department may pay these arrears because its fiscal year 2009 appropriations act increased the cap from 25 percent to 27.1 percent for assessments made during calendar years 2005 through 2008. The request represents the Administration's commitment to pay U.S. assessments in full and on time to support U.N. peacekeeping missions that help maintain and restore international peace and security.

*Question.* For years we have heard complaints that U.S. Embassy and USAID personnel are trapped inside the fortified walls of their offices because of security concerns, and there are too few of them to manage programs so they rely on large contractors

When State and USAID staff do get out to the field they are frequently escorted by convoys of military personnel or armed security contractors, which frightens local people. How can we do a better job of balancing the need for program oversight in the field with keeping our diplomats and development personnel safe?

*Answer.* As of March 2009 (most recent data available), USAID/Afghanistan has noted 337 injuries, 23 kidnappings and 343 deaths.

To further illustrate this point, some of our colleagues in Afghanistan have begun to receive Night Letters and many staff in Afghanistan do not tell their families that they work for the U.S. Government.

Leaving compounds and/or private residences in high threat environments requires a great deal of coordination with the local security contingent as well as approval from the office of the Regional Security Officer (RSO), who sets embassy security policy and practice.

Under Public Law 99-399 (Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986), Chiefs of Mission (COMs) and embassy Regional Security Officers (RSOs) can be held personally accountable when there is serious injury or loss of life.

The law does not promote risk management decision-making in high threat environments, even where there is a high national interest priority in implementation, evaluating and monitoring of a program.

Some level of risk is inherent and accepted by all USG personnel who work in Afghanistan. Predicting the level and type of risk to allow for adequate planning is the objective; however, the nature of security planning is that it is dependent on perpetrators and predicting what they might do is not an exact science.

USAID is currently in the process of increasing our presence in Afghanistan and we hope to have an additional 170 field personnel (150 personnel requested through Spring 2009 supplemental funding and 20 personnel from pre-existing staffing plans) on the ground by the end of the calendar year. This increase in personnel will add to our capacity to provide direct oversight to our projects.

Due to the non-permissive nature of the security situation, USAID currently relies extensively on dedicated Quality Assessment/Quality Control (QA/QC) contractors, along with the military and implementing partners to help monitor programs.

Furthermore, we are utilizing telecommunication/removed video transmission when possible. This allows us to increase our monitoring capabilities at lower risk levels.

*Question.* We often hear that the quick rotation of Foreign Service Officers in and out of Afghanistan makes it very difficult to develop continuity and effectiveness of programs. After 1 year on the job, officers have just begun to understand how things work before they are transferred to somewhere else. Do you see this changing in the future?

*Answer.* Our Foreign Service employees face extremely difficult working conditions in Afghanistan—long working hours, extended family separation, as well as dangerous security conditions. While we recognize the benefits of longer tours, the current conditions there are not yet conducive to mandatory 2-year assignments.

We do, however, continue to review the length of our assignments to not only Afghanistan, but to our other unaccompanied posts. In establishing tour lengths, we must carefully balance the effects on employees of extended assignments in high-stress posts with the advantages that come from reduced personnel turnover.

*Question.* *Maersk-Alabama* Captain Richard Phillips, who was recently held hostage by pirates off the coast of Somalia, is a Vermont constituent of mine. You have requested \$40 million under the Peacekeeping Operations account for Somalia. Are there other types of programs that might provide Somali youth with employment opportunities instead of piracy?

*Answer.* Through implementing partner the Education Development Center, USAID is supporting the Somali Youth and Livelihoods Program which is designed to match approximately 1,200 jobseekers with employers in Somaliland through a database that is accessible via cell phone and internet. USAID is planning to expand this program from Somaliland into Mogadishu and other urban areas in order to reach an additional 4,000 people. In addition, via the International Labor Organization, USAID will be providing communities in strategic areas with assistance to address key community priorities such as infrastructure and rehabilitation and provision of economic and social service centers. This program aims to reduce insecurity related to high-risk youth joining extremist organizations by jump-starting employment and income generation.

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

*Question.* What funding is being requested in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental (please specify dollar amount and accounts) for Afghanistan to help improve the situation for women of all ages in Afghanistan in the following areas:

- Access to primary and secondary education;
- Access to medical care—especially prenatal and post delivery care to help improve child and maternal health;
- Access to technical and vocational training and economic literacy training to encourage economic self-sufficiency;
- Access to family planning;
- Access to adult literacy programs; and
- Access to emergency shelters to provide refuge from sexual and physical abuse, violence in the home, exploitation, and potential abduction.

*Answer.* Funding for programs for women of all ages, including the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental, is described below. The effects of USAID programming in support of Afghan women and girls will be described in more detail in a report scheduled for later in this fiscal year.

*Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental*

In the proposed fiscal year 2009 Spring Supplemental, USAID has identified notionally the following:

- \$3 million to increase access to legal aid through Ministry of Justice and select NGO legal services centers and capacity building for the MoJ.
- Up to \$20 million will be used to support gender-focused activities, including (1) establishing a Women's Leadership Development Institute<sup>1</sup>, where women

<sup>1</sup>The Women's Leadership Development Institute will facilitate the growth of active, competent and politically astute women leaders and entrepreneurs in selected sectors. It will train

Continued

are trained to exercise leadership in key sectors, and (2) upgrading Women's Resource Centers in select provinces.

- Programming for women will be integrated throughout the \$129 million funding for stabilization activities and include small community grants identified by the Afghan local governments.
- Women will also be key beneficiaries of the \$135 million for Cash-for-Work activities which will be aimed at assisting women through short-term jobs for urban and rural families.

As part of a larger, more comprehensive leadership and capacity building strategy for women, the Institute could assume responsibility for leading that strategy development process, organizing career planning, customizing capacity building programs for key sectors and building partnerships among women and men, and solidarity through professional and mentorship networks and inter-agency initiatives.

#### *Fiscal Year 2009 Base*

In the fiscal year 2009 base, USAID expects to spend at least \$85 million for USAID's ongoing activities across all sectors to support women and girls in Afghanistan.

Programs across the sectors will address urgent humanitarian and "catch up" needs in health, nutrition, literacy and education, and they will sharpen the skills of women's civil society organizations so they can more effectively deliver essential services and play an effective advocacy role for peace, justice and good governance.

Additionally, USAID plans to spend \$15 million to support Women and Girls' NGOs, through a new umbrella grant program that is under consideration.

#### *Fiscal Year 2010 Request*

In fiscal year 2010, we expect to spend at least \$85 million for activities supporting women and girls and to support Women and Girls' NGOs, we expect to spend \$12 million or more, depending on the absorptive capacity of the Afghan NGO community.

#### *Fiscal Year 2008*

USAID provided at least \$79 million in fiscal year 2008 in activities that specifically support girls and women. Generally this assistance fell into the following categories:

- Providing basic services benefitting women and girls as components of large programs: maternal and child health; education (basic, secondary, tertiary, vocational), literacy and productive skills; economic opportunities including business development services (training, planning, marketing) and finance; agribusiness economic opportunities—tree nurseries, poultry and egg production, processing; access to justice; and elections—registration and voting.
- Strengthening gender policy and advocacy capacity: Ministry of Women's Affairs—National; Ministry of Women's Affairs—provincial, district, municipal and community levels; Parliamentary Commissions; National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan; Gender within the ANDS; and Afghan Human Rights Commission.
- Strengthening gender focused civil society: Capacity building and small grants program for Women and Girls—focused NGO's providing services of all types—e.g. education, health, training, prevention and mitigation of family violence, etc.; and women-focused and women's components of national business organizations.

The above activities are illustrative only; there are many aspects of the USAID program that benefit all Afghans with effects that are difficult to attribute to girls and women. For example, rural roads, national economic reforms, electricity programs for Kabul and major cities in the south; water and sanitation projects; broad rule of law activities; local governance strengthening; and, courthouses and district administration buildings.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

*Question.* The 2008 Farm Bill requires a specified amount of Public Law 480 funds to be used for non-emergency programs. Has that provision reduced the amount that otherwise would have been available for emergency operations? If so, by how much?

women to exercise transformative leadership in key sectors and provide advisory support to women who are already in decision-making positions.

**Answer.** It is correct that the 2008 Farm Bill requires a specified amount of Public Law 480 Title II funds to be used for non-emergency programs. This is resulting in \$25 million to \$100 million less for emergency food aid each year from 2009–2012. In fiscal year 2008, we programmed \$354.3 million in non-emergency food aid. The levels specified for non-emergency food aid in the Farm Bill are: fiscal year 2009—\$375 million; fiscal year 2010—\$400 million; fiscal year 2011—\$425 million; and fiscal year 2012—\$450 million.

In fiscal year 2009, we must shift \$25 million from emergency programs to meet the requirement for \$375 million in non-emergency food aid, and in fiscal year 2010 we must shift \$50 million from the fiscal year 2008 base to meet the requirement for \$400 million in non-emergency programs. This non-emergency requirement increases by another \$25 million in fiscal year 2011 and 2012, requiring shifting more funds. While non-emergency food aid programs have an important long-term impact, we remain concerned that they are being increased at the expense of funds for emergency feeding.

**Question.** Is it your understanding that donations from other countries are keeping pace with the overall rise in demand?

**Answer.** The United States provided \$2 billion of the \$5 billion in resources collected by the World Food Program (WFP) in CY 2008—some 40 percent of total donations that year. The U.S. share of total donations was in line with previous years, and we continued to be the world's single largest food aid donor.

WFP reports in its April 2009 Operations and Resourcing Update that the amount of contributions received so far this year is comparable to the funding level at the same time last year. However, it further reports that the need for humanitarian assistance has increased significantly, and relatively more funds are needed. WFP is projecting its needs for CY 2009 to be at approximately \$6.371 billion (of which \$5.7 billion is for emergency and protracted relief and recovery operations). It currently has \$3.451 billion available in resources (of which \$1.1 billion is in new contributions), leaving a gap of \$2.92 billion. We understand that due to currency fluctuations, WFP expects that contributions from other countries will be at a lower U.S. dollar value than last year.

**Question.** Can you describe any differences in how the World Food Program (WFP) defines a food "emergency" from what your definition might be?

**Answer.** All activities included in WFP's Emergency Operations (EMOPs) and Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) appeals are considered by WFP to be "emergency" food assistance needs. An EMOP or PRRO may both contain some activities that the U.S. Government clearly defines as emergency activities, such as direct distribution of food to victims of natural disasters, internally displaced people (IDPs) or refugees, and some activities that the U.S. Government does not consider an appropriate use of emergency resources. The provision of U.S. Government emergency resources is generally for a more limited set of activities than WFP proposes. WFP may include within the scope of its emergency programs recovery activities that we would consider developmental, such as certain food for work or training programs that exceed immediate livelihood needs. The total budgetary and program of work needs for EMOPs and PRROs for which WFP is appealing to donors in CY 2009 is \$5.7 billion.

**Question.** Do you think that some of the food-security items in your supplemental request, beyond the Public Law 480 item, could involve USDA participation?

Would you work with us to identify what some of those may be?

**Answer.** An interagency team (Interagency Policy Committee, or IPC) has been established to ensure coordination in all USG food security interventions—including those supported with the current supplemental funding request. State Department co-chairs this Committee with the National Security Council, and USAID and USDA are key participants. The committee has met twice over the past several weeks to begin to identify areas where closer collaboration will increase the efficiency and impact of USG resources provided for agriculture and food security. Over the next weeks and months we expect USDA, together with USAID, State, USTR, Treasury, and other USG agencies to develop an integrated plan of action to reduce global hunger and improve global food security, beginning with increased coordination between USG agencies, and extending to better partnership with other donors, national governments, private sector, and civil society. One expected outcome of this process will be an increased role for USDA in capacity building.

We will be pleased to work with the Congress at an early stage of development of the integrated plan of action.

**Question.** Would the Department of State benefit from collaborating with Defense in using these tools to assist you in managing international crises? What funding would you need and how would such funds be used?

Answer. Thank you for your interest in strengthening the tools at the Department's disposal to address the influenza outbreak and other near-term disasters. We are currently exploring the full range of our capabilities and, where any gaps exist, the extent to which the Department of Defense can support our efforts. We will provide you with more detailed information as soon as it becomes available.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD J. DURBIN

*Question.* Senators Bond, Murray, Dodd, Whitehouse, Cardin and others have joined me on a bill (S. 355) the Increasing America's Global Development Capacity Act that would triple the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers over the next 3 years. Are there other ways in which Congress can help in rebuilding capacity at USAID?

Answer. The President and I have made rebuilding our civilian capacity to undertake development and diplomacy a high priority. I would like to thank you for your support in that regard.

USAID is a resilient organization and has become creative in finding ways to continue to meet an expanding development mandate, while its operational resources have diminished over the past 15 years. The Agency's staffing levels and core business systems have not kept pace with increased program funding levels and the complex development environments in which the Agency operates.

USAID needs sustained Congressional support for requested levels of Operating Expense (OE) and Capital Investment Fund (CIF) accounts over the next few years. Further, increased flexibility in funding availability for the OE account would be beneficial to the Agency's revitalization efforts.

With Congressional support including adequate levels of OE and CIF funding, USAID will rebuild capacity while developing new systems and ways of doing business including:

- Building a high-performing and diverse workforce that is strategically aligned with USG priorities including establishing cutting edge training for existing staff as well as new hires.
- Re-establishing strategic planning, policy formulation, evaluation, and resource management at global, regional, and country levels;
- Greater tailoring of aid delivery modes such as host country contracting, smaller grants, and multilateral funding pools;
- Increasing flexibility for meeting demanding new staffing needs and establishing new working space overseas;
- Enhancing development impact and efficiency by placing development technical and support services in the most efficient locations, including regional centers; and
- Modernizing and globally deploying a suite of systems to meet Agency business needs and increase transparency.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM JOHNSON

*Question.* Do U.S. military clinics and hospitals overseas have sufficient staff, capacity, and medical supplies to treat military personnel and their families in the event of a major outbreak, or will U.S. military families have to seek treatment at host nation medical facilities?

The Department of State defers to the Department of Defense which has jurisdiction over this matter.

*Question.* Secretary Clinton, I would ask you the same question in relation to U.S. embassy personnel and their families overseas, especially those in places like Baghdad or Kabul where they may face special challenges in dealing with an outbreak of swine flu.

Answer. We are closely following the 2009 H1N1 flu developments around the world. In preparation for such events, the Department had prepared a Pandemic Influenza Plan and has recently convened the Influenza Outbreak Taskforce.

For our overseas missions, all posts have pandemic plans and stockpiles of antiviral medication and personal protective equipment to help ensure continuity of operations while minimizing exposure of staff and their families to disease. Our Office of Medical Services maintains health units at over 180 missions, which provide primary medical care and coordinates access to specialty care when needed.

The Department also provides additional assistance to our overseas missions, including providing departure options when determined to be necessary and where feasible. We are, however, aware a pandemic may eliminate normal departure options, requiring overseas employees and local American citizens to remain in coun-

try. While our Embassies cannot provide medical advice or provide medical services to the public, they do provide information regarding local health care providers and hospitals to those U.S. citizens.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

*Question.* In 2005, former Chairman of Yukos Oil Company Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his partner Platon Lebedev were convicted for fraud tax evasion and embezzlement. Those charges have been the subject of significant international scrutiny and the object of intense criticism by human rights organizations that have raised concerns about alleged due process violations. Additional charges have been brought against these defendants and a second trial commenced last month. Has the Administration raised this new case with Russian authorities? If so, what was the response?

*Answer.* The Administration has been closely following the current case against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev. U.S. Embassy and State Department officials have met with the defendants' legal teams and are closely observing the trial. The State Department has repeatedly and publicly urged Russian officials to respect the rule of law and the importance of due process in this, and in other cases and will continue to do so.

*Question.* Has the State Department made any new diplomatic efforts in the case of Sean Goldman, who has been kept in Brazil for years without the consent of his father, David Goldman, in violation of requirements under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction?

*Answer.* The State Department continues to monitor constantly and to work diligently on the Sean Goldman case. We are using every diplomatic tool to resolve this and the 51 other pending abduction cases in Brazil. The Office of Children's Issues (CI) and Embassy Brasilia are in frequent contact with the Brazilian Central Authority to discuss specific patterns in the Brazilian judicial system that are not in compliance with the 1980 Hague Convention on International Child Abduction. U.S. officials at Embassy Brasilia, including the U.S. Ambassador, continue to voice concern about Brazil's speed and efficacy in upholding the Hague Convention, and meet regularly with interested parties urging them to take action to improve Brazil's compliance. We are raising this issue at the highest levels of government. As you may know, I spoke to Foreign Minister Amorim regarding this matter.

In March 2009, CI staff met with Brazilian Consul General Barbuda to discuss six abduction cases which were more than 18 months old as of the end of fiscal year 2008, including Mr. Goldman's case, and to give an overview of good practice in upholding the Hague Convention. CI provided, at Consul General Barbuda's request, a list of the other currently pending cases, with summaries of status on each case.

In late March, Embassy Brasilia also reiterated, via diplomatic note, the State Department's interest in the expedited processing of Mr. Goldman's Hague Application. We requested assurance from the Brazilian Central Authority that the legal question before the Brazilian federal court is that of the return of Sean Goldman to the United States under the provisions of the 1980 Hague Convention.

In April, U.S. Embassy Brasilia requested clarification from Special Secretary for Human Rights Vannuchi after local press articles characterized his remarks to the Chamber of Deputies as indicating that he wanted Sean to stay in Brazil. The Minister's office reassured Embassy Brasilia that Secretary Vannuchi has no intention of changing his office's support for Sean Goldman's return to the United States in accordance with the terms of the Hague Convention. The Embassy has continued to urge Secretary Vannuchi to publicly correct the public impression of his remarks.

Our Consul General in Brasilia and the Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Abductions Division Chief are scheduled to meet with Brazilian Central Authority officials, judges, and attorneys in mid-May to discuss good practices and steps necessary to uphold the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

We will continue to press the Brazilian government at all levels to ensure Brazil's timely and expeditious compliance with The Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

*Question.* The current Migration and Refugee Assistance recommendation in the supplemental for \$294 million is for overseas assistance and does not address the crisis facing refugees who are resettled to the United States who are finding it increasingly difficult to find jobs and stay in their homes, especially given the current economic crisis. What is the State Department doing to specifically address this need?

Answer. The Department of State recognizes that the economic downturn has made it difficult for many newly resettled refugees to find jobs, and that some are finding it difficult to meet basic needs. For that reason, the Departments of State and Health and Human Services are working to find solutions. The Department of State recently announced that \$5 million will be made available to refugee resettlement agencies to help refugees with emergency housing needs. We anticipate that this move will bring an element of relief. Programs for the longer term needs of resettled refugees are housed within HHS' Office of Refugee Resettlement. We are working with HHS to find solutions.

*Question.* Piracy threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of which arrives by sea. In Somalia, an estimated 3.2 million people, approximately 43 percent of the population, required food aid in the latter half of 2008. U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia totaled \$270 million in 2008 and over \$157 million to date in fiscal year 2009. The administration has requested \$200 million in fiscal year 2009 supplemental International Disaster Assistance funding and \$300 million in fiscal year 2009 supplemental Public Law 480, Title II humanitarian assistance, in part to address food and water shortages in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Officials from the World Food Program (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, report it has become more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to deliver relief is significantly hampered. Both the *M/V Maersk Alabama* and the *M/V Liberty Sun*, two vessels that pirates have targeted recently, are U.S.-flagged and crewed cargo vessels contracted by the WFP to deliver USAID food assistance off the southeast coast of Somalia. What is the U.S. Government doing to protect these vessels carrying humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa region from pirates?

The United States is deeply concerned by the unprecedented level of piracy in waters off the coast of Somalia; its impact on commercial shipping, the safety of mariners, and the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance to Somalia and other countries in Africa; and its deleterious effect on trade and development in the region. In response, the USG has taken both diplomatic and military action:

As part of its diplomatic effort:

- The United States continues to address the problems on land in Somalia, including assisting the Transitional Federal Government and other moderates in Somalia to create political and economic stability and address extremism. Without a long-term solution to these problems, the blight of piracy off the coast of Somalia will continue.
- The United States, dating back to June of last year, has led efforts in the U.N. Security Council to support measures to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia leading to the adoption of four resolutions.
- The United States co-sponsored Resolution 1851 (passed unanimously on December 16, 2008) which urges countries to establish an international cooperation mechanism as a common point of contact for counter-piracy activities near Somalia. This resolution also grants authority for states, for which advanced notification has been delivered from the Transitional Federal Government to the Secretary General, to take all necessary measures to repress piracy in Somalia and urges states to enhance the capacity of regional states to combat piracy.
- Pursuant to Resolution 1851, the USG convened the first meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) on January 14, 2009, to coordinate an international approach to the problem of piracy. During this first meeting, the 24 participating countries and five participating international organizations established working groups to address military and operational coordination and information sharing; address judicial aspects of piracy; strengthen shipping self-awareness and other capabilities; and improve diplomatic and public information sharing.
- Since the initial Contact Group plenary, the four working groups have met to address issues within their purview, a second plenary meeting has taken place in Cairo (March 18), and four additional countries have become Contact Group participants. A third plenary meeting is scheduled for May 29th in New York.
- With regard to prosecution of suspected pirates, the United States deeply appreciates the role that Kenya has played in bringing suspected pirates to justice in accordance with an MOU signed between the United States and Kenya in January, but also urges states affected by piracy to fulfill their responsibilities to deliver judicial consequences to suspected pirates. The United States is actively encouraging states that are victims of piracy to prosecute suspected pirates within their domestic legal systems. The United States will prosecute pirates that attack U.S. ships and citizens.

—We have also worked with industry and the International Maritime Organization to develop and implement best practices to help ships avoid piracy incidents, and disseminate those practices to a wide audience.

As part of its military effort:

—U.S. Central Command's naval component has established Combined Task Force 151 to conduct counter-piracy operations in and around the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.

—Ships from CTF 151 took part in preventing the hijacking of the *M/V Polaris* and the *M/V Prem Divya* on February 11 and 12 respectively and took part in the successful outcome of the *Maersk Alabama* incident.

—We would refer you to the Department of Defense for further information on military actions to suppress piracy.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

*Question.* The fiscal year 2009 budget supplemental request included \$815 million in proposed appropriations in U.S. assistance to the Palestinians to address both post-conflict humanitarian needs in Gaza and reform, security and development priorities in the West Bank. The request also proposed a provision which would seemingly shift the requirement to accept Israel's right to exist, renounce violence and abide by previous Israel-Palestinian agreements from Hamas to the Palestinian government.

Under current law, Hamas is designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization and under law may not receive federal aid. But the administration has asked for changes that would permit aid to continue flowing to Palestinians in the event that Hamas-backed officials become part of a power-sharing Palestinian government.

If the proposed provision were to be enacted, what assurances can the administration offer that U.S. taxpayers would not, even indirectly, be supporting Palestinian terrorist groups?

*Answer.* In regards to the \$715 million requested bilaterally for the West Bank and Gaza, we have made it clear that no U.S. aid will flow to Hamas or any entity controlled by Hamas. The United States only will work with a Palestinian Authority government that unambiguously and explicitly accepts the Quartet's principles: a commitment to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. In the remote possibility that Hamas should participate in a future PA government, the government and all of its ministers or the equivalent must adhere to these principles, and the government must speak with authority for all of its agencies and instrumentalities.

*Question.* Madame Secretary, it is my understanding that the Russian government is required to pay for the operating and maintenance cost of the all the nuclear materials controls and security equipment the NNSA has installed in Russian weapons facilities.

The Administration's request includes \$44 million to support the deployment of additional cameras, portal monitors and security upgrades in Russia. This is on top of the billions of dollars spent by NNSA, the Department of State and Department of Defense to secure Russian weapons and special nuclear material.

What confidence do you have that the Russian government is prepared to provide the necessary resources to support the investment we have made in that country to secure weapons-grade material?

*Answer.* We believe NNSA's work is in the U.S. national security interest. The funds requested will be used to support nuclear security improvements to areas where NNSA has recently been granted access and to tackle some of the tougher security challenges, such as tracking and controlling nuclear materials at large facilities with very "active" inventories. It is critical that we continue to work with Russia on these issues as long as the need exists.

At the same time, we are urging Russia to take over financial responsibility. For the past several years, NNSA has been working with our Russian partners, primarily the State Corporation for Atomic Energy, Rosatom, to ensure they are prepared to sustain our sizeable investment in the long term. NNSA and Rosatom have agreed to a Joint Transition Plan which identifies fundamental requirements for sustainable nuclear security programs and joint projects that will be undertaken over the next few years to ensure that these fundamental requirements are in place. Sustainability planning is also underway with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The success of these efforts ultimately depends on Russia's willingness and ability to devote the necessary resources. We have encouraged the Russian government to increase its nuclear security budget and ensure that these funds are efficiently dis-



tributed to the hundreds of nuclear facilities across the vast Russian territory. The Russian nuclear security budget is classified; we have not yet seen much evidence of increases in funding at sites where we are working. Overall economic conditions in Russia have improved significantly from when we first began our investments at its nuclear sites, but we know that the recent economic crisis has hit Russia hard and that 2010 budgets are being reduced as a consequence. It remains to be seen how the current global economic crisis is impacting Rosatom's budget and specifically its allocations to sustaining nuclear security upgrades. We are approaching Rosatom's transition into a state corporation carefully to ensure that security gaps do not emerge in the process.

*Question.* Can you provide this committee with the appropriate data to demonstrate that Russia has identified or committed resources in their budgets to sustain these threat reduction measures?

*Answer.* The Russian nuclear security budget is classified; we have not yet seen much evidence of increases in funding at sites where we are working. We have some knowledge of federal program budgets for combined environmental, safety, and security programs, but specific security budgets are unavailable to us. This applies to Rosatom, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior. We have stressed to Russia that these budgets should be more transparent in the future. The NNSA security budget is published each year and includes allocations for specific sub programs.

There is some evidence that Russian counterparts have taken on some financial responsibility for nuclear security in recent years. For example, the Russian Ministry of Defense has agreed to independently sustain U.S.-funded upgrades at permanent warhead storage sites. NNSA and the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) also are working as equal partners to equip all (approx. 350-370) Russian border crossings with radiation detection equipment.

*Question.* The Administration's supplemental request includes \$35 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration to be used to support its mission in North Korea. Considering the fact that the all international inspectors and U.S. personnel have been kicked out of the country, does the Administration still need this funding before the end of this fiscal year?

*Answer.* The Administration must maintain a state of technical readiness to re-deploy to the DPRK at any time in the future to resume the important work of disablement of North Korea's plutonium production program to pave the way for the verifiable elimination of the North Korean nuclear program. It is prudent that we continue to develop strategies and plans, and tools and technologies for the verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program, should the opportunity for a resumption of denuclearization activities arise. Despite the recent setback in the Six-Party Talks, DOE/NNSA still needs funding to continue its preparatory work for eventual denuclearization activities in North Korea. The long lead time for development and construction of the necessary equipment and resources to undertake denuclearization activities requires a continued and sustained level of effort. Finally, we note this funding would be contingent on the President approving the Glenn Amendment waiver.

*Question.* The Millennium Challenge Corporation has proven to be an effective tool for American development assistance by reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth and by creating incentives for policy reform. Does the Administration plan to strengthen MCC's incentive effect and potential for poverty reduction in a sustainable way?

*Answer.* Under my leadership, the State Department will continue to support MCC and its mission of sustainable poverty reduction through long-term development as an important asset in America's foreign assistance toolbox and as an important complement to other economic and political tools that support prosperity and security with some of our key partners in the developing world. MCC's focus on country ownership and accountability has helped build local capacity, encourage broad civil society consultation, and advance policy reform. MCC focuses on working in countries where the policy climate is most fertile for using assistance to generate sustainable results. This focus is yielding meaningful poverty reduction and strengthening good governance, economic freedom, and investments in people. As I review our development assistance framework and goals, I will consider how best to build on MCC's success within the Administration's overall development assistance strategy.

*Question.* The Millennium Challenge Corporation has been called "smart aid" because it requires good governance, economic freedom and investments in people before it engages with countries. However, the MCC approach requires committing long-term funding upfront, in contrast to other aid programs that spend their appropriated funds each year. This approach has unfortunately made MCC vulnerable to

being used as an offset for amendments proposed by Members for other purposes, as it appears that MCC has a large balance that is in fact already committed. What do you plan to do to protect MCC from being used to offset other short-term interests during the markup of the supplemental and during the fiscal year 2010 appropriations cycle?

*Answer.* Unlike more traditional aid programs, MCC makes full, upfront funding commitments when a Compact is signed and partner countries manage the procurement and implementation processes through an accountable entity. Initially, these factors, along with a generally low level of government capacity and resources in many partner countries, can slow down project development, implementation, and fund disbursement rates. However, MCC believes—and I agree—that a focus on country ownership and accountability, though more time consuming, is critical to achieving accountable governance and sustainable results. As Chair of the MCC Board, I will work with MCC to ensure that the importance of this different approach is understood and valued.

*Question.* As you know, I am a strong supporter of microenterprise programs that are operated by the State Department. These programs provide a very impressive return on investment and have helped tens of thousands of the world's poorest break the cycles of poverty. Will you briefly talk about the State Department's plans for microenterprise this year?

A couple of weeks ago, the President announced \$100 million for the creation of a new partnership of the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) for the purpose of launching a new Microfinance Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere. The fund will provide stable medium and longer-term sources of finance to microfinance institutions and microfinance investment vehicles to help rebuild their capacity to lend during this difficult period and to increase the supply of finance for micro and small businesses as recovery takes hold.

The 2004 Microenterprise Results and Accountability Act requires that 50 percent of all U.S. funding for microenterprise and microfinance benefit the very poor—those living on less than \$1.25 a day. President Obama announced recently \$100 million for the creation of a new Microfinance Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere. What steps are being taken to ensure that this funding adheres to legislative requirements and benefit those living on less than \$1.25 a day?

*Answer.* USAID's Microenterprise Development funding for fiscal year 2008 is estimated at \$233,216,437. USAID expects to continue funding at historical levels in fiscal year 2009, supporting programs in microfinance, enterprise development, and enabling environment development.

Over the next year, USAID's microenterprise development efforts will focus on improving access to microfinance; driving innovation in savings and insurance products from industry to better meet the needs of the poor; increasing productivity and competitiveness; reducing regulatory barriers affecting micro and small enterprises; securing access to rural and urban land; making progress toward more equal legal and property rights for women; linking remittances and diasporas' other resources to development; improving microenterprise development programming in post-conflict and rebuilding states; assessing and disseminating effective approaches for transitioning second-tier microfinance institutions to private capital; building the capacity of new partners; and ensuring that the knowledge and innovation developed is shared widely.

USAID will be utilizing microenterprise development and value chain approaches to increase the participation of the "ultra poor" in rural growth as part of the Agency's Global Food Security Answer. USAID is also addressing the impact of the financial crisis on microfinance institutions and their clients, through Development Credit Authority (DCA) guarantees for microfinance institutions as well as ongoing institutional capacity-building efforts and programs that improve microentrepreneurs' access to markets.

With regard to the Microfinance Growth Fund, fund partners—the Multilateral Investment Fund, Inter-American Investment Corporation, and U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)—are still in the process of seeking Board approval for their contributions and establishing the specifics on the Fund's structure/lending mechanism. We will work to make sure that each institution abides by its legal requirements. At this point, OPIC is the only USG agency participating. The 2004 Microenterprise Results and Accountability Act applies only to USAID-funded microenterprise programs, and so does not apply directly to any of the programs proposed under the Microfinance Growth Fund.

*Question.* The U.N. Human Rights Council, since its inception in 2006, has called for restrictions on free speech and ignored blatant human rights abuses in a host

of countries. With a seemingly "singular focus" it has passed five separate resolutions condemning Israel, including issuing resolutions over the Jewish state's recent incursions in Gaza and Lebanon that exclude any mention of the terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah. And it refuses to cite blatant rights abuses in places like Iran, Zimbabwe, Burma, Sudan and North Korea.

Under this administration, the United States is now seeking to be a part of this council at the U.N. General Assembly in 2 weeks as part of its "new era of engagement." Will you please outline the steps this administration will take to ameliorate the U.N. human rights system without legitimizing the trajectory the council has already taken?

Answer. This Administration is deeply concerned by the trajectory of the Human Rights Council to date. The United States is running for a seat on the Council because of our commitment to protecting and promoting human rights globally. We believe that as a fully engaged member of the Council, working from within rather than sitting on the outside, we can more effectively and credibly work to advance human rights and to improve a body that the President has identified as one of the most troubled parts of the U.N. system.

This change will take time, and progress will undoubtedly be uneven. As a member of the Human Rights Council, the United States will be in a far better position to defend against, and if necessary register its formal objections to, unbalanced attacks on Israel and to call all Council members to account for attempts to do so. As a member, the United States will be able to table resolutions and call for votes, something that we could not do as an observer and that will allow us to ensure that biased or unhelpful resolutions are not adopted by consensus. Membership on the Council also gives the United States a privileged speaking position on all matters before the body. This is particularly important in defending our cherished principle of unfettered freedom of speech.

We are under no illusions that this work will be easy, that U.S. membership will ensure the Council does not take objectionable actions, or that success will come quickly. This is a work in progress, and if the United States does not work to advance the protection of human rights in the U.N. system, we know that there will be other countries who do not share our commitment to human rights that will fill that vacuum. With the help of our partners, we will advance the vision of the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights and help ensure that the U.N. contributes meaningfully to the ability of people the world over to enjoy their human rights and fundamental freedoms, to live freely, and to participate fully in their societies.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

*Question.* President Obama, as a candidate, said last year: "Sanctions are a critical part of our leverage to pressure North Korea to act. They should only be lifted based on North Korean performance. If the North Koreans do not meet their obligations, we should move quickly to re-impose sanctions that have been waived, and consider new restrictions going forward."

In the time since this statement was made, the North Korean regime has launched a multi-stage ballistic missile over mainland Japan towards the western United States, kidnapped and imprisoned two of our citizens, pulled out of the Six-Party Talks, kicked out international nuclear inspectors and American monitors, restarted its nuclear facilities, fell under investigation for shipping enriched uranium to Iran, and just a few days ago, threatened to detonate another nuclear weapon.

Rather than asking Congress to waive sanctions and give this administration \$100 million in economic support funds for this regime, wouldn't the more appropriate and logical approach be to do what the President himself said—to re-sanction North Korea?

Answer. North Korea continues to face wide-ranging sanctions under international and domestic legal authorities, including those stemming from its 2006 nuclear detonation, its proliferation activities, its human rights violations, and its status as a communist state.

The United States remains committed to full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, under which the DPRK is required to suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program and to abandon its ballistic missile program in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. In addition, under UNSCR 1718, the DPRK is required to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as all other existing weapons of mass destruction programs.

In response to the DPRK's April 5 launch of a Taepo-Dong 2 missile, the United States worked with members of the U.N. Security Council to issue a clear and

strong response to the launch. These efforts resulted in a unanimous Presidential Statement that condemned the launch, made plain that the launch was in contravention of UNSCR 1718, demanded that North Korea refrain from further launches, and called upon the DPRK as well as all member states to fully implement their obligations under UNSCR 1718.

As agreed to in the Presidential Statement, the UNSCR 1718 Sanctions Committee on April 24 updated the list of missile-related items that are subject to the restrictions in UNSCR 1718 on transfer to and from the DPRK. The Sanctions Committee also designated three entities as subject to the asset freeze provisions of UNSCR 1718. These entities are Korean Mining Development Trading Company (KOMID), Korea Ryonbong General Corporation, and Tanchon Commercial Bank.

These designations represent an important strengthening of the existing UNSCR 1718 sanctions regime by the 1718 Sanctions Committee. In particular, with the active support of the United States, the Sanctions Committee agreed to subject entities to the asset freeze for the first time since the adoption of the resolution in 2006. The United States has urged countries to fully implement UNSCR 1718 and continues to take appropriate measures to prevent North Korea from gaining access to nuclear, other WMD, and ballistic-missile related technology and equipment.

The United States continues to impose new sanctions as warranted on North Korea and related entities and individuals in response to North Korea's proliferation activities and pursuant to U.S. and international law. North Korean entities were most recently sanctioned by the United States in February 2009 for missile-related proliferation activities.

*Question.* If, as Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony, that it is "implausible, if not impossible" that North Korea will return to the Six-Party Talks this year, and that there is "no interest and no willingness" to give any economic aid, including fuel oil, then why should Congress appropriate \$100 million for this purpose?

Is the Administration concerned about the signal this would send to other states like Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and Sudan, if we reward a regime that is engaging in the most basic form of diplomatic blackmail: taking our citizens hostage and threatening illegal nuclear detonation unless we pay them off to return to the negotiating table?

*Answer.* The United States continues to pursue the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We have called on North Korea to cease its provocative actions and return to negotiations. North Korea's recent actions only underscore the urgency and importance of North Korean denuclearization.

The Administration's fiscal year 2009 Supplemental request for funding for North Korean denuclearization activities is necessary to advance our denuclearization goals. Regardless of recent North Korean behavior, it is necessary to request these funds now so we can be prepared to act immediately if North Korea returns to the table and takes the necessary steps to meet its commitments as agreed in the Six-Party Talks. This funding is a prudent measure to ensure that the United States is prepared to take timely and effective action to implement the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear facilities. It will also ensure the United States is in a position to provide North Korea with continued, timely energy assistance in conjunction with North Korea taking the needed steps to fully denuclearize. The United States would only provide energy assistance to North Korea if it resumed action on denuclearization.

*Question.* Was there any specific reason why the Administration requested \$95 million in ESF designated for North Korea, but did not request any designated funds for addressing North Korean human rights? It should be noted that significant amount of money was requested for Palestinian humanitarian needs in Gaza and the West Bank.

*Answer.* The United States looks forward to a day when individuals live in a free North Korea and have their rights fully respected. In fiscal year 2009, Congress appropriated and the Department of State has allocated \$2.5 million to support important programs to document human rights abuses, increase the flow of information into North Korea, and build the capacity of the defector community. Because of the availability of fiscal year 2009 funding, it was not necessary to request additional funding in the fiscal year 2009 spring supplemental request. We intend to continue such programming in the future.

*Question.* What portion of this \$125 million will go directly to UNRWA? What other international organizations will receive these funds?

*Answer.* Of the \$125 million, \$119 million would be provided to UNRWA for emergency activities in the West Bank and Gaza, including food assistance and the rehabilitation of UNRWA schools and health clinics, as well as refugee shelter. Other international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross

and World Food Program would receive \$6 million to provide humanitarian assistance in Gaza.

*Question.* How can we ensure that the funding we contribute to UNRWA will provide goods and services for humanitarian needs and not benefit terrorist elements in Gaza? Are you confident that UNRWA is in full compliance with Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act that prohibits U.S. funding to UNRWA from going to terrorists? What specific mechanisms does UNRWA have in place to ensure compliance?

*Answer.* The Department of State continues to be vigilant about complying with U.S. laws designed to prevent any support to terrorists, including section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. We will continue to closely monitor UNRWA to ensure that it meets the condition required for our contributions by section 301(c). UNRWA has written policies and procedures in place, undertakes monitoring and inspection activities, and takes swift action to address any allegations of wrongdoing. Accordingly, the Department believes that UNRWA is in compliance with the section 301(c) condition for funding.

UNRWA implements several measures to ensure the neutrality of its staff. Long-standing staff regulations outline the neutrality, integrity, and impartiality required of both international and locally hired U.N. staff. With USG encouragement and funding, UNRWA has developed a monitoring regime using fifteen international Operations Support Officers (OSOs) in the West Bank and Gaza. These international staff help ensure that UNRWA's facilities are not being misused for political purposes or militant activity. The constant vigilance of the OSOs helps ensure the neutrality and integrity of these installations.

Under procedures in place since 2002, the Commissioner General sends semi-annual reports as standing practice to the Department of State containing all relevant information regarding UNRWA's compliance with the section 301(c) condition for funding, including documenting any abuses, or attempted abuses, of UNRWA facilities. UNRWA provides the names of staff to host governments on an annual basis and, on a semi-annual basis, UNRWA checks the names of all 4.6 million UNRWA-registered refugees, as well as persons and entities to whom or to which the Agency made payments against the U.N. al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions list (also known as the 1267 list). In its February 2009 semi-annual report, UNRWA reported no matches against the 1267 list. UNRWA also responds immediately to any cases of alleged wrongdoing, including militant or other illicit activities and overt political participation or displays. Most recently, UNRWA immediately launched an investigation following allegations of political interference in its March staff union elections in Gaza, the results of which are pending. UNRWA officials have stated that any UNRWA employee with political affiliations would be disciplined or terminated.

*Question.* Shouldn't we be doing more within the United Nations to reform UNRWA and to guarantee serious oversight? What is the rationale, for example, for having Palestinian citizens of other countries still qualify as refugees under UNRWA's rolls? Why should UNRWA still exist in a place like Jordan where most Palestinians are Jordanian citizens?

*Answer.* UNRWA is in the process of implementing important management reform. The Organization Development Plan (ODP), initiated in 2006, is designed to foster more strategic planning and to bridge efficiency gaps, improving overall transparency, effectiveness of management and service delivery. The ODP has also focused on strengthening UNRWA's monitoring and evaluation processes, to provide an integrated, strategic and results-based approach to UNRWA programming. UNRWA's Advisory Commission, a quasi-governing body, of which the United States is an active member, provides oversight of progress made under the ODP and other UNRWA programs and activities. UNRWA's finances are audited by the U.N. Board of Auditors (BOA), an independent body, which reviews the Agency on a biennial basis. In its last two audits of 2004–2005 and 2006–2007, the BOA gave UNRWA an "unqualified" audit, which signifies that the auditors performed an extensive examination of UNRWA's financial records and have no reservations regarding the accuracy and fairness of its presentation.

UNRWA's mandate to provide assistance to UNRWA-registered refugees is defined by the United Nations. Jordan is the only country in UNRWA's five fields of operations that has granted citizenship to most of the 1.9 million Palestinian refugees it hosts. UNRWA's mandate, which is renewed every 3 years by the U.N. General Assembly, continues to cover those Palestinians in Jordan whose homes or livelihoods were lost in 1948. The Government of Jordan strongly supports UNRWA and would be expected to strongly object to any proposition by the international community to cease funding for the Agency's operations there. Doing so would place a great strain on the generosity of the Government of Jordan and could leave the refugees without critical services, such as education and primary healthcare. Fur-

thermore, it would potentially damage the relationship between the international community, including the USG, and Jordan, which remains a key strategic ally in the Middle East.

*Question.* The fiscal year 2009 supplemental request calls for \$98.4 million in FMF for Lebanon to provide additional equipment and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces. A Hezbollah-led majority in parliament would give the terrorist organization control over the decisionmaking process and possibly control over the LAF.

The fiscal year 2009 Omnibus bill included tighter congressional oversight on the use of military assistance funds to Lebanon, making funds available only to professionalize the LAF, strengthen border security, interdict arms shipments, and combat terrorism. Does the Supplemental request include the same oversight guidelines?

*Answer.* All FMF funds requested for Lebanon in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental will serve to professionalize the LAF and enhance its counterterrorism and border security capabilities. Much of the equipment is specifically linked to requirements identified by the LAF in coordination with CENTCOM after the LAF's battle against Fatah al-Islam terrorists in the summer of 2007.

There are numerous institutional checks on Hizballah's influence over and within the LAF, including Lebanon's Christian presidency, Christian command of the LAF, and confessional balance within LAF units. We have no reason to believe that the June 7 elections, whatever their outcome, will significantly affect the LAF's role as a national, multi-confessional institution dedicated to the protection of Lebanese citizens and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701.

Furthermore, the LAF has an excellent record of control over its U.S.-origin equipment, with not a single incident of loss or misuse since we resumed FMF assistance in 2005. Nonetheless, we continue to maintain strict end-use monitoring of all U.S.-origin equipment provided to the LAF, including enhanced end-use monitoring for sensitive equipment such as night-vision devices. We also vet all LAF candidates for U.S.-sponsored training in accordance with the Department's Leahy Amendment guidance; we have uncovered no derogatory information to date.

*Question.* How is the State Department countering ideological support for terrorism in Iraq?

*Answer.* Winning hearts and minds by addressing the underlying causes of extremism is a key component in our counterterrorism effort. In coordination with the Department of Defense and other organizations, the Department of State is striving to counter ideological support for terrorism in Iraq through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), strategic communication efforts, economic and political development, education, and judiciary reform programs. Examples of these efforts are as follows:

—*Najaf Legal Services Project.*—The Najaf PRT is working with the Najaf Bar Association to fund legal defense services to as many as 1,000 detained criminal defendants who have not yet appeared before a judge.

—*Basrah Business Center.*—The Anbar PRT has effectively utilized the International Visitors Program (IVP) to organize delegations of leaders from within and without the province. In 2007, they brought together tribal leaders seeking economic assistance with the provincial governor and provincial officials in order to plug the disenfranchised into business opportunities.

—*Simulating the Mechanics of Election Day.*—Shining Hope Organization taught rural, illiterate, handicapped and other voters from traditionally marginalized groups about the mechanics of voting in the upcoming elections in order to ensure that they understand how votes are cast and counted and to encourage them to participate in the 2009 provincial elections.

*Question.* Does the State Department have a strategic communications or public diplomacy strategy that it is following in Afghanistan and Iraq and if so, does that strategy envision and involve interagency participation and coordination?

*Answer.* Special Representative Holbrooke's office is coordinating a major new integrated civilian-military program on strategic communications in Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan. It will include three simultaneous projects that are essential: (1) redefining our message; (2) connecting to the people on the ground through cell phones, radio, and other means; and (3) identifying key communicators and countering the militants fear-mongering and information domination through local narrative. Additional personnel and structures in Kabul and Islamabad/Peshawar are essential and we are working to resource those requirements. We cannot win the information war if the debate is between the United States and the militants. The objective of this new effort is to shift the paradigm so the debate is between the tribal people and the violent extremists who threaten and exploit them.

*Question.* Is the State Department currently coordinating its public diplomacy efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq with the activities of USAID, the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community? How?

*Answer.* In April, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan co-hosted with the Department of Defense (DOD) an interagency meeting attended by over 50 representatives from State, DOD, the Agency for International Development, and the Intelligence Community, to discuss current strategic communication activities within Afghanistan and the tribal area of Pakistan, and the urgent need for a new comprehensive and coordinated plan for the region. Building on this work, Richard Holbrooke is now establishing a new strategic communications cell in his office, with staff from multiple agencies.

*Question.* How did the administration arrive at its request of \$300 million for Public Law 480 Title II grants? Globally, how does food security in 2009 compare to food security in 2008?

*Answer.* We focused on the most significant and severe emergencies with the greatest food aid needs to determine our supplemental request. These included programs in countries such as Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The request is an estimate of what is needed to provide for the most urgent needs in these and other emergencies. It is difficult to compare emergency food needs between years, especially only part way through 2009. We believe, however, that overall needs for the major emergencies—while still significant—are slightly less than last year. This is coupled with somewhat lower commodity and transportation costs as compared with last year.

*Question.* Will the requested level allow the United States to maintain, at a minimum, the current level of support of food aid operations in places like Afghanistan or Haiti for example? If support for existing operations will be decreased from 2008 levels, please specify which countries will receive lower levels of assistance and the amount of the decrease, in dollars, beneficiaries, and tonnage.

With so many dire situations throughout the world how does USAID prioritize where to direct relief?

*Answer.* We are continuously assessing emergency food aid needs throughout the world, including through information provided by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), U.S. government experts on the ground, the United Nations World Food Program, and private voluntary organizations. It is difficult to compare support provided to specific programs from one year to the next, given the variability in terms of needs. Last year, Afghanistan had a poor harvest and Haiti was struck by severe storms, so emergency food aid reached unusually high levels in those countries. This year, by contrast, Afghanistan's harvest has improved and hurricane season in the Caribbean has not yet begun, so emergency food aid needs have thus far returned to more normal levels. The \$300 million request, however, would allow us to provide more assistance to those countries and others if events change.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

*Question.* I am pleased to see President Obama's commitment to make this the last planned war supplemental. But my question is why during a year of unprecedented deficits, why are you coming back to Congress to request yet another emergency funding request? Shouldn't your funding compete in the regular order?

*Answer.* The fiscal year 2009 budget request that was submitted to the Congress in February 2008 did not include full funding for all programs, in particular programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq and humanitarian assistance. It was always anticipated that additional funding would be needed for these programs. In addition, other unanticipated and urgent requirements have arisen since the submission of the budget and the bridge supplemental.

The 2010 budget is intended to reduce reliance on emergency supplemental appropriations by increasing key accounts and programs for which funding is predictable and recurring. While emergency supplementals may be required in the future, we expect that they will be focused on truly unanticipated events as opposed to funding regular programs. However, as we implement the President's strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it may become necessary to review the resources available for programs in these countries.

The current emergency supplemental request addresses pressing challenges that impact the security of the United States. The unstable situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan demand urgent attention. Emergency funding will be used to advance political and economic stability in post-conflict areas, and to build capacity for effective governance. Funds will enable military commanders to respond to humanitarian relief and reconstruction needs in their areas of responsibility. They will also meet the extraordinary security costs associated with vital U.S. diplomatic activity in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

*Question.* International arms sales help to sustain U.S. jobs, reduce the cost of weapons procurement by the Department of Defense, help to grow small businesses, and support the national security and foreign policy objectives of the U.S. government. The Obama Administration must continue to support U.S. arms sales as an important foreign policy tool.

I understand that some of our foreign military assistance funds have been used by the Iraqis and Afghans for the procurement of Russian aircraft and helicopters ill-equipped to interoperate with U.S. personnel and hardware in the field. Can both of you elaborate on the technical and policy rationale for such use of U.S. military assistance?

*Answer.* By law, and with certain exceptions, State Department-managed foreign military assistance can be used only to procure defense articles and defense services from U.S. sources. We also are actively working with the Government of Iraq for it to buy U.S. military equipment through the Foreign Military Sales process. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is the implementing agency for State's foreign military assistance, has confirmed that no State-managed foreign military assistance has gone towards the procurement of Russian aircraft or helicopters. The State Department defers to the Department of Defense to respond to questions about ISFF and ASFF-funded acquisitions.

*Question.* Madam Secretary, thank you for your April 20, 2009, letter outlining the State Department's future steps and efforts to help resolve an ongoing child custody case involving the Republic of Korea. I appreciate you raising this case personally at the highest levels during the recent G-20 Summit in London. I am also grateful for the efforts of your team at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul as well as in Washington on this important case.

As such, can you assure me that the Department of State will continue to provide robust attention and resources to this case until a fruitful resolution is reached in the Korean civil court process?

*Answer.* The Department has been fully engaged with Mr. Melanson regarding the tragic abduction of his son, Eddie, since the earliest moments after Eddie's mother abducted him to South Korea. Ambassador Stephens and I have made Eddie's case a priority with the Korean government and will continue to do so. On more than fifteen occasions now, we have reached out to the Korean government to reiterate our concern. We have worked hard on resolving Eddie's heart-wrenching plight, and we will not diminish our efforts before there is a resolution. We will continue to assist Mr. Melanson until there is a resolution of the case or he no longer desires our assistance.

#### SPECIAL ENVOY TO COMBAT ANTI-SEMITISM

*Question.* In 2004, I was fortunate to have you join me as a cosponsor of the Global Anti-Semitism Review Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-332). As you know, this legislation created the Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism at the State Department. This office, housed in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) is tasked with the development and implementation of policies and projects to support efforts to combat anti-Semitism.

Jewish communities throughout the world cannot afford a gap in coverage. Can you provide the Committee an update on the status of the search process for the new Special Envoy and assure members of the Committee that this position will be expeditiously filled by a competent and capable individual?

*Answer.* Filling the position of Special Envoy to Combat Anti-Semitism is a priority for the Department of State. The Department is committed to identifying an exceptionally qualified candidate that can be announced to the public in the future.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO HON. ROBERT M. GATES

##### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, should we expect to see any more war-related supplemental requests?

*Answer.* We fully support the Administration's goal of not submitting any more war-related supplementals.

We believe the funding in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request will be adequate to support the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have, however, made it clear to the Administration that if the security situation in theater changes significantly from the assumptions that we used in putting together the overseas contingency requests for either fiscal year 2009 or fiscal year 2010, then we will be submitting a supplemental request.



*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, will your fiscal year 2010 budget requests, which we expect to receive next week, contain detailed war funding justifications?

*Answer.* Yes, the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request will include justification for war requirements.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, how long should the United States expect to be in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Our goals in Afghanistan are not time-limited, and neither is our commitment. Eliminating the threats to our vital national security interests will require long-term efforts to defeat al Qaeda and build Afghanistan's capacity to ensure extremists never again find safe haven in that country. To that end, the Administration is developing measures of effectiveness that will help us assess progress as we move forward in developing Afghanistan's capacity in security, governance, and economic development.

*Question.* Secretary Gates and Clinton, what is the United States doing to ensure greater NATO and U.N. participation in addressing the war in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* We work in full partnership with both NATO and the United Nations as well as regional stakeholders in both organizations. The USG is working with Allies to translate the additional pledges of military and civilian support made at the Strasbourg-Kehl NATO Summit into action. The United States increased its own contributions to NATO's mission in Afghanistan and will provide an additional 21,700 forces to fulfill Commander ISAF's/U.S. Forces Afghanistan requirements.

In regard to the United Nations, the USG is working with its partners and allies to strengthen the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and its critical role in coordinating the wide range of civilian activities on the ground. Specifically, we are working to help the U.N. Special Representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, secure the resources and authorities he needs to ensure mission success.

As part of the recently released Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review, we strive to enhance civilian-military coordination and implement an "Integrated Approach" in cooperation with the Afghan government. NATO-U.N. cooperation is a critical component of that strategy. The upcoming August elections are the most immediate and consequential task for both NATO and the United Nations. UNAMA and Afghanistan's Independent Human Rights Commission will jointly observe the election mission, while our Allies and partners in NATO have offered around 3,000 additional forces for election security.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, should the United States be concerned over the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal?

*Answer.* Just as the United States is concerned about the security of all nuclear arsenals, the United States should be concerned about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani Army is responsible for the security of those nuclear weapons and takes that responsibility very seriously, with strong measures in place to ensure that security. Of much greater concern is the fragility of the civilian government and its seeming lack of capacity to deliver on basic services: schools, healthcare, rule of law, and a strong judicial system, particularly in the western areas where insurgents have had recent successes. Helping Pakistan help Pakistanis in these areas is how the United States can eliminate the conditions that give rise to unrest.

*Question.* Secretary Gates, over the last few months, I have worked with your staff to improve emergency medical evacuation and forward surgical capabilities to treat our wounded servicemen and women in Afghanistan. I appreciate your personal attention to this issue and believe that the planned deployments should greatly improve the ability to provide critical care. Only time will tell if this proves to be the case. However, it has been brought to my attention that our ground medical evacuation armored vehicle capabilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan may also be wanting. In their draft supplemental budget documentation, it is indicated that the Army requested 323 armored medical evacuation vehicles. These vehicles were not, however, included in the supplemental budget request. What are the plans and timing for upgrading current armored medical evacuation vehicles with a suitable next generation vehicle?

*Answer.* The Department is evaluating medical evacuation operations requirements based on lessons learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on Afghan terrain and distances. Currently, both theaters use a mix of both armored vehicles and medivac helicopters to retrieve wounded personnel to medical facilities. An Army proposal to use the Stryker vehicles for medical evacuations would complement existing vehicles, notably the Fox combat vehicle. However, due to the road conditions, and greater distances, the time to evacuate personnel by land may be too long. The Department is evaluating various options, thus is not fully committed to armored medical evacuation vehicles as a suitable solution.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

## ARMORED VEHICLES

*Question.* The one area of concern—which I know we all have for every service-member in Afghanistan—is protection when traveling in vehicles. We have seen a higher incidence of roadside bomb attacks in Afghanistan, and the MRAP, which is a very heavy vehicle that is the best protection against that threat but needs to operate on paved roads, does not work well in Afghanistan.

I understand this supplemental request includes spending for the so-called MRAP-All-Terrain Vehicle. The MRAP-ATV can go off-road and still provide strong armor from attack. Can you confirm that this is a priority and that the Department will rush it to the field, of course ensuring that it is fully tested? Is any additional funding needed to accelerate this development?

*Answer.* The Department is in the process of assessing the requirement, both in quantities and system characteristics for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) All Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) for Afghanistan. Because of the significant differences in road conditions, we believe that the MRAP vehicle that has worked so well in Iraq, would not provide the off-road mobility that is desired in Afghanistan. For this reason, we are in the process of evaluating several designs to better address the Afghan environment. Funding is included in the budget request for an additional 1,000 vehicles, which represents the current estimate, which is subject to change as our theater commanders gain a better perspective of the situation and requirements. For now, we are in the process of evaluating candidate systems, and preparing for a comprehensive testing program. For this reason, we do not believe that accelerating the program would be beneficial.

## USE OF NATIONAL GUARD TO COUNTER DRUGS FROM MEXICO

*Question.* The National Guard will likely be soon tasked to help in the effort to counter the traffic in drugs from Mexico. As one of the co-chairs, along with Senator Bond, of the National Guard Caucus, we have seen how the Guard has a unique set of capabilities and experience that make it well-suited to these tasks.

That said, we do not want to make this another Operation Jump Start, which was difficult to manage and created needless challenges in the Guard's abilities to carry out its other missions. It would be far preferable for the Guard's efforts to be done through the existing, highly successful National Guard Counterdrug program. How would you feel if the Committee routed the \$350 million request for the Guard's counterdrug effort through the National Guard Counterdrug program?

*Answer.* The fiscal year 2009 supplemental request to provide \$350 million for the administration to conduct counternarcotics and other activities along the United States-Mexico border is requested as a DOD transfer fund to provide the President with flexibility if he decides that U.S. troops are needed. The President has not made a decision on the use of additional U.S. troops at the border. Additionally, of the \$350 million, the Secretary of Defense may transfer up to \$100 million to other Federal agencies for border-related efforts to include humanitarian activities. Appropriating the funds to the National Guard would not enable such a transfer and would, therefore, not provide the flexibility sought by the administration.

We agree the National Guard's efforts in the DOD Counterdrug program have been highly successful but it would be premature to limit the funding flexibility available to the President before he makes a decision. The current wording in the fiscal year 2009 supplemental request provides the President with flexibility to provide a wide range of capabilities should he decide to deploy troops to the United States-Mexico border.

## QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HERB KOHL

*Question.* I understand that the Department has undertaken ongoing efforts directed towards medical situational awareness targeted at international operations. It appears to me that medical situational awareness initiative has application to our response to the current outbreak of swine flu, as well as our response to potential bio-terrorism threats.

Do you believe that any part of the Medical Situational Awareness initiative can be deployed to help determine risk and allocate resources for managing an influenza outbreak or other near-term disaster, especially in the context of NORTHCOM's role in assisting with a medical response? If so, do you contemplate using a portion of the Administration's Supplemental request for \$1.5 billion in additional funds to fight pandemic flu for speeding up or bringing on-line the Department's medical sit-

ational awareness initiative? What funding would you need to complete the medical situational awareness initiative and how would such funds be used?

Answer. Department of Defense efforts to maintain medical situational awareness is led by the Division of Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, which maintains a global program of infectious disease surveillance with 39 partners touching 111 countries. The global influenza program has surveillance in 72 countries, including 20 U.S. ships, all Service recruit training facilities, and six clinics along the Mexican border (four in California, two in Mexico). Overseas laboratories in Thailand (Army), Kenya (Army), Peru (Navy), Indonesia/Cambodia (Navy), and Egypt (Navy) are the foundation of our international network.

While it is possible that a portion of the supplemental request will go to pandemic influenza response, we have not made such a decision.

The current surveillance system could be improved by accelerating the Global Surveillance Network of the Medical Situational Awareness in Theater program for early detection and timely response to disease outbreaks in the United States and abroad. This program would: Establish and maintain a network of English-speaking information contributors in approximately 1,000 locations in the United States and abroad; develop a reporting methodology and train the contributors on reporting symptoms; deploy a system to gather and report on syndromes throughout the world highlighting increases in syndromes in diverse areas; and be deployed with more than 14,000 providers within 3 years.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM JOHNSON

##### H1N1 FLU

*Question.* Secretary Gates, I am concerned about the global spread of the H1N1 flu virus, particularly its potential impact on U.S. military forces. U.S. troops forward deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan live in very austere conditions in close quarters with many communal facilities. I suspect that most of them do not routinely carry Purell in their pockets, and clean water is often a scarce commodity in combat zones.

What are DOD's contingency plans to prevent or to deal with an outbreak of swine flu among U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. The DOD has been preparing for an influenza pandemic for the last 5 years. These preparations included developing and exercising response plans, educating DOD military forces and other beneficiaries on how to best prevent the spread of influenza, and building up global stockpiles of medical supplies, equipment, antibiotics, and antiviral medications. DOD developed policies on the distribution, release, and use of antivirals, including Tamiflu® and Relenza®, the two drugs currently recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the treatment of the H1N1 influenza that is the source of current global concern. We also developed clinical practice guidelines for our fixed facilities that reflect the current guidance provided by CDC and we modified these guidelines to meet the needs of our medical providers who are practicing in more austere field environments.

Because prevention of an outbreak may be difficult due to the contagious nature of this disease, we have guidance in place to minimize the spread and impact of outbreaks of influenza. Forward-operating personnel who are suspected of having the disease will be isolated when possible, and contacts will be treated prophylactically with antivirals, if necessary. Units can take several measures even in deployed settings to reduce risk of contracting H1N1. DOD has a history of accurate surveillance, prevention, and control of respiratory diseases in our Service member populations. The same measures we use to prevent other respiratory diseases will be effective against H1N1.

*Question.* Does DOD need additional funds to meet this contingency?

Answer. It is possible that the DOD will require additional funds, especially if transmission and disease severity increase. For example, protective masks and antiviral medications are required for adequate personnel protection, but we have no stockpiles of personal protective equipment (PPE) for non-medical uses. Using antiviral medications for protection rather than treatment requires a robust supply of these drugs. Although we have a substantial supply, what we use in response to this influenza will need replacement. The same applies to PPE and antibiotics that we stockpiled at our medical treatment facilities. If the H1N1 virus begins to demonstrate a pattern similar to that seen in the 1918 pandemic, DOD may need to begin an immunization program against one of the more common causes.

As we better understand of the disease dynamics of H1N1, we can better estimate the impact on DOD and develop more precise cost estimates.

*Question.* Does DOD have a sufficient stockpile of anti-viral drugs such as Tamiflu® to treat this disease if it evolves into a pandemic?

*Answer.* Our total stockpile of Tamiflu® represents approximately eight million treatment courses. With this, the DOD has an adequate supply of antiviral drugs to meet our mission requirements, provided the following assumptions hold true:

- Our antiviral supply will be used primarily to maintain mission effectiveness. We continue to rely on the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) for antivirals for our beneficiary and retiree populations. If substantial amounts of our stockpile were used for dependents and retirees, then less would be available to ensure meeting mission essential tasks. We anticipate that not all of our beneficiaries and retirees will have access to the SNS and have planned accordingly for these groups.
- The H1N1 virus must continue to be sensitive to Tamiflu®. Tamiflu® represents the bulk of the DOD antiviral stockpile. If we need to shift to other antiviral drugs such as Relenza®, then our current supply would be inadequate to meet our needs.
- Protecting Service members before exposure assures us that DOD's national defense and civil support mission requirements can be met. However, a pre-exposure approach uses a great deal of the drugs and is very inefficient, but necessary in some instances. If we are required to place significant numbers of Service members in high risk settings where transmission of the H1N1 virus is likely, then our overall requirements for antiviral drugs could exceed our current capacity. Our current guidance reinforces that this strategy should be used only when necessary and should not be widespread.
- Our supply will be adequate if an effective vaccine is provided to DOD before a second wave of the pandemic. Current projections from our colleagues at the Department of Health and Human Services predict that vaccine may be available in early September, with up to 600 million doses available by January 2010.
- The virus does not mutate. In 1918, most of those who caught the flu and developed severe disease or died were young healthy adults. This demographic is the same as the DOD population. If we see a similar pattern, then antiviral use would increase substantially.
- Although H1N1 is the cause of the current outbreak, H5N1 continues to remain a primary threat. We need to be prepared if a mild pandemic of H1N1 were followed by a severe H5N1 pandemic.

The threat of a pandemic will never go away, even when the current H1N1 threat passes. We will need to replace antiviral stockpiles as they are used to maintain our overall readiness to meet the challenges ahead.

*Question.* Thousands of U.S. military personnel and their families are stationed overseas, in places like Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea. What is DOD doing to prevent and to prepare for the potential spread of swine flu among American military populations overseas?

*Answer.* The DOD has been conducting an educational campaign aimed at Service members, their families, DOD civilians, and contractor personnel. This has been achieved through its website, the Department of Defense Pandemic Influenza Watchboard, <http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/>. The website became operational 4 years ago and contains posters and fact sheets (available through the Watchboard as well as the DOD Family Readiness Library). In addition, each of the Services and all DOD medical treatment facilities (MTFs) have conducted their own educational campaigns. Through these campaigns, the DOD community has been educated about the best methods to prevent the spread of the flu virus, mainly through hand-washing, covering one's mouth when sneezing or coughing, social distancing (including appropriate school closures) and staying home when sick (self-quarantining). Because of the logarithmic growth of a pandemic in a susceptible population, once a virus with no known immunity has spread for 2 to 3 weeks, it becomes impossible to totally eliminate it. However, the methods described above will slow down the spread sufficiently to gain some control over the magnitude of the pandemic and its effect on the population at risk.

DOD has made extensive preparations for the contingency of a pandemic, and has included in these plans the building of stockpiles of antivirals, including oseltamavir (Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (Relenza®), and other medications including antibiotics to treat secondary bacterial pneumonia. DOD stockpiled medical supplies and durable medical equipment, and required each military base and MTF to draft and exercise a plan for a pandemic. The antiviral stockpiles are prepositioned around the globe to facilitate rapid distribution worldwide in the event of an influenza pan-

demic. The stockpiling of Tamiflu® and Relenza®, to which the new H1N1 virus is susceptible, would support DOD beneficiaries outside of the United States in this pandemic.

We determined that DOD beneficiaries, including military families, outside the United States might not be able to obtain medications, especially antivirals, through the host nation. DOD planned to maintain a sufficient stockpile within DOD to meet the demand of these beneficiaries. We made similar provisions for medical supplies and durable medical equipment, envisioning a scenario based on the highly virulent H5N1 virus rather than what appears to be a much less virulent H1N1 virus. Plans also include the use of additional facilities on military installations, and training, credentialing, and use of additional hospital personnel to serve as nurse and physician extenders.

*Question.* Do U.S. military clinics and hospitals overseas have sufficient staff, capacity, and medical supplies to treat military personnel and their families in the event of a major outbreak, or will U.S. military families have to seek treatment at host nation medical facilities?

*Answer.* The Department of Defense (DOD) has aggressively prepared for a pandemic of influenza for the past 5 years. DOD has both local and strategic stockpiles of the antiviral, oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) overseas. The strategic stockpiles are prepositioned around the globe to facilitate distribution in preparation for an influenza pandemic. Local stockpiles are held at overseas medical treatment facilities (MTFs) in Europe and the Pacific and in depots for use in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command areas of operation. The stockpiling of Tamiflu® and Relenza®, to which the new H1N1 virus is susceptible, would support DOD beneficiaries outside of the United States in this pandemic.

Through TRICARE, those U.S. DOD beneficiaries who do not have access to care in an MTF or require care that is not available at local MTFs, would receive their care at host nation facilities. This care is contracted by TRICARE and the care provided is consistent with TRICARE standards.

We determined that DOD beneficiaries, including military families, outside the United States might not be able to obtain medications, especially antivirals, through the host nation. DOD planned to maintain a sufficient stockpile within DOD to meet the demand of these beneficiaries. We made similar provisions for medical supplies and durable medical equipment, envisioning a scenario based on the highly virulent H5N1 virus rather than what appears to be a less virulent H1N1 virus. Plans also include the use of additional facilities on military installations, and training, credentialing, and use of additional hospital personnel to serve as nurse and physician extenders.

#### MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

*Question.* Last week, General Petraeus was asked about enduring military installations in Afghanistan. I believe that Bagram has been designated an enduring location, and it appears that Kandahar, if not already an enduring location, is heading that way.

What is the difference between a permanent base and an enduring base, and what is DOD's plan for establishing permanent or enduring bases in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* DOD defines U.S. military presence through three posture elements: the nature of host-nation relationships (and related legal arrangements); the scale and duration of military activities and missions; and the footprint of personnel and infrastructure.

DOD established a tiered terminology for applying these posture elements and characterizing the desired level of U.S. military presence at various locations overseas: Main Operating Bases (MOBs); Forward Operating Sites (FOSs); and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs).

In the context of our global defense posture plans, "permanent" and "enduring" are descriptive terms used by the Combatant Commanders in connection with one of more of the elements of posture, depending on the region and locations to which they are applied.

"Permanent" generally describes a long-standing footprint of personnel and infrastructure—e.g., permanently stationed forces accompanied by family members, with extensive command and control structures, and family support and quality of life services and facilities. MOBs, generally, are "permanent" bases (e.g., Ramstein, Germany; Mildenhall, United Kingdom; Kadena, Japan). "Enduring" generally describes the intent for long-standing host nation relationships and U.S. military capabilities/mission needs. This term could be applicable to MOBs with permanently stationed forces, but also to FOSs. For example, at FOSs in Romania, Bulgaria, and Djibouti, our plans involve limited permanent U.S. military support presence, but long-term

host nation relationships and the intent to maintain or establish enduring, scalable operational hubs for rotational training and other force projections missions.

The Department has continuous consultation with the CENTCOM commander regarding required support to operations in Afghanistan, including requirements to support "enduring" posture locations at Bagram and Kandahar. The Department does not anticipate at this time that these will be permanent bases.

*Question.* I have seen estimates that the United States could spend as much as \$4 billion for military construction in Afghanistan. How much additional Milcon funding beyond this supplemental do you anticipate needing for Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Our efforts are focused on supporting the immediate U.S. force structure increases. In support of that effort our current fiscal year 2010 Milcon estimates for Afghanistan are in the order of \$1.5 billion.

*Question.* Would you please provide for the record the following information: an accounting of how much funding has been appropriated to date for military construction in Afghanistan, by location, project, and fiscal year; for each project, how much of the appropriated amount has been obligated to date; and what is the current projected military construction requirement for Afghanistan?

*Answer.* The funding that has been appropriated to date for military construction in Afghanistan, by location, project, and fiscal year along with the associated obligations is at attachment 1. In terms of projected military construction requirement for Afghanistan, our efforts are focused on supporting the immediate U.S. force structure increases. In support of that effort the current fiscal year 2010 Milcon estimate for Afghanistan is in the order of \$1.5 billion.

In addition to the appropriated projects at attachment 1, we have carried out, or are carrying out, construction projects in Afghanistan under Title 10 U.S.C. sections 2803 and 2804 (attachment 2) and under contingency construction authorities (CCA) that permit us to carry out construction using Operation and Maintenance funds (attachment 3).

The following is a summary of all military construction in Afghanistan:

(In millions of dollars)

	Approved Amount	Obligations
Appropriated .....	1,303.7	820.6
10 U.S.C. 2803 .....	10.8	10.8
10 U.S.C. 2808 .....	104.6	93.8
CCA .....	496.0	86.9
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>1,915.1</b>	<b>1,011.8</b>

ATTACHMENT 1.—AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECT LISTING

[Dollars in thousands]

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Appropriated Amount	Obligations <sup>1</sup>	Funding Source
Army	Fiscal Year 2009	Bulk Fuel Storage & Supply Ph 8	Bagram	Afghanistan	\$26,000		Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Army	Fiscal Year 2009	Bulk Fuel Storage & Supply Ph 5	Bagram	Afghanistan	22,000		Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Army	Fiscal Year 2009	SOF HQ Complex	Bagram	Afghanistan	19,000		Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2009	C-130 Maintenance Hangar	Bagram	Afghanistan	27,400	\$18,995	Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2009	Cargo Handling Area Expansion	Bagram	Afghanistan	8,800	4,375	Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2009	Refueler Ramp	Bagram	Afghanistan	21,000	15,534	Fiscal Year 2009 Base
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Administrative Building	Bagram	Afghanistan	13,800	10,037	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Aircraft Maintenance Hangar	Bagram	Afghanistan	5,100	4,847	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Ammunition Supply Point	Bagram	Afghanistan	62,000		Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Bulk Fuel Storage and Supply ph 3	Bagram	Afghanistan	23,000	20,205	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Bulk Fuel Storage and Supply ph 4	Bagram	Afghanistan	21,000	19,899	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	New Roads	Bagram	Afghanistan	27,000		Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Power Plant	Bagram	Afghanistan	41,000	37,713	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Rotary Wing Parking	Ghazni	Afghanistan	5,000		Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Consolidated Compound	Kabul	Afghanistan	36,000	25,272	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Counter IED Road-Route Alaska	Various	Afghanistan	16,500	14,769	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Counter IED Road-Route Conn	Various	Afghanistan	54,000		Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2008	East Side Helo Ramp	Bagram	Afghanistan	44,400	28,490	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2008	ISR Ramp	Bagram	Afghanistan	26,300	24,991	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2008	Parallel Taxiway Phase 2	Bagram	Afghanistan	21,400	15,411	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2008	Strategic Ramp	Bagram	Afghanistan	43,000	29,074	Fiscal Year 2008 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2008	Administrative Building	Bagram	Afghanistan	13,800	10,037	Fiscal Year 2008 Base
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Bulk Fuel Storage Phase I	Bagram	Afghanistan	9,500	10,447	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Bulk Fuel Storage Phase II <sup>2</sup>	Bagram	Afghanistan	25,000	30,105	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	CMU Barracks	Bagram	Afghanistan	17,000	15,513	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Communications System Facility	Bagram	Afghanistan	8,200	7,807	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Electrical Distribution Utility Chase	Bagram	Afghanistan	17,500	16,579	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Perimeter Fence & Guard Towers	Bagram	Afghanistan	8,900	9,250	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	RSOI Surge Area	Bagram	Afghanistan	14,000	14,214	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Storm Water Collection	Bagram	Afghanistan	5,600	6,117	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	Water Treatment & Distribution	Bagram	Afghanistan	22,000	22,766	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army	Fiscal Year 2007	WWTP & Sewer Collection	Bagram	Afghanistan	16,500	16,809	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2007	Hot Cargo Pad & Access Road	Bagram	Afghanistan	7,300	7,321	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Air Force	Fiscal Year 2007	Parallel Taxiway	Bagram	Afghanistan	33,000	26,004	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp

Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Counter IED Roads .....	Various .....	Afghanistan .....	369,700	201,446	Fiscal Year 2007 Supp
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2006 ...	Kabul Consolidated Compound .....	Kabul .....	Afghanistan .....	30,000	30,993	Fiscal Year 2006 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2006 ...	Tanker Truck Offload Facility .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	19,600	16,834	Fiscal Year 2006 Supp
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	CMU Barracks .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	16,100	16,896	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Joint Operations Center .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	6,400	5,061	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	East Side Ramp/Support Infra .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	17,600	8,181	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Control Tower .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	10,200	6,176	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Cargo Handling Area .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	1,800	1,629	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Coalition Forces Ramp .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	1,400	1,403	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Ammunition Supply Point .....	Kandahar .....	Afghanistan .....	16,000	16,178	Fiscal Year 2005 Supp
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2004 ...	Airfield Runway Repair .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	52,900	53,266	Fiscal Year 2004 Supp
<b>Total .....</b>					<b>1,303,700</b>	<b>820,644</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Through March, 2009

<sup>2</sup> A reprogramming increased the appropriated amount by \$7,000,000 to \$32,000,000.

Fiscal Year 2009 Base is Public Law 110-329; Fiscal Year 2008 Supp is Public Law 110-252; Fiscal Year 2008 Base is Public Law 110-161; Fiscal Year 2007 Supp is Public Law 110-28; Fiscal Year 2006 Supp is Public Law 109-234; Fiscal Year 2008 Supp is Public Law 109-13; Fiscal Year 2004 Supp is Public Law 108-132

#### ATTACHMENT 2.—AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECTS CARRIED OUT UNDER TITLE 10 SECTION 2803

[Dollars in thousands]

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Approved	Obligations <sup>1</sup>	Funding Authority
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2004 ...	CAS Ramp Extension .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	\$764	\$764	Title 10 Section 2803
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	CAS Ramp Extension .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	1,116	1,116	Title 10 Section 2803
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2006 ...	CAS Ramp Extension .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	4,381	4,381	Title 10 Section 2803
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	CAS Ramp Extension .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	4,539	4,539	Title 10 Section 2803
<b>Total .....</b>					<b>10,800</b>	<b>10,800</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Through March 2009.

#### AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECTS CARRIED OUT UNDER TITLE 10 SECTION 2808

[Dollars in thousands]

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Approved	Obligations <sup>1</sup>	Funding Authority
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Bagram Theater Internment Facility .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	\$62,551	\$62,551	Title 10 Section 2808
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Barracks, Temporary, Phase 1 .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	16,000	11,601	Title 10 Section 2808
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Expand Bagram Roads .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan .....	16,000	12,906	Title 10 Section 2808

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AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECTS CARRIED OUT UNDER TITLE 10 SECTION 2808—Continued

[Dollars in thousands]

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Approved	Obligations <sup>1</sup>	Funding Authority
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Barracks, .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan ....	5,600	5,846	Title 10 Section 2808
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Eastside Power Lines .....	Bagram .....	Afghanistan ....	1,200	865	Title 10 Section 2808
<b>Total .....</b>					<b>104,600</b>	<b>93,769</b>	

<sup>1</sup> Through March 2009.

ATTACHMENT 3.—AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECTS CARRIED OUT UNDER FISCAL YEAR 2004 NDA<sup>1</sup> SECTION 2808, AS AMENDED

[Dollars in thousands]

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Approved	Obligations <sup>2</sup>	Funding Source
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2004 ...	Hospital Facility .....	Bagram Airfield .....	Afghanistan ....	\$16,380	\$16,380	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2004 ...	Ammunition Supply Point .....	Bagram Airfield .....	Afghanistan ....	14,095	14,095	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2004 ...	Entry Control Point .....	Bagram Airfield .....	Afghanistan ....	12,874	12,874	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2005 ...	Kabul Consolidated Compound .....	Kabul .....	Afghanistan ....	1,400	1,362	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Primary Electrical Distribution Grid .....	FOB Sharana .....	Afghanistan ....	3,100	3,100	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Camp Phoenix North Expansion .....	Kabul .....	Afghanistan ....	22,928	22,928	O&M
DIA .....	Fiscal Year 2007 ...	Joint Intelligence Operations Facility .....	Kabul .....	Afghanistan ....	2,700	2,700	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2008 ...	Waste Water Treatment Facility .....	Jalalabad Airfield .....	Afghanistan ....	6,300	6,024	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Rotary Wing Ramp and Taxiway PH .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	25,000	.....	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Rotary Wing Ramp and Taxiway PH .....	Camp Bastion .....	Afghanistan ....	25,000	.....	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	RSOI Expansion .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	16,000	84	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	ECP and Access Road South Park .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	9,400	64	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	South Park Infrastructure PH 1 .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	30,000	.....	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Brigade Housing .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	25,000	.....	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Relocation of Class 1 Yard .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	11,000	51	O&M
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Rotary Wing Ramps & Taxiways .....	Shank .....	Afghanistan ....	36,000	.....	O&M
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Strategic Airlift Apron .....	Camp Bastion .....	Afghanistan ....	47,000	.....	O&M
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Runway .....	Camp Bastion .....	Afghanistan ....	97,000	.....	O&M
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Close Air Support Apron .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	37,000	.....	O&M
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Upgrade Munitions Storage Area .....	Kandahar AB .....	Afghanistan ....	20,000	.....	O&M
Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Runway .....	Shank .....	Afghanistan ....	22,000	.....	O&M

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Air Force .....	Fiscal Year 2009 ...	Airlift Apron .....	Shank .....	Afghanistan .....	8,600	.....	O&M
Total .....	.....	.....	.....	.....	488,777	79,662	

<sup>1</sup> National Defense Authorization Act.  
<sup>2</sup> Obligation data as of March 31, 2009.

**AFGHANISTAN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FISCAL YEAR 2003-FISCAL YEAR 2009 PROJECTS CARRIED OUT UNDER FISCAL YEAR 2003 EMERGENCY WARTIME  
SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT, SECTION 1901**  
(Dollars in thousands)

Service	Fiscal Year	Project	Base	Country	Approved	Obligations <sup>1</sup>	Funding Source
Army .....	Fiscal Year 2003 ...	JTF HQ .....	Begram .....	Afghanistan .....	\$7,200	\$7,200	O&M

<sup>1</sup> Obligation data as of March 31, 2009.

*Question.* What is DOD doing to ensure the maximum contribution from NATO for the construction of military facilities in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* Executive Summary: We are using the pre-notification process to NATO for the NSIP Program (described below) for all fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 Milcon and CCA Projects in Afghanistan. By doing so, we are posturing U.S. funded projects to be reimbursed by NATO once they meet the criteria for NATO Common Funding. For example, NATO's Infrastructure Committee is strongly considering common funding for a recent U.S. nomination of a \$30 million runway ramp extension project in Southern Afghanistan.

Description: The U.S. NATO budget consists of the NATO Military Budget (O&M) and the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP). The NATO Resource Support Branch (part of HQ USAREUR) in Mons, Belgium manages appropriations for both programs.

—The NATO Military Budget funds the U.S. share of the day to day operational costs associated with NATO. HQ Department of the Army maintains oversight of the NATO Military Budget Program.

—The NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) funds the acquisition of common use systems and equipment; construction, upgrade and restoration of operational facilities; and other related programs and projects in support of NATO Strategic Concepts and Military Strategy. The Office of DUSD(I&E), Installations Requirements and Management Directorate, maintains oversight of the program.

The United States, along with other allies, annually contributes an agreed level of funding to the NSIP, provided through the Military Construction Appropriations Act. The U.S. share, typically about a quarter of the total budget, is a key factor in our leadership of NATO, and for exerting our influence throughout the European region. The United States derives significant operational benefits from NSIP projects that support U.S. forces and personnel throughout Europe, especially in NATO's Southern Region.

NSIP project requirements are stated in terms of Capability Packages and are prioritized and approved by the NATO Military Authorities. Nationally funded projects may be eligible for NSIP reimbursement if they meet criteria for NATO Common Funding after the fact due to use or mission changes. To be eligible for this Nations must "pre-notify" the NSIP of intent to build.

*Question.* The supplemental request does not include any military construction funding for Iraq. Do you anticipate requiring any further Milcon funding for Iraq in fiscal year 2010 or in future budget requests?

*Answer.* While we do not anticipate any additional requirements, the drawdown coupled with the situation on the ground will drive any future requests.

#### GUANTANAMO

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the supplemental request includes \$50 million in the Iraq Freedom Fund to support the closure of the Guantanamo detention center. The request specifically seeks authorization for the expenditure of military construction funds for projects not otherwise authorized by law.

What is the purpose of the military construction proviso? Is it intended to give the department the flexibility to construct a new prison, or renovate or expand an existing military facility, or is there some other type of facility that could be required?

*Answer.* The purpose of the proviso is to give the Department of Defense the ability to execute the pending decisions of the interagency Special Task Force, which is working to identify options for the disposition of detainees now at Guantanamo. The Task Force is co-chaired by the Attorney General and Secretary of Defense. Any plan to bring detainees to the United States will require legislation and the support of Congress. I fully support the closure of detention facilities at Guantanamo.

*Question.* What options are on the table for dealing with the current detention facilities at Guantanamo once the detention center is closed? Are you considering demolishing the existing facilities, or is the Department considering other options, such as converting them to migrant operation facilities?

*Answer.* The detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay will be closed on or before January 22, 2010, in accordance with the President's Executive Orders dated January 22, 2009. The Department, in coordination with our interagency partners, is working diligently to ensure that the government is prepared to implement that order.

After the Operation Enduring Freedom detainee mission undertaken by Joint Task Force Guantanamo is completed, the Department has no plans to transition the facilities into a different mission profile. The facilities at Guantanamo were de-

signed and constructed to serve the mission of detaining al-Qaeda, Taliban, and associated forces. The exact disposition of the facilities has not been determined.

It is also possible that the Guantanamo facilities will be deemed by the Department of Justice to be covered by the federal court's preservation order that requires DOD to preserve and maintain all documents and information that relates to Guantanamo detainees. If so, the facilities could not be dismantled until that preservation order is no longer in effect.

#### AFRICOM

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the Associated Press reported Wednesday that small numbers of Muslim extremists were leaving the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and heading to East Africa, specifically Somalia. That area of the continent has presented many challenges for the United States in the past.

Will the fact that AFRICOM has very limited presence on the continent diminish our capability to respond quickly to counter these types of threats?

*Answer.* USAFRICOM's capacity is not diminished by its limited presence on the continent. The Global Force Management (GFM) process allows USAFRICOM, like all the other Geographic Combatant Commands, to request forces and assets as necessary to accomplish missions tasked by the Secretary of Defense. These requests are reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense, allowing a dynamic balancing of military force application between emerging requirements and ongoing sustained operations.

*Question.* How large of an infrastructure footprint do you envision for AFRICOM on the continent of Africa? Does the Department have plans to construct any military facilities on the continent beyond Camp Lemonier in Djibouti?

*Answer.* No, the Department does not have existing plans to construct any military facilities on the continent beyond Camp Lemonier. The Department has deferred a permanent location final decision until fiscal year 2012. In the interim, the Department is limiting expenditures on temporary USAFRICOM infrastructure until decisions are made about the long-term on-continent locations for the command.

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

##### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM TO STIMULATE COMPETITIVE RESEARCH

*Question.* In the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 110-181), this Committee requested a Federally Funded Research and Development Center assessment of DEPSCoR. The resulting assessment demonstrated that DEPSCoR has successfully built research capacity in participating states, including a finding that the DEPSCoR states' share of non-DEPSCoR DOD science and engineering funding steadily increased from inception of the program through fiscal year 2005 (the last year the assessment considered), despite wide variations in DEPSCoR program funding level.

As this Administration considers how best to invest the Department's limited 6.1 basic research dollars, can you provide to this Committee an assurance that the DEPSCoR programmatic objective of investing in historically underfunded states will remain a priority?

*Answer.* Senator Reed, the DEPSCoR program, coupled with the larger EPSCoR programs run by six other agencies—the National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, National Institutes of Health, Department of Agriculture, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Environmental Protection Agency—has indeed built research capacity in participating states. However, it is not entirely clear whether the increased capacity can be linked specifically to DEPSCoR compared to the larger EPSCoR funding from the other agencies.

In general, the Department seeks to competitively build research capacity across the entire nation. When the Department developed its fiscal year 2009 budget, Secretary Gates personally made basic research a priority, increasing our overall basic research accounts by nearly \$300 million. These funds are embedded in both Service University Research Initiative and Defense Research Science programs. With this 16 percent real growth in basic research came the charge to invest the funds in competitively awarded and peer reviewed research. Our belief is the total amount awarded competitively from this \$300 million increase to the aggregated EPSCoR states should actually exceed the amount of money requested in the traditional DEPSCoR program. If this is the case, the intent of DEPSCoR program to build capacity in under represented states would be met. As we finish the basic research

awards in fiscal year 2009, we will monitor the total amount allocated to DEPSCoR states, and adjust policy accordingly.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

*Question.* In September 2005, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission recommended closing Fort Monmouth and transferring functions to Aberdeen Proving Ground. Since that time, news and government reports have surfaced raising significant concerns about the rising costs of closing the base and the possibility that such a closure could be disruptive in our military missions abroad. Does the administration have plans to review the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closures? If so, is the decision to close Fort Monmouth under review?

*Answer.* The Department has no legal authority to reconsider BRAC recommendations and has never in its history sought such legal authority. Additionally, the benefits of this recommendation (and all other BRAC actions) are important to achieve and there would be significant negative consequences of legislative reversal of any BRAC recommendation. The Department is not aware of any effort in the Administration to review the 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure broadly or the Fort Monmouth recommendation specifically.

Fort Monmouth is an acquisition and logistics installation with little capacity for other purposes. The Army ranked it 50th of 97 installations in military value. Aberdeen was ranked 18th. Implementation will save over \$154 million annually beginning in fiscal year 2012, reducing infrastructure overhead, even with the cost growth. The Army's move of the Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) to Aberdeen Proving Ground (a property of higher military value) greatly enhances operational support to the GWOT and other contingency operations by creating a combined Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C<sup>4</sup>ISR) technical and research facility with direct and valuable links to the Aberdeen Proving Ground test communities and ranges.

*Question.* Piracy threatens the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa, much of which arrives by sea. In Somalia, an estimated 3.2 million people, approximately 43 percent of the population, required food aid in the latter half of 2008. U.S. humanitarian assistance to Somalia totaled \$270 million in 2008 and over \$157 million to date in fiscal year 2009. The administration has requested \$200 million in fiscal year 2009 supplemental International Disaster Assistance funding and \$300 million in fiscal year 2009 supplemental Public Law 480, Title II humanitarian assistance, in part to address food and water shortages in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Officials from the World Food Program (WFP), which ships tens of thousands of metric tons of food monthly to the Horn of Africa region, report it has become more expensive to ship assistance to Mogadishu, and that their ability to deliver relief is significantly hampered. Both the *M/V Maersk Alabama* and the *M/V Liberty Sun*, two vessels that pirates have targeted recently, are U.S.-flagged and crewed cargo vessels contracted by the WFP to deliver USAID food assistance off the southeast coast of Somalia. What is the U.S. Government doing to protect these vessels carrying humanitarian assistance to the Horn of Africa region from pirates?

*Answer.* Protection of WFP vessels transiting into and out of Somalia has been of paramount concern since piracy off the Horn of Africa began its upsurge in late August 2008, and is specifically mentioned in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1838, 1846 and 1851. In August 2008, NAVCENT established the Maritime Security Patrol Area to provide a relative safe haven for ships passing through the region. In December 2008, the European Union formed its counter-piracy task force, dubbed Operation Atalanta, drawing forces from Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG 2), with the specific mission of providing protective escort for WFP vessels. Moreover, NATO has had SNMG 1 operating in the region since March 2009 and extended its operations in the region until June 2009, rather than deploying to its previously-scheduled operations in Singapore and Australia. To focus more explicitly on the piracy vice counterterrorism threat, NAVCENT established a separate task force in early January 2009, CTF 51. At present CTF-151 includes vessels from six nations. Overall, some 28 nations are conducting CP operations in this region, including escort of WFP food aid.

Military operations are part of the solution, but cannot alone address this problem. The United States advocates a multifaceted international response including self-protection measures by commercial shippers, and is considering the utility of working with regional authorities inside Somalia to address the land-based origins of the problem. This approach is reflected in an interagency Counter-Piracy Action Plan (CPAP), and will continue to be monitored and executed through an NSC-di-

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rected working group, the Counter-Piracy Steering group (CPSG), co-chaired by the Department of State and Defense. Additionally, the Department of State has moved forward in developing an international contact group—the Contact Group on Countering Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia (CGCPCS)—to coordinate efforts more effectively with the other countries now contributing to this mission.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT F. BENNETT

F-22

*Question.* Secretary Gates, both at your press conference on April 6th as well as on two occasions after that you stated that there was no military requirement for more than 187 F-22's and that the Air Force agreed. However, both before your announcement as well as afterwards, and specifically on April 13th, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Schwartz, said publicly that the military requirement for F-22's was 243, not 187. Could you clarify where each of those numbers originated and which number you feel best describes the strategic requirements of the Air Force in the future?

*Answer.* Air Force analysis suggested that 243 F-22s would deliver warfighting capability and sustainment at moderate levels of risk, mitigating uncertainties of threats, scenarios, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter unknowns. In essence, it was suggested that 243 F-22s would provide less risk than 187. After further consideration, however, the Air Force and the Department agreed that 187 F-22s presented an acceptable level of risk, and as a result, it was finally decided that 187 was the right quantity of F-22s. The Department along with the Air Force assessed the military requirement for F-22s from many angles, taking into account competing strategic priorities and complementary programs and alternatives, all balanced within the context of available resources. Based on warfighting experience over the past several years and judgments about future threats, the Department revisited the scenarios on which the Air Force based its assessment. Concurrently, during this F-22 requirement review, the Department assessed the broader road map for tactical air forces, and specifically the relationship between the F-22 Raptor and the multi-role F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. As a result, it was decided that 187 was the right quantity of F-22s.

PAKISTAN

*Question.* Secretaries Gates and Clinton, the supplemental request includes \$3 billion in economic assistance and \$400 million for counterinsurgency operations efforts for Pakistan. If the continued march to radicalization and Islamization in Pakistan cannot be halted or diverted, how will these funds be used to secure U.S. interests in the region? What future do you see in the region with the Taliban gaining maneuverability and power in Pakistan? How would the realistic possibility of a nuclear-armed state led by radical Islamist groups affect our strategic posture, especially concerning nuclear deterrence and missile defense?

*Answer.* The \$3 billion for economic assistance and \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund are designed to build Pakistani capacities in counterinsurgency, economic development, rule of law, and education; thereby eliminating the destabilizing conditions that give rise to concerns like those posited. The United States, and increasingly Pakistan itself, recognize the extremist insurgency poses a threat to Pakistan's government and the people of Pakistan. By increasing the capabilities and capacity of the Pakistani Frontier Corps and Pakistani Army in counterinsurgency operations, the United States will help them secure their sovereign territory, deny terrorist safe havens, and create favorable conditions for economic development. At the same time, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal remains under the control of the Pakistani military, which has strong measures in place to ensure security of those weapons.

GUANTANAMO BAY

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the request before us includes up to \$50 million to support the closing of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility that currently houses 240 of the United States' worst enemies in our struggle against political and religious extremism and international terrorism. I have serious concerns about the consequences of closing the facility and even stronger concerns about the allocation of these funds to transfer the prisoners according to an arbitrary deadline that was promulgated during a political campaign. News reports have indicated the Administration may be planning to release some detainees directly into the United States and you Secretary Gates, have specifically mentioned this possibility.

We have received very little information about the Administration's specific plans for dealing with this issue, other than a request for funds. I ask you now, what are your specific plans for closing the facility, transferring the detainees and ensuring that they do not cause greater harm to U.S. security both at home and abroad? Have you planned for any contingencies that would include extending the political deadline set during the campaign? What are the specific plans concerning detainees that are not accepted in their home countries or proxy countries?

Answer. The President's Executive Orders, which were signed on January 22, 2009, stipulate that the Attorney General was to assess the 241 detainees at Guantanamo Bay and make disposition determinations. That process is currently ongoing and is expected to be completed in October 2009. Until the Attorney General makes a determination, the Department is unable to comment on plans to transfer, prosecute, or make some other lawful disposition.

The Department of Defense will take all appropriate security measures to ensure that, if detainees are held under DOD control in the United States, they are unable to pose a threat to the United States. In addition, the Department of Justice is tasked with all law enforcement activities within the United States. As such, the Department of Justice will be best able to comment on any security measures to ensure that detainees do not cause greater harm to U.S. security. In cases where a detainee is to be transferred to another country, the Department of Defense will work in coordination with the Department of State to get security and humane treatment assurances from countries that are willing to resettle GTMO detainees.

#### NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

*Question.* Secretary Gates, the Administration's request for \$89.5 million for the National Nuclear Security Administration includes funding for a live fire shooting range and railcar to support training exercises for the Russian Ministry of Defense. I am told the Department of Defense is also investing in this Russian Counter Training Center.

Considering that Russia is reinvesting in its military, do you believe it is in the best interest of taxpayers to invest \$6 million in a live fire and training facility for the Russian military?

Answer. The figures quoted related to Department of Energy (DOE) budget requests. DOD and DOE have conducted an integrated program to improve Russian nuclear warhead security based on commitments by President Bush at the 2005 U.S.-Russia Summit on Nuclear Security ("Bratislava Summit"). DOD completed its Bratislava Commitments in December 2008, and DOE completed its commitments in early 2009. As part of the Bratislava commitments, and previous nuclear security commitments undertaken prior to 2005, DOD and DOE provided a range of training, equipment, and services to improve Russian guard forces' capabilities to protect warhead storage bunkers. DOD and DOE also provided special railcars used to transport warheads from operational bases to dismantlement or enhanced-security storage facilities. One element of DOD's early assistance under this program was provision of 12 self-contained small-arms practice ranges. DOD completed this work in the 2004 timeframe. The final aspect of the Bratislava commitments is improving Russia's ability to sustain the warhead security systems installed by DOD and DOE. We are working with Russia and DOE to ensure that this is accomplished; Russia will assume full responsibility for sustainment by the end of 2012.

#### MISSILE DEFENSE

*Question.* Secretary Gates, based on your recent speeches it seems as though the near-term focus of the Administration concerning missile defense is on theater systems and completing the deployment of the Ground-Based Missile Defense that can provide limited protection against traditional threats. With an uncertain future that includes the possibility of more nuclear-armed states with ICBM capabilities, what measures are you considering to develop and strengthen systems that add additional layers of protection to our missile defense system?

Answer. The ascent phase concept leverages existing sensors and weapons and therefore offers a potential lower risk/lower cost solution that could be fielded much more quickly than traditional boot-phase concepts.

*Question.* While working to provide the best balance of systems to protect against attack, what are your thoughts on investing in flexible, adaptable, mobile weapon systems like Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) to counter emerging threats instead of continuing the fielding of older, stationary systems? Would you agree that would more accurately reflect a priority on programs that allow us to stay ahead of evolving threats? Shouldn't we ensure that we are providing adequate resources for flexi-

ble, next-generation weapon systems like KEI, and sensors and command-and-control technologies?

Answer. [Deleted].

*Question.* Mid-course discrimination seems a tough problem and continues to become harder as our enemies deploy more advanced future threats. It has been widely discussed and agreed upon that it is more effective to engage early, before a threat missile has had a chance to deploy countermeasures or multiple warheads. If this is the case, why would you target boost-phase systems for termination in the future budget? If the currently designed systems were not proving adequate, what plans do you have for other systems that would attack a missile threat in the boost phase?

Answer. [Deleted].

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

##### DETAINEES

*Question.* Has the Department of Defense had any discussions with U.S. state and local officials about the possibility of transferring detainees from Guantanamo to locations in the United States? If not, does it intend to do so?

Answer. As Secretary Gates has indicated in the past, the Department has been working on contingency plans to close the detention facility at Guantanamo for some time. Prior to the end of the Bush Administration, the Department visited DOD facilities in various states.

As previously stated, no decisions have yet been made to bring detainees into the United States for continued detention. However, when the facility at Guantanamo Bay closes, there will likely be some number of detainees who are awaiting trial, are awaiting transfer or release, or who cannot be tried, but who are too dangerous to release. For those detainees, it is likely that we will need a facility or facilities in the United States in which to house them. Pending the final decision on the disposition of those detainees, the Department has not contacted state and local officials about the possibility of transferring detainees to their locations.

*Question.* Would you be willing to receive and consider formal assessments of an installation's suitability for a detainee mission from the commanders of installations where detainees might be sent?

Answer. The Department of Defense is willing to receive and consider formal assessments of an installation's suitability for a detainee mission from the commanders of installations where detainees may be sent. As part of the planning process, the Joint Staff conducted site visits to assess possible locations for a post-GTMO detention facility in the event that a decision was made to transfer detainees to the United States. Each of those visits included receipt of information from the appropriate installation commander. The Department of Justice is also conducting assessments of possible post-GTMO sites should the decision be made to transfer some detainees to the United States.

##### AID TO LEBANON

*Question.* The fiscal year 2009 supplemental request calls for \$98.4 million in FMF for Lebanon to provide additional equipment and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces. A Hezbollah-led majority in parliament would give the terrorist organization control over the decisionmaking process and possibly control over the LAF.

Why are we providing UAV's to the LAF? What assurances do we have that those planes—or the information they provide—will not be transferred to Hezbollah? Will restrictions be placed on where they can fly?

Answer. The USG has provided four Raven unmanned aerial vehicle systems, funded by fiscal year 2007 FMF supplemental funds, to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to improve the LAF's border security and counterterrorism capabilities, important aspects of our broader effort to enhance the ability of Lebanese state institutions to exert sovereign authority throughout the national territory. The requirement for a tactical UAV capability was validated by two USCENCOM assessments and is an integral element of the LAF's 5 year plan to enhance its ability to control Lebanon's borders and counter terrorist threats in Lebanon. The LAF continues to have an impeccable end use monitoring record for U.S. equipment. The Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut will implement enhanced end use monitoring requirements on the Raven UAVs, including serial number verification twice a year. The USG is working with the LAF to ensure that the Ravens will be operated no closer than two miles from the Blue Line, the border between Lebanon and Israel.



QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

BUDGET PROCESS AND SUPPLEMENTAL SPENDING

*Question.* This increase in supplemental spending is outrageous when you considered our long-term fiscal outlook. And we must have entitlement reform to address our long-term fiscal problems, because without meaningful reform we will spend all of the governments funds on Medicare, social security, and interest.

I am pleased to see President Obama's commitment to make this the last planned war supplemental. But my question is why during a year of unprecedented deficits, why are you coming back to Congress to request yet another emergency funding request? Shouldn't your funding compete in the regular order?

*Answer.* After passing the fiscal year 2009 bridge funding in June 2008, Congress acknowledged: that the amount passed would only be enough to cover about half the fiscal year, and that the new President would need to submit a supplemental for the remainder. This Congressional action necessitated use of a supplemental to cover war costs for the rest of fiscal year 2009.

In the fiscal year 2010 budget request, the Department has included \$130 billion for overseas contingency operations (OCO). It is the intent of the Administration that the Congress considers this \$130 billion request along with \$533.8 billion needed for the Department's base budget.

FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING AND DEFENSE TRADE COOPERATION

*Question.* International arms sales help to sustain U.S. jobs, reduce the cost of weapons procurement by the Department of Defense, help to grow small businesses, and support the national security and foreign policy objectives of the U.S. government. The Obama Administration must continue to support U.S. arms sales as an important foreign policy tool.

I understand that some of our foreign military assistance funds have been used by the Iraqis and Afghans for the procurement of Russian aircraft and helicopters ill-equipped to interoperate with U.S. personnel and hardware in the field. Can both of you elaborate on the technical and policy rationale for such use of U.S. military assistance?

*Answer.* Iraq Security Forces Fund (DOD funds) funded approximately 40 percent and the Government of Iraq (GoI) funded approximately 60 percent of the Mi-17 aircraft procurement. The procurement is being done by U.S. Army through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system. The GoI requested that the United States buy the Mi-17 aircraft on its behalf since the GoI had already purchased Mi-17s in 2005. The GoI wanted standardization of its rotary wing fleet. Military commanders assessed that, of the aircraft available, the Mi-17 was the ideal medium-lift helicopter airframe for the relevant environment and pilot skill level. The Department funded 40 percent of the aircraft procurement in order to provide an incentive for the GoI to utilize the FMS system to accelerate the development of the Iraqi Security Forces, and to ensure that major acquisitions are transparent and free of corruption. Congress received formal notification of the intent to procure the Mi-17s through the FMS system in late 2006.

The United States has used Afghan Security Forces Funding (DOD funds) to purchase Mi-17 aircraft and parts for the Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) so that they can make an immediate contribution to ongoing combat operations. The Mi-17's ability to operate in a high-altitude, high temperature, rugged environment make it uniquely suited for Afghanistan. Additionally, the Mi-17 is easy to operate and maintain by personnel with limited technical skills. The Afghans had been flying the Mi-17 since the early 1980s and are familiar with operating and maintaining this platform. The ANAAC Mi-17s are refurbished to ensure interoperability with U.S. and Coalition forces. Additionally, many NATO and regional partners operate the Mi-17 and are providing training and support to the ANAAC.

DOD FUNDING FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS/SOUTHWEST BORDER ACTIVITIES

*Question.* Can you provide the Committee in writing your plan for the use of the \$350 million included in the supplemental request for the Department of Defense for counternarcotics and other activities on the U.S. border with Mexico?

*Answer.* According to the request, the \$350 million is "for counternarcotics and other activities including assistance to other Federal agencies, on the United States' border with Mexico." The Secretary of Defense may transfer the \$350 million to "appropriations for military personnel, operation and maintenance, and procurement to be available for the same purposes as the appropriation or fund to which transferred." Of this \$350 million, \$100 million may be transferred "to any other Federal

appropriations accounts, with the concurrence of the head of the relevant Federal department or agency for border-related activities.”

This \$350 million provides the President flexibility should he decide to deploy military personnel to the Southwest border in support of Department of Homeland Security activities. The President has made clear that the current situation does not require the militarization of the border. The President also has made clear that he will continue to monitor the situation at the border carefully and will take additional steps if necessary to ensure the border remains secure. Should the President determine that a military deployment is necessary, military personnel would not operate in Mexico under this provision. Instead, consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD policy limitations, military personnel would provide non-law enforcement support to Border Patrol agents. This \$350 million in contingent DOD funding is a prudent measure to ensure that adequate resources are available, on short notice, if circumstances require increasing efforts to augment civilian law enforcement activities along the Southwest border.

*Question.* Specifically, if you have any indication from the White House or the Office of Management and Budget as to when decisions will be made as to the use of these funds, what activities the Department of Defense will perform, and which agencies will be supported?

*Answer.* The President continues to monitor the situation at the border carefully and will take additional steps if necessary to ensure the border remains secure.

DOD has been supporting Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to conduct a mission analysis regarding how to secure the Southwest border. DOD has not finalized its planning for the type of support to be provided to DHS, but I would note that the support provided in the past by Joint Task Force North and support that was provided during Operation Jump Start from 2006–2008 highlight represent relevant examples of the kinds of support that DOD could provide: aviation support, intelligence analysis, civil engineering, radar coverage, and reconnaissance support.

#### COMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman INOUE. With that, I thank you very much. The session is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., Thursday, April 30, the hearing was concluded, and the committee was recessed to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

May 03, 2009

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### Secretary Robert Gates Interview with CNN

Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Q Secretary Gates, thank you for doing this.

SEC. GATES: My pleasure.

Q You have served eight presidents, and so you have, in a sense, watched 800 days, eight periods of the first 100 days. How do you think this one is distinctive? What do you think people will look at when they look back at these 100 days?

SEC. GATES: I think that what makes them distinctive is the magnitude of the challenges that confronted this president when he took office. Not only did he have all of the international issues that faced his predecessor – the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism, piracy and others; North Korea, Iran, so on and so forth – he faced the most dramatic economic downturn in two generations or more in the United States and in the world; and now, as we are all saying, as if all of that wasn't enough, swine flu. So I think just the magnitude of the challenges that he faces perhaps is unprecedented among certainly the eight presidents I've worked for.

Q How's he doing compared to the seven others?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think he's doing very well. I think that he is – I think he has taken them on. I think he's assembled a good group of people to work with him and to help him. He listens. He's very calm. He's very measured, very analytical. So I think the proof is sort of in, already, based on the polls, the beginning of a return to some confidence that the country is on the right track and the sense that, as difficult as some of these issues are, we're headed in the right direction, at least.

Q You've heard a lot of Republican criticism that he's going around the world apologizing about America. Do you accept that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I like to remind people that when President George W. Bush came into office, he talked about a more humble America. And, you know, you go back to Theodore Roosevelt and his line about speaking softly but carrying a big stick. I think that acknowledging that we have made mistakes is not only factually accurate – I think that it is unusual because so few other governments in the world are willing to admit that, although they make them all the time, and some of them make catastrophic mistakes.

And in speeches myself, I have said that at times we have acted too arrogantly. And I didn't feel that I was being apologetic for America. I just was saying because – I was just saying that that's the way we are in terms of being willing to recognize our own limitations, and when we make a mistake, to correct it, because I think the next line that I always use is, no other country in the world is so self-critical and is so willing to change course when we feel that we've strayed from our values or when we feel like we've been too arrogant.

So I think – I have not seen it as an apology tour at all, but rather a change of tone, a more humble America. But everybody knows we still have the big stick.

Q Let me ask you about perhaps the most pressing crisis on your plate right now, which is Pakistan. In your view, has the Pakistani military regained the initiative in Buner and perhaps even in the areas around the Swat Valley, where the Taliban had gained strongholds?

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SEC. GATES: It is my impression from a great distance that they have begun to regain the initiative. I think that the failure of the agreement in Swat and then the movement into Buner particularly, I think, was a real wake-up call for the Pakistani government.

We and others have been talking with them about how what is happening there in the western frontier area is truly an existential threat to democratic government in Pakistan. And I think the movement of the Taliban into Buner really got their attention.

I think that the leaders of Pakistan do understand this - President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani, General Kiyani and others. But I think that there's a need for them to help the rest of Pakistan understand why it's an existential threat.

Q But you do think that the leadership gets it? Because I look at what's happened, Mr. Secretary. They have these Taliban forces, insurgency, 60 miles from the capital, 100 miles from the capital. And what they've done so far is move 6,000 troops from the eastern border to the western border out of an army of about a half-million.

This does not strike one as a full-throated response at every level that mobilizes the nation and its defense forces. Do you think that there is still a way to go for the Pakistani military in terms of focusing on this threat?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think what you have to do is look at it in some historical context. For 60 years Pakistan has regarded India as its existential threat, as the main enemy. And its forces are trained to deal with that threat. That's where it has the bulk of its army and the bulk of its military capability.

And historically, the far western part of Pakistan has generally been ungoverned. And the Pakistani governments going back decades would do deals with the tribes and the Pashtuns and would play the tribes against one another, and occasionally, when necessary, use the army to put down a serious challenge.

I think that - and partly it's because the Punjabis so outnumber the Pashtuns that they've always felt that if it really got serious, it was a problem they could take care of. I think the - that's why I think the movement of the Taliban so close to Islamabad was a real wake-up call for them.

Now, how long it takes them to build the capabilities, the additional military capabilities and the training that goes into counterinsurgency and so on and to develop the civilian programs that begins to push back in that part of the country, I think, is still a period ahead of us.

But I would just remind that, you know, the first al Qaeda attack on the United States was in 1993. We really didn't change much of anything we did until after we were hit on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. So al Qaeda was at war with us for eight years, at least eight years, before we acknowledged that we were at war with them as well. And I think a little bit of the same denial has been going on in Pakistan. But I think that the recent developments have certainly got their attention.

Q Do you think they have the counterinsurgency capacity? Because at some level armies don't like to fight these kind of wars, as you well know. What armies like to do is have a big enemy so they can have a big budget and never have to fight a war. And that is, in effect, what has happened with Pakistan with India, which is they have this big enemy. It justifies a very large budget for the Pakistani military. But they don't actually have to fight, whereas this one, the insurgency, is one which they have to fight. They could lose. And so they worry, I think, that they even have the capacity. Do they have the capacity for real counterinsurgency?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that they are at the beginning of the process of developing that capacity. But again, to provide some perspective, in 2003, when we went into Iraq, or even in 2001 and '02, when we went into Afghanistan, our Army didn't have that capacity either. We had forgotten everything we learned about counterinsurgency in Vietnam. And it took us several years to change our tactics and to get ourselves into a position where we could effectively fight a counterinsurgency.

So institutions are slow to change even in the face of a real threat. And I think that the Pakistanis are beginning to open up to others, to get additional help. I certainly hope that's the case. But I don't - it's not something where I would sort of blame the Pakistani army, because we went through the same process ourselves as we confronted a building insurgency in Iraq.

We had to learn all over again how to do this, and we had to acquire the equipment to do it effectively, completely outside the normal Pentagon bureaucracy, for the most part. So perhaps I have a little more understanding of the challenges that our Pakistani counterparts face than perhaps others.

Q Well, they're blaming us. The Pakistani ambassador wrote an article in The Wall Street Journal in which he says basically that Washington has been reluctant to share critical technology and training, the modern equipment and training for our military. Basically what they want is helicopters, night-vision goggles, that kind of thing.

Is it true that we have been reluctant to give them some of this equipment and training?

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SEC. GATES: Well, of the kinds of things that you've described, I think that we have been willing to provide all the training and that kind of equipment that we possibly can, as much as they would take. There has been a reluctance on their part up to now. They don't like the idea of a significant American military footprint inside Pakistan. I understand that. But we are willing to do pretty much whatever we can to help the Pakistanis in this situation. I think that we have been willing to do that for quite some time.

Q Will there be American military advisers in Pakistan now training the Pakistani military in counterinsurgency?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that remains to be seen. There are some very small number now. But I think it will depend on how the situation develops and the views of the Pakistani government. I would just say we are prepared to provide whatever help in developing this counterinsurgency capability to the Pakistanis that we possibly can. But it's their country, and they're sovereign, and we'll let them dictate the rules.

Q Let's move east; Afghanistan. You've said a number of times that no civil war, no conflict, no insurgency is ever really ended without some kind of political reconciliation. And you've talked about the fact that some part of the Taliban, perhaps even the majority of the people fighting, though not the leadership, might be reconcilable. There are reports that there have been efforts made by American military officers. Dexter Filkins of The New York Times followed one such reconciliation effort.

What is your sense about how these efforts are going? How is the effort to in some way draw away parts of the Taliban from the central leadership?

SEC. GATES: I think there are several aspects to it. First of all, for – based on the information available to us, some considerable proportion of the Taliban essentially do this as a job. They get paid for it. And if alternative means of employment can be found, they probably could be fairly easily drawn away. And there really is no political agenda associated with it at all.

In terms of political reconciliation, first of all, in my view, it has to be on the terms of the Afghan government, that they will have the monopoly on the use of armed force inside the country. But I think as long as the Taliban think the momentum is with them, that the prospects for political reconciliation are probably not very bright.

If we are successful in restoring significant security, particularly in the south and in the east of the country, I think then, as we are more successful along with our Afghan partners in re-establishing security, then I think the opportunity for political reconciliation will probably grow.

Q But right now there are no real prospects on hand?

SEC. GATES: I think there may be in some limited areas, but not of consequence as far as I can tell.

Q You've talked about trying to secure the population. There's also the effort now to take on the drug cartel, which is effectively run by the Taliban, providing most of the money for their operations.

All of this suggests you're taking the battle to the enemy. Should we expect to see higher numbers of casualties in Afghanistan, American casualties, in just the way we did in the early months of the surge, when, for the first time, you took the battle to the enemy?

SEC. GATES: I think that's a prospect we have to be willing to face, particularly in Regional Command South, as our forces go into parts of Afghanistan where there have been no government or coalition forces, ISAF forces, really for the last several years. So we will be turning over rocks that haven't been turned over in quite some time.

And so that does raise the prospect of greater casualties, although it will be interesting to see whether the Taliban are prepared to stand and fight or whether, in the face of significant military force, they will just dissipate and then return later.

The key, particularly in the south of Afghanistan, it seems to me, is the ability of the Afghan government, with our help, to hold on to the areas that have been cleared. It's very much the same principle as in Iraq. The people are going to be ambivalent as long as they can't tell who's going to win. They're going to try and not take sides, because they're afraid that once we leave, the Taliban will come in and kill them.

And so we have to work with the Afghans to establish an enduring presence in some of these places, perhaps with some of our people, but mostly with Afghan soldiers and Afghan police, to hold these places against the Taliban so the people will have confidence, and then be willing to side with the government in a more enduring way. That, I think, is the real challenge that we face.

Q That sounds like an Afghan government that is strong, legitimate, has a lot of capacity to do things like securing local areas. Some people, as you know – Henry Kissinger argues that this is sort of a bridge too far, that this is probably more than you can achieve in Afghanistan.

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SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that the priority, at least from the standpoint of the Department of Defense, is the continued growth and increased effectiveness of the Afghan national security forces, both the army and the police. And we are now looking at a significant increase in the size of the Afghan army, and it is probable that there will be a need to increase the size of the national police force as well. And I think that those are genuine –

Q Which is riddled with accusations of corruption.

SEC. GATES: But I think, under this new minister of interior in Kabul, there have been some real – there has been some real progress in beginning to clean up the national police and make them more effective. And we also have a program called Focused District Development which takes the police out of villages and districts and retrains them and gives them equipment and gives them new leadership, and so on, that seems to hold promise. So it's a work in progress; there's no doubt about that. But I think that we have to pay more – we have to continue to try and build the capacity of the Afghan government, work with them in their capabilities. But I think we also have to focus at the provincial and the district level.

This is where I think development programs and assistance are more likely to actually happen, and for school rooms to be built, for roads to be built, for wells to be dug, and so on and so forth, where the people can actually see government, Afghan government – it may not be the national government, but the provincial government or the district government actually delivering a service and improving the quality of life.

So I think part of the reason that the civilian surge is such an important part of the administration's new strategy is that it's this kind of capability at the provincial and the district level, in my view, that really has to be strengthened. We have to make the provincial reconstruction teams much more robust, with civilian experts, so we can begin to help the Afghans deliver these kinds of services. I think, at the end of the day, that, plus the increased effectiveness and strength of the army and the police, are really the pathway forward.

Q You once said that the chief lesson you learned from 40 years in government was the limits of power. So apply that lesson to Afghanistan today. What do you think of – what are the limits to what America can do in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I have been quoted as accurately as saying I have real reservations about significant further commitments of American military – of the American military to Afghanistan, beyond what the president has already approved. The Soviets were in there with 110,000, 120,000 troops. They didn't care about civilian casualties. And they couldn't win. If there's ever an example that military power alone cannot be successful in Afghanistan, I think it was the Soviet experience. And I think there's a lot we can learn from that. And so I worry – it is absolutely critical that the Afghans believe that this is their war. It is their war against people who are trying to overthrow their government that they democratically elected.

For all of its flaws and shortcomings, it is theirs. And they – we must be their partner and their ally. If we get to the point where the Afghan people see us as occupiers, then we will have lost. So the way we treat the Afghans, the importance of keeping the Afghans in the lead in many of these activities, the military as well as the civilian, I think is absolutely critical, so that they know – so that these villagers know that it's their people who are leading this fight. This isn't some foreign army coming in there, like all the previous foreign armies, to just occupy them.

Q But that means that a year from now, six months from now, you are unlikely to approve a request for additional troops in Afghanistan.

SEC. GATES: I would be a hard sell; there's no question about it. And I have not made a secret of that, either publicly or in government meetings. I think we will have – between the American military commitment and our coalition partners, the ISAF partners, we will have about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. That's only about 10,000 shy of what the Russians had. And I think we need to think about that.

My view is it would be a far better investment to focus on building the strength of the Afghan army and the Afghan police, making sure that of the numbers of people we have there, there are adequate trainers so that we can accelerate the growth of those forces.

It's that combination of a certain level of international support for the Afghan military effort and the growing of the Afghan security forces themselves. It's that partnership that I think eventually will be successful in Afghanistan. As long as – if we try to do it all ourselves, I think it won't work.

Q I'm going to take you west to Iraq. There has been some renewed violence in Iraq. And some of it does seem to be related to the Sunni community that feels still dispossessed. There is some controversy about exactly who is spearheading it. You and Secretary Clinton have talked about al Qaeda remnants. But Prime Minister Maliki has pointed the finger at former Ba'athists, as he puts it, and used it as a way of explaining why he's not going to make more concessions to Sunni demands.

Is this core problem, the Shi'a and Sunni political disagreement, going to produce more and more violence as U.S. troops draw down?

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SEC. GATES: I actually think that that kind of sectarian violence – I guess I would say I hope not. And I actually think it probably will not grow. I think that they do understand that this is al Qaeda. This is certainly the view of our commanders, that most of this – most of these high-profile bombings are part of a campaign that was started a few weeks ago by al Qaeda, as we begin to draw down our forces, to both demonstrate – to try and make the point to the Iraqi people that it was this kind of terrorist acts that led us to draw down rather than our success, but also to try – for al Qaeda to try and provoke the kind of sectarian violence that you're talking about.

This is al Qaeda trying to set Shi'a against Sunni. Now, regardless of what he says, Prime Minister Maliki also is reaching out to elements of the Sunni community as potential political allies. And so, you know, the key for us is the Iraqis themselves working these differences out and their problems in a political way. And so far the record of the past year, year and a half, has been pretty encouraging in terms of the progress that they've made.

There's no question that the roots of democracy are still very shallow in Iraq. But there's been a lot of progress. And I don't think there are very many Iraqis who want to return to the kind of violence that they saw in 2006. So I think this is mainly al Qaeda.

I think we do have to watch very carefully, perhaps more importantly, the situation between the Arabs and the Kurds, to make sure that that relationship – that they continue to solve their problems, work through their problems politically.

So, you know, they have a lot of challenges; there's no question about it. But I'm really – I'm reasonably optimistic that the gains in terms of solving problems between the sectarian elements will continue to be done politically rather than violently, despite all of al Qaeda's best efforts.

Q But you don't have an oil revenue-sharing law. You don't have much resolution over Mosul. You don't have much resolution over Kirkuk. And when I talk to members of the Sunni leadership in Iraq, they tell me that they feel completely excluded from government jobs, from patronage, from all the kind of power-sharing that they were promised.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that the election of the new speaker of the Council of Representatives is an important step forward, as the newly elected provincial councils begin to allocate positions and so on. We see alliances being made. So I think that there has been progress in that way. The Sunnis have taken charge of several of the provinces where they won the elections this time, where they could have won them before, had they not boycotted. So I think they continue to show progress.

On the oil law, the new speaker of the Council of Representatives has said that's one of the highest priorities that he has. I think that Kirkuk - from an Arab-Kurd point of view, Kirkuk is a bigger problem by far than Mosul. Mosul is really still a security problem from the standpoint of al Qaeda still using it as kind of their last redoubt, if you will. But, you know, they continue to work these things through.

Q Two larger questions before we thank you for your time. President Obama has laid out a vision for a nuclear-free world, a world free of nuclear weapons. Now, since 1945 there has been no war between a major power, and many people attribute that to nuclear deterrence. So would a world free of nuclear weapons be more stable without nuclear deterrence?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know, and I don't think anybody does. I think that it's – you know, we have had a number of countries forgo nuclear weapons, countries that had nuclear weapons programs who really voluntarily walked away from them – South Africa, Libya, Taiwan, South Korea, Argentina, Brazil. So total pessimism with respect to nonproliferation, I think, is unwarranted. I think that – I have worked – President Obama is the fourth president that I have worked for who has said that he would like to – has said publicly he would like to see an end to nuclear weapons and having a nuclear weapons-free world. I think that's a laudable objective.

I think it's clear to everyone it's a goal that you have to move toward step by step. I think that continued nonproliferation efforts, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, another post-START agreement with the Russians in terms of further reducing our stockpile, I think these are all important steps in that direction. But my guess is it's a long march.

Q But if we went to zero and the Chinese went to zero, would the relationship be more stable? I mean, certainly the U.S.-Soviet case, it seemed as though the fact that we both had nuclear weapons kept the peace.

SEC. GATES: Well, you're asking about a hypothetical world, and I think that's – we don't know the answer to that question. The question is, how do you deal with the technology? I mean, when you get down to very low numbers of nuclear weapons, and you contemplate going to zero, how do you deal with the reality of that technology being available to almost any country that seeks to pursue it? And what - what conditions do you put in place, what U.N. verification measures or IAEA verification measures do you put in place, to prevent others from getting that?

So I think this is an important goal for everyone to have in the world, but I think that it's - it's a long road to get there.

Q Your Defense budget has gathered a huge number of opponents. There's the contractors, people in Congress, parts of the Services. Are you going to get through the budget you want, or do you think some significant compromise is inevitable?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that, since the budget isn't even on the Hill yet, I'm not prepared to talk about compromises. But you know, I think there - I will tell you I have actually been surprised by how limited the criticism has been. And where - where I have heard criticism, it has come from predictable places. And I think that there also have been some voices raised, some important voices, in support, including Senator McCain on the Armed Services Committee and others as well, on both sides of the aisle.

So I'm - I'm relatively optimistic, actually. I think we've presented a very - as one news magazine referred to it, "radically sane" set of a proposals. They don't represent a cut. And where we have eliminated one program, we have added to others. So it's a question of how do we balance our preparations for some future conflict with the capabilities necessary to be successful in the conflicts that we're engaged in today. And so it's that rebalancing that I'm trying to do.

But at the end of the day, 50 percent of our procurement budget is still for these high-tech modernization programs; about 40 percent for dual-purpose capabilities, such as C-17 cargo planes; and about 10 percent for irregular conflict. So the notion that I've sort of abandoned looking at future threats is contrary to reality, and I look forward to the opportunity to go to the Hill and make that case.

Q Final question, Mr. Secretary: Do you worry - you're a student of history. Do you worry that we are falling into a kind of imperial trap? We have the largest defense budget in the world. We spend more, basically, than the rest of the world put together. Meanwhile, the Chinese are building this great industrial machine. We are in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have to deal with Somali pirates. It does begin to have this image of the British Empire putting out the fires all over the world in somewhat proliferal area as well. The great industrial/economic challenges are coming up and we're sort of - we're caught by the - the reach of our own power.

SEC. GATES: Well, if we are an imperial power, we are a unique one in history in that we are the only one in history that has - is always looking for an exit strategy.

The reality is the United States has global interests, and our defense budget is about the same as the defense budgets or military budgets of every other country in the world put together. But, as I say, we have global interests, and that defense budget is still less than 4 percent of our gross domestic product. During the Korean War, it was as high as 9 percent; much higher, obviously, during World War II. It was 7 (percent) or 8 percent during Vietnam. So I think, first of all, that the size of the military we have is not a burden on our economy, compared historically to where we've been.

I think that - I think a former Secretary of State put it in a different way than an imperial power. She said we are an "indispensable power" because the reality is that if you look around the world and the variety of problems that exist, nothing ever gets done without American leadership, at the end of the day. And I think that's going to continue. We're going through our economic troubles today.

I think it ties back to the first question you asked me, about, you know, is the president on an apology tour. Absolutely not. This is about how the United States exercises global leadership. And being willing to listen, as well as to talk, is important in that regard.

Q And we thank you for having talked to us. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, AND AFGHANISTAN

May 4 – 8, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center, walks with U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Margaret Scobey and Egyptian officials during his arrival in Cairo, Egypt, May 4, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates May 05, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Cairo, Egypt

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. It was good to be in Egypt again. I'd like to start by thanking President Mubarak, the Egyptian government, and the Egyptian people for their gracious hospitality during this visit.

This morning I have very productive meetings with both President Mubarak and Field Marshal Tantawi. I first met President Mubarak nearly 20 years ago, and over the years multiple American presidents and administrations have benefited from his wise counsel. I appreciated the opportunity to continue that dialog today.

We discussed a number of security issues including Iran, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, next steps in Iraq, and the opportunities for more cooperation among the nations of the Middle East.

It will take full participation and leadership from Egypt to see progress on these issues, as has always been the case. For some time I have considered Egypt to be one of America's most important partners. The United States has longstanding military-to-military relationships and other activities with the Egyptian military, to include the Bright Star exercises.

Our own military has benefited from the interaction with the Egyptian armed forces, one of the most professional and capable in the region. We are always looking for ways to expand these ties through education, training and exercises. In these and other security matters, I look forward to further cooperation between our two countries in the future.

Thank you.

Q (Off mike) -- Al Jazeera English. You mentioned before coming here that your country assured both Egypt and Saudi Arabia about the new approach towards Iran and also to be realistic. By 'realistic' did you mean that what the United States did before, confrontation and sanctions, or that the new approach of -- (inaudible) -- and things like that? There is only one goal is to solve the Iranian nuclear program, and that means reassuring the region that this won't be used against them?

SEC. GATES: Our goal really is two-fold. Obviously we want to try and stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program, but we also are interested in stopping Iran's destabilizing efforts throughout the region. And I think that there is very broad concern in the region about Iran and its activities. And our goal is to continue working with our friends in the

region but at the same time see if there is an opportunity to begin trying to influence Iran to change its activities, its behavior, in the area. 524

Reaching out to Iran with an open hand in no way minimizes or changes the strong security relationship and strong political relationship that the United States has with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and our other long-term friends in the region.

If we encounter a closed fist when we extend our open hand, then we will react accordingly. But we think, the President believes that it is important for us to at least reach out to Iran and provide an opportunity to begin a dialog. But the focus of that dialog is on Iran's behavior, and uppermost in our minds is taking measures necessary with our partners in the region to maintain their security and their stability, in particular against Iranian subversive activities.

Q The U.S. military relationship with Egypt -- (inaudible) -- the U.S. military declaration -- (inaudible) -- U.S. assistance to Egypt under the previous administration was linked to human rights progress. Is the Obama administration changing or shifting that policy? Did you hear concerns here in your talks about the level of U.S. military assistance to Egypt?

SEC. GATES: Well, clearly, the United States always is supportive of human rights, and that is no less true of the Obama administration than other administrations. By the same token, it is important to continue our work and our friendship with these countries. And the position of the administration is that as an example the foreign military financing that's in the budget should be without conditions. And that is our sustained position.

Q (Inaudible) -- the U.S. eager to do everything concerned with -- (inaudible) -- in the future and the fear of Israel -- (inaudible) -- Middle East free from mass destruction weapons? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think the President has been very clear in his speech when he was in Europe about his desire to have a nuclear-weapons-free world. He hasn't broken that down by region. Clearly that is our long-term objective.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the rising concern over instability in Pakistan, what are your expectations for a high-level meeting in Washington this week regarding the way that Saudi Arabia could play a greater role? What specifically could the Saudis do in helping to ease the problems in Pakistan, and are you going to make any request of them in that regard?

SEC. GATES: Well, as I said the other day, I think that the recent Taliban attacks that reached within 60 kilometers of Islamabad perhaps served as a wake-up call, if you will, to many in Pakistan that the Taliban operating inside Pakistan and other extremist groups have become a real danger to the Pakistani government. I think their response in sending the Army into Buner and beginning to deal with that situation is really a recognition of that threat.

And so my hope is that during the talks in Washington next week that their role during the next few days is that there will be a common agreement on the nature of the threat and the importance of Afghanistan and Pakistan working closely together and with the United States to try, and our partners, to try and deal with that threat.

With respect to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia clearly has a lot of influence throughout the entire region. They have a long-standing close relationship with Pakistan. And I think the key here is all of us doing what we can to help the Pakistani government deal with the emergent threat to its own existence from these violent extremists. And I think the Saudis along with other countries can play a constructive role in that.

Q (Off mike.)

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SEC. GATES: I'm not sure I understood the question.

Q (Off mike) -- critical. Next month is the election of Iran -- (inaudible) -  
- so if not, do you support Israel if they have to attack Iran?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think those are completely different questions. I would say that I do not expect this dialog to -- first of all, there is no dialog yet. There have been a few initial contacts, but there is no sustained dialog yet between the United States and Iran. And I expect it to develop, if it develops at all, will develop over a period of time. The United States goes into this with its eyes wide open. There have been previous attempts to establish a dialog with the Iranian government, and they have not proven successful. Our hope is that this time, as the President expressed it, if we extend an open hand that perhaps we will get something similar in response.

But I don't expect this to develop in a way that would have any impact whatsoever on the Iranian election. I don't think it will develop that quickly. And I'm not sure that even as it develops it would have any impact on that.

I continue to believe that we need to address our concerns with Iran. While all options are available of course, I believe that it is important to try and address our concerns about their nuclear weapons program through diplomatic and economic pressures, through trying to isolate Iran, toward building up the security capabilities of our friends in the region, and through cooperation with the Europeans, the Russians, and others to try and show Iran that its behavior is unwelcome to virtually all of the countries in the world.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned on the plane on the way over that you felt some concerns in this region about the U.S. outreach to Iran were the result of an exaggerated sense of what might be possible. Can you expand on that? What in your view is a realistic expectation of what might be possible for an improved relationship with Iran?

SEC. GATES: Well, to tell you the truth, I don't know what might be possible. I've been around long enough to see these efforts attempted before and with no result. The question is whether circumstances in Iran have changed in such a way that with the new administration offering an opportunity for contact, whether the Iranians are willing to take advantage of that opportunity.

I think that there's, as I say I think it's a dialog that if it happens at all will probably develop slowly. And I think what is important for friends and partners here in the Middle East to be assured of is that the United States will be very open and transparent about these contacts, and we will keep our friends informed of what is going on so that nobody gets surprised.

I think one of the areas where I think there has been some exaggerated concern has been some notion here in the region that there might be some grand bargain between the United States and Iran that would suddenly be sprung on them. And I would say that I believe that kind of prospect is very remote.

I think it's highly unlikely, and we will just have to see how the Iranians respond to this offer from the President. Frankly, some of the first things that have happened subsequent to his extension of that open arm, open hand, have not been very encouraging in terms of statements coming out of Tehran.

We're not willing to pull the hand back yet because we think there's still some opportunity, but I think concerns out here of some kind of a grand bargain developed in secret are completely unrealistic, and I would say are not going to happen. And what is important for our friends to understand is that we will keep them informed and be transparent about this process.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates May 05, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

SEC. GATES: Just a couple of things.

It's been good having the opportunity to visit both Egypt and Saudi Arabia to talk about the challenges that we face out here, most especially with respect to Iran, encouraging both to work with the Iraqi government and integrate Iraq's government back into the regional security organizations and provide diplomatic representation in Baghdad, Arab influence in Baghdad.

Clearly talked about Pakistan and what more we can all do together to strengthen and support the civilian government in Pakistan.

Had a great opportunity here to talk with the folks involved in the mission relating to training the National Guard, providing for the Ministry of National Defense Aviation and the new facility security force and protecting critical infrastructure.

Took a lot of questions, some were very specific, pay and benefits. Some were broader about the future of U.S. forces in Iraq and where we're headed in Afghanistan and so on.

And that brings me to my last point. We're headed off shortly, as you know, to Afghanistan. This is really the second part of the trip in the sense of wanting go out -- and we have a new policy, new strategy, a new ambassador and we have a lot of new troops going into the area and I just want to go out and see for myself how they're doing.

Most of this visit will be spent out in the field. I just want to get a sense from the ground level of what the needs are, what the challenges are, what the solutions and some of the problems are from people that, it's been my experience, are more likely to have the solutions than some of the folks back in Washington.

So I'm looking forward to that trip and will be headed off there shortly.

Q Sir, just to close the loop on the first half of the trip, can you give us an update on any kind of discussions you may have had about the repatriating the Yemini detainees at Gitmo and the Saudi clinics?

SEC. GATES: I did raise with the minister of foreign affairs [sic-Saudi Assistant Minister of the Interior Muhammed bin Nayaf] last night our impression, our positive impression of the repatriation program, the rehabilitation, repatriation program in Saudi

Arabia. I think they've probably done as good if not better job of that than almost anybody and explored the possibility of some of the Yemini detainees coming through that system. I think the notion would be if it worked at all it would be those with strong Saudi family connections or strong connections to Saudi Arabia.

Nothing was decided. Nothing specifically was asked. It was more a general conversation about the capability and about the possibility. I didn't ask them to do anything and they didn't volunteer.

Q Did they give you any kind of sense on where the Yemen government is on this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- I would just say on my own behalf that I think President Salih is reluctant to speak out openly and say that this would be a good idea, in part because he may feel that it reflects an inability in Yemen to handle the problem. So I think he is not likely to speak out.

Q Just to follow up, Mr. Secretary, would the idea be that these people would then live in Saudi Arabia once they had been through the program and been monitored by Saudi authorities?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that's further down the road than we went. It really was about getting them into the program, not getting them out.

Q Sorry to belabor this, but if the Yemini president isn't willing to talk about it publicly, do you -- is that an indication that he might be more willing to consider this on a private matter at this point?

SEC. GATES: Well, I honestly don't know the answer to that.

Q Okay.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the top things on your to-do list that you really want to look at in Afghanistan when you're -- at the troop level?

SEC. GATES: Well, mainly I just want to see how it's going in terms of the new infrastructure to accommodate the additional troops. I want -- you know, I want to ask right at the ground level what do you need out here you're not getting. How are the MRAPs working out here? How are the MRAPs with the new suspension working out here? What kind of numbers do you think you need? Is there other equipment that you need?

I just want to keep the focus. Here we have 21,000 additional troops going in over time. I just want to keep the focus on what I've been talking about for months, and that is what do we need to do to get the equipment and the support to the troops in the field so they can be successful and come home safely.

One of the things I'm going to be checking on -- I took some measures a couple of months ago to try and ensure, with respect to MedEvac, that our troops in Afghanistan had the same golden hour that we have in Iraq. I sent 10 or a dozen additional helicopters out to try and meet that requirement. A new combat aviation brigade is coming in this month and will that meet the need that, on the longer term basis, that the 10 additional helicopters met on the short term basis. We sent out a couple of additional field hospitals.

So I want to find out how that's all worked out. And then, obviously, my favorite subject, talking about ISR. So that sounds like a busy schedule.

Q It does. (Chuckles.)

SEC. GATES: We'll see.

MODERATOR: A couple last ones.

Q Among the Saudis, when you talked in there about the potential sales of new military equipment, did they speak to you specifically about what, including Patriot missiles, to somehow encounter the Iranian threat?

SEC. GATES: Actually we didn't speak about any new weapons systems. In the meeting I had with the leadership, my questions were focused on what's wrong with our FMS program and how can we accelerate it, how can we -- it's not just a problem here in Saudi Arabia, it's a problem in Iraq and Afghanistan, anywhere we want to sell systems. What are the bureaucratic impediments? What are the regulatory, the policy, the bureaucratic obstacles to getting weapons into the hands of our friends and allies far faster than we are able to do now. And I've got some suggestions to go back and work on.

Q On the ISR question --

MODERATOR: This is the last one guys.

Q -- on the ISR question in Afghanistan, what are you going to be looking for there? Are there specific programs or --

SEC. GATES: Well, we put a lot of new stuff in there and there's more to come in under the FY '10 budget. I just want to make sure they're ready for it, that they'll be able to absorb it and use it in an effective way. And what is the skill unmet need.

MODERATOR: Okay.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.

Q Any visibility on the strikes this morning, or I guess last night? There was a couple of scores of civilians killed apparently.

SEC. GATES: I haven't heard of that.

Q Okay.

MODERATOR: Thanks.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all.





## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

May 06, 2009

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### Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at a Town Hall Meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

SEC. GATES: (In progress) -- and then take some questions.

Most of all, it's good to be here and to have a chance to spend some time with the men and women of U.S. Military Training Mission, OPM Saudi Arabian National Guard, OPM Facilities Security Forces, and the 64th Air Expeditionary Group.

First, I want to thank you for your service and for volunteering to serve. For a number of you who are veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom, this is not your first tour of duty in this part of the world. Whether you are military or civilian, I appreciate the sacrifices that you make, including long separation from friends and family.

There are a number of changes under way affecting your mission here -- the change of Saudi Arabia from a combat to a non-combat designation, the return of the Gulf dependents, the possibility of building a new compound, and potential sales of more U.S. military equipment to Saudi Arabia. I want to tell you that although you do not work in a direct combat zone, your mission remains essential to America's security. Multiple administrations of both parties, including all eight presidents I have worked for, have believed that America's prosperity and security is closely tied to the prosperity and security of this part of the world.

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been one of the mainstays of stability in the Middle East for more than 60 years. A regional leader in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia continues to be an important partner for the U.S. on counterterrorism and a range of other issues.

U.S. Security Assistance Mission in Saudi Arabia dates back to the 1940s, and continues to grow. Saudi armed forces have become more professional and effective organization due to the work of the U.S. Military Training Mission -- (inaudible) -- (plans, organizations, training and equipment).

The modernization program conducted by OPM SANG -- (inaudible) -- command and control, logistics, training, medicine, and with the LMB (ph) brigades, are helping the Saudi National Guard develop into a more full-spectrum force.

As you know, in the last several years, we have begun an initiative to train Saudi Arabia's interior forces so they can better protect the kingdom's energy infrastructure and vital installations. I'm told that the facility forces -- security forces are projected to increase from 5,000 to 35,000, an ambitious and impressive effort.

And the 64th Air Expeditionary Group continues the work going back more than a generation, has built a formidable Saudi Air Force, and forged close military-to-military ties between our two air services.

I should note that your work here is also an example of the kind of capacity building effort that we would like to see more of by the U.S. military in other parts of the world. The United States will increasingly look to rely more on the capabilities of our partners rather than direct U.S. military action -- (inaudible) -- to deal with the diverse array of security challenges we face.

Those challenges include the transition of responsibility in Iraq, the ramp-up of military forces and civilian efforts in Afghanistan, and the potential perils posed by Iran's nuclear program, and a broader campaign against violent terrorist networks. All of those challenges, to varying degrees, are affected by the work you do here to sustain and strengthen our partnership with Saudi Arabia and build their security capabilities to provide a crucial measure of stability and deterrence in the Gulf.

I have a little history here myself. My first visit to Saudi Arabia, when I was working for the NSC, was in 1977, 32 years ago, when King Khalid was still king, and to prepare a visit by President Carter. And then I was here several times in the interval, but was back again early August 1990 when then-Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Norman Schwartzkopf to tell the Saudis what we were prepared to do to help stop Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. I've been here a number of times, and always have been appreciative of the work that you all do.

And with that, I want to thank you again for your service and commitment to this important mission. One of the things I look forward to during my visit to military installations at home and abroad is to hear directly from servicemen and --women their questions and concerns. So even though this is a big group, and both military and civilian, I want to stop here, invite your questions, and ask you to speak up with what's on your minds because the truth of the matter is, sometimes when you ask a question and I don't know the answer, when you get the answer, it's probably a more positive one that you might have got otherwise -- (laughter) -- because I have a tendency to go back and ask, "Well, what is the answer to this question?" And somehow sometimes has more of an impact when I ask the question than when you ask the question. (Laughter.)

So with that, who will be the courageous soul to lead this off?

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      May 07, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates from Kabul, Afghanistan

SEC. GATES: Well, it's a pleasure to be back in Afghanistan. And I'm glad to have had this opportunity to get a firsthand perspective and assessment of the situation here from General McKiernan and our troops. After meeting with General McKiernan last night, I've had a full day visiting with our soldiers and Marines from both incoming and outgoing units, along with personnel from other troop-contributing nations. In partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces, they are doing an extraordinary job under difficult and dangerous conditions.

This trip has been an opportunity to thank our troops for their service, to see firsthand the work they are doing, to hear about the challenges they face and to make sure they are getting everything they need to be successful.

I also emphasized today to our troops the importance of showing respect and courtesy to our friends and hosts, the Afghan people; to be a true partner for them in securing and building and governing their own country, in defending their democracy and freedom from those who are waging a terrible and ruthless war to deny Afghans that freedom.

This was also my first visit since the new administration has come into office and since the launch of President Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I am hopeful that the meetings this week in Washington of the leaders of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the United States will produce new solidarity in the fight against violent extremism.

We are entering a critical period with the deployment of significantly more American forces, as well as the upcoming Afghan presidential election. It is important that the Afghan people be able to choose their leaders in a secure environment without terror and intimidation.

I will close by reaffirming that the United States, along with our allies and Afghan partners, is committed to doing what is necessary to see that Afghanistan, with a government elected by its people, does not become a haven for terrorists or return to the brutal rule of the Taliban.

And with that, I'd be happy to take some questions.

Q Sir?

STAFF: Excuse me. Is there a member of the Afghan press here?

Q (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: I'm getting a lot of interference. I can't hear.

It's the same thing. Maybe somebody could interpret.

STAFF: Can somebody translate that question?

Q I can translate --

SEC. GATES: I think it's all the microphones that are interfering with this. Okay, let's try it again.

Q Thank you. (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: Got nothing.

MR.

: (Off mike) -- your position, sir.

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SEC. GATES: Please.

Q (Inaudible) -- from Voice of America, sir.

(Through interpreter.) Sir, the question has two part. The first part is, as we know, the Taliban in Pakistan is advancing, and there's a worry about this to -- if they're going to reach or that -- (inaudible) -- a nuclear weapon in Pakistan. This is a -- do we have some worry about this?

And also, the second part of question is as to -- do we know safe haven in Pakistan impacts our power in Pakistan -- is getting -- advancing every day? Is United States -- have any policy to attack them inside Pakistan territory?

SEC. GATES: Thank you. First, I think that the Taliban in Pakistan overreached with their offensive in Buner district, coming within dozens of kilometers of Islamabad. I think that it has served as a -- an alarm for the Pakistani government that these violent extremists in the western part of Pakistan are a significant danger to the government of Pakistan.

And so we have seen, in the last week or two, significant Pakistani military action against these -- against the Taliban in Buner district, and clear recognition that the agreement in Swat has failed. And so I personally have been very satisfied with the strong response that the Pakistani government and army have taken in response to this, and that there is very little chance of the Taliban in Pakistan achieving a level of success that would give them access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

With respect to the U.S. --

Q Hold a minute, sir. I have to translate. (They're used to having ?) a translation. I apologize, sir. (Translates.)

SEC. GATES: With respect to the second part of your question, I believe that the reaction of the Pakistani army shows their recognition of the danger that exists in the western part of the country, and I do not anticipate at all that there will be American troops going into Pakistan from Afghanistan to deal with this problem.

Our goal is to work with the Pakistani army, with the Pakistani government, as they deal with this problem. And we are willing to do all we can to help.

Q Okay. (Continues through interpreter.) Mr. Secretary, as you know, there was an incident in Farah a few days ago which caused dozens of civilian casualties, according to the ICRC. The allegations are that those were caused by U.S. forces. What's your response to those allegations?

And in particular, there have been some suggestions that the Taliban themselves caused the casualties by putting civilians in houses and then throwing grenades in. Is that your understanding of what happened?

And why not apologize, as you've urged people in the military to do in the past -- apologize quickly, and then move on and compensate?

STAFF: So I think the translation works. Let's proceed.

SEC. GATES: All right, we'll hope for the best.

The -- first of all, I'm well aware of this. And as I have -- have said many times before, we -- from the United States and our coalition partners -- do everything we possibly can to avoid civilian casualties.

Representatives of General McKiernan and the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior have gone to Farah to investigate what happened there. The information that you cite about Taliban throwing grenades into houses to create civilian casualties and put the blame on the United States is a report I have heard. But I think we will have to wait -- to wait and see what the results of the investigation are.

We regret any -- even one -- Afghan civilian causality -- innocent civilian causality, and we will make whatever amends are necessary. And I believe that Gen. McKiernan's spokesman, in fact, has already expressed regret about this incident, regardless of who caused it.

We all know that the Taliban use civilians casualties, and sometimes create them, to create problems for the United States and our coalition partners. We will have to wait and see what happened in this -- in this particular case.

But I would make one additional point.

Since the beginning of this year, civilian casualties in Afghanistan are down 40 percent. Casualties American, coalition partners, and Afghan security forces are up 75 percent.

So I believe that the Afghan government, the Americans and our international partners are doing everything we can to avoid civilian casualties. And we will continue to do that.

Q (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: First of all, I believe, in many instances, the Taliban used civilians as shields. They mingle with civilians and then attack ISAF partners. And so while there have been civilian casualties caused by American and our coalition partners' troops, the reality is that in virtually every case, they have been accidental. Whereas when the Taliban creates civilian casualties, it has been deliberate, as part of their strategy for trying to build an adversarial relationship, between the Afghan people and those who are trying to help the Afghan government.

Our technical capabilities provide certain assets, but the reality is this is, at the end of the day, a war on the ground, in rural areas, village by village, block by block. And very often, modern techniques are very limited in what they can contribute to this fight. It's one of the reasons why at home I have been seeking additional capabilities for our troops who are here in the fight.

As I said, we deeply regret any civilian casualty. But fundamentally, people need to recognize that exploiting civilian casualties and often causing civilian casualties are a fundamental part of the Taliban strategy. And it is a measure of the ruthlessness with which they fight.

STAFF: Greg (sp), do you have anything? Do you have -- okay.

Go ahead, Laura.

Q Secretary Gates -- Secretary, Laura Jakes from Associated Press. You heard a Marine today say he needed more communications equipment. Is the surge in troops

outpacing the equipment and supplies that they need that are coming into country? And if so, why is that? **535**

SEC. GATES: I -- this is something that I have to look into when I get back to Washington. I heard this on several occasions today, that the equipment is coming in behind our troops and is not here and available for them when they arrive. And I intend to look into this and find out what the situation is. But I did hear it from several of our military folks today. And it is a considerable concern to me.

Q Is it, perhaps, Iraqi equipment -- (audio break) -- equipment that's still in Iraq?

SEC. GATES: No, it's not an Iraq problem. It's basically just the magnitude of the -- the amount of equipment that has to be brought in, and frankly, the relatively limited infrastructure in terms of airfields and so on, how you get it into Afghanistan. It's not extremists' interference with the lines of communication; I think it's more really a logistical challenge than it is anything else. And that's what I intend to pursue.

STAFF: (Off mike.)

Q (Through off-mike interpreter.)

SEC. GATES: I think civilian casualties in Afghanistan, however they occur, pose a risk to our efforts here. What is critical for the success of the Afghan government, and for us as the government's and the Afghan people's partner, is that the Afghan people believe that we are on their side, that we are here to help them win a victory to protect their own freedom, that we respect Afghans and that we are here to protect them, not to hurt them. And so whenever civilian casualties occur, it tends to undermine that important point, and it is -- and is therefore such a source of great concern.

The last time I was here, I made a statement to the Afghan press and television, about our concern about civilian casualties and that our rules of engagement were being changed and being toughened up, to make it less likely that there would be civilian casualties. I think there is importance in partnering, with the Afghan security forces, so that they are with us when there are operations.

So I think that this -- it is a concern. And it has been a concern for quite some time frankly. And it doesn't matter that it's part of the Taliban's strategy. It's what matters in the eyes of the Afghan people. And so it's so important for us to be seen as their partner and their ally, not as somebody who has come to do them harm.

We are here to help the Afghan people. That partnership, that friendship is absolutely critical to the success of Afghans and our own success here. And so I think we have to continue to work at this problem. And even if the Taliban create these casualties or exploit them, we need to figure out a way to minimize them and hopefully make them go away.

In terms of the election security, there will be a number of election monitors from around the world. A number of the coalition partners will be sending additional troops here, to try and provide security for the election.

One of the reasons that we are bringing forces into the country, as quickly as possible, from the United States, which is part of the logistical issue, is to provide security, before the elections take place, in the period before and during the elections.

So I think that as best I can tell, the circumstances right now seem quite favorable for a reasonably safe and secure election process here in Afghanistan. We look forward to seeing that go forward.

(Cross talk.)

Q Secretary Gates, Chris Lawrence of CNN.

You had a chance to speak with a lot of your counternarcotics experts here in Afghanistan. After speaking with them today and seeing some of the work that they're doing, do you feel that the U.S. mission now is to stamp out the narcotics trade in Afghanistan quickly or to allow some drug trafficking to continue, while the Afghans wear themselves off of that?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have no desire to see the drug traffic continue, and frankly, neither do most Afghans. Our primary purpose here is not to stamp out the drug trade. Our primary purpose here is to make sure that Afghanistan does never again become a haven, a safe haven, for violent extremists who would attack the United States or anybody else. That's our fundamental mission.

We're also here to help the Afghan people. Afghanistan, until 20 or 30 years ago, 30 years ago or so, was a breadbasket.

It not only grew enough food to feed itself but to export food.



We would like to see that kind of agricultural success return to Afghanistan. The farmers of Afghanistan will not find that kind of prosperity and that kind of diverse economic success through growing poppies. You can't feed poppies to your family. You can't feed poppies to your herd. When you grow poppies, you have only one customer, and he does not negotiate. And so it's actually in the best interests of the Afghan people to stamp out this trade.

The reality is, in many of the provinces of Afghanistan, good governors and the Afghan people have stamped out the narcotics trade in those provinces. And most -- in fact, perhaps 95 percent -- of all of the poppy growing in Afghanistan now is in something like seven provinces, most of them in the south, where the Taliban are most prevalent and the most powerful. So I think that the key to stamping out the narcotics trade in Afghanistan, to begin with, is to defeat the Taliban.

STAFF: We'll take one last question. (Cross talk.) Ariana Television.  
(Cross talk.)

Q Everyone should have a chance.

STAFF: We don't have time. I'm sorry.

Q (Inaudible.)

STAFF: Everybody can benefit from these answers.

Q (In one of the local languages.)

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry. There was interference and I didn't -- what is closing in a week?

INTERPRETER: Sir, updating you on that question, the question was as to the parliament of Afghanistan issue a decree. One that gives the coalition forces, international force in Afghanistan to legalize their activity. Otherwise, in one week they will close parliament by itself. And what is your assessment or reaction? Because -- (inaudible) --

(Cross talk.) Yes, sir. That's the question. Is --

SEC. GATES: The first that I've heard of it, and I would prefer not to answer without knowing the background and having some understanding.

Q One question.

Q One more question --

STAFF: Sorry. We're out of time.

Q Last question. (Cross talk.) Last question, sir.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETINGS IN EGYPT


May 5, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak at the presidential palace in Cairo, Egypt, May 5, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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Katie Couric, CBS anchor and 60 Minutes correspondent, interviews U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates aboard his aircraft after departing Cairo, Egypt, May 5, 2009. Gates is traveling in the region to strengthen ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates listens to U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Paul "Dutch" Van Sickle, commanding general U.S. Military Training Mission, Eskan Village, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 6, 2009. Gates is in Saudi Arabia to meet with local leaders and discuss defense issues.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to members of the U.S. Military Training Mission, Eskan Village, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 6, 2009.

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates thanks members of the U.S. Military Training Mission, Eskan Village, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 6, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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


U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates boards a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster in Kabul, Afghanistan, en route to field operating bases around Afghanistan, May 7, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates presents Bronze Star with Valor awards to soldiers deployed to Field Operating Base Ramrod, Afghanistan, during a recent trip to southwest Asia, May 7, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to members of the press in Kabul after touring field operating bases in Afghanistan during a recent trip to southwest Asia, May 7, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tours the Special Marine Air Ground Task Force area during a recent trip to Field Operating Base Bastion, Afghanistan, during a recent trip to southwest Asia, May 7, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates takes a tour of Field Operating Base Airborne in the Wardak province, Afghanistan, May 8, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates signs re-enlistment certificates for soldiers on Field Operating Base Airborne in the Wardak province, Afghanistan, May 8, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to soldiers deployed on Field Operating Base Airborne in the Wardak province, Afghanistan, after re-enlisting eight soldiers, May 8, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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CNN

May 6, 2009

## Interview With Secretary Gates

### The Situation Room (CNN), 5:00 PM

WOLF BLITZER: The Defense secretary, Robert Gates, is in Afghanistan right now. And he's warning that U.S. troops will have their hands full fighting the Taliban even with the reinforcements that are on the way – another 21,000 U.S. forces on the way to Afghanistan.

Our Pentagon correspondent, Chris Lawrence, is traveling with the Defense secretary. He had an exclusive interview with him and he has the story from Afghanistan. Chris?

CHRIS LAWRENCE: Wolf, I spoke with the Defense secretary one-on-one just before we arrived here in Kabul and he was very blunt about the fight ahead. Defense Secretary Robert Gates says Taliban leadership has the momentum here in Afghanistan – a position of strength that makes reconciliation with the Afghan government all but impossible.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: Until that momentum changes, I think it will be difficult.

LAWRENCE: Gates says the U.S. will still encourage negotiations with younger Taliban who are fighting for the money. But he wasn't surprised when I told him the Taliban spokesman told CNN they will send suicide bombers to disrupt upcoming elections and won't negotiate until American troops leave the country.

GATES: He's leading this insurgency. He is not – he's not going to sort of – sort of throw down and say, well, you know, we're ready to negotiate, we're about done here, whatever. No, I think we have a tough fight ahead of us.

LAWRENCE: Gates is here ahead of 20,000 American troops, who will mostly fight in Southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban are entrenched.

GATES: It's sad to say, I expect that with the rising level of our activity and operations, there probably will be higher casualties.

LAWRENCE: Privately, Pakistani officials have expressed concern to the U.S. that increased fighting in Southern Afghanistan will only push the Taliban back to the Pakistani side.

GATES: Well, I think it's just the reality that there – there are extremists on both sides of that border.

LAWRENCE: But the top commander in Afghanistan told me what he sees is mostly foreign fighters crossing that border. General David McKiernan says most of the Taliban that would run back to Pakistan came from that area in the first place. Wolf?

BLITZER: Chris Lawrence in Kabul with the Defense secretary for us. Thank you.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Press Advisories

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No. 036-09

May 06, 2009

### DoD to Conduct Briefs for Fiscal 2010 Budget Request

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Robert Hale, and Vice Adm. Steve Stanley, director, force structure, resources and assessment, Joint Staff, will conduct a briefing at 12:30 p.m. EST, May 7, in the Department of Defense (DoD) Briefing Room, Pentagon 2E973, to discuss President Obama's fiscal 2010 budget submission to the Congress.

Following the DoD budget request overview, representatives from the military services will also conduct briefs and answer questions as follows:

Army (1:30 – 2:30 p.m.): Remain in the DoD Briefing Room, Pentagon 2E973

Air Force (1:30 – 2:30 p.m.): Pentagon Room 4E869

Navy and Marine Corps (2:30 – 3:30 p.m.): Pentagon Room 2E973

Missile Defense Agency (3:30 – 4:30 p.m.): Pentagon Room 2E973

Journalists specifically interested in the Air Force briefing are requested to contact Vince King at (703) 695-0640.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 304-09  
May 07, 2009

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### DoD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal

President Barack Obama today sent to Congress a proposed defense budget of \$663.8 billion for fiscal 2010. The budget request for the Department of Defense (DoD) includes \$533.8 billion in discretionary budget authority to fund base defense programs and \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The proposed DoD base budget represents an increase of \$20.5 billion over the \$513.3 billion enacted for fiscal 2009. This is an increase of 4 percent, or 2.1 percent real growth after adjusting for inflation.

The fiscal 2010 budget proposal will end the planned use of supplemental requests to fund overseas operations, including Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. The inclusion of these expenses as a separate category in the department's annual budget request will ensure greater transparency and accountability to Congress and the American people. The budget will also request funds in the base that were previously in supplementals for programs such as those supporting our military families and providing long-term medical care to injured service members.

"This budget provides the balance necessary to institutionalize and finance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies," said Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Key highlights of the proposed DoD budget are outlined in the attached [overview](#) and [summary charts](#). For more information and to view the entire fiscal 2010 budget proposal, please visit <http://www.budget.mil> and download the department's "FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification." Budget-related transcripts can also be viewed online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/index.aspx?mo=5&yr=2009> to include "[DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon](#)" on April 6, 2009.

## OVERVIEW OF THE DOD FISCAL 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL

### PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

The fiscal 2010 budget proposal was crafted to achieve four principal objectives:

1. Reaffirming and strengthening the nation's commitment to care for the all-volunteer force, America's greatest strategic asset.
2. Reshaping DoD programs to institutionalize and enhance capabilities to fight the wars the U.S. is engaged in today and the scenarios the nation will most likely face in the years ahead, while also providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.
3. Beginning a fundamental overhaul of the DoD's approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.
4. Providing the necessary resources to support the troops in the field.

### Support for the Troops and Their Families

The fiscal 2010 base budget proposal includes \$177.5 billion to directly compensate and support America's military professionals and their families. This represents one-third of the department's base budget and reflects the strong commitment to caring for our troops with an increase of more than \$13 billion from the fiscal 2009 request.

Military Healthcare. Within this request, the department fully funds military healthcare, which will cost more than \$47 billion in fiscal 2010. The Department expects to continue to work with the Congress to look for ways to slow the growth of medical costs while continuing to provide high-quality care.

Pay. The fiscal 2010 budget includes a 2.9 percent military pay raise effective January 1, 2010. This pay raise, coupled with an average increase of 6.0 percent in Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) rates and a 5.0 percent increase to Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), maintains these programs at current standards and keeps military pay very competitive with other employment sectors. The budget also includes a 2.0 percent pay raise for civilian employees.

Ground Force Increase. The proposed budget will fully protect and properly fund the ongoing growth in military ground force end strength, and it will do so in the base budget. Growth in the Army and Marines will be sustained, and reductions will be halted in the Air Force and Navy. Accomplishing this will require an increase of approximately \$2.3 billion in military personnel costs above the fiscal 2009 enacted level.

Family Support and Housing. The budget request provides \$11 billion to fund military housing and support programs for single and married service members and their families. In addition to constructing new barracks and family housing and maintaining current units, this includes funding for child care centers and youth programs; morale, welfare, and recreation

activities; warfighter and family services; commissaries; DoD schools; and military spouse employment programs.

Caring for Our Wounded, Ill, and Injured. The department has no greater priority than providing the highest quality support to wounded, ill, and injured soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and their families. The fiscal 2010 budget recognizes this responsibility and provides \$3.3 billion to support injured service members in their recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. This funding provides additional case managers and mental health providers, an expedited Disability Evaluation System, construction of 12 additional Army Warrior in Transition complexes, and continued implementation of Walter Reed National Military Medical Center and Fort Belvoir hospital BRAC projects within the National Capital Region. The budget also includes \$0.4 billion for medical research and development for traumatic brain injury, psychological health, and other casualty care issues.

### **Reshape the Force**

Efforts to put defense bureaucracies on a war footing in recent years have revealed flaws in the way the department operates. Its institutions were created and organized to prepare for conventional conflicts with modern armies, navies, and air forces. The existing organization has not provided adequate institutional support for today's warfighters and their needs. Today's warfighters require steady, long-term funding and a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs. The fiscal 2010 budget will begin a process of change needed to fully support today's warfighters.

ISR. The budget will increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support for today's warfighter by adding nearly \$2 billion to the base budget. This will include:

- 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial orbits by 2011. This capability, which has been in high demand in Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will eventually result in a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent compared to a year ago.
- An increase in manned ISR capabilities, such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of Task Force Odin in Iraq.
- Research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

Helicopters. The fiscal 2010 base budget will include an increase of \$500 million to field and sustain more helicopters, a capability that is in urgent demand in Afghanistan. Because the principal limitation on helicopter capacity is a shortage in maintenance crews and pilots rather than a lack of airframes, the focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Global Partnerships. To boost global partnership capacity, the department will spend \$550 million for training and equipping foreign militaries (in addition to those in Iraq and Afghanistan) to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations and to conduct security and stabilization activities.

Special Operations. To grow Special Operations capabilities, the DoD will increase personnel by more than 2,400 or 4 percent. The budget will also buy more special forces-optimized mobility aircraft.

Littoral Combat Ships. Plans call for increasing the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) from two to three in fiscal 2010. LCS provide a key capability for operations in coastal regions. The goal is eventually to acquire 55 of these ships.

Joint High Speed Vessels. The fiscal 2010 budget will enable the Department to improve its intra-theater lift capacity by increasing the charter of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) from two to four. This arrangement will continue until the DoD's own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

Brigade Combat Teams. The proposed budget will cap the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams at 45 instead of the previously planned 48, while maintaining the planned increase in Army end strength at 547,400. This will ensure that better-manned units are ready to deploy; it will help to end the routine use of stop loss in the Army; and it will lower the risk of a hollowed force.

### **Modernize Capabilities**

As the DoD shifts resources to support current wars and other potential irregular campaigns, it must still contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries. To deter potential aggression, project power when necessary, and protect U.S. interests and allies around the globe, the fiscal 2010 budget includes new or additional investments in key areas. It also includes carefully chosen program terminations and delays designed to make funds available for higher priority initiatives.

Air Superiority. To sustain U.S. air superiority, the department is committed to building a fifth generation tactical fighter capability that can be produced in quantity at sustainable cost. The fiscal 2010 budget includes \$6.8 billion to buy 30 F-35s, an increase from fiscal 2009 levels of \$3.1 billion and 14 aircraft. The research and development program is fully funded at \$3.6 billion. DoD plans to acquire 513 F-35s over the course of the current five-year plan, with an ultimate goal of 2,443 aircraft. In addition, the fiscal 2010 budget includes \$2.9 billion to acquire 31 F/A-18 and E/A-18G aircraft. In fiscal 2010, the Air Force plans to retire about 250 of its oldest tactical fighter aircraft. Production of the F-22 will also end, with a total force of 187 planes. The fiscal 2009 supplemental budget included funds for four F-22 fighters, which will complete production.

Aerial Tankers. To replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, DoD will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding. Solicitations are planned for this summer.

Airlift. No additional production of the C-17 airlifter program will be requested in fiscal 2010 or beyond. Analysis has concluded that the U.S. has sufficient C-17s with the 205 already in the force or in production.

Cyberspace. To improve cyberspace defense capabilities, the budget continues to support the program initiated in fiscal 2009 and increases funding for a broad range of improvements to Information Assurance capabilities that improve our ability to ensure that information is secure and trusted as it is generated, stored, processed, and transported throughout the lifecycles of information and IT systems. In addition, the budget includes funding to increase training of cyber experts and to establish a cyber test range.

Nuclear and Strategic Forces. In fiscal 2010, the department will begin the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine. A development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber will not be pursued until the DoD has a better understanding of the need, the requirements, and the technology. All strategic requirements will be examined during the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, and in light of Post-START arms control negotiations.

Naval Power. The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs. Accordingly, the fiscal 2010 budget will shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier Program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This plan will result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040. The Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program will be delayed to reconsider the requirements and acquisition strategy. Amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11<sup>th</sup> Landing Platform Dock ship and the Mobile Landing Platform Ship will be delayed in order to assess costs and to analyze the need for these capabilities.

Destroyers. Funds from fiscal 2010 will be used to complete the third DDG 1000 Destroyer and build one DDG 51 Destroyer. Current plans call for building all three DDG 1000 class ships at Bath Iron Works in Maine. The DDG 51 class ship will be restarted at Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi, and this type ship will eventually be built at both yards.

Future Combat Systems. The Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program will be significantly restructured. It will change from a core program with spinouts of mature technologies to an incremental program focused on improving Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with FCS technologies and replacing the most vulnerable platforms in the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams. Meanwhile, the fiscal 2010 budget will continue development of three unmanned ground vehicles, two unmanned aerial vehicles, non-line-of-sight launch system, unattended ground sensors, and an information network.

### **Change How We Buy**

To maintain America's technological and conventional edge, DoD must make a dramatic change in the way military equipment is acquired. Reform involves the following:

1. Consistently demonstrating the commitment and leadership to cancel programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs.

2. Tying goals to the actual and prospective capabilities of known future adversaries, not by what might be technologically feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources.
3. Ensuring that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow the Department to successfully execute the programs.
4. Realistically estimating program costs and providing budget stability for the programs DoD initiates.
5. Adequately staffing the government acquisition team and providing disciplined and constant oversight.

The proposed budget for fiscal 2010 will aggressively support these goals:

Presidential Helicopter. The fiscal 2010 budget will terminate the VH-71 Presidential helicopter, which involved design and production of 23 helicopters. The program is behind schedule and the original cost of \$6.5 billion has ballooned to more than \$13 billion. Plans will proceed for an alternative solution in fiscal 2011.

CSAR-X Helicopter. The Air Force Combat Search and Rescue helicopter program will be terminated. The program has had a troubled contracting history and is an example of a single-Service aircraft with a single purpose. The department will review the CSAR mission in the context of multi-Service requirements.

Transformational Satellite. The \$19 billion Transformational (TSAT) program will be terminated. Instead, DoD will purchase two more Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites.

Missile Defense. The fiscal 2010 budget will reduce the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) program by \$1.2 billion, leaving a fiscal 2010 request of \$7.8 billion for MDA:

- The program will be restructured to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat.
- Ground-based interceptors in Alaska will not be increased as planned, but research and development will be funded to improve existing capabilities to defend against long-range rogue missile threats.
- The second airborne laser prototype aircraft will be canceled due to affordability and technology problems, keeping the existing aircraft as a technology demonstration effort.
- The Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program will be terminated because of significant technical challenges.

Insourcing and Acquisition Workforce. Under the fiscal 2010 budget request, the department will begin reducing its reliance on support service contractors from the current 39 percent of the workforce performing administrative and advisory services to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent. Contract personnel will be replaced with approximately 13,800 government employees, including 2,500 acquisition specialists. In addition, the department will increase the acquisition workforce by another 1,580 government employees, for a total of 4,080 in fiscal 2010. By 2015, the acquisition workforce will grow by about 20,000 people.

## **Support Troops in the Field**

In addition to the department's base budget, the fiscal 2010 request includes \$130 billion to support troops involved in overseas contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not a supplemental request. It is intended to fund all currently known requirements for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for the entire fiscal year.

The requested amount of \$130 billion is the administration's best estimate of needs at this time. Although the goal is not to submit a supplemental request in fiscal 2010, the administration reserves the right to seek additional funds in the event that there are significant changes in the security situation in theater or changes in force levels or other operations in Iraq or Afghanistan.

## **A Reform Budget**

The President's Department of Defense fiscal 2010 budget request is a reform budget. It reflects lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it addresses the range of potential threats around the world, both now and for the foreseeable future.

This budget acknowledges that every taxpayer dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk is a dollar that is not available to care for America's service men and women, to reset the force, to win the wars the nation is in, or to improve capabilities in areas where the U.S. is underinvested and potentially vulnerable.

As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in remarks at the Air War College on April 15, "These recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the U.S. military thinks about and prepares for the future. Fundamentally, the proposals are about how we think about the nature of warfare. About how we take care of our people. About how we institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services, how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes."

These issues will be analyzed further in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and other studies. The President's Department of Defense budget request for fiscal 2010 is an integral part of this effort.

### **Attached Summary Charts:**

- Department of Defense Topline FY2001 – FY2010
- Summary By Appropriation Title
- Summary By Component
- Support the Troops in the Field




# Department of Defense Topline

FY 2001 – FY 2010

(Dollars in Billions)

FY 2009 – FY 2010 Base Growth	
Nominal Growth	4%
Real Growth	2%



Note: FY 2009 Non-War Supplemental is appropriated through American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009

Source: Defense Appropriation Acts FY 2001 – FY 2009, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2009, OMB Historical Tables FY 2009

# Summary By Appropriation Title

(Dollars in Billions)

Appropriation Title	FY 2009	FY 2010	Δ FY 2009 – FY 2010
<b>Military Personnel</b>	124.9	136.0	+8.9%
<b>Operation &amp; Maintenance</b>	179.1	185.7	+3.7%
<b>Procurement</b>	101.7	107.4	+5.6%
<b>RDT&amp;E</b>	79.5	78.6	-1.1%
<b>Military Construction</b>	21.9	21.0	-4.1%
<b>Family Housing</b>	3.2	2.0	-38.0%
<b>Other</b>	3.2	3.1	-1.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>513.3</b>	<b>533.8</b>	<b>+4.0%</b>

# Summary By Component


(Dollars in Billions)

Component	FY 2009	FY 2010	$\Delta$ FY 2009 – FY 2010
<b>Army</b>	139.2	142.1	+2.1%
<b>Navy</b>	147.4	156.4	+6.1%
<b>Air Force</b>	141.2	144.5	+2.3%
<b>Defense-wide</b>	85.5	90.8	+6.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>513.3</b>	<b>533.8</b>	<b>+4.0%</b>

# Support the Troops in the Field

## FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations

(Dollars in Billions)



**\$130.0B**

*Numbers may not add due to rounding*

Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on Leadership Changes in Afghanistan  
From the Pentagon  
Mon, 11 May 2009 17:37:00 -0500

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen  
May 11, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen on Leadership Changes in Afghanistan  
From the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: First, I would like to express my horror and deep regret over today's shooting incident at Camp Liberty in Iraq. I offer my sympathy and condolences to the families of those who were killed. We are still in the process of gathering information on exactly what happened, but if the preliminary reports are confirmed, such a tragic loss of life at the hands of our own forces is a cause for great and urgent concern, and I can assure you that it will get this department's highest-priority attention.

As you know, I just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, where I met with our troops and commanders in the field. My purpose in going was to see firsthand the preparations and plans under way to execute the president's strategy for the region, especially as significantly more American troops begin arriving in country. I thought it critically important to get a sense from the ground level what needs -- what the needs are, what the challenges are and what the solutions to some of the problems are.

As I have said many times before, very few of these problems can be solved by military means alone. And yet, from the military perspective, we can and must do better. We have not been able to fully resource our military effort in Afghanistan in recent years, but I believe, resources or no, that our mission there requires new thinking and new approaches from our military leaders. Today we have a new policy set by our new president. We have a new strategy, a new mission and a new ambassador. I believe that new military leadership also is needed.

After consultation with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commander of Central Command, and with the approval of the president, I have asked for the resignation of General David McKiernan. He will remain in command of both ISAF and U.S. Forces Afghanistan until such time as a relief can be nominated and confirmed.

I am today recommending to the president that Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal be nominated to replace General McKiernan as commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan.

I am also recommending that Lieutenant General David Rodriguez be assigned to the new position of deputy commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan. I have advised the secretary general of NATO and the minister of defense of Afghanistan of these prospective changes.

I made these decisions only after careful consideration of a great number of factors, including the advice of Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus. In the end, I believe my decisions are in the best interests of our national security and the success of our mission in Afghanistan. I urge the Senate to swiftly confirm Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez so they can begin their important work as soon as possible.

Let none of this detract from, nor cause us ever to forget, General McKiernan's long and distinguished career of military service. For decades, in peace and war, Dave McKiernan has led hundreds of thousands of men and women in uniform with conviction, integrity and courage. He has dedicated his life to the preservation of the freedoms we in this nation enjoy. And on behalf of the Department of Defense and the nation, I thank him for his years of selfless service.

Pam.

Q (Off mike.) Are you worried at all that switching horses in midstream has an air of desperation, or that you -- that you -- what you saw on both of your recent trips there was worse than you had expected to see?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me start and then turn to Admiral Mullen.

I think that the -- as the statement suggested, that -- that with agreement on a new strategy and a new mission, and a new national approach and international approach in Afghanistan, that if there were to be a change, this is the right time to make the change, at a time when we are at the beginning of the implementation of a new strategy. And it is in that context that I emphasize that the focus here is simply on getting fresh thinking, fresh eyes on the problem, and in how we implement the strategy and the mission going forward.

ADM. MULLEN: In fact, for me, based on my recent trips, the opposite is true. In the time that I spent in RC East, I was very encouraged by the progress that we'd made and the depth of understanding of what the requirement was from our people on the military side to generate success.

Clearly that is not the case in the south, because we have not had the forces there, and putting them there this year is critically important. And I would only echo what the secretary said, from the standpoint of, with the new strategy, with the new team across the board, I felt it was very important for new leadership, and supported this decision completely.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen? Mr. -- for both of you gentlemen, while you say you felt there needed to be fresh eyes, fresh thinking, General McKiernan, of course, has only been there for a period of months. He's yet to get the resources he asked the Obama administration for. The troops that he has asked for aren't even there yet.

So what specifically was he not doing that he -- you said you wanted fresh thinking, fresh eyes. Did he resist your ideas? Did he resist change? Was he uncooperative with the new thinking, the new way forward? What went wrong here?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, General McKiernan has been in Afghanistan, I think, 11 months. And -- first of all, I would say, nothing went wrong, and there was nothing specific.

It is -- it simply was my conviction, based on my consultations with Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus, that a fresh approach, a fresh look in the context of the new strategy, probably was in our best interest.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Mullen?

Q Admiral Mullen -- excuse me. Admiral Mullen, what -- why couldn't, in your mind -- you said you supported the recommendation; in your mind, why could General McKiernan no longer do the job?

ADM. MULLEN: Again, he's been there almost a year. And, in fact, under normal circumstances, he would have rotated somewhere between 18 and 24 months, depending on timing.

I have said that we must focus all of our effort in terms of making Afghanistan better.

There probably is no more critical ingredient than that -- than leadership. And again, along with all the other changes, it's time now. And that's why I made that recommendation.

Q Is it just loss of confidence? I haven't heard anything yet -- I'm so sorry -- about why you both think he couldn't do the job.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I'm not going to say a whole lot more, other than the -- I thought there was a need for new leadership -- clearly we have in the two that the secretary -- the two officers that the secretary mentioned a rich experience level -- General Rodriguez in particular deep in Afghanistan, having been there before -- and that I think these two officers will bring a -- not just a renewed but a focus, which we really need in 2009, and I just didn't think that we could wait until 2010.

Q Mr. Secretary, having talked to people who are involved in all this, they say McKiernan was maybe too conventional, too "old Army" in his outlook, not nimble enough to deal with the complex counterinsurgency. And as the admiral mentioned, McChrystal has a lot more experience in Afghanistan. Could you just comment on some of that?

SEC GATES: Well, it's -- you know, I won't -- it's hard to say anything more than we've already said. I would -- Admiral Mullen just talked about the experience that -- in counterinsurgency that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez have.

I would tell you that those who are speculating on the ingredients in this decision, if it's not Admiral Mullen or me or General Petraeus, has (sic) no inside information on our thinking.

Q So McKiernan just lacked a certain counterinsurgency experience or wasn't nimble enough on this?

SEC. GATES: I think what the admiral said is exactly where we are. It's time for new leadership and fresh eyes.

Julian?



Q Secretary Gates, for you, talk to me a little bit more about why General McChrystal and his -- whether it's the Special Operations background came into your thinking.

And Admiral Mullen, if you would talk a little bit about the effort that General McChrystal has been doing for you in terms of how to resource the Afghanistan mission, what -- why you assigned him that, what his mission was in that.

SEC. GATES: I would simply say that both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez bring a unique skill set in counterinsurgency to these issues. And I think that they will provide the kind of new leadership and fresh thinking that the admiral and I have been talking about.

ADM. MULLEN: I just -- for both of them, as -- whenever you look for replacements -- I mean, whenever that occurs, you -- I took a broad range of inputs from military officers.

And McChrystal and Rodriguez rank -- outside this discussion, outside this change, McChrystal and Rodriguez have ranked, for the entire time that I've been chairman, at the top of the list. So we couldn't pick two better officers.

And then specifically, Julian, with respect to the -- the discussions and focus on getting the best people to Afghanistan, making sure that we resource that as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible, making sure that leaders who go there that -- have that experience so that our ramp-up time when we turn over is absolutely minimal -- all of that focuses on the importance of Afghanistan, and actually lessons that we learned from Iraq where some of our rotations would -- you know, we were starting over from an experience level. So it's how to do that and keep that focus and move as fast as we can from a resourcing people, training, expertise standpoint in Afghanistan.

Q Is this something you started thinking about some months ago? And could you also tell us what Ambassador Holbrooke's role might have been in this? And also, when -- did you just tell him today?

SEC. GATES: Ambassador Holbrooke?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: No. I talked to him when I was in Afghanistan last week.

The answer to part of your question is that Ambassador Holbrooke played no role in this.

Q He had no recommendation, had no thoughts about how --

SEC. GATES: I don't know whether he had any thoughts. He played no role in this.

Q You'd know. (Laughs.)

ADM. MULLEN: No, I mean, he had no role to -- in this at all.

Q Well, can you talk a little bit about how and when you started thinking about this? Is this some months ago? Is it --

ADM. MULLEN: General McKiernan was -- originally planned to be there between 18 and 24 months. So as far back as six or seven months ago, I was looking at his relief, potentially his relief, as well as General Odierno, who's due to leave sometime early in 2010. So there had been discussions about this over an extended period time. I think certainly for me it's been in the last several months, as we've focused heavily on Afghanistan and resourcing it and how we were going to move forward, that this issue -- that the specifics of this really came to bear and that -- that I concluded that it was time for a change, and made that recommendation to the secretary.

Q So is it fair to say that in terms of a -- unique skill sets, that General McChrystal -- for those who don't follow his career, he specializes in black -- commando special operations: the capturing of Saddam Hussein, the killing of Abu Zarqawi, the melding of intelligence and special-ops units in the -- during the surge. Is that what you're looking for from him in terms of Afghanistan -- replicating some of those successes in that terrain?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me say something and then invite the admiral. The way I look at this is as -- McChrystal and Rodriguez as a team. They each bring tremendous skills in a variety of areas that are very pertinent to the kind of fight that we have in

Afghanistan. And it is their combined skill set that I think gives us some fresh opportunities looking forward.

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ADM. MULLEN: And while General McChrystal has that background that you described, Tony, his background is much deeper and much broader than that. And I've been privileged to work with him over the better part of the last year and seen that, you know, the broadness and the depth that go far beyond just high-end special-operations skills. And I'm extremely confident that he will be able to carry out this mission in its fullness to include, obviously, those skills, but others as well.

Q Those kind of missions, though, to make this more a SOF-like fight?

ADM. MULLEN: I wouldn't be specific about what kind -- you know, exactly the kinds of missions we would increase specifically. But certainly his focus and his background, I think, are very relevant to our needs there. And then -- but it really is also the combination of he and Rodriguez which are so important.

Q Mr. Secretary, you've often said that you were worried about establishing too big a military footprint in Afghanistan. Yet General McKiernan, it seemed like every few months, was asking for more and more and higher levels of forces. Is that one of the areas that wasn't new-think, in your mind? And did you and General McKiernan have a difference there?

SEC. GATES: No, that had nothing to do with it, as far as I was concerned.

Q And about keeping the troop levels lower, you were talking, Admiral Mullen, about the lessons learned in Iraq. Wasn't that one of the lessons learned in Iraq, that we didn't have enough troops in Iraq initially?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, as I've looked at the analysis for what we need, certainly, in the immediate future, the troops we have in the east recently are -- have recently put in there, as well as those going in the south, those meet the needs that we see that we have right now. And I'm very comfortable that they will be able to provide the hold after the clear, which is where we've been short, particularly in the south.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you talk a bit -- now that these changes have been made at the very top, what follow-on changes may take place? I mean, for instance, as an organizational issue, will there be an RC South -- American commands in RC South paralleling RC East? And even in general terms, can you talk about on the ground, tactically, what we may see differently going forward in the months ahead that was not the case up until now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't know that I can speak very well to the strategy and tactics going forward. I don't expect there to be a change in the command rotation in RC South. The Dutch are in command now. They will be replaced for -- at the end of a year by the British, who will be in command for a year, and then we will take command in 2010.

And some of the additional troop levels that General McKiernan has asked for are, in fact, a two-star headquarters to support when the U.S. takes command of RC South in the fall of 2010, in November, I think. So I don't anticipate any change in that arrangement.

Q Can you talk even in general terms about what might take place differently on the ground, as far as the prosecution of the war?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't know.

ADM. MULLEN: I think -- I mean, in some ways, we're learning as we go here. I mean, we're -- what General McKiernan has recommended, in terms of the troops that are going there now, are the ones that we're resourcing.

But I'd also certainly want to hear from new leadership what their beliefs are once they get there, get on the ground and make some recommendations about how to move forward as rapidly as possible.

So I'm not aware of any changes. And I wouldn't speak to exactly how they're going to -- how they'd fight it, although I've been briefed, for instance, on, you know, how it's going to apply in the south here over the course of this year.

But certainly with new leadership, there will probably be some fresh views, which we will have very, very good discussions about.

Q Admiral, you said, we can and must do better. And so I'm surprised you don't have any more solid idea of how we need to do better.

ADM. MULLEN: I can't think of a more important decision than putting in new leadership, with respect to that, and then having the impact that is so critical.

Q Actually the secretary said, we must and can do better.

Any thoughts on how?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's the challenge that we give to the new leadership. How do we -- how do we do better? What new ideas do you have? What fresh thinking do you have? Are there different ways of accomplishing our goals? How can we be more effective? The admiral and I aren't the source of those ideas. General McChrystal and General Rodriguez are. And that's what we expect from them.

Q Let me ask it a different way.

One of the criticisms of General McKiernan was that he hadn't implemented a joint campaign plan, essentially an implementation of the way the strategy would be used on the ground.

When the new leadership gets there, do you have a sense that then they will provide new feedback that could change the Af-Pak strategy as we know it? And what might it be?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- first of all, the new strategy is a strategy approved by the president. And it is a whole-of-government strategy. If there are any changes that they would recommend, it would be in the military part of that strategy.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Recently North Korea said that if South Korea participated in -- (inaudible) -- then North Korea will regard it as an act of war.

What is your comment on this?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've been frankly surprised and disturbed by the kind of rhetoric coming out of North Korea in recent weeks. And I think that North Korea has effectively isolated itself internationally, even greater than was the case before, by some of this rhetoric. But that's what I think it is, rhetoric.

Q (Off mike) -- you can give us any more detail of the shooting in Iraq -  
- what you know about the soldier, whether he'd been on multiple deployments, whether he was  
seeking help for combat stress? Are there any details you can give us?

ADM. MULLEN: No, I don't -- I don't have a whole lot more than what -- than  
that which is already out there. Clearly, the tragedy occurred in a -- in a -- in a place  
where individuals were -- were seeking help. And I'd also like to certainly extend my  
condolences and thoughts and prayers to the families of those who were killed.

It does speak to me, though, about the need for us to redouble our efforts,  
the concern in terms of dealing with the stress, dealing with the whole issue of those kinds  
of things. And it also speaks to the issue of multiple deployments, you know, increasing  
dwell time, all those things that we're focused on to try to improve to relieve that stress.  
But I just don't have the specifics of this particular incident.

Q Mr. Secretary, where do we stand now on the bombings in western  
Afghanistan? A lot of blame was thrown each way -- senior Defense officials blaming the  
Taliban; Taliban blaming U.S., saying there was the use of white phosphorous. Where does  
that investigation stand? Is there any light you can shed on that?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me tell you what I think the status is and ask the  
admiral to correct me if I get it wrong.

My understanding is that General McKiernan has sent a general officer to  
Farah province to participate with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior in an  
investigation of what happened. I also understand that General Petraeus is either  
considering or has already decided to send someone to Afghanistan from outside the country to  
investigate the tragedy.

(To Adm. Mullen.) Is that --

ADM. MULLEN: Yes, sir.

Q Do you have an update on how many civilians may have died?

SEC. GATES: No.

Q And have any payments been made to civilian families, as you suggested they would be done immediately last time you were in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I don't -- I just don't know.

Q Clarification? Mr. Secretary, just a clarification. Does General McKiernan's resignation end his military career?

SEC. GATES: Probably.

Q Sir, can I follow up on that other issue of the bombing? You've expressed concern and frustration the military is unable to counter Taliban or al Qaeda propaganda. In this case, with the bombing in Afghanistan, it seems that they have -- they have a storyline, and the U.S. and McKiernan hinted at another narrative, that the Taliban had killed a bunch of people.

How, going forward, do you hope that that changes? And do you see the new leadership there kind of jumping in on that issue?

SEC. GATES: Well, one of the -- one of the disadvantages we have in these situations is that the Taliban don't tell the truth and they don't care what the truth is. And so when you're making it up, you can respond a lot faster than when you're trying to figure out what actually happened.

And we have -- and that has been a disadvantage for us on an ongoing basis. And we have to figure out how to get inside that strategic communications cycle to get in front of this issue. This is a principal strategic tactic of the Taliban, is the use -- is either provoking or exploiting civilian casualties.

And we have done a lot -- and I must say, General McKiernan has done a lot -- in recent months to try and reduce the level of civilian casualties. The fact of the matter is, civilian casualties since January in Afghanistan are down 40 percent over a year ago during the same period. And U.S., Afghan and ISAF casualties are up 75 percent during the same period.

So there is a tremendous effort going on on our part to try and avoid civilian casualties. But figuring out how to come out better on the strategic communications side of this is an ongoing challenge for us.

Q Is it more of the process, or is it just cultural resistance in the military to just come out and say the truth as soon as you know it?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I'm not sure I would characterize it as a military cultural aspect. I think it's more an American characteristic to try and figure out what happened before you decide --

Q (Off mike) -- President Karzai came out over the weekend. He called upon the U.S. to stop using airstrikes and also to stop nighttime raids. Is that at all practical, do you think?

SEC. GATES: Well, I can't improve on General Jones' statement yesterday, that we can't fight this war with one hand tied behind us. But one of the things that General McKiernan has been working on and that I am confident that Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez will work on is how we can do better in this area.

Q Let me ask you about Swat Valley very quickly. We have seen now perhaps half-a-million Pakistanis displaced in their own country. You've given billions to Pakistan. You've urged them to engage in counterinsurgency. Is this kind of aerial and artillery bombardment the kind of -- with thousands displaced -- the kind of counterinsurgency strategy you wanted them to embark on?

ADM. MULLEN: Actually, I spoke in a continuing dialogue with General Kiyani. I spoke to him earlier today. He called me just to update me specifically. And I won't go into the -- into the details of that, but they actually have made considerable progress in recent weeks and in -- in ways that many of us -- many -- not many of us, but many would have not predicted.

Clearly, there is a concern for the refugees and taking care of that. I know that the prime minister has been out speaking to the need for the Pakistan people to support that. That's also an important strategic both shift and emphasis.

And then I guess I wouldn't get into the details of his planning or his execution, but he's certainly aware of the challenges in particular with respect to the IDPs and the need for his government and other NGOs to address that issue.

Q But are you satisfied with the strategy that you're seeing? Because there are now potentially hundreds of thousands of IDPs? Are you satisfied?

ADM. MULLEN: I think, at least historically in counterinsurgencies, particularly when you're in the -- in the aggressive -- when you -- when you start them, you do -- we do see lots of IDPs and have to address that. And certainly, we're all concerned about that. I know that it's -- that it's -- that concern is being addressed specifically by the Pakistani government as a priority.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all very much.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Submitted Statement on the FY 2010 Budget to the House Armed Services Committee**  
*As Submitted by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, May 13, 2009*

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### INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Representative McHugh, members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget. First and foremost, this is a reform budget – reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our presence there – and refocus our efforts with a new strategy – I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of what the challenges and needs are so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders – unvarnished and unscripted – has from the moment I took this job been the single greatest source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with service members over the past two-and-a-half years – meetings that have reaffirmed this budget's three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, which I will discuss as I go through the different parts of the budget.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for FY10 – a four percent increase over the FY09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there has been some discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture – especially during a time of war. I believe it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term – that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

I will break this down into three sections: our people, today's warfighter, and the related topics of acquisition reform and modernization.

### OUR PEOPLE

Starting with the roll-out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win, and to survive while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they return. So, the top-priority recommendation I made to the President was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and long-term funding. To take care of people, this budget request includes, among other priorities:

\$136 billion to fully protect and properly fund military personnel costs – an increase of nearly \$11 billion over the FY09 budget level. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps and Army will meet their respective end-

strengths of 202,100 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year, so this money will be for sustaining those force levels in FY10 and beyond;

- \$47.4 billion to fund military health care;
- \$3.3 billion for wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs, including \$400 million for research and development. We have recognized the critical and permanent nature of these programs by institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget; and
- \$9.2 billion for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education, some of which was previously funded in the bridge and supplemental budgets.

We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Overall, we have shifted \$8 billion for items or programs recently funded in war-related appropriations into the base budget.

### TODAY'S WARFIGHTER

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and must have a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs and similar to what I have tried to do with programs to support our troops. The FY10 budget reflects this thinking:

First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include:

- Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago;
- Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq; and
- Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

Second, we will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to boost our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters – an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now. Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Third, to strengthen global partnership efforts, we will fund \$550 million for key initiatives. These include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

Fourth, to grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,400 – or four percent – and will buy more aircraft for special operations forces. We will also increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY10.

Fifth, to improve our intra-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

And, finally, we will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus the previously planned 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength to 547,400. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss – which often occurs because certain specialties are in high demand. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

### ACQUISITION REFORM AND INSOURCING

In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I welcome legislative initiatives in the Congress to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with lawmakers in this regard. This budget will support these goals by:

- Reducing the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replacing them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,800 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 33,600 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years;
- Increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce, converting 10,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 10,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 – beginning with 4,080 in FY10; and
- Terminating and delaying programs whose costs are out of hand, whose technologies are immature, or whose requirements are questionable – for example, the VH-71 presidential helicopter.

### MODERNIZATION

We must be prepared for the future – prepared for challenges we can see on the horizon and ones that we may not even have imagined. I know that some people may think I am too consumed by the current wars to give

adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. This budget provides \$186 billion for modernization, which belies that claim.

As I went through the budget deliberations process, a number of principles guided my decisions:

The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising, but as yet unproven, technologies, while continuing to produce – and, as necessary, upgrade – systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and instead build more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites.

Second, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat, or accomplish roughly the same mission, we must look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. The Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, for example, had major development and cost problems to be sure. But what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the services' modernization portfolios.

Third, I looked at whether modernization programs had incorporated the experiences of combat operations since September 11th. This was particularly important to the ground services, which will be in the lead for irregular and hybrid campaigns of the future. The Future Combat Systems' ground vehicle component was particularly problematic in this regard.

Fourth, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent "exquisite" service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, then are deployed in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change, and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers.

This relates to a final guiding principle: the need for balance – to think about future conflicts in a different way – to recognize that the black and white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and platforms to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio – a mixture of capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies. It is my hope that the Quadrennial Defense Review will give us a more rigorous analytical framework for dealing with a number of these issues. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow-on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. But where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations.

## AIR CAPABILITIES

This budget demonstrates a serious commitment to maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American military strength for more than six decades. The key points of this budget as it relates to air capabilities are:

- An increase in funding from \$6.8 to \$10.4 billion for the fifth-generation F-35, which reflects a purchase of 30 planes for FY10 compared to 14 in FY09. This money will also accelerate the development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and avoid the development issues that arose in the early stages of the F-22 program. More than 500 F-35s will be produced over the next five years, with more than 2,400 total for all the services. Russia is probably six years away from Initial Operating Capability of a fifth-generation fighter and the Chinese are 10 to 12 years away. By then we expect to have more than 1,000 fifth-generation fighters in our inventory;
- This budget completes the purchase of 187 F-22 fighters – representing 183 planes plus the four funded in the FY09 supplemental to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses;
- We will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production to meet current and future needs;
- To replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer. Our aging tankers, the lifeblood of any expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement;
- We will retire approximately 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10; and
- Before continuing with a program for a next-generation manned bomber, we should first assess the requirements and what other capabilities we might have for this mission – and wait for the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the outcome of post-START arms-control negotiations.

## MARITIME CAPABILITIES

The United States must not take its current maritime dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel to ensure that dominance in the future. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to reconsider a number of assumptions – a process that will, as I mentioned, be greatly helped by the QDR.

We must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. We cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000: since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled.

The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs. This budget will:

- Shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040;
- Delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy; and
- Delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship to FY11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.

The Department will continue to invest in areas where the need and capability are proven by:

- Accelerating the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big, blue-water surface combatants;
- Adding \$200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities;
- Beginning the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine; and
- Using FY10 funds to complete the third DDG-1000 Destroyer and build one DDG-51 Destroyer. The three DDG-1000 class ships will be built at Bath Iron Works in Maine and the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program will be restarted at Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi.

#### LAND CAPABILITIES

As we have seen these last few years, our land forces will continue to bear the burdens of the wars we are in – and also the types of conflicts we may face in the future, even if not on the same scale. As I said earlier, we are on track with the expansion of the ground forces, and have added money for numerous programs that directly support warfighters and their families.

Since 1999, the Army has been pursuing its Future Combat Systems – an effort to simultaneously modernize most of its platforms, from the way individual soldiers communicate to the way mechanized divisions move. Parts of the FCS program have already demonstrated their adaptability and relevance to today's conflicts. For example, the connectivity of the Warfighter Information Network will dramatically increase the agility and situational awareness of the Army's combat formations.

But the FCS vehicle program is, despite some adjustments, based on the same assumptions as when FCS was first conceived. The premise behind the design of these vehicles is that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency, and, above all, near-total situational awareness, compensate for less heavy armor – a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare, and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I would also note that the current vehicle program does not include a role for our recent \$25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

With that in mind:

- We have canceled the existing FCS ground vehicle program, and will reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach and then relaunch a new Army vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process;
- The FCS budget in FY10 is \$3 billion. I have directed that the new FCS program be fully funded in the out-years; and
- We will accelerate FCS's Warfighter Information Network development and field it, along with proven FCS spin-off capabilities, across the entire Army.

#### MISSILE DEFENSE

The United States has made great technological progress on missile defense in the last two decades, but a number of questions remain about certain technologies and the balance between research and development on one hand, and procurement on the other. This is one area where I believe the overall sustainability of the program depends on our striking a better balance. To this end, this budget will:

- Restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – threats that North Korea's missile launch last month reminds us are real;
- Cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the

- program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems and the program's proposed operational role is highly questionable;
- Terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.2 billion; and
- Increase by \$700 million funding for our most capable theater missile defense systems like the THAAD and SM-3 programs.

#### CYBER SECURITY

To improve cyberspace capabilities, this budget:

- Increases funding for a broad range of Information Assurance capabilities to improve the security of our information as it is generated, stored, processed, and transported across our IT systems;
- Increases the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by FY11; and
- Establishes a cyber test range.

There is no doubt that the integrity and security of our computer and information systems will be challenged on an increasing basis in the future. Keeping our cyber infrastructure safe is one of our most important national-security challenges. While information technology has dramatically improved our military capabilities, our reliance on data networks has at the same time left us more vulnerable. Our networks are targets for exploitation, and potentially disruption or destruction, by a growing number of entities that include foreign governments, non-state actors, and criminal elements.

The President's cyberspace policy review will shortly report its findings and recommendations. I expect this document will offer strategic perspective for the Department in determining how best to defend the government and nation against cyber threats from state and non-state actors alike.

#### OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process – as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate view of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Department of Defense.

We are asking for \$130 billion to directly support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is less than the \$141.7 billion we asked for last year through the bridge fund and the remaining supplemental request – which in part reflects shifting some programs into the base budget.

The OCO request includes \$74.1 billion to maintain our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq – from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves.

- In Afghanistan, this will support an average of 68,000 military members and six Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents – plus support personnel; and
  - In Iraq, this will fund an average of 100,000 military members, but also reflects the President's decision to cut force levels to six Advisory and Assistance Brigades by August 31, 2010. Compared to the FY08 enacted levels for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we are asking for less than half.
- Aside from supporting direct operations, the OCO funding also includes, among other programs:
- \$17.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in theater. The major items include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, trucks, Humvees, Bradleys, Strykers, other tactical vehicles, munitions, radios, and various combat support equipment;
  - \$15.2 billion for force protection, which includes \$5.5 billion for MRAPs – \$1.5 billion to procure 1,080 new MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) for Afghanistan and \$4 billion for sustainment, upgrades, and other costs for MRAPs already fielded or being fielded.
  - \$7.5 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Ultimately, the Afghan people will shoulder the responsibility for their own security, so we must accelerate our training of their security forces in order to get more Afghans into the fight;
  - \$1.5 billion for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) – a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability;
  - \$1.4 billion for military construction – most of which will go toward infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan to support our increased troop levels; and
  - \$700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this authority for the unique and urgent

circumstances we face in Pakistan – for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires military and civilian capabilities. This is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

## CONCLUSION

Let me close with a few final thoughts.

This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than half a trillion dollars – and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending "requirements creep," terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second of all, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight – not just the wars we've traditionally been best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built – on land, at sea, or in the air – to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years – on the battlefield and, perhaps just as important, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars – not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget request is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would, however, ask you to look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do – at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Opening Statement on the FY 2010 Budget to the House Armed Services Committee**  
*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, May 13, 2009*

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Mr. Chairman, Representative McHugh, members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget. There is a tremendous amount of material here, and I know you have questions. So I will try to keep my opening remarks brief and focus on the strategy and thinking behind many of these recommendations. My submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions.

First and foremost, this is a reform budget – reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our presence there – and refocus our efforts with a new strategy – I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders – unvarnished and unscripted – has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with troops and commanders, and all that I have learned over the past two-and-a-half years – all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for FY10 – a four percent increase over the FY09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture – especially during a time of war. I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term – that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process – as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Defense Department.

This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than a half a trillion dollars – and I

believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending "requirements creep," terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight – not just the wars we have been traditionally best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built – on land, in the air, or at sea – to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years – on the battlefield and, perhaps just as importantly, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars – not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; and this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do – at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum: a dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from a capability we do need – often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.



[H.A.S.C. No. 111-56]

HEARING  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARING HELD  
MAY 13, 2009



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**FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, May 13, 2009.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you to today's hearing to review the budget request of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2010.

Appearing before us today are the Secretary of Defense, Honorable Robert M. Gates, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen.

We welcome you and appreciate your service and your being with us. Good to see you.

Let me take a moment to thank you for what you are doing for our Nation. I am sure I speak for all the members of this committee when I express the respect, the admiration and appreciation that we have for both of you.

You are doing a fantastic job for the young men and young women in uniform. We thank you for your service.

There is always something special about the annual budget request hearing. It is symbolic of the principal of the separation of powers, and it signals the start of a very important process.

Congress will give due consideration to this request from the executive branch and we will work with you to make sure that it reflects the national security priorities correctly.

The challenges before us are great, and we have two wars to fight and to win. We have the spread of violent extremism to roll back. We have what seems to be an ever increasing array of new challenges to deal with from high-tech cyber attacks to old-fashioned pirates.

Last Thursday, President Obama submitted his budget request, which includes \$533 billion for the Department of Defense, which represents an increase of 4 percent from last year.

These are tough economic times. Everyone knows that. And so I am encouraged to see some modest growth in the defense spending, even as the President attempts to strike a fiscally responsible balance.

Still, I expect that we will find that the Department of Defense will have serious and compelling unmet requirements. It will be incumbent upon us to recognize them and mitigate the risks that they represent.

But before we talk about that, first, let me commend you on delivering a bold product. Back in April, you said you would reorient the Department of Defense's strategic posture toward what you perceive as the most pressing needs—the wars we are fighting today and hybrid or irregular wars of tomorrow—all while retaining the superiority of our conventional, on the one hand, and strategic forces, on the other.

That is not an easy task. And while I have some questions about your underlying assumptions, I applaud your effort.

I am especially pleased to see that even as you do begin this process of reorientation, you have remained focused on the most critical component of our national security—our people. And I think the news media misses that.

I think it is important and I am sure that you will point that out today, taking care of the people and the troops and their families.

An increase of 8.9 percent in the military personnel accounts, 2.9-percent pay raise, all these are important examples of taking care of the service members and their families.

You also have—you fully funded the defense health program, have not tried to reduce health care costs by raising TRICARE fees.

The question that now faces us is what approach will the Department of Defense take to address the growing cost of providing health care.

I remain concerned about the current readiness of our forces. Continuous combat operations over the past seven years have consumed readiness as quickly as it has gained.

Repeated deployments, with limited dwell time, have reduced the ability of the forces to train across the full spectrum of conflict, putting the Nation at risk.

Equipment shortfalls hinder the force's ability to train for and respond to other contingencies.

In spite of this, the fiscal year 2010 budget, operation and maintenance request, basically leaves training at a steady state, in the case the Army tank miles reduces funding.

I also worry about the ability of the Navy to rebuild their fleet. The fleet today is as small as it has been since the beginning of World War II.

For the last few years, we have heard that the Navy's goal was at least 313 ships. Every year, there is a plan which shows increased ship construction in later years. Every year, those increased construction plans shift even further to the right.

Today, we have before us a request for the construction of nine ships, but see no plan for future construction to guide our deliberations.

It is not just ships that concerns me. It is very concerning that the Navy and Marine Corps strike-fighter shortfall is with us and when I do my math, simple arithmetic tells me that the Navy and the Marine Corps will be some 300 strike-fighters short in the middle of next decade.

On a more positive note, the request for missile defense provides our warfighters with real capabilities to meet the real threats faced by our country as deployed forces and as friends and our allies.

It increases funding for the Aegis ballistic missile defense and the terminal high altitude area defense systems by some \$900 million, and also increases funding for testing facilities.

Regarding the wars we are fighting today, it is good to see a renewed focus on the challenge of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President's new strategy for this region is well considered and supported here in Congress.

Still, we do have some questions about it, especially in light of the leadership decision that you announced Monday. Now, you may wish to touch on that today.

What are you going to need to get the job done? How are you going to go about it? Above all, how are you going to know if you have succeeded?

Let me return for a minute to your attempt to reorient the strategic direction of the department. I know you have said that only about 10 percent of this budget represents funding for those new capabilities, while 50 percent goes toward additional war fighting needs and the remaining 40 percent of the budget supports dual-purpose capabilities that work in any scenario.

But how do we get there?

I repeatedly took the last administration to task for lacking an overall strategy, and I have been encouraging the Obama Administration to begin a holistic process of developing one.

I need not go through the litany, which you have heard me before talk about how President Truman came up with an overall strategy and how President Eisenhower followed in the same footsteps.

On top of that, we have heard that you have postponed some decisions until report of this year's quadrennial defense review (QDR), which will be released early next year.

So help us understand the analysis you used to come up with this budget. We understand that those things deferred to the QDR need more analysis, but what about the decisions that were made now? And I hope you will touch on that, Mr. Secretary.

Last, I would like to make two quick points. The first is to note that Congress still has significant concerns regarding the planned move of the Marines from Okinawa to Guam. At over \$10 billion, it is an enormous project and I am concerned that the thinking behind it is not yet sufficiently mature.

We need to do this, but this move needs to be done right. We can't undo what we have done, and that is why we need to do it right in the first place.

The second is I would like to commend President Obama and you, Mr. Secretary, for your commitment to close the detention facility at Guantanamo and to review the legal process for bringing accused terrorists to justice.

Please take a moment today hopefully to tell us where that review effort stands and what plan there is for detainees.

Before I turn to my friend, my colleague, Mr. McHugh, John McHugh of New York, who is the ranking member of our committee, let me make a few quick administrative announcements.

We will rigorously adhere to the five-minute rule. We have nearly everyone here today and it is important that we do our very best so that everyone can ask questions.

We are starting today, we will have a noon short recess for approximately 30 minutes. The Secretary and the Admiral must leave at three o'clock this afternoon.

So that is why we must do our best to adhere to the five-minute rule. Of course, it goes without saying, there will be no outbursts or disruptive behavior from the gallery at any time.

So, John McHugh, you are on.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your leadership, particularly for lunch. I know I speak for all the members. That is not something we normally schedule in and it sounds a bit flippant, but I am sure all of us appreciate that.

I want to add my words of welcome to our most distinguished guests. I have said before, and I know we all believe very strongly, we are blessed as Americans to have such incredibly brave and sacrificing, in large measure, young men and women in uniform serving our interests across the planet.

But they become that way because of great leadership, and we have with us today two truly great leaders, the head of our military on both the military and the civilian side.

And I have found ups and downs with some of the things the new Administration has done. I have supported a lot of what they have attempted to do, but, clearly, in my judgment, two of the wisest decisions that are made is to keep these two gentlemen endeavoring on behalf of our United States military.

And I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, we are indeed fortunate that they are with us and endeavoring so hard in all of our interests.

As I have mentioned before, balancing has become a buzzword of late. It appears in Secretary Gates' very popular article in Foreign Affairs magazine, and it is really what I think can be fairly described as the animating principle behind the 2008 national defense strategy.

Certainly, balancing is not only unobjectionable, it is a good idea. I think it is important to note it is a lot easier to say than it is to do. And I guess the rub, gentlemen, is how we implement that balance, and that is where we do find ourselves today, of course, as we consider the president's fiscal year 2010 budget request.

Just over a month ago, Mr. Secretary, at your April 6 press conference, you took what you described as the "unorthodox," your word, I would agree, approach of announcing the department's request in advance of the President's budget going to the Congress.

This was done on the grounds that, in your description, you were reshaping the priorities of America's defense establishment.

As the chairman noted, that, too, as an objective, is certainly not objectionable and, in fact, has much that holds it for praise. But some of what you proposed, I think, can widely be agreed is appropriate, in particular, your efforts to make the entire department

focus on and contribute to the wars we are in today, your careful stewardship of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, are highly commendable.

But that said, as the chairman indicated in his statement, we are all interested in your decision to have Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal and Lieutenant General David Rodriguez lead our efforts in Afghanistan, and I know many of us look forward to hearing your comments on that decision during this hearing.

Mr. Secretary, it is the tradeoffs that come along with your April 6 announcement that give me, certainly, some concern. They were bold, they were dramatic. You heard the chairman's commendation for that quality.

The programmatic and funding decisions in the budget, according to your prepared remarks at that press conference, were the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements, risks and needs for the purpose of shifting the department in a different direction.

Now, it is undeniable you are taking the department in a different direction. The problem, Mr. Secretary, is, from my perspective, the Congress really hasn't had yet the benefit of reviewing the analysis and data to determine how those decisions will take the department in the best direction possible.

In the view of many, this budget process has really not been holistic. The delayed release of the budget request, the infamous prohibition on providing briefs to Congress ahead of that release, and the absence of a future years defense program has left an undeniable vacuum of analysis and justification.

Sadly, those circumstances help breed the very conclusion I suspect you wanted to avoid, that this proposal is a series of decisions whose only unifying theme is the aggregate fits within the top line.

I hope we today can help dispose of some of these serious questions, because, as I said, Mr. Secretary, I know that was not your intent.

I know there is going to be discussion that any effort to try to add back portions of this budget will be dismissed as simply the Congress attempting to protect big ticket defense programs. But I do think that perspective overlooks what gives many solid grounds for legitimate pause on some of these specifics.

Importantly, the rationale offered for those proposals in April were not simply cuts to particular platforms, but there were major reductions to military requirements, as well.

Longstanding assumptions about the capabilities needed to hedge against the risks we face were holistically changed. By way of example, we were told last month that additional F-22s are not required and, beyond that, the Air Force and Navy now require fewer strike-fighters to accomplish their missions under the national military strategy.

Another example, the quadrennial roles and missions report, which made intra-theater lift a key focus in January of this year, has now become a requirement, apparently worthy of cuts in April 2009, less than four months later.

Conversely, the budget funds other capabilities that are not yet formally validated requirements, such as the replacement for the



*Ohio* class ballistic missile submarine and the *Ticonderoga* class cruiser.

As we all know, Congress has a mandated process for attempting to reform and alter and restructure the requirements and capabilities of the department. That process, of course, is the QDR, the quadrennial defense review.

The very significant changes in this request not only occurred outside the QDR process, but arrived at our door without a commensurate level of analysis or intellectual rigor.

This committee has emphasized the need for this type of analysis. In the fiscal year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), we required the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish and assign priority levels for joint military requirements.

These decisions seemed to have been made outside that process. And the questions that arise out of all of this are simply these.

Did the world change so much since the last QDR that we are somehow at less risk and require less capability?

Can we really say that the threat of nuclear missile proliferation is now lower than it was four years ago to warrant such significant reductions to missile defense?

Are we so confident in our diplomatic efforts with Iran and North Korea that we can afford a nearly 90-percent cut in the European missile defense and a 35-percent cut to our U.S. missile defenses in Alaska and California?

Some of us, to say the least, are dubious. I worry we are tying both our arms behind our backs by reducing our defensive capabilities, while also reducing our nuclear forces, as the Administration plans to do in the context of the strategic arms reduction treaty (START) currently negotiating with Russia.

As President Reagan quipped, "Trust, but verify."

Your distinguished record, Mr. Secretary, has earned our trust, but you have not yet given us the analysis and the background that we need to verify those decisions.

That leads me back to where I started, and that is at the top line in this budget. This budget is not a four-percent increase. At best, it is treading water. In real terms, it is a two-percent increase. And when you consider the migration into the base budget of items previously funded in the supplemental, the growth is closer to one percent.

In an environment of bailouts and stimulus packages, when the federal budget has a \$634 billion placeholder for health care without a program for spending the money, the message seems to be fiscal restraint for defense and fiscal largess for everything else.

I think we can do better. That is our job, as the chairman noted.

I would, Mr. Chairman, ask that the rest of my statement be entered in the record in its entirety.

And just let me close by saying this. There is much that commends this proposal we have before us, with little time to do the analysis we need. That said, we stand ready to work with the Administration and, of course, as always, with you and the other members of the committee, Mr. Chairman, in doing the best we can by the men and women in uniform who serve us so ably and who these two gentlemen work so hard day in and day out to try to better the lives of.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back, and I look forward to the questions and answers.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your statement is placed in the record in total.

Let me announce that I am told there will be one vote on the rule at 11:15. We will make that a very, very quick turnaround and, hopefully, everyone can be back in their seats immediately after that.

We are pleased to have Secretary Gates, Secretary of Defense, with us today, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, to testify before us.

The comptroller, Bob Hale will be here for questions, as I understand it.

With that said, we look forward to your testimony, Mr. Secretary.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF  
DEFENSE**

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Representative McHugh, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's fiscal year 2010 defense budget.

There is a tremendous amount of material here and I know you have questions, so I will try to keep my opening remarks brief and focus on the strategy and thinking behind many of these recommendations.

My submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions.

First and foremost, this is a reform budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world now and in the future.

As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our focus there and refocus our efforts with a new strategy, I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely.

Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders, unvarnished and unscripted, has, from the moment I took this job, been the greatest single source for ideas on what the department needs to do both operationally and institutionally.

As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their job. Now, it is time for us in Washington to do ours.

In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with troops and commanders and all that I have learned over the past 2.5 years, all underpinning the budget's 3 principal objectives.

First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset.

As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of this business right, none of the other decisions will matter.

Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead,

while, at the same time, providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And, third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for fiscal year 2010, a 4-percent increase over the 2009 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1-percent real growth.

In addition, the department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations (OCO), primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture, especially during a time of war.

I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our Nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending.

I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch.

This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term, that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

As you know, this year, we have funded the cost of the wars through the regular budgeting process as opposed to emergency supplemental. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and, also, create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Defense Department.

This budget aims to alter many programs and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition and procurement processes.

In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate as it has over the last number of years.

We should be able to secure our Nation with a base budget of more than \$0.5 trillion, and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from Defense Secretary to Defense Secretary, Administration to Administration, and Congress to Congress.

Eliminating waste, ending requirements creep, terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the wars we have traditionally been

best suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources.

As I have said before, even when considering challenges from nation states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built, on land, in the air or at sea, to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are the lessons learned from the last eight years on the battlefield and, perhaps just as importantly, institutionally back at the Pentagon.

The responsibility of this department, first and foremost, is to fight and win wars, not just constantly prepare for them.

In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve, and this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future; about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term; about the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight; about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do, at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum. A dollar spent for X capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from a capability we do need, often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, thank you.

Admiral Mullen.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN,  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McHugh, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Let me start off by saying I fully support not only the president's fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this department, but more specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it.

He presided over a comprehensive and collaborative process, the likes of which, quite frankly, I have not seen in more than a decade of doing this sort of work in the Pentagon.

Over the course of several months and a long series of meetings and debates, every service chief and combatant commander had a voice and every one of them used it.

Now, normally, as you know, budget proposals are worked from the bottom up, with each service making the case for specific programs and then fighting it out at the end to preserve those that are most important to them.

If cuts are to be made, they are typically done across the board, with the pain shared equally.

This proposal was done from the top down. Secretary Gates gave us broad guidance, his overall vision, and then gave us the opportunity to meet it.

There would be no pet projects, nothing held sacred. Everything was given a fresh look and everything had to be justified.

We wouldn't cut for the sake of cutting or share the pain equally for doing that, as well.

Decisions to curtail or eliminate a program were based solely on its relevance and on its execution. The same can be said for those we decided to keep.

I can tell you this—none of the final decisions were easy to make, but all of them are vital to our future.

It has been said that we are what we buy, and I believe that. And I also believe that the force we are asking you to help us buy today is the right one both for the world we are living in and the world we may find ourselves living in 20 to 30 years down the road.

This submission before you is just as much strategy as it is budget, and let me tell you why.

First, it makes people our top strategic priority. I have said many times and remain convinced the best way to guarantee our future security is to support our troops and their families.

It is the recruit and retain choices of our families and, quite frankly, American citizens writ large, that will make or break the all volunteer force.

They will be less inclined to make those decisions should we not be able to offer them viable career options, adequate health care, suitable housing, advanced education, and the promise of a prosperous life long after they have taken off the uniform.

This budget devotes more than a third of the total request to what I would call the people account, with the great majority of that figure, nearly \$164 billion, going to military pay and health care.

When combined with what we plan to devote to upgrading and modernizing family housing and facilities, the total comes to \$187 billion, \$11 billion more than we asked for last year, and almost all of that increase will go to family support programs.

I am particularly proud of the funds we have dedicated to caring for our wounded. There is, in my view, no higher duty for this Nation or for those of us in leadership positions than to care for those who have sacrificed so much and who must now face lives forever changed by wounds, both seen and unseen.

I know you share that feeling and I thank you for the work you have done in this committee and throughout the Congress to pay attention to these needs. And I would add to that the families of the fallen.

Our commitment to the wounded and their families and to the families of the fallen must be for the remainder of their lives.

That is why this budget allocates funds to complete the construction of additional wounded warrior complexes, expands the pilot program designed to expedite the processing of injured troops through the disability evaluation system, increases the number of mental health professionals assigned to deployed units, and devotes more resources to the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries.

I remain deeply troubled by the long-term effects of these signature wounds of modern war and by the stigma that still surrounds them.

Last month, during a town hall meeting with soldiers at Fort Hood, Sergeant Nicole Sufman, an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) veteran, told me they were not getting enough psychological help before and after deployments.

I told her I thought she was right and that we were working hard to meet that need. She shot back, "They are hiding it, though, sir," referring to the reluctance of soldiers and families to speak openly about mental health problems.

Then she added, "It is the cause of a lot of suicides, I would imagine." And I would imagine she is right.

I have long believed that the stress of multiple deployments and the institutional pressure, real or imagined, to bear this stress with a stiff upper lip is driving some people to either leave the service or leave this life.

It can also drive them to hurt others, as this week's tragic shooting in Baghdad appears to confirm. In fact, General Lynch out there at Fort Hood doesn't talk about suicide or crime prevention. He talks about stress reduction.

That is where our collective focus must be, as well, not just from the mental health perspective, but across the force, in a variety of ways.

After nearly eight years of war, we are the most capable and combat-experienced military we have ever been, the best I have ever seen; certainly, without question, the world's best counter-insurgency force.

After all this success, we are pressed and still lack a proper balance between Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and home tempo, between Counter Insurgency (COIN) capabilities and conventional capabilities, between readiness today and readiness tomorrow.

And that, Mr. Chairman, is the second reason this budget of ours acts as a strategy for the future. It seeks balance. By investing more heavily in critical enablers, aviation, special forces, cyber operations, civil affairs, language skills, it rightly makes winning the wars we are in our operational priority.

By adjusting active Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) growth to 45, it helps ensure our ability to impact the fight sooner, increase dwell time sooner, and reduce overall demand on our equipment.

And by authorizing Secretary Gates to transfer money to the Secretary of State for reconstruction, security or stabilization, it puts more civilian professionals alongside warfighters in more places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, I can attest to the critical need for more civilian capacity. I was shocked to learn

there are only 13 U.S. civilian development experts in all of southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban movement is strongest and the local economy is almost entirely dependent on opium production.

We have twice that many working in the relatively peaceful Kurdish region of northern Iraq.

I have said it before, but it bears repeating—more boots on the ground are not the answer. We need people with slide rules and shovels and teaching degrees. We need bankers and farmers and law enforcement experts.

As we draw down responsibly in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we need a more concerted effort to build up the capacity of our partners.

The same can be said of Pakistan, where boots on the ground aren't even an option, where helping the Pakistani forces help themselves is truly our best and only recourse.

Some will argue this budget devotes too much money to these sorts of low intensity needs, that it tilts dangerously away from conventional capabilities.

It does not. A full 35 percent of the submission is set aside for modernization, and much of that will go to what we typically consider conventional requirements.

It fully funds the joint strike fighter (JSF) and F/A-18, E and F Super Hornet programs, buys another *Arleigh Burke* class destroyer, a nuclear submarine, and a third DDG-1000.

It invests \$11 billion in space-based programs, including funding for the next generation early warning satellite, and it devotes \$9 billion towards missile defense.

Ground capabilities are likewise supported, with \$3 billion going towards a restructured Future Combat Systems (FCS) program and upgrades to the Abrams and Stryker weapons systems.

We know there are global risks and threats out there not tied directly to the fight against al Qa'ida and other extremist groups, and we are going to be ready for them.

In all this, Mr. Chairman, we are also working hard to fix a flawed procurement process. Programs that aren't performing well are getting the scrutiny they deserve. The acquisition workforce is getting the manpower and expertise it merits, and a struggling industrial base is getting the support and the oversight it warrants.

More critically, in my view, the Nation is getting the military it needs for the challenges we face today and the ones we will likely face tomorrow, and it is getting more than a budget. It is getting a strategy to preserve our military superiority against a broad range of threats, new and old, big and small, now and then.

Thank you for your continued support of that important work and for all you do in this committee to support the men and women of the United States military and their families.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in the Appendix on page 86.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, both of you mentioned the need for acquisition reform, and I am sure you know that a few days ago, this committee unanimously adopted and sent to the floor an acquisition reform measure that touches upon the major weapons systems, and it is scheduled to be taken up for a vote this afternoon

in the full House of Representatives, and, hopefully, we can proceed there to conference with the Senate.

Mr. Secretary, let me ask you a process question, if I may, the process through which you arrived at this budget.

The QDR is downstream, late this year, to be made public, my recollection is, the first part of next year, and some decisions were made now regarding future budgets.

Can you tell us the process, what assumptions, what went into the development of this year's budget? I would appreciate that, sir.

Secretary GATES. First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me describe what I would call the analytical base of the decisions that we have made.

One of the criticisms that has been fairly leveled at previous QDRs is that once they were done, there was a gap between what the QDR recommended and what actually showed up in terms of resource allocation.

So I would say that, for me, beginning when I first took this job, my thinking in terms of some of these issues was actually established by the last QDR, elements of which had not yet been implemented, at least reflected in budgetary terms.

Second was the national defense strategy that came out last fall that I think had a strong analytical base and provides a rationale for a lot of what you see in front of you.

The third element, I would say, in terms of this process and the analysis, was the experience of both the uniformed and civilian individuals and leaders of the Department of Defense who took part in this process over a period of three months.

It was intensive. There were virtually—there were meetings virtually every day, three and four hours a day for that three-month period, and a lot of analysis got done in the middle of that process.

Another, as I indicated earlier in my remarks, has been my own experience, not just in this job, but going back more than 40 years in this national security arena.

Another element was the process itself and the way we went about the discussions, the number of meetings with the military leadership, both collectively and individually. Members of the chiefs came to see me, in some cases, repeatedly, about different elements of this, and both uniformed and civilian Defense Department representatives will be more than happy to answer the questions of members of this committee on that process.

As far as I was concerned, the inhibitions on people imposed by the nondisclosure agreement ended when the president sent his budget to the Congress. And so people will be prepared to answer your questions fully.

I would say another element of this process that was important, from an analytical standpoint, frankly, was common sense. There are a lot of these programs that, as far as I am concerned, were kind of no-brainers.

There were some of these programs where the decisions that I made were based on the fact that the programs were out of control, the requirements didn't make any sense, the costs were too high, they couldn't meet the schedule, and so on.



So it didn't require deep analysis to figure out that those programs ought to be stopped as poster children for an acquisition process gone wrong.

And I would just conclude my comments on this. First of all, we did—those issues where I felt—where the chairman and I felt that there wasn't an adequate analytical base to make a decision at this point, we did, in fact, defer to the QDR, but also to the nuclear program review, nuclear posture review (NPR) that will be going on simultaneously with the QDR, and that includes like the next generation bomber.

It includes the amphibious capability. There were a number of areas where we felt we did not have the analytical basis to go forward.

So let me conclude my answer to this question with a broader statement.

I don't believe the problems that affect our strategy and our acquisition process are the result of a lack of analysis. The Department of Defense is drowning in analysis. There are enough acquisition reform papers to fill my office.

It seems to me that we have a process that is paralyzed by analysis and that makes making tough calls very difficult.

So I guess my bottom line, my bumper sticker would be the problem in the Department of Defense is not a lack of analysis, but a lack of will to make tough decisions and tough calls, and I think we have done that this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

I will limit my questions and, from time to time, I will interrupt and ask future ones.

Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let's stay right where we are, Mr. Secretary. Your very fulsome answer suggests that there was a lot of analysis.

I think part of the problem that we have is we had absolutely no clarity, visibility or any insight onto that analysis, number one.

Number two, you talk about the individual systems that were involved in your decisions and how some members are probably going to take exception to that.

I would agree, but my concern is on the process. You feel very strongly about the decisions you made, I recognize that. We have, however, in law, the quadrennial defense review process that isn't intended to do much of anything more than ensure that we have developed a strategy for success, whatever that success may be, that precedes the budget, that allows the budget to consider it.

Having said that, I fully agree with you, at least your observation that the recent QDRs have been a total mismatch. But I would much rather have a mismatch where we have set an honest strategy and failed to provide the resources, because that accounts for who failed, than to set a false strategy that is somehow melded to a budget figure that has no relationship to the threat.

And that is why this process that you undertook internally troubles me, because it doesn't comport with the QDR requirement; that, in fact, we were totally shut off from it.

You mentioned the nondisclosure statements, that some call a gag order, that kept this Congress from doing its job, and that is what worries me.

And as the QDR goes forward, and I will come to a question at this point, help assuage my concerns. How do we now not have a QDR process that is imbued with the conclusions that you have already made? That becomes a starting point, does it not?

How do you un-ring that bell if the QDR proves to be a mismatch? Why are you not actually requiring the outcome that you don't want to see happen? This QDR is nothing more, upcoming, than a budget exercise.

Secretary GATES. Well, I would disagree with that, Mr. McHugh. I think that there are a lot of analytical areas that we are going to pursue.

But I would give you an example of the mismatch between QDRs and where we have gone with our resources.

Since the QDR in 1991, it has been recommended that the Department of Defense move away from a two-MCO, two-major combat operation, fundamental approach to how we size our forces, and we have never done that.

And I will tell you, this—you are saying that I am going to try and shape this QDR, my answer is you are darn right. And my view is that since 1991, it has been important to look at a world that was more complicated than two MCOs.

And the fundamental question facing the QDR is how do we account for a world that is not accounted for by two MCOs, and that will have huge resource implications, but it will also have enormous strategic and force sizing implications.

But that is a very overdue kind of thing and, frankly, I think that what is needed is both a managerial or executive and analytical leadership, and I am prepared to move down that road. And if I am on the wrong path, then I would be happy to give way to somebody else.

But we will—you know, the other aspect is the notion that the Congress was excluded from the internal deliberations of the Department of Defense because of this process.

The only reason the Congress was included in the internal deliberations of the executive branch process in the past was because the building leaks like a sieve.

It wasn't through formal releases or formal briefings up here that the Congress found out what was going on. It was because they had a hotline to virtually every office in the building.

So it seemed to me, for us to have a coherent approach that looked at all of the aspects of the budget, we had to be able to do that without leaks, and that was the only purpose of the nondisclosure statement.

It was absolutely not intended to keep the Congress from knowing what is going on and, as I said, people from the department are prepared to come up here and talk about any part of this process that you all want to talk about.

But I think that there is a strong analytical foundation here. It is grounded in the last QDR. I think it is grounded in the general direction that I have provided for the next QDR in the terms of reference.

But I will assure you that the people in the Department of Defense are intellectually independent enough that they will take their own—if they have a disagreement with what I have said, I have no doubt that they will raise that and make it a part of the process.

Mr. MCHUGH. Just for a point of clarification, Mr. Secretary, I am not talking about the budget development that is normally a source of tension between Congress and the leaks, whether they occur on the Virginia side of the Potomac or on the Washington side of the Potomac.

I am talking about the analysis behind these very major decisions that you made that may be totally right, and, here, our discussion is a real result of the problem of the process, that may be right, but we have no idea.

Normally, we would be provided those analyses as part of the QDR review. We were circumvented from having that opportunity.

That is why I would suggest, respectfully, if you are going to break out into what you described as “unorthodox,” that was your word and I would fully agree with it, unorthodox process, there becomes a level of added responsibility on the analysis that would have behooved us all.

You would not have to listen to me right now, which I am sure would be a great relief to you—you are not under oath, so you can say anything you want—and those of us on this side who really want to be a helpful part of the process.

There is not a question there, but I just hope, as we go forward, we can have better lines of communications on the analysis. That is what troubles me, not your right to some sort of protections and keeping away from Congress on the budget process, I recognize that, as much as we like to have forewarning, but on analysis that leads to some pretty substantial platform recommendations without any valid analysis that we have seen.

You can talk about what is in-house, we don't know that. So I appreciate your response and the opportunity to be here today with you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh, I would just like to say, first of all, I am always interested in your questions, but the purpose of this hearing and of the number of hearings that you have scheduled is, in fact, to provide an opportunity to hear the analysis that went into or the reasoning that went into these conclusions.

And I would just make one final point. Had I waited—I did not want to miss the fiscal year 2010 opportunity to begin making changes in the direction of the Department of Defense and the way we do business.

Had I waited for the end of the QDR and the nuclear posture review, had I waited for the end of all these processes, we probably would have been looking at the fiscal year 2012 budget before I began to have any real impact, and, frankly, by that time, I expect somebody else will be sitting here.

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I wouldn't wish from your lips to God's ears on that one.

But let me just, if I may, Mr. Chairman, just say to you, Mr. Chairman, I recognize the imperatives the good Secretary was facing and the choices he made.

Perhaps we should go back and look at Section 118 of Title 10, which is the law that provides for the QDR, and make some sort of future accommodation, because, obviously, there is a mismatch between that requirement, as Congress has seen fit to insert itself, and what the pressures that Secretary Gates—

Thank you. I would yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. We are now under the five-minute rule.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, thank you both for your superb service to our country and for your fresh look at our armed forces.

With the additional increment on the way to Afghanistan, I believe our total troop strength there, ours, will be about 60,000. Is that correct?

Secretary GATES. 68,000, Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Can you give us some notion of what you think will be the ultimate number of troops we will commit there, that we ourselves, not our allies, will have to commit there to get the mission done?

Admiral MULLEN. The 68,000 will be there at the commander on the ground's request, General McKiernan, later this year and what we are both developing are series of benchmarks to understand and assess where we are later in the year.

There was an outstanding request from General McKiernan of about another 10,000, but that really is deferred and that was for really 2010, calendar year 2010.

But what we want to do is see where we are later this year and then look at the requirements.

From my perspective, based on what I understood sort of going into this whole strategic review, the output of the strategic review, is that were that additional requirement to be validated later on, and it has not been submitted nor has it been approved, but that that was about another 10,000 and that that was about right in terms of how I saw the fight and the number of troops that we would need.

At this point, I don't see us moving to a level that we had in Iraq, for instance, or anything like that. But there are also circumstances which can change that and I certainly wouldn't want to close out the commander on the ground's views with respect to what he needs in the future.

Mr. SPRATT. You did know, paradoxically, that we needed additional troops with slide rules.

Admiral MULLEN. Those are actually additional civilians.

Mr. SPRATT. I understand that, but you need a civilian complement that is significant to achieve the mission.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. But that is a much smaller number, from an analytical standpoint, in the hundreds, not in the thousands.

Mr. SPRATT. If you are looking at slide rules, you will probably do better to look for Blackberries in Hewlett Packard, I think.

Admiral MULLEN. Relating my own experience here.

Mr. SPRATT. I believe it is your generation.

Once we get the drawdown in Iraq underway, 8/31/2010, as I understand it, is agreeable to the joint chiefs, can we then expect to see an improvement in the dwell time so that we don't have one-to-one, we have 1.3, at least, to one?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. What I can see right now in terms of our deployments and what the commanders have requested, it is probably in about mid to late 2010 where we start to see dwell time increase beyond one-to-one significantly.

We are seeing some of it now, but it is very spotty, particularly in the Army. Some units are actually home longer than one-to-one. But writ large, from a commitment standpoint, it is probably mid to late—it is the next 18 to 24 months before that really starts to show some relief.

Mr. SPRATT. What do we have to do to get our allies to pull their oar, to do more, to take on more serious responsibility within Afghanistan?

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I think we need to continue to engage them. I mean, that was a big part of, obviously, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit request.

They actually have stepped up with additional capabilities. The strong desire there is less—for me, anyway, less on the military side than on the civilian side, the other kinds of capabilities that we need, and some of our allies have done that recently.

And I think we need to continue to make that requirement known and continue to push in that direction.

I also think that security is going to get harder as we add more troops, but when we get to a point where security gets better, there will be additional civilian capabilities which would be added, tied to both better security and not just from governments, but also Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other kinds of requirements that we need.

Mr. SPRATT. One final question. Secretary Gates, you mentioned—Admiral Mullen, also—the stress and strain on our equipment in this harsh operating environment, and the circuitous route that—I was about to be gaveled down, I was waiting on it to fall.

Given that concern, are you concerned about stopping the F-22 at 187 planes and what will happen as attrition begins to take its toll on that force?

Secretary GATES. Well, there is very little attrition on the F-22 force, since it has never flown a combat mission in either Iraq or Afghanistan.

And I would just—knowing that the F-22 is an issue of interest to folks, I think it is important to make clear to everybody that we are not cutting the F-22 force. We are completing the program of record that was established in 2005 in the Bush administration.

That then called for 183 F-22s, that is the program of record, that 2 different presidents, 2 different secretaries of defense, and 2 different chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has thought was the right number.

We now can add the Secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff of the Air Force to that. So there is no cut in the F-22 program and, in fact, over the next 5 years, 5-year defense plan, there is \$7 billion in modernization money for the F-22.

It will be an important part of our force, but we are completing a program, we are not cutting anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our country.

My staff prepared some material for me and it began by saying "I could not agree more with the comments made by our ranking member." I said, "I haven't heard his comments, let me reserve judgment on that until I hear his comments."

Having heard his comments, I can say with great enthusiasm and conviction that I could not agree more with the opening—with the comments made by our ranking member.

Relative to that, Mr. Secretary, I have two questions regarding two of the programs that you have recommended major changes in.

One is the joint cargo aircraft. This is a small cargo aircraft, originally envisioned by the Army. Their study said they needed 78 of them.

At two recent hearings, I have asked the Army and the Guard if there has been any study that indicated that they now need less than 78. They told me there was no study that indicated they need less 78; in fact, they needed 78.

It is my memory that the Air Force was kind of dragged reluctantly, some would say kicking and screaming, into this relationship. They needed 24 aircraft. That has not yet been added to the 28. That was going to wait until the Air Force had solidified their needs before that was done.

Now, you are recommending that you cancel all the future planes to the Army. It was originally their program.

I would just like some understanding as to what has changed, because both the Army and the Guard say that nothing has changed, they still need the 78.

The next program that I have some questions about is the DH-71. So far, we have spent \$3.2 billion on that program. I am told that if we now terminate it, there will be about a half a \$1 billion cost in the industry and about a tenth of a \$1 billion cost in the Navy for terminating that program.

That will be \$4 billion, nine helicopters, none of them ready for service.

If we did a make ready for five of them so that they could be used, that would cost \$1.3 billion, I am told. This is about \$260 million per aircraft.

I know there is a concern about a five-year service life, that is all it has been certified for, but I am told that the father of Thomas Lockes was originally involved with the certification of the DH-3.

The DH-3 now carries twice the load that it was designed to carry, and no one will argue that it has not had a very good 30-year-plus service life.

No one believes that the 71 is built less well than that and we believe that it could be certified for a very much longer service life than that.

I am told that the manufacturer of the helicopter will commit to a firm fixed price bid for the original amount of \$6.8 billion. This would mean that the additional cost of \$1.7 billion spread over 14

more aircraft; to bring it up to 19, it would cost us \$120 million per aircraft.

So this program was started. We made some shortcuts in how we procured this first increment, because, and I would like to quote, that there was "an urgent need to get a more capable helicopter in the hands of the President."

What has changed, sir, that this urgent need has gone away, that we now can wait for a new procurement and use none of these aircraft?

Wouldn't it make sense to go ahead and make ready the 5 of these 9 and to procure the next 14 at only \$120 million each?

Comments, please, on these two programs.

Secretary GATES. First, on the joint cargo aircraft, the C-27 has half the payload of a C-130 and costs two-thirds as much. It can use exactly 1 percent more runways or airstrips than the C-130.

We have 424 C-130s in the force,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of which are in the Reserve component.

At this point, the Air National Guard has—and I would say we have 36 C-130s committed to both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The reality is, here at home, we have over 200 C-130s that are available and uncommitted. So the notion that cutting or limiting the C-27 program somehow reduces the ability of the Air National Guard or the Army to respond to a national disaster or natural disaster or some other kind of disaster here at home is not sustainable.

The 38 number comes simply from recapitalizing the Army's C-23 Sherpa program. We will be looking, as we go forward with the QDR, at the balance between the heavy lift helicopters, C-27s, and C-130s.

The 38 aircraft procurement will take us over the next 3 fiscal years. So there will be no interruption in production. And so if, as a result of that analysis, there is a decision that there should be more, we have the flexibility to do that.

But at this point, it does not seem necessary given the enormous available capability and capacity that we have in the C-130s to meet the need.

Now, what has to change, and here is where I acknowledge the validity of one of your points, the Air Force culture and approach to how they support the Army in this arena has to change, and General Schwartz and General Casey are already talking about that in terms of how the Air Force becomes significantly more responsive to Army needs, and I think that they are going to make considerable progress in that.

With respect to the helicopter, this is a program that was originally budgeted at \$6.8 billion, is now headed toward \$13 billion. It is six years overdue. It does not meet the requirements of the White House. The first increment does not meet the requirements the White House has imposed by a long shot.

The current helicopters the President has have had a usage life at this point of 30 to 40 years. The design life of the VH-71 is 5 to 10 years, and still does not meet the requirement.

If we went forward with this program, each of the helicopters we bought would still be about \$400 million apiece, and I think I have heard—you have heard the President speak to that.

We think that this is a program where both the acquisition and the requirements process got out of control. We need to start over. The President does need a new helicopter over the next several years and it is our intent in fiscal year 2011 to return to this with a new proposal and a new bid for presidential helicopter, but one that is managed a lot more carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, thank you so much for your service.

You mentioned the possibility, and I think that—I hope we do it right—the increase of our military presence in Afghanistan to about 58,000 soldiers.

And my concern is the routes that we have, and I know that some of the equipment that we have—in fact, early last night or this morning, a military, our military depot was attacked and a lot of equipment was destroyed, and this is one of my concerns.

But recently, a story surfaced by one of the TV stations and it was aired on KHOU in Houston, and it says the recent reports and firsthand accounts from service members returning from Iraq indicate that there is a shortage of bottled water, bottled drinking water.

And I know we had this problem some time back, but this has surfaced, and, as a result, these service members claimed they are forced to improvise and sometimes end up drinking the bulk water, which may or may not be of drinking quality standards.

And now some of these service members indicate that they are facing long-term health issues, kidney failures, et cetera, due to the necessity of not having to drink water that is clean and safe for them to drink.

My concern is that if we don't have the proper routes to get there, if they cannot get the equipment and if they cannot get drinking water—have you been made aware of some of this problem, Mr. Secretary or Chairman Mullen?

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I have seen the story that came out of Houston and am aware of that. We have checked to see if there is any shortage of bottled water, and, initially, that is not the case. I mean, that isn't the case.

But we are not done and we will continue to wring this out. We are all very concerned about troops, obviously, in the field being provided what they need. It is a top priority for the Secretary and myself.

In my recent visits, and I sit down and have discussions with them and I know the Secretary does, as well, that they do bring up some issues.

This has not been one specifically, however. In fact, from a provisioning, overall provisioning standpoint, that has been a great strength of ours for a significant period of time.

But if there is something here, we will certainly get back to you.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, one of the things—we were there, the chairman and I and some other members, in Afghanistan and some of the soldiers that we spoke to said, "We are happy to be here," which is the base close to the embassy.



But what is life like at the forward operating posts now? And I know we have many of them and sometimes they are embedded with Afghanistanian troops.

Do you feel safe that even though they are way out there, that they are getting their equipment and the materials that they need, not only the drinking water, but to be able to survive way out there in the boondocks?

Admiral MULLEN. I feel comfortable they are getting the provisions. Again, we are running this to ground to see if there is more there than we understand right now.

But I have visited many of those Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). I have been out there in very stark circumstances. I have had meals with them. I have seen them resourced adequately. It is, obviously, not something that is available in the big mess halls or the big dining facilities on the big bases, but it has been adequate.

And actually, as I have pulled on this, when I sit down with troops, I don't get any negative feedback.

Secretary GATES. I would just add. I was in Afghanistan last week and visited 3 forward operating bases and had 3 different meetings with a total of probably 600 soldiers and Marines and a lot of Q-and-A, and I didn't get a single question about their provisioning.

Mr. ORTIZ. I know my time is about up. Again, thank you for your service. Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you, as well.

I want to commend you both on your comments about your concern about the wounded, your concern about the mental health and the physical health, and I want to thank you for the request that you put in, \$47.4 billion, to fund military health care, and \$3.3 billion for wounded, ill, injured, traumatic brain injury.

That brings me to the issue that I want to bring to your attention and will have a question shortly.

Six years ago, hyperbaric oxygen treatment (HBOT) was brought to my attention. Six years ago, I made an inquiry of the Department of Defense and I was told that this was a treatment that was being studied and that they saw pluses and minuses.

Again, that was six years ago.

I want to read a letter—part of a letter—excuse me—from three soldiers and Marines who received this treatment.

This is from Brigadier General Pat Manny, United States Army Reserves. "Seventeen months into Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) tour, I was injured by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in August of 2005. I spent almost 20 months at Walter Reed before I was medically retired from the Army Reserve.

After a year of conventional testing and treatment, pharmaceuticals, physical therapy, et cetera, I had not recovered enough to remain in the Army and, I believe, to return to my civilian job.

A physician friend suggested HBOT, hyperbaric oxygen treatment. Thanks to several courageous, innovative Army physicians, I received 80 1-hour treatments at George Washington University

Hospital before the process to involuntarily retire me was completed.

I experienced excellent results and was able to resume my civilian career as a state court judge."

He further stated, "Research may be appropriate, but known successful treatment is available and needed now. Congress should direct the Department of Defense and TRICARE to make HBOT available to wounded warriors."

Let me go now, because I want to get to a question before my time is up, Marine Corporal Brian Wilson from Massachusetts, and I have spoken to him, by the way:

"I served two combat tours of duty in Al Anbar Province in Iraq from January 2005 to August 2005, March 2006 to September 2006.

During the course of my first deployment, I was hit by two more IEDs. During the second tour, I was exposed to four additional explosive blasts while on combat patrol."

He also received hyperbaric oxygen treatment. And I further read, very quickly, "Clearly, I would not be holding down the job I presently have and be medication free. My success is clearly the result of hyperbaric oxygen treatment I received from Dr. Harsh.

I am firmly convinced that my fellow Marines and soldiers and sailors who have been diagnosed with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and presently being treated with medication and counseling, rendering them unfit for duty or for reintegration back to the civilian world, would benefit from hyperbaric treatment."

I read from Colonel Bud Day, a hero of this Nation, Vietnam veteran, Medal of Honor winner, whose grandson was also wounded, a Marine. He sought hyperbaric treatment for him.

This letter, Mr. Secretary, is just flowing with praise for this treatment. I will read one paragraph, and then I want to get to the question:

"From a purely practical standard and the issue of loyalty to these kids we have sent off to war, any treatment that we provide these young people is better than the gross neglect and bureaucratic intricacy that has been the rule rather than the exception."

Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you—I want to present these letters to your staff and I wish you would take time, and, Admiral Mullen, to read these clearly from these three men. Read what they are saying.

I have been told, again, six years ago, we are studying this treatment. These letters and other letters, I think it is time that you say to the Department of Defense, the medical division, "Please take this research you are doing and give me, within the next year, a report of where we are on this treatment, because I have talked to numerous Marines, I have talked to Army, that have had this treatment, by telephone, and they have told me, "I am now a complete human being instead of being dependent on drugs, counseling."

I am not saying it would work in every situation, but as you said in your testimony, they deserve our best, if we have it.

Can you say to this committee, can you say to me, can you say to the military that you will ask those who are researching and

studying this issue that, that you will ask for some type of report sooner rather than later?

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, I can't speak for Secretary Gates on this in terms of that report, but I understand there is potential here. I am not a medical officer, not a doctor, sir.

And as we have visited families, Deborah and myself, and some of the doctors—Veterans Affairs (VA) in Tampa is a good example. There is a doctor there by the name of Scott, who is a big believer in this.

So I certainly will commit to pull on this as hard as we can to see where we are.

What I have been told when I have asked about this is it is not Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved. And so I fear what we are still doing is studying it. And if it has positive effects, we ought to be able to do it.

I understand there aren't many down—there are no downsides. That is what I have been briefed before.

So we can certainly take a very focused look on it and, if it has potential, I think, try to bring it forward.

Secretary GATES. We will follow up.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 111.]

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, I have just been informed that there will be 3 votes, a 15-minute and then 2 5-minute votes, which will probably take about 30 minutes, and they will come shortly.

With your permission, why don't we use that as the lunch break, so we won't have to have 2 back-to-back 30-minute recesses? If that is all right with you, we will proceed.

Hearing no objection.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral Mullen, I want to thank you, your sons, and your lovely bride, for your service to our country.

Secretary Gates, I don't compliment people enough, but in your case, you deserve it. You have done, I think, a very, very good job of turning the department around.

I particularly want to compliment you for your willingness to put the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) in service and the lives a day it saved. And I want to compliment you on your acquisition reform. I think you are very much heading in the right direction.

A couple things I would like to ask you to consider. Your department has been very willing to send wounded warriors to the military academies, keep them in uniform, give them a chance to stay in uniform, and yet continue to contribute.

I would hope you would consider expanding that to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs, the reason being that our fine kids from other parts of the country, other than the north-east or Colorado, who say, "You know, I would love to get closer to my family while I am doing this," and I think that is why the ROTC programs would fill that gap, still provide the things that they are providing, still allow them to remain in uniform.

Secondly, on your acquisition reform, I have got to notice with a bit of irony that one of the most troubled Navy shipbuilding programs is the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), and yet you are asking for three of them.

Again, just something ironic there, what I would ask of you is that given that what should have been a \$220 million ship turned into almost a \$600 million ship and going back to your analogy of the small cargo plane versus the 130, where you—you are now bumping up against DDG-51 prices and you are getting a ship that is about one-fifth as capable.

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has convinced me that he wants the ship. I am going to agree with him. What I would like to hear from you, though, is your plans to hold the contractors to the amount of money that you requested in the budget.

What I would like to hear you say is that you are going to ask for firm fixed contracts. And what I would further like to hear you say is if the existing contractors will not live by those prices, I would like to hear a willingness on your part to take some of the money that would have gone to build those ships at that price, get a full set of specifications on the ships, put them out there for other people to bid on, because I have got to believe that what has been going on with these two contractors is unacceptable from the Navy's point of view and from the American taxpayers' point of view.

Just your thoughts.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 111.]

Secretary GATES. First, I think that having wounded warriors still in uniform be instructors for ROTC is a great idea and I will follow up on that.

On the LCS, I think that what you have asked sounds very reasonable to me. I have left these ships in because we need this green water capability and we especially need it in places like the Gulf, the Persian Gulf.

But the costs have escalated and if we want to buy 14 of these over the 5-year defense plan and 55 all together, clearly, we have got to get the costs under control, and I think your requests are quite reasonable.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that.

I think the last thing I would ask of you, I think—and, again, I appreciate you trying to put your acquisition force back together.

But what I think I have noticed is that you have an acquisition force that is pretty good at looking at a set of specs and saying, "Yes, you are building it to spec."

What I don't think I see is an acquisition force that says, "You know what? If you bought this machine, you could do it faster, you could do it cheaper, and, above all, you could save the Nation some money as you build a ship quicker."

I would hope that would be one of the goals on this program, and I will use the LCS-2 as an example. My estimation is that over 95 percent of that ship was hand-welded. That is unacceptable in today's world. That would never happen in the commercial world.

The commercial folks wouldn't put up with that and I don't think we should, and I think, again, part of your acquisition strategy

ought to be getting the right people in there to tell them how to build them faster, quicker, and less expensive to the Nation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Mississippi.

We can squeeze one more in before we take the quick break for the votes.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you both for being here. I share the respect that you have heard many members mention, but that respect can't serve as a shield to prevent me from doing my job and just expressing my frustration with what I perceive as a lack of transparency in this process.

Mr. McHugh touched on some of that, and I would like to ask you a few questions about that. And realizing that I only have five minutes, I would just ask that we get those answers as brief as possible, and you can elaborate on them in written form.

Several members of this committee have sent you a letter, dated May 5, asking you about some of those situations, including the nondisclosure requirement that you had and, also, the INSERV requirements for our INSERV inspections and classifying those.

So far, we have not had a response on that. But as to this non-disclosure agreement, you heard Congressman McHugh mention that some people called it a gag order. The people that call it a gag order are many of the people that had to sign it.

Can you tell us today how many people were forced to sign this particular agreement?

Secretary GATES. I don't know exactly. I would expect probably several hundred.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 111.]

Mr. FORBES. Could you get that number to us when you get a chance to verify about how many it was?

The second thing is in this document, it says that they could not divulge it to any individual not authorized to receive the information.

How did they know which individuals were authorized to receive information?

Secretary GATES. It would have been within the Department of Defense.

Mr. FORBES. Well, was that ever disseminated in any form so that they knew who they could talk to and who they couldn't?

Secretary GATES. Well, sir, the question, I must say, of the people that signed it, that question never came to me.

Mr. FORBES. Of those individuals, you have communicated at least—we got an e-mail, I got one at 7:14 this morning, saying that they could now talk about some of these budget issues.

How has that information been disseminated to the people that have signed this document?

Secretary GATES. I announced it at my staff meeting on Monday.

Mr. FORBES. You announced it at your staff meeting. But as to the individuals that signed it, have they been sent anything indicating that that is the policy?

Secretary GATES. Not yet, no, sir.

Mr. FORBES. And the other thing is it talks about anything—it also mentioned any supplemental budget requests.

Many of the things that weren't included in the budget could have also been included in a supplemental later this year.

How will you differentiate what they can talk about and what they can't?

Secretary GATES. As far as I am concerned, sir, the nondisclosure process is over.

Mr. FORBES. And, Mr. Secretary, the only thing I will tell you is it is very, very difficult, when you talk about them coming in here and speaking their mind now, for us to expect that we are going to have a hearing where they walk in here as a uniformed member of our military and really say that they disagree with something that is in this budget.

But suffice that to say, also, on the budget—

Secretary GATES. On that score, sir, I can tell you that a couple of the service chiefs have been very direct with me that—

Mr. FORBES. Well, they will come—

Secretary GATES [continuing]. When they testify, they intend to say that they disagreed with the decision. So I don't think you have to worry about their candor at all.

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, they will come over tomorrow and testify, I believe, some of them. Is that not correct? I think some of them are scheduled for—but yet they will come without having the unfunded list that will be available for them when they give their testimony.

I think that is going to be the case. You might look into it.

But in the little bit of time that I have got, also, it is my understanding that the statute requires that we have a 30-year shipbuilding plan that is certified by you when the budget comes over.

Have you submitted that plan and have you certified that this budget will comply with that plan?

Secretary GATES. I don't think so.

Mr. FORBES. Are you going to be doing that?

Secretary GATES. The Admiral—well—

Admiral MULLEN. That is a Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) issue, Mr. Forbes. And for this budget, with a new Administration, typically, we don't do that, and it will come in the 2011 budget.

And I would say we can rely reasonably well on the 30-year shipbuilding plan that has been submitted before.

Mr. FORBES. And, Admiral, my time is going out, but let me just say this. The reason that is in there is because you have to certify that the budget will meet the shipbuilding plan and if not, what the risks are.

We are not getting that information. And I would just follow up with the fact that now we have had classification of these INSERV inspections. It is very important for us to know the status of our repair and maintenance budgets, because last year, this committee put \$120 million in for ship repair and maintenance that was killed in the Senate.

The problem is if we don't and can't talk about those INSERV failures that are coming out, it makes it very, very difficult for us to argue about the shipbuilding and—I am sorry—ship repair and maintenance needs that we have.

And if we don't have this certification, it gives us some concern as to whether or not the budget that we have is actually going to meet that shipbuilding plan.

So I would just ask you to take a look at that. I come back to what Congressman McHugh said. It is not so much your analysis—my time is out—but it is just the fact of the lack of transparency to help us conclude that analysis was correct.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 111.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Before we break, let me ask, Mr. Secretary, a very quick question.

There is such a thing known as the Pakistan counterinsurgency capabilities fund. You are familiar with that.

Could you give us, in 25 words or less, how you think it should be structured?

Secretary GATES. What I have suggested is that the \$400 million that is in the 2009 supplemental be allocated to the Department of Defense; that for fiscal year 2010—the concern has been where does the State Department get control of this program.

And what I have proposed is that the money in fiscal year 2010 flow through the Department of State to the Department of Defense so that the State Department gets the money and then that they would use fiscal year 2010 to build the capacity to be able to execute this program and then in fiscal year 2011, the entire program would go to the State Department, even though probably some significant portion of the money would still come to us to execute.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will recess until 12:15.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will resume and, Dr. Snyder, you are up.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you here again. I appreciate your presentation of this budget, what you are calling a reform budget. You have always been a very thoughtful man in your presentations here.

It seems to me there is a passion here today that perhaps you haven't had in the past and although I am suspicious the passion may be this is the first time you have come before us in a long time, that you haven't had a cast or a splint or a bandage on or something.

But I do appreciate the passion that you have shown for this process that you have gone through. You are being criticized for somehow it being a closed process. As near as I can tell, you wanted to have a deliberative in-house process with candor and then you present your budget for us to do with as we want.

The Center for American Progress, a couple of months ago, put out two reports. One is "Swords and Ploughshares: Sustainable Security in Afghanistan Requires Sweeping U.S. Policy Overhaul." And my only comment about it, I didn't see much new in this.

I go back to your Kansas State speech that you made in November of 2007, in which you called for some dramatic changes in how we do national security with regard to the civilian side, and I appreciate the comments you made back there.

The other publication they put out, though, is "Sustainable Security in Afghanistan: Creating an Effective and Responsible Strategy for the Forgotten Front."

And what this report says is, "Two paramount national security interests of the United States are to prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists and to ensure the deteriorating security situation there does not envelop the surrounding region in a broader power struggle.

Doing so will require a prolonged U.S. engagement using all elements of U.S. national power, diplomatic, economic and military, in a sustained effort that could last as long as another 10 years."

My question is—I am concerned that we are setting up a process here that is going on right now, whether we are dealing with the supplemental, that you all are going to get everything that we can give you as far as dealing with Afghanistan and Iraq for the next year, but that when we get to the next year after that, that you will start seeing some of us say, "Well, wait a minute. It is not over yet. You haven't made as much progress as we thought you might."

Would you comment on how you see our commitment ought to be? My own view is going into this, we ought to recognize it is going to be a long-term commitment and somehow this is magically going to end in one year.

But would you comment on that, please?

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. I think that early in the budgeting process, when we were doing out years and looking at these overseas contingency operations, we basically had a much lower number in the out years.

It was basically little more than a plug in the budget, because we knew that we really couldn't estimate what the cost was going to be.

I think that the \$130 billion for 2010, it is down about \$11 billion from 2009, it sounds like a pretty good estimate right now. The burn rate as of February was about \$10 billion, a little over \$10 billion a month. The obligation level was about \$11 billion-plus.

So I think we are in the right ballpark. But that number will come down, particularly in 2010, in calendar year 2010, as we substantially reduce our presence in Iraq.

But I guess the bottom line answer to your question is that I believe that there will be war costs that will need to be covered in these overseas contingency operations portions of the bill for some years to come, and that is whether—that is on the assumption that we are successful.

It is still going to take a sustained commitment, both civilian and military.

Dr. SNYDER. And so those of us who may want to say we will, at this time next year, be evaluating how well we are doing in Afghanistan, either we will be doing about the same, better or worse, that is not necessarily a predictor of how things are going to turn out over the long run.

Is that a fair statement?



Secretary GATES. Right, although I believe—I think that is an accurate statement, but my hope is, and I would characterize it as that, is that with the new strategy and with some changes and adjustments in our military approach, my hope would be that by the end of this year, we will begin to see a change in momentum at least, that we will be able to point to the fact that things are beginning slowly to turn in our direction.

This is not a short term enterprise, by any means.

Dr. SNYDER. And I think that is a message that all of us need to be repeating, not just you, that this is not a short-term enterprise, because otherwise we set up our brave men and women for some real problems if we somehow expect this to dramatically turn around in one year.

Thank you all for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. LoBiondo.

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you very much for being here.

I wanted to focus a little bit on a topic that Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and I have been attempting to raise over a period of time involving the Air National Guard.

And they are predicting, as you know, Mr. Secretary, that in about eight years or so, a little bit of flexibility in the flying time or the hours, that about 80 percent of its air sovereignty alert aircraft units will begin running out of flying hours.

In previous hearings on this issue, the committee has been assured that the Air Force is working on it and that everything will be okay and that we can just hang on a little bit more and we will see what the plan is.

Well, I am really concerned that it has taken this long for the problem to be recognized. I really don't think that it has been properly addressed.

And we need to understand that it appears, to at least some of us, that there is a lack of a plan or at least a lack of willingness to present to Congress whatever is being thought about of how to fill—you can call it a bathtub, you can call it the gap, the fighter gap, whatever it may be—to address the problem.

And a big concern is that if we don't have a plan to do this and we run out of the legacy aircraft, Air Guard units will—what can they do if they don't have aircraft to fly? I mean, they go away. You can't mothball them. The people who are doing the mission are not going to hang around.

And I think a vital link for our homeland security and national defense, because, as you well know, they are integrated fully into the war theater in what they do.

I would be very interested to hear your thoughts and feelings on the fighter shortfall issue which is impacting the Air Force and the Navy and the Air Guard and just a little bit of a comment about how you are 75-percent solution to the problem fit into the fighter shortfall issue.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. Let me offer a couple of thoughts and then invite Admiral Mullen to get into it.

First of all, this is one of the issues, the number of Tactical Air (TACAIR) units that we need will be one of the issues that we are addressing in the quadrennial defense review.

There are two ways to look at it. One is the force structure itself and, as you suggest, the need to keep the Air National Guard in a place where it makes the contribution it needs to make to the Nation, and that is a capabilities and force structure-based estimate and that is where you get the bathtub that you described.

The opposite—another way to look at the TACAIR problem is in terms of our adversaries and what their capabilities are going to be, and how do you reconcile these two.

And I think that is one of the issues that the QDR has to take into account, because if you look at it on a threat basis, just as an example, just to pick China, in 2020, the U.S. will have 2,700 tactical aircraft, the Chinese about 1,000 less than that.

But of our number, we will have over 1,000 fifth generation airplanes and 1,300 fourth generation. They will have zero fifth generation aircraft.

In 2025, we will have 1,700 fifth generation aircraft, plus reapers, and they will have a handful of fifth generation.

So there is how you look at the threat as opposed to our force-based capabilities or our capabilities-based force structure, I think, are two different perspectives that lead you to, right now, at least, two different answers in terms of the number of TACAIR, and that is why I think the QDR needs to take a look at it.

But let me ask Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. I certainly recognize the challenge of the modernization piece to which you speak, and, clearly, you can only fly these aircraft to a certain point when their flight hours are done and you don't have—and you must replace them.

But I see us at a time where we really are in transition to a new strike-fighter, and that is the joint strike-fighter. That is really our investment.

We do have some challenges, obviously, in strike-fighter shortfalls, I think, in this transition, and then the work, the analytical work that I think has to be done is as described by the Secretary.

What it doesn't mean is that 8 years from now or 20 years from now, we are going to be doing it exactly the same way we are doing it now, and I think those are some of the questions that are out there for analysis.

That said, the strength of the commitment to air sovereignty levels and the need to meet that requirement is one we all recognize for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Smith, please.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, for being here.

I just want to offer my strongest possible support for the process that you went through in delivering this budget. I think your efforts are very commendable and absolutely critical to the future of our national security that we, as much as possible, follow the guideline that you have laid out.

And I have got to tell you, I was practically cheering over here when you said that we have plenty of reports and plenty of processes, we needed to make decisions.

After 12 years in this committee, I have watched those decisions get delayed by more process and more studies, and I can absolutely picture your office piled to the top with them.

Somebody just needs to step up and say this is what we need to do and where we need to go and to make the hard decisions necessary to make it happen, and I believe that is what you have done and I applaud you for it and certainly want to try to support you as we work our way through the congressional process out the other side to actually have a budget that is implemented.

In particular, you have placed the emphasis, I think, where it needs to be placed, recognizing that the type of warfare we face has changed. It has moved towards counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, irregular warfare.

I believe you have also been visionary enough to mention the important role that the State Department needs to play in development strategy, in dealing with those counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts as we go forward, and you have shifted the budget priorities appropriately.

If we are going to have a greater emphasis on those things, we need more Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), we need more support for the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and those budget choices have been made.

I think we need to go forward and continue along those lines. And it is not just in Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan. In North Africa, in the Horn of Africa, in Southeast Asia, we are fighting insurgencies at various levels and we need more equipment there, more ISR capabilities, most particularly, and more focus from the Special Operations folks to fight that, and we are not going to get there without some of the budget choices you made.

I thank you for that and I thank both of you, also, for the appointment of General McChrystal in charge of Afghanistan, a Special Operations commander, who is kind of, to my mind, the unsung hero of Iraq.

What he was doing there was not very well understood, but it was absolutely critical and I think it reflects, again, the shift in where the battlefield has moved and how we need to respond.

Just one quick question. In the authorizing bill last year, we had authorized a report to study the personnel challenges within the Special Operations Command. They bring together folks from all the different services.

Admiral Olson does not have that much control or, I think, any control in terms of pay and the various different decisions that are made in terms of managing the personnel are primarily handled on the service level.

He has unique challenges, because they are all there together. I think he refers to it as a "foxhole" problem. If you have got a Navy SEAL and an Army Green Beret in the same foxhole talking about their lives and understanding that they are paid different, they have different benefits and different structures, it becomes a problem.

So the point of the study was to bring the services together, talk about it, figure out where we are going forward. It has been done. It is in your office, is my understanding. No one has really said anything about it in terms of how you intend to act on it.

I would like to urge that action and would be curious of any comments you have about what you plan to do.

Secretary GATES. That is the first I have heard of it. When I get back, I will ask for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 112.]

Mr. SMITH. Okay, all right. Then I have served a purpose here this morning, I guess.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, appreciate you being here.

I am the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and so I have a number of concerns about the cuts to missile defense, all issues that I know other members have also raised and we will continue to work with you and DOD on in trying to address.

My main concern is that by cutting future programs, we are cutting our ability to attain ingenuity, to be able to look to the future as to ways and things that we might yet invent that would protect us.

But I wanted to talk to you today about a topic that does not have a budgetary cost if it goes directly to the issue of support for our men and women in uniform and does affect the upcoming National Defense Authorization Act.

Over the past two years, I have authored an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would protect men and women who are serving in the military from losing their children in custody battles based solely on their military service.

Throughout our country, there are state courts that have entered rulings where they have punished, penalized our men and women who are serving, awarding custody to the other spouse solely on the basis of their service.

A court in New York, for example, ruled that even the threat of deployment of someone who was in the service was enough for custody to be awarded to their ex.

There have been courts that have ruled that the time they have spent away from their kids could be equated to abandonment, as if they had hopped on a Harley and gone to California to find themselves—no prejudice to California—instead of actually serving their country.

Now, the House has passed, three times, once as a standalone bill and twice as an amendment, language that would protect our men and women who are serving as part of the Service Members Civil Relief Act.

The DOD opposes it and because of that opposition, it has failed in the Senate over the past two years.

I am going to ask you two questions and the first one is pretty easy, because I want you to know that there have been several media outlets that have covered this and when they have done

viewer polls of people on this issue, viewer sampling, this is a 98-percent issue.

No one believes that anyone should lose custody of their children solely based upon their service in the military. So I am going to ask you your opinion that.

And the second thing I am going to ask is—we have a real opportunity. We have about less than a month before the National Defense Authorization Act will go through this committee.

I would like your commitment to have your staff to work with my staff and the staff of this committee so that we can come up with language that DOD would support, because the only goal is ensuring that if you serve our country, that you not lose custody of your children based solely on that fact.

So the two questions to you, sir, are, one, do you believe it is right for people to lose custody based solely on their service in the military? And secondly, will you agree to work with us over the next month so that DOD's opposition, which I have the four-page memo of DOD's opposition last year, might be resolved and we could come up with language we could agree to?

Secretary GATES. I am opposed to anything that disadvantages our men and women in uniform solely because of their service.

I had not realized that DOD had opposed this. I am going back to Mr. Smith. I will go back and find out what that is all about and I will commit to you that we will work with you on it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 112.]

Mr. TURNER. I greatly appreciate that. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you again, gentlemen, for being before us.

Secretary Gates, please give us your thoughts about Kirkuk and Iraq's internal boundaries, which is a problem, I believe, that potentially threatens Iraq's future stability and which, in turn, could derail the Administration's goal of responsible withdrawal.

And let me give you a little background of where I am going with this. Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution mandates boundary resolution with an orderly and democratic process of referendum so that Iraqis in these disputed areas will get a choice about what is done.

This was supposed to happen by December of 2007, but it got bogged down. And it looks to me like Baghdad really doesn't want to or hasn't tried to address this issue.

In fact, two weeks ago, the U.N. assistance mission in Iraq issued a long awaited report about this and while it reported on the ethnic cleansing and other issues that went on, in the analysis of the current situation, it didn't offer a path to restarting the Article 140 process.

The report did, however, underscore the urgent necessity of a resolution to the disputed territories for the welfare of the people living there and for the future of peace and the stability of Iraq.

And with tensions on the rise there, we have a U.S. infantry brigade in Kirkuk standing between the Iraqi army and the Kurdish militia and our own deadline of withdrawal next year, it seems to

me that this is a critical issue for U.S. policy, because some of us doubt that we can really achieve responsible withdrawal without first doing something about these disputed boundaries.

For example, in the Balkans, we learned the hard way that we should have gotten to that upfront.

And maybe that is why Admiral Mullen and General Petraeus recently made a visit to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdish region.

So my questions to you are: do you agree that letting the people in the disputed territories decide their own status through referenda, as required by Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, is the best way to resolve this problem?

Do you think they deserve a peaceful and democratic and permanent resolution to that so that we can responsibly withdraw our troops from Iraq?

And since the report offered no alternative, is the U.S. committed to implementing the Article 140 before we withdraw next year?

And lastly, the last Administration really had no policy. So does the new Administration have a policy on this and is this why we have seen these high level trips over there into that area of Iraq?

Secretary GATES. Well, let me answer first and then invite Admiral Mullen to comment, since he has been there.

First of all, we definitely support the carrying out of the provisions of the Iraqi constitution in terms of—in all terms, including Article 140.

There has been a mutual agreement between the Kurdish regional government and the central government in Iraq to delay settling this, because they realize that they were not yet in a position to do so peacefully, and, therefore, to try and maintain the status quo, in particular, until the U.N. report came out.

The U.N. report does make recommendations in terms of what the boundaries ought to be as a basis for discussion and negotiation between the Kurdish regional government and the central government in Baghdad.

We are very supportive of that process. It is imperative that it be done peacefully.

We are concerned about the potential for Arab-Kurdish tensions in terms of Iraq's future, and we would like to see this issue resolved as quickly as possible, but it is imperative that it be resolved peacefully.

Admiral MULLEN. Just, ma'am, on my recent trip, actually, I went there for a number of reasons, one of which, I hadn't been there before; two, recognizing the high level of importance that the future of Iraq has based on resolving these issues, these Kurdish-Arab issues.

And we have had some challenges on the ground in recent months between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi security forces.

That said, I sat with General Odierno yesterday, who walked through a recent operation where they had actually worked together, and I found that to be a very positive step.

So the leadership—and we also listened yesterday to Ambassador Hill, and he has this as a very high priority to try and resolve.

So, clearly, there are a lot of politics involved here between the Kurds and Baghdad and everybody recognizes the criticality of

moving forward in a peaceful way so that the responsible withdrawal can continue.

Ms. SANCHEZ. That would be great. I would just hate to see happen what happened in the Balkans, which was that those boundaries were not resolved.

The CHAIRMAN. The lady's time has expired.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service, great work.

Mr. Secretary, I share some of the frustrations you have heard up here today about our inability to look into the analysis and the nondisclosure statements and our inability to talk with people that we have known and worked with for a long time.

So I am not going to go back over that, but I do have a question about the unfunded requirements list.

There has been an exchange of correspondence between Mr. McHugh, I know, and your office and on April 30, you sent out guidance to the service chiefs citing subsection (f) of Section 151 of Title 10 that says the joint chiefs first inform the Secretary of Defense before making recommendations to the Congress.

I guess I would like to understand. Is it your intention to then sensor that or to edit it or to filter it or are they just going to inform you and then they can do what we have been doing for the past decade or so, having a dialogue?

How is that going to work?

Secretary GATES. What I am trying to do, sir, is reestablish some measure of discipline in the Department of Defense, that people play by the rules.

That means not having a President's budget where people come around the sides and come up and argue against the President's budget when they work in the Department of Defense.

I didn't like it in the Bush Administration, and I don't like it in the Obama Administration.

The other part of it is on this unfunded list, it is simply for me to know, according to the statute, they are required, if they have unfunded requirements, to inform me of that before they come up and testify to it.

I have no intention of censoring them. I have no intention of cur-tailing it. I might ask them a question or two, like why didn't they put it in their budget submission to start with in the Department of Defense, but I have no intention.

And as I indicated earlier in my answer to Mr. Forbes, you must be able to count on the candor of both the civilians and uniformed people who come up and testify in front of you.

That is my guidance to them. I expect them to be candid, and I have no problem with the military officers, in particular, giving you their best professional judgment.

That is required by law, and I intend to support you and them in that.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you.

We appreciate that, because we simply cannot do our job here if we don't have that ability to have discussion. It is not fair to Amer-

ica if we can't have the ability to have other opinions and other ideas.

I appreciate your desire to get some discipline in the military. I always thought that was a good idea in the military and sometimes struggled to find it in the years that I was there.

But we really do have to have that conversation and I am pleased to know—

Secretary GATES. And I would add it applies to the civilians, as well.

Mr. KLINE. Well, actually, I was thinking about the civilians. But we really must have that conversation. So I thank you for that.

Let me jump to another subject here. I assume, in the same vein, now that the budget is here, if we have questions about something down in the weeds, like sole sourcing engines for the F-35, we are now free to talk to somebody about that. Is that right? Okay, thank you.

And then before my time runs out, there is another issue that is of some continuing concern and that has to do with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

They are responsible for spending a lot of money and acquiring a lot of expensive equipment, and they haven't had an updated charter now in decades.

And wearing another hat on another committee, I talked to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), who said that, indeed, they were pressing ahead to get that charter, which would be brief, which I would applaud, 1 or 2 pages would be preferable to 30 or 40, but will allow the acquisition folks in that organization to do their job with oversight, but preferably without a lot of staff interference.

And so you are, obviously, a very key player, Mr. Secretary, in the NRO and in the management of it and the functioning of it and the staffing of it and so forth.

Are you engaged in that, as well? Can you tell us today whether we are going to see a new charter here in the next month or so and are we going to get this cleaned up so that we can fix that part of the acquisition problem?

Secretary GATES. Director Blair and I are in full agreement on the need for a new charter for the NRO, and the only thing holding it up at this point is the appointment of a new director of the NRO, who would oversee that process.

And I would expect that as soon as a new director is in place, that that effort will be undertaken as a high priority.

Mr. KLINE. Well, I hope so. It is just one of those things that has dragged out and dragged out and dragged out, and you know very well, in the Pentagon, by the time 15 staffs have reviewed it, these things die.

And so please, please, let's see that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And to Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, our country is really fortunate to have your leadership. Thank you. Thank you very much.



I am going to try on three questions. I will ask them one at a time and see if I can get through this really quickly.

Last week, my colleagues and I had an opportunity to meet with a group of military spouses, leaders within the military spouse community, at an event that the speakers sponsored and what we heard is that military families are resilient. You all know that.

They value the service of their loved ones very much. But we also heard that our families are at risk of becoming burned out and even in light of their enormous sacrifice, many still believe that the American people do not understand or appreciate their sacrifice.

And, in fact, one of their surveys demonstrated that 94 percent of the American people do not appreciate their sacrifice.

Chairman Mullen, I thought your comments today should be broadcast among the military community, because I think they demonstrate what we would like to signal to families.

But how do you think we should deal with that? You mentioned institutionalizing more of the support for our families, but, clearly, there is still a perception and, clearly, they are still feeling very much that they are an isolated group in our country.

Secretary GATES. Both of us probably ought to comment on this. Let me just say, out the outset, all of the services have very good programs for families and for taking care of the families of our men and women in uniform.

The concern that I have and, in fact, just signed out a memo today, prompted by the op-ed in the newspaper just a couple of days ago by a military spouse, that what Admiral Mullen and I hear when we talk to spouses at posts and bases is very different than what we hear when we are briefed in the Pentagon and what we see is an unevenness of the application or the implementation of these programs.

It depends on whether a commanding officer at a local facility has a passion for and is willing to support it and get in there and do whatever is necessary.

It is questions about whether some of the volunteers who help the family should be paid, as was suggested in that op-ed.

So one of the things that we are both focused on is how do we ensure that the very best practices are applied consistently across the entirety of the military.

And it is not for a lack of programs or a lack of money. It is, in my view, mostly execution and we need to refocus our attention on that.

Admiral MULLEN. I share all those concerns. I do see a great unevenness. We are very concerned about the stress on the families, as well as on the force. That is a part of it. That gets to the dwell time issue, the repeated deployments, et cetera.

What I want to try to—where I am focused is to try to reach to grassroots nationally, Guard, Reserve, I mean, throughout the country, so that there is a reach, and local support for families and I think we can do a better job of that, working through national organizations, chamber of commerce, United Service Organizations (USO), people that have that kind of reach.

We just have to keep it as a priority and keep focused on it and make sure the programs are delivering.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

You mentioned that there is a lot of unevenness in the way that the programs or the services are institutionalized on bases. How does it affect one's career advancement to the extent or degree to which they are good at this and they care about it?

Admiral MULLEN. I think that, as in so many areas, great leaders are easily singled out and we can go to places where it is working well, and it is not just family programs. It is everything is working well.

So those who lead well in this area have a tendency to lead well in combat. It literally goes together and it is pretty easy to figure out who those individuals are and, generally, they are promoted.

Mrs. DAVIS. I just hope it would be quite open that however one treats that subject does have an influence on whether or not they are going to advance, in addition to many of the other qualities that we are looking for.

I think that might make a difference. I would hope so.

The other area is really in the individual augmentees, because for them, a lot of the support is not necessarily there. Again, we hear from many of the spouses in that area and a concern on the part of individual augmentees that the fact that, especially for the Navy and for airmen, they are out of—they are doing things they weren't trained to do.

And so they fear that their careers and the opportunities that they have to become more specialized have been diminished, and I just wanted to bring that out.

And I really wanted to ask a question about Afghanistan, but, Mr. Chairman, I guess I have to stop.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for what you are doing for our country.

Last week, the congressional commission on the strategic posture of the United States presented their report on America's strategic posture. The commission recommended developing effective capabilities to defend against increasingly complex missile threats.

Several missile defense programs were developing technologies to combat these complex missile threats and were the only ones focusing on the boost or ascent phase. These include the multiple kill vehicle, MKV, kinetic energy interceptor, KEI, and airborne laser (ABL).

Your fiscal year 2010 budget kills MKV and KEI and reduces the ABL program to one aircraft.

In light of these cuts, how does the Missile Defense Agency intend to address an enemy launch in the boost or ascent phase?

Secretary GATES. First, I would say that we have very good capabilities at the terminal phase with Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and other systems. We have a good capability at midcourse with the ground-based interceptors, and we will robustly fund continued development of those to increase their capability, the ground-based interceptors.

Boost phase is the toughest of all, because you have to be fairly close to the site of the launch for boost phase to be able to work.

For example, the operational concept of the airborne laser would have required that that aircraft orbit—let's say the target was

Iran—would have required an orbit almost entirely within the borders of Iran. This is probably a little problematic.

And so what we have—but by the same token, I believe that when the boost phase issue is addressed, directed energy is an important opportunity for us in that regard, and that is why we have kept alive the airborne laser that we have, the aircraft that we have, and will robustly fund research and development (R&D) using that aircraft.

The kinetic energy interceptor, this was a program that began as a five-year development program. It is now in its 14th year. It has never had a test launch. There has been very little attention given to the third stage or the kill vehicle, and, frankly, this was a program that wasn't going anywhere.

Multiple kill vehicle was intended for a much more capable missile threat than is posed by rogue states. It was designed to deal with a more complex threat that would have come potentially from either China or Russia.

The reality is U.S. policy with respect to missile defense under the current Administration and under its predecessor was that our missile defense was intended to deal with rogue threats, not a threat from China or Russia.

This system, frankly, was incompatible with the policies of both Administrations, and that, in addition to various technology and acquisition issues associated with it, fundamentally, it was contradictory to the policy of both Administrations.

We have every intention of continuing to fund R&D on boost phase, but, again, the central problem is you have to be very close.

The kinetic energy interceptor also had no platform. It is a 23-ton missile, 38 feet long, couldn't be launched off Aegis ships. It would either have to have its own surface ship or something else, and it would have to be deployed very close to the site of the launch.

So it was useless with respect to the Chinese and the Russians and, for the most part, the Iranians.

Those are the reasons I did what I did.

Mr. LAMBORN. On the kinetic energy interceptor—and I appreciate your answer—aren't they very close to having a test? And with all the money that has been spent, shouldn't we ramp up the last several months before the test and see it through to that next stage if they are so close?

Secretary GATES. As I understand it, there have been a couple of tests. They have not been flight tests and they did not go well. And it just seemed to me, given all the other problems with the program, the continuing to spend money was not the best place to put our resources.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

Changing subjects here. In your April 6 budget statement, you noted, "We will stop the growth of Army brigade combat teams at 45 versus 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength of 547,000. This will ensure that we have better manned units ready to deploy and help put an end to the routine use of stop-loss. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force."

When the original decision was made to grow the Army to 48 BCTs, there must have been some good reasoning in making the determination that 48 BCTs met a certain requirement—okay.

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer the question.

Mr. LAMBORN. And what has changed between that time and today?

Secretary GATES. I think that when that force structure was first put in place, first of all, we didn't have 13,000 people in stop-loss. Second, we have something like 55,000 people in the Army that are not in deployed units. They are in training or whatever.

I think that number is much larger than the institutional Army at the time that it established 48 BCTs, thought would be the case.

The expansion of the number of brigade combat teams has put stress on the number of particularly company level officers and midlevel Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).

And it was our judgment, the chairman's and mine, that it was better to make the units that we have robust, allow us to stop stop-loss, with the end strength that we have.

If the Army can then move more people out of these institutional roles and into deployed units, then there is no question that, at some point, we could change that force structure, and, in fact, longer term Army force structure will be addressed in the quadrennial defense review.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am glad to see you label your budget as a reform budget.

I am a little perplexed that years of transformational budgets have led us to a reformational budget. That is what we have got out of transformation is reform.

But at least we are here and trying to do the right things in the budget and later today we will be moving forward the acquisition reform bill on the floor.

But I want to ask you just a few questions about a few platforms. One, I am glad to see the procurements for the 22 E-18Gs are continuing on track.

But in the broader scheme of things, with regard to electronic warfare (EW), you were asked, in March, at a press conference, about Air Force EW and, at the time, you responded you had not begun yet to think about Air Force EW.

And as some of us who are trying to look at electronic warfare from a broader perspective, a defense-wide perspective, I am just wondering, have you begun to—in that time, have you begun to put some thought into Air Force EW or looking at the functional solutions analysis to come out of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) about EW to see where that might fit in in a broader context in the Pentagon?

Secretary GATES. I have not directly, but the need for—and I will invite Admiral Mullen to speak, because I am sure he knows a lot more about it than I do.

But I think the subject of how many more F/A-18s, Gs, especially, that ought to be bought, especially for the Navy, is going to be addressed in the QDR.

Admiral MULLEN. I think that is really important and it will be the combination of the Navy capability and the growlers and how many of them are focused on the Navy and how many of them are focused on the national mission.

We clearly need an electronic warfare capability that goes beyond just the pinpoint capability that a growler has and that—and you know, I think you know, we have invested a lot of money and haven't produced much in the last 5 to 10 years, and we have got to move forward to make that happen, I think, both in the Air Force and in the Navy.

So the Secretary's comments about QDR, very critical war fighting issue for the QDR.

Mr. LARSEN. And I think our hearing tomorrow is with the Navy and I will be asking questions about the expeditionary element and what happens there.

Admiral MULLEN. Sure.

Mr. LARSEN. The second question, Mr. Secretary. On the 1206 and 1207, you have discussed a little bit in your testimony, but can you talk a little bit about how you see 1207 moving forward, since it expires this—the authority expires the end of this year and whether or not you want that to continue with more money folded into 1206, combined over at State?

How do you envision that?

Secretary GATES. Well, I think we have a—on 1206, if I recall correctly, we have a 3-year authorization at \$350 million a year. On 1207, I have proposed bumping that from \$100 million to \$200 million.

It has been a very worthwhile program, some of the things that we have been able to do with the State Department, and it is one of those dual key programs that both our concurrences involve.

My inclination, we really haven't addressed post the next step in that and I think that is something that I will need to sit down with Secretary Clinton and also talk about within our own building in terms of the longer range future for 1207.

But it has served a very valuable purpose going forward and if, in the mix of all the things that are being done in fiscal year 2010 and in the 2009 supplemental with respect to the State Department and resources and our capability to help them, once we have sorted through all of that, if there is a continuing need for the kinds of things that we are doing under 1207, then it would be my recommendation to go forward with it.

Mr. LARSEN. And, finally, the obvious question from me and folks from Washington State, just on the KC-X tanker, still looking at a Request for Proposal (RFP) sometime in the summer.

Will that be early, mid, late summer? Any more specifics on the timeline when that might be out?

Secretary GATES. Hoping for early summer.

Mr. LARSEN. Hoping for early summer.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I am a bit confused. Let me ask, Mr. Secretary, if the State Department has properly funded, why do we need 1207?

Secretary GATES. Well, because it often involves security training, military training, supporting the things like what—some of the things we have done in Lebanon.

So that is why I say I just need to sit down with our own folks and with the State Department after we see what has happened in fiscal year 2010 and the 2009 supplemental with respect to the State Department to see whether there is a continuing need.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us today and I thank you so much for your service to our Nation.

Secretary Gates, recently, at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, you gave what I thought was a great speech and you went into some depth about our Nation's aircraft carriers, and you stated, "No country in the rest of the world has anything close to the reach and firepower to match a carrier strike group, and the United States has and will maintain 11 until at least 2040."

You said, also, "I might note that we have a number of expeditionary strike groups that will, in the not too distant future, be able to carry F-35s." And I applaud you for your commitment to maintain 11 carrier strike groups at least until 2040, and I think that is very significant.

What I wanted to ask is it seems like, though, in the proposal that you are putting forth, that you are proposing to go from 11, at least temporarily, down to 10.

Can you comment on that and where you see our carrier strike force capabilities going?

Secretary GATES. Let me defer to Admiral Mullen on this, but I think it has—it is a temporary thing, I think caused by a delay in the catapult system of the *Gerald R. Ford*.

Admiral MULLEN. It is tied to two things. It is clearly that and as we bring on the 11th carrier, and it is also tied to the decommissioning of the *Enterprise*, which is at her service life and we have invested and continue, because she is a unique eight-reactor carrier, we have continued to invest heavily.

She is in a big maintenance period right now, as I am sure you know. So I think it is in 2014 and 2015, I think it is that 24-month period, and that is risk I think that we are going to—I mean, I am comfortable taking that over that 24-month period as we bring the *Ford* out. And then, clearly, it is 11 carriers until I think it is 2039.

Mr. WITTMAN. So you are comfortable then strategically about where we are placed here with that 24-month window, at a 10-carrier strike force.

Admiral MULLEN. I am, yes, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. All right, very good.

I also appreciate your overview on the DOD 2010 budget proposal. I think it was very, very well thought out. And as it was stated there, it said the budget acknowledges that every taxpayer dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk is a dollar that is not available to care for America's service men and women, and I think that is extraordinarily cogent these days in the threats that we face.

We are saying there that those dollars would either be available to reset the force or to win wars the Nation is in or to improve capabilities in areas where the U.S. is under-invested and potentially vulnerable.

If you look at the decision that was made on April 10 by the Department of Defense, where you announced a final decision on whether or not to permanently home port an aircraft carrier in Mayport, the focus there was that that decision was going to be made during the 2010 quadrennial defense review.

And I was just wondering, in asking the questions about that and if we are talking about making sure that we are not putting dollars out there for remote or diminishing risks, I am wondering if having \$76 million in this year's defense budget to upgrade the port there at Mayport specifically so that it could have an aircraft carrier, as they say, pull in there, is that really in line with the focus that was pointed out here with the budget as far as making the investment there in home port or should we not wait until the QDR process has worked itself out to determine if that truly is a capability that we need there at Mayport?

Secretary GATES. I wrote a letter to Senator Webb in early December in which I said we have deemed it unacceptable to have only one carrier home port on the west coast, we have two, and that I thought the same logic applied to the east coast.

I do worry about everything being concentrated in Norfolk. The money in the budget is to, at a minimum, provide some dredging and upgrading at Mayport that even in an emergency situation would allow one of our modern aircraft carriers to be able to dock there.

I think the reason the issue has come up in the QDR is simply that the cost has risen significantly in terms of the home porting in Mayport. I stand by the letter that I wrote to Senator Webb, but at the same time, I think that there is a—in terms of there being a need for a second facility on the east coast.

But at a certain point, the Navy has to figure out how best it wants to spend its money.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman.

I want to use my few minutes just to reinforce what you gentlemen said in your opening statements.

First, let me say that I am thankful for your service. Before us, we have two of America's most distinguished public servants and we are grateful for your continued service to our country.

I thought I heard in your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, that you said that the \$533 billion base budget that we are presented with is more than adequate to take care of our Nation's security needs. Is that right?

Secretary GATES. I consider it sufficient.

Mr. COOPER. Sufficient, okay. And the four-percent growth in that budget is enough over last year to take care of our needs.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

Mr. COOPER. I thought I heard the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that—I think it was in your ten years of experience in dealing with such matters, that this has been one of the most open and transparent processes for the services to make their recommendations and to get a fair decision.

Admiral MULLEN. It has been the most open and the most transparent.

Mr. COOPER. The most open and the most transparent.

Admiral MULLEN. And where uniforms had a vote throughout.

Mr. COOPER. Well, I appreciate these findings, because in our degraded media environment, folks back home want to know if this is a good budget or not, plain and simple.

And they want to know that you gentlemen, both of whom have served multiple presidents in both parties, have used your best professional judgment to make sure that our Nation's vital interests are protected.

So I am grateful for that and I know that here on the Hill, you face Monday morning quarterbacks, backseat drivers, and not a few armchair generals, who sometimes speak more on behalf of parochial interests than on the national interests, and I think both of you gentlemen have in mind the national interests.

So I am hopeful that—I know that you made tough decisions and I know that anybody can second guess most anything. I am hopeful that we will keep in mind on the Hill here the national interests, because money doesn't grow on trees, tough decisions have to be made.

It is not easy to pick among spaces or defense contractors or anything or weapons systems, but I think you gentlemen have done an outstanding job.

I haven't said this to some of the previous folks who have held your positions. So I am thankful you are there and I pray for your continued service.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

First question or statement, really, for Admiral Mullen. When you talked about the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) veteran who was talking about combat stress, as a combat veteran of three tours, you can quote me, if you want to.

I would say that prosecuting an enemy that wants to kill your family and mine and a lot of innocent Americans is probably the most uplifting and fulfilling thing you will possibly do in your entire life.

Two, I think that we ought to be focusing on pre-enlisting screening and being more rigorous with that. No post-service screening would have saved those five American lives last week, because that happened while somebody was in.

So if we really want to get down to it, we are going to have to be doing personality tests, stress tests, and emotional testing pre-service, before anybody gets in the military. This is not a Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) after the fact question.

This is a thing about combat being hard, being dirty, being stressful, and that is just the way it is. And I think that anybody



who has been over there can tell you that, especially guys that get shot at, mortared.

I have been shot at, mortared and everything else, and it is just hard. And I don't think that excuses saying that they are stressed, excusing somebody going off the deep end in Iraq and Afghanistan and killing innocent civilians.

You can quote me on that, if you want to, I was an OIF vet, the next time you testify here.

Going to Mrs. Davis' comments and questions, she represents San Diego, as do I, there has been a 19-percent increase in ships operation since 2002.

And this article just went over some things that kind of contradict what you have been saying about the Navy. Most military transfers that the Navy has take place during the summertime so that kids can move without being pulled out of schools.

There were 14,000 planned moves for this summer for San Diego sailors. Most of those have now been pushed off. So they are going to have to do midyear permanent duty transfers, which means that they are going to pull kids out of school.

So if we are trying to make life easier for our military families, why wouldn't you pull them out during the summer?

The reason that the Navy is doing this—lack of funding. Surface ships will remain tethered to their piers for more days. Sailors and aircraft crews will undergo more training with simulators.

Lack of funding, we are not training them.

She actually says, and Mrs. Davis touched on this, too—my wife and family had a much harder time dealing with this war than I did, because I was with my Marine friends overseas and we were doing what Marines do. The family is back here paying the bills, paying the insurance, taking kids to school and doing all of those things that they have to do.

So why not accommodate them by giving the Navy enough money so that they can move during the summer as opposed to pulling kids out of school from elementary to high school?

Once hefty reenlistment bonuses, except for Navy Sea, Air, and Land (SEALs) and some corpsmen, are being canceled this year, as of last week. Those hefty reenlistment bonuses are going to be gone.

So you say that we are out here looking out for the men and women and that is the most important thing that we have is the men and women, yet we are cutting funding. I am not even talking about the ship repair gap in funding that we have in this country right now.

But if we are going to take care of the men and women, let's take care of the men and women.

You just had a piece of paper pushed to you. So I would like to get your comments on that.

Admiral MULLEN. Sir, I appreciate your service and the fact that you have been in combat and understand that.

That said, I have been with an awful lot of soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines who have been in combat and the stress level is high for them and their families. As you said, it is stressful. It is how do we deal with it.

In addition to pre-screenings, tied to this tragic incident, we, obviously this week, there is also, I believe, a requirement to understand how it affects people when they are serving. So that when we are to release people, we understand what the risks are with someone who is returning out to society.

And I think squad leaders and staff sergeants understand what those risks are probably better than anybody else.

As far as the resources for the Navy, there are two issues there. One is the Navy needs the sup, the Supplemental, passed. And so they have taken steps specifically that are precautionary to make sure that they don't break the budget at the end of the year, and when the sup is passed, some of that is going to change.

Secondly, in the personnel accounts, the manpower accounts, the Navy is over end strength. They must manage this to 30 September, and there are very few places you can take money in the manpower accounts to manage that specific issue, and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves is an example.

The other is that you will see the Navy, but all services, manage their reenlistment bonuses, their incentive bonuses tied to the needs, and I know that that is what the Navy has done.

So I think when the sup passes, you will see relief there. Clearly, this is not intended to focus on families and not move them and we recognize the additional stress that that creates for a family right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciated your comments that you have made to several members about wanting—not wanting to have a lot of voices within the Pentagon, within the civilian bureaucracy in the Pentagon, arguing against the President's budget, once the President's budget has been presented, and that puts us in an awkward position.

I am sort of used to an environment—all my life has been as a lawyer, my professional career has been as a lawyer, where we believe firmly that judges get to the right decision by hearing arguments on both sides, not just the case made for a particular position, but the case made against that position, as well.

So we are trying to do our best and will continue to try and do our best to probe with the experts, that means the folks working for you, why suggestions make sense and why they don't make sense, because ultimately we have to make decisions concerning whether or not the recommendations the President is making, that you are making, are the right way to go.

And 90, 95, 99 percent of the time, as you know, historically, we are going to go with your judgment, that some of the time we do not, and some of the time we simply disagree based on the merits. It is not just parochial stuff, but it is purely on the merits.

A balance has to be struck here, but I, for one, and I know an awful lot of my colleagues feel the exact same way, I am going to probe as best I can and I don't want somebody telling me they can't talk to me because, basically, that they have been buttoned up somehow by the Defense Department.

If we need to change the law, we just change the law to give us the information that we need in order to make good judgment.

Now, I am sorry for that sort of preachy little beginning here. The JCA, the joint cargo aircraft, I am a little worried that this could wind up being like the Caribou in the Vietnam era, and I very much appreciate that the chiefs are talking with one another.

Air Force's role has been more strategic and strategic lift. What the Army is looking for is this last tactical mile support, which is what the Caribou gave in Vietnam.

There were some suggestions that when the Caribou was moved to the Air Force, an awful lot of Air Force folks really didn't want to have that mission. A lot of Army people say that the mission was not as well executed as they needed it to be executed during the Vietnam era.

So if the Air Force is going to have the last tactical mile mission that is contemplated by the C-27, there has got to be a really close link between the two.

And the dilemma often winds up being who pays the bill, and Army might have a very different view of how that asset should be used in order to meet its mission and Army's willingness to pay the freight could be very different than Air Force's willingness to pay the freight.

And somehow we haven't broken down those lines and as long as those lines remain, it seems to me that something that is integral to the tactical operations of one of the services perhaps should be with that service.

I do think Air Force is probably the right choice for acquisition, sustainment, maintenance, that sort of thing. It is what Air Force does with platforms like that.

Mr. Secretary, you said that we have to be prepared for the war we are most likely to fight, and I agree with that. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and I would imagine that certainly the Pentagon has seen the study, I don't know whether you have had an opportunity to read the study, but considering specifically the appropriate mix of lift.

Where JCA is concerned, it seemed to me, as I read that study, at last the unclassified executive—or the unclassified summary of the study, it seemed to me they concluded that for the kinds of wars we think the engagement, these long-term, low-level engagements that they were going to be involved in, JCA is a very important, cost-effective ingredient to the solution.

They actually recommend that a lot of JCAs be acquired, if that is the sort of fight that is contemplated.

So I would simply ask you to maybe take a look at the IDA analysis as we move forward to the quadrennial review and that maybe we get more of these JCAs. That is certainly what all the requirements have been to date and it seems to me to be only logical in this low, sustaining kind of conflict.

And I would ask for your comment about that, sir.

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, I would say that one of the more intriguing aspects or events during this process this late winter or early spring was that the agreement with respect to moving the JCA from the Army to the Air Force was actually made between General Casey and General Schwartz.

We were basically bystanders on that one, and it was an expression of jointness that we sort of left us agape, frankly.

But the reality is, and I think General Schwartz would tell you this, there are going to have to be changes in the Air Force culture about how these things get done.

For example, when they load a C-130, they want it to be completely full. They are like a moving company and they don't want to head out unless they have got a full load, and that has got to change.

The JCA is a niche player that is most cost-effective when there are three pallets or fewer and we have this enormous amount of available capacity in C-130s that can land at 99 percent of the airstrips that a C-27 can.

So we will look at it, as I said, in the QDR in terms of the relative balance. But we do have an enormous amount of capability that, at this point, is, and likely in the future, will be available and we need to figure out a way to take better advantage of it.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, before I call on Mr. Franks, last year, the House required a comprehensive review that would provide Congress a better understanding of the science and technology and educational programs that are supported by the Department of Defense, particularly K (Kindergarten) through 12.

We understand that the report has been staffed and is in the beginning stages. And given your expertise as an educator, now as Secretary of Defense, you are in a position to understand the importance of the department's effort to develop and enhance efforts to encourage young Americans, particularly K through 12, to seek a career in science and technology.

Mr. Secretary, we understand that there are many challenges in putting this report together, but we would request that you give it your personal attention at some point in the near future.

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I think the first thing I would like to do, just so I can focus on a more particular thing, is to endorse the comments of Mr. McHugh. I think that he had broad-ranging statements here that were right on the money.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, we would like to thank you for being here.

I guess I want to try to focus on the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget.

Mr. Secretary, you have recommended some rather dramatic cuts in that, particularly investments in programs meant to defend against sophisticated threats.

KEI, MKV, they are gone, and airborne laser has essentially been relegated to a research project. And I have to go on record that I think that that is incredibly the wrong direction to take this budget and our country on missile defense given the growing threats that we face and given the growing attitude of other nations that have missile programs even over and above the Air Force's.

Now, I want to do as you have suggested and look beyond specific programs and look at the overall direction the Administration is going here. And I know that you are focusing on already mature systems that provide theater defenses, but, unfortunately, those defenses that provide protection against long-range missiles and sophisticated missiles are taking a back seat.

And it is my sincere judgment that that places our population at a greater risk, especially in the out years, especially as these threats grow and especially as they develop, and future generations—it really concerns me tremendously.

And I am also kind of overwhelmed by the notion that we have to cut missile defense, given the significance of it, by \$1.5 billion, when we seem to have money for everything else on the planet, except defending the country, which is our first priority.

Now, I understand that, Mr. Secretary, you take orders from someone else. So in the interest of time, I want to try to focus my discussions on your decision to stop emplacement of the additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) and to cap that at 30.

Last year, just last year, with the input from the same commands we have in place today, the recommended number of interceptors to protect the homeland from long-range missiles was 44. And ironically, a lot of the war colleges that I hear from are saying that in their war games, that they end up finding that they want more than even the 44 that was recommended.

Now, obviously, something has changed or seems to have changed, in the Administration's mind, in the last 6 to 9 months, when they decided to reduce the number from 44 to 30.

So I would like to find out what exactly, in your mind, is the analysis that was done to reduce the number of GBIs from 44 to 30. Was the Administration—did they perceive a change in threat or are we accepting a greater risk? And if we are accepting a greater risk, what is that risk?

And, Mr. Secretary, I will ask you to go first, and, Admiral Mullen, if you would follow up.

Secretary GATES. First of all, let me say that the recommendations that are in the President's budget came out of the Department of Defense and were not influenced by anybody from outside the Department of Defense.

The ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California are designed to defend us against a missile from North Korea. The geometry doesn't work for basically any other country.

And the judgment was that, based on our experience, that 30 interceptors, and, particularly, if we continued to upgrade those interceptors, were adequate to meet that threat.

In terms of your larger point, I would just say that the security of the American people and the efficacy of missile defense are not enhanced by continuing to put money into programs that, in terms of their operational concept, are fatally flawed or research programs that are essentially sinkholes for taxpayer dollars.

That was my conclusion on a kinetic energy interceptor, five-year development program, in its 14th year, not a single flight test, little work on the third stage or the kill vehicle, et cetera, et cetera, no known launch platform, have to be close to the launch site.

I am keeping the airborne laser program active. I believe directed energy is important. We are going to continue to put R&D into boost phase defense and we will continue to do that with the airborne laser.

As I say, there are significant increases in this budget in terms of terminal defense, in terms of more protection against missiles for our troops in the field, through maximizing the inventory of SM-3s and THAADs and Patriot 3s.

So I think this budget pays a lot of attention to missile defense. It is just trying to focus the dollars on real yield and on research programs that have some prospect of yielding a operationally sound concept and one that actually can come to fruition in our lifetime.

Admiral MULLEN. I would only say I have been in and out of missile defense since the mid-1990s and we have made a lot of progress on the near-term threats, where this investment goes.

The challenges that we have in boost phase, specifically in boost phase, are enormous. I have felt ABL has been a flawed concept for years, quite frankly, because it made no sense, number of sorties, and I think the investment there to get at the high energy laser and that aspect of it is really critical.

But until we move to a point where it looks like that R&D is going to produce something, then I very much favor the decisions that have been made that we keep those investments focused on boost. That is the toughest problem that we have, as well as the multiple kill vehicle.

Those are two enormous problems and we need an R&D and Science and Technology (S&T) investment to know that we are headed on a clear path.

I also think that the resources in this budget support the national security of the American people.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am still unable to know what has changed from last year's commands to this one.

But thank you, thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Chairman, Mr. Secretary, for your outstanding service to this country. And I think everything that you have done today at his hearing further distinguishes your service to this country.

Mr. Secretary, on page 4 of your testimony, I am going to read your comments about shifting away from the 99-percent exquisite service centric platforms that are so costly. "With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-percent multiservice solution."

I completely agree with that approach and I appreciate the fact that it animates much of what is in this budget.

I wanted to focus on procurement reform and the meaning of that idea in procurement reform.

Would you agree that the place at which we can best start to effectuate that 80-percent solution is in the requirements phase of the procurement process?

Secretary GATES. Yes. I think one of the areas where we have not been sufficiently disciplined, and this came up time and time again as we went through these various programs over the last three months-plus, four months, is the requirements really weren't vetted properly and were flawed at the outset or where they were not flawed at the outset, they kept changing.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Secretary GATES. And as anybody who ever added a room onto their house knows, once you have started building and once you start changing stuff, the cost goes through the roof.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is exactly what happened to me. I wish you had been there to help me when it did.

The question I want to ask you about that is that do you think that the present system gets enough input from the combatant commanders and the individuals who actually use these systems and define the need?

Secretary GATES. Well, let me answer and then I think it is probably more appropriate for Admiral Mullen to answer.

I think that one of the things we tried to do in this process—there is a procedure by which the combatant commanders each year submit their views of what the needs are.

I think this year may have been the first time perhaps in a long time where they actually were invited into the process, both at the beginning and at various points along the way, to provide their view of what the needs were.

Quite frankly, my perception in the couple, 2.5 years I have been in this job is that their description of their needs did not receive particularly high priority when the services came to making decisions, but that may be a misimpression.

Mr. ANDREWS. One of the—yes, Admiral?

Secretary GATES. Let me ask Admiral Mullen to comment.

Mr. ANDREWS. We certainly want to hear the Admiral's views.

Admiral MULLEN. I would put the combatant commanders in sort of the 80-percent solution. That is where they would like to go here, first of all.

Secondly, if I could just talk about requirements, because I think that is a critical part of the problem that we have.

But there is also a point from where requirements go to where the contract gets signed, and that is space that is not visible, not transparent, not open to everybody.

So that when I have a requirement or here are my dreams, my visions, what am I actually paying for? And there needs to be more clarification, more transparency, and more collaboration in this is what I really want when that contract finally gets signed to those who are going to go build whatever it is going to be.

Mr. ANDREWS. We are trying to look in our panel at ways to address that concern and it appears that an awful lot of the cost overruns and schedule delays are in that 20-percent space to try to get us from 80 to 100.

And what would you—you need not respond today, but one of the ideas we would like you to take under consideration is whether we should change our analytical metric from requirements to requirements and aspirations or requirements that are truly essential to the mission and for the protection and service of the warfighter

versus those things which would be nice to have, but deserve a lesser degree of mandate.

What do you think about that, conceptually?

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, you are trying to operate in that 20-percent space, which is enormously difficult, because the system wants to go to 100 percent.

So without commenting on the word itself, however you can limit that growth from 80 to 100 percent, I think, is absolutely critical; and over time, because they grow, as the Secretary said.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you ever seen a situation where the 20 percent, you think, was really essential in saving someone's life or making their mission more achievable?

Admiral MULLEN. There are some where you would want to—

Mr. ANDREWS. I wouldn't want to exclude them, but my sense is that we get an awful lot done in the 80.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, we do.

Secretary GATES. And that is the only—and I haven't—to be honest, I haven't read either one of the acquisition reform bills, either the Senate or the House version, but I totally agree that the focus ought to be on cost, performance and schedule.

But at a certain point, there has got to be the flexibility to focus on value; that if it is something that meets a need that we cannot meet any other way, then we ought to have the flexibility to go forward knowing that we are going to have problems and that there are going to be extra development costs.

And who would have assessed, 3 or 4 years ago, that a \$26 billion investment in MRAPs was the smart thing to do? But how many lives has it saved? How many limbs has it saved? And there is not a—this Congress has been so supportive on that program and it is because every member of Congress knows that it has saved our kids' lives.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your service.

In early 2006, I was in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps and things were not going all that well there and things were reversed later on with the surge, with General Petraeus' concept, where we not only put in more forces on the ground, but we dispersed those forces differently, away from the major, more secure base camps into—pushed into the communities and forward operating bases, and that created a level of security that allowed the political process to move forward.

When I look at the situation right now in Afghanistan, we are going to build up to a troop presence on the ground that is approximately about half of that that we had in Iraq prior to the surge.

And I don't see a robust plan to push our forces or Afghan security forces out into those villages where the Taliban are intimidating the population.

I just don't see that we have an assessment of the current threat commensurate with our resources that we are planning to put on the ground.



And what I would hate to see is that we get into the same situation that I experienced in Iraq in 2006. We were treading water and losing folks, until we realized that we needed a greater presence to provide enough security to allow the political process to move forward.

I wonder if you can respond to that.

Admiral MULLEN. Just two or three weeks ago, when I was there in Afghanistan and, specifically, with the new brigades in RC East, where we had been under-resourced, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division arrived in January and the impact that they had had under the counterinsurgency concept or counterinsurgency plan is to get out and about, just like we did in Iraq, and it is starting to work there.

So they are not back on their bases. They really are out doing exactly what you describe, going where the Taliban are.

We don't have those resources in the south and the forces that have gone in, obviously, in the east, to be about right, and then we have got roughly 10,000 Marines showing up starting now, over the next several months, we think that is about right for certainly this year in the south.

Those are the two big areas, with the south being the most difficult and challenging right now.

As I said earlier, we think that is about right, as best we can tell, but, clearly, the concept is the same, the approach is the same, to get out and provide the security so development and politics, diplomacy, et cetera, can start to grow.

Mr. COFFMAN. I would encourage you, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, to certainly take a review as things develop, as soon as possible. I think it is better that we put the resources in sooner that are necessary than putting them in later.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo, please.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for your leadership in the Department of Defense.

And, also, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your testimony and your leadership, as well.

I guess you gentlemen know in what direction I am going. First, I would like to ask you, Mr. Secretary, to get your perspective in better understanding the Administration's position on the realignment of Marines from Okinawa, Japan to Guam.

Incidentally, just today, the Japanese Diet approved the Guam Airport Improvement Program (AIP), the agreed implementation plan. However, the commandant made comments at a recent House Appropriations Committee hearing that suggested the entire realignment of Marines from Okinawa, Japan to Guam was going to be reviewed.

It was always my understanding that only training and command and control issues connecting Marine Corps presence in the Pacific would be reviewed in the QDR and not the rebasing itself.

So could you respond? Will the rebasing of Marines for Okinawa to Guam be revisited in any way as part of the QDR process?

Secretary GATES. We are still committed to the rebasing to Guam. As you suggested, there are some issues relating to train-

ing; clearly, infrastructure issues on Guam itself; issues relating to the runway that we have to address.

But we are committed to the program. I am very happy that the Japanese Diet has approved. I knew that the lower house of the Diet had approved it. It sounds like the upper house did today.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, that approval was today.

Secretary GATES. And we have money in the 2010 budget to do our part and to keep our part of the commitment, and I urge the Congress to leave that money in there.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is what I wanted to hear.

There has been concern by local leaders on Guam about the level of coordination from the Department of Defense for funding local infrastructure projects, and I guess, really, you touched on it briefly.

For the military buildup to work, the impact on our community and the cost of additional infrastructure must be shared by the military.

In fact, a September 2008 and April 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that improvements to critical civilian infrastructure is needed to handle the buildup and that DOD must do more to ensure that these requirements are resolved.

And I guess you did answer that. The effort of your office in this regard is that you are supportive in this area. Is that correct?

Secretary GATES. Yes, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. And my third question. With your proposal on the JCAs, what will happen to the Army Guard units that are expected to receive the aircraft, but do not necessarily have a Sherpa mission? I am concerned about a hallow force structure.

Secretary GATES. I think this is one of the issues that has to be addressed in this context in the quadrennial defense review in terms of this balance between heavy lift helicopters, JCA and C-130s.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I am very enlightened with the responses to my questions.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The gentleman from Hawaii?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If the representative has any time left, would she yield it to me?

Ms. BORDALLO. I will yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. She yields 1 minute and 30 seconds.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, aloha to you.

Can you tell me, has the issue been resolved with regard to whether or not the basic allowance for housing will result in American construction companies being able to handle that construction?

I know what the Japanese Diet passed. Apparently, the State Department has decided we won't get to review that.

Secretary GATES. I don't know the answer to that, Mr. Abercrombie. I will find out.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay, because I want it clear on the record that I will—if it is not resolved so that the Bank of Japan is not getting the stimulus, but, rather, the United States, construction in the United States, it will be constructing, maintaining and man-

aging the housing for the Marines, I am afraid that we are going to have to have—at least I will certainly put forward an amendment to that effect.

I would like to see the housing for the Marines be in line with the kind of housing we do for military housing right now, where a private enterprise comes in, builds the housing, maintains it, manages it, and we utilize the basic allowance for housing to do the basic financing for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Akin from Missouri.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I came with kind of a multipart question. It has to do with F/A-18s, a subject that has been raised several times today.

The first is that in Section 123 of Public Law 110-417, it requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on F/A-18 procurement costs by March of 2009.

Now, we have not received that report. The purpose of the report was to take a look at particularly the idea of multiyear. We didn't stick that in that we were going to force anybody to do that last year, but we thought at least it makes sense to save money.

If you are going to be buying some F/A-18s and you are going to do it over a multiyear period, why not sort of lock in some type of a contract?

So I guess my first concern—I am going to hit you with a couple different questions. My first concern is I think it would be helpful in terms of transparency to have a better communication so we know what is going on.

Now, I understand that the QDR is the reason. We were going to wait for the QDR and everything. But it seems like, to me, this is a pretty straightforward situation.

In 2008, the projected shortfall was 125 aircraft. That was based on a 10,000-hour run time for these jets. Now, that has been proven wrong. So we are looking at a shortfall of 243,000 (sic) aircraft, and that comes out at 44 aircraft per aircraft carrier.

You are looking at, by the time you get to the year, let's see, it is about—I think it looks like 2018, you are looking at about five aircraft carriers with no airplanes on them.

I would suggest that aircraft carriers without airplanes is not a good combination. We need to have airplanes on them.

And so regardless of what QDR says, it seems to me that there is one of a couple of things. Either you are assuming we are going to get by with fewer aircraft carriers or we are not going to have a full 44 aircraft on an aircraft carrier. That seems to be where we are going.

So I guess my question is, first of all, why the lack of transparency and, second of all, if you would comment on where you think we are on F/A-18s.

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, if the lack of transparency is the fact that we haven't yet gotten that report to you that was due in March, then we have an obligation to get on it.

I wasn't aware about the report and I will find out where it is.

Admiral MULLEN. The strike-fighter shortfall is an area, Mr. Akin, I know that, obviously, you are very focused on. The

multiyear issue, quite frankly, is how long are you going to keep the production line open, and, clearly, there has been a decision previously made that it was—I can't remember the exact year, I think fiscal year 2012.

So how far out you could go on a multiyear right now would be a question, because that question hasn't been answered.

There is no intent to have aircraft carriers without airplanes, I understand that. I am very aware of the 10,000-hour desire and, obviously, those airplanes are not going to last that long.

That said, I advised the Secretary, and I am still there, that we really need to take a pretty healthy look at this overall shortfall, not just in the Navy. What is the strike-fighter future? What does it look like? And, principally, we are headed for JSF.

So what is the risk, when do you take it, and, obviously, that backs up into whether this production line would remain open longer than is scheduled right now.

There is an electronic warfare piece of this, as well, that I am sure you are aware of, which is included.

So I really think this needs to be looked at in the QDR.

Mr. AKIN. Right. Well, we were on point on the electronic warfare and I think there has been some real good progress there.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKIN. I guess the other question I had was, Mr. Secretary, you made the statement, as I recall, on January 2009, "I will pursue greater quantities of systems that represent the 75-percent solution instead of smaller quantities at the 99 percent."

I am thinking that 5.5 F/A-18s per JSF. Maybe the F/A-18 does make a certain amount of sense. And I have to say that as we have taken a look more on the shipbuilding side of cost overruns and problems with missing deadlines, as well as cost deadlines, but production deadlines, I guess I am a little concerned about dropping billions of dollars into trying to rush a program if we haven't even been through testing on it.

So it seems like there is a natural progression. If you drive a program too hard in terms of JSF, it can be pretty costly. And I am happy, if there is a better airplane, go for it, but I don't like to see us just gamble on something where we have a huge shortfall.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And like so many others, thank you for your outstanding service and testimony this morning, to both witnesses.

And like other members, I certainly view this as a reform document and reform budget, and applaud both of you for the hard work that went into it.

I wanted to actually, along that line, just sort of comment on the exchange that Mr. Hunter had with Admiral Mullen regarding the disruption to families.

I heard your answer, basically, to say that it is happening because we have had such a broken budget process, where supplemental passages and late budgets have really kind of made it difficult for the services to plan adequately.

So that trying to be conservative and prepare for the worst case scenario is partly our fault here in Washington, because we really have not followed regular order in passing budgets within a fiscal year that would allow that type of planning.

I also would disappoint a lot of people back home if I didn't acknowledge that your budget does tip a hat to the fact that we have worked so hard to get the submarine building program to an acceptable level in terms of hitting deadlines and budgets, and we certainly appreciate the fact that that clearly was recognized in this budget document.

I would like to ask, though, Secretary Gates, I mean, there has been a lot of talk here today about trying to focus on the national interests in this budget and I completely agree with that.

But, certainly, part of the national interest is the fact that we have an economy which is in probably the worst shape of our lifetimes and we also have a workforce and an industrial base that is part of the national interest, and, certainly, your work on the MRAP was, I think, a classic example of that.

We did not have an industrial base that was really ready to get to the theater vehicles that saved lives, despite the fact that you were pushing for it and budgets were being passed here in Washington.

And the concern in Connecticut, very frankly, on the F-22, is that, certainly, the F-35 sort of vision, at the end, makes a lot of sense and there is going to be work there for that plane, but the plan, as is, right now of basically ending the production line at 187 is going to have a disruption to that industrial base.

I mean, there is just no way that you can have that happen without a gap and a very serious valley in terms of what happens to the workforce.

You described a zero sum game that we are involved in here. I guess the question I have is there has clearly been interest in terms of our Middle East allies, Israel and others, in terms of acquiring the F-22. That is, obviously, now allowed by law right now.

And I just wondered what your thoughts were in terms of that as an option right now and whether or not we can sell modified versions of the F-22, at least to keep that base working.

Secretary GATES. We didn't design an export version of the F-22. We have done that with the joint strike-fighter. We have eight foreign partners in the JSF. They are committed over the 5-year defense plan to buy, I think, 260 of these aircraft over the next 5 years.

The reality is I think that at least in the recommendations that I make to the President, what I have to consider, first and foremost, is what I think is in the best national security interest of the country.

Larger issues are considered by the President and by the Congress. But I would say this, and I realize that it is not one-for-one, but right now, in 2009, there are 24,000 people directly involved in the construction or building the F-22. That will go to 19,000 in 2010 and 13,000 in 2011.

But at this moment, in 2009, there are 38,000 people working on the joint strike-fighter, 64,000 in 2010, and 82,000 in 2011.

So the reality is as we transition from the F-22 to the joint strike-fighter, a significantly larger number of jobs will be created in the country and in the air industrial base, if you will.

And I have heard the figure 95,000 thrown around. I assume that that is a calculus that includes suppliers and everybody else. So if that is a factor of 4, then 4 times 82,000 means that there is a net add over the next 2 years of 220,000 jobs to the American economy through what we budgeted in 2010 and beyond for the joint strike-fighter.

So that is not much solace to the folks in 2012 who are working on the F-22, but we can't keep these programs running forever.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, as one more opinion from the peanut gallery, I appreciate your willingness to make decisions on programs and on personnel.

My perception is that there was some momentum for institutional change at the Pentagon, until September 11. That kind of changed everybody's focus.

But if the last eight years have taught us anything, it is the importance of having a balanced sort of approach and getting the right people in the right jobs at the right time. And whether we may agree or disagree about some particular decisions, I appreciate you making them.

The first QDR included a required red team, an outside group of folks whose job it was to offer an alternative version. It was called the National Defense Panel.

Chairman Skelton and I actually tried to get that on the last QDR, but were not successful.

Do you think it would be helpful to kind of have these retired military think tank type folks to offer an alternative, different sort of look at the broader questions that the QDR is supposed to address?

Secretary GATES. I not only think that having a red team for the QDR is a good idea, I have already moved in that direction. And the person who will lead the red team is the same person who led the red team for the last QDR, and that is Dr. Andy Marshall and the Department of Defense, and he will be assisted, at my request, by General Jim Mattis at Joint Forces Command.

I think Jim Mattis is one of the most creative and thoughtful military minds anywhere and I think the combination of Andy Marshall and Jim Mattis, basically, red teaming the—I have actually got them red teaming both the scenarios and the QDR itself so that we are not the prisoners of a bureaucratic group think of people who have done this work forever.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I share your complete admiration for both people. We might just want to think about whether someone out—a group of people outside the department might be useful.

I am not necessarily advocating that, but I do think some sort of a fresh approach is helpful.

I think some of the best ideas, for example, on change that was needed came from or at least was spurred by that national defense panel, and we haven't done it since the first QDR.

Let me ask about or turn to cyber for a second. You talked about that in your statement. It seems to me that this may be an area where you are fighting the culture of the Pentagon a bit, whereas some folks see cyber as an enabler to help them do their job, which it certainly is.

But some folks see it, also, as a separate domain of warfare for which we need offense and defense.

What do you think?

Secretary GATES. Well, I agree with the latter entirely and we are putting—the budget provides the resources to about quadruple the throughput at our cyber schools for cyber experts in uniform.

I have been waiting for the completion of the White House review. I believe that there needs to be an integration of offense, defense, and exploitation and my inclination and what I have talked about in the past is moving to a sub-unified command under Strategic Command, but with a four-star leader, who would have that responsibility for the Department of Defense for cyber.

And, of course, I think the Air Force is standing up its own folks.

And by the way, I have just gotten a note. Marshall is going to include outsiders in his red team group.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. I appreciate it, that is helpful.

And I appreciate your comments on cyber. Still, you say quadruple, we are going from 80, according to your statement, to 250 per year by fiscal year 2011.

It just strikes me as when you compare the manpower that some other countries are putting on this issue, 250 doesn't sound like a whole lot.

And does it stand the chance of kind of being this outsider, because while—I think of the space analogy. While the Air Force has had to embrace space, produce space-related people, I am not sure who produces—what service has the train, equip responsibility on cyber.

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, part of the problem is, obviously, there are huge demands on the force right now. And so one of the things that the service chiefs have been directed is that their first priority is to fill all those slots at the cyber school as they are making assignments.

But I would also tell you that the reality is, with respect to particularly the Russians and the Chinese, they do a lot of outsourcing of what they do on cyber, and mainly to people in their 20s and early 30s, and it gives them a greater multiplier effect.

I wish I could figure out how to do that.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Maybe we ought to work on that together.

Secretary GATES. Unfortunately, we have rules of accountability that they don't.

The CHAIRMAN. A point of clarification. There is a proposed cyber command and sub-commands in the Air Force. And would it also be true in the Army and the Navy?

Admiral MULLEN. What the Secretary is talking about is a proposal and, again, we await the outcome of the strategic review from the White House.

But the four-star sub-unified who would report to STRATCOM would be supported by components, all the services.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, each of the services would have their own component.

Admiral MULLEN. Each of the services would have the component that would report in, and this is becoming mainstream warfare. This is no longer niche stuff and we all recognize that and we have got to move out on it as rapidly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You answered the question. Thank you very much.

Mr. Sestak, please.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, for whatever it is worth, I think your budget proposal is spot on.

I think it is very similar to what Mr. Rumsfeld might have done when he came to the Defense Department and tried to transform the military. But then with men and women in harm's way in two wars, it is understandable, as you found in your first year that is where you focus needed to be, and I wish you the best success, to where we are no longer measuring our military in how many, but in capability, particularly in cyberspace or network centers.

Sir, could I ask you a question today? And I mean these two questions with the utmost respect. Not as Secretary of Defense, but as one of the two members of the national command authorities with the President.

Probably, your most important job is deciding not just the execution of our operations overseas, but who commands them or the removal thereof.

And may I ask, when you decided to remove General McKiernan, why did you also ask for his resignation from the service, if I might?

Secretary GATES. Basically, I view what has happened with General McKiernan as an accelerated change of command and he—this was the process by which we did that in an accelerated way.

There was no—there was certainly no intent to convey anything negative or denigrate him in any way by that.

Mr. SESTAK. The reason I ask, not about his removal, because I think, as National Command Authorities (NCA), that has got to be your choice, I was more trying to understand the request for his resignation from the service.

When General Eikenberry was here 2½ years ago, having left Afghanistan, he told us in testimony that—or he told us that he needed more forces there.

A few short months prior to General McKiernan going over there, the chairman stated that the policy is not his, but the Administration's policy at the time was in Iraq, we do what we must, but in Afghanistan, we do what we can.

To some degree, is there a lesson here for younger officers, not in the removal, but in the request for resignation, that we may not want to have that this was an individual who, by policy, was given second choice on resources and never enough, despite repeated requests for it?

While it is understandable you need a new strategic approach, but to also call for his resignation, is there a lesson in there that we may not want to have for our younger service members?

And I ask that with great respect, sir.



Secretary GATES. I understand and I guess I would say that I saw his resignation as commander of U.S. forces and not from the service, and, presumably, he will retire with the honor and respect that he deserves.

The reality is we have gone from about 32,000 American troops last year in Afghanistan to, within the next few months, 68,000 troops. We are now in the 40,000s somewhere. So there has been a significant increase in those resources.

My decision to make this recommendation to the President had nothing to do with civilian casualties, had nothing to do with General McKiernan's request for forces.

My view is that a commander in the field should never feel constrained from asking for what he needs and it is up to the Central Command, the chiefs, the chairman to make a recommendation to me on how to—and then to the President on how much and how to satisfy that request.

I have worked very hard to give, first, General Petraeus and now General Odierno the forces that they need in Iraq. We have worked very hard to come up with these additional forces for Afghanistan, and that played—his request for additional troops played absolutely no role in that decision.

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir, and I did not mean to insinuate. I know it didn't.

My last question is different. Back in 2002, Defense Department had about two percent of all overseas developmental assistance funding in the U.S. government. Today, it is about 11 percent.

As we transition more to developmental assistance, do you see transferring those funds over to the State Department?

Secretary GATES. Well, some of them have become—I think we have seen an expanded role for a number of our combatant commanders that have mixed, where the military has been involved in humanitarian and other kinds of activities and in trying to build the security forces of our partners, which has involved some of those development funds.

So I think that the way we envision our mission and the expectations that the President has of us have evolved over the last number of years.

What I believe needs to happen and what I have written about is that I believe that the State Department has been deprived of both the human and dollar resources that they need to carry out their responsibilities in this arena.

I think in the area that we are talking about, for example, for this Pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund, my view is those dollars will transition to the State Department in fiscal year 2010 and beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bishop, please.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have got three questions I would like to ask. So I am going to do this as quickly as I can. If I get kind of antsy with your answers, it is only because I want to get all three of these in here.

The first one deals with the Minuteman 3 propulsion and replacement program, which ended this summer. We now no longer have an Intercontinental Missile (ICM) modernization or

sustainment program, even though the Russians are going to have a new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (IBM) system by 2018.

The question, I hate to ask it in this format, but the delegation from my state sent you a letter on March 18 and we haven't had a response yet from anyone in the Pentagon or from your office.

I am going to take this opportunity to ask the same kind of question, which should have been done by letter.

But in the budget documents, you talk about the solid rocket motor warm line program to maintain a capability and sustainment within the industry for, as you say, "solid rocket motors in order to sustain Minuteman 3 weapons systems through 2030, as directed by Congress, to maintain the production capability for the manufacture of solid rocket motors, as well as maintain system engineering assessment capability." That is your goal.

In the 2010 budget, you have enough money put in there for one set of motors, even though the industry has said they need a minimum of six to maintain the industrial capability.

So the first question, which was the product of that letter, is how do you explain your analysts coming to the conclusion that one rocket motor set can maintain that industrial capability, when the industry says it can't.

Secretary GATES. I don't have an answer for you. I will get the letter to you within the week.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Then let me go on to the second one, which deals specifically with some of the other concerns that have been mentioned. I wanted to re-echo those at the same time, missile defense, especially.

The ground-based midcourse direction and the kinetic energy interceptor program, as well as the Minuteman 3, all are supposed to be prevented by a solid rocket motor propulsion system.

There is only one place where those are built and these three items that we are doing so far I think have the tendency of decimating that kind of industrial capacity.

And it is also ironic that the day you announced the midcourse defense rocket decision was the day the North Koreans launched their missile. But besides that point, I want to zero in on KEI, because I am somewhat confused about some of the statements you made in response to Mr. Lamborn's question.

There have been fire controls, seven static fire tests, which all have been positive. The contracts were let in 2003, not a 14-year program. There is no other speed, reach or mobility. So the idea that there has to be a proximity to an enemy to launch is not understandable to me.

And perhaps if there hadn't been 15 or more redirects coming from the Pentagon on this program, it may have been done a little bit sooner.

But the question I am going to ask from KEI is those rockets are already there for the launch to take this fall. Yesterday, you ordered the stop work order to go through.

It caught all of us by surprise because of the infamous gag order, which, once again, I echo the complaints about that process.

We have not had a chance to discuss this or understand why that is there. Even in your announcement in April, you had made the

decision, but you didn't announce that, we had to read about this program or get it secondhand.

So the question I have, because I have heard your arguments and, once again, we need some time to discuss this, because they don't necessarily jive with the reality of the program, as I know it.

But I want to know, what is the cost of your stop work order? What is the cost of terminating this program? It doesn't come cheap. They are contractual obligations.

How much is it going to cost to implement the stop work order?

Secretary GATES. I will have to get back to you on that. I don't know.

Mr. BISHOP. I am going to have more than five minutes at this rate here. But I would appreciate your writing back.

Secretary GATES. I am being as brief as you asked.

Mr. BISHOP. Well, that is a legitimate answer. But less than three months for the answer?

Secretary GATES. Yes.

Mr. BISHOP. Deal. The third one, though, is the final one that goes back to the Missile Defense Agency, as well as in the 2009 appropriations, there was money in there for this booster test flight.

If the stop work order goes through, MDA has not told us what they will do with the money already in the budget to deal with this.

It was already appropriated by Congress. They told you what to do. It hasn't happened. That money is sitting there.

What are you going to do with the money?

Secretary GATES. Get back to you on that one, too.

Mr. BISHOP. I am zero-for-three with you, aren't I?

Secretary GATES. Well, that is because you are asking questions at a level of detail, frankly, that I don't have.

Mr. BISHOP. I want more F-22s. Does that help?

Secretary GATES. That one I can answer.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. My time is almost up. I appreciate you.

Thank you, Secretary Gates, for getting back with me and I look forward to the responses.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Giffords.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, for appearing before us today and thank you for your service to our Nation.

Despite delaying the delivery of this year's request until the middle of May, the department has yet to disclose some specific justifications behind numerous major defense reductions, and you have probably heard the frustration from members, because we want to know why and we certainly want to work with you to be able to justify those reductions.

I believe that some of the restructuring efforts cut disproportionately across certain forces, and this year's request would have a direct negative impact on the overall fighter aircraft inventory and the combat search and rescue assets, including nearly a dozen units in my district alone.

Members here do not have the luxury of planning our Nation's defense on a year-to-year basis. It is the responsibility of this committee to balance short-term security with long-term stability and provide for the continued robust defense of our Nation.

So delaying the outline of future plans to a date uncertain, in my opinion, undermines this year's request and a major decision being made in this year's budget.

So specifically, Secretary Gates, the department announced last month that they would cancel the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) replacement program and, according to your statement, the next year will be spent researching potential alternatives and verifying the requirement.

At Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in my district, they have long awaited the final selection and delivery of a new aircraft for this crucial mission.

Among operators, there seems to be no question of the need for this program.

So could you please expand on the justification for canceling the program? And in making this decision, did you consider the substantial additional risk being placed on the current aircraft fleet? And were you also aware of the current fleet of Pave Hawk aircraft beginning to reach the end of their designed service life, actually, six years ago now?

Secretary GATES. The principal reasons behind the decision on CSAR-X were, first, some significant acquisition problems associated with the program, and, second, it was a single service, single mission kind of aircraft.

It also had an operational concept flaw, as far as I was concerned. Because it is supposed to be able to rescue pilots deep in enemy territory, it was being designed with a 250-mile range, and yet both the F-22 and the F-35, as well as the F-16, for that matter, have a range of up to 500 miles.

The notion of an unarmed helicopter being able to rescue somebody deep in enemy territory as a single mission struck me as not being plausible.

So what we discovered, if we look back at the previous times, most notably, in the Balkans, when a pilot was down behind enemy lines, it ended up being several services and several different capabilities that were used in the rescue, and I think that is the kind of joint capability we need to think about for search and rescue.

We do need to get on with it and the intent is to do that during the course of fiscal year 2010.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Admiral Mullen.

Admiral MULLEN. The only comment I would add is that the fact that this program was canceled does not, in any way, shape or form, speak to a lack of commitment to rescuing somebody when they are in that need, and we will figure out a way to do that.

Everybody is committed in that regard.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Talking about fighter gap, and we have had a lot of hearings in the subcommittees about the fighter gap, shortfall, and the waterfall, and really losing 80 percent of our fighters in the next 8 years is something that I believe that we are all concerned about.

I know that this year's budget request would cancel the F-22 program, add only a handful of F-35 test aircraft, and retire 250 Air Force fighter aircraft.

The current Air Force fighter fleet is roughly 200 aircraft short of the department's stated requirements for fighters and even

under the most optimistic projections, the Air National Guard would be forced to close 13 fighter wings by 2017.

The total fighter gap now will grow to 800 aircraft under current plan.

So I know we have had a lot of discussion about F-22s, but I am really specifically looking at what we are going to be doing with our Air National Guard program and the justification by some of these requests that you have made.

Secretary GATES. Well, again, as I said earlier, the bathtub in fighters depends on whether you are looking at the requirement from the standpoint of our current force structure and anticipated force structure and our desired capabilities or whether it is based on a threat analysis, and those are the kinds of issues that are going to be addressed in the quadrennial defense review, because if you look at the threat analysis, our lead on fifth generation fighters, for example, over, for example, China, is enormous in 2020 and grows even greater in 2025.

So it really gets more to a question of force structure here in the United States versus the threat-based, and that is the kind of thing that is going to be looked at in the QDR.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

And, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, thank you very much for your service.

My perspective, I greatly appreciate what you are doing in protecting American families and also providing the opportunity for young people to serve our country.

Again, the perspective I have, a 31-year veteran myself, 4 sons who are currently serving in the military, 3 who have served in the Middle East.

Additionally, I am very, very grateful, I represent Fort Jackson, Parris Island Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort Naval Hospital.

I have just returned from visiting, my tenth visit in Iraq, eighth visit in Afghanistan.

What is extraordinary, we had the opportunity to visit with the junior officers and enlisted personnel from our home states and every time I go and visit in country, I am impressed by the dedication and competence and capabilities.

And so I just want to thank you for backing them up.

I am concerned, though, that with the consolidated budget request, this shows that there is actually a reduction, Secretary Gates, in regard to the Army budget.

There is a reduction by consolidating the budget of over \$4.4 billion and my concern is with the force structure staying as it is, maybe increasing, which I think is good, that this could result in a limitation on reset and modernization.

And so how will this be addressed with the reduction?

Secretary GATES. I don't think that it would have that impact, sir. I think that the reduction is primarily due to the changes in the Future Combat System (FCS) program and some other programs and not those affecting the troops.

But let me ask the—the information that I have is that for the base budget, the Army is up 2.1 percent from 2009 to 2010.

Mr. WILSON. That is the base budget. But with the consolidated, which is—

Secretary GATES. Part of the consolidated is that the personnel costs have been transferred to the base budget. So that the truth of the matter is I have added almost \$11 billion for end strength into the base budget of 2010.

About \$7 billion of that was Army, was end strength in the Army, and so that is now being covered in the base budget.

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate your efforts to maintain the funding that can be possible.

I am, like so many other members, concerned about the missile defense program and, in particular, with the changes that have come about.

These decisions were made prior to the completion of the Administration's missile defense policy and strategy review and, also, in the midst of extraordinary changes in Iran, in their capability of developing ballistic missiles and potential nuclear weapons.

How did we address these changes as affecting particularly the capability of Iran?

Secretary GATES. I think there, the changes in terms of the deployment or the addition of six Aegis-capable missile defense ships, the addition of THAAD missiles and the addition of the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) missiles to the inventory were basically maxing out the production lines in terms of being able to protect against the kinds of missiles that the Iranians have deployed today.

Of course, the whole purpose behind the third site in Europe would be able to take on a longer range missile from Iran that might be aimed either at western Europe or Russia or, for that matter, ourselves, and I think that there is still very active interest in pursuing either the third site and doing so in partnership with the Russians, whether it is using one of their radars or some other arrangement with them.

But I think that most of us believe that that kind of arrangement in western Europe, Russia offers the best opportunity to deal with the longer range Iranian missiles.

Mr. WILSON. And do you believe that Iran is proceeding with developing longer range missiles and nuclear weapon capability?

Secretary GATES. Absolutely.

Mr. WILSON. And it is a threat to our allies in the Persian Gulf and throughout the region. And so I am happy to hear of what you are indicating, but I am very concerned that the rogue regime in Tehran could be a threat to the entire Middle East and possibly southeastern Europe, too.

Secretary GATES. And this is one of the reasons why we now have a full-time Aegis presence in both the eastern Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. I believe it is a deterrence. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you both for your very thoughtful and forthright leadership.

It has been a pleasure to listen to you today. You have been here quite a while.

I have a question related to the supplemental. Obviously, you know that is coming to the floor today or later this—tomorrow or later this week.

And while we talk about what is happening in Afghanistan and revisiting that war, expanding the effort there, I really tend to view it as a new war, that much has changed post-9/11, whether it is through our failure to take advantage of what we secured there, and, also, what has happened in Pakistan in the interim.

So that it is a much broader effort, a much more complicated effort. And as we make the investment that the supplemental will ask us to do, I do think we owe it to the American people to know really what the long-term nature of this commitment is going to be.

So, Admiral Mullen, as you have talked about the 17,000-plus soldiers that we will be sending over there, I recently visited and asked a question of what kind of loss of life we could expect as a result of these additional soldiers. The Taliban will be very resistant.

But you spoke about the momentum you hope to achieve with these additional soldiers going forward.

My question really is, if we don't achieve that momentum, if we don't see the impact we desire, not only from our efforts in Afghanistan, but, also, we are very dependent upon Pakistan doing its part, it is not just Afghanistan in isolation, what do you anticipate coming?

What are you going to ask of us in terms of potentially, more soldiers, more funding? How long might we expect to be at this? And how adept are we going to be at changing course, responding to what works and doesn't work?

Admiral MULLEN. Well, as the Secretary said earlier, I think we are certainly going to be there for a while. I am very hopeful that, over the next two years, 2009 and 2010, in particular, that we can have a big impact in Afghanistan and actually in our relationship with Pakistan, because I think it is both, so that we can reverse the trend of growing violence there.

In the interim, we are going to have more casualties. We are going to have more that are killed and more that are wounded as we put more troops in, particularly in the south, where the Taliban are heavily concentrated.

That said, it is not just about boots on the ground, because the civilian capacity is important, the continued capacity development of the Afghan national army, which is actually a pretty good story, and the Afghan national police, and we still have a lot of work there.

New leadership is a part of that and that, obviously, was—that change was made or recommendation for change was made earlier this week.

On the Pakistan side, where I have spent an awful lot of time, I think it has—I would expect us to be coming back for a long-term relationship, a comprehensive program, it is not just military, so that we can establish a long-term relationship with Pakistan and not have it go up and down.

I was recently in Egypt. I was struck by the fact that we have had a relationship with Egypt from the 1978–1979 timeframe and while—and have invested in that. And while we have had our differences, it is a very strong relationship and a very important part of the world.

We were out of Pakistan for almost 12 years, very difficult to have a relationship. So I think it is going to be a while.

At what level of combat, what level of troops, that is difficult to predict right now.

Ms. TSONGAS. It is difficult to predict, and yet it seems it is very important that it be at a minimal level in order for us to achieve the objective we have in Afghanistan.

Admiral MULLEN. And the troops we are sending in there, ma'am, I see, over the next year, certainly 2009, as the right level and that we are going to assess that and, clearly, commanders on the ground are going to adjust.

But in the east and south, best we can tell, it looks about right, from my perspective, right now.

Ms. TSONGAS. And is our capacity to respond to changing circumstances on the ground in Afghanistan dependent upon our drawdown in Iraq?

Do you have sufficient forces really to deal with the dynamics of both at once?

Admiral MULLEN. They are clearly related. They are more loosely related as time goes on, but, again, as we look at the projections in Afghanistan right now, we have the forces to be able to send there to have the impact that we want.

Ms. TSONGAS. For the moment, at the very least.

Admiral MULLEN. Well, certainly, for the next year to two, as best I can tell right now, without being able to—the crystal ball isn't necessarily always clear.

Ms. TSONGAS. Secretary Gates, do you have any comments?

Secretary GATES. Nothing to add to that.

Ms. TSONGAS. Great, thank you both.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

The bells have rung for three votes, and, obviously, we will not be able to get back within the time limit. Our witnesses must depart at three o'clock.

So I am going to do my best to squeeze two more members in and then we will rush to vote.

And in the meantime, know you have our gratitude for your excellent service and your wonderful testimony today.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I probably won't take all my time.

Gentlemen, thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, just to beat a dead horse further, the freeze on communication with Congress you think has been adequately communicated across your team so that there is no residual hesitation and there is no language in there that could be interpreted that would cause anybody anxiety.

And does the White House support the lifting of the freeze?



Secretary GATES. The White House had nothing to do with the nondisclosure agreements and based on today's conversation with you all, I will put out something in writing tomorrow along the lines of what I described earlier.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

Getting this far deep into the bench, all the good questions are asked.

The news service is reporting that the President has decided to oppose the release of the photographs from the detainees in Afghanistan or Iraq and some comments about that is in contradiction to what the Pentagon had planned to do.

Could you walk us through—will the Pentagon—of course, you will support the President, but in terms of continuing to push this through to the courts so that—I have got to believe that if a cartoon in the Danish newspaper was inflammatory, these have got to be equally as inflammatory.

So could you walk us through that a little bit?

Secretary GATES. First, the basic, just to cut to the chase, we are involved in litigation. It appeared that we would be forced to turn over these photographs, if we did not appeal a decision to the Supreme Court. I think that is what is under consideration.

We are looking at a number of other photographs and other litigation down the road. And so one of the considerations that I had asked for was should we put all this together and release it all at once, so we go through the pain once instead of the Chinese water torture over a period of time.

A couple of things have changed on that. First, I think, is, as you suggest, a willingness of the President to take this on, but, second and perhaps what has motivated my own change of heart on this and perhaps influenced the President is that our commanders, both General McKiernan and General Odierno, have expressed very serious reservations about this and their very great worry that release of these photographs will cost American lives.

That was all it took for me.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I agree. If we have to release them at some point in time, fine, but let's don't borrow trouble, particularly with the intent to get out of the cities in June in Iraq and other kinds of things.

There will never be a good time to release those photographs. Let's stick with it and make the courts make us do it.

So I appreciate your change of opinion on that.

And I yield back.

Mr. Secretary, thank you, appreciate you being here.

The CHAIRMAN. The last member, Mr. Heinrich.

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, thank you for being here today. It is a great honor for me to have this opportunity.

I want to get back to something that Representative Giffords and Representative LoBiondo both brought up with the Air National Guard, the changes in force structure, and, I guess, the disagreement over whether there will or will not be a fighter gap.

From my perspective, being new at this, I know what I know and that is my local installation. Kirtland Air Force Base, which is in

my district, is home to the 150th Fighter Wing, which was originally expected to retire its aircraft in fiscal year 2017.

And so it was a little bit surprising and disappointing to find out, as part the fiscal year 2010 Air Force budget, that 18 out of 21 of our aircraft would be phased out, that they would be losing those.

And I guess what I am grappling with is we have—the 150th, in particular, is the fighter wing. It has been there for 60 years of service.

Kirtland was actually ranked number one in the 2005 BRAC as a fighter base during the 2005 BRAC process. And with Air National Guard fighter wings like the 150th generally maintaining a combat ready status at about one-third the cost of an equivalent active duty force, how do these major changes in Air National Guard fighter wings make sense, given the potential for a shortfall and what seems to be a very good record of providing a lot of service for a relatively modest amount of money?

Secretary GATES. Let me just respond in two ways and then see if Admiral Mullen has anything to add.

As I have indicated, the whole issue of the numbers of Tactical Air is one of the issues that we are going to have to address in the QDR, and it is part of an evolution.

After all, a big part of the Air Force capability going forward or a significant part is going to be unmanned vehicles, like reapers, that have many of the capabilities of an F-15, but instead of a 500-mile range, have a 3,000-mile range and a dwell capability.

So that is a capability we are going to have, others don't. That is a new part of our force.

We will look at this whole TACAIR issue in the QDR, but I am usually very reluctant ever to pass the buck. But in this instance, the proposal to reduce 250 legacy aircraft, TACAIR, came from the Air Force.

So it seems to me that this is an issue that, when General Schwartz and Secretary Donnelly come up here, that this is an issue that they will certainly be better able to speak to than I can, certainly.

I don't know if the Admiral wants to add anything.

Admiral MULLEN. I would just say, as a former service chief, one of the ways you start to pay for the future is you start decommissioning the past, and, particularly, as you transition in the aircraft world from many type and model series as you move to the future.

I mean, again, General Schwartz can certainly speak to this, but it certainly wouldn't surprise me that the Air Force has made this decision in order to figure out how to move to the future.

And certainly, what the 150th—this does not speak to the 150th. They have been exquisite for a long time. There are cost concerns associated with this, but I want to make sure, when we talk about those, we are talking about apples to apples and how much time we are operating and is it the total cost, those kinds of things.

All of that goes into service decisions and then gets integrated into the decisions we will make in the QDR.

Mr. HEINRICH. One of my concerns with that unit in particular is many of those aircraft have already been upgraded, so that they have years ahead of them, and the rest could potentially—were scheduled to be this year, most of the rest.

And in the budget, it says "transitioning to another mission to be determined," which does not sound like the kind of strategy and plan that I would hope for a unit of such distinction.

Admiral MULLEN. Understood.

Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen.

By virtue of the fact that we have three votes, we will have to end our hearing.

If there are any questions to be submitted for the record—I think Mr. Abercrombie might have one—please do so, or if anyone else, please do so and have the staff pass them over.

We will not return, because the votes will take us well past 3 o'clock.

But thank you so much for your testimony and for your service, look forward to seeing you again.

The hearing has ended.

[Whereupon, at 2:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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**A P P E N D I X**

MAY 13, 2009

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MAY 13, 2009

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FINAL FOR SUBMISSION

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2009 – 10:00 A.M.

**INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Chairman, Representative McHugh, members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget. First and foremost, this is a reform budget – reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our presence there – and refocus our efforts with a new strategy – I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of what the challenges and needs are so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders – unvarnished and unscripted – has from the moment I took this job been the single greatest source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with service members over the past two-and-a-half years – meetings that have reaffirmed this budget's three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, which I will discuss as I go through the different parts of the budget.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for FY10 – a four percent increase over the FY09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there has been some discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture – especially during a time of war. I believe it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term – that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

I will break this down into three sections: our people, today's warfighter, and the related topics of acquisition reform and modernization.

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**OUR PEOPLE**

Starting with the roll-out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win, and to survive while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they return. So, the top-priority recommendation I made to the President was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and long-term funding. To take care of people, this budget request includes, among other priorities:

- \$136 billion to fully protect and properly fund military personnel costs – an increase of nearly \$11 billion over the FY09 budget level. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps and Army will meet their respective end-strengths of 202,100 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year, so this money will be for sustaining those force levels in FY10 and beyond;
- \$47.4 billion to fund military health care;
- \$3.3 billion for wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs, including \$400 million for research and development. We have recognized the critical and permanent nature of these programs by institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget; and
- \$9.2 billion for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education, some of which was previously funded in the bridge and supplemental budgets.

We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Overall, we have shifted \$8 billion for items or programs recently funded in war-related appropriations into the base budget.

**TODAY'S WARFIGHTER**

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and must have a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs and similar to what I have tried to do with programs to support our troops. The FY10 budget reflects this thinking:

First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include:

- Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago;
- Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq; and
- Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

Second, we will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to boost our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters – an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now.

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Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Third, to strengthen global partnership efforts, we will fund \$550 million for key initiatives. These include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

Fourth, to grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,400 – or four percent – and will buy more aircraft for special operations forces. We will also increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY10.

Fifth, to improve our intra-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

And, finally, we will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus the previously planned 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength to 547,400. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss – which often occurs because certain specialties are in high demand. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

**ACQUISITION REFORM AND INSOURCING**

In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I welcome legislative initiatives in the Congress to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with lawmakers in this regard. This budget will support these goals by:

- Reducing the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replacing them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,800 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 33,600 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years;
- Increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce, converting 10,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 10,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 – beginning with 4,080 in FY10; and
- Terminating and delaying programs whose costs are out of hand, whose technologies are immature, or whose requirements are questionable – for example, the VH-71 presidential helicopter.

**MODERNIZATION**

We must be prepared for the future – prepared for challenges we can see on the horizon and ones that we may not even have imagined. I know that some people may think I am too consumed by the current wars to give adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. This budget provides \$186 billion for modernization, which belies that claim.

As I went through the budget deliberations process, a number of principles guided my decisions:

The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising, but as yet unproven, technologies, while continuing to produce – and, as necessary, upgrade – systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the



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Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and instead build more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites.

Second, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat, or accomplish roughly the same mission, we must look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. The Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, for example, had major development and cost problems to be sure. But what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the services' modernization portfolios.

Third, I looked at whether modernization programs had incorporated the experiences of combat operations since September 11th. This was particularly important to the ground services, which will be in the lead for irregular and hybrid campaigns of the future. The Future Combat Systems' ground vehicle component was particularly problematic in this regard.

Fourth, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent "exquisite" service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, then are deployed in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change, and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers.

This relates to a final guiding principle: the need for balance – to think about future conflicts in a different way – to recognize that the black and white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and platforms to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio – a mixture of capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies. It is my hope that the Quadrennial Defense Review will give us a more rigorous analytical framework for dealing with a number of these issues. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow-on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. But where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations.

#### AIR CAPABILITIES

This budget demonstrates a serious commitment to maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American military strength for more than six decades. The key points of this budget as it relates to air capabilities are:

- An increase in funding from \$6.8 to \$10.4 billion for the fifth-generation F-35, which reflects a purchase of 30 planes for FY10 compared to 14 in FY09. This money will also accelerate the development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and avoid the development issues that arose in the early stages of the F-22 program. More than 500 F-35s will be produced over the next five years, with more than 2,400 total for all the services. Russia is probably six years away from Initial Operating Capability of a fifth-

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generation fighter and the Chinese are 10 to 12 years away. By then we expect to have more than 1,000 fifth-generation fighters in our inventory;

- This budget completes the purchase of 187 F-22 fighters – representing 183 planes plus the four funded in the FY09 supplemental to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses;
- We will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production to meet current and future needs;
- To replace the Air Force's aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer. Our aging tankers, the lifeblood of any expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement;
- We will retire approximately 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10; and
- Before continuing with a program for a next-generation manned bomber, we should first assess the requirements and what other capabilities we might have for this mission – and wait for the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the outcome of post-START arms-control negotiations.

**MARITIME CAPABILITIES**

The United States must not take its current maritime dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel to ensure that dominance in the future. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to reconsider a number of assumptions – a process that will, as I mentioned, be greatly helped by the QDR.

We must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. We cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000: since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled.

The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America's existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs. This budget will:

- Shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040;
- Delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy; and
- Delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship to FY11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.

The Department will continue to invest in areas where the need and capability are proven by:

- Accelerating the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy's big, blue-water surface combatants;
- Adding \$200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities;
- Beginning the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine; and

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- Using FY10 funds to complete the third DDG-1000 Destroyer and build one DDG-51 Destroyer. The three DDG-1000 class ships will be built at Bath Iron Works in Maine and the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program will be restarted at Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi.

**LAND CAPABILITIES**

As we have seen these last few years, our land forces will continue to bear the burdens of the wars we are in – and also the types of conflicts we may face in the future, even if not on the same scale. As I said earlier, we are on track with the expansion of the ground forces, and have added money for numerous programs that directly support warfighters and their families.

Since 1999, the Army has been pursuing its Future Combat Systems – an effort to simultaneously modernize most of its platforms, from the way individual soldiers communicate to the way mechanized divisions move. Parts of the FCS program have already demonstrated their adaptability and relevance to today's conflicts. For example, the connectivity of the Warfighter Information Network will dramatically increase the agility and situational awareness of the Army's combat formations.

But the FCS vehicle program is, despite some adjustments, based on the same assumptions as when FCS was first conceived. The premise behind the design of these vehicles is that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency, and, above all, near-total situational awareness, compensate for less heavy armor – a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare, and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I would also note that the current vehicle program does not include a role for our recent \$25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

With that in mind:

- We have canceled the existing FCS ground vehicle program, and will reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach and then relaunch a new Army vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process;
- The FCS budget in FY10 is \$3 billion. I have directed that the new FCS program be fully funded in the out-years; and
- We will accelerate FCS's Warfighter Information Network development and field it, along with proven FCS spin-off capabilities, across the entire Army.

**MISSILE DEFENSE**

The United States has made great technological progress on missile defense in the last two decades, but a number of questions remain about certain technologies and the balance between research and development on one hand, and procurement on the other. This is one area where I believe the overall sustainability of the program depends on our striking a better balance. To this end, this budget will:

- Restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – threats that North Korea's missile launch last month reminds us are real;
- Cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant

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affordability and technology problems and the program's proposed operational role is highly questionable;

- Terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.2 billion; and
- Increase by \$700 million funding for our most capable theater missile defense systems like the THAAD and SM-3 programs.

**CYBER SECURITY**

To improve cyberspace capabilities, this budget:

- Increases funding for a broad range of Information Assurance capabilities to improve the security of our information as it is generated, stored, processed, and transported across our IT systems;
- Increases the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by FY11; and
- Establishes a cyber test range.

There is no doubt that the integrity and security of our computer and information systems will be challenged on an increasing basis in the future. Keeping our cyber infrastructure safe is one of our most important national-security challenges. While information technology has dramatically improved our military capabilities, our reliance on data networks has at the same time left us more vulnerable. Our networks are targets for exploitation, and potentially disruption or destruction, by a growing number of entities that include foreign governments, non-state actors, and criminal elements.

The President's cyberspace policy review will shortly report its findings and recommendations. I expect this document will offer strategic perspective for the Department in determining how best to defend the government and nation against cyber threats from state and non-state actors alike.

**OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process – as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate view of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Department of Defense.

We are asking for \$130 billion to directly support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is less than the \$141.7 billion we asked for last year through the bridge fund and the remaining supplemental request – which in part reflects shifting some programs into the base budget.

The OCO request includes \$74.1 billion to maintain our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq – from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves.

- In Afghanistan, this will support an average of 68,000 military members and six Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents – plus support personnel; and
- In Iraq, this will fund an average of 100,000 military members, but also reflects the President's decision to cut force levels to six Advisory and Assistance Brigades by August 31, 2010. Compared to the FY08 enacted levels for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we are asking for less than half.

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Aside from supporting direct operations, the OCO funding also includes, among other programs:

- \$17.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in theater. The major items include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, trucks, Humvees, Bradleys, Strykers, other tactical vehicles, munitions, radios, and various combat support equipment;
- \$15.2 billion for force protection, which includes \$5.5 billion for MRAPs – \$1.5 billion to procure 1,080 new MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) for Afghanistan and \$4 billion for sustainment, upgrades, and other costs for MRAPs already fielded or being fielded.
- \$7.5 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Ultimately, the Afghan people will shoulder the responsibility for their own security, so we must accelerate our training of their security forces in order to get more Afghans into the fight;
- \$1.5 billion for the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERP) – a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability;
- \$1.4 billion for military construction – most of which will go toward infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan to support our increased troop levels; and
- \$700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan's military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan – for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires military and civilian capabilities. This is a vital element of the President's new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

**CONCLUSION**

Let me close with a few final thoughts.

This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than half a trillion dollars – and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending "requirements creep," terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second of all, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight – not just the wars we've traditionally been best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from

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potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built – on land, at sea, or in the air – to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years – on the battlefield and, perhaps just as important, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars – not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget request is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would, however, ask you to look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do – at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.

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Posture Statement of  
Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Before the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress  
House Committee on Armed Services

Chairman Skelton, Representative McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, it is my privilege to report on the posture of the United States Armed Forces.

First, I would like to thank our Service men and women and their families. Those who defend this Nation and the families who support them remain our most valuable national assets and deserve continued gratitude. I want especially to honor the sacrifices of our wounded, their families, and the families of the fallen. We are redefining our duty to them as a Nation, a duty which I believe lasts for life. I thank everyone in this distinguished body for their continued efforts in support of this cause.

Your Armed Forces stand as the most combat experienced in this Nation's history. Deeply experienced from decades of deployments in harm's way and from seven and a half years of war, they have remained resilient beyond every possible expectation. They make me, and every American, very proud.

I am grateful for your understanding of the stress our Armed Forces and their families are under. Your recognition of their burdens and uncertainties has been a vital constant throughout these challenging times. Thank you for your support of initiatives such as transferring G.I. Bill benefits to military spouses and children, military spouse employment support, expanded childcare and youth programs, homeowner's assistance programs, and, most importantly, long-term comprehensive support of Wounded Warrior families.

This testimony comes after a notable transition of Administration, the first during wartime since 1968 and the first since the 9-11 attacks on the homeland.

Conducted in the face of threats and continued wartime missions overseas, the transition was marked by courtesy and concern for the mission and our forces from start to finish. Transition obviously means change, but in this case, it also meant continuity in providing for the common defense. Continuity has been and is particularly important at this juncture as we implement the key strategic changes underway that end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility and reinforce a whole of government effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While several key developments have emerged since I last testified, in particular the global economic crisis, the three strategic priorities for our military that I outlined last year remain valid. First, we must continue to improve stability and defend our vital national interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia. Second, we must continue efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our Armed Forces. Third, we must continue to balance global strategic risks in a manner that enables us to deter conflict and be prepared for future conflicts. The three strategic priorities are underpinned by the concept of persistent engagement, which supports allies and partners through programs abroad and at home and which must be led by and conducted hand-in-hand with our interagency partners to achieve sustainable results.

#### **Key Developments**

Over the past year your Armed Forces continued to shoulder a heavy burden worldwide, particularly in the Middle East and South Central Asia. Our emphasis has rightfully remained on the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and against al-Qacda extremists, though we remain ready to face other global challenges.

Per the President's guidance on February 27<sup>th</sup>, we will end our combat mission in Iraq by August 31, 2010. The Joint Chiefs and I believe this is a prudent course given the sustained security gains we have seen to date and Iraq's positive trajectory. This current plan preserves flexibility through early 2010 by



conducting the majority of the drawdown after the Iraqi election period. In the meantime, our troops are on course to be out of Iraqi cities by June of this year and two more brigades will return to the United States without replacement by the end of September. Drawing down in Iraq is not without risks. Lingering political tensions remain and violence could flare from time to time. Assuming no major surprises, however, we will successfully transition fully to the advise and assist mission over the next 16 months and lay the groundwork for a continued partnership with Iraq that promotes security in the region.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan we are providing additional resources to address the increase in violence. The strategic goal as outlined by the President on March 27, 2009, is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country. As that strategy was being developed, we began responding to conditions on the ground by reinforcing the International Security and Assistance Force commander with some 17,700 troops, the majority of which will arrive by this summer. Our aim in Afghanistan is to check the momentum of the insurgency, train additional forces, and ensure security for the Afghan national elections in August, while in Pakistan we will work with the Pakistani military to further develop their counterinsurgency skills and build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels.

We will shift the main effort from Iraq to Afghanistan in the coming year, though our residual footprint in Iraq will remain larger than in Afghanistan until well into 2010. The strategic environment we face beyond these ongoing conflicts is uncertain and complex. In the near term, we will maintain focus on threats to our vital national interests and our forces directly in harm's way. Increasingly, the greatest mid-term military threats will come from transnational concerns – the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology, transnational terrorism, competition over energy, water, and other vital resources, natural disasters and pandemics, climate change, and space vulnerabilities.

A prominent aspect of this shifting strategic environment is the disturbing trend in cyber attacks, where we face both state and non-state actors.

Cyberspace is a borderless domain wherein we operate simultaneously with other U.S. government agencies, allies, and adversaries. Effectiveness is increasingly defined by how well we share information, leverage technology, and capitalize on the strength of others. When appropriate, DoD will lead. Likewise, when appropriate, DoD will provide support and ensure collective success. Our national security and that of our allies is paramount.

A critical new challenge has been added to the strategic environment – the global economic crisis. Although we do not fully understand the impact or depth of this worldwide recession, dire economic conditions increase the pressures for protectionism. They also staunch the flow of remittances, which provide enormous benefits to developing nations. Prolonged downturns can generate internal strife, authoritarian rule, virulent nationalism, manufactured crises, and state conflict. Decreased energy prices have also affected the global economy, on one hand reducing the resources available to some malicious actors, but on the other hand hurting some key allies. Any conflict involving a major energy producer, however, could escalate prices rapidly, which would undoubtedly hamper prospects for a quicker global recovery. Economic concerns will increasingly be the lens through which we – and our partners and competitors – filter security considerations. Many nations may decrease expenditures on defense and foreign assistance, thus making the pool of collective resources we have to address challenges smaller. We will work through our routine military-to-military contacts to address this tendency directly and help to coordinate priorities, emphasizing that we are all bound together in this global economy.

Winning our Nation's current and future wars requires concurrent efforts to restore the vitality of the Armed Forces and balance global risk. I am grateful for Congress's continued support of the programs designed to return our units to the desired levels of readiness and for the honest debate engendered in these chambers to ascertain national interests and determine the best mix of capabilities and programs to protect those interests. The ability to debate these national choices – openly and transparently – is just one of the attractive features of our Republic that others seek to emulate.

Our military remains capable of protecting our vital national interests. At the same time, the strain on our people and equipment from more than seven years of war has been tremendous. There is no tangible "peace dividend" on the horizon given the global commitments of the United States. We still face elevated levels of military risk associated with generating additional ground forces for another contingency should one arise. I do not expect the stress on our people to ease significantly in the near-term given operations in the Middle East, the strategic risk associated with continued regional instability in South Central Asia, and the uncertainty that exists globally. Over the next two years the number of forces deployed will remain high. The numbers will reduce, but at a gradual pace. The drawdown in Iraq is weighted in 2010, with the bulk of the combat brigades coming out after the Iraqi elections. At the same time, through the course of 2009 and into 2010, we will be reinforcing the effort in Afghanistan. Only in 2011 can we expect to see marked improvements in the dwell time of our ground forces.

We can not – and do not – face these global challenges alone. We benefit greatly from networks of partners and allies. Despite the economic downturn, the bulk of the world's wealth and the majority of the world's most capable militaries are found in those nations we call friends. Persistent engagement maintains these partnerships and lays the foundation upon which to build effective, collective action in times of security and economic crisis. In the coming years we must be careful not to shunt aside the steady work required to sustain these ties. By maintaining regional security partnerships, developing and expanding effective information sharing networks, and continuing military-to-military outreach, we improve the ability to monitor the drivers of conflict and help position our Nation for engagement rather than reaction. Such engagement also propels us toward the common good, relieves some of the burden on our forces, improves the protection of the homeland, and helps secure U.S. vital national interests.

**Defend Vital National Interests in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia**

Given its strategic importance and our vital national interests, the United States will continue to engage in the broader Middle East and South Central Asia -- as a commitment to friends and allies, as a catalyst for cooperative action against violent extremism, as a deterrent against state aggression, as an honest broker in conflict resolution, and as a guarantor of access to natural resources. Yet we recognize that our presence in these regions can be more productive with a lower profile. The Iraq drawdown is the first step on the path to that end.

Attaining our goals in these critical regions requires time, resources, and endurance. Most of the challenges in the region are not military in nature and can only be met successfully from within. Our role remains one essentially of consistent, transparent partnership building. These actions send an unmistakable message to all that the U.S. remains committed to the common good, while steadily expanding the sets of partnerships available to address future challenges.

Central to these efforts in the Middle East and South Central Asia will be the relentless pressure we maintain on al-Qaeda and its senior leadership. Al-Qaeda's narrative will increasingly be exposed as corrupt and self-limiting. Though too many disaffected young men still fall prey to al-Qaeda's exploitation, I believe the populations in the region will ultimately reject what al-Qaeda offers. Our priority effort will remain against al-Qaeda, but we will also take preventative measures against the spread of like-minded violent extremist organizations and their ideologies to neighboring regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The U.S. military's task is to partner with affected nations to combat terrorism, counter violent extremism, and build their capacity to shoulder this same burden.

Afghanistan and Pakistan are central fronts in the fight against al-Qaeda and militant global extremism and must be understood in relation to each other. Afghanistan requires additional resources to counter a growing insurgency partially fed by safe havens and support networks located within Pakistan. Additional U.S. troops will conduct counterinsurgency operations to enhance

population security against the Taliban in south/southwest Afghanistan and to accelerate and improve training and mentoring of Afghan security forces. As in Iraq, our troops will live among the population. We must make every effort to eliminate civilian casualties, not only because this is the right thing to do but also because it deprives the Taliban of a propaganda tool that exploits Afghan casualties and calls into question U.S./NATO endurance and effectiveness in providing security. Although we must expect higher Alliance casualties as we go after the insurgents, their sanctuaries, and their sources of support, our extended security presence must – and will – ultimately protect the Afghan people and limit both civilian and military casualties. Our troops will integrate closely with Afghan forces, with the objective of building Afghan security forces that are capable of assuming responsibility for their country's security.

We expect the reinforcements to have the most pronounced effect over the next 12-24 months. Security gains can only be assured when complemented by development and governance programs designed to build greater self sufficiency over time. Our commanders in the field can lay some of this groundwork through the proven Commanders Emergency Response Program to start smaller projects quickly, but these projects can not compensate for the larger, enduring programs required. A temporary boost in security that is not matched with commensurate political and economic development will not only fail to generate faith in the Afghan government and fail to convince Afghans of our commitment, but also fail to accomplish our objectives. Over time, these objectives will be met more through civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations, with a lighter military presence. Getting to that point, however, requires that military forces generate the security required for political and economic initiatives to take root.

Pakistan is crucial to our success in Afghanistan. In my nine trips to Pakistan, I've developed a deeper understanding of how important it is that we, as a Nation, make and demonstrate a long term commitment to sustaining this partnership. We are taking multiple approaches to rebuild and strengthen relationships and address threats common to both of our nations. One key approach in the near term is to help Pakistan's military to improve its overall –

and specifically its counterinsurgency – capabilities. Beyond the trainers we will continue to provide, the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund and Coalition Support Funds. These funding streams provide us the means to address this issue directly, and I ask the Congress to support these initiatives and provide the flexibility to accelerate their implementation. We will ensure that accountability measures are in place so that these funds go exactly where they are intended to go and do not compromise other USG humanitarian assistance objectives. These programs will help the Pakistanis take continued action to combat extremist threats in western Pakistani territories which will complement the reinforcement of troops and special operations efforts in Afghanistan to maintain pressure on al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. In addition to these initiatives, steady support of the Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing programs will help us to address the needs expressed by Pakistan's leaders. We will also be well served by the substantially larger request for International Military Education and Training exchanges with Pakistan, to help reconnect our institutions and forge lasting relationships. Military programs must also be supplemented by non-military investment and continued engagement, which further confirm our Nation's long term commitment.

In all, we must recognize the limits of what can be accomplished at what price and at what pace in both countries. This will be a long campaign. We are committed to providing sustained, substantial commitment to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be halting and gradual, but we can steadily reduce the threats to our Nation that emanate from conditions in those countries.

In Iraq, we are on the path to stability and long-term partnership as codified in the Security Agreement. Political, ethnic, and sectarian tensions may continue to surface in sporadic bouts of violence. But we also expect that Iraq's Security Forces will continue to improve, malign Iranian influence will not escalate, and, although resilient, al-Qaeda in Iraq will not be able to regroup and reestablish the control it once had. I am heartened by the conduct of Iraq's

provincial elections in January and the election of a new Speaker of the Council of Representatives and expect additional political progress in the coming year.

The drawdown in Iraq carries inherent risks. But the plan that is underway provides sufficient flexibility for the ground commander to adjust to Iraqi political and security developments and to deal with the unexpected. We are currently working with Multi-National Force-Iraq, CENTCOM, SOCOM, TRANSCOM, and the Services on the mechanics of the drawdown and the composition of the roughly 35,000 to 50,000 strong transition force that will remain in Iraq after August 31, 2010, to advise and assist the Iraqi Security Forces, conduct counter terrorism operations, and provide force protection to civilian agencies.

The Iranian government continues to foment instability in the broader Middle East. We have two primary concerns: Iran's sponsorship of violent surrogates and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps orchestrates the activities of its proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan, across the Levant, and beyond. Through these proxies, Iran inserts itself into the Israeli-Palestinian situation by its direct support of Hamas and Hizballah. Iran's interference beyond its borders causes us to doubt the regime's declared peaceful intent regarding its nuclear program. Evidence suggests that the regime intends to acquire nuclear weapons, even as it continues to disregard UN and international resolutions. In these actions, the Iranian government rejects the opinion as reflected in recent polls of the Iranian population, the majority of who want peaceful, civilian nuclear power but do not want nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, Iran's behavior could well lead to further regional proliferation as other states would seek similar weapons as a hedge – an outcome that would serve neither Iran nor the region. Iran could be an immensely constructive actor in the region, and its choices in the near term will have far reaching consequences. Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability clearly constitutes a grave threat to U.S. vital national interests in the broader Middle East, and we must use all elements of national power to prevent them from achieving this nuclear capability. In line with the Administration's guidance, we

will continue to work with the international community to convince Iran that the benefits of abandoning its pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery means far outweigh the costs that would come from the alternative.

Iran's actions provide only one strand of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat emanating from the region. Al-Qaeda has expressed the desire for WMD and their intent to strike the homeland is undisputed. Al-Qaeda would also likely use WMD against populations in the broader Middle East. Consequently, the nexus between violent extremism and the proliferation of WMD remains a grave threat to the United States and our vital national interests. The defeat of al-Qaeda would significantly diminish the threat from this nexus, but does not fully remove it given the conceptual blueprint already established for other extremists. We will continue to support national efforts to counter, limit, and contain WMD proliferation from both hostile state and non-state actors. We will also team with partners inside and outside the broader Middle East to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen regional governments' confidence that we can address the WMD threat. But we must recognize that this threat requires vigilance for the duration, given the magnitude of damage that can be wrought by even a single incident.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular the violence in Gaza in January 2009, continues to cast a pall across the region. The Peace Process is primarily a diplomatic endeavor, but one we support fully through such initiatives as the training and advising of legitimate Palestinian security forces, exchanges with Israeli counterparts, and cooperation with Arab military partners. These initiatives support broader national endeavors aimed at a reduction in violence, greater stability, and peaceful co-existence in this critical region.

#### **Reset, Reconstitute, and Revitalize the Armed Forces**

Protecting our Nation's interests in recent years has required the significant commitment of U.S. military forces. Indeed, extensive security tasks remain before us as we pursue the stated objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan,



defeat the al-Qaeda network, prevent the spread of WMD, deter conflict, preserve our ability to project and sustain military power at global distances, and maintain persistent engagement with allies and partners around the globe. At the core of our ability to accomplish all of these tasks are the talented, trained, and well-equipped members of the Armed Forces. I remain convinced that investment in our people is the best investment you make on behalf of our citizens.

The pace of current commitments has prevented our forces from fully training for the entire spectrum of operations. Consequently, readiness to address the range of threats that might emerge has declined. The demands we have put on our people and equipment over the past seven years are unsustainable over the long-term. As we continue to institutionalize proficiency in irregular warfare, we must also restore the balance and strategic depth required to ensure national security. Continued operations that are not matched with appropriate national resources will further degrade equipment, platforms, and, most importantly, our people.

Our Nation's service members and their families are at the core of my efforts to reset, reconstitute, and revitalize our forces. Every decision I make takes into consideration their well being. The All-Volunteer Force has accomplished every mission it has been given, but at a high price. I do not take their service for granted and recognize the limits of their endurance. I remain extremely concerned about the toll the current pace of operations is taking on them and on our ability to respond to crises and contingencies beyond ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The dwell time of units is one key metric we watch closely for the Army and Marine Corps. Dwell time remains at approximately 1:1 for ground units, meaning one year deployed and one year at home for the Army, seven months deployed/seven months at home for the Marine Corps, and similar cycles for the Airmen and Sailors serving in joint expeditionary taskings. Dwell time will improve, but we cannot expect it to return to an interim 1:2 or the desired 1:3 or better for several years given the number of ground forces still tasked with re-posturing to Afghanistan, the advise and assist mission in Iraq after drawdown,

and other global commitments. Special Operations Forces (SOF) face similar deployment cycles but improvements in their dwell time will lag the Army and Marine Corps given the demand for SOF expertise in the irregular warfare environment we face. A key part of the effort to improve dwell time is the continued commitment to the size of the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces as reflected in the 2010 budget. Institution of the "Grow the Force" initiative is an indispensable element of the long-term plan to restore readiness.

Our recruiters met the missions of their military departments for fiscal year 2008 and are well on track for fiscal year 2009. The Services have been able to reduce the number of conduct waivers issued and the Army in the recruiting year to date has seen a marked increase in the number of high school graduates joining its ranks, exceeding the Department of Defense Tier 1 Educational Credential Standard of 90% for all three Army components – Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. Retaining combat-proven leaders and the people with the skills we need is just as important. The Services have benefitted from the full range of authorities given to them by Congress as retention incentives. I ask for your continued support of these programs, in particular the bonuses used by the Services to retain key mid-career active duty officers and enlisted. I also ask for your continued support of incentives for Reserve and National Guard service to provide flexibility and enhanced retirement benefits. We have made important strides in the past year in equipping these vital members of the Total Force, and their performance over the past seven years of war has been superb. Economic conditions will ameliorate some of the recruiting and retention pressure in the coming year, but we must recognize that personnel costs will continue to grow as we debate the national level of investment in defense.

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have spent the last 18 months meeting with Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilian public servants. In them I recognize the differences in our generations, with the younger ones ever more comfortable with social networking and technology. Yet I

recognize in all of them a strong thread of continuity that stretches back to the Nation's beginnings. That thread is a keen awareness of how they and their influencers – parents, teachers, coaches, and peers – perceive the manner in which today's veterans are treated. Service members know that the American people stand fully behind them, regardless of varying opinions over American policy. The All-Volunteer Force has earned this trust and confidence. This contract must be renewed every day with the American people, who can never doubt that we will be good stewards of their most precious investment in their armed forces – the sons and daughters who serve our Nation.

Emblematic of that stewardship is the way we treat returning Wounded Warriors and the parents, spouses and family members who support them. As a Nation, we have an enduring obligation to those who have shouldered the load and who bear the visible and invisible scars of war, some of whom we unfortunately find in the ranks of the homeless. As leaders, we must ensure that all Wounded Warriors and their families receive the care, training, and financial support they need to become self-sufficient and lead as normal a life as possible – a continuum of care that lasts for life. This continuum extends especially to the families of the fallen. Our focus must be more on commitment rather than compensations, and on transition and ability rather than disability. To the degree that we fail to care for them and their families, and enable their return to as normal a life as possible, we undermine the trust and confidence of the American people.

One other area that has been particularly troubling since I last testified is the rise in the number of service member suicides. The Army in particular has been hit hard by a troubling increase over the past four years and an already disturbing number of suicides in 2009. We do not know precisely why this is occurring, though the increased stress of wartime is certainly a factor. All Service leaders are looking hard at the problem, to include ensuring that we make a service member's ability to seek mental health care both unimpeded and stigma free. This approach requires a cultural change in all of the Services that will take time to inculcate, but the seeds are planted and taking root. The program at Fort

Hood, Texas, is just one example of how a commander-empowered that understands the problem as a result of stress rather than weakness and incorporates families can sharply reduce the number of suicides in a specific community.

The Department and the Services have also continued to expand comprehensive programs designed to prevent sexual abuse in the military. Such abuse is intolerable and an unacceptable betrayal of trust. We will continue work towards the goal of eliminating this crime from our ranks.

Although the strain on our people is most acute, the strain on equipment and platforms is likewise significant. Through the reconstitution effort over the next decade, we will repair, rebuild, and replace the equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, and worn out beyond repair after years of combat operations. As Congress is well aware, Service equipment has been used at higher rates under harsher conditions than anticipated. The drawdown in Iraq through the end of next summer will provide us even greater first-hand insight into the state of ground force equipment as we retrograde multiple brigade combat team and enabler sets.

Beyond the wear and tear experienced by ground vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan, our airframes are aging beyond their intended service lives. Indeed since Desert Storm, 18 years ago, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have flown near continuous combat missions over the Middle East and the Balkans with the F-15s, F-16s, and F-18s that were designed in the 1960s and 1970s and which, with upgrades, have proven their worth repeatedly over time. We have struggled with a wide variety of airframes, as seen in the fleet-wide groundings of all major fighter weapons systems at various times over the past five years, the strains on 30 year old P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft, and ongoing efforts to retire some of our C-130 Hercules and KC-135 Strato-tankers. Maintaining and acquiring sufficiently robust air and naval forces remain pressing requirements as these assets are central to ensuring the command of the sea and air that enables all operations. To help pay for these pressing requirements we must continue to look towards acquisition transformation that supports accelerated fielding of

equipment before the speed of technology eclipses its value. We also need to reduce stove-piped Information Technology service solutions and replace them wherever possible with joint enterprise solutions and capabilities that are more effective at reduced costs.

Our forces have relied upon the funds appropriated in the fiscal year 2009 budget request to accomplish equipment reset and to address readiness shortfalls. Congress's continued support is necessary for the predictable, adequate funding required for the repair and replacement of both operational and training equipment. I ask for your continued support for the upcoming fiscal year 2010 funding request. I fully support the vision Secretary Gates has laid out – and which the President has endorsed and forwarded – for the Department and the joint force. This vision and its program decisions emphasize our people first. Our advanced technology, superior weapons systems, and proven doctrine won't produce effective organizations absent quality men and women. These decisions also balance our efforts by addressing the fights we are in and most likely to encounter again without sacrificing conventional capability. That balance helps to check programs that have exceeded their original design, improve efficiency, and steward the resources taxpayers provide us for the common defense. The holistic changes we are making work in combination with one another and span the joint force. I am confident that they not only preserve our war fighting edge but also inject the flexibility required to address today's most relevant challenges.

An area of particular interest is energy – which is essential to military operations. Our in-theater fuel demand has the potential to constrain our operational flexibility and increase the vulnerability of our forces. Thus your Armed Forces continue to seek innovative ways to enhance operational effectiveness by reducing total force energy demands. We are also looking to improve energy security by institutionalizing energy considerations in our business processes, establishing energy efficiency and sustainability metrics, and increasing the availability of alternative sources.

The ongoing revitalization of the joint force makes our conventional deterrent more credible, which helps prevent future wars while winning the wars

we are now fighting. Restoring our forces is an investment in security – one which is hard in tough economic times – but one that is required in an exceedingly uncertain and complex security environment. Understanding that environment and having forces capable of the full range of military operations is central to balancing global strategic risk.

#### **Balancing Global Strategic Risk**

My third priority of balancing global strategic risk is aimed at the core functions of our military – to protect the homeland, deter conflict, and be prepared to defeat enemies. Each function is tied to today's conflicts and each requires continuous attention. Successful campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and improved partnership with Pakistan will take us far in the fight against al-Qaeda, although the network has spread tentacles across Asia, Africa, and Europe that we will continue to attack. These campaigns have two functions: first, deterring future conflict, and second, staying prepared by building networks of capable partners who help us see conflict brewing and are ready to stand with us if prevention fails. These functions help to protect and secure the global commons: sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Increasingly, we are encountering more security challenges to these nodes and networks of global commerce. In cyberspace, we are continuing proactive steps to pursue effective organizational constructs and to reshape attitudes, roles and responsibilities; we must increasingly see our information systems as war fighting tools equal in necessity to tanks, aircraft, ships, and other weapon systems. The nation must work to increase the security of all vital government and commercial internet domains and improve coordination between all U.S. Government agencies and appropriate private sectors. One related step in strengthening the military's operations in the commons that I continue to support is the United States' accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. This Convention provides a stable legal regime by reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, ensuring unimpeded

transit passage through international straits, and providing a framework to counter excessive claims of other states.

We must be sized, shaped, and postured globally to detect, deter, and confront the threats of the future. At the same time we must leverage the opportunities for international cooperation while building the capacity of partners for stability. These capacity building efforts are investments, with small amounts of manpower and resources, which can, over time, reduce the need to commit U.S. forces. I recognize, as do the Combatant Commanders, that our ability to do so is constrained by ongoing operations, but that does not make building partner capacity any less important. We can magnify the peaceful effects we seek by helping emerging powers become constructive actors in the international system. Fostering closer international cooperation, particularly in today's distressed economic climate, is one method of preventing nations from turning inward or spiraling into conflict and disorder.

The wars we are fighting limit our capacity to respond to future contingencies and preclude robust global partnership building programs. While necessary, our focus on the current mission also offers potential adversaries, both state and non-state, incentives to act. We must not allow today's technological and organizational arrangements to impede our preparation for tomorrow's challenges, which include irregular, traditional and cyber warfare. In cyberspace, one often overlooked challenge is the need for military forces to maintain access to and freedom of action in this global domain. Our command and control and most sensitive information are constantly threatened by intrusion, interruption, and exploitation efforts. We must understand these risks in the context of the combined arms fight and carefully weigh their effects on our national security and global missions. This is true for the military as well as our nation's public and private sector cyberspace. In all, we continue to mitigate the risk we face in the ability to respond rapidly to other contingencies through a variety of measures. Restoring balance to our forces, however, remains the principal mitigation necessary for the long-term.

Enduring alliances and partnerships extend our reach. In each relationship we remain wedded to this Nation's principles which respect human rights and adhere to the rule of law. The 28 nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, designed for a far different mission decades ago, has proven adaptive to the times and now leads the security and stability mission in Afghanistan. Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan have made key contributions to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. India has emerged as an increasingly important strategic partner. We seek to mature this partnership and address common security challenges globally as well as within the region. Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines continue to work with us to counter international terrorist threats in Southeast Asia while Thailand remains a significant partner in supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster response in South and Southeast Asia. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership has worked to counter transnational terrorist threats in north and west Africa, and cooperative efforts with the Gulf of Guinea nations has generated improvements in maritime security against piracy, illegal trafficking, and overfishing off Africa's west coast. Multinational efforts in the Gulf of Aden are helping stem the unwanted scourge of piracy emanating from Somalia, though much work remains to be done. Colombia continues a successful counterinsurgency campaign in the Andean Ridge that reflects the patient, steady partnership between our nations, and we are particularly grateful for the Colombian Armed Forces' impressive rescue of three Americans held in FARC captivity last July. Military-to-military relationships with Mexico and Canada help to improve homeland security. In the coming year, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security, we will work to improve cooperation with Mexico via training, resources, and intelligence sharing as Mexico takes on increased drug-related violence. The examples above represent far broader efforts and partially illuminate how enhancing teamwork with allies and partners helps to protect our shared interests. The interdependency of nations should not be allowed to unravel under economic duress, and these security focused programs are one way of reinforcing beneficial ties that bind.



We also seek to further cooperation with states not in our formal alliances. We have established relationships with the nations in the Caucasus and Central Asia to build a transportation network in support of our efforts in Afghanistan. We recognize the key role Russia plays and are encouraged by Russian assistance with this project. There is more we can do together to bring peace and security to the people of Afghanistan. At the same time, we are troubled by the Russian-Georgian conflict last August and while we acknowledge Russia's security concerns, its actions created a more difficult international situation and damaged its relationship with NATO and the United States. We look forward to resuming military-to-military engagement, as part of our broader relationship, in a manner that builds confidence, enhances transparency, and rights the path towards cooperation.

We likewise seek to continue improved relations with China, which is each year becoming a more important trading partner of the United States. We acknowledge the positive trends in our bilateral relations with China even as we maintain our capabilities to meet commitments in the region, given the security and stability that credible U.S. power has promoted in the western Pacific for over 60 years. We seek common understanding on issues of mutual concern but must recognize China's unmistakable and growing strength in technological, naval, and air capabilities, and this growth's effect on China's neighbors. While we are concerned over events such as the confrontation between USNS IMPECCABLE and Chinese vessels, we support China's growing role as a regional and global partner. I believe both governments can synchronize common interests in the Pacific. Key among these interests are continued joint efforts aimed at reducing the chance of conflict on the Korean peninsula and the return of North Korea to the Six Party Talks. This is particularly true given North Korean threats to restart its nuclear program and to continue testing an intercontinental ballistic missile in the face of United Nations Security Council Resolutions demanding that it halt nuclear tests or launch of ballistic missiles.

Rebalancing strategic risk also means addressing capability gaps. Our Nation's cyber vulnerabilities could have devastating ramifications to our national

security interests. Interruption of access to cyberspace, whether in the public or private sectors, has the potential to substantively damage national security. We cannot conduct effective military operations without freedom of action in cyberspace. Addressing this threat, the President's budget for fiscal year 2010 includes funds to reduce cyber vulnerabilities and to close some of the operational and policy seams between military, government, and commercial Internet domains. Likewise, and related to maintaining a secure global information grid, freedom of action in Space remains vital to our economic, civil, and military well being. We need to ensure access to cyberspace and Space as surely as we must have access to the sea and air lanes of the global commons. We must also address perennial shortfalls identified by the Combatant Commanders in Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance sensors and processing infrastructure that are proving ever more crucial in missions that span the globe.

Fighting and winning wars will always be the military's most visible mission. Preventing wars through deterrence, however, is preferable. In our strategic deterrence mission, deterring nuclear threats is most crucial. Our nation remains engaged in many vital efforts to counter nuclear proliferation and reduce global stockpiles through international agreements and support activities. Still, many states and non-state actors have or actively seek these weapons. To preserve a credible deterrent we will need safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons, an effective infrastructure to sustain that enterprise, and skilled people to support it. In addition, as our strategic deterrence calculus expands to address new and varied threats, proven missile defense capabilities will remain essential as tools to deter, dissuade and assure in an environment of WMD and ballistic missile proliferation.

#### **Persistent Engagement**

Our vital national interests call for a wise, long-term investment in global persistent engagement. For military forces, persistent engagement requires

successfully conducting ongoing stability operations and building capacity with allies and partners. These efforts range from advising defense ministries to training host nation forces to conducting joint exercises to sharing intelligence to exchanging professional students. Over time, such actions help to provide the basic level of security from which economic development, representative political institutions, and diplomatic initiatives can take permanent root. Persistent engagement demonstrates enduring U.S. commitment, though, importantly, this commitment must be tempered with humility and a realistic assessment of the limits of our influence. The goal is always to empower partners, who are ultimately the only ones who can achieve lasting results.

During my travels, I've developed a more comprehensive appreciation of the value that personal relationships, fostered over time, bring to our security endeavors. At the senior level, these relationships provide insight and alert us to signals we might have otherwise missed, as such, providing us warning of conflict which can then be used to head off a brewing storm in some cases. These relationships should not be limited to just senior leaders. Rather, they should be developed throughout the careers of our officers and their partner nation colleagues. Such sustained cooperation builds a network of military-to-military contacts that ultimately provides avenues to defuse crises, assure access, institutionalize cooperation, and address common threats.

As I noted in particular with Pakistan, the criticality of "mil-to-mil" exchanges, combined exercises, schoolhouse visits, professional education collaboration, and many other programs are all part of the robust outreach we require. In particular, I ask that the Congress fully fund the Department of State's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and Global Train and Equip Programs, which the Departments of State and Defense jointly manage. While many militaries around the world clamor to train with us, we reap far more than the costs of these programs in terms of personal, sustained relationships. These relationships help us bridge difficult political situations by tapping into trust developed over the course of years. I cannot overemphasize the importance of these programs. They

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require only small amounts of funding and time for long term return on investment that broadly benefits the United States.

I endorse a similar approach for and with our interagency partners, and I fully support the building of a Civilian Response Corps. Achieving the objectives of any campaign requires increased emphasis not only on fully developing and resourcing the capacity of other U.S. agencies (State, USAID, Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce and so forth), but also on increasing our Nation's ability to build similar interagency capacities with foreign partners.

### **Conclusion**

In providing my best military advice over the past 18 months, one important point I have made, consonant with Secretary Gates, is that our military activities must support rather than lead our Nation's foreign policy. Our war fighting ability will never be in doubt. But we have learned from the past seven years of war that we serve this Nation best when we are part of a comprehensive, integrated approach that employs all elements of power to achieve the policy goals set by our civilian leaders. To this end, I believe we should fully fund the State Department as the lead agent of U.S. diplomacy and development, an action that would undoubtedly resonate globally. This approach obviously requires the backing of a robust military and a strong economy. As we win the wars we are fighting and restore the health of our Armed Forces, the military's approach will increasingly support our diplomatic counterparts through the persistent engagement required to build networks of capable partners. By operating globally, hand-in-hand with partners and integrated with the interagency and non-governmental organizations, we will more successfully protect the citizens of this Nation.

On behalf of our service members, I would like to thank Congress for the sustained investment in them and for your unwavering support in time of war.

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**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING  
THE HEARING**

MAY 13, 2009

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#### RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Section 548 of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, entitled Increase in Number of Units of Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps, mandates that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments, develop and implement a plan to establish and support, not later than September 30, 2020, not less than 3,700 units of the Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps. This section also requires that a report be submitted on my behalf detailing how the unit growth would be realized as well as Department efforts to enhance employment opportunities for qualified former military members retired for disability, especially those wounded while deployed in a contingency operation. My office is working with the Services to submit a report to the Congress that will lay out the expansion initiative as well as the action plan for encouraging wounded warrior employment as instructors. [See page 25.]

#### RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JONES

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Hyperbaric oxygen is a treatment, in which a person breathes 100% oxygen intermittently while inside a hyperbaric chamber at a pressure higher than sea level pressure. The Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society (UHMS), the primary source of hyperbaric medicine worldwide, follows a robust process to approve indications for hyperbaric oxygen treatment therapy (HBO<sub>2</sub>). The UHMS has approved 13 indications for HBO<sub>2</sub>, including decompression sickness, carbon monoxide poisoning, problem wounds, and air/gas embolisms. The UHMS has not approved mild traumatic brain injury (TBI) as an indication for HBO<sub>2</sub>, noting a lack of scientific literature to support such an endorsement. Some hyperbaric clinicians have used HBO<sub>2</sub> in an "off label" manner to treat patients with mild TBI. Compelling case reports regarding the benefit of "off label" use of HBO<sub>2</sub> for service members with chronic, mild TBI have been reported, but no well-designed clinical trials have been completed; therefore, HBO<sub>2</sub> cannot be accepted as standard of care for mild TBI. Although it is considered relatively safe, potential risks include barotrauma, seizures, and symptoms of high oxygen blood levels.

An HBO<sub>2</sub> study is anticipated to begin in August 2009, pending Food and Drug Administration approval of an Investigative New Drug application. A Department of Defense (DOD) appointed Institutional Review Board has granted provisional approval. Study completion is anticipated within 18 months.

DOD is committed to rapidly, but safely, determining the efficacy of HBO<sub>2</sub> for mild to moderate TBI. Findings from this study may warrant a new standard of care for patients with chronic TBI, justify future research, and change reimbursement policy regarding HBO<sub>2</sub> for TBI. [See page 24.]

#### RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The non-disclosure statements were signed by the senior leaders of the Department of Defense and other key personnel who participated in the budget process. [See page 26.]

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Under Title 10 U.S.C. 231, the Secretary of Defense is required to submit with the Defense Budget an Annual Long Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels and certification that both the budget for that fiscal year and the Future Years Defense Program is adequate.

As the National Security Strategy is due for release this summer, the Navy has advised me that it is prudent to defer the FY 2010 report and submit its next report concurrent with the President's FY 2011 budget. The FY 2010 President's budget fully funds the construction of naval vessels for FY 2010.

The President's budget submission for FY 2010 represents the best overall balance between procurement for future ship and aircraft capability with the resources necessary to meet operational requirements and affordability.

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In addition to the National Security Strategy, the statutory guidelines required the report to reflect the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The latest QDR is ongoing in parallel with the National Security Strategy work. Also, the Nuclear Posture Review, which has direct bearing on the numbers of strategic ballistic missile submarines, is due for completion incident with submission of the FY 2011 budget. In addition, a Ballistic Missile Defense Review is ongoing and is also due for completion with the FY 2011 budget. These efforts will likely have a substantive impact on the Navy's force structure requirements.

Although Naval forces are arrayed to meet demands of a number of missions including support of Combatant Commanders, security cooperation, and humanitarian assistance, the Navy has been able to largely meet these demands with the force we have in commission today. [See page 28.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH**

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Pursuant to Section 901 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) prepared the Personnel Management Plan for Special Operations Forces (SOF). Their plan was closely coordinated with each of the Military Services and Departments, the Joint Staff, and members of my staff.

The plan contains 11 initiatives which increase USSOCOM's involvement in SOF personnel planning and management. Specifically, involvement will increase in areas such as: Service assignment/manning guidance, command selection process, and compensation policies as they relate to special operations personnel. The majority of these initiatives would be implemented through agreements between USSOCOM and the Military Departments or Services, while others may require DOD policy changes.

In one of the initiatives, however, USSOCOM proposes amending title 10, United States Code, to enhance its SOF personnel management authority. Amendment to title 10 is not necessary to achieve USSOCOM's purpose. Instead, a revised Department of Defense Directive will implement much of the substance of the USSOCOM plan.

Unique challenges exist relating to the effective management of our Special Operations Forces. Through the development of the SOF personnel management plan, USSOCOM and the Services discussed current practices, identified areas of concern, and ultimately agreed upon the path forward. This process illuminates USSOCOM's substantial influence regarding the various different decisions that are made in terms of managing the personnel of the special operations community. The plan's initiatives, modified as indicated above, provide USSOCOM the authority necessary to enhance manpower management and improve the overall readiness of special operations forces. [See page 33.]

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#### **RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER**

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The Department is currently examining the issues surrounding child custody determinations involving Service members. Upon completion of this evaluation the Department will provide a substantive response by separate letter. [See page 34.]

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MAY 13, 2009

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### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

Mr. THORNBERRY. In addition to everyday operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States defends against cyber attacks every day. What War Powers does the President have, or need, to engage in defensive or offensive cyber warfare while observing the Constitutional power given to Congress to declare war? Do you need Congress to pass a war resolution to launch a cyber war? What is the difference between a cyberwar and everyday cyber operations?

Secretary GATES. Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148) provides that the "President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations." Section 4 further provides that the President shall submit a report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the Senate within 48 hours of when U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated; into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation while equipped for combat; or in numbers that substantially enlarge U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation. Since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, Presidents have submitted more than 120 reports to Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution as a part of their efforts to keep the Congress informed about deployments of U.S. combat-equipped Armed Forces around the world.

DOD defensive and offensive cyber activities are conducted as Information Operations (IO), which involve the integrated employment of Computer Network Operations (CNO), operations security, military deception, electronic warfare, and psychological operations. DOD policy provides that the employment of CNO is a core military competency that is one component of an integrated IO strategy to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. CNO is comprised of computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling operations.

In peacetime, IO supports national objectives primarily by influencing adversary perceptions and decision-making. In crises short of hostilities, IO can be used as a flexible deterrent option to demonstrate resolve and communicate national interest to affect adversary decision-making. In conflict, IO may be applied to achieve physical and psychological results in support of military objectives.

It is DOD policy that IO and CNO contribute to information superiority and are employed in concert with other military strategies and capabilities to provide a fully integrated warfighting capability. IO components, including CNO, are capabilities much like any other capability or weapon, i.e., they may be employed in support of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces around the world. Their use alone, however, does not implicate the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.

Every day cyber operations include routine CND, CNE, network operations, and information assurance activities. There is no internationally accepted definition of cyberwar, but DOD views the general concept of cyberwar in international law terms of a threat or use of force, which are incorporated in the DOD rules of engagement as hostile intent or hostile act. Specifically, all States retain the inherent right to respond in self-defense to a threat or use of force, and DOD rules of engagement recognize the United States' right to respond in self-defense to demonstrated hostile intent or a hostile act. In exercising its right of self-defense, the United States must comply with international law including the Charter of the United Nations and the law of armed conflict. International law does not define the terms hostile act, hostile intent, or threat or use of force; however, DOD rules of engagement define hostile intent and hostile act as follows:

Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes the threat

of force to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.

Hostile Act. An attack or other use of force against the United States, US forces or other designated persons or property. It also includes force used directly to preclude or impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, including the recovery of US personnel or vital USG property.

The President and I provide guidance to commanders through the DOD rules of engagement for when they may use force in self-defense in response to certain activities in and out of cyberspace. The President, however, must determine whether any particular hostile cyber activity against the United States is of such scope, duration, or intensity that the initiation of hostilities is an appropriate exercise of the United States' inherent right of self-defense.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Recently, USD(P) Flournoy eliminated the Senate-confirmed position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy. With two active wars ongoing, it is as important now as it ever has been for the US to effectively deliver its strategic communications message to the world. With the elimination of this position, what is the DOD doing to participate in U.S. strategic communications?

Secretary GATES. We are actively assessing how best DOD can contribute to broader U.S. Government strategic communication efforts. To align the organization's structure more closely with policy objectives, many functions of the former office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy have been shifted to other offices within OSD Policy. Policy's regional offices have primary responsibility for Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, in coordination with appropriate functional Policy offices. OSD Policy is also establishing a new global strategic engagement team to help coordinate DOD-wide strategic communications. This team will work closely with the State Department, the National Security Council staff's new Global Engagement Directorate, and other departments and agencies to ensure effective DOD support for interagency strategic communication efforts.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. In recent hearings, Department of Defense (DOD) medical leadership has testified about the challenges of the Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application (AHLTA). Can you update me on what the Department plans to do to improve the effectiveness of electronic medical records in the future?

Secretary GATES. DOD has a multi-faceted, multi-phased plan for fielding a significantly improved electronic health record (EHR) system intended to benefit Service members, retirees, their families, and other beneficiaries, as well as the Military Health System (MHS) community, operational commanders, and other stakeholders.

DOD's vision is for an agile, responsive, and extensive EHR. DOD must achieve this vision to support the warfighter mission; enable the Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record; aid in the delivery of care for our wounded, ill and injured Service members; enhance health outcomes; improve cost effectiveness; provide for better health resource management and health community satisfaction; facilitate achievement of the patient-centric medical home concept to give patients a simpler, more personalized care experience; and offer enhanced care access, quality, and patient safety.

The plan addresses key challenges with the current enterprise architecture, clinical workflow, interoperability and data sharing capabilities, and EHR design. DOD's detailed plan includes specific IT development and acquisition projects to modernize computing, communications and security infrastructure; improve alignment of MHS clinical workflow; implement an enterprise service bus to enable seamless data sharing; enhance and modernize current EHR back end infrastructure using service oriented architecture principles; improve clinical decision support; and enable an enterprise patient portal, giving patients electronic access to their medical records and health history.

Mr. MILLER. The Administration last month announced its intention to create a single Department of Defense/Department of Veterans Affairs (DOD/VA) electronic medical record. Can you provide any details on the timeline for this implementation as it relates to your Department?

Secretary GATES. On April 9, 2009, President Barack Obama affirmed a mutual strategic objective for the DOD and VA: the definition and construction of a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) system that "will ultimately contain administrative and medical information from the day an individual enters military service throughout their military career, and after they leave the military."

VLER will require the Departments to identify and implement standards, protocols, and service-oriented design methodologies that enable the full electronic exchange and portability of healthcare data, benefits data, and administrative information of Service members and veterans. When fully implemented, VLER must provide gateways and standard interfaces between and among the applications and systems of DOD, VA, and other public and private sector service providers, accessible through adapters or application program interfaces. At all junctures, information must be exchanged in a secure and private format.

The VLER approach will be service-oriented, open-architecture and standards-based. The design will emphasize consistent data definitions, information and exchange protocols, and presentation standards and formats. With more than half of DOD and VA healthcare provided in the private sector, the VLER approach must also provide for interoperability using national standards and the Nationwide Health Information Network. Within twelve months, we will seek to identify private sector healthcare providers to participate in pilot programs involving VLER integration and compliance.

Mr. MILLER. As the New, Post-9/11 GI Bill takes effect later this calendar year, please outline the steps that DOD is taking to inform servicemembers of these educational benefits prior to their separation.

Secretary GATES. The Department of Defense Transition Assistance Program (TAP) is an interagency program and collaboration among the Departments of Defense, Labor, Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security. TAP consist of four components, listed below, with each agency responsible for its component.

1. Pre-separation Counseling—DOD and Military Services responsibility
2. VA Benefits Briefing—VA responsibility
3. Disabled Transition Assistance Program (DTAP)—VA responsibility
4. Department of Labor (DOL) TAP Employment Workshop—DOL responsibility

During the "Pre-separation Counseling" session, separating Service members receive an overview of available transition services and benefits, to include information on education benefits (which has been expanded to include information on the new the Post-9/11 GI Bill). The transition counselor encourages the Service member to sign up for and attend VA Benefits Briefing, where a VA representative provides depth information on all VA benefits with new detailed information on the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

OSD and each Military Department issued its own regulation, policy implementation guidance and instructions governing the Administration of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program. The Military Departments are required to ensure all eligible active duty members and members of the Reserve Components are aware that they are automatically eligible for educational assistance under the Post-9/11 GI Bill program upon serving the required active duty time as established in chapter 33 of Title 38, United States Code. Each Military Department is further required to provide active duty participants and members of the Reserve Components with qualifying active duty service individual pre-separation counseling or release from active duty counseling on the benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill and document accordingly. A summary of steps taken by each Military Department follows.

**ARMY:** The Army conducts mandatory education benefits counseling to all Soldiers separating from the Army no later than 150 days before separation date. Counselors advise Soldiers but have no authority to make benefit determination. VA is the administrator of the Post-9/11 GI Bill program and is responsible for establishing eligibility and payment amounts. The Army's policy mandates education benefits counseling. Soldiers sign Department of the Army (DA) Form 669 [Army Continuing Education System (ACES) Record] attesting to the receipt of counseling after completion of mandatory counseling. The Director, Army National Guard (ARNG) is responsible for ensuring that all ARNG Soldiers are notified of Post-9/11 GI Benefits prior to demobilization. The Chief, Army Reserve is responsible for ensuring that all USAR Soldiers are notified of Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits prior to demobilization. Army soldiers separating are required to clear the local installation education center, where they are also informed about the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Separating Soldiers attending the VA Benefits Briefing (VA's portion of TAP) are also informed about the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

Army policy was already in existence prior to the Post-9/11 GI Bill requiring Soldiers to clear their local installation Education Center as part of out-processing. The Post-9/11 GI Bill has been added to that process.

**MARINE CORPS:** The United States Marine Corps informs separating Service members about the Post-9/11 GI Bill during the DOD/Military Services portion of TAP, called "Pre-separation Counseling" and during the VA Benefits Briefing (VA's

portion of TAP). In addition, the Marine Corps Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) sent the VA Post-9/11 Benefits Briefing slides to all its TAMP field managers for use to inform transitioning Service members about the Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Marine Corps transition staff also provides a copy of the VA Pamphlet 22-09-1 "The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008" to transitioning Service members.

**NAVY:** The Navy Transition Assistance Management Program (TAMP) has made the VA Factsheet 22-08-01, "The Post-9/11 Veterans Education Assistance Act of 2008" available to all Navy Transition Assistance Program sites for dissemination during TAP. The information is also covered during "Pre-separation Counseling" as well as by VA representatives during the VA Benefits Briefings. The Navy web site <http://www.npc.navy.mil/CareerInfo/Education/GIBill/Post+9-11+Educational+Assistance+Program.htm> is available to provide information to Sailors on the Post-9/11 GI Bill.

**AIR FORCE:** Air Force policy requires each separating/retiring Airman to complete DD Form 2648, "Pre-separation Counseling Checklist for Active Component Service Members." Separating Airmen must contact the Airmen and Family Readiness Center (A&FRC) to schedule an appointment to receive Pre-separation Counseling. During the counseling session, the A&FRC staff will inform the Airman of available transition services and benefits, to include educational benefits. Airmen will be provided referral information to the Education and Training Section and/or a VA representative for detailed program information, eligibility requirements, etc. Additionally, the Department of Defense released video and print media regarding the New, Post-9/11 GI Bill.

Mr. MILLER. Given that the Air Force spent nearly three years trying to award a tanker replacement contract, starting with the RFI issued in April 2006, why is the DOD now considering throwing that body of effort away? The GAO provided clear recommendations to solve the problems associated with the contract award decision of Feb 2008. DOD then drafted Amendment 6 to the RFP, which embraced GAO's Decision. Why did DOD suddenly stop and now seem committed to throwing all of that effort aside in pursuit of wholly different acquisition strategy?

Secretary GATES. The Department is fully committed to the Tanker recapitalization program. We are committed to a competitive process that meets the Air Force's requirements while ensuring proper stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The Department anticipates being able to solicit proposals from industry soon with award of a contract by late spring 2010. In our deliberations about the appropriate way ahead, the Departments of Defense and the Air Force have fully considered the GAO findings and all other lessons learned from past efforts. In this regard, we have taken into account the previous body of effort. On September 10, 2008, I notified Congress and the two competing contractors that the Department was terminating the competition for the tanker replacement contract. I determined, in consultation with senior Defense and Air Force officials, that the solicitation and contract award would not be accomplished by January 2009. Rather than hand the next Administration an incomplete and possibly contested process, I decided the best course of action was to provide the next Administration with full flexibility regarding the requirements, evaluation criteria and the appropriate allocation of defense budget to this mission. I have met a number of times with senior Defense and Air Force officials and will continue to do so in the near future as we determine the appropriate course of action with regard to the KC-X acquisition. We intend to consult with Congress as we finalize our approach.

Mr. MILLER. Can you provide me with the Department's updated position on an alternate engine for the Joint Strike Fighter?

Secretary GATES. The President's Budget funds those programs that provide the best value to the taxpayer and the most critical capabilities to the Warfighter, within a constrained fiscal program. The Department acknowledges a competitive engine program could provide non-tangible benefits. The Department also recognizes potential life cycle cost savings could be realized well into the future. However, depending on the method used to calculate investment return, procuring an alternate engine could mean a net cost to the taxpayer. Additionally, a considerable investment would still be required in the near term to complete development of the F136 alternate engine. Finally, the costs required to procure, maintain, and sustain two distinct engines until the alternate engine reaches competitive maturity would require additional funding better used for higher Department priorities.

Mr. MILLER. On May 5, 2009 I received a very informative letter from the Secretary of the Air Force regarding an issue important to my district. Your Deputy Secretary of Defense instructed Secretary Donley to respond on his behalf to my question about an overpass near State Road (SR) 85 near Duke Field at Eglin Air Force Base. As referenced in the letter, can you please update me on the results

of the USACE study and the Defense Access Roads submission? Additionally, can you please inform me what office and/or individuals are authorized to, and are currently working with the Florida Department of Transportation on this issue? I remain concerned that some in the DOD may be hesitant to engage directly with a state transportation agency.

Secretary GATES. In June 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed the study on the best alternative for a SR85 overpass. The preferred alternative is a Conventional Diamond Interchange/Overpass, estimated to cost approximately \$8.8 million. The interchange/overpass would span an area capable of accommodating six traffic lanes, which is the long-range, unfunded plan, by Okaloosa-Walton Transportation Planning Organization (OWTPO).

The Army's Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) is the Executive Agent for the Defense Access Roads (DAR) Program within the Department of Defense (DOD). SDDC has now received the study to initiate the process to determine whether a SR85 overpass/interchange near Duke Field will qualify under the DAR Program. If the project does qualify, DOD Military Construction (MILCON) appropriations can be used to pay for the overpass but, it will compete with all other MILCON projects for funding within the DOD appropriation process.

The DOD has engaged Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) and OWTPO as early as 2008 when The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers conducted an area traffic study. However, SDDC serves as the DOD's formal conduit to non-DOD transportation agencies, such as the FDOT and others. As this project moves forward we look forward to continuing both formal and informal communications with FDOT and OWTPO.

We will contact your office when the results from the DAR program review are available.

Mr. MILLER. It is my understanding that you committed to move away 100% exquisite solution to a more affordable commercial solutions that provide 80% of the capability. What is the defense department doing to ensure that commercial solutions are being seriously considered?

Secretary GATES. The key to obtaining more affordable, commercial solutions is to make that a consideration at the very front-end of the process—starting with requirements definition and setting the scope of the analysis of alternatives as a result of the recently instituted Materiel Development Decision (MDD) review led by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics). One of the primary purposes of the MDD is to review the basis for and analysis supporting the need for a material solution and the requirements to be met. During this review, we consider the applicability of a commercial solution and/or the use of commercially available components. Additionally, it is DOD policy that promising technologies must be identified from all sources domestic and foreign, including government laboratories and centers, academia, and the commercial sector. (The conduct of science and technology activities must not preclude and, where practicable, must facilitate future competition.) Consideration of such technologies must be documented in the technology development strategy for the program. It is also Department policy that the Analysis of Alternatives must consider existing commercial off-the-shelf functionality and solutions. As the program moves through technology development, the resultant acquisition strategy for engineering and manufacturing development must also document consideration of commercial solutions and/or commercially available components.

Mr. MILLER. What is the anticipated cost-savings to the taxpayer from making investments in commercial tactical radio products?

Secretary GATES. A competitive business strategy is used for the procurement of commercially developed radios. The Department establishes essential operational requirements and offers industry the opportunity to compete and provide a material solution. This is particularly the case for hand-held radios. This is exemplified by the radios procured under the Consolidated Single Channel Handheld Radio (CSCHR) contract. The CSCHR contract competes the AN/PRC-148 radio against the AN/PRC-152 radio to meet the multi-Service requirement for hand-held radios. Through the CSCHR contract, we have procured 112,514 radios and 12,007 vehicle amplifier adapters to date. The contracting office received \$919M from the Services and returned \$428M due to savings through competition. It should be noted that the commercial radios procured under this contract all satisfy the safety and security requirements of the military through certification by the National Security Agency for information assurance, the Joint Interoperability Test Center for interoperability, and the Joint Tactical Radio System Test and Evaluation Laboratory for Software Computer Architecture compliance.

Mr. MILLER. Why does the DOD continue its investment in the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINGARS) radios when more capable, Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) approved alternatives are available today?

Secretary GATES. Our commitment to the development of JTRS radios remains strong. As these systems become available, they will be fielded and, in some cases, they will replace current systems in use. JTRS is not, however, a one-for-one replacement for SINGARS. While SINGARS is current force technology, it will continue to provide the robust voice communications capability our forces will need well into the future. Furthermore, the SINGARS waveform is being included in JTRS to ensure interoperability with SINGARS radios.

Mr. MILLER. My understanding is that since becoming Secretary of Defense you have not signed any documents regarding detainees at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and that in the previous administration Deputy Secretary of Defense England signed all relevant documents. Is this accurate? In the new Administration, who is signing all relevant documents? In the new Administration, who is the senior official in the Department responsible for decisions regarding the detainees?

Secretary GATES. As the head of the Department of Defense, I am ultimately responsible for Department of Defense matters, including for detention policy. I, along with other senior officials in the Department, have signed documents regarding detention issues at Guantanamo. I have also asked former Deputy Secretary England and current Deputy Secretary Lynn to assume daily oversight responsibilities over detention issues, while keeping me fully informed. A number of other senior officials in the Department of Defense and across the U.S. Government also have responsibilities over detention issues.

Mr. MILLER. I request the DOD certify, in writing, that all political appointees, confirmed and nominated, that served in the Clinton Administration were not involved in the practice commonly referred to as extraordinary rendition.

Secretary GATES. The Department of Defense's responsibilities and jurisdictional authority did not extend to monitoring which officials were or were not involved in extraordinary rendition practices during the Clinton Administration, and therefore the DOD cannot provide the certification that you request.

Mr. MILLER. With regard to the technique commonly referred to as waterboarding, what is the DOD's policy on waterboarding members of our military for training purposes? Please provide any relevant unclassified documents stating such policy.

Secretary GATES. The Department of Defense (DOD) guidance on the use of "waterboarding" is that it is not used as a resistance training physical pressure. This guidance has been conveyed by the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency in visits to Service Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) schools and during the annual SERE Training Conference and annual DOD SERE Psychology Conference since early 2007. Although DOD does not yet have written guidance on this issue, the Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) is currently developing the final draft of a new personnel recovery training DOD Instruction that will soon be ready for Department-wide coordination. This DOD Instruction will provide comprehensive resistance training executive agent guidance on the use of physical pressures. Waterboarding will not be an approved, physical pressure for use in such training.

Prior to 2007, the Navy was the only Service that opted to use the waterboard for training Naval personnel, and the technique was used prior to 2007 at the NAS North Island (San Diego, California) SERE School and from 2000 through 2005 at the NAS Brunswick (Brunswick, Maine) SERE School. Both schools no longer use the technique.

Mr. MILLER. Please provide the number of members of our military that have been waterboarded since 1992.

Secretary GATES. We could find no records that would allow us to answer this question accurately. We do know that waterboarding was used only at the two Navy SERE schools and applied to only a limited number of students and instructors. We do not know with certainty how many persons were waterboarded during training at these schools.

Mr. MILLER. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission of 2005 could not have anticipated the true costs of implementing all of its recommendations. The DOD has made progress in implementing the BRAC 2005 but faces some challenges in meeting the statutory 15 September 2011 deadline. What are you and your staff doing to ensure BRAC 2005 is fully funded and this deadline is met?

Secretary GATES. To ensure BRAC is fully funded, the Department assesses the adequacy of funding during each annual Integrated Program and Budget Review and adjusts the program accordingly. The Department recognizes the unique challenges associated with implementing the more complex recommendations and the synchronization efforts required to manage the interdependencies among many rec-

ommendations. To apprise senior leadership of problems requiring intervention as early as possible, the Department institutionalized an implementation execution update briefing program in November 2008. These update briefings, representing 83 percent of the investment value of all recommendations, provide an excellent forum for business plan managers to explain their actions underway to mitigate the impacts of problem issues. The business managers have and will continue to brief the status of implementation actions associated with recommendations that exceed \$100M on a continuing basis through statutory completion of all recommendations (September 15, 2011). The business managers are also required to brief other plans for which they have concerns.

All recommendations are currently fully funded and on track to be implemented by the statutory deadline of September 15, 2011.

Mr. MILLER. In late April, Computer spies have broken into the Pentagon's \$300 billion Joint Strike Fighter project—the Defense Department's costliest weapons program ever. It was reported that while the spies were able to download sizable amounts of data related to the jet-fighter, they weren't able to access the most sensitive material, which is stored on computers not connected to the Internet. What is the Department's assessment of this attack? And what is the Department doing to ensure the security of the largest acquisition program ever?

Secretary GATES. The Department's review indicated that no compromise of JSF program classified information has occurred. We remain confident that the Department's ongoing efforts will prevent unauthorized access to, or compromise of, classified U.S. technology and information on JSF and other programs involving industry. In addition, in response to the reported intrusion into JSF contractor unclassified networks, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) conducted an independent investigation of the possible compromise. This investigation involved law enforcement and counterintelligence activities to determine if there was evidence of criminal activity. If desired, AFOSI can provide a classified briefing of the investigation and findings.

With regard to enhancing overall protection of unclassified DOD information, the Department established the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program in September 2007 to partner with cleared defense contractors to secure critical unclassified DOD information resident on, or transiting, DIB unclassified systems and networks. This DOD-DIB partnering model provides the mechanism to exchange relevant cyber threat and vulnerability information in a timely manner, provides intelligence and digital forensic analysis on threats, supports damage assessments for compromised information, and expands government-to-industry cooperation, while ensuring that industry equities and privacy are protected.

Mr. MILLER. Melissa Hathaway recently completed her review of the government's cybersecurity efforts. Organizational changes will be one of the most important changes required to address a national cybersecurity plan and recent reports indicate that the Department is considering a four-star sub-unified command under STRATCOM to address the cyber threat. What is the Department's plan, in light of this review, to address the cyber threat?

Secretary GATES. We are pursuing a number of initiatives to address the threat in a long-term manner. These initiatives include 1) building a culture that makes cybersecurity a priority by training a cadre of experts who are equipped with the latest technologies while improving the training, awareness and accountability for all service members; 2) improving our capabilities by developing, through DARPA, a national cyber range that will allow us to test the skills and tactics being trained; and 3) developing USCYBERCOM to allow for a more coordinated and effective response to threats.

The decision to create a sub-unified command under USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM, and place Joint Forces Component Command Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) and the Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) within a single command, will allow for efficiencies that could not be realized through operational command lines between the components. USCYBERCOM, as a Joint Force Commander, will be entitled to a joint staff to coordinate the functions of the command. Under this command, the primary focus will be directing operation and defense of the military's Global Information Grid (GIG). The Department will remain engaged in the national cybersecurity effort, as directed by the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), through continuous collaboration between cybersecurity centers that include USCYBERCOM once the organization has taken over the missions of JTF-GNO.

Additionally, the Services have created organizations to address the need for coordination and integration. The Army is creating the Network Enterprise Technology Command, the Navy created the Naval Network Warfare Command and the

24th Air Force is being stood up. These organizations will be integrated with the new USCYBERCOM to synchronize each Service's ability to conduct operations in the cyberspace domain. The Department of Defense is also engaged in a review of existing policy and strategy to develop a comprehensive approach to DOD cyberspace operations.

Mr. MILLER. One of the important aspects of Ms. Hathaway's review included the relationship between the government and business. In light of the recent computer attacks on the JSF, how is the Department working with companies like Lockheed Martin so that the data at one of their facilities is not compromised?

Secretary GATES. The Department established the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program in September 2007 to partner with cleared defense contractors to secure critical unclassified DOD information resident on, or transiting, DIB unclassified systems and networks. This DOD-DIB partnering model provides the mechanism to exchange relevant cyber threat and vulnerability information in a timely manner, provides intelligence and digital forensic analysis on threats, supports damage assessments for compromised information, and expands government-to-industry cooperation, while ensuring that industry equities and privacy are protected.

Mr. MILLER. In the past, the QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review) was criticized for being written to support the budget, rather than the other way around. Title X states, "The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, during a year following a year evenly divisible by four, conduct a comprehensive examination (to be known as a "quadrennial defense review") of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. How will the Department ensure the QDR is conducted to meet its Title 10 requirements?"

Secretary GATES. The Department's conduct of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is in full accord with the letter and intent of Title 10, U.S. Code, section 118. I am ensuring the full participation of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, leaders of our Military Departments and Services, and experts within and outside the Department of Defense. The views and recommendations of these experts are critical to our development of a defense program for the next 20 years.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is the strategic point of departure for our analysis. The QDR Terms of Reference and my public statements regarding the President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2010 build on the NDS to further define our strategic priorities. Through the QDR process, we are assessing the right balance of capabilities needed to address current and future threats, taking into account lessons learned from ongoing operations and from prior reviews and analyses. I intend to deliver a QDR that is strategy driven, and am prepared to ask for the resources I believe necessary to meet the Nation's defense needs.

Mr. MILLER. The recent supplemental request by the President includes a new \$400 million fund in which Defense and State will work to improve the ability of Pakistan's military to carry out counterinsurgency operations and disrupt the border havens. I would like to hear you elaborate on how this Pakistani Counterinsurgency Contingency Fund (PCCF) will be used? What are your thoughts on how the Department of Defense and the Department of State should work together with respect to this funding?

Secretary GATES. The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) focuses on building enduring capabilities for the Pakistani military to conduct counterinsurgency operations in support of U.S. efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The funding is designed to accelerate development of the Government of Pakistan's capacity to secure its borders, deny safe haven to extremists and provide security for the indigenous population in the border areas with Afghanistan. PCCF will fund counterinsurgency requirements such as helicopters, soldier equipment, and training. The Department proposed \$400 million for PCCF in the FY09 supplemental and \$700 million in the FY10 Overseas Contingency Operations request. DOD is grateful to Congress for supporting its request for \$400 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) in FY 2009. The Secretary of State's concurrence on our use of PCF funding is required, and we will continue to work closely with our colleagues at State to ensure our national security objectives are addressed.

For FY10, we have requested a clean transfer to DOD of the \$700 million Congress provided to the State Department to ensure uninterrupted execution of this critical program while both Departments work closely on putting plans in place for the State Department to implement the program in FY 2011. The State Department



must have the flexible authorities, processes, and funding to be responsive to my Department's needs in order to manage this wartime authority.

Mr. MILLER. I support the need for acquisition reform and agree an element of that includes ensuring the workforce is comprised of the right mix of military, civil service and contractor personnel. However, it appears that the department budget assumes major savings as a result of FY10 conversions in contractor positions to civil service positions. I am very concerned with this on two counts. First, there does not appear to be any analysis available to justify "what positions to convert" and the timeline between today and first the day of FY10 is not sufficient to conduct that analysis and execute OPM hiring procedures. Secondly, the savings are assumed and deducted from the FY10 budget lines. Those savings appear to be very optimistic. Specifically, what analysis drove the decision on how many positions to convert?

Secretary GATES. The Department recognized many contractors have been hired post-9/11 to meet the exigencies of temporary wartime needs. Prior to the war, contractors comprised approximately 26 percent of the government workforce, without any degradation of mission. Returning to this pre-war level of 26 percent from the current 39 percent equates to approximately 33,600 personnel. It is correct the Department cannot do that all at once. We developed a phased approach that requires conversion of approximately 13,600 personnel in FY 2010. This equates to an overall hiring increase of approximately 14 percent. The savings are based on the results of the conversions that have occurred to date.

Mr. MILLER. Given that Public Law 97-174, "The Veterans Administration and Department of Defense Health Resources Sharing and Emergency Operations Act," mandated the sharing of Department of Defense/Department of Veterans Affairs (DOD/VA) resources, what is the overall progress, in specific numbers, of joint operations (not agreements signed)?

Secretary GATES. A comprehensive account of the current progress of joint DOD/VA operations can be found in the VA/DOD Joint Executive Council Annual Report to Congress, located on the DOD/VA website at <http://www.tricare.mil/DVPCO/default.cfm>.

Highlights of the latest numbers include:

- A VA/DOD Joint Strategic Plan (JSP), which includes a continuum of delivery concept, is managed through the Joint Councils (Joint Executive Council, Health Executive Council (HEC), and Benefits Executive Council). The JSP for FY 2009-2011 includes actions to implement more than 400 recommendations from the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors and other national advisory and review groups.
- Joint venture medical facilities currently exist at nine locations: North Chicago (Great Lakes Naval Station); New Mexico (Kirtland AFB); Nevada (Nellis AFB); Texas (Ft Bliss); Alaska (Elmendorf AFB); Florida (NAS Key West); Hawaii (Tripler AMC); California (Travis AFB); and Mississippi (Keesler AFB). A project is also underway to expand joint partnerships to full market areas, as well as increase the number of resource sharing sites.
- The North Chicago VA Medical Center and the Naval Health Clinic Great Lakes will merge into the Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) in 2010, and will serve both DOD and VA beneficiaries. The governance model provides a single line of authority within the FHCC and command and control responsibilities still resting with DOD/Navy and VA. A \$20 million four-level parking garage is completed and construction is underway for a \$99 million joint ambulatory care center, scheduled for August 2010. Six DOD/VA national workgroups (Leadership, Finance and Budget, Information Management/Information Technology, Human Resource, Clinical, and Administration) oversee identification/resolution of issues.
- The Defense Center of Excellence for Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Psychological Health (PH) established a means to improve consistency and quality of TBI/PH care across DOD and VA:
  - ◆ Common access standards were published for mental health services in both DOD and VA.
  - ◆ Over 2,700 DOD, VA, and private sector providers were trained in evidence-based treatments for post-traumatic stress disorder and TBI.
  - ◆ A common DOD/VA post-deployment TBI assessment protocol was implemented.
- The Joint Electronic Health Records Interoperability Program is designed to support sharing of appropriate protected electronic health information between DOD and VA for shared patients.

- ◆ Since 2001, DOD has transmitted electronic health information on over 4.8 million patients to the Federal Health Information Exchange Data Repository for access by VA. Data includes over 2.5 million Pre- and Post-deployment Health Assessment (PPDHA) forms and Post-deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA) forms on more than one million separated Service members and demobilized Reserve and National Guard members.
- ◆ The Bidirectional Health Information Exchange (BHIE) enables real-time sharing of clinical data for patients treated in both DOD and VA.
- ◆ Inpatient discharge summaries are available from 20 of DOD's largest inpatient facilities (equating to approximately 55% of total DOD inpatient beds) and from all VA inpatient facilities.
- ◆ Theater clinical data from DOD is viewable by DOD and VA providers on shared patients.
- ◆ DOD electronically sends VA radiology images and scanned medical records for severely wounded and injured Service members transferring from one of three major DOD trauma centers to one of four main VA polytrauma centers.
- ◆ Through the established interoperability between DOD's Clinical Data Repository and VA's Health Data Repository, the agencies continue to exchange computable outpatient pharmacy and medication allergy information which supports drug-drug and drug-allergy checking for shared patients.
- ◆ The Departments established the DOD/VA Interagency Program Office (IPO) in April 2008. The IPO oversees actions to accelerate the exchange of electronic health care information between the DOD and VA, and will monitor and provide input on personnel and benefits electronic data sharing initiatives.
- ◆ The DOD/VA Interagency Clinical Informatics Board (ICIB) was established to ensure clinicians have a direct voice in the prioritization of recommendations for enhancing electronic health data sharing.
- ◆ DOD and VA completed a Joint Inpatient Electronic Health Record (EHR) feasibility study in 2008. The final report, recommending that the Departments pursue a common services strategy to enable DOD/VA inpatient EHR data sharing, was briefed to and approved by DOD/VA executive leadership in August 2008.
- ◆ DOD and VA data sharing activities underway for FY 2009 include:
  - Inpatient documentation expansion;
  - Document scanning (initial capability); and
  - Expansion of questionnaires.
- AHLTA, the military EHR for DOD, is the cornerstone for health information management and technology. AHLTA includes data on more than 9.2 million beneficiaries and is the source of the majority of the health data shared with VA.

Mr. MILLER. How is the Department of Defense (DOD) addressing what appears to be an increasing number of discharges due to preventable, non-combat related injuries and the discharge rate due to the inability of some Service members to maintain weight standards? Oftentimes, these two issues are interrelated as military programs assume that one type of exercise fits all, thus creating injuries while seeking weight loss.

Secretary GATES. Please understand that discharges secondary to inability to maintain weight standards are a personnel and leadership issue for which the individual Services are primarily responsible. Medically, the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) has identified obesity and alcohol abuse as causes for some preventable, non-combat related injuries and is working to decrease their prevalence.

In an effort to address weight loss and obesity prevention in the Active Duty family member and retiree populations, TMA recently concluded a one-year demonstration project studying the effects of specific weight loss interventions. Due to the successful results of the study, TMA is working to include weight loss tools such as coaching and medications in the TRICARE benefit. Additionally, the TMA Office of the Chief Medical Officer is partnering with TMA Communication and Customer Service on weight loss and nutrition education websites targeted towards our beneficiaries.

The anti-alcohol campaign *That Guy* makes use of edgy humor specifically tailored to reach junior enlisted, with an emphasis on realistic embarrassing consequences of being *That Guy*, the one who gets drunk and out of control. The campaign was designed to be "turn key," and over 1,500 local points of contact at 228 installations

have been engaged in placing over one half million branded items into use. The Headquarters Marine Corps' Semper Fit Program Office continues to be engaged; the Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program Office collaborated in printing and making the branded materials available through the Navy Logistic Library, and the Army Center for Substance Abuse Program provided funds to support additional central printing of the most popular campaign materials, and also to provide onsite contractor support of the campaign's deployment at their 26 largest installations. Based on the Defense Manpower Data Center's Annual Status of Forces Survey, DOD-wide campaign awareness in the target audience of junior enlisted has increased from 2% in 2006 (phantom awareness, pre-campaign deployment), to 14% in 2007, and 30% in 2008.

Mr. MILLER. Is the Department of Defense (DOD) giving any consideration to developing a policy for Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy for injuries other than flight or diving incidents, such as traumatic brain injury?

Secretary GATES. Yes, however, such policy will depend on the results of scientific evaluation of the therapy for its use in other situations, such as treatment for mild traumatic brain injury patients. The DOD is preparing a controlled trial that is scheduled to begin in August 2009, pending Food and Drug Administration approval of an Investigative New Drug application. Developing policies covering other potential Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy uses must be preceded by scientific, orderly, and approved testing.

Mr. MILLER. Considering that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) only supports services and compensation for events documented in a medical record, how can the Department of Defense (DOD) ensure events involving contact with the enemy are properly recorded in a Service member's medical record? This is critical for traumatic brain injury (TBI), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and other related health conditions where a Service member may not have been penetrated by a bullet, for units where contact with the enemy does not provide time at that moment to document health issues in a medical record, or in cases where a medical professional is not available.

Secretary GATES. The DOD agrees that visibility of all events that may impact individuals' short- or long-term health be made available to the VA. Currently, the science is not fully developed enough to identify all the events that may lead to a diagnosis of PTSD, since there is so much variability in individual response. However, DOD is taking the following actions in addressing this concern and will make this data available to the VA:

1. Specific questions are already included in the Post-Deployment Health Assessment and Post-Deployment Health Reassessment for personnel to self-report exposure events potentially causative for PTSD, TBI, and environmental exposures. These assessments are currently included in the medical records and will be made available in the electronic medical record in the future.
2. A longitudinal exposure record is under development, which will include documented occupational and environmental health (OEH) exposures (in medical records) as well as possible or unconfirmed exposures related to OEH surveillance.
3. The Personnel Blast and Contaminant Tracking (PBCT) System, developed by the Army National Guard as a means to identify a population at risk in the vicinity of a blast or chemical exposure incident, is used in Iraq by the Army. DOD intends to more fully develop this system for use for by all Services (Reference: Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Senate Report 111-020, S. 1054).
4. DOD is investing research and development efforts in "smart" technologies to allow capture of individual OEH exposures through the use of biomonitoring and personal chemical detectors that record and integrate exposures over time.

Mr. MILLER. Could you provide the analysis and documentation regarding the 1% of airfield accessibility improvement you stated the C-27J has over the C-130 and can you please provide the locations and ages for the 200 C-130s you claimed were in the inventory?

Secretary GATES. Our airfield accessibility analysis showed that out of an airfield population of 25,122 airfields, there are 399 airfields, outside CONUS, that are more than 50 miles from a C-130 capable airfield which can handle JCAs but not C-130s. To highlight current operational accessibility, only three of the Afghanistan airfields are JCA-only capable. The Department's fleet of more than 400 C-130s is sized to support the demands of a national emergency characterized by two overlapping wars concurrent with other ongoing lesser contingencies and homeland defense; this finite period of extremely high demand is not experienced in day-to-day oper-

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ations. Right now, current operations in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM require about 40 C-130s per day. Other operations require about 20 C-130s. In addition to these operational requirements, about 40 C-130s are committed to training, 14 support USPACOM, 8 support USEUCOM, and 60-80 are in depot maintenance. This leaves about 220-240 C-130s available. A list of current locations and ages of the C-130 inventory is attached.

JUNE 2009 C-130 TAI SNAPSHOT

ACTIVE DUTY												
Total Tails: 147			Avg. Age: 32.84 Years				(Year aircraft were built)					
	DYESS		LITTLE ROCK (AMC)				POPE	LITTLE ROCK (AETC)		RAMSTEIN		YOKOTA
	39 AS	40 AS	41 AS	50 AS	61 AS	53 AS	2 AS	48 AS	62 AS	37 AS		36 AS
	H/H1	H/H1	J	H3	E	E	E	J	E	E	J	H1
1	1973	1973	2004	1992	1962	1962		2002	1961	1962	2008	1974
2	1973	1974	2004	1992	1962	1963		2004	1961	1962	2008	1974
3	1974	1974	2005	1992	1962	1963		2005	1961	1962		1974
4	1974	1974	2005	1992	1962	1972		1994	1961	1963		1974
5	1974	1974	2006	1992	1962	1962		1994	1962	1963		1974
6	1974	1974	2006	1992	1962	1962		1997	1962	1963		1974
7	1974	1974	2006	1992	1963	1963		1997	1962	1963		1974
8	1974	1974	2006	1992	1963	1963			1962	1964		1974
9	1974	1974	2007	1993	1962	1963			1962	1964		1974
10	1974	1974	2007	1993	1963	1963			1962	1968		1974
11	1974	1974	2007	1993	1972				1962	1970		1974
12	1974	1974	2007	1993	1962				1963	1970		1974
13	1974	1974	2007	1993					1963	1972		1974
14	1974	1974	2007	1993					1963	1963		1974
15	1974	1974	2007						1963			
16	1974	1974							1963			
17	1974								1963			
18									1963			
19									1963			
20									1963			
21									1963			
22									1963			
23									1963			
24									1963			
25									1964			
26									1964			
TOTAL	17	16	15	14	12	10	0	7	26	14	2	14

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JUNE 2009 C-130 TAI SNAPSHOT

AFRC												
Total Tails: 102				Avg. Age: 19.02 Years				(Year aircraft were built)				
	MITCHELL (Pope)	KEESLER		NIAGARA	MINN	MAXWELL	PETERSON	PITTSBURGH	WILLOW GROVE	YOUNGSTOWN		DOBBINS
	95 AS	815 AS	53 WS	328 AS	96 AS	357 AS	731 AS	758 AS	327 AS	773 AS	757 AS	700 AS
	H2	J	WC-J	H2	H3	H2	H3	H2	E	H2.5	H2	H2
1	1986	2006	1996	1987	1992	1985	1994	1978		1992	1985	1981
2	1986	2002	1996	1987	1992	1985	1994	1978		1992	1989	1981
3	1986	2003	1996	1987	1992	1985	1994	1978		1992	1989	1981
4	1986	2004	1997	1987	1992	1985	1994	1978		1992	1989	1981
5	1986	2005	1997	1991	1992	1985	1994	1978			1989	1981
6	1986	2005	1997	1991	1992	1985	1994	1978			1989	1981
7	1987	2005	1997	1991	1992	1985	1994	1978			1990	1984
8	1988	2005	1998	1991	1992	1986	1994	1978			1990	1984
9	1988		1998	1989			1996					
10	1988		1999	1989			1996					
11	1988			1989			1996					
12	1988			1989			1996					
13	1988											
14	1988											
15	1987											
16	1989											
TOTAL	16	8	10	12	8	8	12	8	0	4	8	8

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JUNE 2009 C-130 TAI SNAPSHOT

ANG															
Total Tails: 179      Avg. Age: 22.68 Years      (Year aircraft were built)															
	BALTIMORE		BOISE		SELFRIDGE	QUONSET	LOUISVILLE	CHANNEL ILDS	LUJIS MUNOZ	PEORIA	LITTLE ROCK	KUJUS	SCHENECTADY	MANSFIELD	
	135 AS		189 AS		171 AS	143 AS	165 AS	115 AS	198 AS	169 AS	154 AS	144 AS	139 AS		164 AS
	J	H2	H2.5		E	J	H2.5	J	E	H3	E	H2	LC-H2/ H3	H2	H2.5
1	1997			1991		1999	1991	2001	1964	1992	1962	1982	1973	1983	1990
2	1997			1991		1999	1991	2001	1963	1992	1962	1982	1976	1983	1990
3	1997					1999	1991	2001	1963	1993	1962	1982	1976	1983	1990
4	1998					2002	1991	2002	1964	1993	1962	1982	1983	1983	1990
5	1998					2005	1991	2005	1964	1993	1962	1982	1983		1990
6	1998					2005	1991	2005	1962	1994	1962	1982	1983		1990
7						2006	1991	2006	1963	1994	1963	1982	1983		1990
8						2006	1991	2007	1962	1994	1963	1982	1992		1990
9							1991				1963		1992		
10											1962		1993		
TOTAL	6	0	2	0	0	8	9	8	8	8	10	8	10	4	8

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	NASHVILLE		YEAGER	MINNEAPOLIS	CARSWELL	ST. JOSEPH		RENO	CHEYENNE		NEW CASTLE	CHARLOTTE	SAVANNAH
	105 AS		130 AS	109 AS	181 AS	180 AS		192 AS	187 AS		142 AS	156 AS	158 AS
	H2	WC-H	H3	H3	H2	H2	H2.5	H2	H3	H2.5	H2	H3	H2
1	1989	1964	1994	1995	1985	1986		1979	1992	1991	1984	1992	1980
2	1989	1965	1994	1995	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1992	1980
3	1989	1965	1995	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1993	1980
4	1989	1965	1995	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1993	1980
5	1989	1965	1995	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1993	1980
6		1965	1995	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1993	1980
7			1994	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1984	1993	1980
8			1994	1996	1985	1986		1979	1992		1990	1993	1980
9			1994						1993			1993	
10									1993			1993	
11									1993				
TOTAL	5	6	9	8	8	8	0	8	11	1	8	10	8

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## JUNE 2009 C-130 TAI SNAPSHOT

ACTIVE DUTY STATS				
	PAI	BAI	TAI	%TAI
C-130E	61	1	62	77.50%
C-130H/H1	46	1	47	100%
C-130H3	14	0	14	17.50%
C-130J	24	0	24	44.44%
TOTAL	145	2	147	34.35%

AFRC STATS				
	PAI	BAI	TAI	%TAI
C-130E	0	0	0	0%
C-130H2	60	0	60	51.28%
C-130H2.5	4	0	4	16.67%
C-130H3	20	0	20	25%
C-130J	8	0	8	14.81%
WC-130J	10	0	10	100%
TOTAL	102	0	102	23.83%

ANG STATS				
	PAI	BAI	TAI	%TAI
C-130E	16	2	18	22.50%
C-130H2	56	1	57	48.72%
C-130H2.5	19	1	20	83.33%
C-130H3	45	1	46	57.50%
C-130J	22	0	22	40.74%
LC-130H	10	0	10	100%
WC-130H	4	2	6	100%
TOTAL	172	7	179	41.82%

MAF PAI FLEET CODE BREAKOUT	AD	AFRC	ANG	TOTAL
PRIMARY MISSION CODED (PMAI)	111	94	146	351
PRIMARY TRAINING CODED (PTAI)	32	8	12	52
PRIMARY OTHER ACFT INVENTORY (POAI)	2	0	14	16
BACKUP ACFT INVENTORY (BAI)	2	0	7	9
TOTAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY (TAI)	147	102	179	428

MAF AVERAGE AGES	
C-130E	44.9
C-130H	21.8
C-130J	4.5
LC-130H	17.1



Mr. MILLER. Could you please tell the committee what has changed since the Quadrennial Roles and Missions document was signed by you earlier in the year?

Secretary GATES. The 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions (QRM) Review is a key input to the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The 2009 QRM prepared the Department to take a hard look at balancing the demands of winning today's wars with preventing tomorrow's conflicts. Many of the areas examined in the QRM Review feed directly into the QDR. For example, the Department has almost completed plans for increasing the size of Special Operations Forces and has begun the process of rebalancing the capabilities of our General Purpose Forces to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. In the area of cyberspace, the Department has recently established a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with the responsibility of cyberspace oversight, and has established a cyberspace Joint Task Force under U.S. Strategic Command. Intra-theater airlift continues to receive attention as the Air Force and Army develop the C-27J (Joint Cargo Aircraft) Concept of Operations to meet operational demands. Unmanned Aircraft Systems/Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (UAS/ISR) capabilities will be expanded as the Air Force continues procurement and deployment of the MQ-9 Reaper.

Building upon the work completed in the QRM, the Department is developing and evaluating options in the QDR to rebalance U.S. forces for the range of future challenges. The QDR analysis approach emphasizes developing alternative force options to meet the demands of the defense strategy. Thus far, we have conducted a review of strategy and overall guidance, assessed the capabilities of the programmed forces against selected scenarios, and developed proposed alternatives and initiatives to rebalance the force. Some of the proposed initiatives considered have directly capitalized on the QRM work, including irregular warfare, cyberspace and UAS/ISR capabilities. I am confident that we are moving the department to a more balanced set of capabilities to employ in the dynamic and challenging strategic environment, now and in the future.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. On March 18, 2009, I joined with the entire Utah Congressional Delegation to send you a letter asking you to personally review the matter of sustaining the U.S. Industrial Base with regard to ICBM solid rocket motor sustainment, engineering and manufacture. We received an interim reply from you dated April 10, 2009 which informed us that you had delegated the final response to the Air Force Secretary. However, because of the non-disclosure rule you had in place at the time, the Air Force was unable or unwilling to respond to our concerns, and now 60 days later, we have not yet received a responsive answer from you or anyone at the Department of Defense on that subject in spite of our urgent request.

Secretary GATES. The FY10 President's budget request includes funding for a Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Warm Line program to maintain a low-rate Minuteman III SRM industrial manufacturing capability. The effort promotes design-unique material availability, sub-tier material supplier viability, and production/manufacturing skills.

As part of the FY09 Omnibus submission the Department of Defense submitted a New Start request to initiate the Warm Line program in 2009, using funds made available by deferring some of the Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) closeout activities (e.g., storage of tooling and employee severance packages). The scope of the FY09 effort is dependent on final costs for PRP closeout currently under negotiation between the ICBM Prime Integrating Contractor and the sub-contractor.

Mr. BISHOP. What is the disposition of the FY09 close-out funds in Air Force for the Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP)?

Secretary GATES. The FY09 funds for the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (\$62.6M) included \$39M for program closeout. The U.S. Air Force obligated \$29M for closeout to cover severance actions planned by the sub-contractor (approximately 75 to 80 percent of the PRP workforce). The ICBM Prime Integrating Contractor continues to negotiate with the sub-contractor to identify which of the remaining closeout activities can be deferred to the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Warm Line program. Deferral of the remaining closeout tasks will enable the Air Force to initiate the SRM Warm Line program in FY09 as encouraged by Congress. While negotiations are pending, the Air Force proposed realignment of the remaining PRP closeout funds to the SRM Warm Line effort and requested New Start Approval in the FY09 Omnibus submitted to Congress.

Mr. BISHOP. What funding is included in the FY10 defense budget submission for a "warm-line" or industrial base sustainment program for Minuteman III?

Secretary GATES. The FY10 President's Budget requests \$43M for the Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line.

Mr. BISHOP. On page 125 of your FY10 budget documents under Missile Procurement, Air Force, it says that the Air Force is proposing acquisition of only one Minuteman III engine set to sustain the "warm line" or industrial base at \$43 million (\$37.5 million plus \$5.7 million for support equipment). The industrial base indicates that a minimum of six engine sets is necessary to maintain an adequate industrial base. What analysis was used by DOD or the Air Force to justify the budgeting of just one motor set in FY10 as being sufficient to maintain a warm line capability for solid rocket ICBM motor engineering, sustainment and manufacturing, when industry insists that six is the minimum number?

Secretary GATES. The ICBM Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line will maintain material supplier availability and touch labor currency. Furthermore, it will maintain continuity of design and engineering personnel unique to the Minuteman weapon system. As a new start in FY 2010, funds will be used for initial long-lead procurement and cold factory start-up following at least a 3-month gap from the last Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP) booster delivery in August 2009. When the Air Force factored in these non-recurring costs, remaining funding in FY 2010 was estimated to be sufficient for one complete booster set. Actual production quantities are unknown until the contract is definitized.

Mr. BISHOP. Was the omission of KEI cancellation in your April 5th statement intentional or inadvertent? If it was intentional, please state your reason.

Secretary GATES. The omission was inadvertent.

Mr. BISHOP. Would you support rescinding the stop-work order temporarily until these important questions can be reviewed and discussed with the Congress?

Secretary GATES. This question is now overcome by events. The termination notice for the KEI program was issued on June 10, 2009.

Mr. BISHOP. Did you have firm contract termination costs associated with the stop-work order on hand prior to approving the stop-work orders? If so, what are those costs?

Secretary GATES. At the time of the Stop Work Order, the Agency had not started the process for negotiation of the termination of the KEI contract; however, termination liability costs were provided by Northrop Grumman in accordance with clause H.4, "Continuation Reviews and Liability" of contract. The termination costs were estimated to be \$40M based on termination in June 2009.

Mr. BISHOP. Does the DOD/MDA have a spending plan or proposal for any unspent FY09 KEI funds, and what are those plans?

Secretary GATES. MDA is working through the process of determining the final termination costs and planning for costs associated with disposition of hardware and other assets. The Federal Acquisition Regulation allows the contractor one year from termination notification to provide the termination cost proposal. The Agency will assess use of remaining funds, if there are any, at that time.

Mr. BISHOP. Why do you not support going forward with the planned KEI missile test this summer inasmuch as the engine set has been built and already delivered to the test site, \$1 billion in taxpayer funds have already been invested in KEI, and when completing such a test would likely yield important scientific data that could prove useful in future missile defense research and development efforts?

Secretary GATES. There was little utility in flight testing the test article or its design since the flight article was significantly different than the eventual design of the objective KEI booster. Additionally, Northrop Grumman's proposed schedule to complete the launch on September 2009 introduced significant program risk.

Mr. BISHOP. You stated in today's HASC hearing that the KEI program was a 14-year program, when in fact, the current KEI development contract was awarded in 2003. So it is really a 5-year-old program. Upon which facts did you base the assertion that it is a 14-year program?

Secretary GATES. You are correct; the current KEI contract is 5 years old. My reference to a 14 year program was to the actual schedule growth. The original KEI mission grew from a boost phase only mission to a boost and mid-course mission, the development schedule grew accordingly to 12-14 years (from start to projected completion, depending on spirals), and the program costs grew from \$4.6B to \$8.9B with the missile average unit production cost growth from \$25M to over \$50M per interceptor. For these reasons the FY 2010 President's Budget submission removed funding from the Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) program following the Missile Defense Executive Board's recommendation that the KEI program be terminated due to cost growth, schedule delays, and technical risk.

Mr. BISHOP. You stated that KEI test firings were a "failure," which contradicts Missile Defense Agency press releases and information to the contrary that seven

out of ten planned test firings were successful. How do you respond to this discrepancy?

Secretary GATES. There were three notable failures during the rocket motor test campaign: a first stage rocket motor case failed during a pressure test, leading to a successful redesign of both first and second stage case winding processes; a materials defect issue caused a second stage rocket motor nozzle failure during a motor firing, leading to a change of nozzle material and nozzle material inspection process; and, a higher than desired motor pressure at startup was noted on that same motor firing and resulted in a change of the internal geometry of the second stage rocket motor. All three corrective actions were demonstrated successfully in the next second stage rocket motor firing. The static fire campaign allowed for failures to be identified, reworked, and then retested while on the ground versus a more costly flight test environment.

Mr. BISHOP. You stated that KEI does not have a platform and relies upon being proximate to the enemy launch area to be successful. I dispute those claims because I am informed that because of KEI's reach, high acceleration and mobility, it does NOT need to be close to enemy launch sites, and that no other planned system has KEI's speed or reach in countering ICBM and IRBM threats. How do you respond to those specific rebuttals?

Secretary GATES. KEI does not have a launch platform in development. Boost phase interception relies on timely sensor detection and tracking, timely communications, as well as weapon proximity and performance (acceleration, speed, and reach) for successful execution.

Mr. BISHOP. In the hearing today, you indicated that you would support continued research and development for the "boost phase" of missile defense. And yet, Secretary Gates' decision to place an immediate stop-work order on completion of the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program will also stop a planned test firing of the KEI interceptor in less than five months from now even as the interceptor motor has already been built and delivered to the test site. Given your earlier statement today that you support continued research and development for boost-phase, would it not also be consistent for you to support the completion of this upcoming KEI test that would almost certainly yield tremendous scientific and engineering data that would be beneficial to future missile defense efforts?

Secretary GATES. I support the Secretary's decision. The Missile Defense Agency allowed the contractor to submit a proposal to conduct a flight test with the available funds. The contractor submitted two proposals; both fell short of adequately addressing the technical risk associated with a flight test. Additionally, the KEI development effort to date has provided valuable technical data during both development and static engine tests, which will be utilized in future programs. The stop-work order will ensure sufficient funds remain in FY09 to cover the estimated \$40 million legal liability for termination.

The Missile Defense Agency continues R&D efforts in "early intercept" which I view as a derivative of "boost phase" intercept.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE

Mr. KLINE. USA Today reported on 8 May, 2009 that the Army National Guard is being asked to reduce its end strength by 10,000 soldiers by the end of the fiscal year. The FY10 Defense budget increases the size of the Army Guard by approximately 10,000 soldiers (increase plus the 103-percent over-strength authorization). Why isn't the Department funding the Guard's current strength? It seems counter-productive to force out qualified soldiers now only to enlist new soldiers in October. Additionally, the current high deployment schedule has not allowed the dwell time to reach the goals set for both the AC and RC forces.

Secretary GATES. The Army National Guard (ARNG) proposed growing its end strength to 371K and create a Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students account in order to increase the readiness of deploying units and decrease cross leveling of Soldiers. Because of funding constraints that proposal was not accepted, and the ARNG is reducing end strength accordingly to congressionally authorized levels. The ARNG has taken numerous actions to discharge Soldiers at an accelerated rate and to slow recruiting. Together these steps have reduced ARNG end strength from 368K to 362K and it continues to fall. Additionally, the elimination of Stop Loss authority will provide new challenges to unit manning for deploying units. The ARNG is requesting authority from the department to use the congressionally authorized end strength variance of 3% and the funding associated with that 3% to achieve an end strength of 358.2K. At this time, we do not have resolution on whether that request with funding will be approved. If approved, the ARNG will be able to sta-

bilize deploying units and provide better dwell for the Citizen-Soldiers who are answering the Nation's call.

Mr. KLINE. When the Yellow Ribbon Program was being considered, DOD insisted on serving as the executive agent for the program; rather than the more decentralized model proposed with NGB serving as the lead, implementing a decentralized state-centric model. Can you address any major initiatives the DOD has promoted to advance the program? Do we need to reconsider implementing a more state-centric management of service member, family, and employer reintegration?

Secretary GATES. The DOD Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) Office for Reintegration Programs (ORP) has been established and staffed with individual Service Liaison Officers (LNOs) who are the link to their respective National Guard and Reserve component reintegration programs. They are working directly with their Program Managers to align their programs with the goal of the DOD YRRP sharing services to reach all Service members and their families as close to their residence as possible. A Veterans Affairs (VA) Liaison, also assigned to the DOD YRRP ORP, is working closely with DOD YRRP management and the Service LNOs at the policy level, providing technical expertise and guidance relative to the VA benefits and services available to National Guard and Reserve members and their families.

The DOD Yellow Ribbon Program Specialist Pilot is now being launched in ten states. The goal is to have a Program Specialist in each state engaging with the governor's staff to ensure that high quality, robust resourcing is available to support the reintegration events. The DOD YRRP Decision Support Tool (DST), a national calendar and map of events, that captures information to manage and locate events at the national, state, and local levels, has been developed. DOD YRRP Center for Excellence in Reintegration (CFER) has designed a method to sort and evaluate the programs, materials, and presentations from the field to be posted on the DST repository. The DOD YRRP Web site, [www.dodyrrp.org](http://www.dodyrrp.org), near completion and linked to the DST, provides program policy and information targeted to specific stakeholder audiences, and an extensive links section to other Web sites and information resources related to the YRRP.

The DOD YRRP Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) providing guidance for Services to implement their reintegration programs to align with the mission of the DOD YRRP, is in the final coordination process. DOD YRRP Strategic Communications has developed a logo, slogan, and promotional and marketing materials used at conferences and events to provide information to Service members, their families, providers, leaders and YRRP partnering organizations. Program management best practices have been developed and implemented via the governance plans for risk, quality, and data management, for strategic communications, and program management. The DOD YRRP Charter is under development. The DOD YRRP Advisory Board has been instituted and is proceeding to monitor the DOD YRRP and addressing any requirements to fulfill the full intent of the PL 110-181, Sec. 582, assisting Service members and their families in receiving optimal services during the deployment cycle. Additionally, a Departmental Instruction for the YRRP Advisory Board is being developed.

Mr. KLINE. Can you elaborate how the Yellow Ribbon Program is being funded? I understand costs associated with a deployment were to come from OCO funds and basic program funds would come from the base budget. However, I was recently informed that in the USAR all funds (\$58.5mil) were coming from OCO funds. Do we know if this is happening with the ARNG; ANG; and reserve units in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps? Additionally, do we know the total funding for each branch and component?

Secretary GATES. The Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program (YRRP) is funded primarily in the Department's FY 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations Request. The funding for each branch and component, by appropriation, are provided below. Funding to plan, manage, and stage events is funded in the base budget via the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD (RA)).

**FY 2010 YRRP**  
(\$ millions)

OCO	Military		Total
	O&M	Personnel	
Army Reserve	25.2	33.3	58.5
Army National Guard	22.5	76.6	99.1
Navy Reserve	3.1	8.4	11.5

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**FY 2010 YRRP—Continued**  
**(\$ millions)**

OCO	O&M	Military Personnel	Total
Marine Corps Reserve	4.5	8.9	13.4
Air Force Reserve	2.0	17.0	19.0
Air Force National Guard	38.5	18.5	57.0
Defense-Wide JFSAP*	62.0	0.0	62.0
Subtotal OCO	157.8	162.7	320.5
Base			
Defense-Wide (OSD (RA))	24.8	0.0	24.8
Total	182.6	162.7	345.3

\* Joint Family Support Assistance Program

Mr. KLINE. Can you report how many Yellow Ribbon Program events the DOD has overseen, the number of service members who have completed the program, and whether the program has been implemented as directed in the Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-029?

Secretary GATES. The National Guard has fully implemented all programs as prescribed by Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 08-029 signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness on 18 July 2008. Furthermore, during the period from 1 October 2008 to 30 June 2009 there have been 1,657 Service Members and 700 Family Members that have attended Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program Events for the Air National Guard, and 41,460 Service Members and 47,868 Family Members that have attended Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program Events for the Army National Guard.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER**

Mr. SHUSTER. Under your budget, there will only be roughly 100 combat-coded F-22's available at any given time out of the total 186 due to attrition from training and maintenance. The F-35 is designed to work in tandem with the F-22. If there are not sufficient numbers of F-22's to "clear the skies" from threats and allow F-35's to fly uncontested, won't we be sacrificing air superiority in future conflicts and the same protection that has prevented the U.S. from losing a single soldier due to a threat from the air in over a half Century?

Secretary GATES. Analysis has shown that 187 F-22s minus non-operational fighters (training, maintenance, and attrition) combined with a robust buy of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, are what we need to deal with future threats. Given its multi-role capabilities, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter provides adequate offensive and defensive capability against all but the most advanced potential adversary aircraft threats. The Department does not believe we will be sacrificing air superiority in future conflicts.

Mr. SHUSTER. Last month you described this budget as preparing us to "fight the wars we are in today and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years to come." History has proven that armed conflict is more prevalent in times of economic dislocation. Further, the notion that the future will largely resemble the present is contradictory with America's intelligence failures and repeated inability to accurately predict future threats with precision. What in the threat environment has changed to justify canceling the airborne laser program, halting the F-22 and cutting missile defense funding? Between Iran and North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons and Pakistan on the brink of collapse, isn't the threat environment becoming more unpredictable by the day?

Secretary GATES. Although we have begun to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting current wars and other potential irregular campaigns, the United States must still contend with security challenges posed by a broader range of threats. I foresee a future security environment that is highly complex, with a multiplicity of actors leveraging wide ranging tools to challenge our interests and strengths, and anticipate that U.S. forces in the future may face conventional threats from nation states, irregular threats from non-state actors, asymmetric threats from rising challengers, or a hybrid approach from a combination of actors. Striving for balance between prevailing in the conflicts we are in today and pre-

paring for other, potentially quite different contingencies in the future threat environment remains one of our central challenges.

The FY10 budget decisions are consistent with this full-spectrum approach that balances capability requirements to provide maximum flexibility across the broadest possible range of threats. To achieve this, we must set priorities and identify inescapable tradeoffs while intelligently apportioning risk. I have decided to restructure or terminate programs where significant affordability and technology problems are evident, where we are buying more capability than the Nation needs, or where a program's proposed operational role is highly questionable. In the area of missile defense, we are restructuring the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. The Department will continue to fund research and development robustly to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats.

Mr. SHUSTER. The Administration has gone to great lengths to describe this defense budget as an increase. However, when you look at the core defense budgets from 2009 to 2010 and take inflation into account, we see a reduction in spending of about \$5.5 billion. The 10-year budget blueprint is even more troubling and cannot sustain roughly three-percent average annual growth above inflation necessary to recapitalize military equipment. Isn't this budget really the first of a series of defense cuts planned by the Obama Administration?

Secretary GATES. By our calculations the FY 2010 base budget request is \$533.8B—\$20.5B higher than the \$513.3B enacted for FY 2009. This is an increase of 4%, or about 2.1% after adjusting for inflation (real growth).

Regarding the President's 10-year budget blueprint, it is premature to make any conclusion whether that or any other out-year project will prove to be sufficient for our defense needs. We first must complete and assess the Quadrennial Defense Review to decide what capabilities we really need, and then what funding and savings will enable us to field those capabilities.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Secretary, from my understanding the sole source provider's engine for the F-35 was envisioned as a derivative engine of the F119 engine which is used to power the F-22 aircraft. How much has the Government spent to date in developing this so called derivative engine for the F-35?

Secretary GATES. The F135 is a derivative of the F119 engine and is modified for the F-35 missions and usage. The turbomachinery is approximately 70 percent common with the F119 from a parts and manufacturing processes perspective. The engine's compressor shares the most common parts with F119 although part numbers will be different. The rest of the turbomachinery has commonality through design criteria and manufacturing processes.

Funding for F135 engine development totals approximately \$7.3 billion from FY 1995 through FY 2009. This funding includes all of the design, development, test and delivery of the core F135 engine as well as the Short Take-off and Vertical Landing Lift System components and exhaust systems. It also includes Concept Development Phase propulsion development efforts for the Boeing Joint Strike Fighter concept that was not selected for system design and development.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The Department has halted conversion of GS employees into NSPS, and a pause for review was undertaken at the request of Chairman Skelton and my subcommittee Chairman Ortiz. With the increase in the civilian workforce that the Department's budget calls for, under what system will the new employees be hired?

Secretary GATES. In his letter dated March 16, 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn advised Chairmen Skelton and Ortiz that further conversions of organizations into the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) would be delayed pending the outcome of a comprehensive review of NSPS. However, during the review, those organizations already under NSPS prior to the delay in conversions would continue to operate under NSPS policies and processes. This means processing of normal personnel actions continues for individual employees moving into positions in organizations and functional units now under NSPS. Filling jobs and reclassification of positions are essential tools in helping ensure an organization is successful in meeting mission requirements.

While existing NSPS organizations continue to follow NSPS policies, organizations covered by different human resources (HR) management systems will continue to hire new employees under their respective HR system.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In the last several years, submarine accidents have led the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to have to do unplanned and extensive repair work. Due to mission funding, the Shipyard is not allocated any extra funds to deal with such unanticipated repairs, and must take both workers and funds away from planned work. This impacts Shipyard efficiency, strains a limited budget, and can cause additional overtime. Given that unforeseen incidents will continue to occur, what plans does the Navy have to provide funds and manpower to the Shipyard to allow it to do this emergency repair work without reducing Shipyard efficiency and its budget for scheduled work?

Secretary GATES. The Navy baseline budget does not include allowances for catastrophic events like those that have recently affected USS HARTFORD and USS PORT ROYAL. This would be true in either a mission funded or Navy working capital fund environment. When unforeseen incidents occur that require extraordinary shipyard repair efforts, manpower resources are realigned to the highest priority work and if required, previously scheduled work is deferred. The Navy goes to great lengths to schedule the emergent work to minimize impacts to shipyard efficiency and overtime.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Excerpt from GAO-09-6 15 report-May 2009, MILITARY OPERATIONS Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan: "DOD has reported obligations of about \$1 billion for its Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which enables commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. As troop levels increase, DOD officials expect the program to expand. Although DOD has used CERP to fund projects that it believes significantly benefit the Afghan people, it faces significant challenges in providing adequate management and oversight because of an insufficient number of trained personnel. GAO has frequently reported that inadequate numbers of management and oversight personnel hinders DOD's use of contractors in contingency operations. ... DOD has not conducted an overall workforce assessment to identify how many personnel are needed to effectively execute CERP. Rather, individual commanders determine how many personnel will manage and execute CERP. Personnel at all levels, including headquarters and unit personnel that GAO interviewed after they returned from Afghanistan or who were in Afghanistan in November 2008, expressed a need for more personnel to perform CERP program management and oversight functions." Do you agree with the GAO assessment? What are your plans to address this lack of trained personnel?

Secretary GATES. The Department of Defense partially concurred with the GAO recommendation to require U.S. Central Command to evaluate workforce requirements and ensure adequate staff to administer the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). Since the visit of the GAO assessment team, the Department has added personnel to manage the program full-time. The Department also acknowledged the need to train personnel administering the CERP program. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan has begun work on implementing instructions to enhance selection processes and training programs for personnel administering the program and handling funding. The Department will monitor the situation closely and make adjustments as required. Additionally, the Army has developed CERP training in support of pre-deployment for units and is also putting this training into their school systems.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE

Mr. NYE. Secretary Gates, the "Overview of the DOD Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal" issued by the Department on May 7, included the following statement:

"This budget acknowledges that every taxpayer dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk is a dollar that is not available to care for America's service men and women, to reset the force, to win the wars the Nation is in, or to improve capabilities in areas where the U.S. is underinvested and potentially vulnerable."

In addition, you recently commented before the Air War College that, "These recommendations are less about budget numbers than they are about how the U.S. military thinks about and prepares for the future. Fundamentally, the proposals are about how we think about the nature of warfare. About how we take care of our people. About how we institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term.

About the role of the services, how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.”

Moreover, the Navy currently has more than \$5 billion in unfunded requirements including:

- \$4.6 billion Navy unfunded ship priorities for FY2009
- \$800 million in unfunded military construction and restoration projects at its four existing nuclear-capable shipyards
  - Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard: \$183 million
  - Puget Sound Naval Shipyard: \$208 million
  - Portsmouth Naval Shipyard: \$176 million
  - Norfolk Naval Shipyard: \$224 million
- \$417+ million surface ship maintenance shortfall (FY09)
  - This number has been reported in the news to have doubled. The Navy has yet to confirm this.

In addition, I recently read a disturbing article related to ship maintenance and repair shortfalls. This article was particularly disturbing considering I recently questioned CNO Admiral Roughead, at the annual Navy Posture Hearing in the House Armed Services Committee, who assured me the Navy was taking care of all ship repair and maintenance issues. I submitted the article below for the record and look forward to your response.

*Cash-Strapped Navy Puts Hold on Transfers, Goodwill Visits By Ships \$930 Million Funding Backlog May Affect Service's Readiness*

*(Honolulu Advertiser, May 17, 2009)*

*A cash-strapped Navy has halted 14,000 duty station moves and is reducing by one-third the sailing time of non-deployed ships and cutting back on aviation flight hours and ship visits to U.S. cities to counter a \$930 million ship repair and manpower budget shortfall, officials said. That funding backlog is being addressed by Congress; Sen. Daniel K Inouye, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, on Thursday added \$190 million to a defense supplemental bill.*

*The mid-year funds are intended to pay for repairs to the Pearl Harbor-based cruiser Port Royal, which ran aground in February off Honolulu airport, as well as to fix the submarine Hartford and amphibious ship New Orleans following their collision in March in the Strait of Hormuz. Inouye also increased Navy personnel funding by \$230 million to address a \$350 million manpower-cost shortfall, officials said. The Navy expects to recoup about \$89 million with the duty station freeze, the Navy Times reported*

In the context of these comments, I was particularly disappointed to see that the budget request includes approximately \$76 million for two construction projects to prepare Naval Station Mayport, Florida to become a homeport for a nuclear carrier. I find the inclusion of these funds especially troubling for a number of reasons, and would appreciate your thoughts in response:

On April 10, the Department of Defense announced “that the final decision on whether to permanently homeport an aircraft carrier in Mayport, Florida will be made during the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.” If the homeporting decision is to be made next year, why include funds in the budget that effectively implement the decision? In comparison, you have chosen to push numerous other decisions into the QDR—can you account for the apparently different treatment of this one?

Secretary GATES. MILCON Project P-187, \$46M (Channel Dredging) and MILCON Project P-777, \$30M (Charlie Wharf Repairs) are both programmed for FY10 execution. Neither of these projects begin implementation of homeporting a CVN in Mayport.

In May 09, the Chief of Naval Operations testified that “In FY 2010, the Department will start preparations to make Mayport capable of hosting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. This alternative port will provide a safe haven for an aircraft carrier at sea if a man made or natural disaster closes the Norfolk Naval Base or the surrounding sea approaches.”

P-777 is a critical recapitalization project on the Ammunition Handling Wharf C and does not provide any capability to support CVNs. Wharf C is the primary ammunition loading wharf for all ship classes currently berthed in Mayport. The upgrades to the wharf will make it possible to efficiently and safely conduct ammunition on-loads for all ship types, including large deck amphibious ships such as the LHD and LHA classes.



For Naval Station Mayport to be capable of providing a safe haven for CVN class ships, dredging is required to provide the ability to berth and maneuver without draft or tide restrictions. At present, CVNs can only enter Mayport during high tide and without the air wing and normal stores on board. In order to accommodate unrestricted access of a CVN, a depth of 50' must be provided in accordance with direction from the Program Executive Officer, Aircraft Carriers. MILCON Project P-187, \$46M (Channel Dredging) is programmed for FY10 execution and will dredge the turning basin, entrance channel, and federal channel to the required 50'.

Both P-777 and P-187 are critical projects for Naval Station Mayport missions irrespective of the Homeporting decision.

Mr. NYE. I recently received a letter from SECNAV B.J. Penn, which stated that the sole reason for requesting \$76 million for dredging and pierwork at Mayport was to port a CVN in case of natural or manmade disaster at NAVSTA Norfolk. And Mr. Penn recently stated—during questioning in front of the Armed Services Committee on the Navy's Budget proposal—that in the event of an emergency a CVN would be docked at any available port, including an existing civilian port with sufficient draft depth. If this is the case, why is the Administration requesting \$76 million for dredging and pier-work at Mayport if they can already dock a CVN at a civilian port? Please explain if the Department considered the use of existing civilian ports for temporary emergency purposes instead of making an enormous financial and environmental impact at Mayport?

Secretary GATES. In the event of an emergency, civilian port facilities will likely be in high demand from both commercial and military shipping. The Navy would need assurance that it will be able to berth ships for ammunition loading and maintenance to retain operational capability. Berthing a CVN requires a port that is accessible and free of restrictions to CVN operations, such as liquid loading and aircraft loading in addition to force protection requirements which are standard at naval ports. The short list of East Coast commercial ports and their berthing capabilities and restrictions is classified, and can be provided via the appropriate channels. It is important to note that these ports cannot provide nuclear maintenance facilities and lack many facilities required to support operational requirements.

Mayport could support operational requirements and is only limited by the lack of nuclear maintenance capability. The only existing CVN capable facilities that can provide nuclear maintenance are in the Hampton Roads area.

Dredging in Mayport (at a cost of \$46M in FY10) would provide a military port on the Atlantic Coast in which the U.S. Navy can be assured CVN berthing capability, can provide adequate levels of force protection, and can conduct maintenance with the advantage of not disrupting civilian port loading schedules in the event that Hampton Roads facilities are incapacitated. This would ensure that the U.S. Navy can maintain a level of operational capability in the event that a CVN would need to temporarily berth outside of the Hampton Roads area.

The remaining \$30M for pier work in Mayport is for upgrades to Wharf C. Wharf C is the primary ammunition loading wharf for the 21 ships berthed in Mayport and is degraded. The upgrades to the wharf will make it possible to conduct ammunition onloads for all types of ships including large deck amphibious ships such as the LHD and LHA classes.

Mr. NYE. For example, Baltimore, Maryland, Mobile, Alabama, and several other ports have channels that are deeper than the existing channel to Mayport, so using them may require fewer MILCON dollars and result in fewer environmental impacts. Wouldn't it make more sense to deepen channels and strengthen piers at civilian ports that would see a long-term commercial and economic benefit from the work, such as Corpus Christi, Texas or Mobile, Alabama instead of at Mayport, where no additional commercial shipping traffic would result if the channel were deepened due to its location on the river? That way, if the QDR determined that Mayport should not become a nuclear carrier homeport, the funds would have been put to a use that benefits the economy and the commercial shipping activities of our Nation, rather than digging a 50 foot "trench to nowhere". Considering that the decision to homeport a carrier at Mayport has been deferred, why does the Navy's justification book clearly indicate that future projects at Mayport include a Controlled Industrial Facility, Ship Maintenance Support Facilities, and other construction projects that would only be necessary if a carrier is homeported at Mayport? Are you aware that the Navy has programmed these projects in their future budget plans? If so, please explain the disconnect between the apparent budget planning and decision deferral. It seems to me that the \$76 million is an effort to continue the effort to homeport a CVN at NAVSTA.

Secretary GATES. The use of commercial facilities after a disaster will likely be in high demand and cannot be guaranteed to support Navy requirements. Additionally, these facilities would likely need other upgrades in addition to dredging and

pier strengthening to support a CVN. Naval Station Mayport provides the force protection requirements and the weapons handling ability which are not readily available at commercial facilities. The Navy has evaluated all MILCON requirements to possibly homeport a nuclear powered carrier at Naval Station Mayport and determined the above listed projects would be required to support this effort. Following the QDR review of the Navy's decision to homeport a nuclear powered carrier at Naval Station Mayport, the Navy is prepared to program these requirements in future budgets if required.

Mr. NYE. The dredging project included in the request indicates that work would be completed by January 2011. Considering that the environmental impact analysis conducted by the Navy indicated that the port would become a carrier homeport in 2014, does it make sense to make this investment three years ahead of time?

Secretary GATES. Yes, it does. The Navy currently does not have a CVN-capable facility on the East Coast other than Hampton Roads. By upgrading NAVSTA Mayport, the Navy will have a second military port in which a CVN can berth in case of any emergency or if a catastrophic event occurs in the Hampton Roads area. One of these upgrades is dredging the turning basin, entrance channel and federal channel to a depth of 50 feet. Additionally, there are certain facilities available at NAVSTA Mayport that could be used to maintain a certain level of operational capability for a CVN and ensure the Navy would be able to meet its Title 10 requirements. The dredging project is critical to supporting CVN operations, irrespective of the QDR 2010 Homeporting decision.

The Navy has at least three CVN capable ports on the West coast and should not wait until 2014 to have a second CVN-capable port on the East Coast which can serve as an alternative safe haven.

Mr. NYE. Secretary Gates, we have received numerous indications from within the Department of the Navy that the service intends to utilize the QDR to justify the homeporting of a nuclear carrier at Mayport. Needless to say, these are troubling reports that raise proverbial "cart before the horse"-type questions about the QDR process and whether the review is driving strategy decisions or if desired strategic outcomes are driving the QDR. Given the force structure, strategic impacts, costs to taxpayers, and environmental consequences of the Mayport homeporting decision, will you commit to personally ensuring that the QDR is not used to justify a pre-determined Mayport homeporting decision and that the homeporting decision is made upon a rational evaluation of risk, benefit, and strategic requirements?

Secretary GATES. As I stated in my press release on April 10, 2009, the QDR will assess the need for carrier strategic dispersal in the broad context of future threats, future Navy force structure, and likely cost effectiveness. The DOD will carefully review these potential costs and will assess the potential benefits associated with an additional homeport on the East Coast before committing to any future direction.

Mr. NYE. As the Department's budget overview notes, every taxpayer dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk is a dollar that is not available to care for America's service men and women, to reset the force, to win the wars the Nation is in, or to improve capabilities in areas where the U.S. is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. Please explain why the \$76 million included in the budget request for these projects is not "over-insuring against a remote risk".

Secretary GATES. The \$76 million included in the current budget request is not being used for insurance against a remote or diminished risk. This money is intended to be used to address deteriorating conditions and limiting factors which prevent the full execution of current naval assets and the most effective use of Naval Station Mayport. These improvements are unrelated to a decision to make Mayport a homeport for a nuclear aircraft carrier.

The \$76 million is to establish for two different projects. First, \$46 million will be used to dredge the turning basin, entrance channel and federal channel to the required 50 feet to allow access for a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN). The requirement for dredging the Mayport channel and turning basin will remain regardless of the outcome of the carrier homeport decision. Navy CVNs currently make use of Mayport in normal operations. However, the water depth at Mayport places serious restrictions on these operations. CVNs can only enter Mayport during high tide and without the air wing and normal stores on board. The dredging at Mayport is designed to remove these restrictions as soon as possible.

Second, the remaining \$30 million will fund Charlie Wharf repairs. Charlie Wharf is Mayport's primary weapons loading wharf. It is also the primary wharf for berthing visiting big decks (including carriers, amphibians, and ammo ships). Mayport has 21 homeported ships and regularly supports ten or more visiting ships, which requires all the berthing areas available. Charlie Wharf has an old and deteriorating bulkhead, which has lost 75% of its thickness in places and immediate repairs are needed. Load limits are in place on certain areas of the wharf which impact the abil-

ity to perform missions. Upgrading this wharf is necessary whether or not the Navy plans to berth a CVN in Mayport.

Mr. NYE. In testimony before this committee, Admiral Stavridis, commander of U.S. Southern Command, testified that he had no role in making the Mayport homeporting decision. Based upon the Secretary of Defense's actions, there is a commitment to reform of our military requirements processes, jointness, institutionalizing support for the warfighter, and ensuring that our combatant commanders have input into critical decisions. In this case, many of us believe that the homeporting of smaller ship assets at Mayport would better support SOUTHCOM's regional engagements than an aircraft carrier. Will you commit to ensuring that the combatant commanders have a role in the carrier homeporting decision making process?

Secretary GATES. Yes. All Combatant Commands (COCOMs) have the opportunity to influence Service-led decisions, such as the decision to homeport a carrier in Mayport. Venues for influence vary and range from submitting an Integrated Priority List (IPL) to quarterly Defense Senior Leadership Conferences, which are chaired by Secretary of Defense and include all COCOMs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and various other key members. COCOM requirements for all assets are usually addressed through the Global Force Management Process, which balances requirements against resources. We are continuing to study this decision with the Services and COCOMs through the Quadrennial Defense Review.



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speak with Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson prior to testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2010 National Defense Authorization Budget Request in Washington, D.C., May 14, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 339-09  
May 15, 2009

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### Defense Department Announces Proposed Rule Changes to Military Commissions

The President has determined to reform military commissions as an available forum, along with the federal courts, for the prosecution of detainees at Guantanamo.

As part of that, the secretary of defense will be sending to Congress several changes to the rules for military commissions. These rule changes do not require a change in law, but the law does require that DoD gives Congress 60 days' notice before the rules are implemented. DoD believes these rule changes will improve the process. The effect of these proposed rule changes are:

- Statements obtained using interrogation methods that constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment will no longer be admitted as evidence at a trial.
- Limits use of hearsay. For hearsay, shifts the burden of proof to the party who offers it. The burden is no longer on the party who objects to hearsay to disprove its reliability; the burden is now on party who offers it to prove its reliability.
- To permit the accused greater latitude in selecting his defense counsel.
- To provide greater protections for the accused who refuses to testify. Current practice permits the judge to instruct the jury that it may consider the fact that the accused refused to testify and subject himself to cross-examination if he offers his own prior hearsay statements. This practice would be eliminated.
- Jurisdiction. The rule changes would codify existing practice that military commissions judges may establish the jurisdiction of their own courts. Under prior practice, jurisdiction for a military commission to hear a case was established by a prior Combatant Status Review Tribunal.

In the pending military commissions cases, the government will also seek an additional 120-day continuance of the cases, while the rule changes are reviewed by Congress, and the administration continues to develop its legislative proposals.

*\*Continuance date corrected on 15 May 2009.*



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### Dedication of the Defense Humanitarian Relief Corridor (Washington, D.C.)

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Alright Mike [Rhodes]. At Camp Leatherneck, I was introduced as Bill Gates. I said, "He's the rich one." Thank you all for joining us.

Given that so much of the history being cited today is related to inclement weather, it seems appropriate that the effort to commemorate that history began with a "snowflake." Four years ago, Secretary Rumsfeld proposed having a corridor of the Pentagon that would pay tribute to the humanitarian activities of the United States armed forces. Mr. Secretary, it was a great idea, and thank you so much for joining us today. Let me commend Ms. Betty Brennan and her team for bringing Secretary Rumsfeld's vision to fruition.

The U.S. military is the greatest fighting force in the world – but there is another side to what they do. That side is represented in this exhibit. The suffering caused by war and natural disaster prompts a compassionate nation to respond. These vivid displays take us around the world, and back in time, to understand more about the relief operations of our military. Some of these missions of mercy have been carried out on foreign soil; others here in the United States. Some are legendary; many more deserve to be.

"Legendary" certainly describes the Berlin Airlift of 1948 and 1949, one of the earliest events depicted in this corridor. We are lucky to have a veteran of that operation with us today, Colonel Gail Halvorsen, whom I will introduce shortly. He was part of the team flying C-47s, C-54s, and C-74s into Tempelhof airport around the clock during those famous 462 days, as Soviet forces choked off the city's food and energy supplies. That effort saved the lives of Berliners. We remember, too, that it cost the lives of 31 American servicemen.

In 1956, Hungarian men, women, and children streamed westward toward the Austrian border as Soviet tanks and attack planes pummeled Budapest. With us today are former refugees who were part of that exodus, many of whom were helped by the U.S. military after being forced to flee their own country. We welcome them and we honor the memory of those who tried to liberate Hungary from Soviet communism.

The scale and scope of these missions has widened over the decades. Our servicemen and women have responded to natural disasters on our own shores, from forest fires and blizzards to Hurricane Katrina, and have gone to every corner of the globe in the wake of tsunamis, earthquakes, mudslides, and floods. In all of these missions the military plays an important role – not necessarily in the lead, but in support of and partnership with the civilian

agencies of our government. Today's broad range of activities requires close cooperation between civil and military institutions, whether we are talking about a hospital ship, the *USNS Comfort*, which has provided health care to thousands of people in Latin America and the Caribbean, or civil affairs teams in eastern Africa.

As these wall panels attest, it is not just fancy technology and lift capacity that make these operations possible. It is also the resourcefulness of these men and women: their desire to make something good and decent happen even amid situations of chaos and destruction. No one exemplifies this better than a pilot who earned not just one but three nicknames from grateful German children. They called Gail Halvorsen "The Candy Bomber," "the Chocolate Flier," and my personal favorite, "Uncle Wiggly Wings." After he speaks, we will all get a chance to see his handiwork from 61 years ago, the delivery system he cleverly devised, so that Berlin's children could snatch sweets from out of the sky. Colonel Halvorsen lifted everyone's morale during those tense days of the Berlin Airlift. And it is my pleasure to introduce him to you now.

Ladies and gentlemen, Colonel Halvorsen.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES


PHOTOS AT DEDICATION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF CORRIDOR

May 19, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, and Mike Rhodes, acting director, Administration and Management, greet Retired U.S. Army Air Force Col. Gail Halvorsen, right, prior to the dedication of the Defense Humanitarian Relief Corridor in the Pentagon, May 19, 2009. During the Berlin Airlift, Halvorsen earned the nickname the "Candy Bomber" for his habit of dropping candy-laden parachutes from his aircraft to Berlin children.

*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks during a dedication ceremony of the Defense Humanitarian Relief Corridor in the Pentagon, May 19, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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## House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Holds Hearing on the Defense Department

### LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES

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MURTHA:

The committee will come to order.

We will hold an open hearing on fiscal year 2010 Department of Defense budget request.

As the members of the committee are aware, we have held a very robust hearings schedule. This is the 32nd of 35 hearings this year. That includes Defense Subcommittee hearings as well as those of the Select Intelligence Oversight Committee.

I would also note this is an historic day, the first time that this room has been used for hearings.

So, Mr. Secretary, Chairman, you're the first -- first to use this room.

We're pleased to welcome all three of you to the committee. We intend to work with you on your very vigorous schedule that you have set up.

Stop-loss -- a very interesting thing in stop-loss, had to fight with the Army. They didn't want it. They argued with me. You stepped in, and we got stop-loss started, and we can intend to continue stop-loss.. And we got a glowing letter from the White House saying they supported what we were trying to do, and this committee feels very strongly that if a person was extended -- and the first thing you said when you said when you became secretary,



you came before the committee, you said you wanted to stop stop-loss. Well, you weren't able to stop it, but at least we're going to give -- give money to the people who were extended in what I consider a draft.

Outsourcing -- the committee understands outsourced positions cost \$44,000 more than comparable civilian positions. Last year, we put \$5 billion in the budget for -- to cut contracting out. We put \$1 billion for -- for direct hiring. We know you're moving in that direction, and we appreciate -- we appreciate what's happening.

Acquisition reform is going to be much more difficult. The Congress itself cut a lot of money out of -- out of numbers of people in acquisition. We know that's hurt, and we know it's -- it's a real problem for -- for you, and we want to work with you trying to get as much as we can and get it up to speed as quick as we can.

Now I met just-- just yesterday with a contractor who was handling tires. This is Michelin hiring all of -- they -- they decide who gets the tire contracts. It looked very fair. I can't argue with the way they were doing it. But it cost us a lot more, and we hope that next time you'll be able to do this in house, you won't have to go to a contractor in order -- in order to do that.

Since last year, we have seen a significant change in national security forces -- focus in the United States, and -- and we have a new president, and we look forward to working with the administration on Iraq and Afghanistan and the rest of the world.

So we appreciate your coming before the committee, Mr. -- Mr. Gates, Chief, and the comptroller.

I'll turn to Mr. Young for any comments he may have.

YOUNG:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I want to add my welcome to Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and Secretary Hale.

We appreciate your being here today, realizing that you have an awful lot of work to do, but I think meeting with this committee is a very important part of your work because, as you know by now, you have no better friends on Capitol Hill than the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. We remain committed to ensuring that our military men and women have the equipment they need, funding and support for training, and whatever is needed to carry out their mission and do so safely.,

Mr. Secretary, you and your staff have described this budget as a reform budget, and as we look at some of the major decisions, it's -- it's easy to see why. The termination of many troubled programs, such as the presidential helicopter, major parts of the Army's Future Combat System, and the advanced communication satellite, TSAT, just to name a few, shows that you are dedicated and committed to reform.

However, with only 2 percent real growth, even less if you consider the shift of funds from the supplemental to the base budget, I'm not sure how much real progress we're going to be able to make, especially as we look at other agencies and see double digit percentage increases. Further, the lack of a five-year plan hampers our ability to review this request for the reform budget it's supposed to be.

While we understand the importance of the QDR, the combination of a late budget submission and no outyear data, while not unusual

for the first year of a new administration, makes our job a little more difficult. Despite these challenges, the subcommittee will continue to work with you in a true bipartisan fashion to make sure that we have the necessary resources available to you to accomplish your mission.

Further, I appreciate your commitment to our men and women in uniform and your willingness to make the difficult decisions included in this request, something that is not always easy in this environment.

So welcome. I look forward to your comments and your testimony, and I commit to continuing to work with you in a support role as we work through your Fiscal Year 2010 budget.

Thank you very much for being here.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OBEY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I don't have any comments on -- on the year's coming budget. I do just want to make one observation about the supplemental, and I hope that you and the administration understand that the number of votes that were cast against the supplemental last week, I think, significantly understate the concern that a lot of people have in Congress about events in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I think that virtually all of us understand the desirability of trying to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and my

comments should not be seen in any way as questioning the, quote, "policy decisions" that the administration is making in that arena. What I do have substantial doubt about is the capacity of the Afghan government and the Pakistani government to -- to demonstrate that they are useful tools in leading to the stabilization of those two countries.

I -- I do not -- I do not in any way want to see the Congress impose deadlines or timelines or conditions on the use of the money that we've appropriated for the last year, but I do think we have a right, as the legislation does as it left the House, to lay out certain standards of conduct -- or rather standards of performance that -- that both governments should be meeting in order to justify continued support.

It just seems to me that the American taxpayers have a right when they're pumping this much money in and when so many of their sons and daughters are being committed in the area. I think they have a right to -- to expect that over the next year, we will see some significant progress in the focus, determination, coherence, and sense of purpose of both of those governments.

So I hope that -- I don't want to -- I don't think it's wise for us to be in a position of lecturing either government, but I also believe that they need to understand that the patience of the American public is not inexhaustible, and if they expect us to continue this effort, they need to show a sense of purpose and a sense of unity, which heretofore they've not demonstrated.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

Mr. Lewis?

LEWIS:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Comptroller Hale, welcome to what is a very, very important beginning of -- of your season.

To say the least, the pressure within the Congress from my perspective to -- to raise significant appropriations budgets in every other piece of government and to put the lid on -- on your funding is a challenge that's very real. Frankly, I feel that Secretary Gates' appointment should be encouraging to all of us who care about really impacting that future and maintaining this priority. In the meantime, as we go to questions, Mr. Chairman, when we get to it, I have a major program I'd like to discuss, but I'll wait until then.

Thank you.

MURTHA:

Mr. Secretary, if you'll summarize your statement, and Admiral and Comptroller, and we'll -- without objection, we'll put your full statements in the record.

GATES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Representative Young, Chairman Obey, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to discuss the details of the president's Fiscal Year 2010 Defense budget.

There's a lot of material here, and I know you have a lot of questions, so I'll keep my opening remarks brief and focus on the strategy and thinking behind many of these recommendations. As you suggested, my submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions.

First and foremost, as Mr. Young indicated, this is a reform budget, reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world now and in the future.

I was recently in Afghanistan. As we increase our presence there and refocus our efforts with a new strategy, I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and to come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders unvarnished and unscripted has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source of ideas on what the department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job. Now it's time for us in Washington to do ours.

GATES; In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with troops and commanders and all that I've learned over the past two and a half years, all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives; first, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset. -- as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of this business right, none of the other

decisions will matter; second, to rebalance the department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, making a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for F.Y. '10, a 4 percent increase over the F.Y. '09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2 percent one (ph) real growth.

In addition, the department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture, especially during a time of war. I believe that it is.

Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict on so many occasions and slashed defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch.

This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable

over the long term, that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

As you know this year, we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process, as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars, and also to create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for this department.

This budget aims to alter many programs and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind the decisions.

First, sustainability. By that I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years.

We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than a half-a-trillion dollars. And I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and Congress to Congress. Eliminating waste, ending requirements creep, terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.



Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the ones we have traditionally been best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources.

As I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built on land, at sea and in the air to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

And finally, there are the lessons learned from the last eight years on the battlefield and, perhaps just as importantly, institutionally at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department, first and foremost, is to fight and win the nation's wars, not just constantly prepare for them. We have to do both. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve, and this budget makes headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of war and prepares for the future; about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter in the long term; about the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight; about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs and instead at the full range of what we're trying to do, at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum. A dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from capability that we do need, often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform, and we look forward to your questions.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE)

MULLEN:

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Young, Mr. Obey, Mr. Lewis, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Let me start off by saying I fully support not only the president's fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this department, but more specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it. He presided over a comprehensive and collaborative process, the likes of which, quite frankly, I have not seen in more than a decade of doing this sort of work in the Pentagon.

Over the course of several months and a long series of meetings and debates, every service chief and every combatant commander had a voice, and every single one of them used it.

Now, normally, budget proposals are worked from the bottom up, with each service making the case for specific programs and then fighting it out at the end to preserve those that are most important to them. This proposal was done from the top down.

Secretary Gates gave us broad guidance, his overall vision, and then he gave us the opportunity to meet it. Everything was given a fresh look, and everything had to be justified. Decisions to curtail or eliminate a program were based solely on its relevance and on its execution.

The same can be said for those we decided to keep. And I can tell you this: none of the final decisions were easy, but all of them are vital to our future. It has been said that we are what we buy. I really believe that.

And I also believe that the force we are asking you to help us buy today is the right one, both for the world we're living in and the world we may find ourselves living in 20 to 30 years down the road.

This submission before you is just as much a strategy as it is a budget. And let me tell you why I believe that.

First, it makes people our top strategic priority. I have said many times, and remain convinced, the best way to guarantee our future security is to support our troops and their needs and the needs of their families.

MULLEN:

It is the recruit and retain choices of our members and their families -- and, quite frankly, the American citizens writ large -- that will make or break the all-volunteer force. They will be less inclined to make those decisions should we not be able to offer them viable career options, adequate health care, suitable housing, advanced education and the promise of a prosperous life long after they've taken off the uniform.

This budget devotes more than a third of the total request to what I would call the "people account," with the great majority of that figure, nearly \$164 billion, going to military pay and health care. When combined with what we plan to devote to upgrading and modernizing family housing and facilities, the total comes to \$187 billion, \$11 billion more than we asked for last year. And almost all of that increase will go to family support programs.

I'm particularly proud of the funds we've dedicated to caring for our wounded. There is, in my view, no higher duty for this nation or for those of us in leadership positions than to care for those who sacrificed so much and who must now face lives forever changed by wounds both seen and unseen. I know you share that feeling, and I thank you for the work you have done in this committee and throughout the Congress to pay attention and support these needs.

And I would add to that the families of the fallen. Our commitment to them must be for the remainder of those lives. That's why this budget allocates funds to complete the construction of additional wounded warrior complexes, expands the pilot program designed to expedite the processing of injured troops through the disability evaluation system, increases the number of mental health professionals assigned to deployed units, and devotes more resources to the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries.

After nearly eight years of war, we're the most capable and combat-experienced military we've ever been -- certainly, without question, the world's best counterinsurgency force. Yet for all this success, we are pressed and still lack a proper balance between OPTEMPO and home tempo, between COIN capabilities and

conventional capabilities, between readiness today and readiness tomorrow.

And that, Mr. Chairman, is the second reason this budget of ours acts as a strategy for the future. It seeks balance by investing more heavily in critical enablers, such as aviation, special forces, cyber operations, civil affairs and language skills. It rightly makes winning the wars we are in our top operational priority.

By adjusting active Army BCT growth to 45, it helps ensure our ability to impact the fight sooner, increase dwell time and reduce overall demand on equipment. And by authorizing Secretary Gates to transfer money to the secretary of state for reconstruction, security or stabilization, it puts more civilian professionals alongside warfighters in more places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having just returned from a trip to Afghanistan, I can attest to the critical need for more civilian capacity. I was shocked to learn there are only 13 U.S. civilian development experts in all of southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban movement is strongest and the local economy is almost entirely dependent on opium production. We have twice that many working in the relatively peaceful Kurdish region of northern Iraq.

I've said it before, but it bears repeating. More boots on the ground are important, but they are not the complete answer. We need people with slide rules and shovels and teaching degrees, bankers and farmers and law enforcement experts.

As we draw down responsibly in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we need a more concerted effort to build up the capacity of our partners.

The same can be said of Pakistan, where boots on the ground aren't even an option, where helping the Pakistani forces help themselves is truly our best and only recourse.

Some will argue this budget devotes too much money to these sorts of low-intensity needs, that it tilts dangerously away from conventional capabilities. It does not.

A full 35 percent of this submission is set aside for modernization, and much of that will go to what we typically consider conventional requirements. We know there are global risks and threats out there not tied directly to the fight against al Qaida and other extremist groups, and we're going to be ready for them.

In all this, Mr. Chairman, we are also working hard to fix a flawed procurement process. More critically, in my view, the nation is getting the military it needs for the challenges we face today, and the ones we will likely face tomorrow.

Thank you and this committee for your continued support of that important work and for all you do to support the men and women of the United States military and their families.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE)

HALE:

I don't have a prepared statement.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE) Secretary Gates. But I'm not going to ask you any questions.

I just want to say about this presidential helicopter, if it's true it's going to cost us \$555 million, which is 5,000 man-hours at \$100,000 a year, I think we have to relook at the first phase of that. And I hope we can work together in some form to come up with a helicopter to not only take care of the president, but take care of that very vital need.

Mr. Obey?

OBEY:

On the presidential helicopter, I've spent quite a bit of time reviewing the options. And I think there are some good options that should be available to the president and the president's party. And I'm hopeful that we can work out something that will accommodate the needs and the financial requirements. And Mr. Murtha and I have spent a lot of time talking with each other on this subject, and it is an important subject.

But I want to ask you today, specifically about missile defense. And the reason I do is because of the latest firing of the longer range missile by Iran, and Ahmadinejad's continuing rhetoric about threats to our friends and allies in the region.

And I note that the missile defense budget would be reduced somewhat, which I think maybe doesn't put us in as strong a case for the booster phase launches. But, so, that's something that we will work on.

OBEY:

But I want to go to the issue of our radar sites and our interceptor sites in Europe, specifically in the Czech Republic and in Poland. I understand now that, based on some of the comments from the

administration, that the parliaments of both countries are considering whether or not to proceed with the agreement that we thought we had, in view of maybe that they have a question about what our intentions really are.

So talk to us a little bit about that missile site, the radar and the interceptors in Europe that would be very, very important not only to our friends and allies but to American troops deployed in that region.

GATES:

I'd be happy to.

With (ph) the money out for the third site and the F.Y. '10 budget because we have enough money left over for this purpose in the '09 budget to be able to cover any potential costs to go ahead and begin construction on both the radars and the interceptors, the radars in the Czech Republic and the interceptors in Poland.

As I'm sure you know the Czech government that agreed to the radars has fallen and the opposition -- and they're going to have an election I guess this summer or this fall. They have to, under the statutes, pass by the Congress both the Czech Republic and Poland have to pass both a status of forces agreement and agreements on the sites before any money can be sent on construction.

And so depending on how the Czech election comes out, we will see how that goes. There is considerable interest, I would say, in the administration in pursuing the third site but I would say there is also great interest which, frankly, I've been working on for two years to see if we can partner with the Russians and make this, in



effect, a quadrupartite effort of Poland, the Czech Republic, the Russians and ourselves.

The reality is that radar is located in Russia. Supplementing those in the Czech Republic would give additional capability to the sites in Europe. So we have money, we need to see what the Czech Republic does in their elections and I might add that in parallel with Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department of Defense is carrying out a Missile Defense Review that will address the role of the third site in the overall program.

So, I think we've got the money and we just need to see how the politics in Eastern Europe goes.

OBEY:

Mr. Secretary, I understand those issues and I think that you're approaching them in the proper way. On the statement by Ahmadinejad on their missile fire, he said it was a very successful flight and that it hit the target exactly as they intended. Can you comment on that whether that is accurate, whether it was a successful flight?

GATES:

The information that I have read indicates that it was a successful flight test. The missile will have a range of approximately 200 to 2,500 kilometers. Because of some of the problems they've had with their engines, we think at least at this stage of the testing, it's probably closer to the lower end of that range. Whether it hit the target that it was intended for, I have not seen any information on that. I don't know if the admiral's...

OBEY:

Well, thank you very much.

And in view of our limited time available, a lot of questions on shipbuilding, aircraft production, tankers, a lot of important issues but I know that other members want to talk about some of those issues. So, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.

MURTHA:

Mr. Dicks?

DICKS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary, good to see you again. Washington State's still out there, I want you to know.

Admiral, good to see you.

And, Mr. Hale.

On the presidential helicopter, you know, this decision -- I hadn't been involved in this program and hadn't followed it. The only question that I have is that it appears that there was a certain amount of money that's been spent, around \$3 billion, and we developed a number of helicopters that didn't have the full capability that the final helicopters were going to be.

Is there any way to salvage those first four or five helicopters and use them for some purpose?

GATES:

Those helicopters, if we completed them, first of all, they have relatively limited lifespan, 10 years, something like that. The current helicopters have a lifespan of about -- a useful lifespan of 30 to 40 years.

There is minimum capacity on the new, on the Increment 1 helicopters, to add capabilities. So even if you bought those helicopters, you would almost immediately have to begin a new helicopter program to begin addressing the requirements that the White House has had that were posited under the previous administration.

Now I would just tell you that, first of all, those helicopters amortized would be about a billion dollars a piece. And I just, you've heard the president speak on this. The reality is in some respects those new Increment 1 helicopters have less capability than the current helicopter. With 10 passengers, the VH-71 has only 55 percent of the range of the VH-3, the existing helicopter.

DICKS:

Would the gentleman yield?

GATES:

I yield.

DICKS:

How could we get this far? How could we spend all this taxpayers' money and now finally decide that it has less capability than the other helicopter?

GATES:

Well, the first increment of five or six were intended as an increment leading to the second increment which would have all of the new capabilities. To complete the program through the second increment -- first of all, it's already six years overdue but it would cost \$13 billion to finish it out. So the first increment was never intended to have the capabilities and meet the full requirements that the second increment would.

But the truth of the matter is, Mr. Chairman, is that this program is a poster child for an acquisition process gone seriously wrong.

DICKS:

So what do we do? Are we just going to use the existing helicopters and...

GATES:

No. Our plan, the -- first of all, we have programs under way to extend the life of the current presidential helicopters. And the termination cost of the VH-71 plus the cost of additional life extension which would actually take these helicopters for another decade or more, is \$1.2 billion.

And our intent is immediately to sit down with White House and look at the requirements and come up with a new program that will be reasonable and meet the requirements. And I will tell you one of the ideas that I heard this morning that I think is worth pursuing is that what we may have tried to do in this VH-71 is put too many -- too high a requirements on a single kind of aircraft in terms of protections and the number of passengers and so on and so forth.

So one idea is that you look at two different helicopters, that you look at one that the president basically uses here in town to go do Andrews and on regular trips in the United States and things like that and an escape helicopter that has different kinds of capabilities and that perhaps could be a modified kind of helicopter that we use now in combat.

So we're going to be looking at a lot of different ideas on how we can get this program back on track, get a presidential helicopter program back into the budget and get the president and his successors, helicopters within a reasonable period of time.

DICKS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we got a limited time so I want to make sure everybody gets a chance.

MURTHA:

Mr. Secretary, I lined up 13 people, two from the White House telling them, why does this cost this much? It's the White House that put this requirement on from the former administration. They said, well, we'll push it over to the Obama Administration. But it's going to cost more than \$1.3 billion you can be assured because I've never seen an estimate yet that didn't cost a lot more.

So I wish you'd really look at the present money we've spent and see if we can't adapt something to that.

Mr. Lewis?

LEWIS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Mullen, you and I have communicated a bit about the priority that this committee feels are challenges in Pakistan. Our initial communications suggested that the administration was on the right track; that is, they're asking for redirection of funding to Pakistan to help stabilize that government.

The administration's direction, I thought was appropriate. The '10 decisions made by this committee would take us off that course. That is, for '10 they'd have money going to Pakistan handled through the State Department. I'd like to have both the secretary and Admiral Mullen give us the administration view on this for the record in this committee hearing.

GATES:

The proposal that we have put forward for this, if you're speaking about the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund...

LEWIS:

I am.

GATES:

... which was \$400 million in the '09 supplemental and our request is for \$700 million in the '10 budget. What we have proposed is that it be voted in the '09 supplemental as a Department of Defense fund but obviously with a dual key with the secretary of State.

For '10, we have proposed -- the basic problem here is that State lacks the authorities and the capacity to implement this program. So what we've suggested because of concern in the House Foreign Affairs committee and elsewhere is that for F.Y. '10, the money be

directed to the State Department as a pass-through to Department of Defense. But at least the money would come through the State Department.

And our hope would be that it would come through without restrictions so we have maximum flexibility and agility as we do when we implement these programs and that it doesn't become subject to all of the restrictions and so on of the Foreign Assistance Act and so on and so forth.

Then in '11, we would hope that during '10 the Congress and the State Department could work together to make sure the State Department had the authorities and the capacity to implement this program but the idea would be that beyond '10, this program would increasingly be run through the State Department in partnership with us. And we still anticipate that a substantial part of the money would come to us just because of the nature of the projects but this would allow for the State Department to basically receive the money.

LEWIS:

Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN:

If I could just add, I think one of the most important parts of this in a bridge strategy to get to that point is speed of execution. And I think, Mr. Obey, to your point earlier about both visibility and understanding the American people, we have in DOD mechanisms to put this money to work right away.

And in Pakistan, there is I believe there's a requirement for patience on the part of us in dealing with them. And yet I know

there are in many places strong feelings that we've got to get moving quickly.

So what we ask for, what the secretary laid out, is a strategy to be able to execute as quickly as possible on the ground and the vast majority of this money is military money. And keeping that in mind, is what makes me think that you know this strategy that Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates had worked out is the right strategy.

LEWIS:

Well, it occurs to me as we go forward towards conference following regular order, we're going to really want to have your help paying careful attention to the language that actually ends up being in conference regarding this matter. I personally believe it is a Defense matter and State Department, as of this moment, at least doesn't have the capacity to follow through. So I agree with your statement.

MULLEN:

Where's (ph) the authority?

LEWIS:

Yes. Moving to one more question. The Kinetic Energy Interceptor, as you know, KEI, the program's been terminated in the F.Y. '10 budget and the Missile Defense Agency is moving fast to shut it down. In fact, a stop-work order was issued on May 11th, '09 for the program.

I'm told that they will immediately begin the termination process and the program will be de-staffed by July. In partnership with the



Department of Defense, Congress has supported the requested budgets for KEI. In past years, Congress went beyond that and requested and provided the department with additional dollars to accelerate this critical Boost-Phase capability.

In total, the department has expended more than \$1 billion towards this effort to date in providing the nation with a technically viable solution to boost and ascent engagement of a ballistic missile targeted at our country or at our troops. Six years of development and testing with most of the more \$1 billion of funding spent to date, was to accommodate in the first booster flight in the fall of '09, less than five months from now.

With the issuance of the stop-work order, the department is walking away from this investment without benefit of knowing what the technology has to offer. Why would the department kill a program four months before its booster flight? Why not allow the program to execute the F.Y. '09 funds?

GATES:

Actually, this is one decision that I can't take credit for. The Missile Defense Agency itself last fall during the Bush Administration essentially eliminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor from its F.Y. '10 POM. And the reasons for that are as follows.

GATES:

First of all, this was to have been a five-year development program and it now looks like it's about a 16-year development program. As you suggest, there's not been a single flight test. There are a couple of more static tests, as I understand it, that have to be taken -- have to take place before a test of the booster.

There's been little work on the third stage or the kill vehicle, which are obviously critical.

But a big part of the problem with this program is that it needs to be close to the launch site to be able to be effective, and so it has - - the only potential country where it could have a role with some confidence would be North Korea. It has poor capability against Iran and virtually no capability against either Russia or Chinese launch facilities. And so you have a very limited capability here at -- at considerable cost.

The other problem that we have is we don't know what to put it on. The missile's 38 or 39 feet long. It weighs 12 tons. There is no extant ship that we can put it on. We would have to design a new ship to put it on. And -- and, as I say, it would have to operate in close proximity to the territorial waters of these countries.

So, for all these reasons, the -- the decision has been made that -- that this is not a productive way to -- to look at the booster problem.

General Cartwright and I were here on the Hill this morning talking to several senators about this program, and the -- and the fact is we have a very strong and very capable terminal phase missile defense, and it's getting better, and this budget devotes a lot of money to that program and to -- to make it even more robust. We have a strong ground-based interceptor program in Alaska and California, the midcourse intercept program, and we're going to keep funding the development of that to keep improving that capability.

The boost phase is really the hardest, and that's because we have to get -- you either have to have an extremely powerful beam or

you have to be fairly close to the source of the launch, and -- and, frankly, some of these programs and the airborne laser is another example where the -- where the technology is lagging very far beyond what were decisions to go ahead with an operational concept and a procurement program.

We basically got way -- on the boost phase, we got way out in front of our headlights in terms of going forward with a procurement program before we really had mastered the technology, and so we have a number of programs -- one of the reasons I'm keeping the first -- the prototype airborne laser is to keep working the directed energy kind of solution to the boost phase program, but -- but, overall, all these things considered -- I think that's why the Missile Defense Agency made this decision actually last fall.

(UNKNOWN)

Well, Mr. Secretary, the chairman has already expressed the reality that -- that a billion dollars here, a billion dollars there -- sometimes it gets very expensive. In this program area, we've seen the department go in several directions over a reasonably short period of time, and the taxpayers' monies have been spent in the meantime. So I would hope that you'd recognize that the committee does have some priority on this item and -- and want to hear more from you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

Mr. Visclosky?

VISCLOSKY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much.

And, as Mr. Young indicated, I have a number of areas of concern that, as questions are answered for the record, I would be focused on. One is the Joint Strike Fighter alternative engine. The other are your shipbuilding programs.

But, for this afternoon, I have two questions for you, Mr. Secretary. The first is on acquisition program costs. Although the Department of Defense is required by law to conduct an independent cost estimate on major acquisition programs, these programs can be funded to lower confidence levels of the estimates presumably to fit more programs within a given year's request.

Recent examples of programs that have not been funded to full independent cost estimates include the DDG-1000 program, the Joint Strike Fighter, the Advance Extremely High Frequency Satellite program, the CVN-21 aircraft carrier, the VH-71 helicopter that has been spoken about. When the inevitable cost growth is realized, it creates ripples throughout the rest of the budget, and somewhere monies have to be shifted to pay for the growth. Funding these major acquisition programs for their full cost estimates from their inception might as the alternative go a long way to creating more stability in the budget.

In the manager's statement for the Fiscal Year 2009 bill, this committee asked for a report, and the department was forthcoming. The department indicated that in 2004, only 13 of 29 major acquisition programs were funded to the independent cost estimate level. My question is: Do you not find the disruption

caused by these faulty estimates -- and there's been a protracted conversation this afternoon on one of those -- to be much more severe than the constraints you would face if you had hopefully more accurate cost estimates going forward, even though they might be higher?

GATES:

Well, I think that -- let me respond, and then -- and then the admiral who has probably more direct experience with this sort of thing than I do. I think this is really one of the focuses of the -- of the acquisition reform, both the bills here in the Congress and -- and our efforts in the department itself, and I think one of the -- one of the innovations in the legislation that is moving is -- is to get at the question of better cost estimates and more reliable cost estimates along the lines that you're describing.

MULLEN:

I-- I have been on both ends of this problem, both if you -- just if you talk about the 13 of 24 programs, and I don't know what that list is right now. But I've see programs that have been, I think, funded to the full estimate and, in act, sometimes that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy because it was -- because that estimate was out there, we figure out a way to spend that money. I've also seen programs that were unfunded below the full cost estimate in order to put pressure on them.

And -- and so that's to say for me there's no magic bullet here about just getting the cost estimate right. I think it's the totality of the acquisition approach that's got to be taken into effect -- taking into consideration, which include accurate cost estimates, holding people accountable once we get to a point where we agree this is

what the cost should be, holding requirements down which has a tendency to make cost estimates, whatever they are, whether they're underestimated or fully estimated, explode, and -- and it -- it speaks of the need to the -- the entire requirements process as well as getting at all of acquisitions.

There are examples on every end of the spectrum here, but the need to get good cost estimates and properly assess risk in programs at the right time is absolutely critical.

HALE:

Can I add just one thought to that?

VISCLOSKY:

Yes, sir.

HALE:

I can assure you that we see the Cost Analysis Improvement Group numbers, such as the intended group you're referring to, in all cases. So they do enter the debate, and they are fully considered, and as a comptroller, I'll be sure that continues to happen in the future.

VISCLOSKY:

Gentlemen, thank you.

My final question relates to my service on another subcommittee, and that is the Energy Subcommittee along with Mr. Frelinghuysen. As you know, we have jurisdiction over the NNSA and the nuclear weapons program. That budget for the weapons

programs is about \$6.3 billion, and, obviously, we have found proliferation.

For Fiscal Year '08 and Fiscal Year '09, we have been adamant that before the Department of Energy that does not have a stellar track record as far as managing major construction projects goes down the road as far as reconfiguring the complex, we would want to have a strategy in place formulated by yourselves, the intelligence community, the Department of Energy, as far as the proposed use of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, non-kinetic means to protect ourselves going forward, realizing that the world changes every day.

The point of that is before we would provide monies for the Department of Energy, we would want to know a strategy and then the types and numbers of nuclear weapons that fit the strategy you determine, which would then lead us to make sounder financial decisions for DEO -- Department of Energy, I'm sorry.

The concern I have is Defense doesn't pay for that complex over at Energy, and I'm just wondering where you are with that strategy. I know you have the Nuclear Posture Review coming, but I -- I must tell you, Mr. Secretary, I'm not just looking for that annual report, if you would, but some confidence before we start down that road with the Department of Energy that there is a sense of the strategy in the world we exist in today and some discernible decisions -- you made some very difficult decisions on programs already at Defense as to what are those weapons types, what are their numbers, so then -- and -- and we'd be happy to proceed with DEO -- Department of Energy, I'm sorry.

GATES:

Well, I think that, as you suggest, the -- the key here in terms of the administration having an overall longer-term strategy is...

VISCLOSKY:

And -- I might just parenthetically -- and not for the Obama administration any more than we asked for for the Bush administration, but one...

GATES:

I understand that.

VISCLOSKY:

... as a government we would proceed with.

GATES:

I understand that, and -- and I think that -- I think that the basis for an administration review of these policies and development of a strategy will be the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. These are being compressed in time because I want them available -- the conclusions available to be able to help shape the FY '11 budget. So I am hoping that by the end of the summer or very early in the fall, we would have the information available to -- the analysis available to us not only to help shape a longer-range administration strategy in this area, but to inform the kind of decisions you're talking about.

VISCLOSKY:

I appreciate that and would encourage you in that good work. The strategy's obviously as important, as critical, as for our Department of Energy. So I thank you very much.



Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

Mr. Secretary, I think it goes beyond even the cost estimates. LCS is a perfect example of that. Navy said we could build it for \$188 million, and it way -- it went way beyond that. I remember saying at the time you'll never build that ship for \$188 million. And -- and there's all kinds of examples where the -- well, the F-22. They said we're going to build 600 of them so that gets the cost down per unit.

So I -- I think we have to have this -- the -- the department should be more honest in when they're putting forward these projections. And then the industry counts on the requirements changing and -- so they can up the price. I mean, it's -- that's not simple, but I think that's the complicated part of this program.

GATES:

It is -- it is, as Admiral Mullen said, a combination of several things. It's more realistic cost estimating, it is better control of the requirements problem. I mean, anybody who ever added a room on to their house knows what happens when you change the specs, and that's what happens with these big weapons systems. People keep adding capabilities -- or requirements rather, and it keeps driving the cost up. We need better execution in the Department of Defense, and we need to negotiate better contracts.

MURTHA:

Well, the taxpayer has to pay the bill, and -- and that's -- that's our problem, and so we -- we hope that -- we wish you well, and we want to work with you in trying to get this thing under control.

Mr. Lewis was deeply involved in the F-22, and it -- they -- the department fought him tooth and nail because he wanted to make sure the -- the research was done before we put the thing out there in the field for production, and we had one hell of a fight with the Senate and other people.

Mr. Frelinghuysen?

FRELINGHUYSEN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service.

Now that the president has made his decision and outlined a new strategy for Afghanistan and directing more troops there and -- we need to be successful, we need to support those troops, I -- I worry about the drumbeat that accompanied our efforts in Iraq, the drumbeat for six years that we should withdraw from Iraq, sort of the issue of timetables, benchmarks. I'm afraid we're going to -- and maybe this is what Chairman Obey was alluding to. We're going to get the same sort of refrain in Afghanistan.

I'd like to know where you think our involvement in Afghanistan is going. Obviously, we're going to be supportive of our -- of our troops, the president's mission, but how is this going to turn out, and do we have the resources -- do we have enough soldiers to do the job and do they have the capacity with -- with enough equipment to be successful in their mission?

GATES:

This is one we -- we should both take a crack at. The -- it actually was a view of mine, as we were putting together the Afghan-

Pakistan strategy, that the administration needed to develop its own measures of effectiveness, so that we could evaluate over a period of time whether we were actually making progress or not, and so we weren't rolling our goals in front of us and pretending that we were making progress when maybe we weren't.

GATES:

So -- so part of this process has been an interagency development of measures of effectiveness, benchmarks, whatever you want to call them, to -- to see how we can measure progress. My own view, sir, is that I -- I think that there needs to be on the part of the administration at least an evaluation of where we are about next March or April to see if we have begun to change the momentum in some respects, to see if we are making progress, and I think future decisions in terms of troops and things like that should -- should depend on that.

I think that even if this goes well, it is a multiyear undertaking. The ultimate outcome really is, the way we would see it evolving is in many respects the way it has evolved in Iraq, which is the Iraqis increasingly taking more and more responsibility for security, and our taking a narrower and narrower view, until finally we leave, and that the same thing would happen in Afghanistan, which is one of the reasons there is money in this budget for supporting the expansion of the Afghan army.

I would tell you, I think our troops have the equipment that they need. In terms of the numbers of the troops, my experience on this is shaped very much by my experience in CIA and fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, where the Soviets, with 110,000, 120,000 troops didn't care about civilian casualties, and they still lost.

And so, in a country like Afghanistan, I think each of these countries has to be taken one at a time in terms of what the traffic will bear. And at what point, what level of foreign troops do we become, instead of partners and allies, do we become seen as occupiers by the Afghan people?

So, personally, I am going to take some convincing in terms of going beyond the troop levels -- going significantly beyond the troop levels -- the president has already approved.

But I think that these troops are flowing in now. I think we will see them make a difference. And I'm confident that they're going to do a great job.

Admiral?

MULLEN:

I have confidence in the strategy. I think we need the benchmarks or the measures, so that we can accurately assess where we are and adjust. And doing that towards the end of this year and the first part of next year, I think is absolutely critical.

We do have enough people. I think the strategy is about right. It also offers, I think, great potential for success in terms of what we've learned in Iraq.

Rolling those lessons in, whether they're how to move through this and recognize it's not all about military, that we can't -- you know, we can't forfeit the security of the same people we're trying to protect, and that we've got to have a development program. And we've got to have a rule of law governance program that's delivering a capability to the Afghan people.

I think we've got to work rapidly this year and next to stem the violence, to start to turn this around. And I think that's doable with the troops the president has supported so far.

FRELINGHUYSEN:

It's ironic that we are depending on the Russians for two supply routes, the other route being the Khyber Pass. And the Russians lost in Afghanistan, and have made life so difficult for us in Kyrgyzstan, that we would rely on the people who lost Afghanistan earlier.

And I hope that we have a greater degree of reliability, because, obviously, to supply our troops, those overland routes are pretty vital to us.

GATES:

Well, and we have developed some alternatives to those as well.

I think one should not underestimate Russia's concern about Afghanistan being taken over again by the Taliban and being a refuge for extremist -- violent extremists, and especially religious extremists. And also, the Russians are seeing first-hand the consequences of the drug flow out of Afghanistan, and that's a big concern to them.

FRELINGHUYSEN:

OK. Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE)

MORAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of the subject matter that has been addressed today is of great interest and importance.

I want to bring you back home a bit, though, if I could, Mr. Secretary, to the BRAC decisions. I voted against the 2005 BRAC realignment, because I thought that the operational benefits were grossly overstated and the costs understated. And this budget shows that that turned out to be the case.

The cost to implement BRAC increased to over \$32 billion, up from the original estimate of about \$20 billion. And the savings decreased to only \$4 billion annually.

The GAO calculates that the long-term savings for BRAC will save less than half of the \$36 billion that was originally estimated.

There are 230 locations scheduled to be completed, only within the last two weeks of the statutory deadline. It's not going to happen. And yet, we continue to budget under the assumption that it will.

This includes -- and this is why I'm particularly sensitive to this -- more than 6,000 Washington headquarters service employees who are to move to Alexandria -- again, they say it's going to be completed in the last two weeks of 2011 -- 8,500 employees to the new NGA facility at Fort Belvoir, and the realignment at Walter Reed.

These decisions relocated 20,000 workers away from transit-accessible locations to sites where there is no public transportation. And as a result, the Army Corps of Engineers estimates that the traffic around these new facilities -- primarily at

the Fort Belvoir 395 Beltway area -- is going to result in an extra three to four hours of delay in each direction when these employees are trying to get to work and leave work.

And so, given the estimates that we now know are far more accurate than the rosy projections back four years ago, do you have any intent to reconsider the September 15, 2011 deadline? And I guess that goes to the comptroller. My guess is you're going to buck that to the comptroller, Mr. Secretary, so go ahead.

HALE:

I think I'll be glad to try this.

We are committed to BRAC. And I understand your concerns, but we feel we have fully funded it in a way that will allow us to meet the September 15, 2011, deadline. Now, it's possible...

MURTHA:

Would the gentleman yield?

Are these figures accurate in your estimation of what Mr. Moran just explained?

HALE:

Yes.

MURTHA:

In other words...

HALE:

(inaudible) that the cost (ph)...

MURTHA:

... there's going to be very little savings and a big cost. And who pays it?

HALE:

Well, when you say very little savings, we still believe it'll be in the order of \$4 billion a year. That's our best estimate. And these are in perpetuity once they occur. So, when you look at it on a net present value basis, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Moran, I think they'll be more impressive than they appear (ph)...

MORAN:

Well, if I could suggest, Mr. Hale, the decision was made on the basis of information that proved to be wrong. And the \$4 billion savings is much less than we were told when we made the decision to go forward with BRAC.

MURTHA:

And if the gentleman would yield again, Bethesda alone, when I sat in the hearing, it was \$200 million. It's already well over \$1 billion. How do we get these kind of estimates?

How can you say you're going to reform acquisition, and we have these kind of estimates from the department?

MORAN:

Of course, it wasn't these guys, in all fairness, Mr. Chairman.

HALE:



I was going to offer that defense.

(LAUGHTER)

Part of the growth is because we grew the force, and that increased it. But I think you're right. I mean, I know you're right. Part of this is we did not estimate these clearly or well at the beginning.

We used a rough model called the COBRA model. And it doesn't have a great deal of ongoing attention, because we do BRAC so episodically. I mean, right now, I think if we were going to do BRAC every year, we would be hard at work revising the model. And yet, who knows when or if there'll be another BRAC round.

So, I don't offer that as an excuse, but you're right. I mean, costs have gone up significantly.

I'd just repeat my point. Once you start saving -- let's say it's \$2 or \$3 or hopefully \$4 billion a year, you're going to save it forever, unless you have to reverse the decisions. So, it does start to add up.

I think BRAC is one of the few areas where we can really achieve, or have achieved, some substantial long-term savings in the Department of Defense.

MORAN:

In the Washington area, you didn't. And to create a four-hour traffic jam every single day has even national security implications.

You've got tens of thousands of people trying to get to Fort Belvoir, trying to get into work in Washington. And it's because

you moved 20,000 people from Metro to a fort that has no public transit.

It was a dumb decision to make. You didn't make it. But I don't think it would be responsible for you not to reconsider it.

HALE:

We'll certainly look at it. It is the law, as you're aware.

MORAN:

I understand it's the law, but it's a law that was made because you gave us, the Pentagon gave us estimates that turned out not to be accurate. And I'm talking about one area where I know this was not a thoughtful decision.

And it can still be rectified, and that's what should happen.

And I'm going to tell you right now, we're going to be here next year, and these numbers are going to be worse than they are today.

I have one other area, Mr. Chairman, but do we have time to do that? We don't. OK. That's fair.

MURTHA:

Mr. Tiahrt?

TIAHRT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And gentlemen, thank you for your service to the country.

Mr. Secretary, in your budget the tanker program seems to keep lingering on. Hopefully, we'll have a decision in 2010. You also shut down the C-17 production.

And in light of the, I think the uncertainty of Russian influence, the instability in Pakistan and the current situation in Iran, I think there may be a good argument that there is some risk that Afghanistan could become landlocked.

And if that is the situation, how will we sustain our troops, and how will we maintain the air bridge back and forth into Afghanistan?

GATES:

Well, when we were contemplating the loss of Manas, we looked at a number of different options. And first of all, I think the loss of all of the land lines simultaneously is probably not very likely. But we did look at a number of options, including a lot of flights from facilities in the Middle East, in Kuwait and elsewhere.

And certainly, the cost goes up fairly considerably. But it was deemed to be a manageable challenge.

TIAHRT:

But it is still something we have as a contingency plan. I'm glad that you're planning on having some fallback position.

One other program that concerns me is in the airborne laser. If you look at the current situation in Iran with their most recent launch, with launches from North Korea, it seems that the greatest deterrent would be the ability to knock down an airplane in the

initial phase of the launch and leave the debris in the country of origin.

The airborne laser is the only tool that we have that could do that. And we have reduced the amount of funding, even though they're on schedule for a shoot-down this coming fall. So I'm concerned that we're shortchanging this program that has a great need today, and even greater need in the future.

And I'd also like to note that, even though the F-35 hasn't completed its testing, we are moving forward into a production program. So, I'm concerned that we're shortchanging the ABL program when we have such a huge need that's very apparent in current world events, and we're on track for completion of not only what's been proven in the lab and on the ground, now to be completed in the air.

Is there any consideration in how we're going to get this tool online more quickly, when we've delayed the second aircraft purchase and...

GATES:

I don't think...

TIAHRT:

... shortchanged the program?

GATES:

I don't know anybody at the Department of Defense, Mr. Tiahrt, who thinks that this program should or would ever be operationally deployed. The reality is that you would need a laser

something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the chemical laser in the plane right now, to be able to get any distance from the launch site to fire.

So, right now, the ABL would have to orbit inside the borders of Iran in order to be able to try and use its laser to shoot down that missile in the boost phase.

And if you were to operationalize this, you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s at \$1.5 billion apiece and \$100 million a year to operate. And there's nobody in uniform that I know who believes that this is a workable concept.

I have kept the first, the prototype, because we do need to continue the research on directed energy and on lasers. And that will be robustly funded, because we do need to continue developing a boost phase capability. But operationally, this first test, for example, is going to be from a range of 85 miles.

TIAHRT:

Well, thank you for the information.

There's a last comment I would like to leave you, a series a comments. In the competition for the tanker, during the last go-round, we saw that there were some inequities in the request.

There was no accounting for subsidies in the bidding process. There was no accounting for cost accounting standards, international traffic and arms regulations and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act for our European allies. There was no accounting for the industrial base. There was no accounting for the lifecycle cost, long term, as required by the FAR.

And as we go forward with this tanker procurement, I hope that we will take these things into consideration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

Ms. Kaptur?

KAPTUR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.

These questions can be answered very quickly.

Admiral Mullen, how dependent is the United States economy and our military on foreign sources of oil and imported petroleum to meet our national economic needs and our military needs? Are we 5 percent dependent, 20 percent dependent, 50 percent dependent, or 80 percent dependent?

MULLEN:

I don't know the exact number. I would say, from the national security perspective, we are proportionately as dependent as the United States is.

KAPTUR:

I beg your pardon?

MULLEN:

That the percentage that -- the proportional dependence we have, in terms of foreign oil in the Department of Defense and in the

military, is consistent with the proportion that we have as a country.

KAPTUR:

Are you aware that we import about 80 percent of our oil?

MULLEN:

Yes, I am.

KAPTUR:

Well, that seems to be a serious vulnerability. Let me ask you, how important are Iraq's oil fields in terms of global oil reserves? Are they not important? Are they somewhat important or very important?

MULLEN:

I think they're very important.

KAPTUR:

Who is guarding the oil facilities in Iraq at this juncture, the U.S. military or through contractors?

MULLEN:

Actually, I don't -- I don't know the specific answer to that.

KAPTUR:

All right. Is it possible that you or Secretary Gates -- Secretary Gates, do you know the answer to that?

GATES:

I think that the Iraqis are guarding them.

KAPTUR:

Through some type of contract or directly through their security forces?

GATES:

I think through their security forces, but we will get you an answer to that question.

KAPTUR:

And if there are private firms involved somehow in the guarding of those facilities, could you provide that for the record, sir?

GATES:

Sure.

KAPTUR:

Secretary Gates, what is the actual number -- or Admiral Mullen -- the actual number of contracted personnel that the U.S. military anticipates will remain in Iraq this year and next year?

GATES:

We expect the number to be -- the high number was in the 160s, 160,000s. We expect them to be down to about 138,000 by the end of this year and about 90,000 at the end of 2010.

KAPTUR:



And could you provide for the record, as well, in terms of security forces, what happens to those...

GATES:

Yes, ma'am.

KAPTUR:

... as those numbers come down? Are you removing cooks or are you removing contract security forces?

GATES:

I think it's across the board, but we'll get it for you.

KAPTUR:

I thank you very much.

In Afghanistan, the bulk of the Taliban are Pashtun. Are we fighting the Pashtun now, Secretary Gates?

GATES:

I think you're fighting several different enemies. The Taliban are clearly the principal force in -- in Afghanistan, but you also have the Haqqani network. You have a variety of different groups, including Pakistani insurgents, Al Qaida foreign fighters, and so on.

KAPTUR:

Are they under a central command-and-control structure?

GATES:

I would say loosely.

KAPTUR:

They're loosely. Who's the commander?

GATES:

Well, Mullah Omar still is alive and, to the extent that anyone oversees the whole operation, that would be him.

KAPTUR:

Is bin Laden an objective of the war?

GATES:

Yes, but I would say secondary.

KAPTUR:

What is the platform of the moderate Taliban? And is it something we can live with?

GATES:

Well, I think we have to figure out who the moderate Taliban are first. Right now, in terms of potential reconciliation, I think that the odds are -- are against us.

I think that, as long as the Taliban think that they have the upper hand, it's going to get -- it's going to be difficult to -- to get them to -- to reconcile at least on the terms that are acceptable to the Afghan government.

We do believe that a significant number of the Taliban fighters are doing it mainly for money. And so if we can rehabilitate, help Afghanistan rehabilitate their agriculture and find jobs for these people, you could get a number of those people who are doing it just for money to walk away from that movement. But there will be a certain hard core that will be totally irreconcilable.

KAPTUR:

How do we know when we've won in Afghanistan?

GATES:

When our troops are out.

KAPTUR:

After they've achieved what?

GATES:

After the -- achieved a situation in which the Afghan security forces, with international help, are able to maintain the security of their own country against both the Taliban and any external threats.

KAPTUR:

Finally, let me ask Admiral Mullen for the record. In your testimony, at several points you inject the word "partner" -- page two, page four, page six -- networks of partners and allies, expanding the sets of partnerships. Could you for the record clarify what you mean by partnerships, as opposed to allied support?

MULLEN:

I would -- I would say that, in many ways, they overlap. It would depend specifically on the relationship we had with a given country. I think both of them are critical in the world we're living in now and the world we're going to be living in, in the future.

KAPTUR:

Is it possible for you to provide for the record what you mean by partnership is not a country?

MULLEN:

Say that again?

KAPTUR:

A partnership is then not a country?

MULLEN:

Sure, a partnership with a country is exactly what I mean.

KAPTUR:

Then why would, on page six, you say, "Steadily expanding the sets of partnerships," as opposed to allied engagements available to address future challenges? On page two, page four, page five, page six, this word "partnerships" keeps cropping up. I don't understand what that means. Could you clarify that for the record and explain how that is distinct from allied support?

MULLEN:

Sure. Yes, ma'am.

KAPTUR:

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE)

KINGSTON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in April you announced that there would be 45 brigade combat teams and not 48. And I have the honor of representing Fort Stewart, Georgia, in Hinesville. And, of course, they have a lot of pride.

Under BRAC, they were going to get another brigade. It's a community that, as you know, does everything they can to support the post, as does Savannah with the Hunter part of it.

The -- Fort Stewart is a four-time winner of the -- the community of excellence award. And the community, after the BRAC announcement, has spent the last couple of years spending lots of money in preparation for a new brigade, hotels and new roads, and putting investment on the post itself. Actually, millions of dollars have been spent on it.

But now everything's a little bit on hold, up in the air. Banks won't lend money anymore. The community is not sure if this is going to happen or not, definitely maybe not another brigade or maybe more troops will come back, filling the existing brigades. Developers and investors are now back on the sidelines.

And so there's a lot of angst down there. And I was wondering if you could comment, what kind of direction can we -- we give the folks there, both the people in uniform and then the civilians who -- who support the post?

GATES:

Well, as you know better than I do, there were some significant additional units that were deployed to Fort Stewart last fall. And with respect to where the additional Army brigade combat teams will go, my understanding, as of this morning, is that the Army has not yet made that decision.

But the one thing that I would explain is that -- or hope make clear -- is that one of the reasons we're doing this is that -- is that, had the Army gone to 48 brigade combat teams, they were doing so with the same number of people that they had regardless.

And so you have had a thinning out in the brigades. And it would have -- it would have hindered our effort to get rid of stop-loss.

So this is to make these brigades more robust so they're more fully staffed, manned, if you will, and -- and so they'll -- these -- these units will all be filled in, if you will, in a way that -- that we have not seen, at least in the last few years. But in terms of -- of a -- of an additional full brigade moving in there, the Army just hadn't made that decision yet.

KINGSTON:

Well, the community does share your vision into caring for our troops and...

GATES:

Yes, they do.

KINGSTON:

And they are 100 percent behind me on that and, also, the stop-loss and getting everybody up to full strength, so that's -- that's very important. When -- when do you think the Army will make that decision?

GATES:

I just don't know. We can try and get something for the record for you.

KINGSTON:

And we actually do have a delegation letter outlining this in more specifics that's going to be coming to Friday. We've given you an advanced copy of that right now, but we are totally in support of your vision and Fort Stewart and the soldiers.

But it's very different when the banks that were starting to lend money during these economic times, it was important that it was a bright spot, and now all of that is -- is sidelined again. So...

MURTHA:

Excuse me just a minute. I'm going to go vote. Mr. Dicks is going to take over.

I'm impressed, Mr. Secretary, you have been deeply involved in this budget. You -- you answer the question. You know what the hell's going on. That's -- that's interesting for a secretary.

(LAUGHTER)

(UNKNOWN)

Very unusual.

KINGSTON:

Mr. Secretary, on another subject, I want to make a comment that, when Americans think about IEDs, and I think members of Congress, we would think about Iraq and don't realize that there will be -- and there already is -- an uptick of IED incidents in Afghanistan, but that IEDs are not going to be isolated to those two countries. They're already around in other nations and people are more familiar with them, but IEDs could start taking place in, you know, on domestic soil.

Your budget has a lot for IED research and training, but -- but I just want to say that I think a lot of us would certainly support IED continued research beyond 2010. And regardless of what happens in Afghanistan, I think we want to support your commitment to the IED task force.

GATES:

Mr. Kingston, I think that this is a program that we have now moved from the supplemental into the base budget so that it'll be a sustained effort over a period of -- an extended period of time, because I share your view that the IED, unfortunately, is a very cheap weapon that is very effective. And I worry a lot that, as you just said, that Afghanistan and Iraq are not the only two countries where we'll see this.

KINGSTON:

I thank the gentleman.



DICKS:

The gentleman's time has expired.

KINGSTON:

Thank you.

DICKS:

Mr. Secretary, tell us, you've restructured the Army's Future Combat System. Can you tell us about that?

GATES:

Sure. We're going forward with the -- with the first increment of the Future Combat System, which has the UAVs, unmanned ground vehicles, sensors, and the networking. And instead of limiting it to 15 FCS brigade combat teams, we are going to expand it to all 73 brigade combat teams of the Army.

So all of this networking technology that has been developed and spun off will all be put back into -- will all -- will all be filtered into the entire Army.

The Army already is looking at a new -- the only -- well, the part of the -- of the -- of the Future Combat System where I said we need to start over is the vehicle part. And the reason for that -- there are a couple of reasons for that.

One is, we were applying a lot of Band-Aids trying to figure out what this system was going to look like. The -- and because we were having trouble absorbing the lessons of war.

So this program, which began nine years ago, for example, had -- began with an 18.5 ton vehicle so it would fit into a C-130. Then, in 2006, the weight went to 26 tons. In 2007, it went to 27 tons. It has now gone to 30 tons and is probably headed toward 35 tons.

So we were putting Band-Aids on as people were trying to figure out how to accommodate these vehicles to the lessons of war. And, for example, they identified a couple of years ago that the infantry fighting vehicle had a flat bottom and was going to be 18 inches off the ground, so it -- it contained none of the defenses against IEDs that -- that we've just been talking about.

The plan also had no place in it because it had not -- because MRAPs didn't exist in -- when the program was first initiated, the program had no place in it for the \$26 billion the taxpayers have invested in the MRAPs for a role there.

And, frankly, we -- we had a -- we did not negotiate a very contract. All eight vehicles were allocated to two -- to two builders, so there was no competition for the vehicles.

We were paying a third party a pass-through fee to acquire the vehicles for us, instead of the way we bought the MRAPs, which was directly with the manufacturers. And 90 percent of industry's performance fee was guaranteed at critical design review, leaving very little incentive when it came to building the prototypes or final testing.

So for all those reasons, we -- we have restructured the program. I have told the Army -- and I have told the authorizing committees -- an Army vehicle modernization program is a very high priority and I believe -- the latest I heard just this morning or yesterday --

was that, as early as this fall, the Army may have an alternative proposal coming forward in terms of some of these vehicles.

So I think relatively little time will be lost, but -- but -- if -- in a program that potentially will cost \$150 billion, it seemed to me important to get it right.

DICKS:

In Pakistan, there's been a lot of discussion about trying to get -- and Admiral Mullen, I know you've been there many times -- trying to get the Pakistanis to focus more on insurgents and the Taliban and less on their concerns about India. Are we making any progress in that direction?

(UNKNOWN)

Yes, sir. I think we are. In fact -- and I'll cite two examples. The level of activity in the last couple of weeks in Bunair, in Dir, and now Sawat. And it has been a sustained level of activity. Clear, there's a history in Sawat, and it's a big challenge, and so we're going to -- you know, part of the -- part of the future assessment and judgment is are they going to be able to sustain it and have an impact and can they, in fact, in classic counterinsurgency, hold the territory that they cleared the insurgents from.

And we're in that phase right now in some places, and we just don't know because it hasn't been long enough. Secondly, when I was there about three weeks ago, three or four weeks ago, General Kayani, who's the chief of staff of the army, took me through -- took me out in the field with two of his divisions who were doing counterinsurgency training, training that he's put in place over the last 12 to 18 months for his entire army. These two battalions that I was -- that I was observing were actually battalions preparing to

go to the west and spend upwards of one or two years up in the west.

And when I say they were doing training, they built the training ranges. They've looked at best practices here and other countries to build these training ranges, done it very rapidly. So they're starting to move in that direction. All of that said, it's my view they're not going to lose the focus on India, and they've got a challenge of literally two fights, a conventional fight or a conventional challenge and threat along with a counterinsurgency challenge which they increasingly recognize. It's just going to take some time, and our patience level with them is key to establish the long-term relationship with them to, one, counter this threat, and, two, to have a relationship with them in that part of the world, which I think is absolutely critical.

(UNKNOWN)

Let me ask you this. You were talking -- we had this debate -- I actually was at the White House several times when Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Rice would clash over, you know, the role of the State Department wasn't playing in Iraq. And you talked about this a little bit earlier.

But do you think there needs to be legislation to -- to give more authority to the secretary of state to get her people into the field? At that time, they were saying they only could stay for 75 days or 90 days, some very short period of time. And if we're going to -- and I believe it is true. You can't win this thing militarily. It's got to be -- you've got to help this economy change. We've got to get rid of these -- this -- these drugs. And we've got to develop their agricultural capability.

What do you think about?

GATES:

I think, mainly, what the secretary of state needs is resources. She does need some authorities that give her more flexibility. For example, she needs to be able to provide is kind of benefits and pay to people in combat situations, combat zones that we pay to the military.

She makes the point that -- and I won't get the numbers right, but I'm going to be in the right ballpark. And maybe you remember it, but there's a higher -- a significantly higher percentage of civilians who have been killed in Iraq and Afghanistan than military given the number of people who were there.

And so she does need the authorities to be able to be more flexible in paying these people in terms of providing benefits and family care like we have and so on. But above all, she needs more people and more dollars.

DICKS:

Ms. Granger?

GRANGER:

Thank you.

Chairman Mullen, I have two questions for you, please. The first question has to do with the Merida Initiative. And, you know, we've worked closely together to ensure that the key equipment was delivered to Mexico as part of that initiative. I was disappointed to discover how our bureaucracy led to some

significant delays in delivering the equipment that was essential to President Calderon when he was -- as he fights these drug cartels. And I thank you for your efforts to get this process back on track.

My question, first is: Are you aware of steps we're taking to make sure that that doesn't happen again and to make our bureaucracy more efficient and prevent similar situations from arising in the future?

MULLEN:

Ma'am, my recent visit there is when I really got exposed to the delays. Merida -- this was its first year. In fact, the money which was '08 money didn't start flowing until -- until December. And once that starts -- and this is something they don't understand. I mean -- and this is not unique to Mexico; it's -- I see it all over the world.

As you said, you do this -- you know, can we start moving this pretty quickly. And our bureaucracy is -- can be pretty cumbersome at times. The areas I was focused on specifically were helicopters, which they need. And then when I pulled the string on it, in fact, there were discussions about -- we were going to give you five and now it looks like three and putting pressure. At least looking into it, it looks like they're going to get the five helicopters late this year, at least the last input that I had.

And some other -- some other equipment that they need to fight these cartels -- and there's, as many have said, there's dual responsibility here. This isn't just a problem in Mexico because, clearly, it has -- it's been -- it's been supported by money, supported by weapons here, had a big impact, obviously, in the --

particularly in the border states, although, not exclusively there, in our own country.

We're into our FMS system which can be very, very cumbersome, take a lot of time. And the secretary has actually asked the department to go look at ways now to make this much more flexible because of the world that we're living in. And it was originally designed to be slow. The law sort of set in place was this is a -- we don't want this system to move very quickly.

But when I have needs like Mexico -- and I can talk about Afghanistan and Iraq and Pakistan -- we need to move stuff through much more quickly than we have.

GATES:

What we're trying to do in this -- in this review -- and I've told the president about it because it really does hinder our ability to help other countries who are our allies and partners in these fights. And so the part -- the study really has two pieces to it. What is there in the Pentagon bureaucracy that -- and the -- and the executive branch bureaucracy that slows this stuff down? And what is there in the law that slows it down?

And when we figure out -- when we get the answers to those questions, we're going to need your all's help to try and fix this thing.

GRANGER:

Thank you.

My second question was -- has to do with the Pakistan counterinsurgency capabilities, and we've talked about that already today.

Your staff, Admiral Mullen, has been very helpful in letting -- helping me understand the details of that and why it's so critical to our war fighting component. And we agree that the situation and the strategy demand enhanced capacity from the State Department as well.

Help me understand the military components of the PCCF (ph) that will endure -- may endure after we increase state capacity.

MULLEN:

It actually -- for the PCCF (ph), the vast majority of the money is focused on the military. And it gets at training capabilities for the Pakistani military. It gets at requirements like helicopter requirements -- not just if you look at helicopters themselves -- the Pakistani military aviation side has a very, very difficult maintenance challenge. And so supporting that as well.

The kinds of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities -- night vision goggles. Training facilities. So all of which -- all of which focuses on counterinsurgency. And the vast majority of which will be enduring, I believe, in their country for a significant period of time. And it breaks down across those various kinds of capabilities, and there's not an insignificant amount that also goes to State -- to the State Department to support the kind of developmental needs that also must go hand in glove with the military requirements.

GRANGER:



I would encourage -- I happen to sit on the Foreign Operations -- State Foreign Operations and Defense. But we will continue to look at that and make sure that you continue to keep us apprised of that joint capability in this (inaudible).

Thank you very much.

Thank you.

DICKS:

There's a vote on right now. Your last vote is on right now.

Admiral, a lot of older guys like me see in the Pentagon people running around in jumpsuits, running around and utility uniforms. Do we have -- not have enough money for Class A uniforms?

MULLEN:

Yes, sir. We have money for Class A uniforms.

DICKS:

Are we ever going to get back to people not going -- I remember the day when we were constrained from even leaving the base wearing a uniform. I mean, you had to wear a uniform. You didn't wear the field uniform. The field uniform is for the field. Are we going to get back to that?

MULLEN:

Well, we went to this a few years ago. I know you know, Mr. Chairman, because we are at war. And that was really the -- the intent of the change. And I can't remember exactly when that happened. I was in the Pentagon at the time.

There's no -- there's no guidance right now to reverse that, although, I share your concern that some of these uniforms aren't necessarily the right uniforms for the workplace in every kind of situation.

DICKS:

Well, I appreciate the endorsement of the White House for our version of the supplemental. I hope the Senate agrees with the amount because we're going to be constrained -- I figure we're going to get a lot less money in the allocation for our ten bills. And so I would hope that we can convince the Senate that they need to at least look at the possibility of going a little higher in their estimate than where they are right now.

I've talked to Senator Inouye. I know he's constrained by a lot of other things.

But, Mr. Secretary, do you have all the tools you need? Remember, Mr. Obey keeps talking about the tools that you need in order to fight this war. Do you have all those tools in place?

And I heard the first briefing, and I liked the briefing. I think you're going in the right direction. I think you've got the right idea. You're going to train the Afghans. You're going to put State Department to work. I mean, you're not going to, but the president is.

Have you got the tools? Is there anything we need to do? I know you're constraining the other services coming to us, and I agree with that. We told you a couple years ago to try to work through the controller. We appreciate that. But is there anything you need that we're not doing that should be included in the supplemental?

GATES:

I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. I think we've got -- one of the projects we're working on right now is an interim solution for MRAPs in Afghanistan to give them more off-road capability. And until we can get a new vehicle out there, which the request for which is in the budget, the MRAP all-terrain vehicle, we're looking at a program that is working for the Marines which is changing out the suspension on the Cougars (ph). And it costs about a tenth as much as the vehicle -- as a new vehicle and gives you about 80 percent of the capability.

And we're looking at how we can accelerate that over the period of the next months to provide more protection for the troops until we can get this ATV. But on the whole, I think -- you know, the truth is you all have been very generous to us. And like when I came up here 18 months ago, two years ago and asked for the money for the MRAPS, you all have just stepped right up to the plate.

(UNKNOWN)

Mr. Chairman, could I mention one issue with regard to the supplemental I think you're aware of? If we have a significant shortfall of military personnel funding in fiscal '09 before your actions started at about \$2.5 billion associated with the services being over strength, partly because the recruiting environment was good, they were trying to cut back on stop-loss, a variety of reasons.

That's about half of it. The other half higher than expected for budget pay raise -- a lot of other -- a lot of other reasons. You were very helpful. It solved more than half of that, but we're still

about \$1.1 billion short this fiscal year in military personnel and have...

DICKS:

Wait a minute. We put \$2.5 billion in.

(UNKNOWN)

Well, there were also some cuts that you made in military personnel, principally in bonuses. So the net effect still left us short.

DICKS:

You're not talking about the bonuses?

(UNKNOWN)

Yes. The -- I mean, you made some cuts or the committee made some cuts in bonus -- primarily in bonus payments in various accounts.

DICKS:

With the environment you have -- I mean, you know, bonus has never been one of my favorite subjects. I mean, when you get on that subject, I get worried. I mean, we still have to have bonuses?

(UNKNOWN)

Well, actually, some the cuts there actually went to even the anniversary payments for past bonuses and, in some cases, the cuts are below what we've already obligated for this year.

DICKS:

Well...

(UNKNOWN)

I understand your general point, and we have tried...

DICKS:

Well, work with our guys, and we'll try to work that out.

(UNKNOWN)

We will do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DICKS:

We've got some other people who haven't asked any questions, so I'm going to let them ask questions.

Mr. Rothman?

ROTHMAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Chief, Mr. Hale, thank you for being here.

President Obama reiterated on Monday that if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons capability, it would be a grave threat to the region, including our number one ally in the region, the state of Israel, but also many Arab nations in the region.

ROTHMAN:

It probably would start a nuclear arms race in the region. Such a weapons capability would threaten our allies in Europe and would

also threaten the national security interests of the United States of America.

I know that the president -- and I'm glad to see the president will begin new diplomatic conversations with Iran, directly or indirectly, in the coming weeks and months and has said he will give it to the end of the year, then to reassess how Iran is doing, with regards to reversing its position on acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

But we're in the business on this subcommittee of contingency planning. And if, as the president and others have described, a nuclear weapons-capable Iran are accurate -- and I believe they are -- in that it would be an unacceptable threat to U.S. national security, do you feel, Mr. Secretary and Chief, that this present budget and our present military capabilities can fully accommodate a worst-case scenario, where Iran would not step down from its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and military action was necessary?

GATES:

Let me just say, in open session here, that I believe we have the resources in the proposed budget that would allow us to deal with all possible contingencies.

MULLEN:

I agree with that.

ROTHMAN:

Thank you, General.

And on the other issue -- and I know others have -- want a chance to ask questions, as well, so I'll limit myself to one other additional question regarding nuclear weapons, now in possession of Pakistan. It has been discussed that one threat to U.S. national security and the region's security in and around Pakistan would be if, God forbid, those designed -- the terrorists and those designed on the death of Americans and innocents were to get a hold of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Are you confident that our present capability and the resources asked -- you are asking for in the 2010 fiscal year defense budget are adequate to assure, guarantee that those nuclear weapons possessed by Pakistan are secure and will be safe from interception by terrorists?

MULLEN:

I'm -- I'm comfortable that the security measures the Pakistani military, in particular, is taking ensures their security. We -- we, the United States -- has -- have invested in improving their security over the last measures -- program over the last three or four years.

That's not done through the Department of Defense. It's done through the Department of Energy, and that they've improved dramatically.

That said, it's a sovereign country, a very sovereign program, very well protected from a proprietary standpoint by the Pakistan -- by the Pakistani people, the Pakistani government. And there are limits to what our knowledge is.

They certainly are aware of the concerns. And one of the biggest concerns -- I mean, at the top of my list for threats right now

globally would be terrorists getting a hold of nuclear weapons. And I've certainly expressed that concern both publicly here and privately to the leadership in Pakistan.

ROTHMAN:

Admiral, beyond the sovereign issues and your expressions of concern -- again, we deal in worst-case scenarios. Are we -- do we -- in an open session, can you comment on our capability to address the worst-case scenarios...

MULLEN:

I -- I can't.

ROTHMAN:

... with regards to Pakistan?

MULLEN:

I wouldn't comment on that in open session.

ROTHMAN:

Thank you.

MURTHA:

(OFF-MIKE)

(UNKNOWN)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



Welcome. Mr. Secretary, in the recent change of our leadership in Afghanistan, you -- you cited the need for, quote, "a fresh approach" in Afghanistan. Tell us what you mean by that.

GATES:

Well, first of all, I wanted to follow the model that we followed as we implemented the surge in Iraq, which was, when we started the -- when the president decided to implement the surge in Iraq, he moved forward by not much, but some, a change of commander in Iraq. And General Petraeus took General Casey's place. So General Petraeus was able to manage that strategy from the moment it began to be implemented through significant success.

I was very concerned about changing commanders midway through a few months or seven or eight months into this strategy and having somebody brand new come in, in effect, in the middle of the stream. And so one of the considerations for me was having a commander who was there from the beginning of the implementation of this new strategy.

I also think that, with the new forces coming in, I think that, with the 68,000 troops that the president has -- has approved -- and I go back to my comments earlier about my concern about a significantly higher number of troops in Afghanistan. I wanted fresh eyes in terms of, are we -- are we using the troops that we have there in the most effective possible way? And are there other ways in which we can make better use of them?

I think another piece of this is -- is the -- is the fact that we are sending a team in. Both General Rodriguez and General McChrystal have a broad range of experience, not just counterinsurgency. And -- and General Rodriguez, when he was

the commander in Regional Command East, was very successful when he was commander of the 82nd Airborne there.

And so it is this combination of talents between McChrystal and Rodriguez that I think create some opportunities for us. And so it's in that context that I was referring to fresh eyes.

(UNKNOWN)

With what you can say in an open session, how will what we're doing in Afghanistan now change under this fresh approach?

GATES:

Well, I think that's really for them to get out there and -- and get involved -- you know, talk about -- talk to the commanders, the brigade commanders, talk to the Afghans, and make their own decisions, in terms of, what changes in our campaign strategy do we need to make?

The admiral may have some.

MULLEN:

I would comment -- first of all, General Rodriguez has spent 15 months in the eastern part of Afghanistan and did exceptionally well and is immersed in their culture and in what the requirements are there.

In my -- in my position as chairman, I spend a lot of time trying to figure out who should go to what jobs. And in this case, long before the decision was made or even on the table to -- to change leadership in Afghanistan, General McKiernan and General Odierno are both due to rotate out of those jobs next year, I

had done a considerable amount of work across a -- contacting and discussing with leaders from all services who the best individuals would be for the future.

And -- and Generals McChrystal and Rodriguez have come out of the top -- out at the top of the Army list and -- and lots of other people, as well -- for the last 18 months that I've been in this job. And, obviously -- and before that, as well.

They're the best we have right now. And so -- and I'm greatly dependent on -- on great leadership. They are great leaders. And I think they will change the calculus and move us in a way that will create potential for success.

(UNKNOWN)

Well, what I'm trying to get at is, what will be this new strategy? Will it be similar to the surge in Iraq? Or just what does it amount to?

MULLEN:

It will be lessons taken from Iraq. It is -- it is counterinsurgency strategy. I was just in R.C. East, and I was taken by how much our troops have absorbed that almost as a way of life.

So we have enough troops in the east. We just put in a couple -- another -- an additional brigade in January. We are putting more troops in the south, but it's not just the military. It's got to be the civilian side.

It's got to be the -- putting the Iraqi security forces, army and police, in a position to provide for their people and in creating a secure environment, allow for the other things that need to be

done to get done, including, you know, a dramatic reduction and elimination, if possible, the opium -- of the opium problem. So there's an agricultural piece here that lays down right over where they're growing poppies, and that's got to happen, as well.

The government of Afghanistan, at every level, has to get to a point where it can provide for its people. And -- and they are falling short there now. And it's also, there's a terrible amount of corruption.

So those are things, all of which have to be addressed, not just by the military, by -- but by the whole of our government and other nations who are involved there.

MURTHA:

The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Bishop?

BISHOP:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale, thank you so very much for your service.

For the record, I'd like to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Kingston to the extent that we jointly support the fourth brigade combat team at Fort Stewart. I just wanted to do that for -- for the record.

I'd like to talk with you for a moment about outsourcing. I'm sure that you're aware that, on March 23rd, the committee wrote you expressing concern about DOD's outsourcing. Can you remind us,

refresh our memories on what the response was, if there was a response?

GATES:

I don't know about the specific response, but I will tell you that this has been a concern to me, as well. And part of the proposals for the F.Y. '10 budget is to begin in a fairly dramatic way replacing contractors in management services, in management support and personnel -- and professional services, to replace contractors in those jobs -- in those areas with full-time civil service employees.

Our goal is to replace -- is to hire 13,000 new civil service employees in F.Y. '10 and, overall, through the next five years, to hire 33,000. Our goal is to take the -- the percentage of contractors in those areas from the current 39 percent of the workforce back to 26 percent, which is where it was before the -- before 2001.

BISHOP:

Mr. Secretary, can I ask you then why the department has not suspended its A-76 outsourcing efforts in '09?

GATES:

Well, we -- we can't rid of outsourcing all together. And I'd have to -- and I'd -- if there's a specific aspect of this, I'm happy to take a look at it.

BISHOP:

Well, the A-76 study is ongoing presumably to continue the outsourcing, while at the same time you're budgeting for '10 to reduce the outsourcing.

GATES:

Well, as I say, we're -- we're -- in these particular areas, we are reducing from 39 percent to 26 percent. So there's still 26 percent that are going to -- that, even at the end of five years, are still going to be some kind of services outsourced.

BISHOP:

I guess -- and I appreciate your comment there, but it is a very serious concern for the subcommittee. And we have had this concern for -- for some time at the large amounts of outsourcing. And, of course, we've expressed it and, of course, we appreciate very much the fact that you are responding in '10. And, of course, if you still have a need for it, I guess you -- you have to go forward with that -- the remaining outsourcing needs.

But I'm very uncomfortable with the A-76 study, because I really feel like we probably need to do as much in-house as we -- as we can possibly do.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MURTHA:

I just want to reiterate my concern. Last year, we took \$5 billion out of contracting services. We put \$1 billion in for direct hire. The department objected strenuously to what we had done. But I appreciate the fact you're now going the right direction after a little bit of prodding.

Mr. Hinchey?

HINCHEY:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to return to a subject that was mentioned a few times earlier, and that is the VH-71 helicopter. And it seems to me, based upon all the information that I've been able to obtain, that it really makes perfect sense for us to continue that -- that project for a variety of reasons.

First of all, for the safety and security of the present president. The helicopter that he's using now, that system was designed more than a half-century ago. And the helicopter that he's using was manufactured about 35 years ago.

The effectiveness and efficiency of that device, based upon its age, is not nearly what it ought to be. And the safety and security of it is diminishing. That is a vehicle which is becoming weaker and weaker and, in some cases, it seems to be even falling apart.

So the need for a new system is, I think, very, very obvious. And the project that was initiated after the attack of September 11, 2001 and then a contract which was put into play in 2005 brought about this VH-71. And the VH-71, frankly, seems to make perfect sense. It is much more effective and efficient than the existing helicopter. It can travel further -- I think about 200 miles more, I've been told. And the new information that has come out indicates clearly that the structural integrity is stronger than what some evaluation of it came out erroneously earlier, and that the service life is much longer; service life being approximately -- anticipated to be approximately 30 years.

So the fact that this system has already experienced approximately \$4 billion in expenditure and the documents themselves or the helicopters themselves are essentially ready to go. Five of them are almost ready to -- ready to move. They've been all through the tests and all those operations that lead to that final movement, and then there are four behind that. And it would take a minimal amount of money it bring this whole system into play.

And bringing this whole system into play would make the safety and security of the president much more sound and secure, would enable him to engage in the kinds of things that he would have to do under threats and dangers that may occur and his response to that. We have to keep in mind that, on September 11th, that helicopter that was crashed down in Pennsylvania as a result of the courage of the people who were being transported in that and overcoming the hijackers, that that helicopter was likely to slam into the White House.

So that means that it may be that something like that or something similar to is that in some way may be a threat to this president and future presidents. So it just seems so obvious, based upon the amount of money that has been spent, based upon the improvement in this helicopter design, much more so than the existing one, based upon the age of the existing one and the fact that it doesn't function effectively, all of these things and more, and much of the more is classified and can't really be talked about in this particular context, all that and more makes it clear that this VH-71 -- this Marine One helicopter really is needed.

I would just ask you deeply if you would go back and take another look at the facts, particularly, the information that has come out more recently on the strength, the solidity, the length of the life of these helicopters, and the ability for them to function effectively.



Go back and take another look at this. And I think and hope that you would decide on your own, as many of us have, that this is something that really needs to take place.

So I'm just asking you sincerely to engage in that. We really need this new helicopter.

GATES:

Well, first of all, I would say that there is no question about the fact that the current helicopters that the president is flying in are safe and secure. The Navy has confidence in that. And I don't think the Secret Service would allow the president to get on it if there wasn't complete confidence in it.

And the reality is that it may be that the airframe on some of these helicopters is 30 or 35 years old but virtually everything else has been replaced. For example, they're replacing the rotors right now.

So there is life extension. If you're talking about going with the whole system -- if you're going with both increments one and two for the VH-71 helicopter...

(UNKNOWN)

I'm talking only about increment one.

GATES:

OK.

(UNKNOWN)

Not about increment...

GATES:

That's still -- under the Navy's estimates would be a \$9.4 billion program. We have -- currently have spent \$3.2 billion on it. It does not have -- it has 55 percent of the range of the current helicopter the president is flying in in the increment one. It does not meet a lot of the requirements in terms of other protections, whether it's chemical, biological, nuclear, communications, and some of the other things.

It -- we would -- even if we bought increment one, we would have to then initiate a new presidential helicopter program anyway to get to the -- some of the capabilities that were going to be in increment two. So if -- whether or not you do increment one, you're going to end up with a new presidential helicopter program. And we believe that the helicopters he's flying in are safe. The Navy believes that their life can be extended until we can get a new helicopter. And, frankly, if we went -- if we went with increment one with 23 aircraft, the cost per aircraft would be \$485 million a piece. And I think the president has a real problem with that.

(UNKNOWN)

I just want to say one thing. One question I asked these 13 people -- they had them lined up and I said we're not going to pay that much for the helicopter, meaning, the two. I said we all appreciate the president. We all appreciate his safety. But what about us? They just laughed. I don't know if they laughed because, the hell with you or what, but what about the secretary of defense, what about the chief? I mean, you know, this is -- this is -- I think the Secret Service went way too far on this thing. You have to keep them under control as you go forward with this program.

I mean, that's all there is to it.

GATES:

Well, we do have to deal with the requirements. And as I said, one of the things that we're thinking about is that, in fact, all of the requirements that are being placed on this helicopter may not be feasible in a single -- in a single helicopter. And maybe we look at one for escape and one for regular, everyday use. So but we'll go back and look at that.

DICKS:

Mr. Young, any questions?

Mr. Dicks has one question.

YOUNG:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask you about the C-17. This is an important program, and, you know, as I understand it, we're coming to the end of it, but there's going to be some in the supplemental. But there's another issue tied to this, I think, and that is the fact that Congress has kept some C-5s in the service that should be shut down.

And I wanted to give you a chance to talk about that. I think -- our committee has supported you on this. I think the House committee has supported you -- the House Armed Services Committee. But we simply -- we don't seem to be able to get this done.

And could you explain why it's so important?

GATES:

Well, there's a restriction. There are significant restrictions on our ability to retire the old C-5s. And there isn't -- there is -- we believe that the current -- that the force -- the mobility force that we originally -- that we sized a few years ago, two or three years ago of 292 aircraft, 180 C-17s, and 112 C-5As would meet the needs for two simultaneous, conventional conflicts, major conventional conflicts, three domestic disaster events here in the States, and a number of lesser contingencies.

We now have 205 C-17s. It looks like we may be headed for a few more C-17s. And we've still got 112 C-5As. This is more than the Air Force believes they need. And it goes back to what I said in my opening statement. Every dollar we spend on excess capability is a dollar we can't spend on something that the Air Force really does need.

And so that's what our problem is. And we have worked with the House, and our hope is that, with the Armed Services Committee in the House and, also, we're working with the Senate to try and get the restrictions that would allow us -- lifted -- that would allow us to retire some of the C-5As and save some money in that respect.

DICKS:

The time of the gentleman has expired.

We agree with you, Mr. Secretary, and the committee adjourns until tomorrow at 10:00.

CQ Transcriptions, May 20, 2009

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List of Panel Members and Witnesses **PANEL MEMBERS:**

REP. JOHN P. MURTHA, D-PA. CHAIRMAN

REP. NORM DICKS, D-WASH.

REP. PETER J. VISCLOSKEY, D-IND.

REP. JAMES P. MORAN, D-VA.

REP. MARCY KAPTUR, D-OHIO

REP. ALLEN BOYD, D-FLA.

REP. STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, D-N.J.

REP. SANFORD D. BISHOP JR., D-GA.

REP. MAURICE D. HINCHEY, D-N.Y.

REP. CAROLYN CHEEKS KILPATRICK, D-MICH.

REP. DAVID R. OBEY, D-WIS. EX OFFICIO

REP. C.W. BILL YOUNG, R-FLA. RANKING MEMBER

REP. RODNEY FRELINGHUYSEN, R-N.J.

REP. TODD TIAHRT, R-KAN.


REP. JACK KINGSTON, R-GA.

REP. KAY GRANGER, R-TEXAS

REP. HAROLD ROGERS, R-KY.

REP. JERRY LEWIS, R-CALIF. EX OFFICIO

WITNESSES:



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### 2009 Intrepid Freedom Award

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, New York City, NY, Thursday, May 21, 2009*

Brent [Scowcroft] is an example of patriotism, dedication, and total integrity that has inspired me for three-and-a-half decades. He is my friend and he is my role model. This event reminds me of a quote from Benjamin Franklin in talking about public service said one day people will raise him up and praise him and say Hosanna and the next day will say crucify him. And that is Washington today.

I'm honored to receive this year's Intrepid Freedom Award, and join an honor roll that includes, in part, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and four presidents of the United States. And it is especially amazing to be on this ship, with its storied history, in the presence of a number of its former crew.

Of course, it is "Fleet Week" in New York harbor, and let me especially welcome all the naval officers from our allied and partner nations, as well as members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard who are with us tonight. With the festivities in full swing, I can tell that many of you have been enjoying "the city that never sleeps." In fact, for many of you, this may have served as your personal motto this week. Ah, to be young.

My thanks to the Fisher family and the Intrepid Museum co-chairs and trustees for this honor, and more importantly, for everything you do to support our troops and their families through the Intrepid family of charitable organizations. In addition to the museum foundation, which gave this ship new life as a treasured landmark and educational center, there is:

- The Fisher House program, a unique public-private partnership that supports military families in their time of need;
  - The Intrepid Relief Fund, which provides hardship and education assistance to troops and their families;
- and
- The Intrepid Fallen Heroes Fund, assisting countless wounded service members and veterans, and the families of those who have died in defense of our country.

Last summer, I helped break ground in Bethesda at the National Intrepid Center for psychological health and traumatic brain injury. That facility joins the original Intrepid Center in San Antonio as a world-class institution that will greatly improve understanding and treatment of the signature injuries of the current conflicts. After the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, I have no higher priority than caring for our wounded warriors.

They are truly inspiring. Before I visited troops in the hospital for the first time, I was very apprehensive. To be honest, I wasn't sure how I would or if I could handle it. But people kept telling me, "No, you don't understand, they will lift you up." And they did. And they still always do. Last week, I was visiting with a wounded young soldier at Walter Reed. First he thanked me for sending the armored vehicle that saved his life. Then he told me with tears in his eyes that I looked a lot younger in person than I do in the newspapers. Well, that really lifted me up. Now it must have been my lean and sinewy body...oh hell, even I can't tell you that with a straight face. It's a bold-faced lie.

But these wounded warriors, and all of the men and women who step forward to wear America's uniform, are tonight's real honorees and heroes. Consider that nearly 800 have received Silver Stars or service crosses, along with five Medals of Honor – all posthumous – for valor in battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their stories are as varied and as diverse as the nation and military they serve. They are getting the public recognition that they are due.

We saw this earlier in tonight's program with regard to Colonel Strobl and Chance Phelps – and it's wonderful to see the Phelps family with us tonight.

And I must tell you that seeing the film "Taking Chance" profoundly influenced my decision to empower families to decide whether the dignified transfers at Dover should be open to the news media. The entire nation has thus been given the opportunity to pay respect and homage to our fallen heroes – if their families so wish.

Our men and women in uniform are part of what is being called a new greatest generation. Take the story of Lance Corporal Brady Gustafson. Last summer in the Afghan village of Shewan, Corporal Gustafson and a group of Marines outfought and outlasted an estimated 100 Taliban. With his right leg in shreds, Corporal Gustafson kept on firing, and as a result, in his words, "we didn't lose a single Marine." He received the Navy Cross and a deserved place – along with the celebrities, politicians, and CEOs – among *Time* magazine's 100 most influential people. And

all that brought to my mind, and Brady Gustafson comes to mind, when I think of an astute observation by an athlete who said that celebrities are someone you want to meet; a hero is someone you want to be like.

Sometimes the public recognition isn't always expected – or necessarily welcomed. Specialist Zachary Boyd recently was enjoying a well-deserved sleep when his post in eastern Afghanistan came under enemy attack. He immediately grabbed his rifle and rushed into a defensive position clad in his helmet, body armor, and pink boxer shorts that said "I Love New York." Unfortunately – or fortunately, depending on your perspective – an *Associated Press* photographer was there for a candid shot, a photo which ran very shortly thereafter on the front page of the *New York Times*. Boyd later told his parents that: "I may not have a job anymore after the president sees me out of uniform."

Well, let me tell you, the next time I visit Afghanistan I want to meet Specialist Boyd and shake his hand. Any soldier who goes into battle against the Taliban in pink boxers and flip-flops has a special kind of courage. And I can only wonder about the impact on the Taliban. Just imagine seeing that – a guy in pink boxers and flip-flops has you in his crosshairs – what an incredible innovation in psychological warfare. I can assure you that Specialist Boyd's job is very safe indeed.

Not too long ago a friend of mine from Texas A&M told me he had been waiting for a plane at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. A man ran into the waiting area and said that a planeload of troops coming home from Afghanistan were arriving on the level below. Virtually everyone there – hundreds of people waiting for planes – stampeded down the stairs to applaud as the service members entered the terminal. This is the kind of thing one sees in cities and towns all across this country. The appreciation is real, it is sincere, and it bridges any political divide. Our men and women in uniform – our heroes – deserve no less.

My thanks once more for this honor and for all that you do for our troops and their families. Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
**Speech**

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**U.S. Military Academy Commencement**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, West Point, New York, Saturday, May 23, 2009*

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Thank you. Thank you, General Hagenbeck.

It's an honor to be here to deliver my first commencement address at the United States Military Academy here at West Point. Many of you might remember the last time I was here I gave a 45 minute evening lecture. Some of you may have even been awake at the end. A British nobleman, Lord Birkett, known for his long-windedness, once said: "I do not object to people looking at their watches when I am speaking. But I strongly object when they start shaking them to make certain that they're still going."

As someone who presided over some 40 commencements as a university president, and who has given a number of graduation speeches since my assuming this current post, I am well aware that at this point I am just about the only thing standing between you and a great party.

In contrast to when I spoke here last year, my remarks today are not about the great and challenging policy issues of the day. Today I want to talk about you, and your families – because when you signed up, you also signed up all those who love you most.

To the parents: Four years ago you dropped your son or daughter off on these grounds with no shortage of pride, as well as anxiety – about the famed rigors of the U.S. Military Academy, about the known dangers that come with the profession of arms at this time. That pride was well founded, the anxiety hopefully at least partially relieved. And I thank you for everything you have done to make them the outstanding young people they are, and for supporting them on the honorable yet arduous path they have chosen.

To the faculty: In addition to being scholars and teachers, many of you are also veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, and shared those experiences with your students. They will be wiser and better prepared leaders as a result, and I thank you for that.

To the graduating class of 2009: Congratulations! Let me dispense with the easy and fun part first – which is, on behalf of our commander-in-chief, to grant full amnesty for any minor conduct offenses. I will leave the definition of "minor" to the superintendent.

Consider that you were filling out your academy applications in the fall of 2004, at about the time of the second battle of Fallujah – when thousands of Marines and soldiers clawed their way through that city house by house and block by block. As the class of 2009, you made your decision to serve knowing not only that America was at war – as did every man or woman who joined the military after September 11th – but that this war would be bloody and difficult, of indefinite length and uncertain outcome. In doing so, you showed courage, commitment, and patriotism of the highest order.

One of the reasons I look forward to coming back to this bend in the Hudson River is the history of this place – a corner of the continent George Washington once called "the key of America." Just down the road is Verplanck's Point, a Continental Army encampment at the end of the Revolutionary War. It was later recorded that a group of officers got together there and issued a creed. It read:

"We believe that there is a Great First Cause by whose Almighty [will] we are formed, and that our business here is to obey the orders of our superiors. We believe that every soldier who does his duty will be happy here, and that every such one who dies in battle, will be happy hereafter. We believe that George Washington is the only fit man in the world to [lead] the American Army ... We believe that Baron Steuben has made us soldiers, and that he is capable of forming the whole world into a solid column, and deploying it from the center ... We believe in General Knox and his artillery. And we believe in our bayonets. Amen."

Though the tools and tactics of soldiering have changed, the basic principles of soldiering and leadership certainly have not. Now, this former Air Force lieutenant and CIA officer cannot pretend to offer you advice on soldiering. However, as someone who is now working for his eighth president, I can say that leadership is something that I have observed and thought about for a good long time. I've come to believe that few people are born great leaders. When all is said and done, the kind of leader you become is up to you, based on the choices you make. And in the time remaining, I'd like to talk about some of those choices, and how those choices will be shaped by the realities of this dangerous new century.



I would start with something I tell all the new generals and civilian executives that I meet with at the Pentagon. It is a leadership quality that is really basic and simple – but so basic and simple that too often it is forgotten: and that is the importance, as you lead, of doing so with common decency and respect towards your subordinates. Harry Truman had it right when he observed that one of the surest ways to judge someone is how well – or poorly – he treats those who “can’t talk back.”

In this country, going back to its earliest days, the American soldier has been drawn from the ranks of free citizens, which has implications for how those troops should be led and treated.

Two anecdotes from our country’s founding capture the independent thinking of the American soldier and the greatness of the Army officer who led them. During the Revolution, a man in civilian clothes rode past a redoubt being repaired. The commander was shouting orders but not helping. When the rider asked why, the supervisor of the work detail retorted, “Sir, I am a corporal!” The stranger apologized, dismounted, and helped repair the redoubt. When he was done, he turned toward the supervisor and said, “Mr. Corporal, next time you have a job like this and not enough men to do it, go to your Commander-in-Chief and I will come and help you again.” Too late, the corporal recognized George Washington. The power of example in leadership.

On another occasion, Washington was making his rounds and came across a Private John Brantley drinking some stolen wine. Brantley invited Washington to have a drink with him. The general declined, saying, “boy, you have no time for drinking wine.” Brantley responded, “Damn your proud soul – you’re above drinking with soldiers.” Washington turned back, dismounted and said, “Come, I will [have] a drink with you.” The jug was passed around, and as the general re-mounted, Brantley said, “Now, I’ll be damned if I don’t spend the last drop of my heart’s blood for you.” A lesson in the independence of the American soldier and his loyalty, when treated with respect and decency.

In a novel about ancient Greece, the warrior Alcibiades is asked how to lead free men, and he responds: “By being better and thus commanding their emulation.” “How to lead free men? Only by this means: the summoning of each to his nobility.”

Treating soldiers decently also extends to making sure that they – and their families – are properly taken care of – body, mind, and soul. It is the families who often bear the harshest brunt of a soldier’s overseas combat tour, particularly when it is a second or third or fourth deployment. And as a small unit leader you must create a climate where those soldiers who may be suffering from post-traumatic stress or other mental illness are willing to step forward and get the help they deserve.

A second fundamental quality of leadership is doing the right thing when it is the hard thing – in other words, integrity. Too often we read about examples in business and government of leaders who start out with the best of intentions and somehow go astray.

I’ve found that more often than not, what gets people into trouble is not the obvious case of malfeasance – taking the big bribe or cheating on an exam. Often it is the less direct, but no less damaging, temptation to look away or pretend something didn’t happen, or that certain things must be okay because other people are doing them; when deep down, if you look hard enough, you know that’s not true. To take that stand – to do the hard right, over the easier, more convenient, or more popular wrong – requires courage.

Courage comes in different forms. There is the physical courage of the battlefield, which this institution and this army possess beyond measure. Consider, for example, the story of Lieutenant Nicholas Eslinger, Class of 2007. He was leading his platoon through Samarra, Iraq, when an enemy fighter threw a grenade in their midst. Eslinger jumped on the grenade to shield his men. When the grenade didn’t go off, the platoon leader threw it back across the wall. And then it exploded. At the time of this incident, then-Second Lieutenant Eslinger was only 16 months out of West Point. He would later receive the Silver Star.

But, in addition to battlefield bravery, there is also moral courage, often harder to find. In business, in universities, in the military, in any big institution, there is a heavy emphasis on teamwork. And, in fact, the higher up you go, the stronger the pressure to smooth off the rough edges, paper over problems, close the proverbial ranks and stay on message. The hardest thing you may ever be called upon to do is stand alone among your peers and superior officers. To stick your neck out after discussion becomes consensus, and consensus ossifies into groupthink.

One of my greatest heroes is George Marshall, whose portrait hangs over my desk in the Pentagon. As I said here last April, Marshall was probably the exemplar of combining unshakeable loyalty with having the courage and integrity to tell superiors things they didn’t want to hear – from “Black Jack” Pershing to Franklin Delano Roosevelt. As it turns out, Marshall’s integrity and courage were ultimately rewarded professionally. In a perfect world, that should always happen. Sadly, it does not, and I will not pretend there is not risk. But that does not make taking that stand any less necessary for the sake of our Army and our country.

The moral principles of leadership I’ve just discussed are timeless – they apply to any military leader in any generation. So do a range of other choices you will face about the leader you aspire to become. I refer to those relating to the kind of judgment, wisdom, and mental skills – the intellectual attributes, if you will – that will be most needed to be successful as an Army leader in the 21st century.

It has always been one of the hallmarks of the U.S. military to push decision making down to the lowest possible level. In Iraq and Afghanistan, we rely on our junior- and mid-level combat leaders to make judgments – tactical, strategic, cultural, ethical – of the kind that much more senior commanders would have made a generation ago.

The Army has always needed agile and adaptive leaders with a broad perspective and range of skills. Now, in an era where we face a full spectrum of conflict – where high-intensity combat, stability, train-and-equip, humanitarian, and high-end conventional operations may be occurring in rapid sequence or simultaneously – we cannot succeed without military leaders who are just as full spectrum in their thinking. We will not be able to train or educate you to have all the right answers – as one might find in a manual – but you should look for those experiences and pursuits in your career that will help you at least ask the right questions.

Maxwell Taylor – who was an Asia specialist in the 1930s before becoming the famed commander of the 101st Airborne Division and later Army chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – once observed of his fellow academy grads that, “The ‘goats’ of my acquaintance who have leapfrogged their classmates are men who continue their intellectual growth after graduation.”

To this end, in addition to the essential troop commands and staff assignments, you should consider, and in fact embrace, opportunities that in the past were considered off the beaten path, if not a career dead end. Those might include further study at graduate school, teaching at this or another first-rate educational institution, being a fellow at a think tank, advising indigenous security forces, becoming a foreign area specialist, or service in other parts of the government – all being experiences that will make you a more successful military leader in the 21st century.

In 1974, when I left the CIA mother ship to take a staff job at the National Security Council, I was told by my boss at Langley that there probably would not be a job there for me when I returned. My career as a CIA officer was considered over. So you never know when taking some risks in your career will pay significant future dividends.

It is important to remember that none of what I have talked about these past few minutes is alien to the best traditions of Army leadership – particularly at times of great peril for this country:

- Grant and Sherman were not exactly spit and polish soldiers – and in fact left the military for a time before they returned to lead the Union Army to victory.
- George Marshall spent 15 years as a lieutenant and never commanded a division; and
- Eisenhower spent years toiling in obscurity as what General MacArthur later called a “clerk” in the Philippines.


Just over a half century ago, no less an Army institution than General Eisenhower said here at West Point: “Without the yeast of pioneers, the United States Army, or any other organization...cannot escape degeneration into a ritualistic worship of the status quo.” Keep Ike’s admonition in mind in the years ahead – be a pioneer in the assignments you take, the learning you pursue, the assumptions you question.

Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, reflecting on his service as a Union soldier in the Civil War, later said that “in our youth our hearts were touched with fire.” I hope that as a result of coming to this place, in the instruction you have received, and in the friendships you have formed, that your hearts, minds, and spirits have been touched in a way that will prepare you for the trial by fire that may await you.

In closing, as I said last April, know that I think of each of you as I would my own son or daughter. I feel a deep, personal responsibility for each of you. I have committed myself and the department I lead to see that you have everything you need to accomplish your mission and to come home safely to your families. Know, also, that your countrymen are grateful for your service, and will be praying for your safety and your success.

A final thought. We all seek a world at peace. After each war, we always hope we fought the final war, the war to end all wars. I believe that such hopes ignore all of human history. I believe that for so long as we seek to be free men and women, for so long as the bright light of liberty shines, there will be those whose sole ambition, whose sole obsession, will be to extinguish that light. I believe that only strength, eternal vigilance, and the continuing courage and commitment of warriors like you – and your willingness to serve at all costs – will keep the sacred light of American liberty burning: A beacon to all the world.

You will shortly take an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and we, the American people. The nation stands in awe of you. And I salute you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Memorial Day Message

*By Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Monday, May 25, 2009*

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On May 5, 1868, General John Logan, national commander of the Grand Army of the Republic, asked that America remember those lost in the Civil War by "gather[ing] around their sacred remains" to "garland the passionless mounds...with choicest flowers" and "raise above them the dear old flag they saved."

Since then, we have set aside one day each year to honor all those who have died in service to our country. Across the United States, military support groups, veterans associations, and patriots mount public tribute to those who served and sacrificed. By honoring our men and women in uniform with events like this, groups such as the American Veterans Center keep alive the memory of those who paid the ultimate price.

Some wear a red poppy, in the spirit of the poet Moina Michael, who wrote that that flower "grows on fields where valor led." Others continue to adorn graves with flowers and candles. And each year, the soldiers of "The Old Guard" place small American flags at each Arlington National Cemetery gravestone and patrol around the clock during Memorial Day weekend to ensure that each flag remains standing.

At 3 p.m. your local time, on Monday, May 25, 2009, I would encourage you to join millions of your fellow Americans in a moment of silence to remember our fallen heroes.

It is important to think of those who made the ultimate sacrifice on this day, but we should also keep in mind all of our servicemen and women throughout the year. They and their families continue to sacrifice for our country and deserve our recognition and support. We should heed the advice of General Logan who wrote: "Let no neglect, no ravages of time, testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic."



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Wichita High School East Commencement

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Wichita State University (Wichita, KS), Wednesday, May 27, 2009

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Thank you, Katherine.

It's good to be home again. Nearly a half century ago – and yes, I am that old – I was sitting where you are now. I remember what it is like to be in the position of waiting – no, begging – for the graduation speech to be done with. The other day I was looking at the yearbook supplement for our East High commencement ceremony in 1961. It had a line that said: "Remember. . . [our graduation speaker] – and the tremendous message he had to offer?" Well, actually, no. I have no illusions of doing any better in your memories decades from now. But I am delighted to be here nonetheless. And I am well aware that I am the main obstacle between you and a great party.

One of the nice things about being invited to give this commencement has been catching up with East High. From your academic accomplishments, to running across the country to raise awareness about genocide, to correcting the spelling on a state writing test, the students of East High are certainly impressive. When I was here, if you had asked me what an International Baccalaureate was, I probably would have thought it was some kind of French pastry.

Given the job that I hold today as Secretary of Defense, I am deeply gratified to see that an impressive number of you are going to be attending one of America's military service academies or have earned an ROTC scholarship. Some of you will enlist right away in our armed forces. I admire you and I thank you all, on behalf of the American people.

About a hundred years ago, *Harper's Magazine* ran a profile of Kansas. It described the "courage, sand, and grit of the people, their neryv faith in fortune." As I often tell people, I believe a Kansas upbringing imparts qualities that have been a source of strength for me over the years: an enduring optimism and idealism, a love of country, and dedication to citizenship and service. In many ways, for all the places I have gone, the jobs I have held, and all the notable people I have worked with and met, I will always consider myself first and foremost just a kid from Kansas who got lucky.

I grew up in a neighborhood not too far from here. My dad sold automotive parts. After I went off to college, my mother worked as a secretary here in the Psychology Department here at WSU. My brother and I were the first in the whole history of our family to earn college degrees. My brother – who was the principal for a number of years at one of your rival high schools here in Wichita – and I often visited our grandparents in Pratt, about 70 miles west of here. Our grandfather worked at the train depot in Pratt, and when I would visit him, I'd watch the trains come and go and think about seeing the world. Back then, I would never have imagined just how much of that world I would eventually see.

In my life's journey, East High played a major role. Indeed, much of what I have done I trace back in many ways to six teachers at East I have never forgotten. They opened my eyes to the world and the life of the mind, and they were role models of decency and character. They were: Elfrieda Shellenberger, who taught English literature; Julia Emery, international relations; Nell Westacott, honors English; Ermal Lindquist, government; Nancy Millett, English; and Gerald Tague, human physiology.

I only hope that half a century from now you will look back on your time at East High with such fond memories and, above all, remember amazing teachers there who played a similarly major role in shaping your life.

After graduating from East High in 1961 along with friends I'm happy to see tonight, and against the wishes of my parents, I did not follow in the footsteps of my brother and go to K-State. Instead, I went to the College of William and Mary in Virginia.

I had gotten good grades at East so I thought I was pretty smart. Well, during my freshman year of college I got a 'D' in calculus. My father made a long distance call from here in Wichita to ask how such a thing was possible, and I told him, "Dad, the 'D' was a gift." Years later, as president of Texas A&M, I would tell university freshmen that I learned two lessons from that 'D.' First, even if you're fairly smart, you won't succeed if you don't work hard. Second, I am standing proof that you can survive a 'D' as a freshman and still go on to make something out of yourself.

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I started out in college as pre-med: biology, chemistry, calculus and so on. After the calculus disaster, I soon switched from pre-med to history. I used to say God only knows how many lives were saved by my becoming director of the CIA instead of a doctor.

So for those of you on your way to college this year, don't be intimidated or frustrated if you find yourselves not doing so well at first in your classes. Just work harder. And don't let the challenges stop you from reaching outside your comfort zone to consider new subjects or try new things. And statistically, most of you who go to college will change your major at least once – so welcome to the club. All of you, whether you go to college or take another path, should be prepared to take your life in a direction you hadn't necessarily prepared for.

When I went to graduate school, I ran into a recruiter from the Central Intelligence Agency, an organization I had never considered working for. I thought I was going to be a history professor. Now, at first, the CIA tried to train me to be a spy. However, my efforts were less James Bond and more Austin Powers – and I don't mean that in a good way. One of my first training assignments was to practice secret surveillance with a team following a woman CIA officer around downtown Richmond, Virginia. Our team wasn't very stealthy, and someone reported to the Richmond police that some disreputable-looking men – that would be me and my fellow CIA trainees – were stalking this poor woman. My two colleagues were picked up by the Richmond police, and the only reason I didn't get arrested was because I had lost sight of her so much earlier than they had. I – and CIA – concluded pretty quickly that I wasn't cut out to be doing operations in the field, and instead I became a CIA analyst – one of the people who assess and interpret all the information that comes in. That led me into a career that allowed me to witness amazing moments in American history. So it may take you a few missteps and even embarrassments before you find the thing you're really good at – whether you go to college or not. So, keep at it.

In the years since joining the government, I've been privileged to work for eight presidents. As a result, I've learned a few things about service, and a few things about leadership. Many of you already have found opportunities, even at a young age, to exercise leadership in different ways – in athletics, extracurricular activities such as student government, your church, or wherever you happen to work. Opportunities that have placed you in a position to show responsibility or have an influence over others. And since you are all potential future leaders, I thought I might share very briefly a few thoughts on what my experience tells me are the qualities needed by good leaders.

One of the things you must have is integrity – I'm talking about honesty, telling the truth, being straight with others and yourselves. In a movie, John Wayne once said: "There's right and there's wrong. You gotta do one or the other. You do the one, and you're living. You do the other and you may be walking around, but you're as dead as a beaver hat."

Second, moral courage: the courage to do what is right and not just what is popular. The time may come when you will see something going on that you know is wrong. You may be called to stand alone, and say "I disagree with all of you and, because I have the responsibility, this is what we will do." Don't kid yourself – that takes real courage.

Third, real leaders treat other people with common decency and respect. Too often, those who are in charge demonstrate their power by making life miserable for their subordinates – just to show they can. President Truman had it right when he said: "Always be nice to the people who can't talk back to you." In America today, we badly need leaders with these three traits. We need real leaders in all walks of life.

Finally, we also need people to step up and be of service to others – to their community and their country. No life is complete without such service. There are many ways to do this. Some of you already do this at school, in your community, through your church, or elsewhere. Of course, as Secretary of Defense, I lead an organization – the United States military – where that kind of service, that kind of dedication, patriotism, and sacrifice are on display every day – by people who in many cases are your age or not much older. It is their sacrifice, and the sacrifice of so many others in every generation, that has made it possible for you and for me to live free and secure – and to be able to make the choices about our own lives that I've been talking about. Our democracy is not just about our rights – it is also about our responsibilities and obligations.

Which brings me to my final point: I've noticed that too often people in this country get so absorbed in their own needs, and their own problems, that they lose sight of how blessed we all are, how blessed you are, to live in the United States of America. It is the goodness and opportunity of this country that made all things possible for me, that made possible my journey from Wichita High School East to the corridors of power in Washington and around the world. It has been my privilege, and the honor of my life, to give something back in service. For me, it all started at East High. And so for all of you, tonight, with this graduation, the door of opportunity opens – for you to serve and to lead.

Congratulations, and good luck!

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO SINGAPORE, PHILIPPINES, AND ALASKA

May 29 – June 1, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
**Speech**

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**International Institute for Strategic Studies**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Singapore, Saturday, May 30, 2009*

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Thank you for that kind introduction, John. And, as always, let me thank the International Institute for Strategic Studies, our Singaporean hosts, and everyone else who has helped put together this event. As with all IISS forums I attend – whether in Manama or here in Singapore – the opportunity to speak about global issues in settings like these is unparalleled.

Last year when I spoke here, I emphasized that the United States has enduring interests in Asia as a resident power – and thus everyone could expect continuity in our engagement with the region, even if a new administration brought changes in specific policies, or new initiatives and areas of emphasis. Little did I know that the “continuity” I spoke of would end up being quite so personal. I have now failed retirement from government service for the second – and hopefully final – time.

It is an honor to stand here before you once again, this time as part of the administration of President Obama. President Obama is the eighth president I have worked for, and in all my years in government – beginning some 43 years ago – U.S. engagement with Asia has been a mainstay of our foreign policy.

This is the first time, however, we’ve had a president with such a personal connection to the region. As you know, the president spent some of the early years of his childhood in Indonesia, and he has written about how it impacted him – how it demonstrated that citizens of a vibrant, pluralistic society could live together in harmony. I believe this is part of the reason the president has shown such energy and optimism when discussing his policies toward Asia.

And it is no accident that Secretary of State Clinton’s first trip abroad was to this region. As she said just before her trip, “America cannot solve the problems of the world alone, and the world cannot solve them without America.” Surveying the international landscape, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that few, if any, of the world’s problems can be resolved without the support and ideas of the nations of the Pacific Rim. And so, with that in mind, I want to use my remarks today to discuss three main points:

- First, the strategic reality of Asia and America’s role in this order;
- Second, the kinds of challenges we face in an interconnected world and how our dependence on one another yields unprecedented opportunities for cooperation; and
- Finally, the type of leadership you can expect to see from the Obama administration.

Since the end of the Cold War, Asia’s security environment has undergone remarkable change – spurred in part by globalization and the technological revolution of the last two decades and inspired by the dynamism of the peoples of Asia. In recent years, the nations of Asia have, for the most part, achieved unprecedented wealth and stature as they have forged more mature political, economic, and military institutions. All of this has demonstrated the correlation between economic prosperity and stability, and the need to ensure that Asia is appropriately represented in the global economic order.

All the while, the strategic landscape of Asia continues to evolve:

- New and re-emerging centers of power – from China and Russia, to India and Indonesia – combined with other shifts, give impetus to the search for a new security architecture in the region;
- When it comes to freedom, or standards of living, or security, the peoples of Asia are expecting more from themselves – and from their governments. Civil societies and democratic reforms have taken root, and, with them, we have seen a profound effect on domestic politics and national-security policies;
- Military modernization has continued apace – with rising states seeking forces commensurate with their economic power, and smaller states trying to preserve their position in the regional order; and
- The emergence of multiple transnational challenges – some new, some old, which I will discuss shortly – calls for greater cooperation between all of our nations.

The United States has welcomed Asia’s rise over the last few decades, and, indeed, our continued presence in this part of the world has been an essential element enabling that rise. America has paid a significant price in blood and treasure to fight aggression, deter potential adversaries, extend freedom, and maintain peace and prosperity in this part of the world. We have done so over many generations and across many presidential administrations. Our commitment to the region is just as strong today as it has ever been – if not stronger since our own prosperity is increasingly linked with yours.

The challenge for the United States has been to fashion defense policies that adapt to the new realities – but do so in a way that preserves and protects our fundamental, and enduring, interests and values on the Pacific Rim, which includes the security and stability of the region as a whole.

Consider our relationships with long-standing treaty allies Japan and South Korea – cornerstones of our foreign policy. We entered into these alliances in the early years of the Cold War when both nations were impoverished and virtually destroyed.

The Republic of Korea and Japan have since become economic powerhouses with modern, well-trained and equipped military forces. They are more willing and able to take responsibility for their own defense and assume responsibility for security beyond their shores. As a result, we are making adjustments in each country to maintain a posture that is more appropriate to that of a partner, as opposed to a patron. Still, though, a partner fully prepared and able to carry out all – and I repeat, all – of our alliance obligations.

On the Korean Peninsula, we will transition wartime operational control in 2012, a historic moment when the Republic of Korea will take the lead role in its own defense. The United States will continue to maintain its firm commitment to security on the peninsula, even as we seek to broaden the alliance to address other security challenges in the region and beyond. Similarly, our relationship with Japan is evolving. Just a couple weeks ago, Japan's Diet ratified the Guam International Agreement that Secretary Clinton signed during her trip. This agreement is a significant step in the implementation of our plan to strengthen our alliance, modernize our posture, and maintain our engagement in Asia over the long term.

So, in the central and western Pacific, we are actually increasing our military presence, with new air, naval, and marine assets based over the horizon in Guam and throughout the region – prepared as always to respond to a number of contingencies, natural or man-made.

At the same time, we are seeing developments with other nations and other friends:

- Australia remains a steadfast ally whose cooperation is critical on a broad array of issues. We welcome Australia's new Defense White Paper reaffirming its role regionally and globally, and continue to seek ways to advance common interests together.
- Last year we celebrated the 175th anniversary of U.S.-Thailand relations. And we look to expand our cooperation in coming years.
- Our alliance with the Philippines has deepened as we tackle challenges ranging from terrorism to disaster relief to defense reform. And I look forward to visiting Manila soon.
- Earlier this year, the administration announced that we are seeking to build a new comprehensive partnership with Indonesia. We congratulate Indonesia on the significant steps it has taken to strengthen its democracy – and its role in the region.
- Our partnership with Singapore remains strong and we are working to increase cooperation with Malaysia, Vietnam, and others.
- We are also looking to forge new partnerships in places long disregarded. This includes our emerging dialogue with Cambodia, as well as developments with Laos.

When it comes to India, we have seen a watershed in our relations – cooperation that would have been unthinkable in the recent past. As Admiral Keating, commander of United States Pacific Command, recently wrote, it is a “genuine convergence of national interests.” In coming years, we look to India to be a partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

And we are working with China on common challenges – from economic matters to security issues such as regional areas of tension, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, energy security, piracy, and disaster relief. It is essential for the United States and China to find opportunities to cooperate wherever possible. This includes maintaining a defense relationship marked by consistent and open channels of communication and contact. The United States, for its part, will remain committed to this goal. Likewise, it is essential that we are transparent – both to each other and to the rest of the world – about our strategic goals, political intentions, and military development.

What we have seen in the U.S. approach to Asia in recent years – and what I believe we will see in the future – is a very real shift that reflects new thinking in U.S. defense strategy overall. A shift that, while continuing to fulfill our commitments to the permanent presence of, and direct action by, U.S. forces in the region – places ever greater emphasis on building the capacity of partners better to defend themselves. A shift away from solely conventional military deterrence as traditionally understood – think of mechanized divisions poised along the Korean demilitarized zone or the central plains of Germany. A shift toward a re-balanced mix of the so-called “hard” and “soft” elements of national power – where military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and humanitarian elements are integrated seamlessly.

It is an approach that brings together various parts of the United States government to work more closely with diverse partners with a range of shared interests – from old allies such as Australia to former adversaries like Vietnam. It is an approach intended to further strengthen and deepen security in the Pacific Rim through maintaining our robust military presence but also through strengthened and deepened partnerships.

These new strategic realities will play a central role as the United States undergoes a number of policy reviews this year, including the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review. These documents will lay out our view of the threats and challenges to our nation, and how that will be reflected in our future defense procurement and spending strategies. While it is at times a messy process, it will be an open and transparent exercise – so that no one will get the wrong idea about our intentions. We will consult with key allies and partners. And we will articulate our strategy clearly. It is our hope that this effort can be an example of the power of openness and its ability to reduce miscommunication and the risk of competitive arms spending.

I believe these documents will help us pursue whole-of-government approaches that offer the only solution to the vexing security challenges of the modern era. Which brings me to my second point: the nature of the threats we face.

As in the rest of the world, in Asia the traditional dilemmas posed by rising, resurgent, or rogue nation states coexist with a range of diverse, unconventional threats that transcend national borders. Some are ancient – such as piracy, ethnic strife, and poverty. Others are of more recent vintage: terrorist networks harnessing new technologies; weapons proliferation; environmental degradation; drug and human trafficking; cyber security; climate change; economic turmoil in the global markets; and the emergence of deadly and contagious diseases that can spread more rapidly than ever before in human history.

It has become clear in just the last two decades that “security” encompasses far more than just military considerations. An economic crisis can become a security crisis. A lack of good governance can undermine order and stability. Under



pressure from criminals or disease, weak states can become failed states.

What these challenges all have in common is that they cannot simply be overcome by one, or even two countries, no matter how wealthy or powerful. While the United States has unparalleled capabilities, we also recognize that the best solutions require multiple nations acting with uncommon unity.

I have been heartened in recent months by the global response to the economic crisis, the threat of a pandemic flu, and piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. While there have been some differences of opinion, overall our nations have shown the willpower to come together and develop unified responses.

One of the areas in which we are most engaged is maritime security – and the efforts to combat piracy and proliferation. United States Pacific Command works closely with a number of nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and more – to provide the training and equipment, from radars to patrol craft, enabling them to assert control over waterways that have been used by drug smugglers, weapons smugglers, and terrorists.

The United States has also provided assistance to help nations work together: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and others are securing and improving transit routes in the region. And of course, Asian countries have played a major role off the Horn of Africa – with Malaysia, India, Singapore, Korea, Japan, and China all taking part in anti-piracy efforts.

In addition to improving the capabilities of friends, we are encouraging them wherever possible to partner and cooperate more with their neighbors and other nations. Here we are trying to overcome the conventions and habits of the Cold War. For decades after World War II, Asia's security architecture mostly reflected a "hub and spokes" model, with the United States as the "hub" and the "spokes" representing a series of bilateral alliances with other countries that did not necessarily cooperate much with each other. To be sure, Asia already has a number of formal and informal multilateral institutions:

- ASEAN, for example, has for decades been the foundation for prosperity and stability in Southeast Asia – relying upon the idea that a broader dialogue spreads trust and stability.
- Similarly, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum plays an important role in regional development and trade.
- And there are also ad hoc arrangements, such as ones centered on efforts to combat piracy and illegal trafficking.

Moving forward, we would like to see a good deal more cooperation among our allies and security partners – more multilateral ties in addition to hubs and spokes. Let me be clear: This does not mean any weakening of our bilateral ties, but rather enhancing security by adding to them multilateral cooperation.

These kinds of efforts have faced no shortage of obstacles. Countries have sometimes found it hard to work with us, or with each other. But we believe that the nations of the region must move in a more multilateral direction in order to deal with the most pressing threats in this era.

One of the greatest challenges, and one that cannot be overcome without close cooperation between and among countries, is of course terrorism – as an ideological movement, as a criminal enterprise, as a scourge that transcends borders, peoples, and religions. Working together, we have made substantial progress in suppressing terrorism in Asia and reducing the conditions under which it thrives.

I know some in Asia have concluded that Afghanistan does not represent a strategic threat to their countries, owing in part to Afghanistan's geographic location. But the threat from failed or failing states is international in scope – whether in the security, economic, or ideological realms. Extremists in Asia have engaged in terrorist acts such as in Bali, terrorist activity and guerilla warfare in Mindanao, and they have plotted attacks in several Southeast Asian nations. They are inspired by, and at times received support directly from, groups operating along the Afghan-Pakistani border – the ungoverned space from which this threat ultimately emanates.

Failure in a place like Afghanistan would have international reverberations – and, undoubtedly, many of them would be felt in this part of the world.

The United States has unveiled a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan – with new leadership, new resources, and a new sense of urgency. I am optimistic that we will gain momentum over the next year – but it will require hard work.

I thank the countries here that have contributed to this mission. Among them:

- Australia continues to be in the thick of some of the toughest fighting;
- Japan has made great financial contributions;
- India continues infrastructure projects throughout Afghanistan; and
- New Zealand and Singapore continue to help man Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

But Afghanistan needs more. To establish a sustainable and effective government in Afghanistan, it needs additional:

- Aid and expertise to help build infrastructure;
- Funding to expand and maintain the Afghan National Army and police;
- Experts in a variety of fields, such as prison reform, civil service, health care, agriculture, engineering, and education;

and

- Assistance to ensure that the presidential and provincial elections this year – and next year's parliamentary and district council elections – are free, fair, and credible.

The challenge in Afghanistan is so complex, and so untraditional, that it can only be met by all of us working in concert. All must contribute what they can to a cause that demands the full attention of the international community – a cause that is worthy of sacrifice and in everyone's national interest.

Other developments pose challenges to the long-term stability, security, and peace of Asia. Whether on the sea, in the air, in space, or cyberspace, the global commons represents a realm where we must cooperate – where we must adhere to the rule of law and the other mechanisms that have helped maintain regional peace. Only by committing to openness and transparency – by adhering to standard operational practices and international law – can we prevent misunderstandings, accidents, and even open conflicts.

We also have to contend with the problem of Burma, one of the isolated, desolate exceptions to the growing prosperity and freedom of the region. We saw Burma's resistance to accept basic humanitarian aid last year following the cyclone – a

decision indicative of that country's approach to the rest of the world. We need to see real change in Burma – the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the institution of meaningful dialogue between the junta and the opposition.

And then there's North Korea. Dependent on the charity of the international community to alleviate the hunger and suffering of its people, North Korea's leadership has chosen to focus the North's limited energy and resources on a reckless and ultimately self-destructive quest for nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. These programs have isolated North Korea globally and, quite literally, starved its people.

The policy of the United States has not changed: Our goal is complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. North Korea's nuclear program and actions constitute a threat to regional peace and security. We unequivocally reaffirm our commitment to the defense of our allies in the region. The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States and our allies. And we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action.

President Obama has offered an open hand to tyrannies that unclench their fists. He is hopeful, but he is not naïve. Likewise, the United States and our allies are open to dialogue, but we will not bend to pressure or provocation. And on this count, North Korea's latest reply to our overtures isn't exactly something we would characterize as helpful or constructive. We will not stand idly by as North Korea builds the capability to wreak destruction on any target in the region – or on us.

At the end of the day, the choice to continue as a destitute, international pariah, or chart a new course, is North Korea's alone to make. The world is waiting.

There are no easy solutions to the challenges I have outlined this morning. And that brings me to my final point: the type of leadership you can expect from President Obama and the United States in coming years.

When Secretary Clinton visited the region, she said that this administration is committed to listening to the views of friends and partners across the globe. For example, we are now beginning to negotiate accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation – which demonstrates our willingness to take regional norms into account as we consider our relationships across the globe.

The President, similarly, has spoken of a more collaborative and consultative foreign policy – one committed to forging common solutions to common problems. Do not get me wrong: The United States will continue to be assertive on the international stage. We will protect our allies and our interests. We are, as a former secretary of state said, an indispensable power – but we are also one that is aware of our own limitations, aware that the world and nearly all the challenges we face are simply too complex to go it alone.

Let me close with a final thought. Throughout more than two centuries, the United States has been a beacon of freedom. In our efforts to protect our own freedom – and that of others – we have from time to time made mistakes, including at times being arrogant in dealing with others. But we always correct our course, and our willingness to do so is one of our most enduring strengths. In the end we know that our own democracy's strength ultimately depends on adhering to our nation's values and ideals – and on the strength and independence of other democracies and partners around the world. Those remain the guiding principles of our foreign policy today.

Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTO OF MEETING WITH CHINESE MILITARY LEADERS

May 30, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, shakes hands with Ma Xiaotian, right, China's deputy chief of general staff, People's Liberation Army, during their meeting on the sidelines of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Asia Security Summit, Singapore, May 30, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      June 01, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro

MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, members of the media, good afternoon. We will first listen to the opening statement of Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. This will be followed by the opening statement of Secretary Robert Gates.

Sir.

SEC. TEODORO: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. (Off mike.) We warmly welcome and are honored by the visit of the Honorable Robert Gates. Dr. Gates's visit today signals another milestone -- (off mike) -- strong cooperation between and amongst our countries, particularly the defense and military leaders. (Off mike.)

From helping us in fighting terrorism to helping us -- (off mike) -- natural disasters -- (off mike) -- the relationship between and amongst our countries has been strong and should be stronger. The visit of the honorable secretary today is one step further towards that goal.

That goal is increasing enduring cooperation, between and amongst our armed forces and defense departments and our governments, from the common threats of international terrorism -- (off mike) -- when natural calamities strike.

We also talked today about other areas of cooperation, particularly in building up our capacities, at the department level and in the armed forces level. The most important thing, at least that our armed forces said, and the department said, we thank the secretary. (Off mike.)

He talked to our troops. He talked to our men and women, who have been deployed unceasingly since January of last year, under adverse conditions. (Off mike.)

We welcome Secretary Gates and we thank him for his visit today.

SEC. GATES: Secretary Teodoro, thank you for hosting us today.

It is a great pleasure to be back in the Philippines; my first visit to Manila in almost 20 years and the first visit by a United States secretary of Defense in almost 10 years. Frankly it's been too long on both counts. And I'm honored to be the first representative of President Obama, Cabinet officer, to visit the Philippines.

We had a good conversation about a number of issues, from United States assistance, to the armed forces of the Philippines, to broader regional security measures.

Over the last decade, the Philippines has faced a number of security challenges and has met them squarely. This is testimony to Secretary Teodoro's strong leadership, his efforts to reform the armed forces and the courage and adaptability of the Filipino military.

I look forward to meeting a few Filipino troops after this meeting. I will tell them, as I told Secretary Teodoro, that we are partners. We will continue to strongly support their efforts to defeat terrorists and extremists threatening their country and the region.

Together we will not relent until this threat has been eliminated. Looking forward, I believe, our relationship needs to evolve into a broader strategic one.

The Philippines can play an important role in regional peace and stability and in fact just hosted the ASEAN regional forum's first ever field exercise.

I also thank the Philippines for its contributions to eight United Nations missions. It is clear that the Philippines is taking on a larger role on the world stage. And as it does, this relationship, one of our oldest alliance partnerships in Asia, is one that I believe will endure and deepen in the years to come.

MODERATOR: We will now proceed to the open forum. We would like to recognize Mr. Rene Acosta, the president of the Defense Press Corps of the Philippines, for his question.

Q Good afternoon, Secretary Teodoro. Good afternoon, Secretary Gates.

Secretary Gates, how do you assess the regional security environment in Southeast Asia and -- (inaudible)? Given the competing claims -- (inaudible) -- threats from Islamic militants with ties to the al Qaeda, and humanitarian (inaudible) concerns in -- (inaudible) -- around Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, in light of this (current scenario ?), is there a chance for the U.S.-Philippines security partnership -- (inaudible) - - like the VFA? How long will U.S. forces stay in southern Philippines? And your assessment of (inaudible) U.S. counterterrorism cooperation and -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Do we have about an hour? (Laughter.)

First of all, I would just say that the United States is quite comfortable with the VA -- VFA. We are both nations of laws. This agreement provides us with the legal basis for having our people here in partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. We think it works, and we are satisfied.

There are a number of security challenges, and obviously concerns and conflicting claims in the South China Sea. The United States takes no position on those claims. We only urge all the parties involved to try and resolve these issues clearly and peacefully.

The reality is, as I've just come from the Shangri-La conference in Singapore, there are a range of security challenges here in Asia. I must say, though, that I think that the progress that Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore have made in recent years in dealing with the piracy problem in the Straits of Malacca in many respects is a model of what we would like to see happen in the bulk of Asia and off of -- off the Horn of Africa.

The truth is, there has been significant progress. We have been pleased to help these countries in terms of maritime surveillance and equipment as we are trying to work with other nations off the Horn of Africa. And so I think, frankly, that's an area where there has been some real progress.

Obviously, one of the greatest concerns here in Asia really does not have to do with Southeast Asia, but rather recent developments in North Korea. And we spent a good

bit of time on that in Singapore at the Shangri-La conference. And I think this is a one of those areas where the best outcome is for all of the states that are concerned by these activities to partner and work together in trying to resolve them peacefully. 824

MODERATOR: The next question will be asked by Lise Buellad Inger (ph) of -- (affiliation inaudible).

Q Thanks. Secretary Gates, I'd like to ask you about -- sorry -- Secretary Gates, I'd like to ask you about North Korea, considering the team of U.S. officials that is going through the capitals in Asia this week to confer on what to do in response. What kind of bilateral or unilateral measures is the United States preparing in case the five nations other than North Korea in the six-party talks don't reach agreement on a more effective strategy to deal with North Korea? And also, what evidence do you see and how concerned are you related to the potential for a second long-range ballistic-missile test on the part of North Korea?

And Secretary Teodoro, what do you -- (rustling sound) -- sorry -- what more would you like to see the U.S. do in relation to assistance to the Philippine military?

SEC. GATES: I think, with respect to the team that is visiting Tokyo, Seoul, Moscow and Beijing, I think it's important for us to take the step [inaudible]. And I would rather not presume that we will not be successful in gaining a broad agreement on a way forward. I think we ought to wait and see how those conversations go and how our partners in the six-party talks, other than Pyongyang, react to the developments of the last few weeks, and see where we go from here diplomatically.

I think I'd rather not sort of speculate on what we might do after that. Let's wait and see, and hope that these conversations are productive.

With respect to, I guess, the -- we have seen some signs that there is -- that they may be doing something with another Taepo Dong II missile. But at this point it's not clear what they're (inaudible).

SEC. TEODORO: In response to your question as to what more we are going to see regarding U.S. assistance, I would answer this way.

What more can we do together? What other abilities can we do together in order for us to discover from each other what the capacities or lack thereof on each side are? And then it flows from there.



For me, it is the range and scope of our relationship which is fundamentally more important than any offer of assistance given by one government or the other. And such was the focus of Secretary Gates's saying that we need a strategic dialogue about it so that the relationship is one built on principles, on forward-looking things, where both countries can join hand in hand to solve common problems for regional or area-wide problems, and not one being a recipient of aid or those grants from the other.

Because both governments, in terms of assistance -- (off mike) -- government should also rebuild its own capacities for that. So in that -- on that score I'd answer your question as to what can we both do together, and then fill in the gaps as they come.

MODERATOR: We would like to recognize Mr. Jaime Luis (ph) of ABS-CBN.

Q Good afternoon, sir. Secretary Gates, will the Obama administration allow extra constitutional changes if the elections in the Philippines fail next year? And second, what key policy initiatives and changes would the Philippines expect from the U.S. government?

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry, what was the first question?

Q First question is, will the Obama administration allow extra constitutional changes in case -- should the elections in the Philippines fail next year?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, to -- that is a very hypothetical question on two counts. And I think the only way I can answer that is, we assume that the elections will go forward successfully. We assume that the people of the Republic of the Philippines will democratically choose the next leader, and such choices will never face us.

Q On the second question?

(Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think in a way, my answer to that question is the same as Secretary Teodoro's answer to the last question. There are a number of areas in which we have the potential to be more effective partners together, not only in terms of bilateral issues, but also with respect to regional issues.

And so I think that what you can expect from the Obama administration is that, looking at the Philippines as a large Asian democracy that is an old friend of the United States, there is a lot we can do together. And I think we will be looking for those kinds of opportunities to continue, as I indicated in my opening statement, to broaden and deepen the relationship.

MODERATOR: We will now hear the last question from Mr. Peter Spiegel of The Wall Street Journal.

Q Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, the joint training and assistance operation here is largely seen as a success. (Inaudible.) Are there lessons to be learned here from other places, particularly when it comes to the issue of host-country sensitivities? The Filipinos were originally very sensitive and resisted the U.S. bringing special forces here to do training. We've seen similar resistance to that in Pakistan, for example. Are there lessons we can learn from the Philippines experience that we can import elsewhere?

SEC. GATES: I think one of the fundamental tenets of America foreign policy under the Obama administration, as well as of the Department of Defense itself, is the growing importance of partnering around the world and building partner capacity. I put a significant additional amount of money, hundreds of millions of dollars, in our fiscal year 2010 budget for this purpose, to advance this kind of partnering, where we can build partner capacity. And as I said in response to many questions -- for example with respect to Pakistan -- we have to be very sensitive to their sovereignty and to their domestic politics.

And so we will move with these various countries at a pace that is comfortable for them and in a way that is comfortable for them to build a relationship with us. We have to look at this, I think, in the long term. And the stronger the foundation we can build under these partner relationships, the longer they're likely to last and the more effective (inaudible).


MODERATOR: Thank you, sir.

That ends our press conference.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES


June 1, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates receives a tour of the Manila American Cemetery and Memorial in the Philippines by Larry Adkison, superintendent American Military Cemetery Philippines, in Manila, Philippines, June 1, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro, left, welcomes U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, upon his arrival in Manila, Philippines, June 1, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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Larry Adkison, Manila American Cemetery and Memorial superintendent, left, escorts U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center right, during a visit to the largest American military cemetery abroad, Manila, Philippines, June 1, 2009.  
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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      June 01, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates From Ft. Greely, Alaska

Q     (In progress.) Also, on -- management of some parts of the program, do you have any comment on that? Were you briefed on that?

SEC. GATES: I'm not -- I'm not familiar -- I haven't been briefed on -- on any management problems associated with it. Most of the -- most of the dollars -- part of the problem is people are look at this as a dollar amount, rather than as the programs themselves. And we have significantly plussed-up the dollars for terminal intercept and the THAAD and SM-3 systems that provide our capability for taking care of our troops in the field and our ships and theater defense.

We have this capability and, as I said, we'll put about a billion dollars in the FY '10 budget for enhancing the capabilities up here. And we continue the research on boost phase.

The issues really have focused more on the changes that I've made with respect to the boost phase. And that -- most of the dollars are accounted for by three programs. And they are programs, in my view, where the procurement programs got way out in front of the technology and of the operational concepts. We will continue to invest in boost phase technology. We will continue to work that, and when we have a proven technology then we'll procure it and deploy it. But I don't see any point in continuing programs in a procurement sense that -- that we're never going to deploy. And the 2nd airborne laser is a perfect example.

We're keeping the first one, but the operational concept doesn't work because to be of any value, for example against Iran, that 747 would have to orbit inside Iran. Don't think they're going to allow that. Same way with North Korea.

So we want to continue that directed energy research, that's why we're keeping the first airborne laser. Kinetic energy interceptor -- again, it was a five-year program, it was stretching to 14, no work on the third stage, no flight test, no work on the warhead, significant problems. 830

So those are the kinds of decisions that we're trying to make. It doesn't mean we think any less of missile defense. As I told the Congress, I am a very strong supporter of missile defense. But I think we need to put the money where we can actually get some value out of it.

Q You spoke about geometry. Part of the geometry is having another set of missile silos in the Czech Republic and radar in Poland. What's happening with that?

SEC. GATES: Well, it's still open.

First of all, because of the statutes that the Congress has passed, we couldn't break ground until, in any event, until both countries ratify both the agreements, for the radars and the interceptors, and ratify the Status of Forces Agreement.

With the change in government, in the Czech Republic, I think, that's potentially problematic now. But we are serious about talking with the Russians and participating perhaps -- with the Russians, the Poles, the Czechs and ourselves -- in a program that would allow us to put radars in Russia, to have the interceptors in Poland, perhaps radars also in the Czech Republic, if their government agrees to that.

So I think that's not a closed chapter at all. But I think it's still a work in progress.

Q Is that necessary to protect the East Coast of the United States?

SEC. GATES: Actually the protection that it would provide, for the continental United States, is pretty limited.

(Cross talk.)

Q Are your arguments, for your changes in missile defense, making traction on Capitol Hill?

And if I could ask the senator, he was initially critical of them. Are you persuaded by what Secretary Gates has argued?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I don't know. And we probably won't know until we get to the endgame on the budget. But I think we have a robust program. And I'm hopeful that the Congress will be supportive. The truth of the matter is, what's been interesting to me is that in the past, there have been a number of skeptics, of missile defense, on Capitol Hill. And I haven't heard much out of those folks lately.

So one good thing about this discussion is, it's brought a lot of people out in front, in support of missile defense, which I think is a very good thing.

And I think having a broad, bipartisan support for building a robust missile defense, for the United States, at a minimum, to take care of tactical and theater needs but also against a limited intercontinental ballistic missile threat, I think, is all a very good thing. And I hope that's the way it works out.

Q (Off mike.)

SENATOR MARK BEGICH (D-AK): I'll just respond.

I think we've had very good discussions with the secretary, bipartisan discussions, about missile defense. Part of it is, as the secretary talked about -- (off mike) -- and there's a sizable amount in this budget to do that.

But -- (inaudible) -- how we're going to debate it. This will be a discussion -- (inaudible) -- I think we're having good discussion, let's say that. And I think, as the secretary said, this is a 2010 budget. It's the long term that we're interested in, to make sure we have the full complement of what we're going to do for defense for our country. So we're having good discussion with the secretary at this point.

STAFF: Thank you very much, everybody.

Q I just want to ask about how much -- how much has the North Korea nuclear test complicated your attempt to cut the missile defense budget? I mean, to what extent has this made your life difficult?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that their behavior has -- has certainly alarmed people. I guess I would have to say, and maybe it's a reflection of my past, their behavior hasn't surprised me. And so I think -- if anything, I think what the North Koreans have done has won more adherents to the importance of our having at least a limited missile defense capability, in the Congress.

Q     You don't think their weapon program is a threat to us, to the United States?

SEC. GATES: Not yet, no.

STAFF (?): Thank you all.


Q     Thank you, sir.




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO ELMENDORF AFB AND FORT GREELY, AK


June 1, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to servicemembers from Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Greely, Alaska, on Elmendorf, June 1, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks to members of Fort Greely's military police security detachment after visiting ground-based interceptor missile silos on Fort Greely, Alaska, June 1, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, receives a tour by U.S. Army Col. Gregory Bowen, commander, 100th Missile Defense Brigade Ground-based Midcourse Defense, at the ground-based interceptor missile facilities on Fort Greely, Alaska, June 1, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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**STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES  
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE – DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE  
TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 2009 – 10:30 A.M.**

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting me to discuss the details of the President's Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget. First and foremost, this is a reform budget – reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

I was in Afghanistan last month. As we increase our presence there – and refocus our efforts with a new strategy – I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of what the challenges and needs are so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders – unvarnished and unscripted – has from the moment I took this job been the single greatest source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with service members, and all that I have learned over the past two-and-a-half years – all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives:

- First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view represents America's greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Third, in order to do all this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, which I will discuss as I go through the different parts of the budget.

The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for FY10 – a four percent increase over the FY09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know there has been some discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture – especially during a time of war. I believe it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term – that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

I will break this down into three sections: our people, today's warfighter, and the related topics of acquisition reform and modernization.

## OUR PEOPLE

Starting with the roll-out of the Iraq surge, my overriding priority has been getting troops at the front everything they need to fight, to win, and to survive while making sure that they and their families are properly cared for when they return. So, the top-priority recommendation I made to the President was to move programs that support the warfighters and their families into the services' base budgets, where they can acquire a bureaucratic constituency and long-term funding. To take care of people, this budget request includes, among other priorities:

- \$136 billion to fully protect and properly fund military personnel costs – an increase of nearly \$11 billion over the FY09 budget level. This means completing the growth in the Army and Marines while halting reductions in the Air Force and Navy. The Marine Corps and Army will meet their respective end-strengths of 202,100 and 547,400 by the end of this fiscal year, so this money will be for sustaining those force levels in FY10 and beyond;
- \$47.4 billion to fund military health care;
- \$3.3 billion for wounded, ill and injured, traumatic brain injury, and psychological health programs, including \$400 million for research and development. We have recognized the critical and permanent nature of these programs by institutionalizing and properly funding these efforts in the base budget; and
- \$9.2 billion for improvements in child care, spousal support, lodging, and education, some of which was previously funded in the bridge and supplemental budgets.

We must move away from ad hoc funding of long-term commitments. Overall, we have shifted \$8 billion for items or programs recently funded in war-related appropriations into the base budget.

## TODAY'S WARFIGHTER

As I told the Congress in January, our struggles to put the defense bureaucracies on a war footing these past few years have revealed underlying flaws in the priorities, cultural preferences, and reward structures of America's defense establishment – a set of institutions largely arranged to prepare for conflicts against other modern armies, navies, and air forces. Our contemporary wartime needs must receive steady long-term funding and must have a bureaucratic constituency similar to conventional modernization programs and similar to what I have tried to do with programs to support our troops. The FY10 budget reflects this thinking:

First, we will increase intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) support for the warfighter in the base budget by some \$2 billion. This will include:

- Fielding and sustaining 50 Predator-class unmanned aerial vehicle orbits by FY11 and maximizing their production. This capability, which has been in such high demand in both Iraq and Afghanistan, will now be permanently funded in the base budget. It will represent a 62 percent increase in capability over the current level and 127 percent from over a year ago;
- Increasing manned ISR capabilities such as the turbo-prop aircraft deployed so successfully as part of "Task Force Odin" in Iraq; and
- Initiating research and development on a number of ISR enhancements and experimental platforms optimized for today's battlefield.

Second, we will also spend \$500 million more in the base budget than last year to boost our capacity to field and sustain more helicopters – an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now.

Today, the primary limitation on helicopter capacity is not airframes but shortages of maintenance crews and pilots. So our focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews.

Third, to strengthen global partnership efforts, we will fund \$550 million for key initiatives. These include training and equipping foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism and stability operations.

Fourth, to grow our special operations capabilities, we will increase personnel by more than 2,400 – or four percent – and will buy more aircraft for special operations forces. We will also increase the buy of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) – a key capability for presence, stability, and counterinsurgency operations in coastal regions – from two to three ships in FY10.

Fifth, to improve our intra-theater lift capacity, we will increase the charter of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) from two to four until our own production program begins deliveries in 2011.

And, finally, we will stop the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus the previously planned 48, while maintaining the planned increase in end strength to 547,400. This will ensure that we have better-manned units ready to deploy, and help put an end to the routine use of stop loss – which often occurs because certain specialties are in high demand. This step will also lower the risk of hollowing the force.

## **ACQUISITION REFORM AND INSOURCING**

In today's environment, maintaining our technological and conventional edge requires a dramatic change in the way we acquire military equipment. I welcome legislative initiatives in the Congress to help address some of these issues and look forward to working with lawmakers in this regard. This budget will support these goals by:

- Reducing the number of support service contractors from our current 39 percent of the workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent and replacing them with full-time government employees. Our goal is to hire as many as 13,800 new civil servants in FY10 to replace contractors and up to 33,600 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next five years;
- Increasing the size of the defense acquisition workforce, converting 10,000 contractors, and hiring an additional 10,000 government acquisition professionals by 2015 – beginning with 4,080 in FY10; and
- Terminating and delaying programs whose costs are out of hand, whose technologies are immature, or whose requirements are questionable – for example, the VH-71 presidential helicopter.

## **MODERNIZATION**

We must be prepared for the future – prepared for challenges we can see on the horizon and ones that we may not even have imagined. I know that some people may think I am too consumed by the current wars to give adequate consideration to our long-term acquisition needs. This budget provides \$186 billion for modernization, which belies that claim.

As I went through the budget deliberations process, a number of principles guided my decisions:

The first was to halt or delay production on systems that relied on promising, but as yet unproven, technologies, while continuing to produce – and, as necessary, upgrade – systems that are best in class and that we know work. This was a factor in my decisions to cancel the

Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and instead build more Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites.

Second, where different modernization programs within services existed to counter roughly the same threat, or accomplish roughly the same mission, we must look more to capabilities available across the services. While the military has made great strides in operating jointly over the past two decades, procurement remains overwhelmingly service-centric. The Combat Search and Rescue helicopter, for example, had major development and cost problems to be sure. But what cemented my decision to cancel this program was the fact that we were on the verge of launching yet another single-service platform for a mission that in the real world is truly joint. This is a question we must consider for all of the services' modernization portfolios.

Third, I looked at whether modernization programs had incorporated the experiences of combat operations since September 11th. This was particularly important to the ground services, which will be in the lead for irregular and hybrid campaigns of the future. The Future Combat Systems' ground vehicle component was particularly problematic in this regard.

Fourth, I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99 percent "exquisite" service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, then are deployed in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change, and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80 percent multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget, and in significant numbers.

This relates to a final guiding principle: the need for balance – to think about future conflicts in a different way – to recognize that the black and white distinction between irregular war and conventional war is an outdated model. We must understand that we face a more complex future than that, a future where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where near-peers will use irregular or asymmetric tactics that target our traditional strengths. And where non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles. This kind of warfare will require capabilities with the maximum possible flexibility to deal with the widest possible range of conflict.

Overall, we have to consider the right mix of weapons and platforms to deal with the span of threats we will likely face. The goal of our procurement should be to develop a portfolio – a mixture of capabilities whose flexibility allows us to respond to a spectrum of contingencies. It is my hope that the Quadrennial Defense Review will give us a more rigorous analytical framework for dealing with a number of these issues. That is one reason I delayed a number of decisions on programs such as the follow-on manned bomber, the next generation cruiser, as well as overall maritime capabilities. But where the trend of future conflict is clear, I have made specific recommendations.

## **AIR CAPABILITIES**

This budget demonstrates a serious commitment to maintaining U.S. air supremacy, the sine qua non of American military strength for more than six decades. The key points of this budget as it relates to air capabilities are:

- An increase in funding from \$6.8 to \$10.4 billion for the fifth-generation F-35, which reflects a purchase of 30 planes for FY10 compared to 14 in FY09. This money will also accelerate the development and testing regime to fix the remaining problems and avoid the development issues that arose in the early stages of the F-22 program. More than 500 F-35s will be produced over the next five years, with more than 2,400 total for all the services. Russia is probably six years away from Initial Operating Capability of a fifth-

generation fighter and the Chinese are 10 to 12 years away. By then we expect to have more than 1,000 fifth-generation fighters in our inventory;

- This budget completes the purchase of 187 F-22 fighters – representing 183 planes plus the four funded in the FY09 supplemental to replace one F-15 and three F-16s classified as combat losses;
- We will complete production of the C-17 airlifter program this fiscal year. Our analysis concludes that we have enough C-17s with the 205 already in the force and currently in production to meet current and future needs;
- To replace the Air Force’s aging tanker fleet, we will maintain the KC-X aerial refueling tanker schedule and funding, with the intent to solicit bids this summer. Our aging tankers, the lifeblood of any expeditionary force, are in serious need of replacement;
- We will retire approximately 250 of the oldest Air Force tactical fighter aircraft in FY10; and
- Before continuing with a program for a next-generation manned bomber, we should first assess the requirements and what other capabilities we might have for this mission – and wait for the outcome of the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the outcome of post-START arms-control negotiations.

#### **MARITIME CAPABILITIES**

The United States must not take its current maritime dominance for granted and needs to invest in programs, platforms, and personnel to ensure that dominance in the future. But rather than go forward under the same assumptions that guided our shipbuilding during the Cold War, I believe we need to reconsider a number of assumptions – a process that will, as I mentioned, be greatly helped by the QDR.

We must examine our blue-water fleet and the overall strategy behind the kinds of ships we are buying. We cannot allow more ships to go the way of the DDG-1000: since its inception the projected buy has dwindled from 32 to three as costs per ship have more than doubled.

The healthy margin of dominance at sea provided by America’s existing battle fleet makes it possible and prudent to slow production of several shipbuilding programs. This budget will:

- Shift the Navy Aircraft Carrier program to a five-year build cycle, placing it on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in a fleet of 10 carriers after 2040;
- Delay the Navy CG-X next generation cruiser program to revisit both the requirements and acquisition strategy; and
- Delay amphibious ship and sea-basing programs such as the 11th Landing Platform Dock (LPD) ship and the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship to FY11 in order to assess costs and analyze the amount of these capabilities the nation needs.

The Department will continue to invest in areas where the need and capability are proven by:

- Accelerating the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go to places that are either too shallow or too dangerous for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants;
- Adding \$200 million to fund conversion of six additional Aegis ships to provide ballistic missile defense capabilities;
- Beginning the replacement program for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine; and

- Using FY10 funds to complete the third DDG-1000 Destroyer and build one DDG-51 Destroyer. The three DDG-1000 class ships will be built at Bath Iron Works in Maine and the DDG-51 Aegis Destroyer program will be restarted at Northrop Grumman's Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi.

## LAND CAPABILITIES

As we have seen these last few years, our land forces will continue to bear the burdens of the wars we are in – and also the types of conflicts we may face in the future, even if not on the same scale. As I said earlier, we are on track with the expansion of the ground forces, and have added money for numerous programs that directly support warfighters and their families.

Since 1999, the Army has been pursuing its Future Combat Systems – an effort to simultaneously modernize most of its platforms, from the way individual soldiers communicate to the way mechanized divisions move. Parts of the FCS program have already demonstrated their adaptability and relevance to today's conflicts. For example, the connectivity of the Warfighter Information Network will dramatically increase the agility and situational awareness of the Army's combat formations.

But the FCS vehicle program is, despite some adjustments, based on the same assumptions as when FCS was first conceived. The premise behind the design of these vehicles is that lower weight, greater fuel efficiency, and, above all, near-total situational awareness, compensate for less heavy armor – a premise that I believe was belied by the close-quarters combat, urban warfare, and increasingly lethal forms of ambush that we've seen in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I would also note that the current vehicle program does not include a role for our recent \$25 billion investment in the MRAP vehicles being used to good effect in today's conflicts.

With that in mind:

- We have canceled the existing FCS ground vehicle program, and will reevaluate the requirements, technology, and approach and then relaunch a new Army vehicle modernization program, including a competitive bidding process;
- The FCS budget in FY10 is \$3 billion. I have directed that the new FCS program be fully funded in the out-years; and
- We will accelerate FCS's Warfighter Information Network development and field it, along with proven FCS spin-off capabilities, across the entire Army.

## MISSILE DEFENSE

The United States has made great technological progress on missile defense in the last two decades, but a number of questions remain about certain technologies and the balance between research and development on one hand, and procurement on the other. This is one area where I believe the overall sustainability of the program depends on our striking a better balance. To this end, this budget will:

- Restructure the program to focus on the rogue state and theater missile threat. We will not increase the number of current ground-based interceptors in Alaska as had been planned. But we will continue to robustly fund research and development to improve the capability we already have to defend against long-range rogue missile threats – threats that North Korea's missile launch reminds us are real;
- Cancel the second airborne laser (ABL) prototype aircraft. We will keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant



affordability and technology problems and the program's proposed operational role is highly questionable;

- Terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement. Overall, the Missile Defense Agency program will be reduced by \$1.2 billion; and
- Increase by \$700 million funding for our most capable theater missile defense systems like the THAAD and SM-3 programs.

## **CYBER SECURITY**

To improve cyberspace capabilities, this budget:

- Increases funding for a broad range of Information Assurance capabilities to improve the security of our information as it is generated, stored, processed, and transported across our IT systems;
- Increases the number of cyber experts this department can train from 80 students per year to 250 per year by FY11; and
- Establishes a cyber test range.

There is no doubt that the integrity and security of our computer and information systems will be challenged on an increasing basis in the future. Keeping our cyber infrastructure safe is one of our most important national-security challenges. While information technology has dramatically improved our military capabilities, our reliance on data networks has at the same time left us more vulnerable. Our networks are targets for exploitation, and potentially disruption or destruction, by a growing number of entities that include foreign governments, non-state actors, and criminal elements.

## **OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS**

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process – as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Department of Defense.

We are asking for \$130 billion to directly support the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is less than the \$141.7 billion we asked for last year through the bridge fund and the remaining supplemental request – which in part reflects shifting some programs into the base budget.

The OCO request includes \$74.1 billion to maintain our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq – from pre-deployment training, to transportation to or from theater, to the operations themselves.

- In Afghanistan, this will support an average of 68,000 military members and six Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents – plus support personnel; and
- In Iraq, this will fund an average of 100,000 military members, but also reflects the President's decision to cut force levels to six Advisory and Assistance Brigades by August 31, 2010. Compared to the FY08 enacted levels for Operation Iraqi Freedom, we are asking for less than half.

Aside from supporting direct operations, the OCO funding also includes, among other programs:

- \$17.6 billion to replace and repair equipment that has been worn-out, damaged, or destroyed in theater. The major items include helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, trucks,

Humvees, Bradleys, Strykers, other tactical vehicles, munitions, radios, and various combat support equipment;

- \$15.2 billion for force protection, which includes \$5.5 billion for MRAPs – \$1.5 billion to procure 1,080 new MRAP All Terrain Vehicles (ATV) for Afghanistan and \$4 billion for sustainment, upgrades, and other costs for MRAPs already fielded or being fielded.
- \$7.5 billion for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Ultimately, the Afghan people will shoulder the responsibility for their own security, so we must accelerate our training of their security forces in order to get more Afghans into the fight;
- \$1.5 billion for the Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP) – a program that has been very successful in allowing commanders on the ground to make immediate, positive impacts in their areas of operation. It will continue to play a pivotal role as we increase operations in Afghanistan and focus on providing the population with security and opportunities for a better life. I should note that the Department has taken a number of steps to ensure the proper use of this critical combat-enhancing capability;
- \$1.4 billion for military construction – most of which will go toward infrastructure improvements in Afghanistan to support our increased troop levels; and
- \$700 million for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF). This program will be carried out with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and will complement existing and planned State Department efforts by allowing the CENTCOM commander to work with Pakistan’s military to build counterinsurgency capability. I know there is some question about funding both the PCCF and the Foreign Military Financing program, but we are asking for this authority for the unique and urgent circumstances we face in Pakistan – for dealing with a challenge that simultaneously requires military and civilian capabilities. This is a vital element of the President’s new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy.

## CONCLUSION

Let me close with a few final thoughts.

This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than half a trillion dollars – and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending “requirements creep,” terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction.

Second of all, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight – not just the wars we have traditionally been best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I’ve said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built – on land, at sea, or in the air – to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years – on the battlefield and, perhaps just as important, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars – not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would, however, ask you to look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do – at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future.

Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.

###

CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS  
Congressional Hearings  
June 9, 2009

## Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense Holds Hearing on the Proposed Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2010 for the Defense Department

LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES

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INOUYE:

This morning, the subcommittee's pleased to welcome Dr. Robert Gates, secretary of defense and Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to testify on the administration's budget for fiscal year 2010.

And, Mr. Secretary, while the full Senate Appropriations Committee has already had the pleasure of meeting with you earlier this year regarding the so-called supplemental bill, let me extend a warm welcome to you on behalf of the Defense Subcommittee.

Your continued willingness to put your nation's needs ahead of your personal interests demonstrates your unwavering commitment to public service and your dedication to the men and women in our military, and our nation owes you a great debt of gratitude.

The administration has requested \$534 billion for the base budget of the Department of Defense, an increase of \$21 billion over the amount enacted in last fiscal year. Additionally, the administration has requested \$130 billion in supplemental non-emergency

funding for overseas contingency operations in the next fiscal year.

Mr. Secretary, you have called this a reform budget, and in recent months, you have given several keynote speeches emphasizing, in particular, the need for greater balance in our force structure between competing requirements for irregular warfare and conventional warfare and for changing the way the Defense Department does business. This budget request before us reflects these priorities, and, as you're well aware, it will raise a few questions.

A key theme you have emphasized in recent months is the need to improve an institutional home in the Department of Defense for the warfighter engaged in the current irregular fight. Much of the critical force protection equipment that is used with great success in the theater today has been funded outside the regular defense budget process and is being managed by newly created ad hoc organizations that appear to be temporary in nature.

For example, since 2005, the department has procured over 16,000 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles, funded entirely with supplemental appropriations. Yet even after five years, the role of these vehicles in our force structure and the future role of the office that manages this program within the department are undefined.

Another example is the ISR Task Force, which is to accelerate the fielding of critical intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets into the theater, and you have made it a point to emphasize these capabilities by adding \$2 billion to the base budget for the ISR capabilities. Yet the role of this task force within the

department's institutional chain of command remains ad hoc, and the future is undetermined.

There's no question that these capabilities will be needed in the future, so we hope today you can illustrate to the committee how we can institutionalize the lessons learned with respect to equipping our warfighter and permanently address the warfighters' requirements in DOD bureaucracy without continuously adding bureaucratic layers.

At the same time, Mr. Secretary, conventional threats to our national security remain. While irregular warfare is, and will presumably continue to be, a preferred tactic between non-state actors, we cannot lose sight of threats from traditional nation states, such as North Korea, Iran and others.

So as we consider the many adjustments your budget proposes to modernize programs designed to address conventional threats, it is important that we understand the strategic underpinnings and consequences of curtailing or terminating programs, such as the F-22, the C-17 transport or Future Combat Systems Manned Ground Vehicles.

There's no question, Mr. Secretary, that the requirements to winning irregular conflicts have been neglected too long, but I believe we must ensure that we strike the right balance between preparing for both irregular and regular wars, and we look forward to hearing your thoughts on that matter.

Finally, Mr. Secretary, your budget emphasizes our nation's greatest military asset, the all-volunteer force. By fully funding end strength growth, providing for increased medical research and increased funding warfighter families, these programs have long

been funded through supplemental appropriations, and we welcome your commitment to our service members and their families by institutionalizing these programs in the base budget.

On the other hand, the rising military personnel and health care costs are creating budget pressures on our acquisition programs, calling into question the affordability of many high-priced platforms designed to meet specific military requirements.

So, gentlemen, we have much to discuss this morning. We very much appreciate your being here with us today, and we look forward to your testimony.

However, before proceeding with your opening statements, may I call upon the vice chairman of the committee, Senator Cochran, for comments.

COCHRAN:

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'm pleased to join you in welcoming the distinguished panel to review the budget request of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Comptroller Hale, we appreciate the hard work you're doing and the challenges you face, and we want to be sure that what we do will help deal with the problems that we face in the national security arena, and we thank you for your distinguished service.

INOUYE:

Senator Leahy, do you have any statement you'd like to make?

LEAHY:

Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to see the secretary and Admiral Mullen. I've had many conversations with them, and I appreciate their help.

And, Mr. Hale, I just had an opportunity to lead a Senate delegation on a trip to Iraq and Pakistan and Afghanistan. I know you've made some visits of your own there, which is of significance to the trips, although I think they were probably more excited of seeing Stephen Colbert than they were seeing me. But it -- we did see some extremely hardworking men and women in uniform in each of the places we went.

We also saw our coalition forces, especially in Afghanistan, working and taking large number of casualties. Canada, our neighbor to the north, has had many, as have other coalitions, and yet they are working very, very hard.

I wanted to be there because, as I mentioned before, Mr. Secretary, the end of the year we'll see 1.800 members -- up to 1,800 members of the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team from the Vermont National Guard going there. They're one of the only units with mountain skills. I mean, they train both summertime and then 20 degree below zero weather in Vermont in the wintertime.

They're training hard on that, and I will, Mr. Chairman, ask some questions on that. We're watching. Of course, I'm very proud of these men and women who are going, but this is one of the largest deployments we've ever had. I see Senator Feinstein here. It would be equivalent on a per capita basis with, like, about 100,000



people or more going from -- well, over 100,000 people going from California.

And, Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your response and your willingness to work with us on some of the special situations they'll have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INOUYE:

Senator Shelby?

SHELBY:

Mr. Chairman, I have an opening statement. I'd ask it be made a part of the record in its entirety. And other than that, I just want to welcome Secretary Gates here, Admiral Mullen and Comptroller Hale.

Thank you.

INOUYE:

So ordered.

Senator Feinstein?

FEINSTEIN:

No opening statement, Mr. Chairman. I'd just welcome Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen.

INOUYE:

Senator (inaudible).

(UNKNOWN)

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen. We congratulate you on the progress you're making in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It's not easy, but I think you have a way ahead with the counterinsurgency strategy.

I will be back to ask some questions but two points I want to raise with you. First, you have said, we need to shift away from the 99 percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, deploy to limited quantities. We must look more to the 80 percent multiservice solutions that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers.

And, Mr. Secretary, I'd like to know how that fits with the recommendation in the overhead area to go with the NGO -- NCEO (ph) when there are a number of less expensive solutions that can provide a multitude of opportunities for getting the overhead collection we need. And Chair Feinstein and I on the Intelligence Committee have been looking at that very intensely, and we'd like to continue the discussions with you on that.

And the second thing, Admiral Roughead recently stated that the F/A-18E/F is the aviation backbone of our Navy's ability to

project power ashore, and the numbers of the carrier-capable strike fighters will decrease between 2016 and 2020 to affect our air wing capacity of effectiveness.

And we had asked last year, and actually set in law, a requirement that there be a report on the multiyear procurement of the F/A-18. I believe that was due in March. We think that is a very important element to consider, particularly with the delays in time, the budget being exceeded and the failure to meet operational standards of the plane forecast to take its place to date.

So I will look forward to asking more about those and may have some questions for the record. I have another meeting I have to go to, but I will come back for the questions.

I thank the chairman and the members of the committee and you for the indulgence.

INOUYE:

Thank you.

And now, Mr. Secretary.

GATES:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to discuss the details of the president's fiscal year 2010 defense budget.

There is a tremendous amount of material here, and I know that there are a number of questions, so I'll keep my opening remarks

brief and focus on the strategy and thinking behind many of these recommendations. My submitted testimony has more detailed information on specific programmatic decisions.

First and foremost, as you suggested and commented on, Mr. Chairman, this is a reform budget reflecting lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, yet also addressing the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.

I visited Afghanistan last month, and as we increase our presence there and refocus our efforts with a new strategy, I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so we can give our troops the equipment and the support to be successful and come home safely.

Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders unvarnished and unscripted has, from the moment I took this job, been the greatest single source for ideas on what this department needs to do, both operationally and institutionally.

As I told a group of soldiers in Afghanistan, they have done their job, now it is time for us in Washington to do ours.

In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I've had with troops and commanders and everything that I have learned over the past two and a half years, all underpinning this budget's three principal objectives.

First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America's greatest strategic asset. As Admiral Mullen says, if we don't get the people part of this business right, none of the other decisions will matter.

Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies.

And, third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, making a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition and contracting.

From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony. The base budget request is for \$533.8 billion for FY '10, a 4 percent increase over the FY '09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the department's budget request includes \$130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, principally in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture, especially during a time of war. I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after various previous times of conflict on so many occasions and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch.

This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term, that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities.

GATES:

As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the war through the regular budgeting process as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for this department.

This budget aims to alter many programs and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting acquisition and procurement processes. In this respect, three points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions.

First, sustainability -- by that I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It simply is not reasonable to expect the defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than \$.5 trillion. And I believe this budget focuses money where it can most effectively do that.

I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration and Congress to Congress. Eliminating waste and ending requirements creep, terminating programs that go too far outside the line and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to a more reasonable level will reduce this friction.

Second balance -- we have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight, not just the ones we have been traditionally best suited to fight or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who in the real world also have finite resources. As

I've said before, even when considering challenges from nation states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we build on land, in the sea and in the air to stop the Soviets during the Cold War.

At the same time, this budget robustly funds many modernization programs that will sustain our significant advantages for potential future conflict. For certain modernization programs have been canceled because of acquisition, technological or requirements issues, such as FCS (ph) vehicles, it is our intention to relaunch those modernization programs on a much sounder and more sustainable basis after completion of the quadrennial defense review, the nuclear posture review, the ballistic missile defense review and the space policy review later this year.

And finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years on the battlefield and perhaps just as importantly, institutionally at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win the nation's wars, not just constantly prepare for them. We have to do better. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve. And this budget makes real headway in that respect.

At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of war and prepares for the future, about how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the war fighter in the long-term, about the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight, about reforming our requirements and acquisition processes.

I know that some will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do, the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future. As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum. A dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is \$1 taken from capability we do need, often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely.

Once again I thank you for this committee's ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. And we look forward to your questions.

INOUYE:

I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Cochran, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Let me start by saying I fully support, not only the president's fiscal year 2010 budget submission for this department, but more specifically, the manner in which Secretary Gates developed it. He presided over a comprehensive and collaborative process, the likes of which, quite frankly, I have not seen in more than a decade of doing this sort of work in the Pentagon.

Over the course of several months and a long series of meetings and debates, every service chief and every combatant commander had a voice. And every one of them used it. Normally, as you



know, budget proposals are worked from the bottom up with each service making the case for specific programs and then fighting it out at the end to preserve those that are most important to them. This proposal was done from the top down.

Secretary Gates gave us broad guidance, his overall vision and then gave us the opportunity to meet it. Everything was given a fresh look, and everything had to be justified.

Decisions to curtail or eliminate a program were based solely on its relevance and on its execution. The same can be said for those we decided to keep. If we are what we buy, I believe the force we are asking you to help us buy today is the right one, both for the world we're living in and the world we may find ourselves living in 20 to 30 years down the road.

This submission before you is just as much a strategy as it is a reform budget. First and foremost, it makes people our top strategic priority. I have said many times and I remain convinced the best way to guarantee our future security is to support our troops and their families. It is the recruit and the retain choices of our families and quite frankly, American citizens writ large, that will make or break the all-volunteer force.

They will be less inclined to make those decisions should we not be able to offer them viable career options, adequate health care, suitable housing, advanced education and the promise of a prosperous life long after they have taken off the uniform. This budget devotes more than a third of the total request to what I would call the people account with a great majority of that figure, nearly \$164 billion, going to pay military pay and health care.

I am particularly proud of the funds we have dedicated caring for our wounded. There is, in my view, no higher duty for this nation or for those of us in leadership positions than to care for those who sacrifice so much and who must now face life forever changed by wounds both seen and unseen.

I know you share that feeling, and thank you for the work you have done in this committee and throughout the Congress to pay attention to these needs and to the needs of the families of our fallen. Our commitment to all of them must be for the remainder of their lives.

That's why this budget allocates funds to complete the construction of additional wounded warrior complexes, expands the pilot program designed to expedite the processing of injured troops through the disability evaluation system, increases the number of mental health professionals assigned to deployed units and devotes more resources to the study and treatment of post-traumatic stress and traumatic brain injuries.

After nearly eight years of war, we are the most capable and combat-experienced military we've ever been, certainly without question the world's best counterinsurgency force. Yet for all this success, we are pressed and still lack a proper balance between OPTEMPO and home tempo, between unconventional and conventional capabilities, between readiness today and readiness tomorrow.

And that, Mr. Chairman, is the second reason this budget of ours acts as a strategy for the future. It seeks balance by investing more heavily in critical enablers such as aviation, special forces, cyber operations, civil affairs, language skills. It rightly makes winning the wars we are in our top operational priority.

By adjusting active Army BCT growth to 45, it helps ensure our ability to impact the fight sooner, increase dwell time and reduce our overall demand on equipment. And by authorizing Secretary Gates to transfer money to the secretary of state for reconstruction, security or stabilization, it puts more civilian professionals alongside war fighters in more places like Iraq and Afghanistan.

I said it before, but it bears repeating. More boots on the ground are important, but they will never be completely sufficient. We need people with graphing tablets and shovels and teaching degrees. We need bankers and farmers and law enforcement experts. As we draw down responsibly in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we need a more concerted effort to build up the capacity of our partners.

The same can be said of Pakistan where boots on the ground aren't even an option. Some will argue this budget devotes too much money to these sorts of low-intensity needs, that it tilts dangerously away from conventional capabilities. In my view, it does not.

A full 35 percent of this submission is set aside for modernization. And much of that will go to what we typically consider conventional requirements.

We know there are global risks and threats out there not tied directly to the fight against Al Qaida and other extremist groups, threats like those we awoke to on this past Memorial Day when the stability of an entire region was shaken by the increasing belligerence of North Korea.

The work of defending this nation does not fit nicely into any one bucket. It spans the entire spectrum of conflict. We must be ready

to deter and win all wars big and small, near and far. With this budget submission, the nation is getting the military it needs for that challenge. It's getting a strategy for the future.

Thank you all for your continued support and for all you do to support the men and women of the United States military and their families.

INOUYE:

Well, I thank you very much, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Undersecretary.

If I may now begin my questioning.

Mr. Secretary, our troops entered Afghanistan in 2001. And our troops entered Iraq in 2003. And we soon learned that it wasn't what we expected. And in some ways we weren't quite prepared.

So we rapidly developed platforms like the MRAP and the anti-IED mines. Now, why was it necessary to go outside the regular DOD acquisition process to get these things? And how can we institutionalize these activities instead of continually adding layers of new bureaucracy?

GATES:

We've had to go -- we've had to go outside the regular bureaucracy, I think, in four major areas, one before I became secretary and three subsequently. The first that was formed before I became secretary was the effort to counter the IEDs, as you suggest. The subsequent ones have been for dealing with wounded warriors, for building the MRAPs and for greater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance needs.

The problem is that there was not -- I guess the most graphic way I've put it is that there were too few people that came to work in the Pentagon every day asking what can I do today to help our war fighters succeed and come home safely. And so, we needed to go outside the regular procurement processes because, frankly, without the top down direction from the secretary of defense, these efforts would not have been successful.

In the case of the MRAPs, it required using a number of authorities provided by law only to the secretary of defense in terms of acquisition of materials and priorities and so on. But in other cases, the solution was across multiple services and outside the normal bureaucratic structure.

I believe that the services are changing the way they do business. For example, the Air Force just in the last year or so under General Schwartz's leadership has taken onboard the significance of the ISR challenge and the need to have significantly larger numbers of pilots who can pilot, who can run these UAVs and so on. And so, the services, I think, are beginning to embrace the needs of the current war fighter and provide for them.

And, frankly, the reason for my putting a number of these things into the base budget is because that's where the services draw the resources to be able to go ahead and pursue these programs. For example, the ISR task force -- my anticipation is that it will disappear. And one of the challenges that I've had is keeping it focused on what can we do in the next two or three months to help get more ISR capabilities into the field.

And the natural bureaucratic propensity has been to try and squeeze, because I'm paying attention to that task force, to try and squeeze all kinds of new long-term programs that'll take years and

so on into it. So we've had to be very disciplined about keeping it focused on the near-term while the longer term issues are taken care of in the regular bureaucracy. But I'm satisfied enough with the progress that the Air Force and the Army are making in the ISR area that I believe this task force can go away.

GATES:

The truth of the matter is in the case of the MRAPs, had it not been for the generosity of the Congress and the American people, we never could have built the MRAPs. As you suggested, Mr. Chairman, we've built and deployed some 16,000 of these. We are now developing a new kind of MRAP for Afghanistan. But the total cost of that -- that program to date has been about \$26 billion. If we had tried to carve \$26 billion out of the current Pentagon budget, there would have been a real blood-letting.

So the only way we were able to do the MRAPs was through the special funding from the Congress. But I -- I -- what I am trying to do is to bring about a change in the culture of the Pentagon so we can, as I described it in another hearing, walk and chew gum at the same time; so that we can energetically and with a sense of urgency, deal with the wars we are in, and at the same time, plan for the future wars, which as you rightfully suggested we have to be prepared to fight.

INOUYE:

Thank you. Secretary -- Mr. -- Admiral Mullen, many have described the acquisition process in DOD to be cumbersome and inflexible, because we tend to seek a perfect solution. It takes many years to do this. But for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

we -- as the secretary pointed out, we've expedited the process, maybe not seeking 100 percent, but going for 75.

My question to you, as a leader of troops, do you believe that we are meeting the needs of warfighters?

MULLEN:

Yes, sir. And, if I were going to use the task force analogy just briefly, because I've been in this building for -- in and out, but in, certainly, in the last decade or so for a long time. And I just think it takes the kind of leadership focus that has been offered in those to create the sense of urgency to constantly update the guidance, so the -- so the system does not take off by itself.

And it is really in those areas that -- that the secretary and you have talked about. In addition, the equipment, the personal equipment for our warfighters, which all of us have taken a great interest in. And service chiefs certainly lead that as well in -- in front.

So from an equipment standpoint, absolutely. That doesn't mean that we won't continue to advance in some of these areas, because we still need more capability in terms of capacity. ISR would be a great example.

I also, having participated in this acquisition for a long period of time, think the -- the -- we -- we don't -- we don't move swiftly with the sense of urgency and the speed, and we do look too far out to meet the -- the current needs. And I've seen the kind of focus that these task forces have created and been led -- and the leadership that's on top of them be able to do that. And I just don't believe our system could have done that.

I do think they need to, at some point in time, sunset, have a sunset clause, set the criteria out there to be absorbed in the system. And, as the secretary has indicated, that's the case for the ISR task force. So I'm -- I'm confident we have the equipment we need. We also need to stay focused as the enemy changes to ensure that we stay ahead of the enemy as he changes his tactics.

GATES:

Mr. Chairman, let me add one more example of -- of frankly where -- where we, the chairman and I, have to -- have to fight the inertia of the department on a daily basis. One of the things that -- that we've been trying to do this spring -- this goes to Senator Leahy's point about his troops going to Afghanistan -- is drive the Medevac time of -- the -- the time required for Medevac from two hours down to the same golden hour that exists in Iraq.

And -- and we've made some substantial headway in this. We're now on average at about 68 minutes. And many are much faster. And I sent a number of additional resources forward from the Air Force and the Army earlier this spring, including three additional field hospitals. But -- but the sad reality is that, without the chairman and I paying attention to this, almost daily, getting it done and getting it done in a timely manner is just a real challenge.

So at the end of the day, I'm not sure that there is a permanent bureaucratic fix. But what it does take is the focus of the leadership on what's important. And -- and that priority, in my view, when we are at war, is taking care of those who are at war.

INOUYE:



Mr. Secretary, you suggested about 10 percent of this budget will be for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for conventional strategic traditional warfare, and 40 percent for dual use. How did you divide it up in that fashion?

GATES:

Well, that actually -- those numbers came after the fact, Mr. Chairman. I -- I made the decisions on each of the program areas independently and in the context of each other from a strategic standpoint and capabilities standpoint. And it was only after I'd made all the decisions that frankly the guys who manage the money told me that that was about how the breakout of the percentages worked.

So it -- it basically was a recognition of a reality that -- that formed by the decisions that had already been made. I -- I didn't go into it with the goal of shifting X dollars.

INOUYE:

Thank you.

Senator Cochran.

COCHRAN:

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your mentioning the MRAP vehicles, the vehicles that have been used in Afghanistan. And I wonder about whether the budget requests funding for the new all-terrain vehicle as well, the -- the MATV, as it's now referred to. Is that -- will that be useful in Afghanistan? Or do you foresee other uses of -- of those vehicles besides in our efforts to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan?

GATES:

They're primarily being designed for use in Afghanistan, where the -- the extraordinary weight of the regular MRAPs we've designed for Iraq sometimes makes their usefulness, particularly off road -- or limits their usefulness off road. So what we have done, in the all-terrain MRAP, is -- is to try and provide essentially the same level of protection, but with a different design that will give it more capability off road.

And there is money in the budget that -- both in the overseas contingency operation funds, and also in the base budget -- that will fund most of the requirement for the all-terrain vehicles. The -- the requirement has been growing since we submitted the budget. And so I don't think that -- that there's enough money in the budget to buy all of those needed for the -- to meet the requirement, but a substantial number. And in fact, Mr. Hale will give you the exact numbers. I don't know.

HALE:

We have 1,000 MRAP ATVs in the '09 remaining supplemental and 1,080 in the -- in the fiscal '10. Although I -- I believe Congress is adding some to the fiscal '09 supplemental.

COCHRAN:

In connection with ship requirements, we've noticed the increase in the amphibious ship fleet needs that go beyond traditional military missions. The tsunamis, the hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, led the military to contribute ships, some aircraft carrier capabilities, for humanitarian relief and providing food and medical supplies to these areas that were hard hit. Do you see a continuing need for shipbuilding in the amphibious area, because

of the willingness to use those vessels for non-traditional missions?

GATES:

This is one of the issues where I did not make any significant decisions, because I didn't feel that I had the analytical basis to do so. So one of the subjects that -- that the Quadrennial Defense Review is addressing is -- is the role of amphibious capability going forward, and not whether we need it, but how much we need. And so those -- that will be one of the areas of the -- of the QDR where I will be looking for some analytical guidance.

But it's clear that -- that those capabilities range far beyond the kind of armed intrusiveness, or the armed intervention that -- that was the original design purpose.

COCHRAN:

The activity we noticed with concern in North Korea in the recent short-range missile testing has led to concerns about whether or not we're moving fast enough with a ground-based interceptor production line. What is the impression that you have about the request in this budget as it relates to our capacity to defend ourselves against what looks to be an emerging and a continuing threat from North Korea and maybe others?

GATES:

The -- the ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California clearly are an important element of defense against rogue state launches, and I would say in particular, North Korea. I think the judgment and the advice that I got was that -- that the 30 silos that

we have now, or are under construction, are fully adequate to protect us against a North Korean threat for a number of years.

Now, the reality is that, if that threat were to begin to develop more quickly than anybody anticipates, or in a way that people haven't anticipated, where the 30 interceptors would not look like they were sufficient, it would be very easy to reason this program and expand the number of -- the number of silos.

I was just in Fort Greely last week. And -- and it's an immensely capable system. And one of the things that I think is important to remember is it is still a developmental system. It has real capabilities. And I have confidence that, if North Korea launched a long-range missile in the direction of the United States, that we would have a high probability of being able to defend ourselves against it.

But one of the things this budget does is robustly fund further development and testing of the interceptors at Fort Greely and -- and at Vandenberg, so that it has new interceptors with new capabilities and that are most sophisticated, are developed, we will put those into the silos and take the old interceptors out.

So we -- the idea of this is not just a static system up in Fort Greely, but something that is undergoing continuing improvement. And if the -- if the circumstances should change in a way that leads people to believe that we need more interceptors than the 30, then -- then there's plenty of room at Fort Greely to expand.

COCHRAN:

Well, we thank you, and Admiral Mullen, and the department and the soldiers and sailors who carry out your decisions well in continued success as we protect our nation. Thank you.

INOUE:

Thank you very much.

Senator Leahy.

LEAHY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'm sure Secretary Gates, though, I was going to have some questions about the MRAP ATV. But Senator Cochran and others have. And Chairman Inouye has been very helpful in money on that.

Mr. Hale, you had mentioned the -- the money part. In the '09 budget, we -- we doubled it here in the -- in the Senate. We're now in negotiations with the other body on that.

I have a particular interest in this. I -- everybody I talked with in -- when I was in Afghanistan told me how -- how much they -- how much they -- they need this for the same reasons that they -- the secretary described. I was -- it was interesting from the commanding generals of the coalition forces and -- and others.

You -- you know this terrain probably better than I. But you just look at the terrain, coming from a rural mountainous area myself, I can -- I can easily understand why the MRAPs as great as they are with their -- their weight. Try to go off -- off road, they're just going to tip over. So I -- I hope it will happen.

I -- the (inaudible) when we were there, we visited the Kabul Military Training Center. But we is myself, Senator Whitehouse, Senator Warner, that sprawling former Soviet base, where the Afghan National Army go through a kind of -- type of basic training. And I -- and I went to them in the training courses and saw what they do.

LEAHY:

And the extraordinarily high rate of illiteracy among the recruits there has to be a cause of concern. I -- I saw so many of the training things were written in their language, but also almost like a comic book showing diagrams of people doing things.

And then I read the article, which I'm sure you've seen the C.J. Tripper's (ph) article from the New York Times about the failures, especially in the police force and the training of the police force. And then in the military in a patrol one of the things that struck me is when one Afghan insulted the other, and they started into a fist fight in the middle of patrol. And they were out in an area where you have to depend on everybody being at their highest level.

That's on the bad side. On the good side, I heard from so many there how they don't see us as occupiers. They see us as people trying to help. They see a country, unlike one of its neighbors, a country probably with the potential of pulling this off with our help. Our help means a lot of money and unfortunately a lot of casualties.

How do you feel? Are we going to have a cohesive, trained Afghan National Army and police force? Because I don't see how we leave until there is one.

I mean, you must look at this all the time, Mr. Secretary.

GATES:

Let me start, and then ask Admiral Mullen to add in. I think our commanders are very optimistic about, particularly the Afghan National Army. It is, I think at this point, perhaps the strongest national institution that exists in Afghanistan. And we are on a path to increase the size from about 82,000 to 134,000.

I think a lot of the problems with the police are being addressed. Part of that problem is the lack of sufficient trainers. And part of the added forces that we're sending in will, in fact, be for training the police.

And we have a program where we're going back into districts pulling the police force out, retraining them, giving them new equipment and then putting them back in with police mentors. And the experience with that program so far has been encouraging. It's still pretty small scale. And it needs to be expanded and accelerated. And I hope that the addition of our trainers will be able to do that.

But there's no question but that our ticket out of Afghanistan is the ability of the Afghans to maintain their own security. And I think our commanders feel that we're on the right track.

But let me ask Admiral Mullen to...

MULLEN:

I would only echo that, Senator Leahy, from the point of view that these are warriors. They are a warrior nation. And they have been, in many cases, at war over the last 30 years. And we share the

concern about illiteracy. That said, in my many visits, this kind of issue has never routinely raised its head as something that we can't take into account and move forward with.

LEAHY:

Well, would you agree that there is a significant difference between the police and the army?

MULLEN:

Yes, sir, actually, not unlike Iraq.

LEAHY:

Yes.

MULLEN:

In Iraq, the army came quicker. It's the same thing in Afghanistan.

LEAHY:

But the average person is going to see the police before they're going to see the army in many, many instances in their day-to-day life.

MULLEN:

Yes, sir.

LEAHY:

And if they see bribery and corruption and all that, that's the face of the government. I mean, it's the same in our country. The



difference is that we've evolved so most of our police forces are extraordinarily well-trained.

MULLEN:

Yes, sir.

LEAHY:

But do you feel confident we can turn that around?

MULLEN:

Yes, sir, I think it's actually Minister of Interior Otmar (ph). And I don't know if you met him.

LEAHY:

I did.

MULLEN:

But he's a very impressive guy.

LEAHY:

I had a long (inaudible)...

MULLEN:

He understands the problems he has, and he's addressing them. It's going to take some time. This program the secretary mentioned, which is this focused district development where they go off to school for eight or nine weeks and then return with mentors is another significant step in the right direction.

But it's going to take time. And the police are not going to come as fast as the army is. But it is the way out.

LEAHY:

Well, thank you. And if your staff could keep me posted, both on how that's going because I'm one who wants to see it work. And I know a number of our Vermonters are going to be involved in helping to train that. I think the potential is there. I think it's a real uphill battle. Thank you.

INOUYE:

Thank you.

Senator Shelby?

SHELBY:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Gates, I believe that we must have a fair, open and honest Air Force tanker acquisition process that ensures that our men and women in uniform receive the best possible aircraft. It's also my belief that the upcoming request for proposal should utilize the best value process so that we're procuring the most capable tanker for our war fighters.

We've talked about this earlier this year. And it was my understanding that you stated that you believe the process should be fair, open, transparent. With regard to the process, who will be the acquisition authority for the upcoming tanker competition? Will it be the office of secretary of defense, the Air Force? And

also, do you believe that the draft RFP will be released this month or when?

GATES:

I don't know that it'll be released this month. And I'm in the process, the final decision process in terms of the acquisition authority and the structure we're going to put into place to ensure that it is a fair, open and transparent process.

I would expect to be -- to make the decision on the acquisition process within the next week or 10 days. And all I have heard is that their hope is to put the RFP out this summer, perhaps next month. I'm not entirely sure about that. And we will fulfill the commitment that we have made to you all to share the draft RFP here in the Congress as part of being a transparent process.

SHELBY:

Mr. Secretary, shifting to Army aviation, your proposed budget calls for an additional \$500 million over last year's funding level to field and sustain helicopters. As stated in your testimony, this is an urgent demand in Afghanistan right now. And I support your initiative here.

I understand you've indicated the focus will be on recruiting and training more Army helicopter crews. But will you -- could you provide additional details regarding how this money would be spent, either now or for the record?

GATES:

I'd be pleased to do that for the record.

SHELBY:

OK.

GATES:

But let me just say that having visited Fort Rucker, it's clear that the schoolhouse needs to be expanded and modernized.

SHELBY:

Thank you.

Admiral Mullen, the LCS, littoral combat ships -- the department's '10 budget provides an increase in purchase in the littoral combat ship from two to three ships. Do you believe that this program will play a vital role in our Navy's future fleet? And could you tell us here the advantages that the Navy will gain once the service begins to utilize the LCS around the world?

MULLEN:

OK. I need the LCS at sea deployed today. The urgency of that requirement has been there for a number of years, which is why we started this program. And that urgency hasn't gone away. And I'll be very specific about its need in places like the Persian Gulf.

It offers unique characteristics in terms of speed and mobility and...

SHELBY:

Also firepower.

MULLEN:

And firepower.

SHELBY:

Yes.

MULLEN:

It certainly provides -- and back to helicopters. If I'm short one thing, sort of across the department, helicopters qualifies for being at the top. The LCS also has a small crew. It has flexibility in its mission. It has the modules, depending on where you're going to, where you're going to apply it, where you're going to deploy it, whether it's mine warfare or anti-submarine warfare or surface warfare.

So it's a very adaptable platform. We need them -- I need them out, and I need them in numbers as rapidly as we can get them out.

SHELBY:

You need them now, too, if you can.

MULLEN:

Yes, sir.

SHELBY:

Thank you, Admiral.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INOUYE:

Thank you.

Senator Feinstein?

FEINSTEIN:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I'd like to put on my intelligence hat for a minute. And I note Senator Bonds has come back. Without getting into details or classified matters, I wanted to ask you about the overhead architecture program.

I think it's fair to say that both sides of the aisle on the Intelligence Committee are very concerned about matters dealing with this program and particularly the huge investment in electrical optical satellites. And Senator Bond mentioned your statement that you would not necessarily favor a 99 percent solution, but a lesser solution. And so, my question is can the department's imagery needs be met with a larger number of lower resolution systems.

GATES:

I have agreed with Admiral Blair on the architecture that is before you and before this committee. And I would say first of all that I think that the primary need for the very high resolution of the upper tier of capabilities is needed above all by the intelligence community.

We have had those kinds of satellites. Obviously, the new ones are much more sophisticated than when I was last in the intelligence business. But we have always needed that kind of resolution and multi-mission capability.

The reason that I supported going with the lower tier satellites, frankly, is because there is some schedule and technology risk

associated with the upper tier. And I felt very strongly about having a capability that was proven technology and that we would have high confidence would work and meet with the upper tier, the needs of the military. I would have to get back to you for the record in terms of whether -- of what military needs are satisfied by the higher resolution capability.

FEINSTEIN:

Well, if you would, I think both Senator Bond and I would appreciate it. We have extraordinarily serious concern involving the waste of many, many dollars over a period of years and are rather determined that that not happen again.

We also have information that the so-called lesser tiered satellites can be just as effective and have a stealth capability. So if you would get back to us on that point, we hope to sit down with Senator Inouye and Senator Cochran and our staff and talk very seriously on this issue. Because I think, you know, to make this mistake once or twice is all right.

But to continue that mistake doesn't make sense, I think, to the vice chairman or to myself or to other members of the committee or to our technical advisory group, who has looked at this as well.

So if you would, I would appreciate it very much.

Let me move on to another thing. There has been a lot of discussion and in the public press about the possibility of Israel attacking Iran. And I think we asked you the last time you were before us. In the last year, do you believe that the chances of that happening have gone up or down?

GATES:

Well, I'd hesitate to speculate about the decisions of another government. But I would say that our concern about the nature of the Iran problem has continued to rise as they continue to make further progress in enriching uranium and particularly in their public statements and also as they have enjoyed some success in their missile field.

So I would say that our concerns with Iran and with Iran's programs -- and I believe I can say also -- Israel's has continued to grow given the unwillingness of the Iranians to slow, stop, or even indicate a willingness to talk about their programs.

FEINSTEIN:

Thank you very much.

Final question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

And it's on the subject of Afghanistan. And we have slipped into this very easy, very quickly. I believe there are about 68,000 men and women either due to Afghanistan or already there. Is that a correct figure?

And you look back at 48 years of history, and let me just give you one quote from a recent Government Accountability Office report. And it said some progress has occurred in areas such as economic growth, infrastructure development, and training of the Afghan national security forces. But the overall security situation in Afghanistan has not improved after more than seven years of the United States and international efforts.

I'm one that has deep concern as to how you turn this country around after 40 years into a much more secure area. I know you're making changes, and maybe they work and maybe they don't



work. I don't know. But could you share with us how you see this going because this is a large commitment over a substantial unknown period of time with no known benchmarks, no known exit strategy at this time but just a continuation of beefing up troops and changing commanders.

So if you could give you some idea of what benchmarks you would hold, how would you evaluate success, where you would look for it, and within what timeframe, I think it would be very helpful.

GATES:

Let me -- let me open and then ask Admiral Mullen to add his thoughts.

First of all, I think that the administration's new strategy gives us some opportunities that we have not had before. And I think the strategy brings a focus to our efforts that we may not have had before.

The reality is the situation in Afghanistan went along OK after 2002 until about 2006. And it coincided to a considerable degree the beginning of greater Taliban activity in Afghanistan began as Pakistan began to do these peace agreements with various insurgent and extremist groups in -- on their western border which then freed the Taliban to come across the border because they had no pressure from the Pakistani army.

And that situation has continued to worsen, and it is a combination of the Taliban, which are the heart of the problem we face but not the only piece of it: the Haqqani, Al Qaida and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and these others. And so as this problem became worse in terms of the violence caused by the Taliban coming

across the border from Pakistan, I think that it's self-evident that we were under resourced to deal with it.

We did not have the military capabilities or the civilian capabilities in terms of counterinsurgency to be able to deal with it. I think, under the administration's new strategy, we'll have both the military and the civilian capacity to be able to make headway with the Afghans. And I think the key here is the strengthening of the Afghan national army and police that we talked about earlier. It is the strengthening of other institutions in Afghanistan.

I think one of the things that's important to remember about Afghanistan is that we have 40-some other nations there as our allies. This is not just the United States carrying this by ourselves. Now, do we wish they had more troops? Do we wish they spent more money? Absolutely.

But the fact is our allies have 32,000 troops in Afghanistan. This is not a trivial commitment on their part. And as I think Senator Leahy pointed out, the Canadians, the British, the Australians, the Danes, and others have been in the fight and have lost a lot of people.

So I think that the new strategy -- and now the newest development, which gives me more hope than I've had in quite a while, the newest development of the Pakistani army taking on these extremists in Swat and elsewhere, I think, is an extreme important development. And the possibility of the Afghans, the Pakistanis, ourselves, and our allies together working against this problem has given me more optimism about the future than I've had in a long time in Afghanistan.

I will say we have developed, in the interagency, benchmarks for success. I pressed very hard for these because I say, you know, the last administration had benchmarks forced upon it. Let's volunteer them. Let's say here's what we think we need to achieve, and here's how we can measure ourselves against this.

My own view is it's very important for us to be able to show the American people that we are moving forward by the end of the year or a year from now; to show some shift in momentum. This is a long-term commitment, but I think -- I think the American people will be willing to sustain this endeavor if they believe it's not just a stalemate and that we're sacrificing lives and not making any headway.

So I think the benchmarks are important. And I think making an evaluation a year from now of where we are is important.

The last point I'd make before turning it over to Admiral Mullen is I'm very sensitive about the number of troops we put into the United States -- put into Afghanistan. I'm too familiar with the Soviets having had 110,000 troops there and still losing. If you don't have the right strategy and if you don't have the Afghan people on your side, you will not win in Afghanistan because, as the Admiral said, they are a warrior nation.

And so I think that we have to be very cautious about significantly further expanding the American military footprint in Afghanistan, in my view.

Admiral?

MULLEN:

Ma'am, I'm encouraged.

First of all, it is -- there is a strategy, and it's a regional strategy; it's not just Afghanistan or Pakistan because I think they're inextricably linked. And we've got to approach it in that -- with that in mind.

Secondly, I recognize it's -- that it has changed a lot since 2002. And the resources we're putting in there now meet a need that we've had for some time.

Our lessons learned from Iraq, the whole -- the counterinsurgency force that we are, the civilian military approach that we now have with, obviously, with Ambassador Holbrooke, who has focused this effort and does so full time. I believe we know what we need to do. And I, too, am concerned about time and think that, with these forces we're putting in there now, we've got to reverse of trend of violence over the next 12 to 18 months. And I think it's possible.

So I have we have the strategy right. We're resourcing it right. It's -- but I do not underestimate the difficulty of the challenge here, the benchmarks not only in security, which are important, but also in governance and improvement in whether local tribal leaders, local district, subdistrict leaders are providing for their people and that we make the Afghan people the center of gravity here.

We've been through some difficult times with civilian casualties. We can't keep doing that. The more we do that, the more we back up, and it's hurts our strategy.

So I am actually optimistic more than I was, but I think the next 12 to 18 months will really tell the take.

GATES:

Well heard two statistics on a teleconference, videoconference with Kabul this morning from one of our commanders. They believe this year will be the first year in 30 years that Afghanistan will not need to import wheat; that the wheat crop is sufficiently robust that they won't need to import.

And just as important, it's at basically price parity with poppies and, in some districts, even higher value than poppies. So, you know, maybe I'm grasping at straws, but I thought that was pretty interesting.

FEINSTEIN:

It's a good one to grasp. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INOUE:

Senator Bond?

BOND:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, I agree with what you've said. I believe the counterinsurgency strategy is important. I think we have to realize that, while our NATO allies had many people over there, they very often didn't get into the fight. They were restrained in the compounds. They traveled around in armored tanks and went back home at night. And the Taliban works at night.

We did not have an effective force. And the admiral has said we have to have an Afghan base. We've got to do that. The

counterinsurgency strategy is essential. I know the commanders emergency response -- the CERP funds -- were used to buy wheat at least in Mangahar Province. And that kind of rebuilding of agriculture, I think, is a critical key. But I would just ask you is it reasonable to expect the counterinsurgency to pacify the whole country in 12 or 18 or even 24 months?

It seems to me we have to be realistic. We have to say, yes, we're seeing signs of progress. Mangahar Province, for example, is an area that I know about and that poppy production has dropped almost to nothing. But still does it not take some time to get the full benefits of the counterinsurgency strategy? Should we be looking at a slightly longer timeframe?

GATES:

Absolutely, Senator. And what I was referring to -- and I think what Admiral Mullen was referring to is hoping to see a shift in the momentum over the course of the next year to 18 months. This problem will not be over in 18 months. This problem will not be over in two years. This is -- well, to be honest -- a long-term commitment that we are involved in in Afghanistan if we are to, ultimately, be successful.

I think what we are saying simply is that we think that the strategy needs to show some signs that it's working, not that it has been totally successful a year or 18 months from now.

BOND:

Well, I think you can -- I think you can cite Mangahar as one little province that's working. And with the Marines going into Helmand I think that you'll see some changes there.

I would mention, following up on what my good friend from California said, the kinds of overhead requirements you have. I was talking with Admiral Blair earlier this morning about intelligence needs in Afghanistan for the PRTs and others. He needed some overhead. And that's the kind of thing that we think can very well be supplied in terms of military needs by the smaller, cheaper, more flexible alternatives that we would like to see with NGOs.

And we would welcome the opportunity to talk, and we will look forward to talking with the chairman, the ranking member, and other members of the committee in a classified setting about some of the problems and some of the opportunities. And I hope that we will be able to continue to talk with you about that because we feel very strongly about the overhead.

I want to ask one other -- one other point. Just today, I agreed with Admiral Mullen. So many things, breakfast last week, you said we're all concerned about the industrial base; I have been for a period of time. The competition for who is going to build JSF was done years ago, essentially move down to one contractor. And that's where we are.

What I worry about, you want as much competition for as long as you can. That said, we, years ago, got down to a minimum number of competitors. I'm concerned about how I do not have a lot of other choices about where to go to build. I think it's important to consider. We need to pay attention to it. And I would agree with those statements, and I think that maintaining the JSF, the F-18 as a bridge, moving forward on the C-17 and the next-generation bomber which you, Mr. Secretary, have indicated you wish to pursue are all parts of that strategy.

And I happen it think that no matter who won the competition, giving the entire purchase was a tragic mistake on the TACAIR. And I would like to hear your comments, both Mr. Secretary and the admiral, on the defense industrial base.

GATES:

Well, it is -- it is a concern. And, frankly, the last time I was in government in 1993, we had -- we had a lot of choices. And when we wanted to build satellites, we had multiple choices as well.

And so I think that, you know, with respect to -- with respect to the FA-18, we have 31 in the budget for F.Y. '10. We will probably buy more in '11. And one of the subjects that the Quadrennial Defense Review is examining is -- is the right balance for our tactical air. And -- and I look forward to the conclusions of the QDR on that.

Admiral?

MULLEN:

Senator Bond, it's a great airplane. It's actually at a great price. You've certainly dealt with the multi-year aspect of this. The -- one of the reasons it is at a great price is because it's had -- it has been under multi-year a number of times.

That said, we're at a point in time we're -- where we're trying to figure out how long the program goes on, how many more years. And that's really the analysis that -- that's at the heart of this. As I said the other day, although I -- I was -- I'm amazed you got absolutely every word I said, very accurate.

BOND:



My other business is intel.

MULLEN:

And I do have a concern about the industrial base. In airplanes, in ships, in satellites. And we dramatically brought the defense contractors together in the '90s; and that -- by virtue of that, eliminated an awful lot of competition.

And so I don't have the answer with how we -- how we go ahead here, except I think we do have to pay attention to it over the long run and make some strategic decisions. And I think the we there is -- is the department, the services, the industry itself as well as here in Congress. And -- and it's that strategic relationship, which I think is important, which says this is how much of America's industrial base we are going to make sure is in good shape for the future. And the aegis of that, obviously drive that continuation.

As I said before, and would only repeat, it was years ago this -- this decision was made about the JSF. And at that point in time, it's my view, we made a -- a -- national decision to go down to -- essentially to go down to one contractor for the future. And we're living with the results of that now.

BOND:

I think that's a tragedy. I've made my -- my point time and time again at these hearings year after year. I have an answer for you if you want to call me sometime. I'll be happy to share it with you.

But -- but I'm not the witness today, Mr. Secretary.

GATES:

I used to be in intelligence. And I think I know the answer.

BOND:

I'll bet you do. We'll -- we'll see if we can communicate by mental telepathy. But can we expect the study assessing the cost benefits of an F/A-18 multi-year anytime soon? I think it was requested in law to be delivered a couple of months ago.

GATES:

We can -- we can certainly provide a response, Senator. I think that the -- what we were hoping to do was be able to give you a meaningful response after the QDR. If the decision, for example, were made to -- to continue the F/A-18 line, then a multi-year contract would make all the sense in the world for exactly the reasons you and Admiral Mullen have been talking about. We can provide you an interim response if -- if -- if you would like.

BOND:

Well, I think -- I just think it was required in law. And the QDR, I know everybody hypes it. But if it's just a -- a justification of what it -- what you put in the budget, I hope there will be some thinking on -- on that, broader thinking along the lines that maybe Admiral Mullen suggested and -- and your intelligence suggests.

So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity.

INOUYE:

Senator Specter.

SPECTER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I was intrigued with one of the points you made in testifying before the Appropriations Committee on the war supplement, where you said that it would be useful in our dealings with Iran to have a missile defense that is aimed only at Iran. And that played into the relationship that we have with -- with Russia. And it is generally recognized that if we're to be successful in dealing with Iran, we're going to have to have the cooperation of other countries, perhaps mostly Russia.

We've talked before about the issue of having Russia enrich Iran's uranium, which Russia has offered to do and Iran has declined as a way of being sure that Iran is not moving toward the use of the enriched uranium for -- for military purposes.

A two-part question, number -- number one, is any progress being made on publicizing Russia's offer, which I think has gotten scant little attention? And the Iranian refusal really shows -- raises the inference of potential bad faith. And secondly, where do we stand on efforts to pick up your suggestion that missile defense be aimed only a Iran and not at Russia, which has given so many political problems?

GATES:

First, I think that, although it's certainly not been a secret, it has not been, I think, widely enough publicized, Russia's offer and -- and Iran's turn down of it. And I think equally, not publicized was the fact that the United States indicated that we thought that was a pretty good idea and -- and would be supportive.

With respect to the missile defense, I think that the Russian -- I still have hope that we can get the Russians to partner with us on missile defense directed against Iran.

SPECTER:

Have we -- have we made that offer suggesting that missile defense would not be aimed at Russia?

GATES:

Oh yes. And I've made it myself to then-President Putin. And I've made it to President Medvedev. And -- and we've made a number of offers in terms of how to partner. And I think there are still some opportunities, for example perhaps putting radars in Russia, having data exchange centers in Russia.

And so I think the administration is very interested in continuing to pursue this prospect with the Russians. And it may be that our chances are somewhat improved for making progress, because I think the Russians -- when I first briefed, when I first met with President Putin and talked about this, he basically dismissed the idea that the Iranians would have a -- a missile that would have the range to reach much of western Europe and much of Russia before 2020 or so.

And he showed me a map that his intelligence guys had prepared. And told him he needed a new intelligence service. And -- and the -- and the fact of the matter is, the Russians have come back to us and acknowledged that we were right in terms of the nearness of the Iranian missile threat. And so my hope is -- and that they had been wrong.

And -- and so my hope is we can build on that, and -- and perhaps -- perhaps at the president's summit meeting with President Medvedev, perhaps begin to make some steps where they will partner with us and Poland and the Czech Republic in going forward with missile defense in the -- this third site.

And I would say, although I took the money out of the '10 budget for the third site, the reason I did that is because we have enough money in the budget from '09 that would enable us to -- to do anything in the way of construction necessary.

SPECTER:

Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining? There's no clock here.

I'm pleased to see the announcement of the joint military operations or sending military commanders to Syria. And it appears to be part of a general change in U.S. policy, which I believe is long overdue in trying to at least explore with Syria the possibilities of having them stop destabilizing Lebanon and stop supplying Hamas and moving toward the negotiations which have been brokered so long now by -- by Turkey with -- with Israel.

What -- what do you say -- and this may be over into state, but defense is certainly involved -- for the opportunities to improve relationships with Syria along those lines?

GATES:

Well, I -- I guess my attitude would be that there's no harm in trying. And the -- the CENTCOM representatives who -- who will be going to Syria -- I'll ask the admiral to correct me if I get this wrong. But I think their -- their mandate is focused on the security

of the border between Syria and Iraq, and particularly to try and enlist Syria's support in stopping the foreign fighters from crossing that border into Iraq and -- and attacking us and the Iraqis.

INOUYE (?):

Sure.

SPECTER:

I have one more question. There may, and I emphasize may, be good news in the offing with what is happening along a number of fronts. The election results in Lebanon with Hezbollah losing, and the dominance of U.S.-backed interests in certainly encouraging. There's speculation that President Obama's speech in Cairo may have sent some effect on that. The political campaign in Iran, by all press accounts, is about as much of a political brawl as you see -- about to pick South Philadelphia as an illustration.

And a question that is in my mind, I'm interested in your views as to whether the change in policy toward Lebanon and Syria and the speech that President Obama has made, is there any intelligence that that is having an impact on the forthcoming Iranian elections? Is it -- and whether it has had any impact on the elections in Lebanon?

GATES:

I have not seen any intelligence specifically relating to either Lebanon or Iran.

SPECTER:

Oh. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INOUYE:

Thank you.

Senator Murray.

MURRAY:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you all for being here and for what you do for all of our men and women who serve this country. I really do appreciate. I apologize for my voice. I was out in Seattle this weekend. I was warm weather, and allergy season went crazy.

Secretary Gates, you're going to be out there, I believe, to speak at the University of Washington. Be prepared. But I apologize.

But I wanted to -- I understand I missed some questions from Senator Shelby on the Tinker (ph) competition and -- and your statement that you expect some kind of decision on how to move forward in the next seven to 10 days. And I wanted to ask you, is that going to -- discussion going to conclude who will lead the process, whether it's you or -- or the Air Force?

GATES:

Yes, the -- the period seven to 10 days was how we will structure the acquisition and who the acquisition authority will be. I'm in the process of making those decisions right now, but I have not --

have not made final decisions. And -- and I don't know with specificity. But as I told Senator Shelby, our -- our -- our hope is to probably try and get the RFP out mid-summer. And -- and we will fulfill our commitment to bring the draft up for you all to look at.

MURRAY:

OK. I really appreciate that. And I just wanted to ask you if you're thinking about what kind of measures you're going to take to make sure that we don't have claims of unfair valuation or the scales are tipped one way or the other as we move through this.

GATES:

Well, part of the -- part of the process I'm going through right now is -- is to try and structure this in a way that puts the best people on this program and that provides a -- a supervisory role. And -- and right now, tentatively thinking I'm -- you know, I'm going to clearly ask the deputy secretary to take a very close interest in this process.

MURRAY:

OK. Well, you know, clearly this is a real challenge. And we all want the best aircraft at the end of the day. We all want fair and transparent competition. Everybody's saying that, and I think that's clear. I think we want the best warfighter. And we also want what's best for the taxpayer as well.

You have been a strong proponent of the winner-take-all competition. Is that still your opinion at this point?

GATES:



Yes, ma'am.

MURRAY:

OK. Thank you very much.

Secretary Gates, let me ask you, you -- you've referred to your budget as a reform budget, reforming how and what we buy. And I'm really worried about how we are balancing this acquisition reform effort in relation to our domestic industrial base. I'm worried about the long-term ability of our domestic industrial base to provide our military forces what they need to accomplish their national security missions.

Since we talked last April, I've worked with Chairman Levin on the acquisition reform bill and included language to require report regarding the effects that canceling a major acquisition program would have on the nation's industrial base. And I wanted to ask you today if you can tell me how you are taking into account the health and longevity of our domestic industrial base, including our suppliers, design engineers, manufacturers, as you tackle acquisition reform in the DOD.

GATES:

Well, I think, so far, in terms of the decisions that I've made, most of the issues have not been taken -- the decisions have not been taken with a view to the industrial base but rather acquisition programs that had been extremely badly managed in substantial measure by the Department of Defense. And so I would say that, in all honesty, not very many of the decisions that I made were made with the industrial base being as an important consideration but rather as acquisition programs gone badly awry.

But as we go forward, as Admiral Mullen talked about a few minutes ago, clearly, we have concerns about the industrial base, but, to be perfectly honest, decisions made a long time ago have limited our options in this respect, and the best example, as he cited, is the Joint Strike Fighter. And so we are where we are, and...

MURRAY:

Well, we are where we are, but if we keep going down the road and we all 10 years from now go, "Oh my gosh, what happened," without thinking about it now, we're going to be in a bad place.

So I agree with you, we've looked at acquisition reform in terms of contracts gone bad. I do think we have to start talking about acquisition reform in terms of our industrial base as well, and I hope we can work with you on that.

Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN:

Ma'am, if I could just offer one other thing, and I spoke to this earlier, but the other thing that I have found, which keeps primes very focused as well as subs, is predictability. We can't keep changing the program, whatever it is, year -- whoever "we" is, because we all do this -- year after year after year, because they just won't plan, they won't invest in the industrial base if there's great uncertainty and great risk associated with that.

So as we come to grips with this whole issue of acquisition, which I think we need to do and which this budget really attempts to do and the acquisition reform legislation is critical to that, is that is a

key piece is, can we get programs into some level of predictability and stability?

MURRAY:

I think that's really important. Thank you for that.

Secretary Gates, I wanted to applaud the budget plan in terms of military health care, and I really think it goes a long way toward ensuring that all our service members and their eligible family members have access to and get the best medical care possible.

I just wanted to say, I am so -- as I think all of you are -- so very concerned about the psychological health of our service members. We continue to see reports.

And, Admiral Mullen, I know combat-related stress is a great concern for you.

If you can just address that for a minute here and tell us what you're doing to continue to focus on that.

MULLEN:

Again, this budget puts a lot more money in that direction, and that's key. Leadership throughout the department and clearly the military leadership is very focused on making more capability and capacity, more mental health providers available. And I just -- I won't rest on the fact that we're short nationally. If I do that, then I just accept that we're going to be short, and I'm not going to do that until I have no other choice, and I just don't believe we've wrung it out.

We've taken some steps in the stigma issue, but that's still a huge issue, and I don't think we really remove until we get to a point where everybody receives an effective screening. And it's not voluntary. You must do it and create, again, opportunities to both understand when somebody is under -- is suffering, as so many are right now, which is pretty normal and pretty human.

So leadership will continue to focus on this. In fact, it was at Fort Lewis -- I was there maybe 18 months ago now -- that really -- Madigan has really got some very innovative staff personnel, medical personnel there. We're trying to pay attention to them and to spread those kinds of best practices. But we're not there yet. It's still -- as long as we've been at this, it's still early.

GATES:

Let me just add two things. First of all, the admiral mentioned money. This budget, we've budgeted \$428 million just for psychological health in 2009, FY '09. The FY '10 budget will have \$750 million in it, so a substantial increase focused strictly on psychological health.

Second, one of the things that I'd like to explore with the Congress, and I've mentioned this in the other hearings on this budget, and it goes to the issue of the availability of mental health care providers, and the truth is there are a lot of places in this country where we are trying to hire them and they aren't available. We have hired a lot but not as many as we would like.

And one of the things that I'd like to explore with the Congress is expanding the military medical education program so that it goes beyond just physicians and includes mental health care professionals, whether it's people getting masters degrees, and I'm

not talking necessarily about funding somebody to become a psychiatrist, but somebody who can do counseling and somebody who is the first line provider for mental health care and to pay for that education for someone in exchange for a commitment to the military, and then, frankly, we will have done the country a service, because then they can go out into the broader population.

MURRAY:

Mr. Secretary, I think that's exactly what we need to be doing, because, as the admiral mentioned, this isn't just a DOD problem, it's a problem for everyone, and we can't just say we hope that they come through the other system. I think if the military really focuses on that and promotes and sustains a program within itself, it will help the military and will also help the rest of us. So I think it's a great idea, and we'd like to work with you on making that happen.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Secretary, I look forward to seeing you out in Seattle at the Husky graduation.

INOUYE:

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, as we close the session, I'd like to make a couple of observations, if I may.

Your decision to terminate the acquisition of the C-17s, the F-22s, the DDG-1000 and the Future Combat System vehicles, we have concerns that it may send the wrong signal to our friends and our potential aggressors that we are reducing our capability. It may also have a long-term impact on our defense industrial base. It may diminish our capacity to provide deterrents and reduce our strength that we provide to our allies. We hope that this is not the consequence, but some of us are concerned.

Second observation is that in that ancient war in which I involved myself about 65 years ago, the casualties were high, but the survival rate was not as good as the ones we have today. For example, in my regiment, which in one year's time we went from 5,000 men to 12,000 because of replacements, we had no double amputee survivor, none of those survived, and yet if you go to Walter Reed today, double amputations are commonplace. We had no brain injury survivors. As a result, as I look back, we had very little psychological concerns.

But today we have survival rates so well because of high technology that double amputees, triple amputees are surviving, brain injuries are surviving. As we can anticipate, as Senator Murray pointed out, psychological problems become commonplace. I just hope that you are preparing ourselves to cope with all of these problems.

With that, I'd like to thank you, Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, for your contributions today, and we hope that we can continue our discussions because we will be submitting to you, if we may, questions for your concern and response.

Our next hearing will be held on June 19 at 10:30 at which time we'll listen to public witnesses.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Mullen, Mr. Hale, we thank you very much for your service to our country, and through you we thank the men and women of our uniformed services.

Thank you very much.

GATES:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MULLEN:

Thank you, sir.

CQ Transcriptions, June 9, 2009

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List of Panel Members and Witnesses **PANEL MEMBERS:**

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SEN. ROBERT C. BYRD, D-W.VA.

SEN. PATRICK J. LEAHY, D-VT.

SEN. TOM HARKIN, D-IOWA

SEN. BYRON L. DORGAN, D-N.D.

SEN. RICHARD J. DURBIN, D-ILL.

SEN. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, D-CALIF.

SEN. BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, D-MD.

SEN. HERB KOHL, D-WIS.

SEN. PATTY MURRAY, D-WASH.

SEN. ARLEN SPECTER, D-PA.

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SEN. MITCH MCCONNELL, R-KY.

SEN. RICHARD C. SHELBY, R-ALA.

SEN. JUDD GREGG, R-N.H.

SEN. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, R-TEXAS

SEN. ROBERT F. BENNETT, R-UTAH

WITNESSES:

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN (USN), CHAIRMAN, JOINT  
CHIEFS OF STAFF

ROBERT F. HALE, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

June 9–12, 2009

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

June 12, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates Following NATO Ministerial Meetings in Brussels, Belgium

SEC. GATES: (In progress) -- earlier this week, but I want to 'once again recognize his strong, principled and innovative leadership. Even while heading the alliance during its largest operation ever, he has initiated a number of reforms -- (inaudible). In order for NATO to remain the most successful military alliance in history, we must continue to evolve to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Let me also thank General John Craddock, NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Later this month, I'll have a chance to pay tribute to him as he leaves his post in Europe. However, at this his last ministerial meeting, it was important to note the valuable contributions he has made to this alliance over the last three years.

We just concluded a very successful ministerial, my ninth, I would say the most successful and productive of all, and dealt with a wide range of NATO missions. I'm pleased that we've agreed to establish a long-term counter-piracy operation and to reduce our presence in Kosovo to a deterrent level.

But as the secretary general just made clear, our main focus was Afghanistan, a mission whose importance to the security of Europe and the United States must not be underestimated. As we have seen from attacks all over the globe over the past eight years, the danger posed by instability in the region reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan or Pakistan. It is critical that we get this right and quickly establish positive momentum. I'm confident we will do just that. The alliance has a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, one that will bolster and unify our military and civilian capabilities.

With that in mind, this week for the first time -- again, as Jaap just described -- we decided to deploy NATO AWACS for use in Afghanistan; we stood up a new,

unified NATO training mission for the Afghan National Security Forces; and we agreed in principle to establish a new command structure. 907

We also now have a new commander to lead these efforts. This morning I introduced General Stan McChrystal to the ministers. We all look forward to working with him as he brings fresh thinking and unparalleled energy and determination to Kabul. His extensive counterinsurgency experience and expertise will help us forge a much more comprehensive approach to the war.

I made a statement during the session with the troop-contributing nations about civilian casualties. I said, and I quote, "We know the Taliban target innocent civilian Afghans, use them as shields, mingle with them, and lie about their actions. That said, every civilian casualty, however caused, is a defeat for us and a setback for the Afghan government."

We need to make more changes in the way we conduct our operations to overcome what I believe is one of our greatest strategic vulnerabilities in Afghanistan; that is, civilian casualties. We can only succeed if Afghans believe we are their friends, their partners and, with Afghan forces, their protectors.

We must address this problem on a ISAF-wide basis, in no small part because 43 percent of air support missions are flown in support of non-U.S. forces. I have told General McChrystal that addressing this challenge must be one of his highest priorities. He is obviously in complete agreement. All you have to do is look at his congressional testimony during his confirmation to see that. And he is already working on new ways to improve our operations and better protect the Afghan people.

While this will undoubtedly be a long and difficult fight, we can achieve what I believe to be our primary goal, a free Afghan people who do not provide a safe haven for al Qaeda, reject the rule of the Taliban, and support the legitimate government that they elected and in which they have a stake. To accomplish all of this will take continued commitment of the alliance and of our partners, as well as the courage of our men and women in uniform.

Take a handful of questions.

Q (Name inaudible) -- from Geo Television Pakistan. Can you tell us what sort of objections Pakistan is having with Afghan government regarding Baluchistan? And foreign minister yesterday said that the -- (inaudible) -- the allied forces has to address and review after seven years of ISAF (inspection?). Are there any -- (inaudible) -- of Pakistani objections, or did you take into account regarding ISAF (inspections)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've been in these meetings for the last two days, so I don't know what statements may have been made. I do know that there is broad recognition that the evolving cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the two of them and ISAF, is regarded by all the ministers as a very positive development. We think there's been a lot of a progress in this respect in the last few months, and we look forward to continuing.

Q (Name inaudible) -- the Czech Republic. Mr. Secretary, can you elaborate on the expected level of combat in Afghanistan this season, this summer?

SEC. GATES: I think we've been pretty forthright that as more ISAF troops, as more American troops go into Afghanistan and into places such as Helmand, where there has not been an Afghan government or security forces or ISAF presence in the past, or a number of years, that the fighting will almost certainly get heavier.

And so I think the realistic expectation of most people is that we expect a heavy fighting season ahead. But I think there are some real opportunities to make important gains.

Q Andrew Gray from Reuters.

Mr. Secretary, soon the United States will have twice as many troops, in Afghanistan, as the rest of NATO put together. You know, three American generals are now in more senior positions, if you like, in the NATO structure in Afghanistan.

With that in mind, isn't this really now a U.S.-dominated operation? And why persist with the NATO structure and proceed with this new NATO structure, when America has the overwhelming majority of forces and influence in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, we certainly have a majority. But I would not minimize the importance of 32,000 NATO and partnering troops, in Afghanistan, and the role that they and their civilians and their development people are playing in virtually every part of the country.

They're playing an increasingly important role in the police training. They are doing a lot in the area of mentoring. They provide something on the order of, at this point, I think, 43 OMLTs. So I think that our partners and our NATO allies are making a tremendous contribution in this fight.

I also think it's important; from the stand point of the Afghan government, there were -- in the troop contributing nations meeting this morning, there were 43 representatives. This is 43 institutions and governments that are allied, with the Afghan government, in trying to overcome the threat posed by the Taliban and other violent extremists: the Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, al Qaeda and so on.

So I think the importance, in terms of the deep involvement of the U.N., with their special representative in Kabul, Ambassador Kai Eide, along with the representatives of our partners, the overall impact is much greater, in my opinion, than the arithmetic.

The sum, as they say, is greater than -- the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. And I for one and I know that I've certainly not been silent about wanting more help, from other troop contributing nations, both civilian and military. But that is not to say that the contribution that's already being made is huge.

And I think the fact that, you know, just over the last year or so, the number of non-U.S. forces has increased by a third, from about 22,000 to about 32,000. So I think people are looking for ways to step up their contribution.

Q Jim Neuger from Bloomberg. What, if any, commitments did you get from the allies to keep their election-support troops in Afghanistan after the election? And were you satisfied with these forces?

SEC. GATES: We really didn't talk about that. To be honest, when you have representatives from 43 entities that all want to speak in two hours and 40 minutes, there's not a lot of opportunity for a back-and-forth dialogue.

I think we've made our hopes and wishes clear. I think some of our allies have indicated that they're prepared to do that. A number of the troop-contributing nations indicated this morning that they were increasing either their military or civilian presence, in some cases both.

Again, the numbers may not necessarily be large, especially from some of the smaller countries, but, proportional to their size, it's an important commitment on their part, and we welcome it. And they did not indicate that this presence was something that would go away after the election.

Q Dan De Luce, Agence France-Presse. On the question of civilian casualties, this latest incident in the Farah province, are you satisfied with how the communications aspect of it was handled, the way that -- the different messages and different

accounts given by the U.S. military itself over a period of time? Would you like to see these kinds of incidents handled differently in the way the U.S. and the coalition explains what's happened and what went wrong? 910

SEC. GATES: I think the only thing that I would say on that is that I think we can do better.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible). Secretary, as I understand it, Russia -- relations with Russia were absent from your discussion -- from the discussion during the discussions about Afghanistan. Do you continue to consider any role Russia -- (off mike) -- your efforts in Afghanistan? And what do you -- what do you think about the future relations with Russia in next months? They were very harmed by the Georgian war. What do you consider your relationship with Georgia, too?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think you squeezed about four questions in there. First of all, I think that Russia rightfully is concerned about particularly the narcotics coming out of Afghanistan into Russia. I think Russia also is concerned about the dangers the -- posed by gains by the violent extremists and terrorists for its own security.

And so I think that Russia has started to make some contributions already, and they are welcome. And clearly, whatever's -- there's obviously a history there with respect to Afghanistan and the Afghan government, but I think our view would be that help that is welcomed by the Afghan government would be -- would be welcomed by us.

And let me just say, on the larger relationship with Russia, I think that beginning with the meeting, the early meeting between the president and President Medvedev in London, the meeting between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Clinton, and the prospective summit meeting with -- when the president travels to Moscow next month, indicates that there's a lot of opportunity for progress in this relationship. But I would say it needs to be reciprocal, in terms of each side doing things to reset the relationship. And I would say at this point, so far so good.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible) -- about this issue with Russian relations. You are rather optimistic this week about the possibility that the anti-missile shield would be installed-- (off mike) -- in Russia. But the Russians have been, I mean, skeptical about this possibility. So do you still see a good chance about this? And did you touch about this issue at all in the meeting today? Thanks.

SEC. GATES: I'm the eternal optimist. I think that -- I think we have a common concern with respect to the development of Iran's missile capabilities and what appears to be Iran's programs to develop nuclear weapons. And based on the conversations that I have had going back over the past 18 months with first then-President Putin and then President Medvedev, I continue to believe that if we can find the right formula, that there

is an opportunity for the United States and Russia to work together in addressing -- in addressing this problem. And I certainly will do my part to pursue that. 911

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible.) Today there is Iranian election. How do you consider future risks between the United States and Iran? And how do you think of the role that Iran could play in the -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- first of all, I think we are interested in seeing the policies that the Iranian government follows.

And we would wait to see, no matter who was elected, we would wait to see what kind of policies are followed by that person. So it's really less dependent on personalities than it is on the policies that the leaders follow.

Iran is playing a bit of a double game in Afghanistan. They are an important trading partner for Afghanistan. They profess to have warm relations with the Iranian, I mean, with the Afghan government. At the same time, they're sending in what I would describe as a relatively modest level of weapons and capabilities that attack ISAF forces and coalition forces.

So I think that they're trying to do what they can to hurt us and to hurt our allies and partners, in Afghanistan, which also ends up hurting the Afghan people. At the same time, officially they're trying to have a good relationship. So I think, as I said, they're playing kind of a double game.

One more question.

Yeah.

Q (Off mike.) BBC. (Off mike.) Two questions.

First, a general question: General Petraeus said a couple of days ago that insurgent attacks were at their highest level since 2001. I'm just curious. I mean, what would you say to -- what is the answer to why should one be optimistic that events can be turned round, in the next couple of years now?

And the second question: About the civilian casualties, to what extent are you concerned that -- after all, NATO and U.S. soldiers rely on airpower when things get sticky for them. To what extent will any attempt to minimize civilian casualties increase the risk to NATO forces?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think, with respect to the second question, we will do whatever is necessary to protect our and our allies' and partner nations' men and women in uniform.

That said, I think that one of the areas General McChrystal will be looking at is, how do we design our operations to minimize the chances of civilian casualties, through better intelligence, through more precise targeting of ground operations and so on that reduces the chances of having to call on airpower.

The truth of the matter is, I think, as we get more forces on the ground, in the country, my hope would be that the need for that would be reduced. We've said all along we expected hot and heavy fighting this year.

We're going into areas that have not been touched before. The Taliban have each year, for the last three years at least; each year there has been a higher level of violence. So it's not surprising that this year, it's higher than it was last year and the year before that.

But I think that with the additional forces and all the other things that we're doing, and that the Afghan government is doing, I think, we have a chance to turn the tide of that momentum, during the course of the next year.

Thank you all very much.





## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

June 12, 2009 12:00 PM EDT

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### Media Availability with U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at an American World War II Cemetery in The Netherlands

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.

SEC. GATES: I've just finished a tour of this incredible cemetery, which illustrates the long history between the United States and the Netherlands and the trials we have endured together.

Last week I visited the American cemetery in Manila. These places are inspiring and beautiful, fitting tributes to the Americans who lost their lives on foreign shores fighting tyranny and oppression. They're also humbling reminders of the great sacrifice the United States and our allies have made and the terrible human cost we have paid together in the defense of the ideals given their birthright on this continent and their renewal on battlefields across Europe and the Pacific.

Last week was the 65th anniversary of D-Day. In paying homage to those who died on the beaches of Normandy, President Obama spoke of the clarity of purpose with which World War II was waged.

Today we're engaged in another war waged with clarity of purpose, similarly, one that once again has required great sacrifice by the United States, the Netherlands, and all members of the coalition in trying to help a proud people rebuild their nation after decades of war. It is a mission whose importance should not and cannot be underestimated, for it is critical to the security of both Europe and the United States.

Over the next few days, the United States and our partners will discuss what remains to be done. I am confident that we will summon the will and the courage to do whatever it takes in Afghanistan, just as we have in the past on battlefields that necessitated memorials like this one.

I'll take one question from the Dutch and one question from the Americans. Do our Dutch colleagues have a question?

Q (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: A question?

Q What does this mean to visit this in the Netherlands? I'm really sorry, everybody. (Laughs.) What does it really mean for you to see all these graves here?

SEC. GATES: Well, it's a solemn reminder of the sacrifices that mainly young men and women have made over the generations to try and preserve freedom or to recapture -- (inaudible). This is the third overseas cemetery I've visited. I visited the Manila cemetery last week and Normandy two years ago. And as I sign the papers to send American soldiers to fight again for somebody else's freedom, these cemeteries remind me of the long line of patriots who have made the supreme sacrifice in the cause of liberty.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you hope to achieve in meetings today and also in Brussels?

SEC. GATES: I think we basically will be taking stock here in the Netherlands of the situation in Regional Command South. We'll get a briefing this afternoon by the Dutch commander of RC South. And we'll be -- I'm sure I'll be talking about the new troops that we're sending in and where they're going and what their role will be.


And the other point that I will be emphasizing is the continuing high importance of our partners staying with us and keeping us truly an international coalition battling the Taliban in Afghanistan. And at the ministerial, we have several different meetings with different subjects that won't all be on Afghanistan. The defense planning committee will meet and others. But I'm sure the focus will be on Afghanistan. We'll (probably ?) be talking about proposals for the new command arrangements.

Thank you all very much.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES


PHOTOS OF MEETING OF NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS AND VISIT TO THE  
NETHERLANDS

June 10-12, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, receives a tour of the World War II Netherlands American Cemetery and Memorial where 8,301 Americans rest and 1,722 Americans are listed on the Tablets of the Missing, Margraten, Netherlands, June 10, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with reporters after touring the World War II Netherlands American Cemetery and Memorial where 8,301 Americans are buried and the names of another 1,722 Americans appear on the Tablets of the Missing, Margraten, Netherlands, June 10, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, receives a tour of the World War II Netherlands American Cemetery and Memorial where 8,301 Americans rest and 1,722 Americans are listed on the Tablets of the Missing, Margraten, Netherlands, June 10, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, meets with his defense counterparts from NATO nations in Brussels, Belgium, June 11, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry D. Morrison*


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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, shakes hand with the German Minister of Defense before a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels, Belgium, June 11, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry D. Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates listens to questions during a media conference after a meeting of NATO defense ministers at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, June 12, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*


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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center, introduces U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, left, to NATO defense ministers at a conference in Brussels, Belgium, June 12, 2009. McChrystal is the new commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry D. Morrison*


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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with U.S. Navy Vice Admiral William D. Sullivan, the U.S. military representative to NATO at a defense ministers meeting in Brussels, Belgium, June 12, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
**Speech**

**University of Washington Commencement**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Seattle, Washington, Saturday, June 13, 2009*

President Emmert, Mr. Cole, members of the faculty and the Board of Regents – thank you for the distinction you have conferred upon me. I am deeply honored.

One thing I should get out the way, particularly in this of all cities, is to clear up any case of mistaken identity. Several times over the past couple of months I've been introduced as "Bill or William Gates" – by everyone from a Marine sergeant major in Afghanistan to the president of the United States. So, for all I know, that's who you were expecting today – perhaps with some fundraising in mind. Sorry to disappoint, though I do have plenty of jobs to offer. I do know that the William Gates family was honored here at the beginning of the year, so perhaps my presence is a fitting bookend.

It is a special and great pleasure to be with you today – especially since it gives me an excuse to get away from the other Washington – a town whose self-regard can reach near-biblical proportions. There's an old saying about Washington, D.C.: for your first six months you wonder how the hell you ever got there; then you spend the next six months wondering how the hell everybody else got there. I discovered this just over 40 years ago.

This corner of the country has become a very special place for me and my family. I've been coming to Washington state ever since marrying my wife Becky here in Seattle in 1967. She grew up not too far from here. There is a spirited "Washington–Washington State" rivalry among my in-laws, which I wisely stay away from. I get more than enough conflict at my day job. Friends and family members – a special thanks for the love and support you have given to these young people over many years. Parents, I know you are swelling with pride at the achievements of your children. Having put a son and a daughter through college myself, I know you are also breathing a sigh of relief – and maybe already planning on how to spend your newly re-acquired disposable income. Forget about it. Trust me on this – if you think you've written your last check to your graduate, dream on. The National Bank of Mom and Dad is still open.

And to the Class of 2009: Congratulations on this great achievement!

I guess today, as you finish one chapter in your life and move on to the next, I am supposed to give you some advice on how to succeed. I could quote the billionaire J. Paul Getty, who offered sage wisdom on how to get rich. He said, "Rise early, work late, strike oil." Or, Alfred Hitchcock, who explained, "There's nothing to winning really. That is if you happen to be blessed with a keen eye, an agile mind, and no scruples whatsoever."

Well, instead of those messages, my only words of advice for success today come from two great women. First, opera star Beverly Sills, who said: "There are no shortcuts to any place worth going." And according to Katharine Hepburn: "Life is to be lived. If you have to support yourself, you bloody well better find some way that is going to be interesting. And you don't do that by sitting around wondering about yourself."

In 39 commencements at Texas A&M, I learned the importance of brevity for a speaker. I will speak quickly, because, to paraphrase President Lincoln, I have no doubt you will little note nor long remember what is said here. I also know that I am an obstacle between you and a great party.

Perhaps it is heretical to say, but the truth of the matter is that, in life, there really are no tricks or shortcuts – or straight lines. In fact, it's often those times when you think you know exactly what you're doing that a new opportunity comes along and disrupts all your well-laid plans. I have a lot of experience with this – as recently as after the national elections in 2006 and again in 2008.

But, it will happen all through your life. When I started college in 1961, I wanted to be a doctor – a career choice that lasted only until the end of my first semester, when I received a "D" in calculus. My father called long-distance call to ask about the "D." I said, "Dad, the 'D' was a gift."

Even if there are no straight courses in life, you will nonetheless need to have some anchor points – a set of inner values or higher purposes to guide you. As you graduate today, I encourage you to discover for yourself what it is that drives you. But I also ask you to consider spending at least part of your life in public service. You will have the chance to learn and see things that will make you a better person and a better citizen. You will have a chance to work on issues of great importance to our nation and to the world. And you will have a chance to give back to the country that has already given you so much. No life is complete without service to others.

I know it may be somewhat redundant to deliver this message here – at a school with such a distinguished record of service. Year in and year out, as noted earlier, this university sends the highest number of graduates in the nation into the Peace Corps. And, 64 members of your class are becoming new lieutenants and ensigns in the United States Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Army – following in the long line of University of Washington grads who proved their valor on the battlefield. Indeed, this university boasts a remarkable seven recipients of the Congressional Medal of Honor – tied with Virginia Tech and the university I led for four and a half years, Texas A&M, for the most Medal of Honor recipients of any civilian American university.

I extend my heartfelt gratitude to all ROTC cadets and midshipmen on campus, University of Washington graduates currently serving, and especially the veterans who are pursuing their education – some of whom are graduating today. You have served your nation honorably, and your nation is proud of and grateful for what you have done.

The students at this institution and others around the nation are as decent, generous, and compassionate as we've ever had in this country. Millions of young people all across the country donate countless hours to volunteer organizations, community service, and public-spirited foundations. I know many of you were active in the 2008 presidential campaign.

But even in last year's election, with all the challenges facing our nation – two wars, a meltdown on Wall Street and an economy in free-fall – not even half of eligible voters in the college-age bracket cast a ballot. So, I worry – and I worry greatly – that too many of our brightest young Americans, so public-minded in campus and community affairs, turn aside when it comes to our political process or careers in public service.

I entered public life 43 years ago, and no one is more familiar with its hassles, frustrations, and sacrifices than I am. Certainly the challenges are daunting, and the current state of our politics isn't exactly the best marketing scheme for attracting new talent. The pay and working conditions can be difficult. Government is, by design of the Founding Fathers, slow, unwieldy, and almost comically inefficient. Will Rogers used to say: "I don't make jokes. I just watch the government and report the facts."

And all too often, in the public spotlight, the main reward of your labors is criticism, more criticism, and maybe a dash of character assassination thrown in for good measure.

We shouldn't delude ourselves: Political life has always been a rough business in this country. Ben Franklin once observed that the public is apt to praise you today, crying out "Hosanna," and tomorrow cry out, "crucify him." One of Thomas Jefferson's critics said it would have been advantageous to his reputation if his head had been cut off five minutes before he began his inauguration address. John Adams was called a "hideous hermaphroditical character which has neither the force and firmness of a man, nor the gentleness and sensibility of a woman." They just don't talk like that anymore.

But, there is another aspect to public service about which Americans hear very little: the idealism, the joy, and the satisfaction and fulfillment.

It was at CIA, throughout the long years of the Cold War, that I first had a chance to observe public servants at all levels, in various agencies and departments, from administrative assistants to great statesmen. And after dealing with governments all over the world, I came to believe Americans have the most dedicated, capable, and honest public servants anywhere. I've worked for eight presidents, and worked in the White House under four. I have seen, in political appointees and career civil servants alike, an extraordinary number of people of the highest quality acting with steadfast integrity and love of this country and what it stands for.

Millions of other Americans have chosen careers in civic service, electing to work for their fellow citizens in the belief they can help make this country and the world a better place: policemen; firemen; teachers; nurses; elected and appointed local, state, and national officials; and many, many others.

And of course, there are the more than two million troops in the active and reserve armed forces – men and women who have chosen this course with the knowledge they will likely be sent to a combat zone. They are risking their lives in service to our country every day, fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan to the streets of Iraq. Their courage is awesome, their tenacity boundless. As junior Michael Beatty – an Iraq Army vet and co-founder of Husky United Military Veterans put it: "If you don't do your job, your brother is going to pay for it with his blood." That spirit is the reason these extraordinary men and women have rightfully been called the new "greatest generation."

Each person in public service has his or her own story and motives. But I believe, if you scratch deeply enough, you will find that those who serve – no matter how outwardly tough or jaded or egotistical – are, in their heart of hearts, romantics and idealists. And optimists. We actually believe we can make a difference, that we can make the lives of others better, that we can make a positive difference in the life of this country and the world.

A few final thoughts. For almost a decade now, our country has been at war. In the last year, we have seen incredible economic turbulence – and, along with it, suffering by many of our fellow Americans. Add to this other mounting challenges international in scope – from global terrorism to ethnic conflicts, rogue nations, rising powers, climate change, pandemics, and more.

These are no ordinary times – and they are certainly not for the faint of heart. But I am reminded of a letter from Abigail Adams to her son John Quincy Adams. She wrote him: "These are the times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station, that great characters are formed. . . . Great necessities call out great virtues."

We live in a time of great necessities, and we must come to grips with a very old truth: As individuals, the

burdens and responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy are permanent. And as a nation, we cannot escape the long-term burdens, responsibilities, and costs of global citizenship and global leadership.

If, in the 21st century, America is to be a force for good in the world – for freedom, social justice, the rule of law, and the inherent value of each person; if America is to be a beacon to all who are oppressed; if America is to exercise leadership consistent with our better angels, then the most able and idealistic of today's young people must step forward and accept the burden and the duty of public service. As President Obama said, you must "put your foot firmly into the current of history."

When I was a college student at another time of great necessities, I heard a different president beckon to service Americans young and old with words that still ring true. President Kennedy said, "Now the trumpet summons us again – not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need; not as a call to battle, though embattled we are – but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation,' a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself."

These common enemies are with us still, enduring and stubborn barriers to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for too many. Public service still calls for the best among us to do battle with those common enemies of humanity about which President Kennedy spoke.

Preparedness to serve, devotion to one's community and fellow citizens, caring beyond self – these are all fundamental to democracy. Our forebears understood this when they risked their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor to establish a new nation conceived in liberty.

But it is a lesson that must be refreshed in every generation by the best and brightest young Americans. It is a lesson that must be refreshed by you.

John Adams wrote his son, Thomas Adams: "Public business, my son, must always be done by somebody. It will be done by somebody or another. If wise men decline it, others will not; if honest men refuse it, others will not."

Will the wise and the honest among you come help us serve the American people?

Congratulations and Godspeed.



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen      June 18, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. First, I'd like to extend my sympathies and commiserate with the secretary of state, with her fractured elbow. Having broken my right arm as secretary of defense, and had the left arm operated on, I think I can truthfully say, I feel her pain. But I wish her a speedy recovery.

As you know, last week, I attended the NATO ministerial in Brussels, along with a meeting of allies and partners who are contributing troops to RC South and Afghanistan. In Brussels, I was pleased to introduce General McChrystal, the new ISAF commander, to the NATO defense ministers and to our troop-contributing partners. He is now, obviously, on the job and in the midst of a 60-day review of our operations there. He'll bring unparalleled energy and determination, as well as substantial counterinsurgency experience and expertise, to the international military effort in Afghanistan. I look forward to the results of his review, which should represent a more comprehensive and effective civil-military approach.

One of the key takeaways from Brussels was an agreement in principle to stand up a new ISAF command structure, including a new operational headquarters. On that front, I look forward to the North Atlantic Council's approval of the new command organization next month and to the Senate's confirmation of Lieutenant General David Rodriguez who, with NAC approval, would assume command of the day-to-day military operations of this intermediate headquarters.

Another important takeaway from last week, and one of the highest priorities for General McChrystal, is a commitment from NATO to do everything possible to prevent civilian casualties during ISAF military operations. It is clear that we need to do much more to overcome what I believe is one of our greatest strategic vulnerabilities. The Afghan people must be reassured that U.S. and NATO forces are there as friends, partners and, along with Afghan security forces, they're protectors as well.

With a comprehensive new civil, military and diplomatic strategy, a great new leadership team, I think the United States, our allies and partners, and above all the Afghan people, will be able to achieve the goal of an Afghanistan that does not provide a sanctuary for al Qaeda, rejects the rule of the Taliban and has an elected government that is working to provide for the needs and security of the Afghan people.

And with that, we'd be happy to take your questions.

922

Ann?

Q Question for both of you: Why has the report into the May 4th-5th Farah incident in Afghanistan not been released? Do either of you oppose its release? And does the fact that it hasn't yet been released, after word that it would be, sort of play into the idea that the United States has something to hide?

SEC. GATES: No, we -- there's -- first of all, we do not oppose its release, and I don't think anybody else in the administration does either. And I expect that the report will be released in the next day or two.

What we have here is -- this is the first major situation where there were potentially a number of civilian casualties since the new administration came into office and since the development of the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. And what we've been trying to do is to give our colleagues in the interagency the opportunity to become familiar with this report and -- and then go ahead and release it. And as I say, we expect it to -- I expect it to be released in the next day or two.

ADM. MULLEN: I would only add that I thought this was important enough to review with the Joint Chiefs, which we just recently did at the beginning of this week. In fact, it's -- it's a report that I discussed with the combatant commanders who are in town for one of our major conferences, and that it is -- as the secretary said, it is a strategic vulnerability that we've got to get right and get the lessons from it both understood and then embedded in our training and in our execution.

And it is also -- the whole area of civilian casualties is something that General McChrystal has made very clear he's going to review very -- very quickly while he's there. But again, there's -- there's support for releasing it, and it will be out here very shortly.

SEC. GATES: This is -- I made a point at the NATO meeting last week that I think is important, because dealing with this problem is not just a U.S. military challenge.

Somewhere between 40 and 45 percent of the close air support missions that are flown are flown in support of our allies and partners. And so it also is going to involve a much greater degree of integration of military operations by General McChrystal and presumably, soon, General Rodriguez, to avoid getting into situations that -- where -- as much as we possibly can -- involving not only our troops but the troops of the other contributing nations where we have civilian casualties.

Q What did the investigation find? Did it find that civilians were killed? And were American forces responsible in any way?

ADM. MULLEN: I think there certainly is responsibility. I thought Ambassador Eikenberry, weeks ago, said that it would -- it is going to be -- we may never know how many. And certainly, as I've looked at the investigation, there are some estimates, but I agree with what he said: I don't think we ever will really know how many. There were command-and-control challenges, chain-of-command challenges, some training issues that we've got to address, as well as -- you may remember there were changes that General McKiernan made in January as a result of incidents last year. 923

And we've evolved through those changes, and there are additional changes that I think that we're going to clearly have to make to ensure that we do absolutely everything to make sure civilian casualties are eliminated, if possible, or certainly minimized in every situation.

Q "Command-and-control challenges" -- does that mean mistakes were made?

ADM. MULLEN: One of the things that we've been challenged with in Afghanistan for a considerable period of time is the whole chain-of-command issue. And there were some -- there were -- and those -- we've made adjustments in that regard by changes that have been made in the chain of command, as -- last year with U.S. 4A and ISAF -- the combination at the commanders level.

But there are others that down through the chain of command that we're -- that we think we need to address as well. And I know that General McChrystal, who had seen this investigation as well, is going to address those as he takes over.

SEC. GATES: I think one of the reasons that the allies so readily supported the creation of this intermediate headquarters was the recognition of the need for a tactical day-to-day commander who had purview over all of the regional command areas of Afghanistan to get at this chain-of-command issue. Tony?

Q A couple airplane questions. You've got two looming here.

What is the status of your decisions on the tanker program in terms of when a re-competition will start?

Two, what's your reaction to the House Armed Services Committee's markup yesterday that put in money to continue the F-22 line? How much -- how hard will you fight that? And is that potential veto material if in fact it remains in the final bills?

SEC. GATES: First of all, on the tanker, I have -- I'm probably within a few days of making a decision on the structure of how we're going to go about the process and who will be the acquisition authority and so on. And I still am hoping that we can get an RFP out midsummer or thereabouts.

With respect to the House mark, I would say it's a big problem. I have a big problem with it.

Q Why?

SEC. GATES: Well, because it continues the F-22 program, which is contrary to the recommendations I made to the president and that the president sent to the Congress in his budget. That's why it's a problem.

Q Is it veto material?

SEC. GATES: I'm not going to go that far at this point. I think describing it as a big problem suggests where I am on it.

Q Admiral Mullen, Secretary Gates, currently the U.S. military is tracking a North Korean-flagged ship, the Kang Nam, which is suspected of proliferating either weaponry, nuclear materials or missile parts. What are your options in terms of enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874? Are you prepared to board the ship at this time?

ADM. MULLEN: Without going into specific details, clearly we're -- we intend to vigorously enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, to include -- options to include certainly a hail and query. There are -- part of the UNSCR is to, if a vessel like this is queried and doesn't allow a permissive search, to direct it to go into a port, and the country of that port would, as required to, inspect the vessel, and to also keep the United Nations informed, obviously, if a vessel like this would refuse to comply.

But the United Nations Security Council resolution does not include an option for an opposed boarding or a noncompliant boarding with respect to that. And if we get to that point with a vessel that we suspect has material which is counter to -- unauthorized in accordance with UNSCR, that's a report that goes back to the United Nations as well.

Q What do you think is on board this ship? What has made you suspicious that the military's tracking it?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I wouldn't go into any kind of details, at this particular point in time, except to say that it's very clear that the resolution prohibits North Korea from shipping these kinds of materials, the kinds of weapons that were laid out, in the material, from conventional weapons up to fissile material or nuclear weapons.

And we expect compliance. And I've gone through the steps that we would take.

Q The north has said that they would take that, any sort of interdiction, as an act of war. Would that prevent you from pursuing U.N. Security

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I think, it's important that this is a U.N. resolution. This is an international commitment. It's not just the United States. It's a lot of other countries as well. And the North taking steps to further isolate itself, to further non-comply with international guidance and regulations, in the long-run, puts them in a more difficult position.

Q Dr. Gates, I wondered what you thought about the report that North Korea might shoot a ballistic missile toward Hawaii, if you thought there was any accuracy to that. And if that was to occur, would that be a situation where the U.S. would use its missile defense system, to eliminate that test?

SEC. GATES: Well, we're obviously watching the situation in the North, with respect to missile launches, very closely. And we do have some concerns, if they were to launch a missile to the [sic - east], in the direction of Hawaii.

I've directed the deployment again of THAAD missiles to Hawaii. And the SBX Radar has deployed, away from Hawaii, to provide support. Based on my visit to Fort Greely, the ground-based interceptors are clearly in a position to take action.

So without telegraphing what we will do, I would just say, we are -- I think we are in a good position, should it become necessary to protect American territory.

Q With regards to Farah, Mr. Secretary, is there evidence in the report that the mistakes or the problems that you both mentioned contributed directly to the civilian casualties? And does it rise to the level where there needs to be any accountability or disciplinary action?

SEC. GATES: Let me ask the admiral.

ADM. MULLEN: Again without going into the specific details of this, this was a lengthy firefight, a number of hours, on the order of about seven or eight hours. It was very intense. It was by the -- handled very well, by the young captain on the ground, who essentially -- who was in charge of it. And at least in my review, I found nothing that would lead to the need to do -- to take any specific action, along the lines of what you're asking.

A tough fight. What he was mostly concerned about was defending his people. There were some injuries. There was a MEDEVAC involved in this. And I thought what he did with the capability that he had, certainly was supportive of the overall requirements at the time. It went from day to night. It was a very complex operation, sustained, et cetera.

So -- and were there some issues with -- along the lines of what I talked about that we've got to adjust? Absolutely, and we'll do that.

SEC. GATES: I think it is worth making the point that there should be doubt in no one's mind that we will do what is necessary to protect our troops. The question is, how do we carry out our operations in a way to minimize the need for the use of close air support? And I think those are the kinds of things that General McChrystal is going to be looking at.

ADM. MULLEN: And there have been suggestions that close air support would be somehow in jeopardy in terms of using that capability. And I just don't see that. It's got to be used very carefully, so it meets the standard that the secretary just described.

Q Are you satisfied, sir, that the air forces that were involved were sufficiently sure of their targets and that civilians would not be injured when they released their ordnance?

ADM. MULLEN: Yes, I am.

SEC. GATES: Barbara.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm sure both of you have watched this week the use of social networking unfold on the streets of Iran, and I want to ask you about that, not from the standpoint of the politics going on in Iran, but social networking as a tool. Given your -- some of your previous government jobs in the information business, what do you think about all of this? I mean, certainly -- it certainly must strike you that social networking, regardless of the mechanism, impacts decision-making speed, national security. A lot of people say that it's something to be considered these days.

SEC. GATES: I think one of the more -- maybe more significant developments in the last 20 years or so has been the advance of communications technology in the hands of average citizens around the world. There is no question but that the easy availability or the easy access to Western communications and media played a part in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe.

It is increasingly difficult for an authoritarian government to maintain control of all the means of communication that are available to its citizens, and especially when -- I mean, you either have economic stagnation and backwardness, or you allow modern communications.

And it makes the control of communications, by a government, extremely difficult.

And frankly I think it's -- you know, it's a huge win for freedom, around the world, because this monopoly of information is no longer in the hands of the government.

Q So when you look at a country like Iran and the government there right now, which is clearly trying to control modern communications, what is it -- 927 they succeed, do you think? And how do you think about this, in terms of U.S. national security? Is it something that we need to take into account, in this country?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, frankly the freedom of communication and the nature of it is a huge strategic asset for the United States. And without being specific about Iran, there are clearly a number of governments, around the world, that try to control these communications --that try to control the Internet and so on.

And I would just say, I think, their efforts, while successful in some respects, they just can't draw the net tight enough to stop everything. And you know, if you can't text, then you Twitter. And you know, my guess is, in some of these countries, that the leadership is kind of like me. They don't have a clue what it's about. (Laughs.)

Q Well, I want to ask you both that because, I mean, I mean this with all respect. Do you both -- do either of you have a Facebook page? Do either of you actually Twitter yourselves? Or does your staff Twitter for you?

SEC. GATES: Absolutely not.

ADM. MULLEN: Well, actually I do. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: He's more technologically advanced.

ADM. MULLEN: But let me -- let me just see if I can take a crack at part of what you asked about, which is the speed issue, because I think the speed of communications and information for -- in lots of domains, but let me talk about security, creates a flexibility and an adaptability. It meets needs for flexibility and adaptability, which we have to have in our forces, first of all.

Secondly I think our force, whose average age is 20ish, 20-21, you know, they -- this is how they live. It's what they've grown up on. And so for leaders -- I mean, I'll take myself in particular -- I think, it's really important to be connected to that and understand it, certainly not be as facile as they are on it, but to understand because I think communicating that way and moving information around that way, whether it's administrative information or information in warfare, is absolutely critical.

SEC. GATES: I would just add -- I would just add one point. What Admiral Mullen just said, I think, is absolutely critical.

So what I have been saying in terms of our hiring a new assistant secretary for public affairs in the Department of Defense -- and when I have talked to people and when I interviewed Price Floyd, the key issue that I have been after is, we have 2 million people, most of them around the -- in uniform, most of them around the age that Admiral Mullen described. And how do we communicate better with them? How do we -- how do we get reactions from them to things that we're doing? How do we get better

Also, in terms of our strategic communications, that's the age, or -- if not younger, of many of the people around the world we are trying to reach. And how do we reach them in a way that they understand? And this department, I think, is way behind the power curve in this, and it's an area where I think we have a lot of room for improvement.

Q Well, what do you think as to how the people of Iran are doing it --

Q Have you -- has either you or Admiral Mullen or anyone else in this building been stepping up your communication with the Chinese, the South Koreans, the Japanese about interdicting North Korean ships? And if so, are you sensing more of a willingness, particularly on the part of the Chinese, to monitor and, if necessary, to interdict North Korean ships?

SEC. GATES: I'll just say that when I was in Singapore I had bilateral meetings with both my South Korean and Japanese counterparts, and then we had the first-ever trilateral meeting of the defense ministers of the three countries. And our focus was on how do we improve our defensive capabilities together in response to what's going on in North Korea. I'm not aware of -- I certainly have not had any communications with the Chinese in terms of the North Koreans.

ADM. MULLEN: No, I haven't, although I know Admiral Keating has, as a combatant commander in the Pacific -- has engaged both Japanese and Korean -- my counterparts in Japan and Korea. And I'm not aware of any contact with the Chinese.

SEC. GATES: Tom?

Q If I could just follow up briefly -- you've periodically said that, in the case of Pakistan, there was a shift where, after a long time of paying lip service, Pakistan now takes the Taliban as an existential threat. There was a shift in how it saw the Taliban.

Is there a shift in the way that the Chinese see North Korea? I mean, is there -- have they hit a -- crossed a Rubicon where they now, perhaps, are more amenable to the thought that North Korea is a problem for them as well, not just a problem for the U.S.?

SEC. GATES: I think that remains to be seen. Communicating that message was clearly one of the purposes of the delegation led by Jim Steinberg, deputy secretary of State, to China a week or two ago.

It was that, yes, we understand your concern about instability in North Korea and its implications for you, but you need also to be concerned about the implications of instability in Northeast Asia created by the behavior of North Korea. And since that visit was relatively recently, I think it just remains to be seen whether it had any impact. Tom?



Q Thank you, sir. Coming to the question about Iran and communications, the Obama administration has recently announced a new cyber-initiative. We're standing by perhaps for the announcement of the cyber command here. So is the Pentagon watching what Iran is doing, the government, in trying to control, monitor, shut down cyber-communications internally, to draw lessons for what they might do offensively against this nation?

SEC. GATES: To be honest, I'm not aware of analysis going on along those lines. But you know, there are 3 million people in this department, so somebody may be doing that, but not to my knowledge.

Q But do you see their capabilities to try to shut down these networks, try to control dissent as an offensive capability that could be used against the U.S., its allies and its interests?

SEC. GATES: I suppose so. But you know, that would be true of all the governments that try and shut down the Internet. It's not unique to Iran by any means.

Q Mr. Secretary, the department is engaged in the Quadrennial Defense Review, department-wide review of strategy, weapons systems. And I take it from your public comments in recent months that the framework is that the U.S. should be focusing, at least right now, on the current conflicts it's engaged in, conflicts of the irregular type that could last into the foreseeable future.

There are officers in the military who at least privately express some reservations that large numbers of conventional forces for an open-ended commitment in a place like Afghanistan or -- perhaps less so -- Iraq is the way the United States should be looking at the world in terms of its defenses.

If you do this review, will that construct itself be under review? In other words, will you analyze whether or not this type of operation is what the U.S. should be focusing on for the next decade?

SEC. GATES: Those who believe that is what we are trying to do, and that that's what I believe, do not understand what we are trying to do or what I believe.

The reality is, the vast preponderance of the Defense Department procurement budget will still be for large systems used and sophisticated systems useable against near peers and that will continue to give us a technological edge for the next 20 to 25 years.

What I am trying to do is simply get a place at the table, when resources are passed out, for those who are fighting today's wars, and to institutionalize what we've learned about counterinsurgency, so that we don't forget it like we did after Vietnam.

So this notion that I'm tilting the scale dramatically against conventional capabilities, in order to fight irregular or whatever, asymmetric wars or whatever you want to call it, is just not accurate.

You know, \$1 trillion for the Joint Strike Fighter, a fifth generation fighter that has some capabilities the F-22 does not, is not a trivial investment in the future. Neither is -- I have hardly read about the fact that we're initiating the replacements for the Ohio-class SSBN with this budget.

So the notion that we are not taking seriously the range of potential future conflicts, I think, frankly is just a misunderstanding of what we're trying to do. It derives from my view that the old way, of looking at irregular warfare as being one kind of conflict and conventional warfare as a discreet kind of warfare, is an outdated concept.

And my belief, that conflict in the future will slide up and down a scale, both in scope or scale and in lethality. And we have to procure the kinds of things that give us -- the kinds of equipment and weapons that give us the maximum flexibility, across the widest range of that spectrum of conflict.

And frankly I think that there is broad agreement, on the part of the senior military leadership, that that kind of a construct going forward is what we ought to be looking at. If there is one major aspect of the QDR that I have insisted that we try and get away from, it is this construct that we've had, for such a long time, that we size our forces to be able to fight two major combat operations.

I think that is not a realistic view of the world. We are already in two major conflicts. So what if we have a third one or a fourth one or a fifth one? And how do you -- along that spectrum, how do you -- where do you characterize a Hezbollah that has more missiles and rockets than most countries or a violent extremist group that may acquire a weapon of mass destruction?

So it's this -- it's the versatility of our force and our ability to be able to respond, to a wide range of conflict, that we're trying -- that I think is important, in trying to build the programs for this department, for the future. But there is a huge investment in trying to protect our technological edge for the future. And frankly, to be blunt about it, the notion that not buying 60 more F-22s imperils the national security of the United States I find completely nonsense.

But mark me down as undecided. (Laughter.)

Q Yesterday in President Obama's announcement on federal worker benefits for gay employees -- in this building there's a whole lot of civilians alongside military personnel. Did you or do you have concerns about any type of a double-standard, and with reports this morning even of possibility of a high-ranking official named Bill White from the Intrepid Foundation possibly being nominated for a high civilian position?

But also, before that announcement yesterday, there seemed to be a bit of back and forth between the White House and Congress over who should be or is taking the lead on "don't ask, don't tell." Without allowing them to speak over your heads, who should be taking the lead, do you think, from this department? 931

SEC. GATES: This department's position is dictated by the fact there is a law. And the law only applies to people in uniform. So on the civilian side, we will absolutely comply and implement everything the president announced yesterday. But until the law is changed, our ability to change the policy is extremely limited, if not non-existent.

Q Sir, it's been some weeks since you removed David McKiernan from Afghanistan. There continues to be head-scratching, though, about the way in which it was handled. Recognizing that what's done is done, do you have any regrets at all about the way it was done?

SEC. GATES: I think that -- I think I probably could have framed it better when I announced it, and particularly in terms of the desirability of, just as we installed a new commander in Iraq when we initiated a new strategy, the belief that it was important to have a new commander in Afghanistan as we initiated and began to execute a new strategy, and in particular to have one -- to have a commander who could be there for a prolonged period of time in the implementation of that strategy, for a year, 18 months or more.

Q At the beginning?

SEC. GATES: Whatever period of time. And so, in all honesty, in retrospect, I would have done General McKiernan a better service to have described it that way.

Q Have you reached out to him since?

SEC. GATES: No. Jim?

Q You had said earlier that in the event where collateral damage and civilians are killed in Afghanistan, that the U.S. should be as up-front as quickly as possible.

Are you at all concerned that by this investigation being dragged out, that America's credibility in Afghanistan is being undermined and -- or do you think that in this particular case in Farah, the battle for the hearts and minds of the Afghanistan people is already lost?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think that battle's lost at all. But I think that, you know, I -- what I have said in the past is that where we believe there may have been civilian casualties -- what I've said months ago was we should immediately express regret if there were indeed innocent civilian casualties; if necessary and appropriate, make amends; and then investigate; because the truth is, the way we do investigations, which is to say thoroughly, takes time. And that's the problem.

In the past, we have not taken the first two steps until we finished the third step. And so the changes that General McKiernan put in place months ago -- put more emphasis on doing the expression of regret and making amends, if necessary, and then carrying out the investigation. So I don't think the length of time of the investigation itself is an issue. I think what we do in the immediate aftermath of one of these tragedies is what's important.

I don't know if you want to add any more?

ADM. MULLEN: No, sir.

Q And you said that there was a training issue? After the priority, Mr. Secretary, that you, and you Admiral, gave to this issue, how could there possibly be a lack of adequate training in regard to avoiding civilian casualties in Afghanistan?

ADM. MULLEN: Very, very complex environment for an extended period of time -- complex change of platforms involved in the fight, and it exposed some deficiencies from a training standpoint that we have to back all the way up in to our schools here, and then make sure that that's trained to in our rehearsal exercises, et cetera.

And we -- you know, as the fighting changes over time, you know, we constantly adapt. And what we've found from this investigation very thoroughly is there were some things -- there's an awful lot of things that went well. There are some things from a training perspective that we've got to fix.

Q Was there excessive force in this case?

ADM. MULLEN: I won't go into that.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### Swearing-In Ceremony for Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C., Thursday, June 18, 2009*

Thank you for the introduction, Admiral Lorge.

It is an honor to welcome Ray Mabus back to the Naval service as our new Secretary of the Navy.

Ray brings to the Navy and Marine Corps a long and diverse record of proven leadership. His service to our country began when he was commissioned as a Navy officer in 1969 and served aboard USS Little Rock, a guided-missile cruiser. I should note that just after Ray joined the Navy, CNO Admiral Zumwalt, in the spirit of the times, decided to relax the service regulations for facial hair – something Ray took great advantage of, at least based on a photo I saw.

After leaving the Navy, Ray worked as legal counsel to the House Agriculture Committee, before returning to his home state of Mississippi to serve as state auditor. After a hard-fought race, he was elected governor of Mississippi – the youngest governor in the nation at the time. There he passed one of the most comprehensive education reform programs in the country.

Ray was later appointed ambassador to Saudi Arabia by President Clinton. It was during his tenure that Saudi Arabia ended its boycott of American businesses that traded with Israel. Most recently, he was the CEO of a large manufacturing firm, which he successfully brought out of bankruptcy in nine months.

As Secretary of the Navy, he will be responsible for an annual budget of more than \$150 billion dollars and almost 900,000 people – military and civilian, active and reserve. It is a Navy and Marine Corps that is arguably engaged with more countries in more different ways around the globe than at any other time in recent history.

Every day hundreds of thousands of America's sailors carry out a variety of tasks – a partnership station in Africa; coordinating with Indonesia and Malaysia to secure a vulnerable shipping lane; leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; and treating patients on humanitarian missions to Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa. Every time I visit the war theaters, I am amazed by the number of sailors on the ground. In the Central Command AOR, there are more sailors deployed on land than there are on ships.

These are all in addition to the Navy's traditional role of keeping sea lanes across the planet open and secure – a duty highlighted in recent months by acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia – an enduring mission for America's sea services that go back to the earliest years of our republic. And with our ground troops committed to the campaigns in the Middle East and Central Asia, the weight of America's strategic military strength has shifted to our air and naval forces.

In addition to leading the aviators, surface warriors, submariners, SEALs, and others who make up the United States Navy, Ray will also be responsible for our Marine Corps. In recent years, Marines have proven themselves, once more, to be a flexible "two-fisted" force that has earned its reputation of first on the scene, first to help, and first to fight. Building on their expeditionary ethos and maritime heritage, Marines have become one of the world's most effective counterinsurgency forces and are now back at the tip of the spear in Afghanistan.

As you know, President Obama has charged this department to reform the way we buy weapons and equipment, to become better organized to win the wars we are in, and provide the best possible support to our men and women in uniform and their families. Ray will be responsible for overseeing the Navy Department's role, including examining our assumptions about shipbuilding and how we prepare for future wars.

As I said at the beginning, Ray's experiences as a sailor, a lawyer, a diplomat, a governor, and a businessman, well-equip him for this position – and for the great task ahead. Our Navy and Marine

Corps are exceedingly fortunate to have him at the helm.

Ray, I'm glad you are joining the team. We have a lot of hard work to do and I wish you good luck. Thank you, and thank you to all the sailors and Marines who protect our country every day.

And now, would Ray's wife Lynne and his daughters, Elisabeth, Annie, and Kate please join us on stage for the oath of office.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### United We Serve Kick Off

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, DC, Monday, June 22, 2009*

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Good afternoon. It's a real pleasure to be here and to have the opportunity to thank all of you in person for your work at Walter Reed.

As you may know, today is the start of the President's summer service initiative – United We Serve – a call for all Americans to engage in their communities and help build a better future for our country.

Of course, you have already answered that call – and answered it resolutely. Earlier I had a chance to hear about what your organizations are doing here and at our other military hospitals. To say that it is impressive would be an understatement. Your work plays a vital role in uplifting spirits and easing the burdens on the families of our wounded.

Countless activities and projects, tens of thousands of volunteer hours, work sustained over many years – the collective magnitude of what you have accomplished cannot be summed up in just a few minutes. And nor can I fully express my appreciation for all that you have done in these brief remarks. Let me just say that, for those whose lives you have touched, every gesture, no matter how small, has a tangible impact.

I know you do it because you feel, like I do, a deep pride in a new generation of Americans who, when faced with extraordinary challenges, have answered a call to duty, honor, and country. During my time as Secretary of Defense, I have had the opportunity to travel all over the world and meet with our men and women in uniform, at every level, from privates to four-stars. I've also met with the families of these extraordinary service members. In all of these encounters, I feel honored to serve alongside them; humbled by their extraordinary sense of duty and dedication and their willingness to risk life and limb in defense of our country; and blessed to live in a country with so many brave men and women.

As Americans, we owe them so much. And as only Americans can do, I believe that our citizens – you – have risen to the occasion, a far cry from the last time we were engaged in a protracted war in the 1960s and 1970s. You see it in airports all over the country, where soldiers are met with standing ovations by passengers in the

terminal. I've been there, I've seen it myself. There are free meals, rounds of drinks – I hope only for everyone who's over 21. And, above all, simple thank yous. The appreciation is real, it is heartfelt, and it bridges any political divide.

And while we're all united in our admiration of those who have volunteered to serve our nation during these challenging times, it takes a special kind of person to devote part of their life to actively making the lives of our troops better – both during their deployments and when they get back. That is especially important for those who bear the wounds of war, both seen and unseen.

To be honest, when I first learned that part of my duties as Secretary of Defense was to visit the wounded at our hospitals, here at Walter Reed and elsewhere, I wasn't sure I could handle it – or what I would say. Seeing firsthand the incredible sacrifice our men and women in uniform had made, I wasn't sure I could keep it together. But people kept telling me, "You don't understand, they'll lift you up."

And they did. And they do whenever I visit here and other facilities – especially when they tell me sometimes I look younger in person. Their grit and resilience and indomitable spirit amaze and inspire me every time. It reminds me of a notice posted on a door at Bethesda's National Naval Medical Center. You may have heard about it. Lieutenant Jason Redman, a SEAL, took rounds from a machine-gun in his face and arm in Iraq. When he got to Bethesda, he put a bright orange sign on his door warning away those who might feel sorry for him. He wrote: "The wounds I received I got in a job I love, doing it for people I love, supporting the freedom of a country I deeply love. I am incredibly tough and will make a full recovery. What is full? That is the absolute utmost physically my body has the ability to recover. Then I will push that about 20 percent further through sheer mental tenacity. This room you are about to enter is a room of fun, optimism, and intense rapid regrowth." After more than 20 surgeries, Lieutenant Redman returned to the SEALs. I had the honor of meeting with him and his family a few months ago. He told me that he hopes to lead a SEAL platoon back downrange as soon as he's well enough. Talk about sheer mental tenacity.

These days we hear a lot about how our society for the most part is not involved in the war effort – that most citizens are not directly affected by the ongoing conflicts. There is an element of truth to these claims. But in making them, there is also a tendency to overlook all the good work that is being done on behalf of our troops – the work being done by organizations such as those represented here and by compassionate and selfless citizens across the nation. Your work here is invaluable in creating an atmosphere that promotes, as Lieutenant Redman suggested, fun, optimism, and intense rapid regrowth.

Winston Churchill said, "You make a living by what you get – you make a life by what you give." You all live this motto. You have much to be proud of. You are an example for the entire rest of the country.

A final thought. I take the issue of wounded warriors personally. I will repeat here the pledge I made to myself, to Congress, and to countless moms and dads and

husbands and wives: Other than winning the wars we are in, my highest priority is providing the best possible care for those who are wounded in combat.

At the heart of our volunteer force is a contract between the United States of America and the men and women who serve in our military: a contract that is simultaneously legal, social, and sacred. That when young Americans step forward of their own free will to serve, they do so with the expectation that they and their families will be properly cared of should something happen on the battlefield. That eternal commitment is engraved high on the walls of President Abraham Lincoln's memorial. His words echo through time, calling on us today to "care for him who shall have borne the battle."

You have helped answer that call, and I thank you from the bottom of my heart. Thank you very much.





**U.S. Department of Defense**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
**Speech**

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**U.S. CENTCOM Gulf States Chiefs of Defense Conference**

*Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Fairfax Hotel, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, June 23, 2009*

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Thank you General Petraeus for that kind introduction, and it's an honor to be here with the chiefs of defense. And many thanks to the leaders of CENTCOM for hosting this conference. First let me welcome you to Washington and offer greetings on behalf of President Obama. This event provides me an opportunity to convey to you his message of continuity and commitment to all of America's friends and partners in the Gulf region and the Middle East. Today, I'd like to discuss with you the most pressing security challenges faced by the United States and the nations of the Gulf and other Arab states, and offer some thoughts on how we can deal with those challenges through greater unity, cooperation, and resolve.

Since my career in government began more than 42 years ago, the security and stability of the Gulf region have been a central concern of every U.S. administration regardless of party.

- I was on the National Security Council staff at the White House in the 1970s when the "Carter Doctrine" was formulated, based on the tenet that America would do what was necessary to defend our vital interests in the Gulf – a policy adopted by subsequent presidents that led to the creation of the United States Central Command;
- During the 1980s, the United States stood with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to protect tankers and keep vital sea lanes open; and
- Then, of course, the coalition that came together in 1990 to repel aggression against Kuwait.
- In short, America has been a steadfast and reliable security partner for our friends in the Gulf and the Middle East for a long time and will continue to be.

Today's security environment in the Gulf poses new dilemmas and opportunities that span national borders. They include Iran's nuclear missile program; terrorist networks, militias, and criminal groups; Iraq's nascent government and improved security situation; the enduring need to protect the free flow of trade and vital resources; and the serious security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which, as I will describe later, also has implications for the Middle East.

I would note that in the past, this region has lacked an enduring political basis for cooperation, but venues like the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Gulf Security Dialogue are making important inroads. These forums cover a wide range of matters – from trade and critical energy infrastructure to counter-terrorism and regional stability. And so for a few minutes, I want to focus on – in particular on missile, air, and maritime surveillance and defense.

We have made good progress in this area over the past two years. Several Gulf Cooperation Council nations are acquiring, or have expressed interest in, Shared Early Warning – near real-time information on air and missile attacks that would allow maximum time for a nation to defend itself.

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Additionally, all GCC countries have expressed a desire to obtain, or are already obtaining, active defense systems. This demonstrates the GCC's commitment to regional security and interoperability with each other and with the United States.

Maritime security – and potentially new and better means of cooperation – has become a salient issue with the high-profile acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. As with terrorism, piracy is a problem that has serious international implications, and should be of particular concern to any nation that depends on the seas for commerce. Last year, Combined Maritime Forces, based in Bahrain, established a Maritime Security Patrol Area in the Gulf of Aden to keep shipping lanes safe. I encourage you to continue to participate in this important mission. Given the vast coastal areas we are talking about – more than a million square miles – there are limits to patrolling alone. More must be done:

- Members of the international community must work together to aggressively pursue and deter piracy under the U.N. Security Council resolution passed late last year;
- Companies and ships must be more vigilant about staying in recommended traffic corridors – and should consider increasing their security personnel and non-lethal defensive capabilities; and
- Gulf nations might develop a common maritime surface picture and standard operating procedures against seaborne threats beyond piracy – such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and smuggling.

Efforts like these bolster the defensive capabilities of everyone involved, without diminishing pre-existing bilateral or multilateral relationships. They are, I believe, a model for how all of us can better address the challenges of the 21st century by fostering collaboration in and among the nations of the Gulf.

Because the array of security issues affecting the Gulf are all interrelated, they are best addressed through a comprehensive approach, where nations work together using all elements of national power – military, diplomatic, and economic.

The primary example I would offer in this regard is Iran – whose pursuit of a nuclear weapon could set off an arms race in the Gulf, and whose regional meddling has already cost too many lives. Like you, we have watched the aftermath of the Iranian election with interest and concern. While this is an issue that should be decided within Iran by the Iranian people, we firmly believe that the Iranian people deserve to have their voices heard free from violence and intimidation.

The new U.S. administration has reached out to Tehran. As President Obama said: “The question now is not what Iran is against, but rather what future it wants to build.” That future must not include a nuclear weapon or destabilizing activities in the region. Engaging diplomatically on these issues will test Iranian intentions and claims of good faith. Even as the U.S. engages with Iran, we will move to strengthen non-proliferation norms and work with allies and partners to see that their fundamental security interests are protected. Where necessary, we will take action by conducting counter-terrorism operations; and sharing intelligence for the interdiction of illegal shipments of weapons or materiel.

Iran has openly threatened the existence of the state of Israel, and in so doing has complicated efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. President Obama is fully committed to supporting a two-state solution, with a Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel. This outcome would do much to weaken the proxies of Iran – organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, whose violence is directed at undermining not just Israel but other governments in the region.

Furthermore, there is little doubt that Iran is engaged directly in a campaign to influence the development and direction of its neighbor to the west. Iraq – Iran trains and supplies groups trying to destabilize the elected Iraqi government – more often than not through violence and attacks on Iraqi

security forces, government installations, and officials. Iran also engages in more subtle forms of coercion intended to shape the direction of the new Iraq. The embrace of Iraq by its fellow Gulf states will help contain the ambitions of Iran. As I have said before, the Iraqi people want to be your partners. Given the challenges in the Gulf, and the reality of Iran, you should wish to be theirs.

The benefits would be mutual: the Iraqi people and their elected government want to play a constructive regional role. Whether they can do so depends in substantial measure on the nations represented here. For the better part of 50 years, the government of Iraq too often has been a bad actor in the region – inflicting suffering on its own people and on many others. To be sure, I am aware that, in international affairs, old wounds do not heal easily. However, if we look closely at Iraq's political and economic potential, it is clearly in the Gulf nations' strategic interest to support the new government and the people of Iraq. Iraq's neighbors should lend support with intelligence-sharing and must increase their border-control efforts, especially those nations that have thus far failed to live up to pledges to tighten border crossings. Iraq, moreover, should be considered for membership in regional forums such as the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Great security progress has been made in Iraq over the past two years. There remain those who wish to see the new Iraq fail – and who will continue to kill innocent civilians to further this goal, as we have seen in Anbar, Diyala, and Ninewa provinces lately. Success depends, in the final analysis, on the fortitude of the Iraqi people and the leaders they choose. Yet, as the United States responsibly draws down its presence, we look for sustained international and regional support that will allow Iraq to take full charge of its own security and rejoin the family of nations.

Though Afghanistan is outside the regional focus of this conference, it is nonetheless a vitally important topic for Gulf security interests. Al Qaeda and its ideology were incubated in the failed state of Afghanistan, and the extremists have largely returned their attention there in the wake of reversals in Iraq. But as we have seen from attacks and Al Qaeda planning and activities across the Middle East and Europe, the danger reaches far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Afghanistan has become the U.S. military's main effort and central front. President Obama has authorized some 21,000 additional U.S. troops, including more than 10,000 Marines in the southern part of the country reinforcing our British, Canadian, Australian, Dutch, and Danish allies. As you know, President Obama has ordered a comprehensive new civil-military strategy – focused on protecting the Afghan people – and appointed a new leadership team.

Our goal is an Afghanistan that:

- Does not provide a sanctuary for Al Qaeda;
- That rejects the rule of the Taliban; and
- Has a government that works for the needs and security of the Afghan people who elected it.

The U.S. government is also sending more than 400 civilians to the country, most of whom will be deployed outside the capital, to the provincial reconstruction teams and various other units laboring to bring improvements to the lives of Afghans at the provincial and district levels. I believe that, with the new strategy, we and our international and Afghan partners will have both the military and civilian capacity to be able to make real headway.

Of course, the situation in Afghanistan cannot be addressed in isolation from its neighbors. To a considerable degree, the Taliban resurgence began when Pakistan made peace agreements with various insurgent and extremist groups on its western border. This allowed them more freedom of movement and an effective base of operations. That approach by the Pakistani government has come to an end. There is now a clear recognition by the Pakistanis on the direct threat the extremists pose to their national survival. The recent offensive by the Pakistani military in the Swat Valley was most certainly an encouraging first step.

Also encouraging is the support Afghanistan has received from other nations, including members of the Gulf community. We are grateful for that assistance but urge you to do more – to improve Afghan governance, reconstruction, economic development, and security capacity.

The application of more resources, improved cooperation, a better integrated civil, military, and diplomatic strategy – and the benefit of lessons learned both in country and in Iraq – present a historic but fleeting opportunity to turn the situation in Afghanistan around. I hope you will help us take that opportunity.

In closing, I would like to strike a note of optimism – perhaps cautious optimism, at any rate – about the state of affairs in the Gulf region. I think it is warranted because, while many of the problems in the Middle East have a long history, we should also stop and recognize elements of the overall picture that have changed. They include:

- An Iraq slowly but surely fighting its way out of the darkness of the recent decades;
- Positive political trends in places like Lebanon, Pakistan, and Iraq, where the electorates gravitated toward parties that stand for pluralism, and away from parties that foment religious extremism; and
- Last but not least, the unprecedented cooperation between the nations of the Gulf as you, and we, face these very difficult and dangerous threats to our common security.

As I said at the outset, American administrations led by both parties, going back some six decades, have regarded the stability of the Gulf Region as a vital national interest for the United States. The eight Presidents I have been privileged to serve all recognized that our security and prosperity were closely tied to the security and prosperity of the Middle East. President Obama is no different – he has pledged that America will continue to be present and engaged in this part of the world – to protect our enduring interests, and those of our allies and partners.

As we look ahead, let us pledge to keep these efforts strong and make them even stronger – to cast aside old animosities and work together in friendship. Forging ever-closer ties between your militaries and U.S. Central Command, and with each other, all of this will bring a better and brighter future for all of our peoples. Thank you very much.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO FLORIDA

June 25, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### U.S. SOUTHCOM Change of Command

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Miami, FL, Thursday, June 25, 2009

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Good morning, and thank you. We are especially honored to have so many representatives here today from the nations of this hemisphere – a tribute to the bonds of trust and partnership cultivated by the man we are honoring and seeing off today.

Over the course of his three-plus decades in uniform, Admiral James Stavridis has proven himself to be one of the military's most incisive thinkers and innovating leaders – qualities that he applied in full to the work of Southern Command.

From the start of his tenure at SOUTHCOM, Admiral Stavridis has fostered a spirit of interagency and international cooperation that reflects the post-Cold War realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. He has made SOUTHCOM the embodiment of what now is called “smart power,” drawing on the full strength of our nation and our partners to enhance the security, freedom, and prosperity of this part in the world.

Jim has certainly had an eventful tenure here. During his time at SOUTHCOM:

- Three American hostages were located and rescued in Colombia after more than five years of captivity, an effort that entailed more than 17,000 flight hours and 3,600 sorties;
- The annual Panamax multilateral exercises grew to 20 nations, compared to three when this exercise began six years ago;
- Nearly 700 metric tons of cocaine were interdicted;
- Numerous military-to-military exercises were conducted, including 21 in 2008;
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief were delivered and institutionalized; and
- Jim did all this while also dealing with the thorny legal and political issues associated with Guantanamo.

When he first took this post nearly three years ago, Jim understood that the mix of security challenges facing this region – narcotics, corruption, gangs, kidnapping, and more – does not lend itself to military solutions as traditionally understood or practiced. Toward this end, Jim has not just redrawn this command's organization charts, he has also fundamentally reformed its institutional culture and ways of doing business.

It was Jim's insight that building bonds of trust and friendship – especially in this hemisphere – would take more than the usual pronouncements. Consider that arguably one of the most successful acts of American public diplomacy so far in this new century was the tour of the *USNS Comfort* in 2007. This remarkable ship carrying a diverse and dedicated medical team visited 12 countries; had nearly 400,000 patient encounters; performed some 1,700 surgeries and more than 32,000 immunizations; and trained 28,000 medical students and technicians. The success of that first tour spurred the subsequent Continuing Promise missions that carry on to this day.

Admiral Stavridis understood the importance of strategic communications and employing the latest tools and technology to reach out to worldwide audiences in a credible

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and compelling way – from his *In the Americas* blog to the *Southcomwatch* twitter. And if you want to see what a basset hound looks like in sunglasses, I would urge you to visit Jim's popular Facebook page.

As we can see, Jim's initiatives went beyond the usual bureaucratic routine. There were movie showings, where staff were treated to films about everything from Che Guevara to the slums of Rio. All for the very serious, and very necessary purpose of seeing that the men and women of SOUTHCOM understand the people of the Americas – their history and culture, their grievances, as well as their aspirations.

It was Admiral Stavridis' unique combination of strategic vision and diplomatic skill that led me to recommend him to lead European Command and be Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Not only is he the first Navy officer to hold this post, he is also the first Greek American – something that I know is a source of great pride for Jim and his family.

Admiral Stavridis is no doubt looking forward to his new NATO duties with great enthusiasm. For all I know Jim has been studying Flemish and Walloon to add to the list of languages he has mastered over the years. Of course, Jim must also learn to speak NATO – where an OMLT is not breakfast dish you make with eggs, and a CJSOR is not a painful symptom of some unmentionable disease. I certainly look forward to an update on Jim's bright-eyed enthusiasm at the next ministerial, especially after all 28 defense ministers of the North Atlantic Council have taken a turn at speaking. Just between us, my secret is crossword puzzles.

A few minutes ago in the awards ceremony, I had a chance to pay tribute to Laura Stavridis, and all the extraordinary work she has done in this command and in this community. I know that I speak for the men and women of SOUTHCOM and their families in saying that you will be sorely missed, and will leave behind a legacy of generosity and service that will long outlast the three years that you made this corner of the Americas.

Today, we are also privileged to welcome a new leader, General Douglas Fraser, and his wife Rena, to this important post. General Fraser's long and distinguished career has seen staff and command assignments at every level of the Air Force and joint community, culminating with his tenure as deputy at Pacific Command – an organization whose area of responsibility encompasses about half the earth's surface and more than half the world's population.

Over the course of his life and career, General Fraser has shown himself able to adapt easily to vastly different environments. Not only did he spend a good part of his childhood in South America, but his last PCS was from Alaska to Hawaii. Doug, I bet they really had to twist your arm to take that one.

As with Admiral Stavridis going to Europe, General Fraser's appointment to this post also marks another first, as no Air Force officer has ever before led Southern Command. The trajectory of these officers' careers, and the billets they are now taking, is but one more indication of how joint our military leadership has become, and how much America's global-security arrangements have evolved since the end of the Cold War.

I would like to close by recognizing and extending my appreciation to the men and women of Southern Command. The important work you do here every day is making a difference to the prosperity, security, and freedom of your countrymen and to the people of the region. You have the enduring gratitude and respect of the American people. Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF USSOCOM CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY


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
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Thank you.



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, middle, talks with Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis and wife his wife Laura before the change of command ceremony at Southern Command Headquarters in Miami, Fla., June 25, 2009. Stavridis, who relinquished command to Air Force Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, will head to Stuttgart, Germany, to take over European Command and become the supreme allied commander of Europe.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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From left to right, Air Force Gen. Douglas M. Fraser, commander of Southern Command, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, congratulate Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis during the change of command ceremony at Southern Command Headquarters in Miami, Fla., June 25, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Joint Armed Forces Officers' Wives' Luncheon

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland, Friday, June 26, 2009*

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Well, thank you for that introduction. And my thanks to the luncheon committee for inviting me to spend some time with all of you today. I'm very grateful to receive the National Military Family Association's award – a little belatedly. The N.M.F.A. is a faithful helper to our service men and women and their loved ones, wherever they may be, whether it's:

- Running "Operation Purple," a free camp program for military kids that operates in 37 states and territories; or
- Providing tens of thousands of dollars in scholarships to military spouses each year; or
- Offering career development advice – in particular, awarding military spouses with fellowships to gain accreditation as financial counselors.

So I'm very honored to be associated with you all. And I would say also that the list of your past luncheon speakers is quiet impressive. I'll do my best to meet the high mark you've already set.

One person I will not be able to equal is the late humorist Art Buchwald, your very first speaker and in a way, accidental founder – since it was he who urged that the several organizations be consolidated into what became the Joint Armed Forces Officers' Wives' Luncheon in 1977. He returned as the JAFOWL keynoter a dozen years later, no doubt to celebrate with you the success of his chance creation.

I always appreciated Buchwald's ability to make fun of Washington. I have been known to do a bit of that myself from time to time, but I can't improve on the best of Buchwald. The Congress did not escape his wit. He said, "I always wanted to get into politics, but I was never light enough to make the team." The lobbyists received attention as well; he said they're "just like you and me – they put on their golf shoes one foot at a time." Presidents were fair game, too. Richard Nixon, for whom I worked, among others, and who was great material for political humorists, prompted Buchwald to say: "I worship the quicksand he walks in."

As a pundit Buchwald was in demand around this town. Military groups like this, though, had a special claim on him because he was a veteran. And a proud one. A high

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schooler when the Second World War broke out, he ran away to join the Marines. As he put it: "My father was the Marine Corps. It was everything."

We have been fortunate enough throughout our history to find men and women like him to serve our nation and defend it. And today, as America fights two wars, we have seen – have the most skilled armed forces that have ever been assembled. Buchwald was part of the "Greatest Generation." Today's soldiers, sailors, airmen, coastguardsmen, Marines – volunteers all – are rightly being called the "new Greatest Generation."

The nation is currently engaged in the longest war with all-volunteer forces since the War of the Revolution. A higher percentage of moms and dads are serving in this conflict than in any time in recent history. More than 40 percent of the military are parents and over 230,000 children have a mother or father at war. A generation of kids has had a parent deployed for war at least once – if not many times. A Pentagon survey earlier this year of over 13,000 spouses of active-duty service members recently found that the children most affected by deployments were between the ages of six and 13. The empty seat at the dinner table night after night is a constant reminder of a child's worry for the safety of his or her parents. And there is also the grief and the heartbreak when a loved one is injured or killed.

Even in peacetime, military kids face special circumstances, such as moving every time mom or dad gets a new assignment. But these parents appreciate that their service today will pay dividends tomorrow. When the nation calls them to difficult and dangerous places, they answer that call knowing that what they do protects the loved ones that they've left behind. And perhaps the children understand this fact the best. Said one teenager whose dad was deployed with the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne in Afghanistan: "My father doesn't do an everyday job."

And kids in families like these are not everyday kids. We must ensure that they get the best possible education. Last year, the Departments of Defense and Education signed an agreement to ease the strain on families as overseas units move back home in accordance with the Base [Re]alignment and Closure Act. The agreement will help military children make smoother transitions between schools and will teach them coping skills to deal with the stress of deployed parents. This effort is the culmination of years of informal partnering between the two departments.

Likewise, I applaud the governors who have joined the "Interstate Compact on Education Opportunity for Military Children." This compact, now signed into law in 20 states, eases school transitions for military kids by standardizing records transfers, course placement, and graduation requirements, among other things.

Those who fight for us deserve every effort we can possibly make on their behalf. Over the years, government action such as the creation of the Veterans' Administration, G.I. Bill, and the establishment of a military health system has made an enormous difference. But there is still a huge amount to do.

Major new provisions have been added to the G.I. Bill, for the first time since 1984. You are probably aware of the increased benefits. Now these may be passed on to a spouse or child if troops opt not to use them. I first heard of this idea of transferring G.I. education

benefits during a meeting I had with military spouses at Fort Hood. One spouse asked about the possibility, and I thought it sounded like a good idea and passed along the concept. Thanks to the support of President Bush and Congress, the changes were signed into law last July and come into effect this August. As the former chairman of the board of N.M.F.A., Nancy Alsheimer, put it: "Transferring benefits is good for the family, but also good for the military as a retention tool and quality-of-life improvement."

Last year, the Departments of Defense and Labor launched the Military Spouse Career Advancement Initiative. More than 35 million dollars was invested in projects – the project's initial demonstration phase, and included 18 military installations in eight key states. It will help military spouses obtain the professional training, licenses, and certificates they need to have high-growth, portable careers in fields such as technology and health care.

You may or may not have heard about President Obama's budget request for the Defense Department. It entails big changes in terms of how the department operates. But one of the most important things we did was to enhance and institutionalize support of troops and their families fighting in the current wars – to see that these programs have a bureaucratic home and sustained, long-term funding. Our all-volunteer force represents the United States' greatest strategic asset. We must reorient in this direction because, as Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, says, if we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions matter.

There is no "people" issue more critical than taking care of our wounded warriors – and that is my highest priority after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The problems we have had in this area come in part from the fact that well-intentioned individuals have been stymied by the frustrating bureaucratic complications endemic to huge organizations. No doubt you've struggled with military bureaucracy over the course of your service as spouses. It's been that way for a long time. It has been rumored that during the Civil War, red tape was used to bind the personnel records of soldiers. And clerks literally had to cut through the red tape to gain access to the soldier's records, which gave birth to that unfortunate term we're all familiar with. One example of a reform to help overcome these hurdles is the Army's "Warrior Transition Units," where coordinators are assigned to make it easier for the troops and their families as they transition through each phase of the military medical system.

And, as you know, we are doing battle with the ages-old stigmatizing of combat-related stress and other psychological ailments – those unseen wounds that are taking such a toll on our troops and on their families.

The last point I'd like to address is the strain on the force, especially ground forces that have borne the human and material brunt of the current wars. I've visited a number of military installations over the past two-and-a-half years. It is a difficult thing to look a family member in the eye whose spouse or father or son or daughter is being deployed again – sometimes on a second or third tour. Or even more. And it is harder to do with the families of those who have been killed or wounded.

There are metrics that we need to watch – such as the waivers granted to new recruits, a troubling rise of suicides in the Army, and the incidence of divorce and other signs of wear on military families. There are a number of measures underway that are designed to ease the strain on the small proportion of the American people who have borne the burden of these conflicts. And I hope and trust these changes will make a difference.

I know one thing that has been a great source of support and comfort and inspiration has been the public support for our forces that we have seen. Our military is not alone – the American people are with them. Organizations such as yours have seen to this and – speaking as someone who began his career during the early part of the Vietnam era – it marks an amazing and wonderful change for our country.

Not too long ago, a friend of mine from Texas A&M told me he had been waiting for a flight at the Dallas-Fort Worth airport. A man ran into the waiting area and said that a planeload of troops from Afghanistan were arriving on the level below. Virtually everyone there – hundreds of people waiting for their flights – ran down the stairs to applaud the service members as they entered the terminal. This is the kind of thing one sees in towns and cities all across this country. The appreciation is real, it is sincere, and it bridges any political divide. Our men and women in uniform – our heroes – deserve no less.

So my thanks once more for this honor and for all that you do for the “new Greatest Generation” and the families who serve and sacrifice with them.

Thank you.

**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

June 28, 2010

No.

703-697-5131/5132 (media)

**DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES STATEMENT ON THE NATIONAL  
SPACE POLICY**

“Today, I’m pleased to welcome the release of the President’s National Space Policy. I fully support the vision it lays out. This policy clearly articulates the right space policies and priorities for our nation, and is also a pledge that the United States will maintain the leadership and capabilities in space imperative for our national security.

“Our continued presence in space is vital to our national security. Space-based capabilities are critical to our military’s ability to navigate accurately, strike precisely, and gather battle space awareness efficiently. However, changes in the space environment over the last decade challenge our operations. Today, space is increasingly contested as our systems face threats of disruption and attack, increasingly competitive as more states, private firms, and others develop space-based capabilities, and increasingly congested with orbital debris.

“Together with other departments and agencies, the Department of Defense will take a number of steps to support the new National Space Policy, and will work with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to develop a strategy document to address specific national security requirements for outer space. We will look to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce vulnerabilities.

“Finally, we will pursue activities consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation with allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the responsible and peaceful shared presence in space.”

The White House statement, the fact sheet and the text of the National Space Policy are available online at <http://www.defense.gov/spr/> under “Related U.S. Govt Publications.”

- END -

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO GERMANY

June 30, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### U.S. EUCOM Change of Command

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, Tuesday, June 30, 2009*

Thank you, Admiral Mullen. I'm pleased to see so many representatives of our NATO allies here today, especially those from our host, the Federal Republic of Germany.

We are here to show our appreciation for and bid farewell to one fine officer, to welcome another, and to take stock of the accomplishments and important work of this historic command.

I also would like to start by acknowledging the Craddock family – his granddaughter Addy, his son Zachary, and, of course, his wife Linda. We just heard Admiral Mullen speak about some of Linda's work in this command, and a short while ago Admiral Mullen presented her with an award for her service. Having attended and spoken at a number of these ceremonies since taking this post, I continue to be amazed at the sacrifices military spouses make over the course of their loved one's career. Linda, thank you for all you have done – for the men and women of this command, and for your country.

Today, General Craddock brings to a close nearly 40 years of exemplary service. In many ways it is appropriate that we gather at this post, in a country where John spent so much of his time in uniform keeping the peace as a U.S. Army armor officer. In fact, he has been posted in Germany at some point in each of those four decades – not that we are trying to date him in any way.

The trajectory of General Craddock's career, in many respects, tracks some of the most important missions the United States military has undertaken over the past two generations.

- As commander of an armor battalion in Operation Desert Storm, John spearheaded the 24th Infantry Division's famed "left hook" into Iraq;
  - He led the first U.S. forces deployed into Kosovo as commander of Task Force Falcon, which included the delicate task of patrolling with Russian troops;
  - He would go on to command the U.S. Army's First Infantry Division, the legendary "Big Red One;"
- and
- Of course, he led two combatant commands on two different continents through a period of transition and transformation.

His tenure since taking command here at EUCOM and at NATO has been one of steady professionalism and forward-thinking leadership during a time of great consequence for the United States and our allies and partners in Europe. General Craddock was well-positioned by his experience and skill to oversee the changes necessary to modernize these organizations' thinking, planning, and ways of doing business. Under his leadership:

- NATO has become a more expeditionary force able to deploy and conduct missions far from its traditional borders;
- We've seen an expansion of NATO's role in combating non-traditional security threats, such as narco-trafficking and the proliferation of deadly weapons;
- The Alliance welcomed in two new members – Albania and Croatia – and managed a smooth transition from UN to EU management in Kosovo; and
- The Alliance reformed its command structure and re-designed the NATO Response Force.

During General Craddock's tenure here at EUCOM:

- A new Africa Command was stood up, transferring 120 missions, activities, programs, and exercises;
- The international community established a long-term counter-piracy operation to defeat a force of



instability that threatens the freedom of the seas;

- Operation Assured Delivery sent more than two million pounds of humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Georgia; and
- Over the last two years, 36 countries in the EUCOM area of responsibility have increased their assistance to the international military effort in Afghanistan.

John also guided the development of the EUCOM Strategy for Active Security, which recognizes that a small investment of resources and effort now to deal with festering problems before they become crises can help avert the need to expend greater blood and treasure later. General Craddock accomplished all this while having nearly half of EUCOM's forces deployed in direct support of the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I mentioned earlier that John had spent much of his army career in this country and in this command. Through solidarity and steadfastness of purpose – and the service and dedication of millions of allied men and women in uniform like John Craddock – that famous gap to our east was never breached. Today, the transatlantic alliance faces new challenges, and new stresses and strains, that will test our credibility, resolve, and shared purpose. An Alliance that never fired a shot during four decades of the Cold War now has thousands of troops deployed thousands of miles from the heart of Europe, many coming under fire as we stand here today.

Overcoming the daunting, multi-faceted security challenges of this dangerous new century will require a talented and innovative leader to build on General Craddock's achievements. We are fortunate to have one in Admiral James Stavridis, who, once again, is taking the proverbial baton from General Craddock as he did nearly three years ago at Southern Command.

Admiral Stavridis is, of course, the first navy officer to lead EUCOM and become SACEUR – a symbol of both how much this alliance has changed since the end of the Cold War, and how joint our militaries are, and must continue to become. Jim Stavridis is a true sailor-scholar, whose strategic vision and diplomatic expertise make him the leader we need at this command at such a critical juncture in the history of the transatlantic alliance.


This year, the sixtieth anniversary of the NATO Alliance, offers an opportunity to step back and take stock of all that we have been through: the history we share, the challenges we have endured, and the great sacrifices we have borne together. Our nations are again engaged in a war whose outcome and duration is uncertain. But I am confident we will summon the will and the courage to do what we must in Afghanistan. I am confident that Admiral Stavridis will lead our brave men and women with honor and do right by them, just as General Craddock has over these past three years.

Thank you very much.


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF NATO CHANGE OF COMMAND CEREMONY


June 30, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates congratulates U.S. Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, incoming commander for European Command, during the change of command ceremony at European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, June 30, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates presents the U.S. European Command guidon to Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis during a change of command ceremony in Stuttgart, Germany, June 30, 2009. Stavridis, who replaces Army Gen. John Craddock, will also assume responsibilities as NATO supreme allied commander, Europe, in a ceremony July 2 in Mons, Belgium.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Rob Hazelett  
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Left to right; U.S. Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, incoming commander of European Command, U.S. Army Gen. John Craddock, outgoing commander, and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates share a light moment before the change of command ceremony at European Command Headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, June 30, 2009. Craddock relinquished command to Stavridis.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

June 30, 2009

### Press Conference with Secretary Gates En Route From Germany

Q So today is an important day -- the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities. We've seen a peak of violence these past weeks and your commanders and yourself said that it was pretty predictable. However, I was wondering if you could give us an assessment of the security in Iraq for the next month? What is the Pentagon's assessment? What might happen?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think it really varies around the country. You have some places like Fallujah and Ramadi and Kirkuk, Basra that are pretty quiet. Mosul -- they were in the middle of a fight in Mosul when this deadline came, and we're seeing some of these high profile suicide attacks in Baghdad.

And I think the general view is that part of General Odierno and what he has been anticipating for weeks was that al Qaeda, in particular, as soon as we began -- two things. First, as soon as we began to leave the cities, al Qaeda would try and reignite the sectarian violence, and to the degree that he has seemed relatively positive about developments, I think it's because even after these high profile bombings and with a lot of casualties, that sectarian violence has not reignited. And I think his view is most Iraqis are sick and tired of the violence.

The other thing is al Qaeda and others trying to increase the level of violence to try and pretend that they were the ones that forced us out of the cities and also to try and demonstrate deficiencies of the Iraqi security forces.

So this is -- I think our commanders have anticipated these strategies on the part of the remaining al Qaeda and a few others, to try and take advantage of our withdrawal to get into the cities. And the failure to spark new sectarian violence is what is, I think, making them as positive as they sound.

Q So what do you expect for the next month to happen?

SEC. GATES: Well, I expect that there'll continue to be sporadic attacks as people try and take advantage of our being out of the cities. But we're not -- you know, we're not coming home and in many respects, being out of the cities and able to focus on, say, the belts around Baghdad and some of these other areas may, in fact, allow us to help the Iraqi security forces by preventing those who want to foment trouble from getting into the cities.

So I think we can continue the partnership that's been developed with the Iraqi security forces. We'll just be doing it outside the cities.

Q (Off mike.) Mr. Secretary, on Afghanistan, can you sort of conclude at this point that NATO allies contributed about as many troops as they're going to, and that our request -- (inaudible) -- should be not for troops but for money or training camps or things other than just raw numbers of troops?

SEC. GATES: I actually started that in Poland, in Krakow, earlier this year, focusing on two things. One, seeing if they could get some more troops in, at least temporarily, in the pre-election period; but then, second, longer term, contributing civilian experts; and then, third, contributing to the Afghan trust fund in NATO to help sustain the Afghan security force.

Q Let's talk about the other big battle you're facing right now with Congress. Obviously, the F-22s -- more of them was red lined for you. What are some of the other red lines that you see as they try to pick at the budget?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've indicated to some of the chairmen and the ranking minorities of the committees what I -- issues that I think would be a problem. I'm not going to detail what that list is but I'll give you one more example. It'll be the vehicle program for future combat systems. But so far -- you know, the truth of the matter is, we haven't seen the full Senate

Armed Services Committee mark yet, but based on what I've been told about the House part and the partial information I have about the Senate mark, the F-22 and the second engine for the F-35 seem to be about the only main issues where they have gone anywhere different than what we put forward.

So based on the mark we've already seen from the House and what I've heard about the Senate, with those exceptions, I think we've actually done pretty well.

Q Are you surprised at how little resistance there's been to some of these big cuts?

SEC. GATES: A little bit. But I think that, you know, the Chairman and I have done four hearings, appropriations and authorizers, but the service secretaries and the service chiefs have done a lot of hearings and so has -- and General Cartwright has done a lot of briefings on missile defense, for example. And so I think that between our hearings and -- but especially hearing directly from the service chiefs and the service secretaries I believe has undoubtedly had a positive impact on the Hill in terms of hearing the services' views on these changes and their involvement in the process and their belief that we're headed in the right direction.

Q Mr. Secretary, while you were meeting with the wounded warriors, we were getting a briefing at lunch and we were hearing about the long distances that injured troops in Afghanistan have to get to care -- and I know you've been pushing to get more assets there.

How soon do you expect that all be in place so they can start having an impact with this -- (inaudible) --

SEC. GATES: I think we're pretty close to being there. The overall average time in Afghanistan -- you know, I mean, our goal is that golden hour, 60 minutes, which is the goal in Iraq. That is my goal in Afghanistan as well. We're now down to about 68 minutes on average, but we're keeping track of every single Medevac because there maybe some that are 20 minutes and there are maybe others that are an hour-and-a-half.

Q Right.

SEC. GATES: And I want to try and equalize that. So a big impulse, big input was the arrival of the new combat air brigade, aviation brigade in May with all the helicopters they provide.

We took some of the helicopters -- when they arrived, we took some of the helicopters -- I had 10 helicopters I had sent in February back out. I think we took four of the helicopters that went into Afghanistan earlier this year back out.

Q So six were here --

SEC. GATES: We left six, plus the capabilities of the combat aviation brigade and then we sent in three new field hospitals as well. So we're trying to get -- part of the problem is the procedures in terms of the approval process for Medevac and what we're trying to do now is get them to the point where they launch the helicopters and -- even if they don't have the full chain of approvals, so that when they get those approvals, they're on their way or almost there.

So we're not -- trying to avoid the bureaucracy and procedures getting in the way of being there quickly. When I was in Afghanistan about three weeks ago, one of the surgeons told me that until the arrival of these capabilities, they had not been able to save a -- at least in his hospital, had not been able to save a single double amputee.

Q To save as in --

SEC. GATES: To save their lives, and they had already saved several with these additional air assets. So they're working it. I think we're going to get very close to being down to that hour.

Q One thing that they mentioned to us was -- apparently, a large number of our troops in Afghanistan, their first level of care was actually from the coalition for medical treatment, not U.S., because of where they're located.

SEC. GATES: Well, most -- that would be true really only in parts of the west. And if we put another field hospital into the west of our and if we're working through some issues with our allies, they had some caveats associated with conditions under which they will fly helicopters and things like that and getting rid of a lot of those problems as well. Chairman Mullen has been very active with his counterparts in the Alliance on that.

But my direction was -- where we have the assets, our CEs and our CSTAF, let's get it down to an hour and then we'll work the north and the west as well as we possibly can.

Q The president yesterday spoke again about "Don't ask, don't tell" and his desire to overturn it. When is the last time you spoke to him about it and the last time you had your staff speak about a timeline or any movement -- (inaudible)

SEC. GATES: There was some discussion of it among the senior military during our Defense Senior Leadership

Conference last week, and I think my last discussion with the president was probably last week as well.

Q And what was the level of that discussion? Was it just the same -- his desire or is it --

SEC. GATES: We were talking about how do we move forward on this to achieve his objective which is changing the policy and the issue that we face is that how do we begin to do preparations and simultaneously the administration move forward in terms of asking the Congress to change the law.

What we have is a law -- be it a policy or a regulation -- and as I discovered when I got into it, it's a very prescriptive law. It doesn't leave much to the imagination for a lot of flexibility.

And so one of the things we're looking at is there flexibility in how we apply this law in terms of -- well, let me give you an example. Do we need to be driven when the information, to take action on somebody if we get that information from somebody who may have vengeance in mind or blackmail or somebody who has been jilted.

Q Somebody was outed without --

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: Yeah. In other words, if somebody is outed by a third party, we have to -- does that force us to take an action? And I don't know the answer to that and I don't want to pretend to. But that's the kind of thing we're looking at to see if there's at least a more humane way to apply the law until the law gets changed.

Q Is that a legal question that has to be worked out?

SEC. GATES: I think it's a question of legal interpretation, yeah. So we've got the general counsel and others working on it.

Q Just going back to the Iraqi -- (inaudible.) Is there concerns at the Pentagon that, you know, U.S. forces leaving the Iraqi cities might create a vacuum that Iran can take advantage of to gain more influence in Iraq?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think so. I think that, to a considerable extent, Iranian influence is political and covert, not military.

Q And can you update us on the flow of aid to the insurgents from Iran?

SEC. GATES: There is still a flow of help from Iran to the insurgents, but I would say -- and, frankly, I haven't read much about it lately, so my suspicion is that the amount of it is down some. But I'm not in a position to quantify.

Q Maybe never.

Q I wanted to follow up on the -- (off mike) -- what's your sense as a historian -- Iran, obviously, seems to have pummeled them. Do you think that's going to hold or do you think that they would create the conditions for -- (inaudible) -- down the road?

SEC. GATES: I honestly think that no one knows the answer to that question. I mean, you have the kind of situation that you saw in places like Hungary and Czechoslovakia where liberalization trend or hope or repression and the repression lasted for another 40 years; or do you have a situation that is more like the circumstances that happened in Eastern Europe more recently or in places like Ukraine and so on. And I think you just don't know, and I think the key -- the quick -- the key question often is the security forces, the loyalty of the security services and whether there are deep fissures within the leadership. And, frankly, we don't have a lot of information on that.

Q By the way, are you satisfied with the intel that you're getting from Iran right now whenever you know?

SEC. GATES: I'm never satisfied with the level of details. I want to know everything.

Q How would you qualify it? Like the intel from the U.S. coming from Iran?

SEC. GATES: It's as good as we had when I was at the CIA, and I'll just leave it at that. (Laughter.)

Q In your book, you talk a lot about how a '70s propaganda campaign within the Soviet Union started opening up fissures there. So following Yoki's question, do you feel like the Internet, Twitter, Facebook, is actually starting to serve those same purposes in Iran?

SEC. GATES: I just think that -- as I said in the press room last week, I think that the multiplication of channels of information and technology make it increasingly difficult for authoritarian governments to cut their people off from outside information. And as we've seen in Iran, particularly young people are incredibly innovative and creative in finding ways

around the blogs.

So I think it's a problem for all authoritarian governments. You know, the people in the western part of the Soviet Union couldn't -- were able to access West German television, it's going to take something much cruder than what we riot about now. It made all the difference in the world. They're looking at their lifestyle and they're looking at West Germany and they're saying, what's wrong with this picture? And -- so I think it remains to be seen.

(Cross talk.)

Q Just back to Iraq real quick. You said you expect the level of violence, you expect more push back from al Qaeda groups. But do you have any concerns about the effect that will have on U.S. forces if they're under more -- removed from positions to have to respond to situations where the Iraqi security forces may not be handle it right away? Does that put U.S. forces in a more dangerous situation?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, as you all know, we're going to have a certain number of soldiers embedded with Iraqi units, and we will still be providing them a lot of support, ISR and so on. And so I think we'll be in pretty good touch with the situation and won't have to wait until somebody is an extremist before we -- if they call for help.

I think -- I mean, I've been struck by General Odierno's overall positive view of the way things have developed and in the way forward.

STAFF: Okay, last one.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: I saw him today.

Q You saw him today in the field -- in the hospital? Is it fair to say that -- (off mike).

SEC. GATES: Yeah. I think it's still a dangerous situation. We just lost four kids today.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: I think so. Yeah, it was about half and half of the patients I saw.

Q Are you --

SEC. GATES: He got a Purple Heart. We gave out a Purple Heart.

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: I'm not sure the soldier will remember -- (off mike).

Q I kind of understand that the Pentagon plans to keep the level of forces currently in Iraq steady for the next month until the election while the number in Afghanistan is going to go up. So it means pretty much according to provisions that -- forecast that there's going to be 180 (thousand) or more, almost 200,000 U.S. soldiers in theater at the end of the year. Is there any concerns that it might, you know, add to the issue of stretching the force?

SEC. GATES: Sure there is. And, you know, we really don't begin to get real relief. They've obviously gotten some relief by going from 20 BCTs to 12, which is where we are now. But until we can begin drawing down from that 12 to the five or six that General Odierno is talking about after August '10, then we're going to -- it will be a continual strain. And that's why General Casey and others have said we don't really begin to see real relief in terms of dwell time until probably after the turn of the year and next spring.

Q I wonder if -- Cyber Command, just real quick. If you can give us a little more overview on when we'll see more details and if you feel like we're already behind the eight ball in getting that underway?

SEC. GATES: No. I -- you know, that's another one of those things that I punted with the next administration. Actually, I created a subordinate unit under STRATCOM and double-hatted the director of NSA, General Alexander, in that job because I didn't want to move straight to a sub-unified command in the waning days of the Bush administration.

Once I agreed to stay, I told everybody to go ahead and move toward the sub-unified command and it simply brings more structure to it and even further integration of our different capabilities. And we were actually ready to move about four months ago, but I told the White House that I would wait until the White House cyber review was completed.

So we waited until then and then we moved ahead.

Q Sir, did that -- did the White House review not have any affect on the plans for the DOD site commander?

SEC. GATES: I think we probably made some adjustments. I wasn't deeply engaged in the process, but I imagine we made some adjustments to the plan based on the 60-day study, but the fundamental structure was not changed.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
June 30, 2009

No. 466-09

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### Security Agreement Implementation Announced

The Department of Defense announced today that, in accordance with the security agreement between the United States and Iraq signed last year, U.S. combat forces have left Iraqi cities, villages and localities.

This historic security agreement between the United States and Iraq is indicative of Iraq's confidence, capacity and capability as U.S. combat forces move out of Iraq's urban areas.

At the forefront of creating a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq and developing an environment of political and economic growth, significant investments have been made in infrastructure, training, equipment, essential services, and the institution of rule of law to benefit all Iraqis.

As U.S. combat forces move out of the localities, Iraqi security forces (ISF) are assuming responsibility for security, a significant step for Iraq and a tribute to the tremendous progress made and dedication of the ISF members.

"The United States is committed to full, transparent, and continued implementation of the security agreement in a spirit of partnership with the sovereign nation of Iraq. Iraqi security forces continue to take the lead in the security and stability of Iraq," said Gen. Ray Odierno, commanding general, Multi-National Force Iraq. U.S. forces outside urban areas will continue to conduct operations by, with, and through, ISF, focusing on securing Iraqi borders and areas outside the cities. "In order to meet our obligations under the security agreement, some U.S. forces will remain in cities to train, advise, and coordinate with Iraqi security forces, as well as support civil capacity efforts led by the U.S. Mission-Iraq, government of Iraq (GoI) and the United Nations. All U.S. forces retain full authority and ability to protect themselves, Iraqi security forces, and the Iraqi public," said Odierno.

To date, more than 150 U.S. bases have been closed or returned to the GoI since January 2008. U.S. troop strength has decreased to 131,000 from a high of 165,574 in September 2007. Contractors have also decreased from 164,491 to 125,163 today.

Additionally, more than \$15 million of property has been transferred to the GoI. The United States will continue to reduce both number of bases and combat forces in 2010 through the end of 2011.

Increased security, improved Iraqi security forces, and continued progress in local and national government capacity has set the conditions for U.S. forces to withdraw from the cities.



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IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
July 01, 2009

No. 473-09

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#### DoD Announces New Defense Policy Board Members

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates today announced the following new members to the Defense Policy Board: Gen. (Ret) Larry Welch, former Air Force chief of staff ; Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations; Richard Danzig, former secretary of the Navy; Robert Gallucci, former assistant secretary of state; Chuck Hagel, former senator from Nebraska; Robert D. Kaplan, Center for a New American Security; Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; Rudy deLeon, former deputy secretary of defense; John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Sarah Sewall, Harvard University; Wendy Sherman, former special advisor to the President.

These members join the following returning members: John Hamre, chairman; Harold Brown; Adm. (Ret) Vern Clark; J.D. Crouch; Fred Ikle; Gen. (Ret) Jack Keane; Henry Kissinger; Dave McCurdy; Frank Miller; William Perry; James Schlesinger; Marin Strmecki; Vin Weber; Gen. (Ret) Pete Pace.

The Defense Policy Board provides the secretary, deputy secretary and under secretary for policy with independent, informed advice and opinion concerning matters of defense policy.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 474-09  
July 02, 2009

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### DoD Announces New Director Of DARPA

The Department of Defense (DoD) today announced the selection of Regina E. Dugan as the 19<sup>th</sup> director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA is the principal agency within the DoD for research, development, and demonstration of concepts, devices, and systems that provide highly advanced military capabilities for the current and future combat force. In this role of developing high-risk, high-payoff projects, DARPA compliments and balances the overall science and technology program of the DoD.

"Regina Dugan is precisely the dynamic leader DARPA needs to open new technology frontiers and transition revolutionary technologies to serve our nation's interests," said Zachary J. Lemnios, director, Defense Research and Engineering. "I am delighted she will be leading this agency and look forward to working closely with her."

Prior to this appointment, Dugan held several key positions in industry, most recently as president and chief executive officer of RedXDefense, LLC, which she co-founded in 2005, a company that develops defense against explosive threats. She has also served in senior executive positions in several additional companies in roles ranging from global sales and marketing to research and product development.

During her first tour at DARPA from January 1996 to May 2000, Dugan received the program manager of the year award for her leadership of the "Dog's Nose Program", which was focused on the development of an advanced, field-portable system for detecting the explosive content of land mines. She is also the recipient of the deFleury Medal, the office of the secretary of defense award for exceptional service, and the award for outstanding achievement. She has participated in wide-ranging studies for the Defense Science Board, the Army Science Board, the National Research Council and Science Foundation, and currently sits on the Naval Research Advisory Committee and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Science and Technology Panel.

Dugan earned her doctorate in mechanical engineering from the California Institute of Technology and her master's and bachelor's degrees from Virginia Tech. She is the co-author of "Engineering Thermodynamics," 1996, sole inventor on one issued patent and inventor or co-inventor on nine additional patents pending.

Media may contact DARPA external relations at 571-218-4512. Additional information on DARPA is provided at <http://www.darpa.mil>.

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
July 06, 2009

No. 482-09

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Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on the death of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

Robert McNamara was a patriot and dedicated public servant who took on grave duties during a period of great consequence. Having also held this post in a time of war, I have a special appreciation of the burdens and responsibilities he faced. As America's longest-serving secretary of defense, he implemented visionary reforms that fundamentally changed the way this department does business -- reforms that long outlasted his tenure at the Pentagon. With his keen analytical mind, Secretary McNamara never shied away from the most pressing national and international issues of his time -- above all, matters of war and peace including his own decisive role in shaping that history. My thoughts and prayers are with his family.

U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE  
July 06, 2009

No. 480-09

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Defense Science Board Appointments

The Department of Defense today announced the appointments of Dr. Paul Kaminski as chairman of the Defense Science Board for a term effective immediately through Dec. 31, 2011, and retired Air Force Gen. Lester Lyles as vice chairman for a term effective immediately through Dec. 31, 2010.

Dr. Kaminski is chairman and chief executive officer of Technovation, Inc. as well as chairman of the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees. His previous government experience includes service as the under secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology from October 1994 to May 1997. He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering, a Fellow of the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers, and a Fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics. He was awarded the National Medal of Technology in 2006.

Gen. Lyles is currently an independent consultant. He served as the 27th vice chief of staff of the United States Air Force from 1999 to 2000 and as commander of Air Force Materiel Command from April 2000 to August 2003.

The Defense Science Board is the senior advisory body in the Department of Defense. It is composed of members appointed from the private sector, and advises the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) on scientific, technical, manufacturing, and other matters of special importance to the Department.

U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Retirement Ceremony for General David McKiernan

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Wednesday, July 15, 2009*

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Thank you General Casey. I want to thank General McKiernan for inviting me to take part in his retirement ceremony. It is an honor to be with him, his family, and his colleagues to celebrate the accomplishments of his 37 years wearing the uniform of the United States Army.

As Dave knows, he and I have something in common that's important. As George just indicated he's a fellow graduate of the College of William and Mary, although he graduated some years later than I did. And both of us majored in history. And so, I should note that for more than a century, William and Mary's senior and most famous military alumnus was General Winfield Scott of Vera Cruz fame. Well, move over, General Scott – another William and Mary alum has outranked you and is even more famous.

Over the course of his career, David McKiernan has served as operations officer at every level of command in the United States Army. He led the storied First Cavalry Division. His overseas deployments took him to Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He has handled everything the Army, and his commander-in-chief, have thrown at him with supreme professionalism, intelligence, and dedication to our nation and the men and women under his command.

When General McKiernan assumed command of the Third U.S. Army, he took his place in a line of leaders that included George S. Patton. With a historian's regard for these kinds of connections, he approved the idea of code-naming the entry into Iraq Operation Cobra II, after the Normandy "breakout," Operation Cobra, in France in 1944. I grant you that Dave McKiernan's way of doing things was not identical to Patton's. A major book on the Iraq war described David McKiernan as "taciturn and unflappable" – qualities for which George Patton was not famous. Then again, I would note that the book later goes on to modify its description of David to: "usually taciturn, almost always unflappable."

Cobra II was a plan made better by his tireless work in the days before the troops and tanks crossed the Kuwaiti border on March 20, 2003. And yet when it comes to plans, we all know – and no one better than Dave McKiernan – that they never survive first contact with the enemy. General McKiernan had the skill, and the will, to keep the march to Baghdad on track through Fedeyeen

attacks and furious sandstorms – a march that in less than three weeks brought Saddam Hussein's brutal regime to an end.

General McKiernan's hard-won experience in the war served him well in Afghanistan, where for the past year he ably led a vast international military effort to secure and rebuild a country and a people who have suffered from decades of deprivation and conflict. In that time he devoted himself to:

- Recalibrating ISAF's mission to better protect the Afghan people;
- Overseeing a major enlargement of the Afghan security forces;
- Bringing better coordination to the civilian and military international efforts in the country, both in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan;
- Making ISAF better at counterinsurgency by insuring its members were more effectively trained for this purpose; and
- Enabling Afghanistan's military and that of its neighbor, Pakistan, to work more closely together.

One of his many virtues is his good-humored flexibility. I saw this first-hand when I was in Afghanistan to meet with military leaders and our troops. General McKiernan's staff had prepared a 30-slide PowerPoint presentation. While walking to the briefing room, the general was taken aside and informed of my dislike of PowerPoint briefings. On the spot, he chucked the slides, got a map, and gave me a great briefing.

Reflecting on the mission in Afghanistan, Dave once said that the Afghan people deserve better than "the last 30 years of conflict . . . While the Taliban and other terrorist groups offer only lies and fear[s], our continued efforts promote freedom and hope." David has spent 37 years in service to these ideals, which are his country's ideals. David, on behalf of all Americans I thank you.

For the exceptional career of David McKiernan we also need to thank Carmen McKiernan and their children. Carmen, you and your family have made great sacrifices as you've helped and supported Dave, and endured having a husband and father in harm's way. Your own service to America is deeply appreciated. As the McKiernans head back to Germany for a well-earned respite, we wish them every happiness for the future and whatever new adventures retirement brings. Thank you.



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates greets Army Gen. David D. McKiernan prior to his full honors retirement ceremony on Fort Myer, Va., July 15, 2009. McKiernan served as the commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

Trip to New York and Illinois

July 16 – 17, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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Fort Drum Town Hall

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Fort Drum, NY, Thursday, July 16, 2009

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Thank you all very much and thank you General Oates for the introduction. And thank you all for coming today.

- I am thankful for the opportunity to be among the Warriors of the 1st Brigade Combat Team and those loved ones and supporters of this august, battle-tested organization.

- And, I wish all the best to the “Commandos” of 2nd BCT now on a rotation at JRTC, and soon to deploy to Iraq.

- And also, to the “Spartans” of 3rd BCT in Afghanistan and the 10th Aviation Brigade and the elements of the 10th Sustainment Brigade in Iraq. I wish you Godspeed and a swift and safe return.

- Finally, I want to welcome home the division headquarters team from their most recent Operation Iraqi Freedom deployment. Your work helped pave the way for the transition that took place just over two weeks ago.

Much has been asked of this division over the last two decades – from Somalia to repeat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq – and the 10th Mountain Division team has delivered for our country time and time again. No other division or post has been asked to do more. We are a safer and more secure nation as a result. What else needs to be said but: “Climb to Glory.”

My prepared remarks, I’m sure you’ll be pleased to know, will be thankfully brief in order to leave more time to hear from you – what you need to do your job that you are not getting, what we can be doing better for your families, or just what’s on your mind. And, then we’ll do some handshakes, handout some coins, and do some photos

I know that several of your own have recently fallen in Afghanistan. And my words are wholly inadequate to characterize the men, or their sacrifice, or the sacrifice of so many from this division over the last eight years of war. It calls to mind a stirring example from ancient Greece. On the eve of the battle of Thermopylae, someone asked King Leonidas of Sparta about the risks he and his men faced. The king’s response was: “If you men think that I rely on numbers, then all Greece is not sufficient, for it is but a small fraction of their numbers; but if on men’s valor, then this number will do.” Men and women of this division are more than equal to do anything asked of them.

As we fight two wars, I am mindful of the stress on Army families back home. The quality of life for our soldiers, their families, and especially our wounded warriors remains my top priority. And, I'm glad to see a number of efforts under way here at Fort Drum:

- An expansion of the Guthrie Clinic;
- A new Warrior in Transition support center and barracks;
- More Family Housing Units renovated, and hundreds of new homes delivered – although as I heard from my meeting with spouses not nearly enough houses on post;
- Expansion of the child development center and other youth programs; and
- The Soldier Family Assistance Center and Warrior Transition Units that continue to do outstanding work.

Nonetheless we know that much more still needs to be done.

I also want to take a moment to thank all the families. I know how much they sacrifice in order for you to be able to serve. They are truly the “power behind the power.” I just can't tell you how much we all appreciate what they do, and what you do. And, I thank you for your noble work, and your selfless sacrifice.

With the announcement of your upcoming return to theater, I know I speak for all Americans when I wish you the best in the arduous missions that await you. The nation is grateful for your service.

Now let me just close with a final thought. I actually did not do these town halls for the first two years plus I was in this job. I thought they looked staged with soldiers as props. And I was embarrassed at how early you all had to show up and kill time waiting for the secretary of defense when you could be in the rack or doing something more productive. But I started to do these a few months ago because I realized that it was a chance mainly just to thank you personally, and to thank your families, for your service to our country. And to shake hands with each and every one of you. And be able to look you in the eye and thank you. I'll take some questions here in a few minutes but the main purpose of this meeting really is for me to have the opportunity to tell you that I consider the well-being of each and every one of you to be my personal responsibility. For the younger ones of you, I care about you the way I would my own son and daughter. And for all of you my highest priority is to do everything possible to help you accomplish your mission, to win, and to come home safely.


So now I'll take a few questions.



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO FORT DRUM, NEW YORK

July 16, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with members of the press after he conducted a town hall meeting with soldiers assigned to the 10th Mountain Division on Fort Drum, N.Y., July 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with spouses of deployed 10th Mountain Division soldiers during his visit to Fort Drum, N.Y., July 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
[Download Hi-Res](#)



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with brigade commanders and command sergeants major of the 10th Mountain Division over lunch during his visit to Fort Drum, N.Y., July 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Economic Club of Chicago**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Chicago, IL, Thursday, July 16, 2009*

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Thank you, Secretary Daley, for that kind introduction.

It's an honor to be at the Economic Club of Chicago. I certainly appreciate the special arrangements you made to have me here this afternoon.

I thank all the distinguished citizens of this great city who came here today. I am mindful I am speaking in the adopted hometown of my boss. President Obama sends his greetings, as do Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod and the rest of the Chicago crew. They are no doubt discovering that Washington is the true "Windy City."

The issue that brings me here today is central to the security of all Americans: the future of the United States military: How it should be organized, equipped – and funded – in the years ahead, to win the wars we are in while being prepared for threats on or beyond the horizon. Earlier this year, I recommended to President Obama – and he enthusiastically agreed – that we needed to fundamentally reshape the priorities of America's defense establishment and reform the way the Pentagon does business – in particular, the weapons we buy, and how we buy them. Above all, to prepare to wage future wars, rather than continuing the habit of rearming for previous ones.

I am here on relatively short notice to speak publicly about these matters because the Congress is, as we speak, debating the president's defense budget request for the next fiscal year, a budget request that implements many needed reforms and changes. Most of the proposals – especially those that increase support for the troops, their families, and the war effort – have been widely embraced. However, some of the crucial reforms that deal with major weapons programs have met with a less than enthusiastic reaction in the Congress, among defense contractors, and within some quarters of the Pentagon itself. And so I thought it appropriate to address some of these controversial issues here – in a place that is, appropriately enough not only the adopted home of our Commander-in-Chief, but also a symbol of America's industrial base and economic power.

First, some context on how we got to this point. President Obama's budget proposal is, I believe, the nation's first truly 21st century defense budget. It explicitly recognizes that over the last two decades the nature of conflict has

fundamentally changed – and that much of America’s defense establishment has yet to fully adapt to the security realities of the post-Cold War era and this complex and dangerous new century.

During the 1990s, the United States celebrated the demise of the Soviet Union and the so-called “end of history” by making deep cuts in the funding for, and above all, the size of the U.S. military, including a 40 percent drop in the size of the Active Army. This took place even as a post-Cold War world grew less stable, less predictable, and more turbulent. The U.S. military, with some advances in areas such as precision weaponry, essentially became a smaller version of the force that held off the Soviets in Germany for decades and expelled Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. There was little appetite for, or interest in, preparing for what we call “irregular warfare” – campaigns against insurgents, terrorists, militias, and other non-state groups. This was the bipartisan reality both in the White House and in Congress.

Of course, after September 11th, some things did change. The base defense budget – not counting spending for the wars – increased by some 70 percent over the next eight years. During this period there were important changes in the way U.S. forces were organized, based and deployed, and investments were made in new technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles. However, when all was said and done, the way the Pentagon selected, evaluated, developed, and paid for major new weapons systems and equipment did not fundamentally change – even after September 11th.

Indeed, the kinds of equipment, programs, and capabilities needed to protect our troops and defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not the highest priority of much of the Defense Department, even after several years of war.

I learned about this lack of bureaucratic priority for the wars we are in the hard way – during my first few months on the job as the Iraq surge was getting underway. The challenges I faced in getting what our troops needed in the field stood in stark contrast to the support provided conventional modernization programs – weapons designed to fight other modern armies, navies, and air forces – that had been in the pipeline for many years and had acquired a loyal and enthusiastic following in the Pentagon, in the Congress, and in industry. The most pressing needs of today’s warfighter – on the battlefield, in the hospital, or at home – simply lacked place and power at the table when priorities were being set and long-term budget decisions were being made.

So the most important shift in President Obama’s first defense budget was to increase and institutionalize funding for programs that directly support those fighting America’s wars and their families. Those initiatives included more helicopter support, air lift, armored vehicles, personnel protection equipment, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, we also increased funding for programs that provide long-term support to military families and treatment for the signature

wounds of this conflict – such as traumatic brain injury and post traumatic stress.

But, while the world of terrorists and other violent extremists – of insurgents and IEDs – is with us for the long haul, we also recognize that another world has emerged. Growing numbers of countries and groups are employing the latest and increasingly accessible technologies to put the United States at risk in disruptive and unpredictable ways.

Other large nations – known in Pentagon lingo as “near-peers” – are modernizing their militaries in ways that could, over time, pose a challenge to the United States. In some cases, their programs take the form of traditional weapons systems such as more advanced fighter aircraft, missiles, and submarines.

But other nations have learned from the experience of Saddam Hussein’s military in the first and second Gulf wars – that it is ill-advised, if not suicidal, to fight a conventional war head-to-head against the United States: fighter-to-fighter, ship-to-ship, tank-to-tank. They also learned from a bankrupted Soviet Union not to try to outspend us or match our overall capabilities. Instead, they are developing asymmetric means that take advantage of new technologies – and our vulnerabilities – to disrupt our lines of communication and our freedom of movement, to deny us access, and to narrow our military options and strategic choices.

At the same time, insurgents or militias are acquiring or seeking precision weapons, sophisticated communications, cyber capabilities, and even weapons of mass destruction. The Lebanese extremist group Hezbollah currently has more rockets and high-end munitions – many quite sophisticated and accurate – than all but a handful of countries.

In sum, the security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed, and our thinking must likewise change. The old paradigm of looking at potential conflict as either regular or irregular war, conventional or unconventional, high end or low – is no longer relevant. And as a result, the Defense Department needs to think about and prepare for war in a profoundly different way than what we have been accustomed to throughout the better part of the last century.

What is needed is a portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. As a result, we must change the way we think and the way we plan – and fundamentally reform – the way the Pentagon does business and buys weapons. It simply will not do to base our strategy solely on continuing to design and buy – as we have for the last 60 years – only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of another superpower adversary – especially one that imploded nearly a generation ago.

To get there we must break the old habit of adding layer upon layer of cost, complexity, and delay to systems that are so expensive and so elaborate that

only a small number can be built, and that are then usable only in a narrow range of low-probability scenarios.

We must also get control of what is called "requirements creep" – where more features and capabilities are added to a given piece of equipment, often to the point of absurdity. The most flamboyant example of this phenomenon is the new presidential helicopter – what President Obama referred to as defense procurement "run amok." Once the analysis and requirements were done, we ended up with a helicopter that cost nearly half a billion dollars each and enabled the president to, among other things, cook dinner while in flight under nuclear attack.

We also had to take a hard look at a number of weapons programs that were grotesquely over budget, were having major performance problems, were reliant on unproven technology, or were becoming increasingly detached from real world scenarios – as if September 11th and the wars that followed had never happened.

Those of you with experience in the technology or manufacturing sectors have at some point probably faced some combination of these challenges in your own businesses. But in the defense arena, we faced an additional, usually insurmountable obstacle to bring rationality to budget and acquisition decisions. Major weapons programs, irrespective of their problems or performance, have a habit of continuing long after they are wanted or needed, recalling Ronald Reagan's old joke that a government program represents the closest thing we'll ever see to eternal life on this earth.

First, there is the Congress, which is understandably concerned, especially in these tough economic times, about protecting jobs in certain states and congressional districts. There is the defense and aerospace industry, which has an obvious financial stake in the survival and growth of these programs.

And there is the institutional military itself – within the Pentagon, and as expressed through an influential network of retired generals and admirals, some of whom are paid consultants to the defense industry, and some who often are quoted as experts in the news media.

As a result, many past attempts by my predecessors to end failing or unnecessary programs went by the wayside. Nonetheless I determined in a triumph of hope over experience, and the president agreed, that given the urgency of the wars we are in, the daunting global security environment we will inhabit for decades to come, and our country's economic problems, we simply cannot afford to move ahead with business as usual.

To this end, the president's budget request cut, curtailed, or ended a number of conventional modernization programs – satellites, ground vehicles, helicopters, fighters – that were either performing poorly or in excess to real-world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. was relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more funding.

For example, we must sustain and continually improve our specialized

strategic deterrent to ensure that our – and our allies' – security is always protected against nuclear-armed adversaries. In an initiative little noticed, the President's program includes money to begin a new generation of ballistic missile submarines and nearly \$700 million in additional funds to secure and assure America's nuclear deterrent.

Some of our proposed reforms are meeting real resistance. They are called risky. Or not meeting a certain military requirement. Or lacking in study and analysis. Those three words – requirements, risk, and, analysis – are commonly invoked in defense matters. If applied correctly, they help us make sound decisions. I've found, however, that more often they have become the holy trinity of the status quo or business as usual.

In truth, preparing for conflict in the 21st century means investing in truly new concepts and new technologies. It means taking into account all the assets and capabilities we can bring to the fight. It means measuring those capabilities against the real threats posed by real world adversaries with real limitations, not threats conjured up from enemies with unlimited time, unlimited resources, and unlimited technological acumen.

Air superiority and missile defense – two areas where the budget has attracted the most criticism – provide case studies. Let me start with the controversy over the F-22 fighter jet. We had to consider, when preparing for a future potential conventional state-on-state conflict, what is the right mix of the most advanced fighter aircraft and other weapons to deal with the known and projected threats to U.S. air supremacy? For example, we now have unmanned aerial vehicles that can simultaneously perform intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions as well as deliver precision-guided bombs and missiles. The president's budget request would buy 48 of the most advanced UAVs – aircraft that have a greater range than some of our manned fighters, in addition to the ability to loiter for hours over a target. And we will buy many more in the future.

We also took into consideration the capabilities of the newest manned combat aircraft program, the stealth F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F-35 is 10 to 15 years newer than the F-22, carries a much larger suite of weapons, and is superior in a number of areas – most importantly, air-to-ground missions such as destroying sophisticated enemy air defenses. It is a versatile aircraft, less than half the total cost of the F-22, and can be produced in quantity with all the advantages produced by economies of scale – some 500 will be bought over the next five years, more than 2,400 over the life of the program. And we already have eight foreign development partners. It has had development problems to be sure, as has every advanced military aircraft ever fielded. But if properly supported, the F-35 will be the backbone of America's tactical aviation fleet for decades to come if – and it is a big if – money is not drained away to spend on other aircraft that our military leadership considers of lower priority or excess to our needs.

Having said that, the F-22 is clearly a capability we do need – a niche, silver-bullet solution for one or two potential scenarios – specifically the defeat of a highly advanced enemy fighter fleet. The F-22, to be blunt, does not make much sense anywhere else in the spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, supporters of the F-22 lately have promoted its use for an ever expanding list of potential missions. These range from protecting the homeland from seaborne cruise missiles to, as one retired general recommended on TV, using F-22s to go after Somali pirates who in many cases are teenagers with AK-47s – a job we already know is better done at much less cost by three Navy SEALs. These are examples of how far-fetched some of the arguments have become for a program that has cost \$65 billion – and counting – to produce 187 aircraft, not to mention the thousands of uniformed Air Force positions that were sacrificed to help pay for it.

In light of all these factors, and with the support of the Air Force leadership, I concluded that 183 – the program of record since 2005, plus four more added in the FY 09 supplemental – was a sufficient number of F-22s and recommended as such to the president.

The reaction from parts of Washington has been predictable for many of the reasons I described before. The most substantive criticism is that completing the F-22 program means we are risking the future of U.S. air supremacy. To assess this risk, it is worth looking at real-world potential threat and assessing the capabilities that other countries have now or in the pipeline.

Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds. Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020. And by 2025, the gap only widens. The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese. Nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America's national security.

Correspondingly, the recent tests of a possible nuclear device and ballistic missiles by North Korea brought scrutiny to the changes in this budget that relate to missile defense. The risk to national security has again been invoked, mainly because the total missile defense budget was reduced from last year.

In fact, where the threat is real or growing – from rogue states or from short-to-medium range missiles that can hit our deployed troops or our allies and friends – this budget sustains or increases funding. Most of the cuts in this area come from two programs that are designed to shoot down enemy missiles immediately after launch. This was a great idea, but the aspiration was overwhelmed by the escalating costs, operational problems, and technological challenges.

Consider the example of one of those programs – the Airborne Laser. This was supposed to put high-powered lasers on a fleet of 747s. After more than a decade of research and development, we have yet to achieve a laser with



enough power to knock down a missile in boost phase more than 50 miles from the launch pad – thus requiring these huge planes to loiter deep in enemy air space to have a feasible chance at a direct hit. Moreover, the 10 to 20 aircraft needed would cost about \$1.5 billion each plus tens of millions of dollars each year for maintenance and operating costs. The program and operating concept were fatally flawed and it was time to face reality. So we curtailed the existing program while keeping the prototype aircraft for research and development.

Many of these decisions – like the one I just described – were more clear-cut than others. But all of them, insofar as they involved hundreds of billions of dollars and the security of the American people, were treated with the utmost seriousness by the senior civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon. An enormous amount of thought, study, assessment, and analysis underpins these budget recommendations – including the National Defense Strategy I issued last summer.

Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of the decisions in this budget. But when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, and excess to the military's real requirements, we did not need more study, more debate, or more delay – in effect, paralysis through analysis. What was needed were three things – common sense, political will, and tough decisions. Qualities too often in short supply in Washington, D.C.

All of these decisions involved considering trade-offs, balancing risks, and setting priorities – separating nice-to-haves from have-to-haves, requirements from appetites. We cannot expect to eliminate risk and danger by simply spending more – especially if we're spending on the wrong things. But more to the point, we all – the military, the Congress, and industry – have to face some iron fiscal realities.

The last defense budget submitted by President George W. Bush for Fiscal Year 2009 was \$515 billion. In that budget the Bush administration proposed – at my recommendation – a Fiscal Year 2010 defense budget of \$524 billion. The budget just submitted by President Obama for FY 2010 was \$534 billion. Even after factoring inflation, and some of the war costs that were moved from supplemental appropriations, President Obama's defense request represents a modest but real increase over the last Bush budget. I know. I submitted them both. In total, by one estimate, our budget adds up to about what the entire rest of the world combined spends on defense. Only in the parallel universe that is Washington, D.C., would that be considered "gutting" defense.

The fact is that if the defense budget had been even higher, my recommendations to the president with respect to troubled programs would have been the same – for all the reasons I described earlier. There is a more fundamental point: If the Department of Defense can't figure out a way to defend the United States on a budget of more than half a trillion dollars a year, then our problems are much bigger than anything that can be cured by buying a few more ships and planes.

What is important is to have a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful to sound budgeting. From the very first defense budget I submitted for President Bush in January 2007, I have warned against doing what America has done multiple times over the last 90 years by slashing defense spending after a major conflict. The war in Iraq is winding down, and one day so too will the conflict in Afghanistan. When that day comes, the nation will again face pressure to cut back on defense spending, as we always have. It is simply the nature of the beast. And the higher our base budget is now, the harder it will be to sustain these necessary programs, and the more drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later.

So where do we go from here? Authorization for more F-22s is in both versions of the defense bill working its way through the Congress. The president has indicated that he has real red lines in this budget, including the F-22. Some might ask: Why threaten a veto and risk a confrontation over a couple billion dollars for a dozen or so planes?

The grim reality is that with regard to the budget we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar diverted to fund excess or unneeded capacity – whether for more F-22s or anything else – is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I cannot accept and I will not take.

And, with regard to something like the F-22, irrespective of whether the number of aircraft at issue is 12 planes or 200, if we can't bring ourselves to make this tough but straightforward decision – reflecting the judgment of two very different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two chairmen of the joint chiefs of staff, and the current Air Force Secretary and Chief of Staff, where do we draw the line? And if not now, when? If we can't get this right – what on earth can we get right? It is time to draw the line on doing Defense business as usual. The President has drawn that line. And that red line is a veto. And it is real.

On a personal note, I joined CIA more than 40 years ago to help protect my country. For just about my entire professional career in government I have generally been known as a hawk on national security. One criticism of me when I was at CIA was that I overestimated threats to the security of our country.

Well, I haven't changed. I did not molt from a hawk into a dove on January 20, 2009. I continue to believe, as I always have, that the world is, and always will be, a dangerous and hostile place for my country with many who would do America harm and who hate everything we are and stand for. But, the nature of the threats to us has changed. And so too should the way our military is organized and equipped to meet them.

I believe – along with the senior military leadership of this nation – that the

defense budget we proposed to President Obama and that he sent to Congress is the best we could design to protect the United States now and in the future. The best we could do to protect our men and women in uniform, to give them the tools they need to deter our enemies, and to win our wars today and tomorrow. We stand by this reform budget, and we are prepared to fight for it.

A final thought. I arrived in Washington 43 years ago this summer. Of all people, I am well aware of the realities of Washington and know that things do not change overnight. After all, the influence of politics and parochial interests in defense matters is as old as the Republic itself. Henry Knox, the first secretary of war, was charged with building the first American fleet. To get the support of Congress, Knox eventually ended up with six frigates being built in six different shipyards in six different states.

But the stakes today are very high – with the nation at war, and a security landscape steadily growing more dangerous and unpredictable. I am deeply concerned about the long-term challenges facing our defense establishment – and just as concerned that the political state of play does not reflect the reality that major reforms are needed, or that tough choices and real discipline are necessary.

We stand at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing down the same path – where our spending and program priorities are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. These threats demand that all of our nation's leaders rise above the politics and parochialism that have too often plagued considerations of our nation's defense – from industry to interest groups, from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from one end of Pennsylvania Avenue to the other. The time has come to draw a line and take a stand against the business-as-usual approach to national defense. We must all fulfill our obligation to the American people to ensure that our country remains safe and strong. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we in Washington must now do ours.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates July 17, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary Gates at the Recruit Training Command, Great Lakes, Illinois

SEC. GATES: It was inspiring to watch the graduation of the brand-new sailors this morning, being able to participate in that.

And it's also been educational. It's a good training experience for me in finding out how the recruits are trained. I had lunch with about 10 of the -- those responsible for their training and was just amazed by their dedication, the amount of hours they put in, in trying to get these young men and women ready to be members of the United States Navy, to be good sailors. It was a great experience. I think we're in really good shape, very good hands.

Q Sir, can I get your remarks on John McCain trying to kill the F-22 of the Department of Defense bill?

SEC. GATES: Well, actually it's a joint amendment that has been submitted, and it's bipartisan. Senator McCain is one of the sponsors, but the other sponsor is Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. So I think they -- their collaboration in this is the best of bipartisanship, and they're doing what's (inaudible).

Q One more question, please. The hate crimes amendment that's being attached to the Defense authorization bill -- can you just talk on that?

SEC. GATES: You know, I'm not any expert on it in terms of whether it's part of our bill (inaudible) -- how they structure the legislation. But I don't have a view on that at all.

Q But my understanding was, you were upset up about it. That's not true?

SEC. GATES: That's not true.

Q Secretary, the Boeing Company, which is based in Chicago --

SEC. GATES: (Off mike.)

Q The Boeing Company, which is based here in Chicago, just had to lay off about a thousand workers. (Off mike) -- missile defense systems. (Off mike) -- are those cuts indicative of a large spending shift? Are you -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: No, the truth of the matter is, it's a rebalancing. And you know, a good example is the F-22 that we just discussed. There are today about 24,000 direct employees involved in the production of the F-22. That will go down to about 19,000 next year and 13,000 in 2011.

On the other hand, the money we're putting into the F-35 -- the F-35 already has 38,000 employees. It will go to 64,000 employees in the next -- next year and ultimately will be 82,000 employees in FY '11.

So while there may be some job losses with respect to the F-22, there will be significant -- thousands and thousands of new jobs created with the F-35 program.

And so there are a lot of programs that we've plussed up and where people will be hired and doing the work. There will be others -- (off mike) -- capabilities. But overall, there's really no reduction in our spending; it's a matter of priorities.

Q Your thoughts on the Jakarta hotel bombing?

SEC. GATES: Well, it's a tragedy, and if, as -- the only -- basically, the only thing I know about it is what I saw on the television news this morning. But you know, what's there to say except what we say after all these terrorist attacks -- that it truly is a horrible thing when people kill innocents to try to make (inaudible) political point.

Q Sir, is it your understanding that JI was behind the bombing?

SEC. GATES: It's what I saw on the news, that's all I know --

STAFF: (Off mike.)

STAFF: Okay.

Q Secretary Gates, the -- (off mike) -- the footprint in Afghanistan. We have the ceiling -- (off mike).

SEC. GATES: No, I -- what I've said all along is, we have -- General McChrystal is doing an evaluation of -- an assessment of what it takes to implement the president's strategy in Afghanistan. I expect to get that report from him in the next few weeks. And I have communicated personally to both General Petraeus and General McChrystal that I want them to feel that they can ask for whatever they genuinely feel they need, and then we'll evaluate that. And I also said I do become concerned at some point that our footprint gets too big -- the foreign military footprint gets too big. This is the Afghans' war, and we are there as their partners and their friends, and that's the whole thrust of General McChrystal's strategy. And so I'm awaiting his assessment, and we will make a rigorous evaluation of it.

Q Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen has said you've said that Afghanistan is our number-one priority. Is there a danger, as we're building up in Afghanistan and winding down in Iraq, that the United States loses focus on Iraq and the administration does --

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think so. I mean, we've got -- General Odierno is just an extraordinary general and doing an incredible job. We have an extraordinary new ambassador there.

We have -- we still have 130,000 troops, or thereabouts, in Iraq, and I don't think that any of those people are losing their focus. I think that as the vice president and others have made clear, what's important is for the Iraqis now, while we're still there, to take advantage of that opportunity to resolve some of the unfinished political business that they have.

Q Is there shift of attention at the Pentagon towards Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: (Inaudible).


STAFF: Okay. Thank you.

STAFF: Thank you all.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO NAVY RECRUIT TRAINING COMMAND


July 17, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates congratulates the U.S. Navy's 971 newest sailors as they graduate from boot camp at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Ill., July 17, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with Navy Recruit Training Command instructors over lunch at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Ill., July 17, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates takes part in a "Battle Stations 21" exercise while visiting Great Lakes Naval Training Center, Ill., July 17, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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**Farewell to Secretary of the Army Pete Geren**

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Arlington, VA, Friday, July 17, 2009*

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Thank you, General Casey.

I should start by noting that I just flew back from a trip where, among other stops, I visited the Tenth Mountain Division at Fort Drum. Those soldiers are a remarkable group of warriors and patriots. And their high morale and preparedness after nearly eight years of war is testament enough to the man we pay tribute to today.

It is honor, on this bittersweet occasion, to say farewell to Pete. Pete's tenure as Army secretary caps a long and accomplished career of serving things larger than himself – and stepping forward at the right time to do what was needed for his country.

Having said that, Pete is not perfect. For example, early in life, he did suffer a serious lapse in judgment when he decided not to follow the example of his father and grandfather by attending Texas A&M and instead went to that other Texas school in Austin to complete his undergraduate and, later, his law degree.

Pete would go onto work in law and politics. The first time he ran for Congress was against Joe Barton in 1986 – when he campaigned by driving around the district in an old cream colored jeep without floor mats. The result of that race allowed Pete to continue practicing law just a little while longer. Of course, he ultimately achieved electoral success, and faithfully represented the people of the Fort Worth area for four terms. Back then, Pete already showed his interest and devotion to the U.S. military – so much so that I'm told he was referred to as "Congressman F-16."

It says a good deal about Pete that as a lifelong Democrat – albeit a Texas Democrat – he was selected by President Bush to serve what Pete thought, as General Casey said, was a two-year hitch in the Department of Defense. Over the past eight long years in the Pentagon, Pete has served in a number of posts and taken on a number of diverse assignments – what they all had in common was that they called for someone with uncommon ability, integrity – and agility.

As Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Pete was a Minister Without Portfolio, a utility Mr. Fix-it of sorts – from reforming the civil service system and environmental laws to managing all dimensions of detainee issues

in the wake of Abu Ghraib.

I'm told that soon after Pete got to the Pentagon, Secretary Rumsfeld asked him to work with his former colleagues in Congress to reduce the 900 or so reports that the department had to send to the hill every year – always the dream of every cabinet secretary. It was not long before Pete's office was filled with reports stacked everywhere, on every spare horizontal surface in the room. I suspect Pete to this day is still the only person in government – on either side of the Potomac River – who has actually read all of those papers.

In the wake of the scandal involving the refueling tanker contract, Pete was once again called on – this time to be the Acting Secretary of the Air Force, where he worked to restore integrity to the service's acquisition culture.

The Army was fortunate, indeed blessed, that Pete Geren was there two and a half years later in the wake of Walter Reed. The surge had just gotten under way in Iraq, casualties were high, and combat tours were being extended. The Army family was under tremendous stress and strain. But Pete's steady leadership and passion for soldiers helped see the Army through and emerge stronger.

He dedicated himself to improving the outpatient and transition care of everyone in the Army – including a Warrior Care and Transition Program that provides one-stop shopping for benefits and entitlements – what Pete called “the least we can do” for wounded warriors and their loved ones. On my visit to Fort Drum yesterday, I saw the very real benefits of his efforts in the construction of their new assistance center and the expansion of nearly every medical facility on the post.

Pete made himself the Army's tireless spokesman, advocate, and guide. He often said that our all-volunteer force is a national treasure not to be squandered. He was fully aware of all he was asking of the Army family with extended and repeat deployments. But he also understood we are a nation at war – engaged in conflicts whose outcome will affect the security of the United States for decades. As you know, in Iraq, U.S. forces have transitioned from the surge to turning over full security responsibilities to the Iraqis – an achievement made possible in no small part by Pete's training, preparation, and care for the soldiers who made it happen. He leaves having strengthened the core institution that has borne the brunt of America's wars.

He has earned a well deserved rest. Pete, like Cincinnatus of ancient Rome, left his proverbial plow to defend his homeland when his nation needed him most. And like Cincinnatus, he can, having done his duty to his countrymen, go back to doing what he loves most. And in Pete's case, that means spending time with his family, lawyering, and watching the Longhorns try to beat the Red Raiders. The less said on these last two the better.

Seriously, Pete Geren is what a public servant ought to be. Pete, I thank you, and I thank your family, for your service to the Army and the American people. We have a good man following you, but he has a huge pair of shoes to fill. And I also want to thank Beckie, Tracy, Annie and Mary for standing by Pete and also serving and sacrificing on behalf of our country. You will all be sorely missed. Good luck and Godspeed.

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DoD Announces 2009 Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Awards

The Department of Defense announced today the 2009 Secretary of Defense Employer Support Freedom Award recipients.

The award represents the highest recognition given by the U.S. government to employers for their outstanding support of their employees who serve in the National Guard and Reserve.

The 2009 recipients are:

AeroDyn Wind Tunnel LLC □ Mooresville, N.C.  
AstraZeneca International □ Wilmington, Del.  
Cambridge, MA Fire Department □ Cambridge, Mass.  
Consolidated Electrical Distributors, Inc. □ Westlake Village, Calif.  
First Data Corporation □ Greenwood Village, Colo.  
FMC Technologies □ Houston, Texas  
Jackson Parish Sheriff's Department □ Jonesboro, La.  
Marks, O'Neil, O'Brien & Courtney, P.C. □ Philadelphia, Pa.  
Microsoft Corporation □ Redmond, Wash.  
Mid America Kidney Stone Association □ Kansas City, Mo.  
NetJets □ Woodbridge, N.J.  
Ohio Department of Public Safety □ Columbus, Ohio  
Perpetual Technologies, Inc. □ Indianapolis, Ind.  
Santa Ana Police Department □ Santa Ana, Calif.  
TriWest Healthcare Alliance □ Phoenix, Ariz.

"In the eight years our nation has been at war, America's employers - almost universally - have done an outstanding job of supporting their Citizen Warrior employees, said Dennis M. McCarthy, assistant secretary of defense for reserve affairs. "These fifteen employers are the 'best of the best' this year. They reflect the powerful synergy that exists between the men and women of the National Guard and Reserve, and their employers."

A record 3,200 National Guard and Reserve members or their family members from across the country nominated their employers for the Freedom Award this year. A national selection board comprised of senior Defense officials and business leaders selected the recipients. The Freedom Award will be presented to these employers during a formal ceremony Sept. 17, 2009 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington, D.C.

The Freedom Award was instituted in 1996 under the auspices of the National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve to recognize exceptional support from the employer community.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen July 20, 2009

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DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. On the recommendation of Secretary of the Army Pete Geren and Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey, and with President Obama's strong support, today I am announcing a decision to temporarily increase the active-duty end strength of the Army by up to 22,000. That is a temporary increase from the current authorized end -- permanent end strength of 547,000 to an authorized temporary end strength of 569,000 active-duty soldiers.

I came into this job in 2006 with the belief that we did not have enough forces to properly support the extended pace of combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. Shortly after taking office, and mindful of the decision to surge additional forces into Iraq, I recommended and the president and the Congress approved a permanent increase in the size of the Army of 65,000 and the Marine Corps of 27,000. At the time, it was judged that these increases would sustain the projected level of deployments and lower the stress on the force. At the same time, I directed that the Army continue to reduce the size of the nondeployable or institutional part of the force.

Much has changed over the last two years, causing us to reassess whether we are properly sized to support current operational needs. In Iraq, significant progress has ushered in a security agreement with the government of Iraq and new policy direction by President Obama to significantly draw down U.S. forces by next year and completely by the end of 2011.

By contrast, the escalating violence in Afghanistan and political turmoil in Pakistan has resulted in a new policy direction by the president and an associated increase in American forces in Afghanistan to implement it. The persistent pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last several years has steadily increased the number of troops not available for deployment in the Army. The decision to eliminate the routine use of stop-loss authority in the Army also requires a larger personnel float for each deploying unit to compensate for those whose contract expires during the period of deployment.

The Army has reached a point of diminishing returns in its multi-year program to reduce the size of its training and support tail. The cumulative effect of these factors is that the Army faces a period where its ability to continue to deploy combat units at acceptable fill rates is at risk.

Based on current deployment estimates, this is a temporary challenge which will peak in the coming year and abate over the course of the next three years.

For these reasons, I have authorized the Army to temporarily increase its personnel strength by up to 22,000 troops for a period of three fiscal years. These additional forces will be used to ensure that our deploying units are properly manned, and not to create new combat formations.

The department will not seek additional funds for fiscal years '09 or 2010 to implement this decision, and will work with OMB and the Congress in putting together the necessary fiscal program in the remaining two years.

I am mindful that during this period of financial crisis this decision will result in additional tough choices for the department, calling to mind my comments in the past about things that we don't need creating problems for us in the areas we do need.

However, I am convinced that this is an important and necessary step to ensure that we continue to properly support the needs of our commanders in the field, while providing relief for our current force and their families.

Admiral.

ADM. MULLEN: I would just add that I fully support this increase. I've grown, as you all know, increasingly concerned over the last year and a half about stress on the force and our ability to meet the demands out there. This temporary increase helps us address that concern.

It will also help us get a better handle on dwell time and boost the number of people we can deploy with the capabilities our commanders most need. And that's really the larger point here. It's not just about relief. It's about renewing our efforts to fight these two wars.

This has many components; managing stress in the OPTEMPO for troops and families is one. So is meeting the demands for the kind of skills and the kind of thinking we need to complete the mission in Iraq while shifting the main effort to Afghanistan.

As you all know, I just returned from a trip to both places.

And what I found was, across the theater, a much deeper appreciation and understanding of counterinsurgency warfare than I found in the past, especially in Afghanistan, where nearly to a person our troops had read General McChrystal's tactical directive on civilian casualties, understood it and were executing at a very high level.

Perfect example of that were the Marines down in Helmand, who I spoke 990  
day with, and I can tell you they really do get it. They reported not one civilian  
casualty up to that point in their operations and were using and were espousing a very  
disciplined and deliberate amount of care for the Afghan people.

And the soldiers we are looking to add to our force will no doubt give us  
some breathing room, but they will also give us room to run in what I believe is an even  
faster-paced war against an even more adaptive enemy. It's the right thing to do.

I told the troops we're living in a time not only of great change, but  
also great simultaneity. Many things are happening all at once in many different places;  
and though we may be tired, we must stay focused. Now, particularly in Afghanistan, is no  
time to lower our gaze or pull back our outstretched hands.

Q A question for both of you, please. A couple weeks, now, past the  
June 30th handover of control in the cities in Iraq, how do you assess the level of  
cooperation and the level of tension between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, particularly in  
Baghdad? There's been a couple of reports of disagreements or even stand-offs over who  
gets to do what when. Are you convinced that you have the authority you need to protect  
the force and that you can operate as you need to?

SEC. GATES: I received a report from General Odierno just today that  
addressed this issue. And he said that the level of cooperation and collaboration with  
the Iraqi security forces is going much better than is being portrayed publicly and in the  
media. So my impression from his reporting, and not just this week but over the last  
couple of weeks, has been that it's actually, in his view, going quite well.

Admiral?

ADM. MULLEN: All discussions I've had with General Odierno, including one  
midweek last week, about this issue have been very positive. Certainly there are  
challenges. I would point out the independent effort that the Iraqi forces provided  
recently in terms of providing security for the visit of many, many Iraqis to a very  
sacred mosque.

And that, as an example -- the -- we continue to clearly work with them.  
But from the time actually before the 30th of June when we had been pulling out of cities  
until up to now, it's been positive. There clearly are challenges, but I think the  
leadership is working its way through each one of those challenges. So I'm encouraged.

Q Got an F-22 question. You know the vote is looming, and you made an  
impassioned speech Thursday, I guess it was, in Chicago. What would you tell a worker --

SEC. GATES: I couldn't tell whether I was staid or animated.

Q Well, you were animated. You were animated. What would you tell a

worker who -- at a -- in a tavern in Hartford, Marietta, Georgia, or Boeing in Sea' about the jobs impact? That's -- this is what's -- it's been couched on the Hill **991** 3  
Dodd, Pat -- Patty Murray: jobs. What would you tell a worker face to face in a tavern about the impact of your decision, if they say, "Secretary, I'm going to lose my job if your decision goes through?"

SEC. GATES: What I would say is that -- is what you've heard me say before: The net effect of this will be a substantial increase in the number of jobs in the aerospace industry. The F-22 has 24,000 direct employees this year; 19,000 in '10; 13,000 in '11. The F-35 already has 38,000 employees, so it already is hiring 13,000 more than the F-22.

That will go to 62,000 -- or 64,000 in FY '10 and 82,000 in FY '11, if we don't drain money away from it. So the net increase in the aerospace industry is, in fact, tens of thousands of jobs net added between the two aircraft as one ramps down and the other ramps up.

Q And one follow-up. Does it bother you that a number of prominent Democrats are basically saying we need to buy more planes? Dodd, Murray, Kennedy, I think, and Kerry. I mean, they're going to come out in favor of the --

SEC. GATES: What I have not heard is a substantive reason for adding more aircraft in terms of our strategic needs.

Q Secretary, over the weekend the Taliban, as you know, released a video of PFC Bowe Bergdahl, captured around June 30th in Afghanistan.

Has the U.S. military, has the department been able to glean anything from that video? And for both of you, please, what was your personal reaction when you saw this American soldier put on display in that manner?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me -- because the admiral just got back from there, let me ask him to address it. But I would just say, by way of introduction, that first of all, our commanders are sparing no effort to find this young soldier. And I also would say my personal reaction was one of disgust at the exploitation of this young man.

ADM. MULLEN: And I deplore the exploitation of him and would just reaffirm what the secretary said, having been with the forces in fact who are conducting the operations to recover him or to find him is -- they are extensive, vast. They're on it 24/7. And we're doing absolutely everything we can to get him back.

Q And anything anyone was able to glean from this video?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, from a -- I mean, from a -- I guess, an intelligence perspective, we certainly wouldn't share that publicly. And I guess I -- we're certainly looking at that, studying it very hard, and I'd just leave it at that.

SEC. GATES: Elizabeth?

Q In your upcoming talks with the Israelis, what is the message you're planning on delivering --

SEC. GATES: My secret visit. (Soft laughter.)

Q I just mentioned talks. (Soft laughter.) I didn't mention a visit.

SEC. GATES: This is -- since it's all over their newspapers, there's nothing particularly secret about it, I guess, at this point. But it is a routine visit, as far as I'm concerned. It has been probably at least two years since I have visited Israel. I have been in regular contact over the last long while, with my counterpart, Minister Barak. This is an -- I see this as a very routine visit to touch base with my counterpart and others in the Israeli government.

Q But on Iran, are you going to reassure the -- I mean, that will come up.

Will you be reassuring the Israelis? Will you be --

SEC. GATES: I think the only thing that I'm prepared to say about that is that I'm confident that subject will come up.

Q Admiral Mullen, I wanted to talk to you about Afghanistan. You spoke about the tactical directive, counterinsurgency -- (inaudible). You said that troops, I think, were showing a lot of discipline. And I think you were quoted in the papers over the weekend as saying -- if this was accurate -- that "We killed too many civilians. One is too many."

But what I wanted to ask you, and maybe both of you, is, both of you for so many years have sat here and talked about the notion that the U.S. military takes every precaution and is more careful than any other country out there about the caution on civilian casualties. But yet I don't see how that squares with the fact that you now have done something else; now you have the tactical directive. So clearly, there was something else that could be done that wasn't done until now. And yet you talked for so long about being more careful than anybody else. How do you square both these views?

ADM. MULLEN: I think every -- every civilian casualty is a tragic loss in and of itself. And in fact, the secretary, myself and commanders earlier this year, beginning of the year, took a -- what we believe was a significant step in that direction. And yet we continue to have -- we had -- we've had incidents, and most recently the Farah incident.



And what struck me on this trip was how -- how quickly and how deep **993** message from General McChrystal had penetrated, both on the aircraft carrier when we talked to the air wing that was having a much more comprehensive discussion about a target set, if you will, and other choices before you had to release a weapon, to the Marines who had conducted this operation most recently and not had a single casualty.

And I just found it much more inculcated, and in ways it's very much a learning process. I don't -- I think it's -- when I talked earlier about -- we've -- you know, we've killed too many civilians, I think part of it has been, since we've been in the fight, a learning process, which has brought us to this point.

Believe me, if I thought taking additional steps six months ago -- if I had thought of those, I certainly would have done that. And that's part of what we've gone through. What I was taken with, again, is how quickly McChrystal's directive had been grasped by everybody.

Q But Mr. Secretary, let me try it this way. If you -- for so many years, yourself, your predecessors have said the U.S. does everything it can. I mean, you've said this for many years now. And yet clearly, there were other steps to take. Are you satisfied that it has taken eight years to figure out these other steps?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm only going to speak to the last 2-1/2. And my view is that it has been an evolutionary process. I think all of the things that I have said and that the admiral has said about the U.S taking more care with respect to civilian casualties than anybody else is absolutely true. I think that, you know, when I was in Afghanistan over a year ago, I took Afghan press with me to Bagram, where they received a briefing, along with me, of the measures that were taken by our pilots to check and double-check and triple-check to try and avoid civilian casualties when they were attacking a target.

What I think we've seen is, first of all, I took the approach early last year that we should change our approach when there are civilian casualties, in terms of how we react, because we were reacting too slowly. And then General McKiernan took steps to try and tighten up how we went at operations with respect to avoiding civilian casualties. And I think General McChrystal has taken it to yet another level, with, frankly, some fairly significant changes in tactical direction, but also from a strategic standpoint.

And I think that -- our concern all along has been that we -- that we not place our own troops in increased jeopardy.

And so the question has been, how do we design our offensive operations in a way that will reduce the possibility of civilian casualties? And I think that's what General McChrystal has undertaken.

I stand by the fact that nobody cares more and worries more and works harder to avoid civilian casualties than we have over the last -- certainly ever since I've been in this job, and I'm confident before.

But I think it has been an evolutionary policy, and I think it's reached a completely different level under General McChrystal. And it really keys off of his testimony during his confirmation hearing that the measure of success is not the number of Taliban killed but the number of Afghans protected.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q Senator Gillibrand is talking about adding a -- an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would give an 18-month moratorium on "don't ask, don't tell." Do you support that -- such an amendment being added?

And some have noted that there's been a change of tone from this building about "don't ask, don't tell." Earlier this year you said, "It's the law; we will implement the law." Later you said you were looking at ways to bend the law. Why the change in tone?

SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, we have a new president -- (chuckles) -- who has a different policy, and we will support what his goal is here. I'm not going to speak to specific legislation. I would just say this: that if -- first of all, we -- even as we look for ways to apply the law more humanely and as we look at how we might begin to implement the law, the only thing -- a change in the law, should that happen -- the only thing we have continued to say, and I think certainly I believe, and I think I can speak for the chairman in this, is that if the law does change, then it is important that the implementation be deliberate and careful.

This is not something that should be -- in my view, should be done abruptly, because I think that we have a force under great stress in two wars, and to try and do something abruptly, I think, would be a real concern.

Q Have you taken any steps to apply the law more humanely, as you said?

SEC. GATES: We're still looking at that.

Q Mr. Secretary, is a further U.S. troop increase in Afghanistan now all but certain, given General McChrystal's desire to increase both the size and the pace of the training of Afghan security forces?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think it's inevitable. We're waiting to see what -- what his 60-day review produces. It's fine with me if he takes the full 60 days to examine it. I've asked him to scrub very hard the forces that are already there, to ensure that we're using them to maximum effectiveness, and so we'll just wait and see. But I don't think there's -- I don't think an answer either way, or an outcome either way is inevitable at this point.

Q How can you make a dramatic increase in the pace and size of training of the Afghan security forces without more trainers?

SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, we have another brigade coming in later this summer -- early fall -- whose principal responsibility is going to be for training, so that's 4,000 additional forces that are going to be devoted almost exclusively to training.

ADM. MULLEN: The other thing I would add to that, David, is the -- almost every major unit that's coming in is going to have a training responsibility in addition to its other responsibilities. I mean, so there's very heavy focus on training police as well as the army. And additionally, there are -- there are forces coming in, training capabilities coming in, from other countries, as well.

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q Mr. Secretary and Admiral, there seems to have been a change, both substantively and rhetorically, coming out of Iraq, where, substantively, lower-level American commanders say that they're being asked to provide route convoy information before they leave, which they worry about for obvious security reasons. And rhetorically, there were comments today, which I was struck by, from the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, who was describing America's soldiers in Iraq as being under house arrest. He said that: They're getting impatient because we confine them to their bases, which are like big prisons; they're under house arrest.

So, two questions. One, substantively: How confident are you that the safety of American troops is being protected, given that you have commanders speaking openly with fears that it is not currently as safe as it could be? But, two, if the Iraqis see our presence there as putting us under house arrest, putting our soldiers into that prison, why are we there?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that I certainly have not heard anything from General Odierno that would indicate that our soldiers have been put at increased risk. And second, it is perhaps a measure of our success in Iraq that politics have come to the country.

ADM. MULLEN: What I would only add to that is, being -- having been in Kirkuk the other day and spending the better part of the day with the brigade commander there, who has been there over a half a year, his interaction with the security forces, both police as well as the army -- and in addition, he's in a spot where he's looking at the interface between Peshmerga as well as the Iraqi army, as well.

And believe me, the idea that he was somehow either handcuffed or unable to do what he's doing -- was -- what he's supposed to do, it just never came up.

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q Admiral, from your Afghanistan visit, what's your assessment of the level of Taliban resistance or response to the U.S.- led offensive? And are you satisfied that, as Secretary Gates said, the new rules about protecting civilians are not creating more dangers for U.S. troops?

ADM. MULLEN: I discussed the civilian-casualty issue and the tactical directive broadly with seniors and juniors alike, and the issue of not being able to execute or protect themselves just never came up. In fact, what I found was an enthusiasm for that that was very important.

And I'll give a quick example of Marines who actually had a group of Taliban in a house, and they were very patient, where some time ago they may have taken that house out. They were looking, they were waiting and waiting. And, in fact, they were assured all women and children were out.

They continued to wait, and not too long after that, in that patience, an -- or a -- sorry, an Afghan woman came out with two of her fingers shot off, bleeding very badly. The Marines went to her. And in that regard -- you know, while that was occurring there were about 12 other individuals that came out dressed in burqas thinking -- with additional -- with childrens (sic) -- in their hands, walking with them.

And, in fact, they were actually Taliban masquerading as women. And, in fact, in the end, what the locals said was that they were cowards, how dare they hide behind women -- you know, dress as women and hide behind children.

So what that said to me is our people are thinking three and four steps out. And, in fact, the message is that the locals turn against the Taliban, which, in the long run, is the right answer. So I just -- and I found other examples of that while I was there as well. So that's -- that has really -- in my view, that's an example of it really sinking in.

And the first part --

Q And just -- the first part was the level of Taliban resistance. And if I could add also, General Nicholson said he only has 650 Afghan troops with the 4,000 Marines. Any word on why that is or whether that can be increased?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, that's how the forces have been distributed. I'm assured that General McChrystal is going to make that part of his assessment, and so we'll see what that distribution is and whether or not it changes as a result of that.

Two aspects of the Taliban. One is, in some places they're just not standing and fighting. They're dispersing. But the other is that they've reached a level of sophistication, in some cases, which is pretty high. And I've talked to a couple Rangers who were in some pretty tough fights that were surprised that the Taliban were as good and as sophisticated as they were.

Q If I could ask you about the -- what you call General McChrystal's approach in Afghanistan. As part of the search effort for the missing -- of the captured American soldier, some leaflets have been handed out, one of which shows an American soldier kicking down a door, with the words, in Pashto, saying, "If you don't hand him over, we will hunt you." Doesn't it sound -- send a conflicting message to the local population if you're trying to wind hearts and minds when you have a leaflet like that? And what is your opinion of that leaflet?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I mean, it's a -- again, I would reiterate that there's a tremendous effort ongoing to return this individual to us, and it is full spectrum. Clearly, the enemy is able to, as they are, use this in their own -- in their own information way. I don't think that message is meant to be -- to be threatening as much as it is to express the concern and that we will go to every end to find this individual, which is what we're doing right now.

Q Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: You know, that's the kind of thing that I leave to the judgment of the commanders in the field. I'm not going to try and second-guess those kinds of things from here. Clearly, there's a balance here between the effort to try and recover our soldier, get him back, and how we interact with the local population. And I think in a tactical sense the commanders in the field are a lot better able to do that than I am.

Q Back to the announcement you made earlier. You referred to additional tough choices. Can you just speak a little bit more to that? What would those choices perhaps be, say, out of the supplemental to pay for the expansion? And what's the cost, do you think?

SEC. GATES: It goes -- it goes to the line I have been using all spring. This is a zero-sum budget. If money for one thing as opposed to another has to come out of it, there has to be an offset. And so the cost we expect for the rest of fiscal year '09 -- just a couple of months left, a little over that, two and a half months -- probably on the order of less than a hundred million dollars; for FY '10 a billion dollars.

I've told the president and the Hill that we need their support obviously for reprogrammings, but we will absorb those costs within our current top line, and then work with them, as I said in my statement, in terms of '11 and '12.

But we will take that money from some place that we think isn't as high a priority as more soldiers and taking some additional steps to relieve the stress on the force. This is a very high priority, and this is why, frankly, some of the wheeling and dealing on the Hill of a few hundred million (dollars) here and a few hundred million (dollars) there for a pet project here and a pet project there confront us with ever more difficult choices when we're trying to make trade-offs in terms of how do we help our soldiers out, how do we relieve the stress on the force. The money's got to come from somewhere, and this is the point that I've been trying to make all along.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'm wondering if you can talk about the ramifications of the F-22 vote. If you prevail, does this mean it's going to be easier for you to retool the Pentagon in the way you want? Conversely, if you lose, are your efforts doomed?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- you know, first of all, I think it's important to remember -- I mean, the vote this evening clearly -- I guess it's going to be this evening -- is important, but the reality is that the president has been quite clear that if there is money for the F-22 in the budget that comes to him, he will veto it. So that's pretty clear.

I would say that while there are several areas where we do have a disagreement with some on the Hill, I made about 50 program decisions that I -- and I announced the main ones on April 6th. But the reality is, the Congress has embraced most of those. And they certainly have embraced all of the initiatives that I announced with respect to taking care of our people and taking care of the force.

So I think that there is -- while there are several very high-profile programs that are a source of contention, the reality is that much of what we are trying to do is reflected in the markups that have been passed so far and I think is being internalized inside this building, as I watch the QDR go forward and so on.

You know, I wouldn't presume to say that such changes are lasting at this point. But I think that just based on what I see in the discussions of the QDR, I think a lot of the points have been internalized.

Last question.

Q Some of us just returned from Guantanamo, and we were surprised to see that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed didn't show up in court. I was just wondering if you had any reaction to this or any thoughts on how this case is advancing and developing.

SEC. GATES: No idea. Easy last question.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### House Army Caucus Breakfast

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, July 22, 2009*

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Chet, that's very generous of you. I think part of the specialty of the job is having the ability to know that you're brushing off on 18 and 19 year olds who are quite impressionable. It's always good to see Chet – a Texas Aggie alum, and now representative of the district that includes College Station, my former home and the heart of Aggieland. Last week I bid farewell to Secretary of the Army Pete Geren, who served with him in that delegation, and had a chance to talk about Pete's distinguished career. Chet, you'll appreciate that I did note one glaring lapse of judgment on Pete's part: transferring to and graduating from the other university in Texas. And adding insult to injury, going to law school there.

Let me also thank Congressman McHugh – for his work on the Armed Services Committee, for co-chairing this caucus, and, of course, for agreeing to serve as secretary of the Army, if confirmed. It is a great responsibility, but I have no doubt that John is up to the challenge. I look forward to working with John Carter, even though he also spent three years in Austin for law school.

I know there will probably be a number of questions, so I'll try to keep my remarks on the short side and cover three main topics. First, our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the state of the Army. And, finally, a topic integrally related to the other two: the budget.

Let me start very quickly with our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last month we marked a major milestone in Iraq – with our troops withdrawing from all cities in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement signed last year. Despite an uptick in violence since that transition, General Odierno is pleased with the progress that has been made, and confident that the Iraqis are taking the steps necessary to secure their country. I look forward soon to discussing the situation in Iraq with General Odierno and our other military commanders.

Even as we reduce our presence over the next couple years, it is clear that we have an extremely important role to play with regards to political, diplomatic, and economic development as well as ongoing efforts to train, equip, and, when necessary, support Iraqi troops. The price in blood and treasure has been high in Iraq, but I believe we are now in a position to ensure that the sacrifices we have made will serve our national interest for decades to come.

The situation in Afghanistan is very different. A few weeks ago, we kicked off

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a series of operations using the additional troops ordered to theater by the President, to implement his new strategy – one that combines new resources with new tactics and a new leadership team. The commencement of these operations has, as expected, led to rising casualties both American and coalition. The next few months will be hard, especially as we clear and hold areas where we have not had a persistent presence, and as we attack an enemy that has, over the past few years, become more battle-hardened, lethal, and media-savvy. As with our troop increase in Iraq in 2007, we expect violence to increase before signs of progress and positive momentum start to show – hopefully by sometime next summer.

The wars will continue to affect the state of the Army for years to come. We have asked extraordinary things of our ground forces over a number of years – and as you would expect, they have all risen to the occasion. With incredible courage and resilience, they have shown uncommon valor. But it has not come without high costs: such as lives lost, the wounds of war – both seen and unseen – and the overall stress we have placed on them and, just as important, their families.

There is no doubt that prolonged and multiple combat tours have put great pressure on the force. I can assure you that we are monitoring the situation and paying close attention to telling statistics like suicide and divorce rates. We are meeting this challenge by developing and enhancing programs to get ahead of any possible trends. As the vice chief of staff of the Army recently said: “Any soldier, from private to general, may need help at some time in their Army career. Seeking that help, without fear of stigma, has to become second nature in our Army community, it has to become part of our culture.” General Casey has led the effort, engaging the entire force – the entire army in that respect.

While the ratio of dwell-time to time in theater is certainly not what it needs to be, it is getting a little better. We have reduced the length of deployments that were extended during the surge in Iraq. And we believe we will be able to end the use of stop-loss at the beginning of next year.

Toward that end, on Monday I announced my decision to authorize the Army to temporarily increase its personnel strength by up to 22,000 for a period of three fiscal years. Based on current deployment estimates, the Army’s ability to attain acceptable fill rates over the next year or so is at risk. This temporary challenge will peak in the year to come and abate over the course of the next three years. So this measure will allow us to give commanders the forces they need, and our soldiers and their families the relief they deserve. We will not seek additional funds in FY09 or FY10 for this increase, but will need to work with you to put together the necessary fiscal program for the following two years.

Despite the stress of the two wars, and some worrying trends, the Army remains strong and, as we have seen, incredibly effective. It continues to meet its recruiting and retention goals – so much so that we will reach our end-



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strength numbers much earlier than planned. I believe this resilience in the face of great obstacles is in large part due to your support and the funding of key initiatives, such as:

- Quality-of-life programs on bases across the country, from better housing to stronger support for military children;
- Enhanced benefits, such as pay increases and the new GI Bill, which signifies a serious, long-term commitment to a new generation of veterans;
- Your willingness to help me go outside the usual bureaucratic channels to buy weapons and capabilities needed by our troops on the frontlines – the most prominent examples being MRAPs and equipment to support our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts; and
- Of course, funding for permanently increasing the end-strength of our ground forces.

So I thank you for all of that. This is also a fitting introduction to my final topic: the Defense Department's FY10 budget.

When I was putting together this budget, I had three principal objectives in mind:

- First, and foremost, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force;
- Second, to rebalance this department's programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and
- Finally, in order to do all this, fundamentally reforming how and what we buy.

I appreciate the legislation that the House and Senate passed and the President signed on acquisition reform. I have been very happy with the response from the Congress on meeting many of my objectives – especially the need to fully fund and shift money for the warfighter and quality-of-life programs into the base budget. I also appreciate support for many of the programmatic decisions, such as ending the FCS vehicle program, allowing us to spin out mature technologies to the entire Army quickly, and ensuring that any future Army vehicle modernization program incorporates the lessons we have learned on the battlefield in recent years.

Now a few decisions have not been received as favorably. Last week in Chicago I spoke in more detail about some of those, which are also detailed in my testimony before the Armed Services Committee in May. For the remainder of my time though this morning, I want to discuss two related long-term considerations – one, budgetary, and one, strategic.

For far too many decades, roughly 90 years by my count, the defense

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budget has been characterized by a “boom and bust” cycle – if you graphed it, it would look like an EKG of a defibrillating heart. It has dramatically increased and then plummeted in a number of short cycles. Since 2001, for example, the base budget – not counting expenditures for Iraq and Afghanistan – has gone from about \$300 billion to more than \$510 billion last year.

From the very first defense budget I submitted under President Bush in 2007, I have warned against doing what America has done multiple times over the last 90 years by slashing defense spending after a major conflict. The war in Iraq is winding down, and one day so too will the conflict in Afghanistan – whether in this administration, or the next, or the next. When that day comes, the nation – all of you – will again face pressure to cut back on defense spending, as we always have. And the higher our base budget goes now beyond what is sustainable in the long-term, the more drastic and dangerous the drop-off will be later – especially cuts for critical programs that might not have the same bureaucratic clout and support as big-ticket, long-term modernization programs.

The fact is that even if the defense budget had been higher, my recommendations to the President with respect to troubled programs would have been largely the same. What is important is to have a budget baseline with a steady, sustainable, and predictable rate of growth that avoids the extreme peaks and valleys that are enormously harmful to sound budgeting and planning – I would add that as each cycle falls it will bring a great cost with it not only in treasure but in blood the next time we go to war.

The grim reality is that, with regard to the budget, we have entered a zero-sum game. Every defense dollar taken to fund excess or unneeded capacity is a dollar that will be unavailable to take care of our people, to win the wars we are in, to deter potential adversaries, and to improve capabilities in areas where America is underinvested and potentially vulnerable – now, or in the future.

All of this brings me to long-term strategic considerations. There is little doubt that the security challenges we now face, and will in the future, have changed – and our thinking must likewise change. It simply will not do to base our defense strategy solely on continuing to design and buy – as we have for the last 60 years – only the most technologically advanced versions of weapons to keep up with or stay ahead of a superpower adversary, especially one that has been gone for nearly a generation.

We have to invest in new concepts and new technologies and take into account all the assets and capabilities we can bring to the fight. We have to measure those capabilities against the real threats posed by real-world adversaries with real limitations, not threats conjured up from enemies with unlimited time, unlimited resources, and unlimited technological acumen. And we have to prepare to wage future wars and break the habit of rearming for previous ones.

Some have called for yet more analysis before making any of the decisions

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in this budget. Or cited varying definitions of “requirements” in defense of the status quo. A number of the arguments I’ve heard remind me of the line about those who use statistics the way a drunken man uses a lamp post – for support rather than illumination.

Let there be no doubt that the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review will offer a stronger analytical framework going forward on issues like sea and nuclear capabilities. I should also note that it will incorporate thoughts, ideas, and concerns from the Hill. But when dealing with programs that were clearly out of control, performing poorly, excess to the military’s real requirements, or designed for a threat that no longer exists, we do not need more study, more debate, or more delay. As I said last week, in effect, paralysis through analysis. What we need are three things – common sense, political will, and the guts to make tough decisions.

For too long, on too many issues, we have blindly pursued the same defense strategies that underpinned our nation’s safety and security in a very different and long-gone era. Even with the country at war, with our young men and women fighting and dying, we have struggled to understand the full implications of the type of adversary we face and the painful, messy reality of war in the 21st century. We have struggled to adapt our thinking to address the new and increasingly vexing security dilemmas of a post-Cold War world, where the lines between regular and irregular war – between nation-states, quasi-states, and non-states – are often blurred to the point of irrelevance.

And so, we are at a crossroads. We simply cannot risk continuing down the same path – where our major focus and acquisitions are increasingly divorced from the very real threats of today and the growing ones of tomorrow. From the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue to this one, everyone involved in our national security needs to rise above the politics, partisanship, and parochialism that have too often guided defense procurement. Just as our men and women in uniform are doing their duty to this end, we here in Washington must now do ours.

So I ask you to support the President’s budget – and I also ask you to convince your colleagues that we need to make the tough choices today so that our military is prepared for the challenges of tomorrow.

Thank you, and I’m happy to take some questions.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND IRAQ

July 27 – July 29, 2009

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

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July 27, 2009

Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak

MODERATOR: Good morning. We will have our short press conference.

Minister Barak and Secretary Gates will both now give short statements followed by brief questions, two questions from Israel side and two from the U.S. side.

Minister Barak, please.

MIN. BARAK: I welcome the visit to Israel by an old friend, Secretary Bob Gates. You are most welcome here.

We had a good, extensive discussion. We covered a range of strategic and security issues, including the challenges and threats to Middle East security and stability being caused by -- (inaudible) -- relationship between our defense establishment and the developments with the -- (inaudible).

The U.S. and Israel have a long history of a very close relationship. There are common values of friendship and cooperation. And we highly appreciate the commitment of the United States to the security of Israel and to achieve this -- (inaudible).

We also discussed the prospects of regional issues with the Middle East and the need to shape a structure for regional security arrangements when the time comes. And I expressed to the Secretary our top -- (inaudible) -- for the peace process and ending up with security and defense issues -- (inaudible) -- the big -- the top priority for everyone. But that will take time.

Of course, the continuing Iran nuclear program is a central issue in our minds still and we -- and we do welcome a -- (inaudible) -- coordinated international effort to try to block this nuclear, military program. We have -- worried that the continuation of the nuclear Iran could destabilize the whole region and -- (inaudible) -- world order. And Israel remains in its basic position that no options should be removed from the table in spite of the fact that at this stage priority should be given still -- (inaudible) --

sanctions. And I take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the friendship shown by the United States of America and to you, Mr. Secretary both in the previous and the present administration. 1006

And we are looking forward to more open discussion in the future to -- (inaudible) -- and more stable and peaceful region.

Thank you very much.

MODERATOR: Secretary Gates.

SEC. GATES: Let me start by thanking Prime Minister Netanyahu whom I look forward to meeting with shortly, and my old friend, Minister Barak for hosting.

It is wonderful to be back in Israel after an absence of more than two years. During that period, Minister Barak has visited Washington a number of times. So it's a pleasure to finally be able to reciprocate with this trip.

We had a good meeting, during which I reaffirmed the strong commitment of the United States to the security of Israel. As President Obama said in Cairo last month, our bond is unbreakable. We also discussed the regional security challenges we both face from terrorism to the threat posed by Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

As part of our steadfast support for Israel, the United States continues to provide a robust, annual military assistance package. We are contributing both financial and technical assistance to strengthen Israel's defense against the growing threat posed by rockets and missiles. And we will continue to ensure that Israel has the most advanced weapons for its national defense. One example is our ongoing discussion of the Joint Strike Fighter program. Of course, achieving long-term security for Israel is ultimately dependent on a sustainable, comprehensive Middle East peace. The goal is vitally important for regional stability.

To help move the process forward, we will continue to address further Israeli security requirements to make a two state solution possible.

I'm encouraged that all parties share the vision of two states and I'm further encouraged by Special Envoy Mitchell's efforts to bring everyone together. While we know that forging a lasting peace will not be quick or easy, we also know that peace is in the interest of all countries in the region. That it is the only way that Israelis and Palestinians alike can enjoy the safety and security they deserve.

Minister Barak, let me thank you again for your warm welcome, for your valuable insights and for your longstanding friendship with the United States.

MODERATOR: Thank you. We will now have four questions. I want to remind you

that we are short in time. So one question -- (inaudible)

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Q Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you've previously spoken about the potential of a military strike on Iran. (Inaudible) -- in terms of a disaster -- I want to ask you, sir, what do you consider to be more of a disaster, a nuclear-armed Iran or -- (inaudible) -- to strike these facilities?

SEC. GATES: Well, there's no question that as Minister Barak said a nuclear-armed Iran would be profoundly destabilizing to the entire region and a threat to, certainly, to Israel and a threat to the United States and other states as well.

I think we are in full agreement on the negative consequences of Iran obtaining this kind of capability. I think we also agree that it is important to take every opportunity to try and persuade the Iranians to reconsider what is actually in their own security interests. And we're in the process of doing that, both in terms of the president's offer to engage with the Iranians, but also through sanctions to impose costs on for pursuing that course.

The other thing that we agreed is that the president's offer is not open ended. And we will deal with the situation at that time.

Q (Off mike) -- Associated Press

Q Mr. Minister, is the United States asking you to put your nation at risk if you hold back on a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities?

MIN. BARAK: I'm not sure if I fully understand.

Q Is the United States asking you to place your nation at risk if you hold back on a strike against Iran's nuclear facilities? And Secretary Gates, how long is it appropriate to ask Israel to be patient?

MIN. BARAK: May I answer first? I don't think that it makes any sense at this stage to talk about -- (inaudible). Our position is very clear -- (inaudible) -- we are in no position to tell the administration whether to -- (inaudible) -- engagement with Iran or not. But if there is an engagement, we believe it should be short in time -- (inaudible) -- followed by sanctions -- (inaudible). It won't take too much time to verify whether Iran is trying to keep -- (inaudible). And we clearly believe that no options should be removed from the table. This is our policy. We mean it. We recommend to others to take the same position. But we cannot dictate it to anyone.

SEC. GATES: I'd say that as I said earlier, the president has been quite clear that this is not an open ended offer to engage. We're very mindful of the possibility that the Iranians would simply try to run out the clock. I think that the president is certainly anticipating or hoping for some kind of a response this fall, perhaps, by the time of the U.N. General Assembly.

Q (Inaudible) -- President Obama said in November, the end of the year -- (inaudible) -- in light of what's happening in Iran now, the rapid progress in the development of long-range missiles. Would it be something to consider -- (inaudible) -- the timetable the president has set?

SEC. GATES: I think based on the information that's available to us that the timetable that the president has laid out still seems to be viable and does not significantly increase the risks of -- (inaudible).

MIN. BARAK: (Speaking in Hebrew.)

Q -- (inaudible) -- looking forward to serious results. We were expecting more serious sanctions -- (inaudible) -- Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter -- (inaudible).

MODERATOR: Thank you. Last question, Elizabeth Yu, New York Times

Q This past week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talked about a defense umbrella over the Middle East. What shape would that really take and would it be a nuclear defense pact along the lines of what we have with South Korea, Japan.

SEC. GATES: Well, there are a number of paths that we are following an effort to try and get the Iranian government to reconsider what appears to be its intent to develop nuclear weapons, the economic sanctions that Minister Barak spoke of are clearly one of those paths.

Another path on the diplomatic and security side is trying to persuade the Iranians that their own security interests are diminished by their policies, not enhanced. And that their security actually -- they would be better off without a nuclear weapons program, partly because it would be destabilizing, partly because it might set off an arms race in the Middle East. But also through our efforts to further develop our bilateral and multilateral security relationships with our friends and allies in the region that we've been working on for the last two years or so in terms of maritime surveillance and air and -- (inaudible) -- defense and missile defense, capabilities in the region, the additional capabilities we put in the region for missile defense.

But the work that we are doing with a number of Gulf states in trying to enhance their security and our mutual security are part of the umbrella -- (inaudible).

MIN. BARAK: I did read the Secretary's speech. I can just say that -- (inaudible) -- clearly prefer to defend ourselves on our own. We are extremely central to the American administration -- (inaudible) -- continued and consistent support, financial and technological -- (inaudible) -- with the best tools to do the job. And I think that, therefore, basically, we are not blind to the fact that whatever we are doing can have implications for neighbors -- (inaudible) -- take into account. And of course it's very good to always know that the United States of America, the leader of the free world, the most powerful nation on the Earth. It is standing on the side of the good -- (inaudible).

Q (Off mike)



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

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July 27, 2009 12:00 PM EDT

Press Conference with Secretary Gates in Amman

SEC. GATES: First of all, let me thank His Majesty King Abdullah for his warm welcome today. This visit and my meetings with His Majesty and Chief of Defense Sarayra highlight the strong friendship and long-standing strategic partnership between Jordan and the United States.

During our discussions, I congratulated His Majesty for his principle leadership in the region on a number of issues. Just recently General Petraeus, the U.S. commander of Central Command, was here for the opening ceremony of the King Abdullah special operations training center.

That state-of-the-art facility will be a foundation, upon which other nations in the region will build their counterterrorism forces. Of course, the King Abdullah center is just one example of a broader pattern of regional leadership.

Jordan has been instrumental in building momentum for Arab contributions to a comprehensive Middle East peace, including two-state solution. And it's taken a leading role in supporting the development of Palestinian Authority institutions and security forces. I also commend Jordan for leading the way in assisting Iraq, as it seeks renewed engagement with its neighbors. His Majesty was the first Arab head of state to visit the new Iraq. And the deepening economic and diplomatic ties between Iraq and Jordan offer an example of the type of support needed, from other countries, to fully reintegrate Iraq into the region.

This is the only way to forge a stable and prosperous Iraq, a goal that is in the interest of all the nations of the Middle East. There are many difficult and daunting challenges facing us, from the continued threat of extremism to Iran's destabilizing behavior. But I'm confident that the relationship between Jordan and the United States has a very bright future, one in which we will continue to build on our past long record of cooperation and accomplishment.

I'll be happy to take a few questions.

Q Secretary Gates, your talks in Israel with Israeli officials tackled mostly

What guarantees do you have that Israel will not take any military action, against Iran, until the U.S. is engaged maybe in dialogue, until there is a breakthrough, when in fact you never got guarantees with regards -- Israel is not listening to your administration, with regards to halting settlements in -- on occupied land?

SEC. GATES: I think that the -- I certainly had the sense from my meetings with the prime minister and defense minister in Israel today that they are perfectly willing to allow this process of attempted engagement to go forward. They know, as President Obama has said, that this is not an open-ended process. But I had every sense that -- that the Israeli government is prepared to let our strategy play out, in terms of trying to use a combination of diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions and -- and other peaceful means to try and get the Iranian government to change its mind in terms of its nuclear ambitions.

One of the paths that we are following, obviously, is to try and persuade the Iranians that their security will be diminished by trying to acquire nuclear weapons, rather than enhanced. And our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with nations all through the region is -- is one facet of the effort to lead them to that conclusion. But I had the sense that as long as the process is not completely open-ended, that the Israelis were prepared to let it go forward.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q Could you tell us what the king's concerns and perspective was on this same subject, on the threat posed by Iran, and also, his perspective and concerns on the political situation in Iraq, as the U.S. presence is drawn down there?

SEC. GATES: I would -- I don't think it's appropriate for me to characterize what his majesty said. I would characterize our discussion more as focused on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Jordan, and Jordan's leadership role in the peace process and a two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians.

We talked about what they were doing in terms of trying to help Iraq and some of the other areas in which the king is exercising leadership here in the region.

We talked very briefly about Iran, and it basically was to -- to share our, I think, agreement about the destabilizing nature of -- of Iranian activities.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q Hello. My question is that --

SEC. GATES: Could you hold the microphone closer?

Q Sorry, it's not working?

SEC. GATES: Just hold it closer.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q (Off mike) -- it's agreed that settlements is the biggest obstacle on reaching a peace agreement. So how far do you think that the United -- the U.S. administration will go in putting pressure on Israel to stop illegal settlements on the occupied land?

SEC. GATES: Well, this -- the peace negotiations -- the negotiations for a settlement -- a two-state settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is really the province of the Department of State and Senator Mitchell. My message today was simply that the Department of Defense will do what it can to support those efforts, and particularly with respect to both sides in terms of if there's anything we can do to help enhance their security. But the subject beyond that really was not discussed today.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q Mr. Secretary, the Israelis were talking earlier today about binding Chapter 7 sanctions against Iran if the early part of the engagement process does not work. Does the U.S. support the notion of binding Chapter 7 sanctions? And, if so, has the U.S. begun either crafting language -- specific language or trying to drum up support among its allies?

SEC. GATES: Well, again, the diplomatic side of that is -- I'm not quite sure what may be going on inside the State Department. What is clear is that, if the engagement process is not successful, the United States is prepared to press for significant additional sanctions that would be non-incremental -- in other words, we would try and get international support for a much tougher position. Our hope still remains that Iran will respond to the president's outstretched hand in a positive and constructive way, but we'll see.

MODERATOR: How about -- (off mike.) Q Secretary Clinton said recently the U.S. would consider establishing a defense umbrella in cooperation with allies in the Arab Gulf.

How much that would affect what Jordan gets in military assistance from the U.S.? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry?

Q How much that would affect what Jordan gets in military assistance from the United States? 1012

SEC. GATES: Well, I think an important step forward in our bilateral relationship between Jordan and the United States was the memorandum of understanding that was signed last year that put both our economic assistance and security assistance on a -- which, I might add, is quite generous -- on a longer-range and more predictable path.

One of the concerns that had been expressed to us by the government of Jordan was the unpredictability of what the assistance might be. The agreement that was reached last year provides for the next several years for Jordan to get I think, I think, \$360 million a year in economic support funds and about \$300 million in security assistance. And I think whatever other bilateral or multilateral engagements the United States has in the region would not have any impact on that.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.)

Q Did you discuss with the king the plight of Iraqi refugees living in Jordan and things that the United States could do to speed their return and reintegration to Iraq?

SEC. GATES: No, we did not.

MODERATOR: (Off mike.) How about -- (off mike) -- from -- (off mike).

Q (Inaudible) -- hello. What are the features of the Obama plan? And do you know when they are going to launch this plan?

SEC. GATES: Sorry. I didn't hear the question.

Q Okay. American plan, U.S. plan, Obama will launch a new plan to the area, the conflict between Israel and Palestine -- what are the features of this plan?

SEC. GATES: I apologize. I didn't understand the question. (Cross talk)

MODERATOR: Well, that's a State Department question.

So let's try one last one here -- (off mike). The gentleman -- (off mike).

Q (I'm here?) --

MODERATOR: This gentleman --

Q (I'm here -- please, sir, from Arabic?).

(In Arabic)

MODERATOR: Well -- (inaudible) -- one last U.S. question. (Off mike)

Q Secretary, you mentioned discussions with Israel on Israel's interest in acquiring the F-35.

But I understand that there are significant issues that Israel has raised before it's ready to sign a letter of offer and acceptance; specifically, having to do with Israeli-built electronic warfare suite, technology transfer, cost concerns. Did you make any progress in your discussions in meeting Israeli concerns that will allow for them to move ahead with signing a contract?

SEC. GATES: Other than just noting it in -- as part of the bilateral relationship going forward, we really didn't discuss any specifics relating to it. Clearly, our position is that all of the partner nations that are acquiring the F-35 along with us have essentially the same -- the same suite and the same maintenance structures.

Q Sir, one of the questions about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq is, is the United States genuine or is this just a plan on a piece of paper -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: No, the U.S. forces have withdrawn from Iraqi cities, as agreed in the security agreement. They actually withdrew prior to the deadline of June 30th. And I think that you probably saw here in Jordan the celebrations in Iraq, as they celebrated what they call their national sovereignty day.

This is very real. The United States is abiding by the terms of the agreement that we signed with the Iraqis, and we will continue to abide by that agreement. And the reports that I get from General Odierno and others is that the implementation is going very well, as is the partnership between the U.S. forces and the Iraqi security forces.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      July 28, 2009

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Joint Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Iraqi Minister of Defense Abd Al-Qadir Al-Mufriji

(Note: Min. Qadir's remarks are provided through an interpreter.)

MIN. QADIR: Welcome, everybody. We have met a few days ago with the American secretary of Defense in Washington. We had some good discussions in different subjects, and today he is visiting -- his excellency is visiting us. And before, we were with him in a meeting with his excellency, Mr. Prime Minister, the commander in chief of the Iraqi armed forces.

The subjects were discussed, which are our immediate needs in terms of the equipment, acquisition, training, command and control, as well as assessing the current situation, the status of the terrorist activities in Iraq. This is one of our biggest concentrations. How we are going to cooperate and coordinate from now until the end of 2011? What are our future plans?

At the same time, the completion process of our capabilities, readiness of the both Iraqi minister of Interior, Iraqi minister of Defense to coordinate with the Pentagon.

(Audio break) □ and how we are going to put the detailed plan, in terms of the ground forces, naval forces, air force, and how we are going to put the right plans together according to the priorities and according to the transfer and the capabilities of the American forces are going to present to us, and how we're going to take the subject forward.

The subjects are very big and very much multiple, that have been discussed in detail in a very open way. And we have discussed the different possibilities and we are going to look forward in the very soon future, put new plans and capabilities (off mike).

Q      (Through interpreter.) Now for his excellency, the secretary of

Defense, for a question. What is the necessity, what is the construction of his visit, Mr. Secretary? 1015

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon, I would like to begin by thanking both the prime minister and the defense minister for their warm welcome, and also look forward to discussions with the interior minister later this afternoon.

Today's meetings and the prime minister's visit to Washington last week are reminders of the strong bond of friendship and shared sacrifice that underpin the relationship between the United States and Iraq.

Our mutual commitment is perhaps most evident with regards to security matters. American and Iraqi troops have fought side by side with many on both sides making the ultimate sacrifice to build a new Iraq.

As a result, together we have made incredible gains for the Iraqi people. And I congratulate the Iraqi security forces for their courage and their resilience, and for their recent assumption of responsibility for security in cities and towns across the country.

General Odierno and I are confident that Iraqi troops are up to the challenge of securing these urban areas and soon their entire nation, but we stand ready to assist, if called upon.

Looking forward, we will continue to support Iraq's progress toward national unity, and we will encourage progress toward ensuring that all of Iraq's communities are represented in its security forces and institutions.

We are also willing to assist in resolving disputes over boundaries and hydrocarbons; disputes that require a continued commitment to the political process in word and deed by all the players.

We will also coordinate closely as we develop Iraq's military capabilities. This includes more resources for the U.S. training mission. And given current economic and budget realities in Washington and in Baghdad, it is more important than ever to set clear priorities and focus on the capabilities needed to ensure Iraq's domestic and external defense as our forces draw down.

The June 30th repositioning of American troops and the continuing evolution of our security partnership is yet another step as we move together toward a fully normalized relationship between the United States and Iraq.

Between now and the end of 2011 when all U.S. troops are scheduled to depart Iraq, we have a number of important milestones to achieve, including fair and secure elections, the seating of a new national government, and the continued draw down of U.S. forces leading to our change of mission in August 2010 to a largely advise-and-assist role.

This is all part of a shift in the focus of our relationship from security matters to economic, cultural, educational and diplomatic cooperation under the Strategic Framework Agreement.

While great strides have been made, we know that significant challenges remain, from the ongoing threat posed by extremists to lingering ethnic and regional tensions. There will undoubtedly be some hard days ahead as enemies of a free Iraq try to derail progress.

As in the past, however, their efforts will fail. Iraq's leaders, inspired and encouraged by the Iraqi people, will show continued resolve as they enter a new and brighter era, one defined by an ever-more stable, sovereign and self-reliant Iraq. Thank you.

MIN. QADIR: Twenty minutes for questions -- 20 minutes only for questions for -- and the podium. Only one question for each reporter, please.

Q (Through interpreter.) Mr. Minister, there has been some reports that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense is going to purchase 18 F-16s, that the delivery will be in 2020, as well as there have been some reports that there has been a request by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense for some purchase from China and France.

Can you, as the Iraqi minister of defense, tell us about the equipment and the program of the acquisition for the Iraqi armed forces?

MIN. QADIR: As we're building an Iraqi air force, we as the Iraqi military, we have been walking into some certain phases and trying to transfer from a certain ability to another one. And the last project was the combat, and we have huge options.

Those options that we are moving toward, some modern, new airplane capabilities, but it's going to take a long time in terms of delivery, or our capability to be able to include those kind of modern system. But we as the Iraqi government, as the Iraqi military, we have to have the right airplane to protect our skies in 2011.

That's why we have to have the best kind of capabilities to protect our capabilities so we as an expert as well as a force to protect the country. We do listen to the technical recommendation by our air force headquarter.

We do not look for names. We have to look for the capability that match our educational system, our technical system, and according to a very tender timeline. And we do accept about 80 percent of the right standard to have their quick strike capabilities. But wherever we can get it, we are going to obtain it.



Q Thank you. (Off mike) -- with NPR. Last week on his visit to Washington, Prime Minister Maliki suggested he might still be open to U.S. troops remaining beyond 2011, depending on the security situation at that point. I wonder, Minister Qadir, whether you also would leave the door open to that possibility? 1017

And, Secretary Gates, the same subject. You have expressed when asked the personal view that that might be necessary at some low levels. Where are you on that today?

MIN. QADIR: This is just an assumption. That's why the question will be also probably an assumption. This all belongs to the SOFA agreement. The SOFA agreement will be expired at the end of 2011. At the end of 2011 there is going to be another government. This is going to be another government, not this government.

The combat field or the ground of Iraq is going to show if the Americans can stay longer or not. That's why the next government is going to assess the requirement of Iraq and how long they can stay.

SEC. GATES: I think the top priority is to implement the agreements that we've already signed. We have implemented the June 30th deadline in the security agreement to withdraw from Iraqi cities and towns. We will have withdrawn all of our combat units by the end of August 2010. And we will stick to our commitment to withdraw all of our troops by the end of 2011.

Those are the commitments we have made. Those are the agreements that we have signed with the Iraqi government, and we will implement those agreements as written.

I think it's premature at this point to talk about what happens after 2011. I think that that is an issue that we would leave -- as the defense minister says, a new Iraqi government will be elected next January, and I think that what happens beyond 2011 is a subject probably best left to the end of 2010 or 2011 itself. But in the meantime, the United States is absolutely committed to carrying out all of the commitments that we made in the security agreement.

Q (Through interpreter.) From Iraqi TV. Mr. Secretary of Defense, what's the official situation of the United States about the Kuwait situation, trying to leave Iraq and the 7th Chapter of the United Nations?

SEC. GATES: Well, this is more a diplomatic matter that is not exactly my expertise, but I will say that I think the United States was intrigued by some of the proposals made by the U.N. special representative, Ambassador di Mistura.

This is clearly a matter that needs to be resolved between Kuwait and Iraq, but it seemed to us that the U.N. offered a possible path forward and we hope that both countries will be able to resolve these issues so that Iraq in particular can move into the future without the burden of Chapter VII.

Q (Through interpreter.) I would like to ask the Iraqi minister of defense, what is the reason of the -- why did the prime minister have some kind of concern with President Obama in regard of a meeting that happened in Turkey, according to what Prime Minister Maliki said and also what Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister Hoshiyar Zebari said. What is the -- is it correct news? 1018

MIN. QADIR: His Excellency, the prime minister, he had an open discussion, meeting with President Obama, and I was one of the persons who attended that meeting. It was a special private meeting, I could say.

The subject was discussed in a very calm atmosphere. There was no demonstration that happened. And at the same time, the Iraqi government will never, never accept to have agreements about internal affairs of Iraq without involving Iraq. This is the commitment and it's the concern of the Iraqi government.

This entire agreement was presented as an agenda of the Ministerial Council. It's been studied now in the U.S., why this kind of meeting happened in Turkey.

Q (Off mike) □ If I could (off mike) for Secretary Gates. Were you aware of these secret meetings (off mike) American officials and representatives from Iraqi insurgents?

SEC. GATES: I was not aware of the specific meetings, no, but the United States has tried to play a constructive role over time in reconciliation efforts. But as the defense minister says, at the end of the day these are all decisions that must be made by the government of Iraq.

Q (Through interpreter.) Al Arabia. The question is for the Iraqi minister of Defense. Some days ago the American State Department, there has been -- there is some kind of --

(Conversation in Arabic.)

INTERPRETER: The first question is -- I couldn't understand it -- for the minister of defense.

Q (Through interpreter.) There were some discussion about there is some kind of military operations are going to happen between Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders.

And the second question for the American secretary of Defense, you just mentioned that there has been some work to do -- we are doing -- what are the targets that you are talking about that we have to do with this (off mike) that we have to achieve before the 2011?

MIN. QADIR: I don't know what you have just said that the Ministry of

Iraqi Foreign Affairs said that it has been through an official channels or not. It was just something judicial -- sorry, it was just something in the rumors and the press don't know where did you get this information. You know, we don't have any official information. 1019

As a minister of Defense, wherever I go I get an update about operations. I do not have any kind of Iraqi security forces in the Kuwaiti borders. And I do not even have the right number of the Iraqi naval forces to be able to do such a job.

So, as a Ministry of Defense, I do not have any kind of a leak or any idea that we are going to have such an operation.

INTERPRETER: Mr. Secretary?

SEC. GATES: I am not aware of any particular targets leading up to the end of 2011. We have specific dates that we have committed to in terms of our forces, and I mentioned those just a few minutes ago.

If there are any goals, they are more focused on the transfer of military equipment and purchase of military equipment -- transfer to and purchase by the Iraqi military to ensure that it has the capabilities to maintain internal security and border security by the end of 2011.

But these are simply efforts we are undertaking jointly to determine what the requirements of the Iraqi forces are and then do our best, in partnership with the Iraqis, to help them meet those needs and requirements.

Q Hi, I'm Kevin Baron with the Stars and Stripes. Mr. Secretary, we were just in the south where we saw some of the assistance and advisory role going on there. We were told that it's going wonderfully. They haven't had any incidents. They've been able to maintain a large pilgrimage that needs to happen. (Off mike) -- story about more violence still going on.

What assessment have you heard and at what point was there any sort of consideration to address the schedule to bring in more advisory, which is the case here, to replace the combat troops -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: I'm not aware of any effort or any plan to bring in the Advisory and Assistance brigades early. I would say that what I told the prime minister this afternoon, based on what I heard from Iraqi officials in Nazariah was that one of the main reasons that the situation has evolved so smoothly in the south in particular is because both Iraqi commanders and American commanders have been -- have gone to great lengths to educate and train their forces and their subordinate officers on the terms of the security agreement.

And I very much commend both sets of commanders for doing that. My belief is that that has been going on throughout Iraq. I think it is inevitable that, given the

changes of circumstances, that there would be the occasional problem.

What I think is remarkable is that you had such a dramatic redeployment of American forces and a dramatic change of the rules of operation, and that there have been so few problems along the way. And I think it's really a testimony to the security forces' leadership in Iraq, as well as our own American commanders, in training and educating their subordinates on the terms of the security agreement.

So I think one of the main reasons for my visit this time was to see how the change was going, since June 30th, and I must say, what I have seen and what I have discussed, both in the south and here in Baghdad today, leads me to believe that the circumstances are indeed as positive in the developments as I had been led to believe.

INTERPRETER: Last question.

Q (Through interpreter.) From the Ministry of Defense Media for the secretary of Defense.

Mr. Secretary, the test is very common. Eisenhower has -- that you have a very big knowledge about the military. What kind of support you are going to provide and assistance to the Iraqi army and Iraqi military, and how you are going to assist us so the withdrawal will happen in 2011, and especially after all the success and achievement at the Iraqi military has achieved -- what kind of support?

SEC. GATES: Well, in the first place, I don't think I have a very big knowledge of military affairs, and certainly not such to be mentioned even in the same sentence as General Eisenhower.

That said, we are in the process of working out, with our Iraqi colleagues, what their needs are, and we obviously have suggestions and recommendations, but it's their military and it's their police.

And so we are in the process, here in 2009, in working out the kinds of equipment we might be able to transfer to the Iraqi security forces, equipment that's already here, as well as talking about purchases of new equipment by the Iraqis. And we basically will be guided by the requirements that they provide and that we develop in a dialogue with them.

MIN. QADIR: Thank you very much.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      July 29, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary Gates

SEC. GATES: (In progress.) in the south, the brigade that was re-missioned about five months ago, and I was very encouraged by the nature of the Iraqi and American cooperation and the degree to which they were working together and had a clear understanding of each side's obligations and responsibilities, under the security agreement, and really no incidents.

And what I found especially interesting was the comment by the U.S. brigade commander that his operations actually had increased in effectiveness since we began this partnering, subsequent to the 30th of June.

Clearly talked in Baghdad about the implementation of the agreement. And I must say that one thing that came through loud and clear is that the success of this agreement has depended, to a considerable extent, on the degree to which both American and Iraqi commanders have educated and trained their subordinate commanders in the terms of the security agreement.

And I would say it certainly has been the view of General Odierno and based on my conversation with the troops and other commanders, that overall the whole thing has gone considerably better than our expectations before June 30th. There will clearly be the occasional hiccup by somebody who doesn't get the word. But on the whole, we're quite pleased.

The meetings with the Iraqi officials yesterday afternoon had a lot to do with the security relationship going forward, talking about additional equipment for the Iraqis, what we might be able to transfer to them, other vehicles for getting them additional equipment and training, as well as the importance of resolving some of these outstanding issues inside the country with respect to borders, hydrocarbons, security and so on, and the importance of doing that while we were still in a position to be helpful.

And that really was the same message in Erbil this morning with President Barzani and the prime minister and other Kurdish officials, was the importance to -- as I emphasized with folks in Baghdad, the importance of resolving all these issues peacefully and doing so sooner rather than later.

Q What sort of -- what sense did you get back from the Iraq --1022  
both the Iraqi government officials and the Kurdish regional government officials?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I at least took from both that they shared the view that it was important to try and make progress and get some sustainable compromises while we were still in a position to be helpful.

Q In Erbil did you get much pushback on doing that fast? I mean, they've -- there's an election year for both Barzani and Maliki.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think their view also was, it was important to move as quickly as possible and, I think, from their standpoint, particularly while we have -- still have a sufficient presence in the country, to be able to influence the process, or at least help it, to be able to facilitate the process.

Q What would be the best way for the U.S. to facilitate the process?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think really Ambassador Hill and General Odierno and, I must say, also the vice president, I think, have played a very constructive role in trying to encourage these guys to keep talking about these issues and avenues through which they might be able to resolve some of these issues in the months ahead.

Q They don't like the U.N. plan that you told them today you endorsed.

SEC. GATES: The -- we didn't really -- the U.N. plan, the only U.N. plan that I discussed was I -- when I did have a brief conversation with the prime minister, Maliki, about the Iraqi-Kuwaiti situation and told him that it seemed to us that the de Mistura plan offered the path forward in terms of dealing with those problems, with both the border situation but also the revenue stream that goes from Iraq to Kuwait.

In terms of Kirkuk and the U.N. proposals there, we really didn't discuss that in Erbil.

Q Sir, you mentioned the high-level task force.

SEC. GATES: Did -- did encourage them to continue participating in the high-level task force, and that was a real opportunity to get that issue resolved. But we really didn't talk about the specifics of it beyond the importance of that group.

Q Mr. Secretary, yesterday General Odierno told us that you are seeking "creative solutions," quote, unquote, in getting the Iraqis the -- (off mike) fighters as soon as they would like before 2011. Can you discuss what kind of creative solutions you may be able to work?

SEC. GATES: Well, most of the solutions that would give them some capability sooner than a number of years from now would undoubtedly involve working with the Congress. But it involves everything from figuring out a way to provide more flexible financing, to seeing if there are some of our aircraft that may be excess to our needs that could be transferred.

But all of that would have to be worked out with and through the State Department and the -- and with congressional approval. But if it did work out, it could provide them with some bridging capability in the relatively near future compared to buying brand-new aircraft.

Q But do you support the idea of selling them F-16s?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, we've been supportive of that.

Q President Barzani, I guess a few weeks ago, said that he felt tensions between the KRG forces, the Pesh and Iraqi army were higher than he had remembered in the past, or higher than they had been since the new government. Did you get the feeling that things were still tense, or that things had ratcheted down a little?

SEC. GATES: He didn't say anything along those lines this afternoon, and I did not get anything like that from the Iraqi officials or, I must say, General Odierno either.

Q Could you characterize how big a problem you see the north-south tensions -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think these are some fundamental issues. And I think that it's important that both the government in Baghdad and the Kurds have pursued them through political means and seem -- and both seem to understand the importance of continuing to do that.

But they are tough issues. The Iraqis have elections coming up in January. I think it remains to be seen whether important progress can be made before those elections. But if the issues can -- if they can continue the dialogue on the issues and perhaps narrow their differences, then perhaps solutions could come pretty quickly after the Iraqi -- after the Iraqi elections.

Q Did you use the term blood and treasure? I just want to make -- hear it from you, that you said that we've made too many -- there's been too much lost in blood and treasure for the Iraqis and the Americans and the Kurds to -- (off mike) -- gains they've made in Iraq, at this point, in terms of their dispute.

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q How did you put it?

(Cross talk, laughter.)

SEC. GATES: He was the one -- he was the one taking notes. I wasn't taking any notes but I did use that, that we'd all spent too much blood and treasure to lose the gains that have been made.

Q On your visits yesterday, in the south with Tallil and in Baghdad and in the north, the advisory role going on in the south, was that presented to you? Or do you give it as what you sort of expect to see coming in Baghdad or in the north later on? Or is it going to be somewhat different, a somewhat different set of expectations?

SEC. GATES: I think it's kind of -- I think it's kind of a test of this new model of the role that we will play increasingly, through 2010, as we pull our combat units out and consolidate into these five or six advisory and assistance brigades. And I must say that based on everything that I heard in Tallil yesterday, I'm very encouraged.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you -- you hear what's going on, in Iraq, in the Pentagon. But then when you go out, do you see things differently? I mean, did what you see jive with what people have been telling you in the building?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, pretty much. I mean, it jives better than with most reality that I hear about in the Pentagon. (Laughter.)

I get -- I get fewer differences between what's going on in Iraq, when I'm in the Pentagon, than I do on what's going on at American military facilities, when I'm in the Pentagon. The troops in America tend to have a different, somewhat rosy -- less-rosy view of how wonderful all of our programs are than we at the Pentagon do.

And that's one of the reasons I make those visits, is because often the policies that we're implementing, and I'm referring now to a lot of programs we're working on, with families and so on, the right policies have been put in place in Washington. But their implementation at the local level has been more uneven. And that's what I hear more about. But that's kind of an excursion.

I mean, no, I've found -- I do feel it's necessary to come out here and talk to subordinate commanders and talk to the troops and compare that with what I'm told back in Washington. And I must say, I found a great deal of consistency.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you see anything during this trip that might give you any reason to think of any changes in the troop withdrawal plans, for Iraq, any either acceleration or slowdown for that matter?



SEC. GATES: I don't think there's anything in the cards for a slow  
I think there is at least, and I'm not going to get into any specifics, but I think  
there's at least some chance of a modest acceleration.

But because of the way General Odierno sees things going, that remains to  
be seen.

Q Before the election or after, sir?

SEC. GATES: Possibly before.

Q All right. Fine.

Q What markers would you --

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: (Chuckling.) I just said I'm not going to say anything  
further.

Q So much for not making news. (Laughter.)

Q (Off mike) -- before January.

Q You were doing so well. (Laughter, cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: Rats. (Laughter.)

Q What's the current --

SEC. GATES: No, I mean, he -- there isn't any -- nothing's going to  
happen very soon, but he's looking at all the possibilities and he's very encouraged by  
things so far.

Q Around Christmas? (No audible reply.)

Q What's the current glide path between now and January, possibly -- the current plans--

SEC. GATES: I think the original plan was to go from 14 to 12 BCTs. Is that right?

STAFF: That probably is right. I'm not quite -- (off mike) -- I think it is -- (off mike).

Q (Off mike) -- by January.

SEC. GATES: That was the original laydown, I think.

STAFF: Right.

Q And what would an acceleration -- (off mike)?

SEC. GATES: Maybe one earlier -- one more earlier. But I don't want to put the general into a corner, because it really depends on circumstances, and it may or may not happen.

But I mention it only because I think it is an indicator of his view that things are going pretty well, post-June 30th.

Q Then, one, you apparently agree with him; you wouldn't --

SEC. GATES: Well, I mean, my view on things like that is, that's his call.

Q (Off mike) -- things going well, with the general overall level of violence down, as well as --

SEC. GATES: And the cooperation between the Iraqi security forces and the Americans, the division of labor after June 30th, the withdrawal from the cities and so on. I think he feels like that's all going, as I said, better than expected.

STAFF: All right. Last question. We're about to roll.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday that you sensed a different chemistry down in the south between the Iraqis and the Americans. Is there a different chemistry now post-June 30th with you and your opposite number?

SEC. GATES: I didn't sense that. I mean, I feel like I've had a very good relationship with Abdul-Qadir all along, and we've worked together very closely. So I would say we had a very good relationship before, and it remains to be a very good relationship.

Q Thank you.

Q Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND IRAQ

July 27– 29, 2009




Joe Tabet of the Middle East Broadcasting Network interviews U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates at the the U.S. Embassy in Amman, Jordan, July 27, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with Jordanian Defense Chairman Gen. Khalid Jameel Sarayreh during a recent visit to the Middle East, July 27, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with King Abdullah Al Hussein of Jordan at the Kings Palace during a recent visit to the Middle East, July 27, 2009.  
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**1029**  
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak hold a joint press conference in Jerusalem during a trip to the Middle East, July 27, 2009.  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold a working lunch meeting in Jerusalem, July 27, 2009.  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shake hands before a working lunch meeting in Jerusalem, July 27, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani during an office visit in the international zone of Baghdad, July 28, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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
Iraqi Minister of Defense Jawad al-Bolani and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates answers questions at a press event after holding an office visit in the international zone of Baghdad, July 28, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with Iraqi security personnel during a site visit on Combined Operating Base Adder in Talil, Iraq, July 28, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with members of the advise and assist brigade on Combined Operating Base in Talil, Iraq, July 28, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with troops and thanks them for their service during a trip to Combined Operating Base Adder, Iraq, July 28, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates **1032**  
meets with Massoud Barzani, president of the  
Kurdistan Regional Government, at the  
regional White House during a brief visit to  
Erbil, Iraq, July 29, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates  
meets with Massoud Barzani, president of the  
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Erbil, Iraq, July 29, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is greeted  
by Massoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan  
Regional Government at the regional White House  
during a brief visit to Erbil, Iraq, July 29, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry  
Morrison*  
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
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF HONOR CORDON AND VISIT OF MEXICAN SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL GUILLERMO GALVAN


July 30, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, and Mexican Secretary of National Defense Gen. Guillermo Galvan walk through a cordon of honor guards into the Pentagon after a full honors arrival ceremony welcoming Galvan, July 30, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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Mexican Secretary of National Defense Gen. Guillermo Galvan, left, and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates stand at attention during a full honors arrival ceremony welcoming Galvan to the Pentagon, July 30, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right foreground, hosts a luncheon meeting with Mexican Secretary of National Defense Gen. Guillermo Galvan, left, at the Pentagon, July 30, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Molly A. Burgess*  
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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright August 13, 2009

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DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen. Cartwright from the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Afternoon. Before taking your questions, I want to share a few thoughts about where we are in Afghanistan.

One week from now, the people of Afghanistan will go to the polls to elect a president and provincial councils. The role of the Afghan and international military forces is to support an election administered and organized by the government of Afghanistan. The goal is to provide a security environment as conducive as possible to holding a fair, credible election free from violence and intimidation.

Due to some of the military operations that have taken place in the Helmand province and other places in the south, it looks like more Afghans will be able to vote than had been the case before the recent deployment of additional U.S. forces, and obviously that's an encouraging development. In terms of the overall security situation in the country, my view and, I believe, the view of most of our military commanders, is that we are looking at a mixed picture. In some parts of Afghanistan, the Taliban have clearly established a presence. The operations under way now and those being considered for the coming months are designed to roll back the Taliban and establish a lasting security and government presence, a presence that can give the Afghan people confidence that they will be protected from intimidation and retribution.

An absolutely critical factor in the success of this mission is reducing civilian casualties from military operations. And I believe the rules of engagement changes that General McChrystal has put in place are making a real difference, though we still have more work to do in this area.

These military operations are but one component of a multi-faceted strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan announced by the president four-and-a-half months ago.

At this time, General McChrystal is assessing the security situation, in the context of the president's goals and strategy, and will submit his assessment, to us and to NATO, sometime between the Afghan election and early-September.

That assessment will not include specific recommendations or requests for more forces. However we've made clear to General McChrystal that he is free to ask for what he needs, to complete the important mission that he has been given. 1036

Though there's been a good deal of reporting recently, about what General McChrystal may ask for, I can tell you, it's premature to speculate on that. Any future resource request will be considered separately and subsequent to his assessment of the security situation.

We'd be happy to take your questions.

Ann.

Q A question for both of you, please.

How long do you think American combat forces will be fighting active war in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's -- you know, in the intelligence business, we always used to categorize information in two ways: secrets and mysteries. The secrets were things that were ultimately knowable. Mysteries were those where there were too many variables to predict. And I think that how long U.S. forces will be in Afghanistan is in that -- is in that area.

I think that we are certainly hoping to see progress within a year, in terms of the new -- the president's new strategy and General McChrystal's new strategy and tactics. And certainly it would be our hope that, assuming that we are moving in the right direction, that we would see a situation, as we have seen in Iraq, over the past two-and-a-half years, where more and more of the security responsibility will flow from international security forces to Afghan security forces.

I think that we all see -- we and our allies, as well as the Afghans, see a significant pacing factor here to be the speed with which we can accelerate the growth of the Afghan National Army and Police.

And we have a lot of money in the budget to do that for fiscal year '10. And so I think that, you know, it's just not possible to predict specific periods of time when you're in a conflict like this, where the enemy has a vote and where there are so many variables. But I think -- as I've said from the very beginning, I think that we need to be in a position to be able to show progress within a year.

But being in a position where we could completely be where we are in Iraq depends a lot on the political environment inside Afghanistan and also on the Afghan national security forces.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Now I'll stick with the mystery construct, but things that I would look for that would tell us that we're moving in the right direction, to the end of the significant engagements part of this and more into the holding side of this, would be when we can start to turn over certain areas and responsibilities to either the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police for security. When that security is in the equal interests of us and the people there, and they acknowledge it and they contribute to it, they help us maintain the security. When you start to see that attitude change, then you start to have a sense that things are going to move in a direction that would be towards the end of the violence side of this equation, which is what I think you're asking about, and then more towards the stability, the holding and the building side of the equation.

Q But clearly what you're hoping to achieve in Afghanistan -- rebuilding institutions, increasing the size of the forces, the economy -- is going to take many years. Incoming top British General David Richards says British troops will be committed there for 30 to 40 years. That sound about right?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't agree with that. And first of all, I think you have to differentiate between institution-building and economic development, on the one hand, and defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda on the other. And I think that the one -- the latter can be accomplished in a -- from -- with all of the considerations that I just described, in a few years.

The larger part of it, economic development and institution-building, probably is a decades-long enterprise in a country has been through 30 years of war and has as high an illiteracy rate as Afghanistan does and low level of economic development. So that is a long-term prospect, but it's also one of those areas where virtually all of our international partners and nongovernmental organizations are committed to that side of the equation for an indefinite of period of time. But that's what we do all over the world in developing countries. And so that is a long-term prospect.

But in terms of the security situation, I think you're looking at a much shorter time frame.

Q So it's several years to get stable security in the country, you think?

SEC. GATES: No, I said it's unpredictable. I said perhaps in a few years. But I think we have to show progress over the course of the next year.

Q Well, General Cartwright, first, can you give us an update on the current operation in Helmand province? Is it accomplishing what you set out to do? Will it achieve better security or the desired security in advance of the election?

And for the secretary, is this the desired timeline for this kind of operation, or couldn't something along the same lines have been done sooner without just days to spare before the election?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think, on the first count, with the work that's going on in Helmand, we're seeing positive signs. I think the commanders believe that they are making progress.

What's the end state? If the election is the timeline that we're looking at, the metric is, are more people able to come out and avail themselves of the democratic process of voting?

Yes, that looks like it's going to be the case, all the indications are.

Are we stable there? Do we -- have we obtained all of the objectives we intend to obtain in Helmand? Not yet. We've got a lot of work to do there.

And my sense is -- back to the original question -- you know, that's probably going to take us some time. But we have -- certainly, I think, from the standpoint of the Marines in Helmand and now the Strykers, as they start to roll in -- have established a situation and an environment where the elections are going to be better off than they were before.

SEC. GATES: I think the answer to your second -- the second part of your question's pretty straightforward. The forces weren't available to send in until fairly recently. We got them in there as fast as we could.

Q A budget question for you, just to switch gears for a second. Congress is away for the recess, and you can keep building your case for budget cuts -- your budget cuts. One of the more vexing issues is the second engine for the Joint Strike Fighter, that the House wants to build a second engine and the Senate does not.

Couple weeks ago you won a victory in the Senate when they stripped out money, but that very week with the program manager said that Pratt & Whitney's engine proposal has gone up like 24 percent in -- for one year, a fairly significant cost growth. I want to ask you, does that kind of cost growth undercut your case for keeping one producer of the engine for the Pentagon's largest weapons program?

SEC. GATES: First of all -- and General Cartwright probably has more experience with these things than I do -- but there is always cost growth associated with a developmental aircraft. And it was true of the F-22. It's true of the F-35.

It's one of the -- and there are often development problems.

It's one of the reasons we have over \$400 million -- over \$4 billion in the FY '10 budget to reduce the program risk, to allow for more engineers, more testing time, more airframes for testing. And obviously the engines are part of this.

We think that fixing the problems that we've encountered, the challenges **1039** we face, with the engine, is something that's quite manageable, doable. And we don't think it's the best use of our money to fund a second engine.

(Cross talk.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I mean, there's more than one way to manage risk. And dual -- two engines might be one. But the path that we're on is to manage it both with technical expertise, making sure that we're working off any of the issues that we see technically, that might be risk, and then from the standpoint of the larger decision that we made here, there were a lot of reasons, beyond management of risk, why we went to the single engine. And they still stand valid.

Q On the cost issue though, I mean, are you in favor of fixed-price contracts for this going forward, when they start producing these things, so that the taxpayer doesn't get nailed with cost overruns?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, that's something we would have to look at. I think once the production begins, that's clearly -- the Congress clearly likes that idea. And I'm certainly open to it. But I think we have to -- let's get through the development part of the program first.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have expressed reluctance to send more troops to Afghanistan. Are you being convinced to change your mind, perhaps in part through the Belgian meeting? And is it a matter of either resourcing the mission or changing the mission at this point?

SEC. GATES: Well, I have -- I have expressed my concern in the past, about the size of the footprint of international forces. I think General McChrystal makes the very valid point that how those forces behave, toward the Afghans, is clearly an important element of that. So far, I think that most Afghans see us as there to help them and see us as their partner. I just worry that we don't know where -- what the size of the international presence, military presence, might be that would begin to change that. And I think we need to move with considerable care in that respect and in close consultation with both our allies but especially with the Afghans and the Afghan government.

So I -- that is still a concern for me, but I would say also that the availability of forces is still a challenge as well.

Q General, what's your view of the resources versus -- (off mike)?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Right now we've got a new strategy. We're resourcing that strategy. The resources and the -- particularly the forces have not all flowed. The infrastructure is not all in place for that strategy change and the allocations that we put against it. So as General McChrystal goes through his assessment, it is understanding that he is still receiving forces against that strategy. What he's assessing is, have I got it laid down right; is it appropriate, is that resource lay-down appropriate for the problem that's actually there, that I assessed -- "I" being General McChrystal -- and so

he'll come back to us and talk more about is this -- am I going to be able to do the job I was given? Again, as the secretary said, it's not really coming back and saying, **1040** "more forces." We're not closing that out, but it is a question of the strategy resource mix, and is it in fact executable as we go forward?

But again, remember that forces that are moving to the theater under this updated strategy aren't all there yet.

SEC. GATES: Barbara.

Q Mr. Secretary, if you look at four-and-a-half months of the new regional Afghan-Pak strategy, one of the things we don't hear any of you talk about anymore at all, really, is the hunt for Osama bin Laden. As you look at this regional strategy and you're so busy with this, administration-wide, to what extent has the hunt for bin Laden become less of a priority? On a scale of one to 10, basically.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that we are still very interested in getting rid of the leadership of al Qaeda. And I can tell you that the effort against al Qaeda, not just in Afghanistan but in other parts of Africa and the Middle East, goes on. And -- but I think that our view -- my view is that what we need to do -- we -- I think we have done some real damage over time to the al Qaeda organization and leadership.

And I think they still have capabilities. They are still the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world, with respect to this country and a lot of our allies. So they remain a very high priority. By the same token, that doesn't mean that we can't resource the effort in Afghanistan either.

Q Mr. Secretary, with respect though, I understand what you're saying about the leadership. My question really goes to, so many Americans eight years later remain deeply interested. And the president, while he was campaigning for office, talked about capturing or killing him.

So to what extent -- him in particular -- can you tell Americans? Have you had any good leads in recent months? Do you still -- does this administration still look for him every day? Are you -- what's the priority on trying to get him?

SEC. GATES: I would -- I would say that the United States and our allies and partners continue to have the hunt for al Qaeda very high on our priority list. I'd just leave it at that.

Q Sir, this trust agreement with Colombia, allowing U.S. anti-drug missions to operate from military bases there, has caused a lot of concern among Latin-American countries, among them U.S. allies.

So do you feel like this agreement is worth the political price? And what guarantees can you give that the U.S. will actually not deviate from its mission there, inside the Colombian border?



SEC. GATES: Well, let me start and then ask General Cartwright to pitch in. Virtually all of the counternarcotics efforts that we pursue, in Latin America, are in partnership with other countries. These are not unilateral actions on our part. And we hope to continue these partnerships.

Clearly the need for reconnaissance, for being able to find laboratories and so on -- we bring some assets to this that our allies welcome. And that's really what this is all about is, how do we work together and more effectively with our partners in the region, to go after these narcotics cartels?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I mean, as you may know, this is talking about seven bases in particular. And the intent here, what we're doing is going in first -- and we use these bases to provide capability to the Colombians. It's going in and actually assessing the bases for safety and security, the ability to give us fuel, park, and weight-bearing of the runways, things like that.

The intent, though, the strategic intent is, in fact, to be able to provide to the Colombians that what they need in order to continue to prosecute their efforts against the internal threats that they have. This is a bilateral relationship with the Colombians.

Q So do you think that the criticisms or concerns expressed by Latin American allies, U.S. allies, are unfounded?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think we need to do a better job of explaining to them what we're doing and making it as transparent as possible. Because anybody's concerns are valid, and so if they have concerns we need to do a better job about describing what we're doing, to make sure that we allay those concerns to the best of our ability.

Q Since the spring, when the Swat Valley fighting began, Pakistan has responded and there's been more fighting with -- I mean, with Americans as well, on the border since the strike; intelligence sharing, all of that going on. Pew came out with a report today on Pakistan public opinion that says only 9 percent of Pakistanis see the U.S. as a partner; 64 percent still see the U.S. as the enemy. What -- how is that -- how do you react to that new statistic? What do you think is DOD's role in reaching -- in changing that kind of public opinion?

And personally, Mr. Secretary, do you see a need to go to Pakistan -- you haven't been there recently, or this year -- but you know, taking this to a level up -- all the way up to your office, personally?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that, first of all, one of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice. We walked away from them after the Soviets left Afghanistan, and we walked away from them through the 1990s because of the Pressler amendment. And so, our military-to-military relations were significantly interrupted. And so, I think that the Pakistanis probably -- and with some legitimacy -- question our -- how long are we prepared to stay there? Is the only reason we're interested in working with the Pakistanis because of the war in Afghanistan? Or do

we value Pakistan as a partner and an ally independent of the war in Afghanistan?

1042

The latter is the case. And I think that the bills on the Hill, to provide multi-year economic assistance to Pakistan, manifest that. So I think it's going to take us some time to rebuild confidence, with the Pakistani people, that we are a long-term friend and ally of Pakistan.

By the same token, I think that the polls that are perhaps more meaningful in this context is the strong support that the Pakistani people seem to have given, to their government, in terms of the activities in western Pakistan, in the FATA and in the North-West Frontier Province.

And there, there seems to be, more than I think any of us would have expected six months ago, broad political support for what the Pakistani military is doing in the west.

And I think that this change of attitudes and the success of the Pakistani forces clearly serves our interest as well as it serves the interest of the Pakistanis. And so my hope is that over time, we will be able to demonstrate, to the Pakistanis, that we are a reliable ally that they can count on for the long term.

As I look at my travel schedule, over the -- over the next six or eight months, one of the places that I am looking -- thinking about going is back to Pakistan, because it has been a while.

Admiral Mullen obviously has developed a good relationship with General Kayani. And I think he's made something like a dozen or 13 visits to Pakistan, over the past 15 months. But it probably is time for me to return.

Q May I just follow, sir? Are you satisfied, as far as Pakistan's nuclear program, that it does not go into the hands of terrorism? Because there are some reports.

And also some Afghans are concerned about the present government of President Karzai, if you are happy and satisfied with his government. Because they think that al Qaedas are still coming back and government is not doing much there, as far as their safety is concerned.

SEC. GATES: The only thing I would say is that is what Admiral Mullen has testified to on a number of occasions, and that is that we are comfortable with the level of security in the Pakistani forces.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Yeah.

Q Back to the availability of forces to Afghanistan. Clearly there's a dearth of forces, and you've called for a 22,000 increase in the Army. But that will take some time. Do you have the forces to give to General McChrystal in the short term, and

say, "I need more into next year," and should the president agree with him?

**1043**

SEC. GATES: Well, we haven't -- at -- as far as I know, people have not started to look into the availability of forces. I would just say off the top of my head that until the more accelerated drawdown in Iraq begins after the elections there, that it will be a challenge for us, and particularly as we seek to increase the dwell time at home for our forces. But it is something that I'm sure will be looked at, but it will depend really entirely on what he proposes.

Q Does dwell time come after providing enough forces for Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think you have to balance these things.

Q You mentioned when you left Iraq a few weeks ago that there was the potential to speed up the drawdown even further, bring another BCT out of Iraq before the end of this year. Is that -- is it safe to assume that that's still on the table, despite an uptick in recent violence there?

And isn't it -- would that likely be done -- a brigade not going in and instead going to Afghanistan to fill the -- what seems like a continuing need there?

SEC GATES: Well, not necessarily, but I would say that -- we had a video conference with General Odierno earlier this week, and I think he's feeling pretty positive about the way things are going in Iraq.

So I would say that despite the uptick -- which is clearly one of the things that he made clear that is a positive development, is that the Shi'a clearly recognize that this is al Qaeda trying to restoke sectarian violence. This is not the Sunnis coming after the Shi'a; this is al Qaeda. And it's one of the reasons that the Shi'a have been as restrained as they have and not reacted. And so I think, you know, I raised it as a possibility.

I think that's a decision, whether or not to do it, that he will make probably several months from now.

Q Back to the troops issue. In your opening statement, you said that McChrystal's assessment will not include a request for more forces, but he's free to ask for what he needs. So was he specifically told not to ask for more forces? And if it is more forces that he needs, are you willing to put a cap on that number?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all -- and we'll both answer that -- General McChrystal has been told very directly by both the chairman and by me that we want him to ask for what he thinks he needs. And I think you have to allow your commanders that freedom.

And then the chain of command -- General Petraeus, the Joint Chiefs, chairman and the vice chairman, myself -- will all look at that and decide what to recommend. ~~1044~~ So we're not talking about caps. Where -- what we're waiting for is his assessment and then to see what options or courses of action he puts forward, independent of the assessment, as we move forward. But as General Cartwright said, the reality is, he's still got another full brigade to come in - the 4th of the 82nd. And so these forces are still flowing that already have been made available or approved by the president. And so, you know, we need -- he needs some time and we need some time to see what the impact of all of that is.

Q (Off mike.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I think the only other piece that I would add is that, as we have watched and you have watched what's going on in Afghanistan, the IED fight is pretty lethal. And so that's one area that we're going to have to focus in on. Whether it's an adjustment in our lay-down, in our tactics; whether it is additional resource, we're going to have to take a serious look at that, and we will have to do that soon.

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q Mr. Secretary, given what you said about the need to roll back to the Taliban, the push to roll back the Taliban, and General McChrystal's comments this week about needing to secure populations and possibly redeploying troops to urban centers as a result, is there some trade-off between taking the fight to the Taliban and protecting the population, particularly given the limited resources and the terrain?

SEC. GATES: Well, my view is that if you deny the Taliban access to the people, you basically are starving what nourishes them.

And the key -- and the key, as General Cartwright said at the very beginning of this conversation -- the key is the Afghans themselves becoming part of the security force. And it's not just their security forces. It is ordinary Afghans turning in Taliban who are planting IEDs or who are setting ambushes and people like this.

We saw this happen in Iraq, and it's clear that when people begin to feel a sense of security, that then they begin to look to the long-term future and become the allies of their government and of the international forces there to help them.

Q In turn, does that mean that there may be greater attention to protecting people in population centers, rather than fighting the Taliban in particularly remote places?

SEC. GATES: I suspect that may be something that's addressed in the general's assessment.

Q Mr. Secretary, how do you assess the security meeting held yesterday in Damascus between U.S. military officials and the Syrian government? What kind of results

you are expecting and improvement you are expecting from the Syrian government?

1045

SEC. GATES: Well, I haven't received a readout on the meeting, or heard anything about the results, but the reason they're there is that when foreign fighters cross the Syrian-Iraqi border they more often than not target American troops. And so our expectation -- my expectation is that -- that Syrians need to do more in terms of stopping those foreign facilitators and foreign fighters.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may ask two questions, first one on Afghanistan, do you see any evidence that al Qaeda is playing a role in the recent fighting? I mean, is there any kind of coordination between al Qaeda and Taliban in the current battles with the U.S. troops?

And second one is on Somalia. Do you think the level of assistance given by the U.S. to the interim government is enough to defeat al-Shabab, or from your own assessment you need to send more assistance, technical support maybe, to see a change?

SEC. GATES: Well, with respect to the latter, I think, with Secretary Clinton just having been in Africa and in Kenya, I'm interested in hearing her evaluation based on what she has learned out there before I make any judgment about whether we ought to be doing -- recommend to the president that we do more to help the transitional government in Somalia.

So I'm waiting for Secretary Clinton on that one.

I think that what we have seen in Afghanistan, over the past more than a year, is several different elements engaged in the fight against the government of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda is one element. The Haqqani network is another. The Taliban is obviously a major element. And there have been some others as well: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his group.

These are kind of the major players, if you will. And I think it's fair to say that they are mutually supportive and that they at times collaborate. But we don't -- I don't -- I haven't seen any information that suggests that they are a unified fighting force or that they are following al Qaeda's direction.

They all have their own independent agenda but with, in their view, a common foe. And so I think that clearly al Qaeda is in touch with these different elements. And probably different elements help provide protection for al Qaeda. But I don't see that they're sort of firm allies or have a common agenda.

(Cross talk.)

Q Roughly how much of Afghanistan do you consider to be under Taliban control right now? And how can you convince so many Afghans that it's safe to vote, when the Marines are just showing up in their village seven days or so before the election?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, it's a pretty big country. And I think I would -- I would remind -- or just make the point that first of all, based on everything that I've heard, we are looking at an election in which there will perhaps be 13 or 1,400 more polling places than there were in 2004.

Several million more Afghans have registered to vote than in 2004. They're obviously holding an election in adverse circumstances. But I think these considerations are important.

They have significant -- significantly larger number of both international and Afghan observers for these polling places. There is a tiered security arrangement. And so I think that the potential is there for a quite credible -- quite credible election, and in all parts of the country.

I mean, I think that General McChrystal's view would be that Kabul is reasonably calm right now. There's more activity in both the west and in the north, but there -- there are -- there are individual provinces and districts where there has been an uptick in activity, but for the most part they've -- they're not too bad.

So the real issue, the challenge is in Regional Command South and Regional Command East. And again, it differs from district to district in terms of what the security situation is. But I think that -- I think that most of us here believe that there's ample opportunity for a quite credible election. Okay.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I might just throw in --

SEC. GATES: Yes. Please.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: I mean, if you walk or move around the country, the other thing that you see now is, one, candidates making speeches, having rallies, posters all over the place, rallies absent the candidates and villages advocating one candidate or the other.

And so the openness of the activity right now is substantially different than anything we've seen in the past. And that's just a judgment on their part that the security's sufficient that they're going to go out and do that, but it is also a reflection of their confidence in the security.

And it's not -- you know, it's not the same everywhere. Absolutely not. But by and large, you're seeing so much activity out there that you would associate with a political campaign, a democratic election, it's really startling when you walk around and watch this.

Could that be interrupted by violence? Sure. But right now, it's very shocking -- at least, you know, having seen it before -- how much openness there is in this campaign.

SEC. GATES: Okay. Thank you all.



**U.S. Department of Defense**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**No. 622-09**  
**August 17, 2009**

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### **2009 Maintenance Awards Winners Announced**

The Department of Defense today announced the 2009 winners of the Secretary of Defense Maintenance Awards for the depot and field levels. These awards are presented annually to recognize outstanding achievements in military equipment and weapon systems maintenance.

The Robert T. Mason Depot Maintenance Excellence Award recipient is the Army's Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Program at Red River Army Depot, Texarkana, Texas. The program provided exceptional and responsive support for the fielding and sustainment of the MRAP vehicles while providing unit embedded maintenance support teams to numerous sites in Iraq.

The depot-level award is named in recognition of Robert T. Mason, a former assistant deputy under secretary of defense for maintenance policy, programs, and resources. Mason served as the champion of organic depot maintenance for three decades, while helping to transform DoD organic depot-level operations.

There are six field-level awards presented in the categories of large, medium, and small units (two each). The recipients of this year's Secretary of Defense Field-level Maintenance Awards are as follows: for the large category, the Army's 1<sup>st</sup> Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Multi-National Division—North, Fort Hood, Texas, and the Navy's USS Harry S. Truman home ported in Norfolk, Va. Winners in the medium category include the Navy's USS Frank Cable home ported in Apra Harbor, Guam, and Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16, Marine Corps Air Station, Miramar, Calif. Small category winners include the Air Force's 31<sup>st</sup> Munitions Squadron, Camp Darby, Italy, and the 6<sup>th</sup>/927<sup>th</sup> Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.

The awards will be presented to the winners at the Secretary of Defense Maintenance Awards banquet on Oct. 28, 2009, during the 2009 DoD Maintenance Symposium and Exhibition at the Phoenix Convention Center in Phoenix, Ariz. Additional information regarding the 2009 DoD Maintenance Symposium and Exhibition can be found at <http://www.sae.org/dod>.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO TEXAS

August 31, 2009





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### MC-12 Factory Visit

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Greenville, TX, Monday, August 31, 2009*

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Thank y'all very much and thank you for coming this morning. I must say I celebrated a sort of, an anniversary yesterday. It was 43 years ago yesterday that I entered CIA.

I want to thank you all for coming this morning and I don't want to interrupt your work for very long, but I did want to take a few minutes to express my appreciation for what you're doing here with this Liberty Project.

I just had a chance to look at four of the MC-12s here on the floor. It is an impressive operation, to say the least – with tens of thousands of parts incorporated onto a commercial aircraft in only a few months. Each of these planes represents critical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities badly needed in the field by our troops and their partners. The nature of the fight places an incredibly high demand on ISR. Our enemies often hide among the population and use tactics like IEDs to avoid a direct fight, offsetting our traditional advantages as they try to exploit our vulnerabilities. Platforms like the MC-12, though, give America a distinct counter to their efforts – an unmatched advantage. They give our troops an eye in the sky. They often help us disrupt and hunt down our enemies often before they strike – saving the lives of Americans troops while sparing innocent civilians.

Your work already has had an impact in Iraq: There have been more than 250 combat missions since the first MC-12 was deployed to theater in June. And within the next few months, I hope that the plane sitting right here – the first second-generation MC-12 scheduled for deployment – will be flying combat missions in Afghanistan, giving our troops a crucial asset as they engage a committed and deadly enemy in a new phase of that war.

I spent most of my career in the intelligence business, and I can safely say there has been an unprecedented fusion of intelligence and operations on the ground in recent years. It is a fusion driven by technological advances and the creativity and flexibility, not just of our men and women in uniform, but of industrial partners like all of you. Increasing and institutionalizing ISR capabilities for today's war fighter has been one of my top priorities as Secretary of Defense. Your work proves what industry and the military can accomplish together. And it reminds us that new platforms can be developed, built, and deployed in a short period of time – and the best solution isn't always the fanciest or the most expensive.

A final thought. In the 1940s, the war effort mobilized the entire American economy. That is not the case today for most of our industry, defense included. But you all have the opportunity to work on one of the few projects where your efforts have a direct and

immediate impact on men and women fighting on the front lines. With every plane that you complete, you are saving American lives and giving our troops the tools they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely.

During World War II, President Roosevelt said of the industrial effort: "We must raise our sights all along the production line. Let no [one] say it cannot be done." So I ask you to keep raising your sights; you are getting it done. I know it means long hours and missed vacations. But each day earlier one of these planes arrives downrange may well be the day that a soldier's life is saved. So I ask you to sustain your effort and keep pursuing ways to improve this program. Your job is critical. We are counting on you. Most importantly, the troops who are putting their lives on the line also are counting on you.

Again, thank you for everything you have done and everything you are doing.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

August 31, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at Lockheed Martin Factory, Fort Worth, Texas

SEC. GATES: (In progress from source) □It has been a great opportunity to tour this historic facility today. Did a little reading on the history, and we've been producing combat aircraft for the United States of America in this plant since 1942. And now it has the latest generation in combat aircraft that are being produced here, the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35.

I was very impressed by what I saw this morning, by the investments that have been made in the production line, in the robotics and automation, in the -- but I would say especially by the dedication and clear commitment of the men and women who work principally from Lockheed Martin, but from their principal partners as well who are working on this airplane.

They're clearly excited about it. I'm excited about it. I'm especially excited that things seem to be on schedule for the first training squadron at Eglin in 2011 and IOC for the Marine Corps in 2012.

We obviously have a huge investment in this aircraft. It is the heart of the future of tactical combat aviation for our services. So the importance of this program can hardly be overstated. And I was encouraged by what I heard this morning in terms of progress and the ability to overcome the challenges that have already been overcome and begin moving toward completion of the development program in the next few years and then full production.

So I'm heartened by what I've seen here this morning, but especially by the commitment of the people involved in putting this airplane together.

So I feel it was a very good visit, and I'm happy to take a few questions.  
Ann?

Q (Off mike) -- two things. First, could you say a word about the current state of play on the two engines for this aircraft? Is there still a standing veto

threat?

1052

And have you received General McChrystal's assessment? Do you share his assessment that the current strategy in Afghanistan is not working?

SEC. GATES: That would be General McChrystal's assessment of the F-35?

Q He probably is going to ram that in there. (Laughter.)

SEC. GATES: First of all, we have looked at the business case a number of times in terms of an alternative engine to the F135. The general conclusion is that it would cost several billion dollars in addition; that it would, just by the nature of things, be three or four or more years behind the F135 engine. And there's no reason to believe that it would not encounter the same kinds of development challenges that other new engines have encountered along the way.

And so at this point, where we're trying to count every dollar and where a dollar from one program -- added to one program takes away from another program that we think is more important, we feel strongly about the fact that there is not a need for a second engine.

And the president's advisers -- the Hill has been informed that the president's advisers would recommend a veto if that's in the bill. The final decision, obviously, is up to the president.

With respect to General McChrystal's assessment, I have not seen it. I'm here in Fort Worth. I expect I'll get it in the next day or two. As I indicated to you when I met with General McChrystal in Belgium, there were some additional questions that I asked him to address. I have not seen the answers to those questions. And so I'm looking forward to seeing his assessment.

I think that his assessment, without having read it, I suspect is going to point to the challenges that remain before us in Afghanistan. I think it will also point to areas where we can do better and can make improvements in our strategy and tactics. There is no question that we have a tough fight in front of us in Afghanistan and a lot of challenges.

By the same token, I think a lot of positive things have been happening in terms of getting more American troops into place. There are more European and partner troops in place now. There are nearly 37,000 partner nation troops in Afghanistan.

The elections took place in a country torn by war for 30 years, and the fact that those elections were able to take place I think is an important thing.

The fact that we're going into areas where the Taliban have basically been

unchallenged for a number of years means that our casualties are going to be higher. I am concerned that we -- I haven't discussed this with respect to the assessment, but I am concerned about getting assets into Afghanistan to help us deal with the IED problem. I expect that the all-terrain MRAP will begin flowing to Afghanistan in October. And we are in the process of putting significant additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities there as well. It worked well for us in Iraq in dealing with the IED problem, and we're all hoping that they'll help us in Afghanistan as well.

1053

But while there's a lot of gloom and doom going around, I think that General McChrystal's assessment will be a realistic one and set forth the challenges we have in front of us. At the same time, I think we have some assets in place and some developments that hold promise.

Yeah.

Q President Obama just said he wanted to send 20,000 more troops there, which would bring the total to more than 68,000. And the general's recommendation and his assessment also is to bring in even more troops than that. That goes along the lines with what you're saying, but you didn't specify specifically that he recommended more troops. A lot of those would come from this area. Any ideas? Do you support that? I know you haven't seen the assessment, but do you think that would be additionally required as well?

SEC. GATES: Well, I have not only not seen the assessment, I have not seen any recommendations yet from General McChrystal. We have been very explicit that General McChrystal should be forthright in telling us what he needs in order to accomplish the mission that he has been given. And we will look at his assessment, and then we will look at the resource recommendations that he makes.

I think there are larger issues. I have expressed some concerns in the past about the size of the American footprint, the size of the foreign military footprint in Afghanistan. And clearly, I want to address those issues. And we will have to look at the availability of forces, we'll have to look at costs. There are a lot of different things that we'll have to look at, once we get his recommendations, before we make any recommendations to the president.

Yeah.

Q Sir, the Joint Estimating Team has come up with a different price for the JSF program that's higher. Do you have any concerns that this program might meet with a non-recurring situation where you have to go through a review and compare it with other airframes? And what do you think is the likelihood that might happen, given the information you were told today?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't think I want to get specific about that, because frankly, I don't know the specifics that go into that, or into the assessment that was made. I know that there were some assumptions made in putting together that estimate that others have some disagreements with in terms of assumptions.

My impression is that most of the high-risk elements associated with this developmental program are largely behind us, and I felt a good deal of confidence on the part of the leadership here that the manufacturing process, that the supply chain, that the issues associated with all of these have been addressed or are being addressed. 1054

So I'm -- I think that to the degree the planes that are being assembled here could have significant additional cost growth, you know, you never know in these programs. And it has had its challenges, but I would tell you that virtually every modern tactical aircraft has had its challenges as well in the developmental part.

And I think people who've been associated with these programs -- for example, as I testified on the Hill last spring, out of the flight tests that have been flown, 75 percent or so -- 75 to 80 percent -- have been characterized as code 1, or mission capable, which is a significantly better record than most comparable development programs.

So I can't stand here and say there won't be further cost growth or anything like that, but I think everybody is aware of the importance both of the timelines and the execution of this program to keep the cost as low as possible.

We talked about trade-offs in other programs with respect to the alternate engine a minute ago. Well, every dollar additional to the budget that we have to put into the F-35 is a dollar taken from something else that the troops may need. So it's as important to watch the costs here as it is on everything else.

Yeah.

Q Joel Thomas with CBS here in town. Getting to the human factor of the labor force, have you been able to identify how many people would be affected as F-22 draws down and F-35 production ramps up. And regarding that, seeing what you've seen today, are you going to be able to ramp up faster to help those employees who will be displaced with F-22?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would leave -- I would leave the answers to those questions to the -- to the Lockheed Martin management. I think they're in a much better position than I am to evaluate how they are going to use their workforce. There clearly -- as the production of this aircraft ramps up, there clearly will be significant additional jobs here for that purpose -- several times the number of people who are already working on this program, as I understood it this morning. So I think there's going to be some significant opportunities.

And I would just repeat what I said at the outset. One of the things that impressed me the most as I toured the assembly line was the commitment and quality of the men and women who are working on this airplane. And what I also found interesting is the blending of people who have been here 25 and 30 years with a number of people who have just come in recent years. So you've got new ideas, fresh faces, along with a lot of skilled, experienced people, and also, clearly, and much -- very gratifying to me -- a significant number of veterans.

So, one last?

Q Mr. Secretary, the overall cost of the plane in the future years, is this something the government will continue to be able to afford, given all of the other resource pressures we're seeing among the -- at the Pentagon and elsewhere?

SEC. GATES: I think that the F-35 is at root the core of our combat tactical aircraft in the future. Our planned buy of these airplanes at this point is in the neighborhood of between 24 and 25 hundred, with hundreds more being purchased by our foreign partners. This is a huge program -- talking overall 3,000-plus aircraft over the lifetime of the program.

I think that the fact that we have a(n) aircraft that has many common components for all three services is important in terms of potential cost savings. This aircraft at full production is less than half the price, for example, of the F-22.

And I guess I would say my view is we cannot afford, as a nation, not to have this airplane.


Thank you.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF VISIT TO LOCKHEED MARTIN F-35 FACTORY

Aug. 31, 2009





Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks with members of the press following a tour of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter production facility in Fort Worth, Texas, Aug. 31, 2009.

*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tours the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter production facility with Lockheed Martin President Robert Stevens and Dan Crowley, executive vice president and F-35 program manager, in Fort Worth, Texas, Aug. 31, 2009.

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 668-09  
August 31, 2009

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### DoD Establishes Suicide Prevention Task Force

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs announced today the names of 14 members who will serve on the Department of Defense Task Force on the Prevention of Suicide by Members of the Armed Forces.

The congressionally directed task force will address trends and causal factors, methods to update prevention and education programs, suicide assessment by occupation, suicide incident investigations, and protective measures for confidential information derived from investigations for the department.

"One service member suicide is too many and DoD is taking a proactive and comprehensive approach towards prevention, with efforts to address the stigma of psychological health issues, reduce barriers to care and research best practices," said Ellen Embrey, performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for health affairs. "The members of this task force have significant and varied experience in national suicide prevention, research, policy and clinical care that will play a critical role in guiding the Department of Defense in addressing this very serious issue."

The task force will operate within the Federal Advisory Committee Act guidelines as a subcommittee of the Defense Health Board, responsible to the Secretary of Defense, through the assistant secretary of defense for health affairs and the under secretary of defense for personnel and readiness.

Membership consists of, DoD and non-DoD experts, including at least one representative each from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and one family member with a background in working with military families.

The task force will present their findings and recommendations to the secretary of defense within twelve months. Following review by the secretary, the task force's report and recommendations will be sent to Congress.

The names and biographies of the task force members are available on the Military Health Care Web site at <http://www.health.mil/dhb/subcommittees-ftpmaf.cfm>.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      August 31, 2009

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Secretary Gates Interview with Peter Cook, Bloomberg News

PETER COOK, BLOOMBERG NEWS: Mr. Secretary thank you for joining us to talk about defense spending, other issues as well, we appreciate very much.

ROBERT GATES, DEFENSE SECRETARY, U.S. GOVERNMENT: My pleasure, happy to be here.

COOK: I want to get to Afghanistan, Iraq, some of those areas, but I do want to start with the defense budget and the future for the defense budget. You have made a very public push to overhaul how the defense department does business going forward. You spent about \$6 billion last year in the United States on defense spending, by some estimates, more than all the other nations of the world [world] combined. Are American taxpayers getting their money's worth?

GATES: I think for the most part they are. They certainly are getting more than their money's worth in terms of their men and women in uniform and the performance that they turn in. And I think the key, as we look ahead, beginning with this kind of effort, is how do we deliver weapons systems and equipment to those men and women in uniform to be able to deal with today's threats as well as future threats, and do so in a way that the nation can afford and where we can afford to buy as many of these things as we need. We need to get passed an era where the platforms become so expensive that we can only buy a small number of them. For example, the B-2 Bomber is almost \$2 billion apiece. And so we have - we built 19 of them. We were going to buy 32 DDG-1000 destroyers. We're now going to build three. That's no way to spend the public's money. And it also doesn't help our military capabilities. So the key is getting control of this acquisition process. Making sure that programs are being executed according to the budgets that have been established for them, and on the timelines established.

COOK: Other secretaries of defense have tried to make these changes like this in the past. You've talked about perhaps who's to blame for the current situation and there's plenty of blame to go around, Congress, the Pentagon itself, defense contractors.

GATES: Absolutely. Everybody has had a piece of this action. And I think that what matters now is that in a time of economic stringency there is a, I think, a consensus on the part of the people in the Department of Defense, people in Congress and in the Executive Branch with the President's leadership, to try to address some of these acquisition issues that have built up cumulatively over a large number of years.

COOK: Some of your high-profile programs within the Defense Department. Your latest budget does call for some significant cuts and curtailments. You also are boosting for commitments to other programs, one of them is the plane behind you, the F-35, close to \$300 billion projected of the life of this contract going forward. Tell me why this plan roughly - this plane at roughly \$85 million a piece makes sense for American taxpayers going forward and makes sense for the military?

GATES: Well, I think one of the basic things that makes sense is its capabilities. It has extraordinary capabilities as a weapons platform. Another thing that makes sense is that we are developing a fundamental airplane that will be shared by all three services. There will obviously be variants but significant elements of the aircraft, the different variants will have a lot in common. This will help keep the cost down. The cost per airplane, once under production is less than half than that of an F-22. So I think we have created a system here - I think Lockheed Martin and all of their industry partners and the Defense Department, and one of the things I have talked with their leadership today is the importance of staying on schedule, having that initial training squadron at Eglin in 2011, having the Marine Corps get their first aircraft in 2012 and also just executing the program within the budget.

COOK: How confident are you at this moment in time that this program will be on budget and on time?

GATES: Based on what I've been briefed on before I came here, and here, I think that a lot of the highest risk elements of the program are behind us at this point. I think there are still management and execution issues that have to be dealt with. I think they are dealing with those. And I think it's fair to say that are confident that they will meet the timetable set I just described.

COOK: All right, let me talk about some of the other programs that perhaps weren't as successful in the Robert Gates defense budget that were sent up to Congress set to be voted on again shortly in the Senate. The F-22, you mentioned that, another Lockheed Martin plane. Why doesn't it make sense for the U.S. Military to continue producing more F-22s as some members of Congress have pushed for?

GATES: Well, I think basically, for the last two administrations beginning in 2005, the judgment of two different presidents, two different secretaries of defense, two different chairmen of the joint chiefs of staffs has been that 183 F-22s are enough for the missions that the F-22 is being given or is likely to encounter in the future. The question is how many as enough? That's the judgment that has been made. The F-22 is a great airplane. Pilots love it, they think it has tremendous capabilities. It does have tremendous capabilities. The question is, though, in a time of finite defense resources, how many do you need, and is that money better applied to other programs? The judgment, first under President Bush, now under Present [President] Obama is 183, now 187 thanks to the supplemental, is enough. And I think that Congress I think ultimately will agree.

COOK: Well, I was going to say, you have essentially - have you won that fight already? It looks like both spending bills in the House and Senate will not have F-22 funding. Is this fight over?

GATES: I never count my eggs before they hatch. We'll see. Right now it is looking

promising.

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COOK: All right. Let me ask you about a couple other controversial programs, again, programs that members of Congress keep pushing for, you're pushing against. An alternative engine for this plane, does it make sense to build a second engine for this plane? You say no.

GATES: Well, we've done the business case, we've looked at it a number of times. It would be an additional cost of several billion dollars. It would start three to four years behind in terms of where we are with the F-135 engine and there's no reason to believe that that prototype engine, or that that new engine would not encounter the same kinds of challenges and issues that other developmental engines on this aircraft as well as others have encountered in the past. At this point, based on the business case, we don't think it's necessary.

COOK: Will the President veto a spending bill that comes to his desk that includes a second engine?

GATES: Well, the Congress has been told that the president's advisers will take a dim view of the second engine.

COOK: What about more funding for the Presidential helicopter fleet that's gotten so much attention.

GATES: Very much against that.

COOK: Veto that?

GATES: Yes, yes. Even to finish the first five helicopters would mean that you would require first of all another \$2 billion for an aircraft this President and no future President will ever ride in. It will be about \$1 billion per helicopter. It has less [less] range than the helicopters the President flies today. We are already on track in terms of beginning to work with the White House, the Navy, acquisition folks, to begin talking about how to restart this program and build a helicopter that the nation can afford and that will protect the President and give him the communications he needs. Vh-71 is the poster child for an acquisition program gone seriously wrong. And there's no reason to throw good money after bad.

COOK: Let me get you to give me your perspective on defense spending beyond this fiscal year. You've made some tough choices here. But the reality is this is a bigger defense budget than the year before. What about the out years? We see a deficit right now \$1.5 trillion next year, expected to grow as well. Do you expect this President to come to you and say Robert Gates, I need you to cut defense spending in the future?

GATES: Well, you know, we've done this before. We've been down this road. We did in the early 1990s. We did it probably four or five times in the 20th century. And the result with significant cuts in defense, is that you always end up having to go back up because

the world hasn't changed, the threats out there haven't changed. If anything, it's gotten more complex and more dangerous. And my view is what we need is a steady defense budget that we can plan for and that provides modest, real growth each year that allows us to sustain the programs that we have. It's the stability that we need. And I don't think that the rates of growth need to be significantly significant or very high but they need to be predictable and they need to be sustained. I think that's the key and that's the argument that I will make to the President and to the Congress going forward is that to sustain the programs we have, the Defense Department needs real growth, but I believe it can be modest, but it needs to be sustained over the long term.

COOK: Let me switch to Afghanistan if I could. News today General McChrystal, top U.S. NATO commander in Afghanistan, that he has submitted his latest assessment of the situation both to his higher ups, General Patraeus, ultimately it's going to land on your desk. Have you seen it yet?

GATES: I saw an early draft weeks ago. My impression is that it's changed quite a bit. I asked a number of questions when I met general McChrystal in Belgium, some additional issues that I asked him to look at. So I have not seen the finished assessment. I am in Fort Worth today but I expect to in the next day or two.

COOK: There are reports out there that General McChrystal, even though it's not in this report, that he's going to come back to you and to the President ultimately and say we need more troops beyond the 68,000 that will be in place as of December. How are you going to consider that request if indeed it comes?

GATES: Well, I think first we all need to look at the assessment and see how he thinks things are going, what things are need and then we will turn our attention to whatever resource requirements he's put forward.

COOK: You've been skeptical about the notion of committing more U.S. troops?

GATES: I - one of the questions I asked him to address in the assessment when I was in Belgium with him was the implications of significant additional forces in terms of the foreign footprint in Afghanistan, whether the Afghans will see this as us becoming more of an occupier or their partner and how do you differentiate those and how do you make sure you don't lose their confidence in us as their partner. And also, what are the implications with respect to Americanization of the war. I am confident he's going to address both of those in the assessment and we'll take a look at it.

COOK: Are we winning in Afghanistan?


GATES: I think it's a mixed picture in Afghanistan. I think that there aren't too many people with too rosy a view of what's going on in Afghanistan. I think there are many challenges. But I think some of the gloom and doom is somewhat overdrawn as well. We have a significant Afghan army that is being grown, about 95,000. We're going to grow it to 134,000 and maybe larger than that depending on General McChrystal's recommendations. Our allies have 37,000 troops in Afghanistan now in addition to the troops we have. I think we've got our strategy is moving into the right place. The Afghans have had an election, however difficult that was in conditions of war. So I think there that are some positive developments but there is no question our casualties are up and there's no question we have a very tough fight in front of us, a lot of challenges.

COOK: How much longer are you going to be in this job, sir?

GATES: That would be a mystery.

COOK: That would be a mystery. We'll end on that note. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for joining us here in Bloomberg, we appreciate it.

GATES: Thanks a lot.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen

September 03,  
2009

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### DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I want to start today with an update on where we stand with General McChrystal's assessment on Afghanistan, and then turn things over to Admiral Mullen for his perspective.

First, some context. Soon after taking office, President Obama approved the deployment of some 21,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan to help cope with the anticipated Taliban spring offensive and to provide additional security for the Afghan elections last month. Our allies and partners also sent significant additional troops to provide for election security.

In late March, the president announced a comprehensive new civil, military and diplomatic strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al Qaeda in order to prevent them from launching another major attack against our country.

A new military commander, General McChrystal, was appointed to implement the military component of the new strategy. When General McChrystal took command in June, I asked him to report back to me in about 60 days with his assessment of the security situation and his thinking on the implementation of the president's new strategy.

I received that report two days ago and informally forwarded a copy to the president for an initial read.

I've asked General Petraeus, the commander of Central Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chairman to provide me with their evaluation of the assessment and the situation in Afghanistan, and will send their views plus my own thoughts to the president early next week. I expect that any request for additional resources would follow after this process and be similarly discussed by the president's national-security team.

All of this is being done as part of a systematic, deliberative process designed to make sure the president receives the best military information and advice on the way ahead in Afghanistan. As I said earlier, what prompted my request for this assessment was the arrival of a new commander in Afghanistan, not any new information or perceived change in the situation on the ground. My request and General McChrystal's response both are intended to help us effectively implement the president's March strategy, not launch a new one.

Admiral?

ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would just add a couple of thoughts. First, on process, as the secretary indicated, he's asked the chiefs and myself to review General McChrystal's initial assessment and provide our thoughts, our advice. The chiefs and I have already met twice in the tank this week to discuss it, and we're planning at least one more session later on. My intention is to wrap up our review by Friday.

Our job -- and it's one we take very seriously -- is to provide the secretary and the president our best military advice. And we're going to do that with a clear eye not only on the needs in Afghanistan but also the needs of the force in general and on our other security commitments around the globe.

Second, it's clear to me that General McChrystal has done his job as well, laying out for his chain of command the situation on the ground, as he sees it, and offering in frank and candid terms how he believes his forces can best accomplish the mission the president has assigned to him.

And that is what this whole thing is about: the mission assigned, the strategy we've been tasked to implement. There has been enormous focus on troop numbers and timelines lately, lots of conjecture, lots of speculation.

I understand the interest in those things, and it's legitimate. Those numbers represent real units, real people and real families. But the troop piece of this is just that. It's a piece, critical, but it's not total.

What's more important than the numbers of troops he may or may not ask for is how he intends to use them. It should come as no surprise to anyone that he intends to use those forces under his command to protect the Afghan people, to give them the security they need to reject the influence the Taliban seeks.

Now, you've heard me talk for much of the last two years about Afghanistan. You know how much I remain concerned about the situation there. There is a sense of urgency. Time is not on our side.

I believe we understand that. And I believe we're going to regain the initiative, because we have a strategy. We have a new approach in implementing that strategy. And we have leaders on the ground who know the nature of the fight they are in, leaders who know that the other people and the other families who matter just as much, in this fight, are the Afghans themselves.

Our mission is to defeat al Qaeda and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven again. We cannot accomplish that alone. We'll need help from other agencies and other countries. But we will also need the support of the local population.

So in my view, the numbers that count most are the number of Afghans we protect. As one villager told a visiting U.S. lawmaker recently, security is the mother of all progress.

SEC. GATES: Lara.

Q Thanks. A question for both of you. New polls show that public support for the war in Afghanistan is eroding. They're coming just as you prepare to go to Congress to ask for funding to fulfill General McChrystal's anticipated resource request. How concerned are you that the fading support will make it harder for those requests to be fulfilled, and how concerned are you both about this idea, that the war is slipping through the administration's fingers, is taking hold with Americans?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I don't believe that the war is slipping through the administration's fingers. And I think it's important -- first of all, the nation has been at war for eight years. The fact that Americans would be tired of having their sons and daughters at risk and in battle is not surprising.

I think what is important is for us to be able to show, over the months to come, that the president's strategy is succeeding. And that is what General McChrystal is putting in front of us, is how best we can, at least from the military's standpoint, ensure that we can show signs of progress along those lines.

But I think it is also -- there is always a difference between the perspective in terms of timing in this country, and certainly in this city, and what's going on in the country. And I think what's important to remember is, the president's decisions were only made at the -- on this strategy were only made at the very end of March.

Our new commander appeared on the scene in June. We still do not have all of the forces the president has authorized in Afghanistan yet, and we still do not have all the civilian surge that the president has authorized and insisted upon in Afghanistan yet.

So we are only now beginning to be in a position to have the assets in place that -- and the strategy or the military approach in place to begin to implement the strategy. And this is going to take some time.

By the same time (sic), no one is more aware than General McChrystal and certainly the two of us that there is a limited time for us to show that this approach is working, and certainly for the secretary of State and the president as well, because there is this broader element of the strategy that goes beyond the military.

But I would just say we are mindful of that. We understand the concerns on the part of many Americans in this area, and -- but we think that we now have the resources and the right approach to begin making some



headway in turning around a situation that, as many have indicated, has been deteriorating.

Q And the Chairman doesn't --

SEC. GATES: I'm sorry. Go --

ADM. MULLEN: The only thing I'd add to that is, this has been a mission that has not been well-resourced. It's been under-resourced almost since its inception, certainly in recent years. And it has -- and part of why it has gotten more serious and has deteriorated has been directly tied to that. President Obama has approved the troops, approved the civilians that, as the secretary indicated, are literally in many cases just arriving on scene.

I talked about a sense of urgency, and I do believe we have to start to turn this thing around from a security standpoint over the next 12 to 18 months.

I think the strategy's right. I -- we know how to do this. We've got a combat-hardened force that is terrific in counterinsurgency. And to listen to General McChrystal, he believes it's achievable, and I think we can succeed.

That said, it's complex. It's tough. We're losing people, as everybody knows. And yet that's the mission that the president has given us in the military, and it's the one that we are very fixed on carrying out.

Q And you don't feel that -- or you don't fear that Congress is going to -- how do you feel that Congress is going to respond to the resources request that may come?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I mean, that's not -- that -- I mean, Congress will respond, you know, as they see fit with respect to that. I'm very aware of the debate. You know, I'm in -- I'm raised -- I'm a Vietnam veteran. I'm raised in a country that actually cherishes that debate. That said, from the military perspective, again, we have a mission that we're doing the best we possibly can to carry out.

Q You have -- Secretary Gates, you've said repeatedly in the past that you're concerned about the size of our footprint in Afghanistan. But amongst -- in the middle of all this talk of urgency, of -- that we have to prove ourselves very quickly, are you changing your view on the size of that footprint as it becomes clear that General McChrystal's going to ask for more troops, perhaps as many as 25 --

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to speculate about what resources he's going to ask for. I would just point out that the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan has nearly doubled in the space of the last year. And I would say, giving due credit to our allies, the number of allied and partner troops has nearly doubled in the past year to 18 months. So there has been a significant increase, a major increase, just in the last few months.

I have expressed concern about the footprint. I have expressed concern, as the chairman referred to in his remarks, about impact on the force and other worldwide responsibilities. By the same token, I take seriously General McChrystal's point that the size of the imprint -- of the footprint depends -- is more -- is -- depends in significant measure on the nature of the footprint and the behavior of those troops and their attitudes and their interactions with the Afghans.

And if they interact with the Afghans, in a way that gives confidence to the Afghans that we're their partners and their allies, then the risks that I have been concerned about, about the footprint becoming too big and the Afghans seeing us in some role other than partners, I think, is mitigated.

But you know, I'm -- I'm very open to -- to -- to the recommendations and certainly the perspective of General McChrystal.

Yeah.

ADM. MULLEN: Can I just add a couple of thoughts on that?

One is that he -- General McChrystal has placed great emphasis on reducing civilian casualties. And they have been dramatically reduced. He's placed great emphasis on literally how we travel throughout the country, in terms of being mindful of those citizens that live there.

And -- and those kinds of things that he considers strategic vulnerabilities, to our ability to focus on the people and to partner, as the secretary has described; he's made those changes since he's arrived. And those were significant steps in the right direction.

Q Can you talk about how this will work, General McChrystal's request or report to you, for troops, and whether he wants a troop increase? Will you be presented with options? Because I think in the end, if General McChrystal says, I need more troops, how can you turn him down? Or just give us a sense of that and how this will be presented, in what way?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- I -- assuming that he makes some sort of a request, it would be my expectation that we would handle it very much as we have handled every other request for resources previously, in both Iran and Afghanistan, at least since I became secretary.

His recommendations or alternative courses of action would -- would follow the chain of command. They will go to General Petraeus, as the commander of Central Command, who will offer his view.

That will then be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the chairman. And they will evaluate it and add their point of view. And I will then add mine and provide that to the president.

There will be a discussion in the interagency and a debate about the pros and cons of various things.

And I would tell you -- and I'll just use -- I'll use the Iraq security situation as an example -- a lot happens in this dialogue up and down the chain of command.

And I really do invite the chairman to add in when I'm done here.

When General Odierno came in with his original timelines on what he -- where he felt the risk was acceptable to him, in terms of when we would end the combat -- the presence of combat units in Iraq -- there was a dialogue back and forth between General Odierno and General Petraeus and between him and the chiefs. And there emerged a consensus that we probably could take somewhat more risk than general Odierno originally had been comfortable with. So that's how we moved from General Odierno's original proposal of December 2010 to August of 2010.

I expect if there is a recommendation from General McChrystal, there will be the same kind of dialogue that we have had repeatedly with respect to Iraq, in the chain of command and then as it moves to the interagency.

ADM. MULLEN: We sat earlier this week -- I mean the chiefs and General Petraeus and General McChrystal -- to really have that kind of dialogue and for us to really understand it from his perspective. But at our level and at General Petraeus's level -- he's got a region. It's not just about Afghanistan. He's got -- we have lots of troops in Iraq, and there are challenges and tension between those two theaters in terms of troop distribution.

And then the chiefs have a global responsibility that certainly includes the health of the force.

And so, that doesn't mean that General McChrystal or General Petraeus don't consider that, but that's really our responsibility to focus on that and to weave that into the overall discussion, and then make a recommendation based on how we see where General McChrystal is and how we see the overall mission.

And certainly, it's going to include risks, and risks associated with various options, you know, if we get to that point. We're just not there yet. We really are trying to understand both the assessment and then there will be a resource piece of this which will follow.

Q Yes. Can I just follow up on the footprint that Elizabeth was talking about? One of them -- that was an argument that General Abizaid had originally in Iraq, and he's been widely criticized for that; that he didn't want a big footprint of American troops and didn't build up enough, or was worried about the footprint. Have you thought about that?

SEC. GATES: No, because, frankly, I wasn't here for that discussion. But I will say this. I think that --

Q (Off mike) -- take part in the Iraq war.

SEC. GATES: I think there is a real mistake -- I think it is a real mistake to -- to compare Iraq and Afghanistan, and I see that at lot. And I think that there are some -- there are real limits to analogies between the two, in a number of different ways. For example, Iraq has had a very strong central government for a very long time. That is not the case with Afghanistan. And that is a huge difference between the two.

So again, as I told Elizabeth, I think that the footprint issue can cut several different directions. I have been concerned about the size of it, and I would expect those concerns to be addressed. That's one of the things

that I asked -- when we were in Belgium, that I asked General McChrystal specifically to address.

Q Well, then, Mr. Secretary, specifically on Afghanistan, then, what is the genesis of your concern about the footprint?

SEC. GATES: History. And as a number of articles have pointed out, where foreign forces have had a large footprint and failed in no small part has been because the Afghans concluded they were there for their own imperial interests, and not there for the interests of the Afghan people.

So how the footprint fits into this, as General McChrystal suggested, I think also has to take into account how the Afghan people look at that presence. And if they -- and this has been my issue, something that I've worried about ever since I took this job -- first, that we weren't paying enough attention to Afghanistan, but second, that trying to figure out is there a -- is there a tipping point where the Afghans begin to see us as part of the problem -- a part of their problem rather than part of their solution?

I think that the way that the -- the approach that General McChrystal has taken in terms of civilian casualties and in terms of the way we -- our troops interact with the Afghans has given us a greater margin of error in that respect, because I think it does affect the way the Afghans look at our troops.

Q And if the new -- could I follow? And if the new mission is to protect the Afghan people, isn't that, by its very definition, very manpower-intensive?

ADM. MULLEN: It -- and it is actually General McChrystal's implementation of the new strategy that focuses so heavily on the people. And it is clearly a requirement to be distributed throughout the country, obviously, where the people are, and then the need, as we build up the Afghan security forces over time, certainly to hand that off to them.

But it is -- it is very direct, very face-to-face, and I think we understand that. He has made that literally job one for our forces since he's taken command.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Yeah.

Q I'd like to get your response to George Will's column, in which he says this week it's time for the U.S. to get out of Afghanistan. He says -- he writes, "America should do only what can be done from offshore using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small, potent special forces." He goes on to say we should just focus on the 1,500-mile border with Pakistan. Is it time to get out of Afghanistan, given your concerns about footprint? How do you respond to that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I have a lot of respect for Mr. Will, but in this case I do disagree with him. I absolutely do not think it is time to get out of Afghanistan. And I think that the notion that you can conduct a purely counterterrorist kind of campaign and do it from a distance simply does not accord with reality.

The reality is that even if you want to focus on counterterrorism, you cannot do that successfully without local law enforcement, without internal security, without intelligence. And the way -- and General McChrystal probably knows more about counterterrorism than anybody in or out of uniform, and the way he has been so successful has been an iterative process in which we have killed or captured terrorists, exploited on the ground what we found and then used that for the next target.

The notion that you can somehow have a campaign that focuses solely on the border and has no interaction with local Afghans along that border or elsewhere in the country, for that matter, or assume that the status quo in Afghanistan would not -- that there cannot be a status quo in Kabul, that if you just walk away, that the situation there won't deteriorate, I think is unrealistic.

ADM. MULLEN: The only thing I'd say about the -- that kind of approach is, there's no way to defeat al Qaeda, which is the mission, with just that approach. You can't do it remotely, and you can't do it from offshore, for some of the reasons that the secretary laid out.

And so again, I certainly don't think it's time to leave. We've got new leadership, new strategy, resources moving in. And I think this approach has great potential, but it's going to take some time to start to turn this.

Q And just to follow up, the -- you talk about General McChrystal's concern about how U.S. forces are

perceived by the Afghans.

In light of the revelations of what was occurring at the U.S. embassy with this guard group that was having parties -- photographs have now come out showing behavior that would be offensive to most Muslims -- what do you think should be done about that situation at the embassy?

SEC. GATES: Well, I won't -- I don't think we have the information to be able to say what ought to be done. But if those allegations are true, those activities are not just offensive to Afghans and Muslims; they're offensive to us and inexcusable.

Tony.

Q Can I get your reaction to remarks yesterday by the Russian ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin? He suggested that Russia wants to be in the planning strategy of Afghanistan. What's your reaction to that, given the history of Russia in Afghanistan -- or the then-Soviet Union in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- first of all, I think the Russians have a very clear interest in the success of our endeavor in Afghanistan. They're very worried not only about violent extremists but also the flow of narcotics into Russia coming out of Afghanistan.

The Russians have been cooperative and helpful, in terms of our northern distribution network. And we welcome that.

And -- and I think that both on a bilateral basis and through the U.S. -- through the NATO-Russia Council, there -- there are ample opportunities for a dialogue and learning from one another.

Q What about the ghost of history there, their invasion and obviously the sour note they left with the world in Afghanistan? Might that come back to haunt any Russian participation?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I think whatever Russia's role on the ground, in Afghanistan, might be really is up to -- up to the Afghan government.

Yeah.

Q I wanted to follow up on polling concerns, about perhaps falling public support and mounting concerns on the Hill. One of the reasons that's cited for that, as you'll well know, is not just casualties but that there's still not a strong sense, among the American people, of what the mission there is.

The president has defined it. But I wonder whether you all could speak to that and also whether General McChrystal's report this week shed any new light, in terms of what exactly the military needs to achieve in the next 12 to 18 --

SEC. GATES: Let me address that and then invite the admiral. I think that it's important to -- to keep our perspective. The fact is that 9/11 represented the first foreign-based attack on the Continental United States, with significant casualties, since the War of 1812.

That attack emanated from Afghanistan under Taliban rule. The Taliban did not just provide a safe haven for al Qaeda. They actively cooperated and collaborated with al Qaeda. They provided a worldwide base of operations for al Qaeda.

So it seems to me that we're in Afghanistan less for nation- building than we are in giving the Afghan state the capacity to oppose these -- to oppose al Qaeda, to oppose the use of their territory by other violent extremists, and for them to have that capacity that can be sustained over a period of time.

The reality is, terrorists lurk in a number of countries. But the problem is manageable, because the governments of most countries are opposed to their activities and have the intelligence, law enforcement and internal security capabilities to sustain that opposition and to be effective.

It seems to me that in the context of the president's goal of disrupting, dismantling and destroying al Qaeda, we seek an Afghanistan that is our partner in that endeavor and that can sustain that endeavor after we're gone.

ADM. MULLEN: My only comment is that the intelligence continues to support that al Qaeda and its

extremist affiliates, one of whom are the Taliban, very specifically still target this country, our people, as well as other Western countries. That has not abated and it is not going to go away, based on anything that I've seen. And what the secretary has described is they thrive in ungoverned spaces.

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Q During the Iraq debate, General Petraeus had been very effective and very public in testifying on the Hill, alongside Ambassador Crocker, writing op-eds, being a public face for the war. Two questions.

One, Mr. Secretary, do you think the administration needs to do more publicly to clarify what the message is and to keep kind of reminding skeptical voters by upholding the importance of the war?

And Mr. Chairman, do you have any plans currently for General McChrystal or others from that command to come back to the U.S., testify and try to serve as a public surrogate in the way that General Petraeus did during the surge debate?

SEC. GATES: First of all, I think that the president's message in his speech at the VFW was crystal clear about what we're doing and what we're about. I think that, clearly, press opportunities like this and other opportunities for us to talk about this and why we're in Afghanistan and why it's important are important.

I think, you know, all you have to do is look at the front page of any newspaper or turn on the television to see that Afghanistan right now, at least as far as the media and the government are concerned, are at the forefront. There are a lot of people out there talking about this and debating the issue already in terms of the way forward. And I think -- I think that -- I think there is clarity in terms of our strategy. I think -- I think the president has described it. I think I just described it. And we will continue this effort as we go forward.

Last question.

Q Ambassador Holbrooke has said that progress -- asked what progress would be in Afghanistan, he said, "Well, we'll know it when we see it." Can both of you address more specifically, how do you measure progress on this goal of defeating or dismantling al Qaeda?

And as a part of that, is denying a safe haven in Pakistan part of this mission as well, or removing the safe haven that some would say is thriving there now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, one of the most significant new elements of the president's strategy that he announced at the end of March was in fact recognition that this is a regional concern, a regional problem. And the chairman has spoken often about the Pakistani part of this. And he mentioned earlier in this -- in this press availability that this is a piece that is independent, really, of -- that this is not part of General McChrystal's writ, if you will, but it is certainly an integral part of the president's overall strategy and our integrated civilian-military approach. So I think that -- I think we do take that into account.

ADM. MULLEN: And I mean --

Q Are we making progress?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, the administration has developed -- let me answer that in two ways. The administration has developed measures of effectiveness. Those have been shared with staff on the Hill. They will be shared with members, when the members come back next week. The deadline to have those completed is, I think, September 24th. And those -- and my view has been, and I assume that it's the case, that those that are unclassified will be made public.

So one of the things -- and we have -- we started this ourselves; this is not something imposed by the Congress. This is something so we can evaluate how we think we're doing and not keep rolling our goals in front of us, but in fact try and genuinely measure whether we're -- whether our approach is making headway or not. And I think that that's a very important thing.

But I think -- I think that in this one respect there is a comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is, success is the Afghan national security forces assuming a greater and greater role in controlling and protecting the -- their own territory as we recede into an advisory capacity and ultimately withdraw.

ADM. MULLEN: I would only ask to specifically -- or say specifically with respect to the safe haven, the current safe haven in Pakistan, I think the way we get at that is through a growing and sustained and trusted partnership with Pakistan.

And one of the ways I measure progress is if I look at Pakistan over the last 12 months and the success of their Frontier Corps, the success of their military in terms of its operations in Swat and the movement in that direction to address the extremists in their own country, and that kind of continuing pressure that eventually will provide security for their own people so that, in fact, their own people -- who now protect al Qaeda -- turn them out, and that applied -- sort of almost a pincer approach with pressure from the Afghanistan side. And that's going to take some time to create that.

But I think strategically we know how to get that done.

Q Thank you.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates      September 04, 2009

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Secretary Gates Interview with Al Jazeera at the Pentagon

Q      Mr. Secretary, on behalf of Al Jazeera network, we're absolutely delighted to be here in the Pentagon doing this interview with you. Thank you for your time.

There are obviously as you know rumblings of discontent, among Americans, about what's going on in Afghanistan. How much is that of a concern to you personally as the secretary of Defense?

SEC. GATES: Americans know that our country has been at war for a number of years, ever since we were attacked in 2001. And obviously we've lost a lot of our young men and women in combat, not to mention the casualties in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11th.

And so there is a certain war-weariness on the part of the American people. But by the same token, I believe that they and members of our Congress vividly remember that it was from Afghanistan that the attack on us was launched and that the Taliban did not just provide a safe haven for al Qaeda but actively cooperated with them, colluded with them and provided them with a worldwide base of operations.

And so I think the American people know that we have to work with the Afghan government and the Afghan people so that they can establish control over their own territory and prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for al Qaeda in the future.

I mean, the reality is also that al Qaeda has killed many more Muslims than it has Americans and Europeans and others. And so this is a -- this is a challenge we all face, and I -- I'm confident that the American people will sustain their commitment to help the Afghan people.

Q      Obviously, I'd like to come back to the issue of al Qaeda and 9/11 and Afghanistan. But before I move on to ask you about that, there are Americans on both the left and the right, and there are people outside the United States, who look at what's going on in Afghanistan and they conclude that the United States is in a bit of a pickle in Afghanistan. How much of a pickle do you think the United States is in in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: I think the picture is mixed. It's clear that the Taliban have had success in reinfiltrating back into the country. They have intimidated a lot of Afghans. And so we and our allies and the Afghan security forces clearly have our work cut out for us. It -- the situation is serious. But General McChrystal and, I must say, the Afghan defense minister, Minister Wardak, both have told me that they believe that we can be successful.

Q Now, on the issue of the difficulty that the United States is facing in Afghanistan, recently there's been the incident in Kunduz where 90 people were killed.

And there are reports that the 90 people included civilians. That has been a constant theme in the trouble that the United States military has been having in Afghanistan -- the killing of civilians in that country. How much of a real problem is that for the U.S. military at this particular point in time in terms of the strategy that the president, President Obama, would like to see implemented there?

SEC. GATES: I think it's a real problem, and General McChrystal believes it's a real problem.

Clearly we regret any loss of innocent life in Afghanistan, and I've addressed this issue while in Afghanistan, as well as here in the United States. And one of the central themes of General McChrystal's new approach in Afghanistan is significant change in our tactical approach to try and minimize the number of innocent civilians who are killed. So he has changed the rules in terms of the use of airpower. He has changed the rules we are -- he has issued a tactical directive that our convoys obey Afghan traffic laws and in fact that our troops take some additional risk to avoid -- to themselves to avoid innocent Afghan casualties.

Part of the challenge here is that the Taliban actively target innocent civilians, and they also create circumstances where they mingle among innocent civilians and they make it very difficult. And they are willing to put the innocent civilians at risk and -- but we are trying to figure out new tactics that minimize this. But it is a challenge.

The -- central to the success of the 42 nations that are trying to help the Afghan people and government at this point is that the Afghan people continue to believe that we are their friends, we are their partners, and we are there to help them. And so civilian casualties are a problem for us, and we are doing everything conceivable to try and avoid them.

Q Now when you say that the Afghan people continue to think of the U.S. military as their friends in Afghanistan, the flip side of the coin is that there has been increasing support among the Afghans for the Taliban.

And that has enabled the Taliban to make a lot of the gains that we hear about, military gains, including a marked improvement in the tactics they use against the U.S. military.

Now you're saying that the Afghan people continue to support the United States.

SEC. GATES: I think that -- I think based on the latest polling that we have nationwide, in Afghanistan, fewer than 10 percent of the people support the Taliban. The Taliban's approach is one principally of intimidation of villagers and others. And the Afghans don't want to live under those circumstances.

They don't want to live under the Taliban rule again. And while they may not -- while they may not actively support the United States, neither do they support the Taliban. What -- you asked me earlier about the Americans being -- growing weary of the war.

The Afghan people have been at war for over 30 years. And what they want is peace and security. And over time, we and all of the international community with us, along with the Afghan security forces, are in a position to try and bring that to them.

Q Talking of 30 years of war in Afghanistan, the Afghans are renowned for being very hostile to foreign powers being in Afghanistan. We've seen that with the British, saw it with the Soviets. And to some extent, we are seeing it with the U.S.

Given all the things that you say the United States is doing, to explain to the Afghans that the United States military is there to help them, do you think that holds water in the eyes of the majority of Afghans, knowing their historical rejection of foreign powers in their country?

SEC. GATES: I think that the historical rejection of foreign powers has been because the Afghan people have come to see those powers, whether it's Britain or the Soviet Union or anyone else, as being there for their own imperial interests rather than being there in the interests of the Afghan people.

We have no interest in a permanent presence in Afghanistan. We have no interest in bases in Afghanistan. What our principal interest is in, is in giving Afghanistan the capacity to protect its own people and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a center of violent extremists again. And then we'll leave.

And I think that's an important message from us to the Afghan people. We want to give them the capacity to protect their own security and -- as well as the security of other nations around the world from threats emanating from Afghanistan. And then we'll be gone.

Q Sir, if I may right there take you on a bit of a tangent, when President Barack Obama says that the war in Afghanistan is a war of necessity as opposed to the war in Iraq, which he describes as a war of choice -- now, when he said he had to prosecute this war in Afghanistan, did he -- and I want your personal assessment here -- did he say it because he knew that it is a -- it could be a winnable situation? Or does he say that it's a war of necessity because if he said otherwise, and he had talked about



exiting from Afghanistan, people on the right, especially in this country, will say President Obama does not actually have what it takes to look after the concerns -1073 national-security concerns of America and Americans?

SEC. GATES: I don't believe that President Obama would have made the commitment he has made if he did not believe that we could achieve our objectives in Afghanistan, which, as I have described, are giving them the capacity to secure their own territory and prevent al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan. If he didn't think we could achieve those objectives, I don't think he would have committed the forces -- the additional forces that he has or made the strong statements in support of the strategy as he did just a few weeks ago.

Q So you think the war in Afghanistan is winnable, given that Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it's achievable.

SEC. GATES: I don't like to speak in terms of winning or losing. I think we need to speak in terms of achieving our objectives. And this is not just about the United States; it's about the Afghan government and the Afghan people.

It's about dozens of nations and nongovernmental organizations that are in Afghanistan that all share the same objectives that I've just described, which is to bring peace and security to the Afghan people and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for violent extremists. So I think that those objectives are achievable, and I think that's the way we ought to think about it.

Q Now, there's a debate which, obviously, you're very aware of here in the United States, and the outside world is following it very closely, especially in Afghanistan and the rest of the Muslim world. And this debate is about the level of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Some people are saying, well, to secure the gains that the United States makes in Afghanistan, the troop level needs to be increased. But others say, well, the more you increase the level of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the more targets the Taliban have in terms of their tactics to drive the United States out of Afghanistan.

SEC. GATES: Well, there are arguments, obviously, on both sides of this issue. We are not yet beginning to think about significant additional troops in Afghanistan. The next step for us is to evaluate General McChrystal's assessment of the situation that he has found and the way he intends to implement the president's strategy going forward. And once we've done that, then we will look at the question of whether additional resources are needed to achieve those objectives.

I have been concerned about -- I've had a number of reservations about significant additional U.S. troops. One of those is, as we were just talking about, whether our forces come to be seen by the Afghans at some point as occupiers rather than as partners.

General McChrystal's point, which I think has great validity, is, it's really how those forces are used and how they interact with the Afghan people that determines how they are seen by the Afghans. And I think that the approach that he has taken in terms of partnering with the Afghans, and interacting with the Afghan people and supporting them, mitigates the concern that I had.

There are issues on both sides of it, and frankly, I haven't made up my own mind at this point in terms of whether I think more forces are needed.

But as far as you're concerned -- and I'm just trying to make sure that I've got it right -- as far as you're concerned, what -- basically saying is that any thinking of withdrawing the U.S. military from Afghanistan -- even thinking about it, at this particular point in time, is absolutely out of the question.

SEC. GATES: That's my view.

Q Now, this takes me back to your original point about 9/11; 9/11 happened, President Bush at that time made the decision to go to war in Afghanistan, which he did. And then subsequently he made the decision to actually go to Iraq, opening himself to criticism that he diverted attention, crucial attention, from Afghanistan to Iraq. And yet now we hear President Obama saying that it is a war of necessity.

A lot of people would argue it was a war of necessity then, but having moved away from it to come back to it is a war of choice.

SEC. GATES: It is a matter of -- first of all, this gets very much tied up into U.S. politics and into the controversies that are associated with the war in Iraq and so on. I think that success in achieving our objectives in Afghanistan has been a consistent theme since 2002 for both the Bush administration and for the Obama administration. I think President Obama would say, as you suggested, that our attention was diverted by Iraq, and now it is important to focus again on the situation in Afghanistan.

The truth is, the situation in Afghanistan has changed, and it really began to change in 2005 and early 2006, frankly, when agreements were reached on the Pakistani side of the border that essentially relieved the pressure from the Pakistan side on the Taliban, who were then in Pakistan. And so we have seen a steady increase in violence that really began in late 2005 and early 2006. And the Taliban have gotten better and better over that time.

You also now have alliances of convenience between the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his group and al Qaeda. So it's now a much more complex situation than it was perhaps in 2002.

But in terms of the determination, to deal with this problem and to partner with the Afghans, in achieving these objectives, the president is absolutely firm.

Q But when you say the situation is much more complex, to what extent is that synonymous with saying, we U.S. politicians missed the bandwagon?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- the way I would phrase it and the way we have

phrased it is that we did not provide the resources in Afghanistan early enough to stem the change in the situation in 2005 and 2006. And we have to speak frankly. Because of the troop commitments in Iraq, we didn't have the resources to move in reinforcements, if you will, as the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate. 1075

When I first arrived in this job, I extended one brigade in Afghanistan, in January of 2007, and added another brigade later in the spring of 2007. But that was really about all the resources that we had at that time. As we have drawn down in Iraq, more capability has become available.

Q Sir, in the time left in this segment, I would like to ask you about the shenanigans with the AP over the publication of the picture of the dead U.S. Marine.

That puts you in a difficult position, to accuse a U.S. official of infringing or violating freedom of expression, doesn't it?

SEC. GATES: I -- I have -- in the letter that I sent, to the head of the Associated Press, I said this is not a matter of law, this is not a matter of policy, there's not a constitutional issue. This is a question of judgment and common decency and out of respect for the family.

What I asked was that they defer to the wishes of the family that these -- that these pictures of their maimed and stricken child not be provided to newspapers all over the United States. They chose to go ahead and do it anyway.

Q And you're concerned that this may have been interpreted as an infringement on freedom of the --

SEC. GATES: No, I don't think -- I've -- there's no question -- there's no issue of infringement of the freedom of the press whatsoever. I was asking them -- I didn't pressure them. I didn't threaten them. All I did was ask them. In fact, the words that I used with the head of the Associated Press was that I beg you to defer to the wishes of the father of this Marine. That's all I ask. That's not an infringement of the freedom of the press. That's an appeal to common decency.

Q Sir, I'd like to take a short break. When we come back, we'll talk about Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, and possibly other topics later in the show. (Makes remarks in Arabic.)

(Break.)

Q (Makes remarks in Arabic.)

(In English.) Mr. Gates, welcome back to the show. I would like to get you to talk a little bit on -- or about Pakistan. George Will, as you know, wrote about

Pakistan, saying that it is the country that really matters. What do you make of that, and given that the implications are that Afghanistan does not really matter and the U.S. should get out of Afghanistan? 1076

SEC. GATES: Pakistan is very important. It is important intrinsically to the United States. We have been a friend of Pakistan's for a long time and an ally of Pakistan's, and we've had a very close relationship. And we look forward to building that relationship going forward, completely independent of Afghanistan.

I think one of the new aspects of the president's strategy with respect to Afghanistan is the recognition that the problem we face there -- we and the Afghans -- is a regional problem. And as we've seen in recent months, it is a problem that the Pakistani government faces.

And so I think Pakistan clearly is important. It is important in its own right to the United States as a friend and ally. But it is also important in terms of violent extremists that cross back and forth across that border and put both the government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan at risk.

Q Now, given the difficulties that the Pakistani civilian governments, successive civilian governments, have had, how dependable from the U.S. point of view do you think is the current civilian government in Pakistan, in terms of being able to deal not only with the volatility of Pakistan but with the regional volatility?

Afghanistan is one example. India is the other example.

SEC. GATES: I think if you look back 15 or 16 months, the Pakistani government has performed admirably. No one, I think, would have predicted the political consensus that has emerged in Pakistan, in terms of the effort to take on these violent extremists in the North West Frontier Province, in the FATA and in that area.

I think people would not have predicted the success of the Pakistani army. I think people would not have predicted the success in Pakistan -- Pakistanis -- the Pakistani government's effective dealing with internally displaced persons, as a result of military operations, and how many of them have returned to Swat, and how effective the Pakistani government has been in this respect.

So all of that is simply to say, I believe that the Pakistani government, both the civilian side and the military side, have performed better than almost anyone's expectations, in the region or in this country or elsewhere. And we are very impressed by that. And we are prepared to be helpful, to help the Pakistanis, in any way we can.

Q Now, given the serious misgivings that the United States had in the past, about the role of Pakistani intelligence, in terms of dealing with the Taliban, there were accusations to Pakistani intelligence at that time that they were actually lending a hand of support to the Taliban.

Are you 100 percent satisfied now that that has stopped and that you, the Pakistani military and the Pakistani civilian government are all in the same trench working for the same goal? 1077

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I believe we are in the same trench working for the same goal. I think you have to go back a little bit in history. I was very much involved in the American effort 20, 25 years ago in cooperation with Pakistan to support the mujahedeen in Afghanistan when they were fighting against the Soviet Union.

One of the vehicles that we used in that effort was the connection between the Pakistani intelligence services and the various mujahedeen groups within Afghanistan. So these relationships with these different groups in Afghanistan and with the Pakistanis go back a long way and at that time were very productive and were very useful.

My own view is that the connections were maintained largely as a hedge, because the Pakistanis are very concerned about the stability of that border area and about the stability of Afghanistan, and they want -- and they weren't sure whether we would continue our efforts in Afghanistan. So I believe we are on the same page; I believe we're working for the same goals. I have a lot of confidence in the Pakistanis.

Q Now, basically, what you're saying -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- the implication of what you're saying is that the United States will not do again what it did after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which is to cut loose and leave, leaving the regional players to fend for themselves, undermining the credibility of the United States in that part of Asia.

SEC. GATES: I think that's absolutely right. I think that -- and I have to say, I was in the American government at the time we did that, and it was a serious strategic mistake. As soon as the Soviets left Afghanistan, we turned our backs on Afghanistan, and we did not cultivate our relationship with the Pakistanis properly. And so I think we gave rise to doubts in the region about whether we are prepared to stay there and be their partner on a continuing basis. And I believe we have learned our lesson and that both Afghanistan and Pakistan can count on us for the long term.

Q And in terms of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, you are absolutely, categorically sure that there is no risk that they may fall into the wrong hands, given the pressures that the Taliban in Afghanistan are exerting not just on the Pakistanis but also on the United States in Pakistan?

SEC. GATES: I'm quite comfortable that the security arrangements for the Pakistani nuclear capabilities are sufficient and adequate.

Q What sort of guarantees do you have to cover that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I would say it's based both on our own understanding of the security arrangements that the Pakistanis have for their weapons and their capabilities in their laboratories and so on, but also the assurances that we have been given by the Pakistanis.

Q Were you baffled by the -- President Obama's envoy, Richard Holbrooke, when he was asked about progress and how he would measure progress and he said, "We'll know it when we see it"?

SEC. GATES: I probably would have answered the question differently.

Q How would you have answered it?

SEC. GATES: I would have answered it: I believe that success or progress will be as -- when we see the Afghan national security forces, the army and the police, assuming a greater and greater role in protecting the -- in security operations protecting Afghanistan and the Afghan people, so that we can recede first into an advisory role and then leave altogether.

So in a way it's somewhat comparable to the situation in Iraq, where we have -- where our role has become less and less prominent, where the Iraqis have taken a more and more prominent role in protecting their own security. And I think that that's how we will measure -- be able to measure -- one way we will be able to measure success in Afghanistan is as we see the Afghan security forces taking a more and more prominent and leading role in protecting their own security.

Q Well, I'm glad you given me a very smooth transition into Iraq, because I would like to talk about Iraq for a little while. The latest press conference that you gave together with Admiral Mike Mullen, you talked about the analogies that people that often make between Afghanistan and Iraq. And you said that those analogies are very often misplaced. They're wrong, you said.

But you said there's one fundamental similarity between Iraq and Afghanistan and -- I'm sorry. You said -- let me take that again. You said the analogies are often wrong, and the fundamental difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in Iraq, there has been a strong central government; in Afghanistan, you said, there's never been a strong central government.

And in terms of fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan, that's obviously making your goal a lot more difficult. How satisfied -- that the Iraqi central government, led by Nouri Maliki, at the present time, can hold the country together after you leave?

SEC. GATES: I think we have real confidence that they can do that. And I think the best evidence that this sense of Iraqi nationalism has returned is that al Qaeda has made very strong efforts in recent weeks and months to try and provoke a renewal of the sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shi'a in Iraq. And what has -- through suicide bombers.

And what has been interesting and encouraging is that they have failed in that effort. The Shi'a understand this is al Qaeda trying to provoke that kind of a conflict, and they're having none of it. And so there has not been a renewal of the sectarian violence.

Our generals have very high regard for the Iraqi army and increasingly the Iraqi police. And I think we would not have felt comfortable agreeing to the arrangements that we have to pull out of Iraqi cities to put a deadline on the withdrawal of American combat troops if we didn't have confidence in the Iraqis. And I think General Odierno would say they have developed better and faster than he would have anticipated.

And so we are very encouraged by developments in Iraq with respect to the security situation, despite these suicide bombings that we think are mostly the fault or the efforts of al Qaeda.

Q Well, a lot of the people in the region will look at Iraq, post-2003, now that you say that al Qaeda was -- has been trying to stoke up sectarian strife in Iraq -- a lot of people in the region will look at 2003 and what the United States did post-2003 in Iraq and they say, "Well, actually, that was the engine of sectarian strife in Iraq in the first place."

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm -- I wasn't in government at the time, and I am no expert on Iraq before I came into government. I wouldn't pretend to be an expert now either, but --

Q But would you say the U.S. -- getting out of Iraq would necessarily put an end to sectarian strife or help put an end to sectarian strife in Iraq? Or would it actually increase the prospects of sectarian strife there?

SEC. GATES: I think that what we have already seen in Iraq, despite the provocations by al Qaeda, that Iraqis are ready to move beyond the violence of the last several years and to grow their economy and to have peace. I think that's why you have not seen a renewed sectarian violence, and that's why we are comfortable with the arrangements in which we have withdrawn from the cities and in which we will withdraw all of our combat troops by the end of August next year. We are very comfortable with that, and that means we do not believe there will be a renewal of the sectarian violence with our departure.

Q And after you leave, my understanding is that President Obama pledged that the United States will not build any permanent military bases in Iraq. Is that pledge -- does that pledge still stand?

SEC. GATES: Absolutely.

Q Now, how do you define permanent? Because bases in Germany, they've been there for about 60 years now; in Korea for a similar period of time. How do you define permanent? How do you define temporary?

SEC. GATES: Temporary is based on the fact that another part of this agreement is that all U.S. forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011.

That is the agreement that we have with the Iraqi government. All U.S. forces. No bases. No forces. That's the --

Q Unless the Iraqis ask you to stay longer.

SEC. GATES: Unless there is some new agreement or some new negotiation, which would clearly be on Iraqi terms. But we will not have any permanent bases in Iraq. We have no interest in permanent bases in Iraq. And we are now planning on withdrawing all American military forces by the end of 2011.

Q Sir, I would like to take another break, with your permission. When we come back, I would like to talk about Iran, among other things. (Makes remarks in Arabic.)

(Break.)

Q (Makes remarks in Arabic.) Mr. Gates, welcome yet again to the show. We left off the previous segment talking about Iraq. And I wanted to put it to you that a lot of people, including some of your closet allies in the Gulf, think that really, come to think of it, at the end of the day, the real winner after the invasion of 2003 is Iran. And you have a big problem with Iran, if you listen to all politicians here in Washington.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think Iran has been a challenge for the United States and for the international community, for that matter, for 30 years.

I think that a strong and democratic Iraq and particularly one with a multi-sectarian government becomes a barrier to Iranian influence, not a bridge for it.

And so I think in the short term, perhaps Iran's position was strengthened somewhat. But I think if you look to the longer term and the role that Iraq can play in the region going forward, I think that Iran's position may well be diminished.

Q But a lot of people feel that you took out one fundamental bastion against Iranian influence, in the region, and that is the regime of Saddam Hussein. You changed the political configuration in the country, bringing a Shi'a government to power.

Everybody knows that there are Iraqi politicians in the Iraqi government who are very close to Iran or have some sort of sensibility that makes them close to the government of Iran.

How is that going to be a bastion against Iranian influence, even in the long term?



SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, we've seen, over the past year or so, a genuine assertion of Iraqi nationalism, from Prime Minister Maliki and from other leaders inside -- inside Iraq.

I have no doubt at the end of the day that the leaders in Iraq are first and foremost Iraqis. After all, none of them have forgotten the eight-year war that they fought with Saddam Hussein. And they haven't forgotten that Saddam Hussein started that war.

So I think -- I think that by all accounts that we can see and the actions that we have seen the government of Iraq take, including -- for example, Prime Minister Maliki's offensive in the Basra area, over a year ago, made clear that they are most concerned with maintaining Iraqi sovereignty.

If the United States has learned anything in the last year and as we've negotiated the Strategic Framework Agreement with the Iraqis, it is that the Iraqis are very sensitive about their sovereignty and, as with almost any other country, are not going to tolerate other countries trying to interfere in their internal affairs.

Q Well, Mr. Secretary, let's assume for a minute that in the short term or even immediate -- medium term, that the Iranians have strengthened their hand in Iran and -- in Iraq, and that that's going to change. The nuclear issue -- Iran's nuclear issue -- hasn't Iran being able to increase its influence in neighboring Iraq strengthened its hand in dealing with the West over its nuclear program?

SEC. GATES: No, I don't agree with that. I think that the situation in Iraq has little bearing on Iran and its nuclear program.

Q Can you, for example, in the case of the Israelis, resort to military actions, as they seem to be itching to do -- military action against Iranian nuclear facilities -- can you guarantee that the Iranians will not use Iraq to retaliate against the United States, for example?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to address hypothetical situations. I mean, our view is that there is still an opportunity for diplomacy and political and economic pressures to bring about a change of policy in Iran. So getting into hypotheticals about military action, I think, doesn't take us very far. And I'm confident that we still have some opportunities in that area.

Q Okay. I'll move away from the hypothetical. Now, if you say you still have some time to maneuver in that area, to what extent are you reading from the same hymn page as the Israelis in terms of saying that you still have some time to maneuver in that area?

SEC. GATES: Every country looks at a given situation through the lens of its own security. Our view, and the view that we have shared, I might say, strongly with

all of our friends and allies, in the region as well as elsewhere, is that the way to deal with the Iranian nuclear program at this point is through diplomatic and economic efforts. 1082

Q Sir, the issue of Iran and Israel has obviously and is rattling a lot of countries in the region. The Israelis, the gulf states, at least the governments who seem to be thinking more and more about buying more and more weapons.

And indeed there have been some sales authorized by the United States government. Some estimates for example put the weapons packages, to the gulf states and Israel, at about \$100 billion.

How much substance is there to that?

SEC. GATES: Well, that figure sounds very high to me.

But I think -- I think there's a central question or a central point here to be made. And it has to do with both our friends and allies in the region, our Arab friends and allies, as well as the Iranian nuclear program. And that is, one of the pathways to getting the Iranians to change their approach, on the nuclear issue, is to persuade them that moving down that path will actually jeopardize their security, not enhance it.

And so the more that our Arab friends and allies can strengthen their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their cooperation both with each other and with us, I think, sends the signal to the Iranians that this path that they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it.

And so that's one of the reasons why I think our relationship with these countries and our security cooperation with them is so important.

Q Now, I mentioned \$100 billion. And you said that that doesn't sound right. What sounds right to you as a figure?

SEC. GATES: I honestly don't know.

Q But there are a lot of weapons being asked for by countries in the region.

SEC. GATES: We have a very broad foreign military sales program and obviously with most of our friends and allies out there. But the arrangements that are being negotiated right now; I just honestly don't know the cumulative total.

Q Okay.

Now, you're asking the Iranians, and this is the feeling of people in the region, not necessarily governments, but you're asking the Iranians to give up their intentions to build nuclear weapons.

They are saying they're not trying to build nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a lot of people in the region feel that you know that the Israelis do have nuclear weapons, and they say: Why doesn't the West start with Israel, who is known for sure to hold and to possess nuclear weapons, rather than with the Iranians, who are suspected of having these nuclear weapons?

What do you say to that argument?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, it's the Iranian leadership that has said that they want to wipe Israel off the face of the Earth. Those threats have not been made in the other direction. It is the Iranian government that is in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions with respect to these programs. And so the focus needs to be on the country that is thwarting the will of the international community and the United Nations.

Q But the -- you've decided that the rhetoric of the Iranians reflects the reality of what's going on in Iran in terms of this nuclear weapon. Isn't that a leap of faith?

SEC. GATES: Well, we obviously have information in terms of what the Iranians are doing. We also have what the Iranians themselves have said. So we only are taking them at their word.

Q So you know for sure that they are working on a nuclear bomb.

SEC. GATES: I won't go that far. But clearly they have elements of their nuclear program that are in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. We want them to adhere to those resolutions.

And we are willing to acknowledge the right of the Iranian government, the Iranian people to have a peaceful nuclear program if it's intended for the production of electric power and so on. And what is central, then, is trying to persuade the Iranians to agree to that and then to verification procedures under the IAEA that gives us confidence that it is indeed a peaceful nuclear program and not a weaponization program.

The truth of the matter is, if Iran proceeds with a nuclear weapons program, it may well spark an arms race, a real arms race, and potentially a nuclear arms race in the entire region, so it's in the interest of all countries for Iran to agree to arrangements that allow a peaceful nuclear program and give the international community confidence that that's all they're doing.

Q But the Obama administration seems to have a difficult circle square, because on the one hand, they're saying that they want improved relations with the Muslim world. On the other hand, any pressure on Iran is seen by people in the Muslim world -- and again, I put the emphasis on people, not necessarily the governments -- that the U.S. is not actually genuine in wanting to improve those relations, because they say Israel has nuclear weapons and the U.S. is not doing anything about it.

SEC. GATES: The focus is on which country is in violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. The pressure on Iran is simply to be a good member of the international community. It's -- the neighbors around Iran, our Arab friends and allies, are concerned about what is going on in Iran, and not just the governments. And so the question is, how does Iran become a member in good standing of the international community? That's in the interests of everybody.

Q Sir, I've run out of time, but there's one last issue that I would like to raise with you, with your permission, and that is the relations between the United States and Latin America. As you know, there's been a lot of angry noises coming out of Latin America over the issue of U.S. bases in Colombia. How much of a problem is the issue of U.S. bases in Colombia to the United States and to its relations with Latin America?

SEC. GATES: I think it's an issue that's being exploited by certain governments down there, such as the Venezuelan government. I think, for most of the continent, it's not a problem.

These are not American bases. This is a cooperative arrangement negotiated with the government of Colombia for counter-narcotics purposes. That's all it is, nothing more. No permanent U.S. base -- no U.S. base at all -- but our use of Colombian facilities in cooperation with the Colombians in the counter-narcotics arena.

Q But doesn't it concern you that even somebody like President Lula of Brazil, who is not exactly renowned for being over-vocal in his criticism of the United States, has actually been quite vocal recently in terms of criticizing what is described by President Chavez, for example, of Venezuela, as you said, as belligerent intentions on the part of the United States in Latin America?

SEC. GATES: Well, there clearly are not belligerent intentions on the part of the United States. And I believe that when the other governments that are concerned in Latin -- that may be concerned in South America fully understand the nature of the cooperation agreement with the Colombians, they will understand that this is a very limited arrangement, tightly focused on counternarcotics.

Q Mr. Gates, thank you so very much. There were a lot of other topics that we would have liked to raise with you. We ran out of time. We're extremely grateful for the time that you've given us. Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.

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## **Interview: Robert Gates**

*Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, says bringing peace and security to Afghanistan and Iraq represents a major challenge, but one that the US is committed to achieving.*

In a wide-ranging interview with Al Jazeera's Abderrahim Foukara, Gates spoke about: the US strategy for peace in Afghanistan facing a "war of necessity", the divide between two wars, fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq, Pakistan's role in the region, the "threat" of a nuclear Iran, maintaining allies in the Middle East, and US ties with Latin America.

### **Strategy for peace in Afghanistan**

**There are rumblings of discontent with the war in Afghanistan among many Americans. Is that cause for concern to you personally as secretary of defence?**

Americans know that our country has been at war for a number of years ever since we were attacked in 2001.

Obviously we've lost a lot of our young men and women in combat, not to mention the casualties in New York and Washington and Pennsylvania on September 11.

And so there is a sort of war awareness on the part of the American people.

By the same token, I believe that they and members of our congress vividly remember that it was from Afghanistan that the attack was launched.

And that the Taliban did not just provide a safe haven for al-Qaeda, but actively co-operated with them, colluded with them and provided them with a worldwide base of operations.

And so I think the American people know that we have to work with the Afghan government and people so that they can establish control over their own territory and prevent Afghanistan from being used as a base for al-Qaeda in the future.

The reality is also that al-Qaeda has killed many more Muslims than it has Americans, Europeans and others.

So this is a challenge we all face and I am confident the American people will sustain their commitment to help the Afghan people.

**How much is the US in a pickle in Afghanistan?**

I think the picture is mixed. It's clear that the Taliban have had success in reinfiltrating back into

the country.

They have intimidated a lot of Afghans. And so we and our allies and a lot of the security forces, clearly have our work cut out for us.

The situation is serious, but General [Stanley] McChrystal and, I must say, the Afghan defence minister [Abdul Rahim] Wardak have told me that we can be successful.

**In light of the US attack in Kunduz, which resulted in the killing of many civilian Afghans, how much of a real problem are civilian deaths in Afghanistan?**

I think it's a real problem, and General McChrystal thinks it's a real problem too.

Clearly, we regret any loss of civilian life in Afghanistan, and I've addressed this issue while in Afghanistan as well in the United States. And one of the central themes of General McChrystal's new approach in Afghanistan is significant change in our tactical approach to try and minimise the number of innocent civilians that are killed.

So he has changed the rules in terms of air power. He has issued a directive that convoys obey Afghan traffic laws, and, in fact, that our troops take some additional risk to themselves to avoid innocent Afghan casualties.

Part of the challenge here is that the Taliban actively target innocent civilians and they also create circumstances where they mingle among innocent civilians.

And they are willing to put innocent civilians at risk.

But we are trying to figure out new tactics that minimise this.

But it is a challenge. Central to the success of the 42 nations that are trying to help the Afghan people and government at this point is that the Afghan people continue to believe that we are their friends, their partners and here to help them.

So civilian casualties are a problem for us and we are doing everything conceivable to try and avoid that.

I think that based on the latest polling that we have, nationwide, in Afghanistan, fewer than 10 per cent of the people support the Taliban.

The Taliban's approach is one principally of intimidation of villagers and others, and Afghans don't want to live under those circumstances. They don't want to live under the Taliban rule again.

While they may not actively support the US, neither do they support the Taliban.

The Afghan people have been at war for over 30 years. What they want is peace and security. Over time, we and all of the international community with us, along with the Afghan security

forces, are in a position to try to bring that to them.

### **Facing a 'war of necessity'**

**Do you think saying the US is in Afghanistan to help the people holds water despite the fact that Afghans have traditionally been hostile to foreign forces in their country? In the past they rejected occupation, first by the British and later on by the Soviets, for example.**

I think that the historical rejection of foreign powers has been because the Afghan people have come to see those powers, whether it's Britain or the Soviet Union or anyone else, as being there for their own imperial interests, rather than being there in the interests in the Afghan people.

We have no interest in a permanent presence in Afghanistan; no interest in bases in Afghanistan.

What our interest is, is in giving the Afghan people the capacity to protect its own people and to prevent Afghanistan from being a centre for violent extremists again. And then we'll leave.

And I think that's an important message from us to the Afghan people. We want to give them the capacity to protect their own security as well as the security of other nations around the world from threats emanating from Afghanistan, and then we'll be gone.

**When Barack Obama said the war in Afghanistan was a war of necessity, did he say that because he knew it could be a winnable situation or because if he said otherwise and he talked about exiting Afghanistan, people would say President Obama does not have what it takes to look after the national security concerns of Americans?**

I do not believe that President Obama would have made the commitment he has made if he did not believe we could achieve our objectives in Afghanistan, which as I have described are giving them the capacity to secure their own territory and prevent al-Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan.

If he didn't think, he could achieve those objectives, I don't believe he would have committed the additional forces he has, or made the statement in support of the strategy as he did a few weeks ago.

### **So you think the war in Afghanistan is winnable?**

I don't like to speak in terms of winning or losing. I think we need to speak in terms of achieving our objectives.

This is not just about the United States, it's about the Afghan government and people, about dozens of nations and nongovernmental organisations that are in Afghanistan that all share the same objectives that I have just described.

Which is to bring peace and security to the Afghan people and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for violent extremists.

I think that those objectives are achievable and I think that's the way we ought to think about it.

**There is a debate about the level of US troops in Afghanistan. Some people say to secure the gains the US makes in Afghanistan, the troop level needs to be increased. Others say the more you increase the level of troops, the more you increase the targets for the Taliban.**

We are not yet beginning to think about significant troops in Afghanistan.

The next step for us is to evaluate General McChrystal's assessment of the situation and the way he intends to implement the president's strategy going forward. And once we've done that, then we will look at the question of whether additional resources are needed to achieve those objectives.

I have been concerned about ... I have had a number of reservations about the number of US troops.

One of those is - as we were just talking - about whether our forces come to be seen by the Afghans at some point as occupiers rather than partners.

General McChrystal's point, which I think has great validity, is: it's really how those forces are used and how they interact with the Afghan people that determines how they are seen by the Afghans.

And I think that the approach that he has taken, in terms of partnering with the Afghans, and interacting with the Afghan people, and supporting them, mitigates the concerns that I had.

There are issues on both sides of [the argument] and, frankly, I haven't made up my own mind at this point, in terms of whether more forces are needed.

**So, as far as you are concerned, thinking about withdrawing the US militarily from Afghanistan, even thinking about it, is out of the question?**

That's my view.

**The divide between two wars**

**This takes me back to the original point you made about 9/11. President Bush made the original decision to go to war in Afghanistan, which he did, and then subsequently made the decision to go to war in Iraq, opening himself to criticism that he diverted crucial attention from Afghanistan to Iraq. And yet, now we have President Obama saying that it is a war of necessity. A lot of people would argue it was a war of necessity then, but having moved away from it, then come back to it again, it's become a war of choice.**

It is a matter of first of all, this gets very tied up into US politics and the controversies of the war in Iraq and so on. I think that success in achieving our objectives in Afghanistan has been a consistent theme since 2002, for both the Bush administration and the Obama administration.



I think President Obama would say as you suggested that our attention was diverted by Iraq and now it is important to focus, again, on the situation in Afghanistan, and the truth is the situation in Afghanistan has changed, and it really began to change in 2005 and 2006.

Frankly, when agreements were reached on the Pakistani side of the border, it essentially relieved the pressure from the Pakistan side, on the Taliban who were then in Pakistan.

And so we have seen a steady increase in violence that really began late in 2005 and early 2006, and the Taliban have gotten better and better over that time.

You also now have alliances of convenience between the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Haqqani network, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar - his group - and al-Qaeda. So it is now perhaps a more complex situation than it was in 2002.

But in terms of the determination to deal with this problem and partner with the Afghans in achieving these objectives, the president is absolutely firm.

**When you say the situation now is much more complex, to what extent is that synonymous with saying we, US politicians, missed the bandwagon?**

The way I would phrase it, and the way we have phrased, it is that we did not provide the resources in Afghanistan early enough to stem this change in the situation in 2005 and 2006.

And we have to speak frankly: because of the troop commitments in Iraq, we didn't have the resources to move in reinforcements if you will as the situation in Afghanistan began to deteriorate.

When I first arrived in this job, I extended one brigade in Afghanistan in January 2007 and added another brigade later in spring 2007 but that was really about all the resources that we had at that time.

As we have drawn down in Iraq, more capability has become available.

**I would like to ask you about the 'shenanigans' with the news agency Associated Press over the publication of the picture of the dead US marine. Doesn't that put you in a difficult position, leaving you open to the accusation of infringing or violating freedom of expression?**

I have, in a letter that I sent to the head of the Associated Press, I said this is not a matter of law, this is not a matter of policy, this is not a constitutional issue, this is a question of judgement, of common decency, and out of respect for the family.

What I asked was, that they defer to the wishes of the family that these pictures of their maimed and stricken child not be provided the newspaper all over the United States. They chose to go ahead and do it anyway.

**And you are not concerned that this may have been interpreted as an infringement on the**

**freedom of press?**

No I don't think. There is no question, no issue of infringement of the freedom of the press whatsoever. I was asking them, I didn't pressure them, I didn't threaten them.

All I did was ask the. In fact, the words that I used with the head of the Associated Press was that "I beg you to defer to the wishes of the father of this marine".

That's all I asked. That's not an infringement of the freedom of the press. That's an appeal to common decency.

**Pakistan's role in the region**

**[Washington Post columnist] George Will recently wrote about Pakistan, saying that it is the country that really matters. What do you make of that, given that the implications are that Afghanistan does not really matter, that the US should get out of Afghanistan?**

Pakistan is very important. It is important intrinsically to the United States.

We have been a friend of Pakistan's for a long time and an ally of Pakistan's. We've had a very close relationship and we look forward to building that relationship, going forward completely independent of Afghanistan.

I think one of the new aspects of the president's strategy with respect to Afghanistan is the recognition that the problem we face there, we and the Afghans, is a regional problem.

And as we've seen in recent months, it is a problem that the Pakistani government faces and so I think Pakistan clearly is important.

It is important in its own right to the United States, as a friend and ally, but it is also important in terms of violent extremists that cross back and forth across that border and put both the government of Afghanistan and the government of Pakistan at risk.

**Given the difficulties that successive Pakistani civilian governments have had, how dependable, from a US point of view, do you think the current government in Pakistan is, in terms of being able to deal not only with the volatility of Pakistan but also the regional volatility, Afghanistan, India and so forth?**

I think if you look back, 15 or 16 months, the Pakistani government has performed admirably.

No one I think would have predicted the political consensus that has emerged in Pakistan in terms of the effort to take on these violent extremists in the North West Frontier Province, in the Fata [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] and in that area.

I think people would not have predicted the success of the Pakistani army. I think people would not have predicted the success in the Pakistani government's effective dealing with internally displaced persons as a result of a military operation and how many of them have returned to

Swat and how effective the Pakistani government has been in this respect.

So all of that is simply to say I believe that the Pakistani government, both the civilian side and the military side, have performed better than almost anyone's expectations in the region, or in this country, or elsewhere, and we are very impressed by that and we are prepared to be helpful, to help the Pakistanis in any way we can.

**Given the serious misgivings that the United States had in the past about the role of Pakistani intelligence, in terms of dealing with the Taliban, there were accusations to the Pakistani intelligence at that time that they were actually lending a hand of support to the Taliban. Are you 100 per cent satisfied now that that has stopped and that you, the US, the Pakistani military and the Pakistani civilian government are all in the same trench, working for the same goal?**

First of all, I believe we are in the same trench, working for the same goal.

I think you have to go back a little bit in history. I was very much involved in the American effort 20, 25 years ago in co-operation with Pakistan to support the mujahidin in Afghanistan when they were fighting against the Soviet Union.

One of the vehicles that we used in that effort was the connection between the Pakistani intelligence and various mujahidin groups within Afghanistan.

So these relationships with groups in Afghanistan and with Pakistanis go back a long way and at that time we were very productive and very useful.

My own view is that the connections were maintained largely as a hedge because the Pakistanis are very concerned about the stability of their border area and about the stability of Afghanistan and they weren't sure whether we would continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

So I believe we're on the same page, I believe we're working for the same goals. I have a lot of confidence in the Pakistanis.

**Basically the implication of what you're saying is that the United States will not do again what it did after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which is to cut loose and leave the regional players to fend for themselves, undermining the credibility of the US in that part of Asia?**

I think that's absolutely right. And I have to say I was in the American government at the time we did that and it was a serious strategic mistake.

As soon as the Soviets left Afghanistan, we turned our backs on Afghanistan and we did not cultivate our relationship with the Pakistanis properly. And so I think we gave rise to doubts in the region about whether we are prepared to stay there and be their partner on a continuous basis, and I believe we've learned our lesson and that both Afghanistan and Pakistan can count on us for the long term.

**In terms of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, you are absolutely categorically sure that there is no risk that they may fall into the wrong hands given the pressures that the Taliban in Afghanistan are exerting not just on the Pakistanis but also on the United States in Pakistan?**

I'm quite comfortable that the security arrangements for the Pakistani nuclear capabilities are sufficient and adequate.

**What sort of guarantees do you have to cover that?**

I would say it's based both on our own understanding of the security arrangements that the Pakistanis have for their weapons and their capabilities, their laboratories and so on. But also the insurances we have been given by the Pakistanis.

**Were you baffled by President Obama's envoy Richard Holbrooke, when he was asked how he would measure progress and he said 'we will know it when we see it'?**

I probably would have answered the question differently.

**How would you have answered it?**

I would have answered it: I believe that success or progress will be as when we see the Afghan national security forces, the army and the police, assuming a greater and greater role in security operations protecting Afghanistan and the Afghan people, so that we can recede, first into an advisory role and then leave altogether.

So in some way, it's somehow comparable to the situation in Iraq where our role has become less and less prominent, where the Iraqis have taken a more and more prominent role protecting their own security, and I think that will be one way we will be able to measure success in Afghanistan as we see the Afghan security forces taking a more and more prominent and leading role in protecting their own security.

**Fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq**

**In the latest press conference that you gave, together with Admiral Mike Mullen, you talked about the analogies people often make between Afghanistan and Iraq. You said that the fundamental difference is that in Iraq there has been a strong central government but in Afghanistan, there has never been a strong central government. And in terms of fighting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, that's obviously making your work a lot more difficult. How confident are you that the Iraqi central government, led by Nuri al-Maliki, at the present time, can hold the country together after you leave?**

I think we have real confidence that they can do that and I think the best evidence that a sense of Iraqi nationalism has returned is that al-Qaeda has made very strong efforts in recent weeks and months to try and provoke a renewal of the sectarian violence between the Sunnis and the Shias in Iraq through suicide bombers, and what has been interesting and encouraging is that they have failed in that effort.

The Shia understand this is al-Qaeda trying to provoke that kind of a conflict and they're having none (...) so there has not been any renewal of sectarian violence.

Our generals have very high regard of the Iraqi army and, increasingly, Iraqi police, and I think we would not have felt comfortable agreeing to the arrangements we have to pull out of Iraqi cities, and to put a deadline on the withdrawal of American combat troops, if we didn't have confidence in the Iraqis. I think [commander of US forces in Iraq] General [Ray] Odierno would say they have developed better and faster than he would have anticipated.

So we are very encouraged by the developments in Iraq with respect to the security situation despite these suicide bombings that we think are mostly the efforts of al-Qaeda.

**A lot of the people in the region will look at Iraq post-2003, now that you say al-Qaeda has been trying to stoke up sectarian strife in Iraq. A lot of people will look at 2003, and at what the United States did post 2003, and say: Actually that was the engine of sectarian strife in Iraq in the first place.**

Well, I wasn't in government at the time and I was no expert on Iraq before I came into government. I wouldn't pretend to be an expert now either but ...

**But would you say the US getting out of Iraq would necessarily put an end to sectarian strife or would it actually increase the prospects of sectarian strife?**

I think that what we have already seen in Iraq, despite the provocations by al-Qaeda, the Iraqis are ready to move beyond the violence of the last several years and to grove their economy and to have peace.

I think that's why you have not seen renewed sectarian violence and that's why we are comfortable with the arrangements in which we have withdrawn from cities and in which we will withdraw all our combat troops by the end of August next year.

We are very comfortable with that, and that means we do not believe there will be a renewal of the sectarian violence with our departure.

**My understanding is that President Obama has pledged that the US will not build any permanent military bases in Iraq after leaving. Does that pledge still stand?**

Absolutely.

**Now how do you define permanent? Because bases in Germany have been there for about 60 years now. In Korea for a similar period of time. How do you define permanent and how do you define temporary?**

Temporary is based on the fact that another part of this agreement is that all US forces will be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. That is the agreement that we have with the Iraqi government: all US forces. No bases, no forces.

**Unless the Iraqis ask you to stay?**

Unless there is some new agreement, or some new negotiation which would clearly be on Iraqi terms.

But we will not have any permanent bases in Iraq. We have no interest in permanent bases in Iraq and we are now planning on withdrawing all American military forces by the end of 2011.

**The 'threat' of a nuclear Iran**

A lot of people, including some of your closest allies in the Gulf, think that at the end of the day, the real winner after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, is Iran, and, you listen to US politicians here in DC, you have a real problem with Iran.

I think Iran has been a challenge for the United States, and for the international community for that matter, for 30 years. I think that a strong and democratic Iraq, particularly one with a multi-sectarian government, becomes a barrier to Iranian influence and not a bridge for it.

So I think, in the short term, perhaps Iran's position was strengthened somewhat but I think if you look to the longer term, and the role that Iraq can play in the region going forward, I think that Iran's position may well be diminished.

**But many people feel that you took out one fundamental bastion against Iranian influence in the region and that is the regime of Saddam Hussein. You changed the political configuration in the country, bringing a Shia government to power. Everybody knows there are Iraqi politicians in the Iraqi government who are very close to Iran or have some sort of sensibility that makes them close to the government of Iran. How is that going to be a bastion against Iranian influence even in the long term?**

Well, I think first of all we've seen over the past years a genuine assertion of Iraqi nationalism from Prime Minister Maliki and from other leaders inside Iraq.

I have no doubt that at the end of the day, the leaders in Iraq are first and foremost Iraqis. After all none of them have forgotten the eight years of war that they fought with Saddam Hussein and they haven't forgotten that Saddam Hussein started that war.

So I think that, by all accounts that we can see and the actions we have seen the government of Iraq take, including for example Prime Minister Maliki's offensive in the Basra area over a year ago, made clear they are most concerned with maintaining Iraqi sovereignty.

If the United States has learned anything in the last year as we have negotiated the framework agreement with the Iraqis it is that the Iraqis are very sensitive about their sovereignty and, as with almost any other country, are not going to tolerate other countries trying to interfere in their internal affairs.

**Let's assume for a minute that in the short term, or medium term even, that the Iranians have strengthened their hand in Iraq, and that's going to change in the long term. Hasn't**

**Iran been able to increase its influence in neighbouring Iraq, and therefore strengthened its hand in dealing with the West over its nuclear programme?**

No, I don't agree with that. I think that the situation in Iraq has little bearing on Iran and its nuclear programme.

**Can you, for example in the case the Israelis resort to military action, as they seem to be itching to do, against Iranian nuclear facilities, can you guarantee that Iranians will not use Iraq to retaliate against the United States for example?**

Well, I'm not going to address hypothetical situations. Our view is that there is still an opportunity for diplomacy and political and economic pressures to bring about a change of policy in Iran, so getting into hypotheticals about military reaction, I think doesn't take us very far.

And I'm confident that we still have some opportunities in that area.

**Hypotheticals aside, if you say you still have some time for manoeuvring in that area, to what extent are you reading from the same hymn sheet as the Israelis?**

Every country looks at a given situation through the lens of its own security. Our view, and the view that we have shared I might say strongly with all our friends and allies in the region as well as elsewhere, is that the way to deal with the Iranian nuclear programme at this point is through diplomatic and economic efforts.

**Maintaining allies in the Middle East**

**The issue of Iran and Israel is obviously rattling a lot of countries in the region, the Israelis, the Gulf states, who are thinking about buying more and more weapons, and indeed there has been some sales authorised by the United States. Some estimates put the weapons packages to the Gulf states and Israel at about \$100bn. How much substance is there to that?**

That figure sounds very high to me. But I think there's a central question or a central point here to be made and it has to do both with our friends and allies in the region, our Arab allies, as well as the Iranian nuclear programme, and that is one of the pathways, to get the Iranians to change their approach on the nuclear issue, is to persuade them that moving down that path will actually jeopardise their security, not enhance it.

So the more that our Arab friends and allies can straighten their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their co-operation, both with each other and with us, I think sends the signal to the Iranians that this path they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it.

So that's one of the reasons why I think our relationship with these countries and our security co-operation with them is so important.

**I mentioned \$100bn and you said that doesn't sound right to you. What does sound right to you as a figure?**

I honestly don't know.

**But there are a lot of weapons being asked for by the countries in the region?**

We have a very broad foreign military sales programme and obviously with most of our friends and allies out there, but the arrangements that are being negotiated right now, I just honestly don't know the accumulated total.

**You're asking the Iranians to give up their intentions to build nuclear weapons. They are saying they're not building nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a lot of people in the region feel that you know that the Israelis do have nuclear weapons and they say why doesn't the West start with Israel, which is known to possess nuclear weapons rather than with the Iranians, who are suspected of having them. What do you say to that argument?**

First of all, it's the Iranian leadership that has said it wants to wipe Israel off the face of the earth. Those threats have not been made in the other direction. It is the Iranian government that is in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions with respect to these programmes, so focus needs to be on the country that is feuding the will of the international community and the United Nations.

**But you decided that the rhetoric of the Iranians reflects the reality of what's going on in Iran in terms of nuclear weapons. Isn't that a leap of faith?**

Well, we obviously have information in terms of what the Iranians are doing. We also have what the Iranians themselves have said, so we only are taking them at their word.

**So you know for sure that they are working on a nuclear bomb?**

I would not go that far but clearly they have elements of their nuclear programme that are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.

We want them to adhere to these resolutions and we are willing to acknowledge the right of the Iranian government and the Iranian people to have a peaceful nuclear programme if it is intended for the production of electric power so on. What is central, then, is trying to persuade the Iranians to agree to that and then to verification procedures under the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

That gives us confidence that it is indeed a peaceful nuclear programme and not a weaponisation programme.

The truth of the matter is that, if Iran proceeds with a nuclear weapons programme it may well spark an arms race, a real arms race, and potentially a nuclear arms race in the entire region.

So it is in the interest of all countries for Iran to agree to arrangements that allow a peaceful



nuclear programme and give the international community confidence that's all they're doing.

**But the Obama administration seems to have a difficult circle to square because on one hand they're saying that they want improved relations with the Muslim world. On the other hand, any pressure on Iran, is seen by people in the Muslim world as an indication the US is not genuine in wanting to improve those relations because many Muslims say Israel has nuclear weapons, and the US is not doing anything about it.**

The focus is on which country is in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions. The pressure on Iran is simply to be a good member of the international community.

The neighbours around Iran, our Arab friends and allies, are concerned about what is going on in Iran, and not just the governments.

So the question is how does Iran become a member in good standing of the international community. That's in the interest of everybody.

#### **US ties with Latin America**

**A last issue, relations between the US and Latin America: There have been a lot of angry noises coming out of Latin America over the issue of military bases in Colombia. How much of a problem is the issue of bases in Colombia to the United States and its relations with Latin America?**

I think that's an issue that has been exploited by certain governments down there such as the Venezuelan government.

I think for most of the continent it's not a problem. These are not American bases. This is a co-operative arrangement, negotiated with the government of Colombia, for counter-narcotic purposes.

That's all it is and nothing more, no permanent US base, no US base at all, but use of Colombian facilities in co-operation with the Colombians.

**But doesn't it concern you that even President Lula [da Silva] in Brazil, who is not really known for being over-vocal in his criticism of the United States, has actually been quite vocal recently in terms of criticising what is described by President [Hugo] Chavez of Venezuela, for example, as belligerent intentions on the part of the United States in Latin America?**

Well, they are clearly not belligerent intentions on part of the United States and I believe that when the other governments that may be concerned in South America fully understand the nature of the co-operation agreement with the Colombians, they will understand that this is a very limited operation tightly focused on counter-narcotics.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### 9/11 Memorial Remarks

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington D.C., Friday, September 11, 2009*

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Mr. President, Madam First Lady, distinguished visitors, and above all, family and friends – good morning and thank you for being here today.

On September 11th, 2001, the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, absorbed the first foreign-based major attacks on the continental United States since the War of 1812.

David Lloyd George, a former prime minister of the United Kingdom, speaking during the opening months of World War I, said, “The stern hand of fate has scourged us to an elevation where we can see the everlasting things that matter for a nation – the great peaks we had forgotten, of honor, duty, patriotism, and clad in glittering white, the towering pinnacle of Sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to Heaven.”

Today we honor the dead and to speak to the survivors and loved ones whose lives were irrevocably changed on that terrible day eight years ago. Words are inadequate to remove the pain of that loss. In the lives of these patriots we can find some solace. Because they lived, and because of the great “pinnacle of [their] sacrifice”, and because of the sacrifice of thousands more since that day, we remain a strong and free nation.

Those who fell are commemorated here, and they are represented by the men and women you see around you acting as docents for this memorial. The docent program that begins today is being run by Lisa Dolan, who lost her husband, Navy Captain Robert Dolan, on 9/11. She and other 9/11 family members have added something poignant and profound to this program.

We are grateful and honored on this day that the President – and the First Lady, who has made the welfare of military families her personal priority – are here to help us commemorate this anniversary. It is my great pleasure to introduce our commander-in-chief, the President of the United States.


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY COMMEMORATING 9/11

Sep't. 11, 2009



President Barack Obama, center, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, and Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, salute under rainy skies before a wreath-laying ceremony during the 9/11 remembrance ceremony at the Pentagon Memorial, Sept. 11, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Robert Ward*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks at the 9/11 commemoration ceremony at the Pentagon, Sept. 11, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Air Force Association Convention

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, National Harbor, MD, Wednesday, September 16, 2009*

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Thank you, for that kind introduction.

It's an honor to have the opportunity to speak to the Air Force Association. For more than six decades this organization has been a tenacious advocate for Airmen and U.S. air supremacy – without which, as Hap Arnold once said, “there can be no national security.”

General Arnold was, of course, a formidable advocate for air power long before there was a U.S. Air Force. His dealings with President Roosevelt also showed, once more, that a little civil-military tension is nothing new in the history of our republic. Arnold recalled the time when he said some things in congressional testimony that were none too pleasing to FDR. At a White House meeting, soon there after, the president looked pointedly at Arnold and observed that military officers who were unable to “play ball” with his administration might be found available for duty in Guam.

But, later that year, General Arnold was invited to another White House gathering – a small dinner and he arrived to discover that Roosevelt awaited him with a tray of cocktail mixings. “Good evening, Hap,” said the president, as if nothing had happened. “How about my mixing you an Old Fashioned?” Well, I’m afraid the early hour precludes our breaking the ice – literally and figuratively – in a similar manner this morning, but it is a pleasure to be here.

Today, I want to talk about Airmen and air power – about what the men and women of the U.S. Air Force do every day to serve our country, and about the range of things the service must be able to do in the future to protect America against an array of lethal and complex threats. I do so keenly aware of what the Air Force has experienced, endured, and accomplished in recent times – above all, waging two major wars, protracted air campaigns that have accelerated the wear and tear on the service’s people and aging inventory.

First, words of thanks to those men and women whose achievements we cherish and whose interests you represent. Since 9/11, hundreds of thousands of Airmen have gone about their duties – usually unheralded, and unrecognized by the usual metric of medals and media coverage. Often they are on the ground, in the dirt, and sometimes under fire – doing their jobs without fail and without complaint. More than 100 have made the supreme sacrifice in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As a result of Airmen’s efforts, dangerous men looking to attack our troops and harm our country have met their just end, usually without warning: a distant buzz followed by a bolt from the sky. Some of those strikes may have come from the 74th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron – the “flying tigers” who trace their lineage back to

Claire Chennault. They deployed to Afghanistan from Moody Air Force base about seven months ago. Since then, they have completed more than 2,800 combat missions spanning over 12,000 flight hours of reconnaissance and close air support – a record for this historic unit.

Our enemies have also been under the unblinking eye and precision fire of the 214th Reconnaissance Group of the Arizona National Guard, which recently received the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award from Secretary Donley after its Predators logged more than 17,000 hours over Afghanistan and Iraq . Overall, the Air Force has increased the number of Predator and Reaper combat air patrols in theater by more than half from last year, and the numbers of CAPs will grow to 50 by the end of FY 2010.

For America's fighting men and women on the ground, the efforts of Airmen have made a life or death difference.

Take the example of Tech Sergeant Benjamin Horton, from Hill Air Force Base in Utah. Sergeant Horton destroyed more than seven tons of enemy explosives while deployed to Iraq in the hair-raising vocation of EOD technician. His expertise with the tactics of enemy bombers led to the capture of six bombmakers in the Kirkuk region. In one instance, he pulled four injured soldiers from a vehicle after an IED attack, and then cleared the extraction zone to medevac the wounded, earning a bronze star for his efforts.

On a visit to Afghanistan earlier in May, I had a chance to meet with some of the Search and Rescue Aircrews from the 34th Weapons Squadron and 38th Rescue Squadron supporting the Marines in Helmand Province. Over a three month stretch in the spring, "PJs" from the 34th recovered or treated more than 320 casualties – both military and civilian.

Then, there was the crew of Shocker 21 of the 305th Expeditionary Rescue squadron based in Kandahar. They were called in after an American Special Forces team and Afghan soldiers came under heavy attack. In four successive passes over a hot landing zone, Shocker 21 picked up two groups of wounded troops, laid down suppressive fire, and delivered badly needed ammunition. All told, the expertise and courage of Air Force search and rescue teams are making the goal of the "golden hour" a reality in Afghanistan.

In the coming months, America's Airmen will be tested even more. The war in Afghanistan is entering a decisive phase. In a landlocked nation with mountainous terrain and few usable roads, we and our allies are far more dependent on air power to protect troops and move supplies. This year, the Air Force is on track to deliver over 22 million pounds of cargo within Afghanistan, more than double the amount from two years ago. A C-130 touching down on a dusty, improvised landing strip is a welcome sight at many remote outposts that may be running low on food, fuel, and ammunition.

Then, of course, there are the C-17 and C-5 crews flying thousands of tons a day in and out of theater. And the tanker aircrews and maintenance personnel keeping planes in the air that are often older than their parents. Without these efforts and the exertions of tens of thousands of Airmen – including engineers, security forces, medical personnel, explosive ordnance disposal experts, and those protecting our lines of communication in space and cyberspace – the entire U.S. war effort would simply grind to a halt.

Many of these tasks in high demand today have been core service competencies

for decades. Others are no doubt making Curtis LeMay spin in his grave. All told, the full measure and potential of air power – kinetic and non-kinetic – in counterinsurgency, stability operations, and irregular warfare is getting the focus and attention it deserves – both within the service and in the wider public. For example, the number of air strikes in Iraq in 2007 was nearly five times the total from the previous year – playing a key role in the security gains of the Surge.

Within the Air Force, these combat lessons learned have become the seeds of future acquisition decisions and institutional change. A couple of weeks ago, I visited the Texas factory where MC-12 Liberty aircraft are being outfitted with reconnaissance and intelligence gear before shipping off to the battlefield. The Air Force is considering bringing online a fleet of light fighters and cargo aircraft – inexpensive, rugged platforms that can be used to build local capacity in lift, reconnaissance, and close air support missions, and are also usable and affordable by partner nations.

- With regard to ISR: the production of the most advanced UAVs across the military will increase to 48 annually, and I'm told we are currently training more pilots for unmanned systems than for fighters and bombers; and

- An air advisor school house is now open whose graduates are helping our partners overseas confront the threats within their borders.

As you know, institutionalizing these kinds of capabilities was what drove many of my budget recommendations earlier this year. The goal was to give these critical capabilities a seat at the table when priorities are set and budget decisions were being made. But, contrary to what some have alleged, the purpose was not to reorganize and rearm the entire U.S. military to hunt insurgents and do nation-building or to fight wars just like Iraq and Afghanistan. Programs specific to these kinds of missions will continue to make up a small fraction of overall defense spending. For example, over the next few years, the Air Force is planning to devote an extra \$175 million annually on programs dedicated exclusively to irregular warfare – a significant commitment at a time of tight budgets, but not exactly an existential threat to overall modernization accounts, which, in the case of the Air Force, will total some \$64 billion for the next fiscal year.

With hundreds of thousands of troops deployed in two major combat theatres, fielding these capabilities and putting them into the hands of the warfighter as soon as possible are the most important thing to do.

It is not, however, the only thing we must do. It would be unwise to assume that conflicts of the future will be like those of today or the past – the fatal conceit of military planners since antiquity. The crumbling remains of the Maginot Line and the cemeteries in Flanders Fields are monuments to that tragic folly. And with regard to air power, it would be irresponsible to assume that a future adversary – given enough time, money, and technological acumen – will not one day be able to directly threaten U.S. command of the skies. As an allied commander from World War II said, "Air power is like poker. [The] second-best hand is like none at all – it will cost you dough and win you nothing."

With this admonition in mind, consider the capabilities the United States has or will have over the next 20 to 30 years.

At the high-end of the spectrum of course is the F-22, which provides a critical hedge against the possibility that another country could some day field enough advanced fighters to directly challenge the United States. It is far and away the best

air-to-air fighter ever produced, and will ensure U.S. command of the skies for the next generation. Our commitment to this aircraft is underscored by the nearly six-and-a-half billion dollars provided over the next few years to upgrade the existing F-22 fleet to be fully mission-capable.

The largest piece of the U.S. air-dominance portfolio, designed to span a wide range of the conflict spectrum, is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It lacks some of the high-end air-to-air attributes of the F-22, but this fifth-generation stealth aircraft has cutting edge capabilities in electronic warfare and in suppressing enemy air defenses.

Without question, the F-35 program represents an ambitious effort. More than 3,000 aircraft, counting all military services and foreign partners. Twenty-two million lines of code. Over \$46 billion for development plus an estimated \$300 billion in total acquisition costs. A truly massive investment in the future of U.S. air power.

As with every advanced military and commercial aircraft, the F-35 has seen its share of rising costs, delays, and other development issues – and no doubt will see more challenges in the future. Three weeks ago I had a chance to tour the F-35 plant in Fort Worth. I made clear to the manufacturers our expectations with regard to costs and schedule, and they assured me that earlier problems are being aggressively confronted and addressed.

Next year's budget reflects a major commitment to accelerate the development and production of the F-35 – with nearly half a billion dollars added to the FY 10 budget to support the flight-test program. Our objective continues to be to equip the first training squadron at Eglin Air Force Base in 2011, and achieve initial operating capability for the Marines and Air Force in 2012 and 2013 respectively. I consider the F-35 program a major leadership priority – with all that entails with regard to funding, oversight, and accountability.

As you know, the Air Force's modernization program includes accelerating the retirement of more than 230 of its oldest fighters – just under 13 percent of the total fighter inventory – leading some to allege a looming "fighter gap." In my view, such a conclusion is based on dated assumptions about requirements and risk – assumptions that also pervade thinking about some of our land, sea, and amphibious forces as well. The definition of the requirement should be un-tethered from the current force structure and instead be defined by what is needed to defeat potential adversaries in plausible scenarios. What we then find is that the more compelling gap is the deep chasm between the air capabilities of the United States and those of other nations. For example, the United States is projected to have more than 1,000 F-22s and F-35s before China fields its first fully operational fifth-generation fighter – a gap that will grow well into the 2020s.

The disparity with other countries is even greater when it comes to pilot quality and logistics. Last year the United States Air Force devoted one-and-a-half million hours to flight training – not counting ongoing operations – and conducted roughly 35,000 aerial refueling missions. The Russian Air Force, by comparison, conducted about 30 refueling sorties.

All told, the combination of F-22s, F-35s, and legacy aircraft will preserve American tactical air supremacy far into the future. Moreover, a key additional – and yet untapped – part of this mix of capabilities is unmanned aerial vehicles. Today, because of their effectiveness in Iraq and Afghanistan, these systems are mostly thought of as counterinsurgency platforms. But they have enormous game-changing



implications for conventional conflict as well.

In future years, these remotely piloted aircraft will get more numerous and more advanced, with greater range and the ability to fight as well as survive. The director of the Air Force's unmanned task force has compared judging UAV potential based on today's systems to judging manned aircraft based on the Wright Brothers Flyer. Large numbers of increasingly capable UAVs – when integrated with our fifth-generation fighters – potentially give the United States the ability to disrupt and overwhelm an adversary using mass and swarming tactics, adding a new dimension to the American way of war.

At this point it is not clear what the full strategic impact could be – whether, for example, it could be comparable to the impact of carrier aviation on naval warfare. We certainly do not want to engage in the kind of techno-optimism that has muddled strategic thinking in the past. But we cannot ignore the wider implications of this profound shift in battlefield technology, especially since their low cost and high utility make UAVs very attractive to other nations.

In fact, when considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically – fighter to fighter or ship to ship – and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options. Their investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary way to project power and help allies in the Pacific – in particular our forward air bases and carrier strike groups. This would degrade the effectiveness of short-range fighters and put more of a premium on being able to strike from over the horizon – whatever form that capability might take.

I am committed to seeing that the United States has an airborne long-range strike capability – one of several areas being examined in the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review. What we must not do is repeat what happened with our last manned bomber. By the time the research, development, and requirements processes ran their course, the aircraft, despite its great capability, turned out to be so expensive – \$2 billion each in the case of the B-2 – that less than one-sixth of the planned fleet of 132 was ever built.

Looking ahead, it makes little sense to pursue a future bomber – a prospective B-3, if you will – in a way that repeats this history. We must avoid a situation in which the loss of even one aircraft – by accident, or in combat – results in a loss of a significant portion of the fleet, a national disaster akin to the sinking of a capital ship. This scenario raises our costs of action and shrinks our strategic options, when we should be looking to the kind of weapons systems that limit the costs of action and expand our options.

Whatever system is chosen to meet this requirement – be it manned, unmanned, or some combination of the two – it should be one that can realistically be produced and deployed in the numbers originally envisioned. That is why it is so important that with aircraft – as with all of our major weapons systems – schedules are met, costs are controlled, and requirements are brought into line with reality.

Now, before closing, I'd like to turn to some areas that underpin America's strategic strength and global reach – areas of ongoing and future importance to the Air Force and the United States.

First, just about all of our military forces – land, sea, and air – now depend on

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digital communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. With cheap technology and minimal investment, adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage on our command and control, ISR, and precision strike capabilities. The recently activated 24th Air Force under the service's Space Command – working with other military and non-military partners – will make an important contribution to protecting this key domain.

Second, the role of space and satellites has never been more crucial to military operations – from GPS-guided munitions and navigation to missile defense and communications. The Air Force has extended its streak of successful national-security space launches to 65. Our forces around the globe could not succeed without the satellite-based capabilities provided by the Air Force 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

Third, the Air Force's nuclear stewardship. The stand-up of the Global Strike Command – and the future consolidation of the 20th and 8th Air Forces in this command – is a historic marker that will add clear lines of authority and accountability to the service's nuclear mission. These institutional reforms will also help keep this critical expertise alive and valued within the service and its officer corps. The activation of another B-52 squadron further illustrates our commitment to America's strategic deterrent. All told, more than a year of introspection and hard work is starting to show some results – steps on the path to institutional excellence in a mission where there is no room for error.

And finally, I am pleased to announce that source selection authority is returning to the Air Force for the KC-X refueling tanker, with a draft Request for Proposals to follow. I don't need to belabor the importance of getting this done soon and done right, and my office will continue to have a robust oversight role. We are committed to the integrity of the selection process, and cannot afford the kind of letdowns, parochial squabbles, and corporate food-fights that have bedeviled this effort over the last number of years.

I have confidence that the KC-X selection authority is in good hands with the service's leadership team of Secretary Donley and General Schwartz. Indeed, the Air Force is fortunate to have a deep bench of senior flag officers, including four Combatant Commanders – as many as any other service, including the first Air Force officer to lead Southern Command. I depend greatly on their expert advice and strategic vision.

All told, the foundation of America's air power in the 21st century rests, first, a broad and versatile mix of capabilities – tactical and strategic, manned and unmanned, from cyberspace to outer space. And second, on the quality and commitment of our Airmen, without which all of the most advanced hardware in the world would be of little use.

Which brings me to a final thought. This organization properly reveres the memory of leaders like Billy Mitchell, who advocated for air power between the world wars in the face of cherished traditions and conventional wisdom. Cavalry, for example, was against aircraft because they might scare the horses. One of my predecessors, the Secretary of War at the time, told a friend that General Pershing managed to win a war without even looking at a plane, much less riding in one. Another U.S. war secretary, Newton Baker, thought that Mitchell's idea of using airplanes to sink a ship was "so damned nonsensical and impossible that I'm willing to stand on the bridge ... while that nitwit tries to hit [it]." That must have been a helluva temptation!

It strikes me that the significance of Mitchell and his travails was not that he was always right. It's that he had the vision and insight to see that the world and technology had changed, understood the implications of that change, and then pressed ahead in the face of fierce institutional resistance.


The transformative figures of American air power – from Mitchell to Arnold, LeMay to Boyd – had this quality in varying degrees. It is one I look for in the next generation of Air Force leaders, junior and mid-level officers, and NCOs who have experienced the grim reality of war and the demands of persistent conflict. These are men and women we need to retain and empower to shape the service to which they have given so much.

In this dangerous new century, our country faces a fiendish and complex array of threats, and our military confronts a bewildering array of tasks. To overcome these challenges will call on all of the elements that make up America's defense establishment – military and civilian, Congress, industry, retired flag officers, veterans' groups and military service organizations – to step up and be part of the solution. To be willing to stretch their comfort zones and re-think long-standing assumptions for the wider and greater purpose of doing what is necessary to protect our country. I believe this is happening in the United States Air Force. The American people are grateful to Airmen for having protected us for many decades and we are counting on you to do what it takes in the years ahead.

My thanks again to AFA for the opportunity to speak with you today, and for everything you do on behalf of our country and our Air Force.

Thank you.

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Gen. James Cartwright

September 17,  
2009

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### DoD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen. Cartwright from the Pentagon

SEC. GATES: Good morning.

First, before starting on today's announcement, I'd like to acknowledge the loss of six Italian soldiers and a number of civilians in a bombing attack in Kabul. Our condolences go out to the families of those killed and to the Italian and Afghan people.

This week, the president, on the recommendation and advice of his national security team and our senior military leadership, decided to change the architecture of our ballistic missile defense in Europe, a change I believe will enhance our ability to respond to the most immediate threats to the continent, as well as future threats.

First, some background. On December 27th, 2006, I recommended that President Bush initiate a Europe-based, missile-defense system that would put in advanced radar in the Czech Republic and 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland. At the time, this was considered the best way to protect the United States and our European allies from the growing threat posed by Iran's development of longer-range ballistic missiles.

Since then, two important developments have prompted a reassessment of our approach in Europe. First, a change in our intelligence community's 2006 view of the Iranian threat: The intelligence community now assesses that the threat from Iran's short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, such as the Shahab-3, is developing more rapidly than previously projected. This poses an increased and more immediate threat to our forces on the European continent, as well as to our allies.

On the other hand, our intelligence assessment also now assesses that the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities has been slower to develop than was estimated in 2006.

The second development relates to our technology. Over the last few years, we have made great strides with missile defense, particularly in our ability to counter short-and-medium-range missiles. We now have proven capabilities to intercept these ballistic missiles with land-and-sea-based interceptors supported by much-improved sensors.

These capabilities offer a variety of options to detect, track and shoot down enemy missiles. This allows us to deploy a distributive sensor network rather than a single fixed site, like the kind slated for the Czech Republic, enabling greater survivability and adaptability.

We have also improved the Standard Missile 3, the SM-3, which has had eight successful flight tests since 2007. These tests have amply demonstrated the SM-3's capability and have given us greater confidence in the system and its future.

Based on these two factors, we have now the opportunity to deploy new sensors and interceptors, in northern and southern Europe, that near-term can provide missile defense coverage against more immediate threats from Iran or others.

In the initial stage, we will deploy Aegis ships equipped with SM-3 interceptors, which provide the flexibility to move interceptors from one region to another if needed.

The second phase, about 2015, will involve fielding upgraded, land-based SM-3s. Consultations have begun with allies, starting with Poland and the Czech Republic, about hosting a land-based version of the SM-3 and other components of the system. Basing some interceptors on land will provide additional coverage and save costs compared to a purely sea-based approach.

Over time, this architecture is designed to continually incorporate new and more effective technologies, as well as more interceptors, expanding the range of coverage, improving our ability to knock down multiple targets and increasing the survivability of the overall system.

This approach also provides us with greater flexibility to adapt to developing threats and evolving technologies. For example, although the Iranian long-range missile threat is not as immediate as we previously thought, this system will allow us to incorporate future defensive capabilities against such threats, as they develop.

Perhaps most important, though, we can now field initial elements of the system to protect our forces in Europe and our allies roughly six to seven years earlier than the previous plan, a fact made more relevant by continued delays in the Czech and Polish ratification processes that have caused repeated slips in the timeline.

I would also note that plans to cover most of Europe and add to the defense of the U.S. homeland will continue on about the same schedule as before. As the president has said very clearly, as long as the Iranian threat persists, we will pursue proven and cost-effective missile defenses.

Today the Department of Defense is briefing the Congress and our NATO allies about this plan. One of our guiding principles for missile defense remains the involvement and support of our allies and partners. We will continue to rely on our allies and work with them to develop a system that most effectively defends against very real and growing threats.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting the reality of what we are doing. The security of Europe has been a vital national interest of the United States for my entire career. The circumstances, borders and threats may have changed, but that commitment continues. I believe this new approach provides a better missile defense capability for our forces in Europe, for our European allies and eventually for our homeland than the program I recommended almost three years ago. It is more adapted to the threat we see developing and takes advantage of new technical capabilities available to us today.

With that, let me now turn to General Cartwright, who has been deeply involved in the development of this proposal, for a more detailed presentation of it.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Thank you.

What I'd like to do is kind of step down through some of the elements of this capability and this architecture as it develops and give you a sense of how we're thinking about it.

Most of this work has emanated from the congressionally directed Ballistic Missile Defense Review that is a part of our QDR analysis.

One thing that has not changed is the set of priorities that we started with, which is the defense of the homeland first, defense of our deployed forces, and then friends and allies.

It is consistent with the budget decisions that we took in both '09 and in '10 as we moved forward associated with missile defense and the capabilities that we wanted to have there. And some of these decisions started back in the Bush administration as we started to shift the priority and the weight of our effort towards the deployed forces after we fielded the initial ground-based interceptors up in Alaska and out in California.

The review and the accompanying analysis has moved us, based on the threat, principally, but also on the opportunities that technology has availed to us, to shift the architecture and enhance it. Okay? This is not a moving away of the defense of the homeland and the capabilities of the ground-based interceptor. But what it is is an acknowledgement that there are capabilities out there that are able to, one, address the threat that has really emerged versus the threat that we initially postulated would be what we would call most dangerous, which is the threat to the United States, but the fact that the Iranians are starting to field, as have the South -- I'm sorry, North Koreans, capabilities associated with intermediate- and medium- range and short-range ballistic missiles, in

numbers that are substantially larger than could be addressed by 40 or 10 ground-based interceptors. We're talking about hundreds. And the ability to go after these raids was one of the driving factors tactically that had to be addressed, both for our deployed forces and for those nations that are threatened by those missiles.

And so this enhanced architecture we put together associated with Europe is also an architecture that is globally deployable and is the same architecture that you would find if you went now to Japan, South Korea, facing the North Korean threat and the ground-based interceptors that defend against that. We're also looking at this architecture with an initial deployment that occurred earlier this year with the ground-based radar that went into Israel.

So this is an architecture that is globally exportable, but we're going to focus today on the European aspect of that architecture.

It is adaptable. In other words, one of the realities of life is the enemy gets a vote. And if they don't emerge the same way that you planned five and 10 years ahead of time, if you can't adapt, you're left disadvantaged. This system gives us a much more significant and robust capability to adapt to the threat as it actually emerges versus what we would like it to emerge as. Okay?

Elements of the system. We generally break them down in three ways. The command and control, which is probably the most leveraging capability we have and gets the least notoriety, so to speak, but the ability to network systems together in a way that makes the whole substantially greater than any one of the elements is at the heart of this command-and-control system.

And I'll talk a little bit more about that as I get into this.

The sensors. One of the key activities here is the rapid advancement of our sensor technologies. And so heretofore when we started with the ground-based interceptor, we were focused on large terrestrial radars that were basically left over from the Cold War, based up in the northern part of the world; that would see.

And if you look at the world from on top, which is the way a missile looks at it, things fly directly across the poles. So these radars were aligned up there in the Cold War to defend us against incoming ICBMs. We modified those radars, updated their processors, so that they -- they are still part of the system.

But we've also added mobile and re-locatable radars: the X-band radar that is in Japan, the X-band radar that we currently have deployed to Israel, one that will be probably deployed someplace in Europe, to be part of this European lay down. That system has proved to be very, very effective and very capable.

The second is the mobile radars both on Aegis, the organic radar, to the Patriot system and also the sea-based X-band that is currently deployed out in the Pacific. These are all mobile systems that can move, to wherever the threat actually emanates and to wherever it is that we feel we need to defend ourselves. And that's an important aspect.

The one piece that we have not had up until now is the airborne layer. And part of this program is to bring in an airborne layer of sensors that will add to the redundancy, survivability and efficiency of the overall system. And that work is ongoing now, was part of our '09 budget and '10 budget submissions, will likely start to emanate itself in real capability probably in the '12 to '13 time frame.

And it is very promising technology that we're working on. And then we have our space-based sensors. All of this is netted together to give us the adaptability we believe we'll need to have.

The last piece in this triad of capability is the weapons. And everybody pretty much knows the capabilities of the Patriot system. It's been out there. It's well deployed. It's globally deployed.

Many countries have procured it, use it for their defenses. It is a point defense system. You would put this at critical infrastructure, a facility like an airport or a port, to defend that area.

Then there is the SM-3, which has proven itself in the testing and which we are now fielding in larger numbers. It is a more capable area-defense weapon. It is more aligned with trying to take care of a general area like the area from Philadelphia down to Washington, D.C., for an analogy.

And the THAAD -- which has just started to finish its testing -- its first operational deployments will begin this year to the European theater, and we'll do that operational flash development deployment to make sure that we wring this system out. But it is by all measures successful in its testing, and we're getting ready to move on to

deployment of that system.

And then there's the ground-based interceptor, which is the large missile that we've put in the ground in Alaska and in Vandenberg, California, to defend the homeland against ICBM-type threats, sophisticated-type threats.

So all of those three make up the capabilities that we have in the system today. The phases that the secretary introduced that we're going to work our way through will allow us to be adaptable and to allow us to field tested systems when they're needed, where they're needed, rather than a pre-planned lay down that locks us in to any particular capability and threat that may well change over time, because one thing I'm relatively sure of is the threat will change. I mean, we have a thinking adversary, and we have to acknowledge that.

The first phase starts in 2011 and really, actually, has already started. But this is the deployment of the Patriot systems, which are out there today. This is the deployment of the SM-3 system, Block I, Mod A, but this is the system we have today. We've had eight good tests. It is the same system we used to shoot down the satellite. It is a very efficient and a very effective system with a long heritage of R&D and knowledge about it.

That system we have started to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean already, and we will begin to deploy that in larger numbers. When we marry that up with the sensors, that will give us the ability to defend critical infrastructure, defend our four deployed forces in Europe and in the Mediterranean as we move forward. That is scheduled for 2011 to be fully in place, okay?

As we move in to the second phase, which, as the secretary said, is somewhere around the 2015 time frame, we expect to have an upgrade to the SM-3 Block IA, which will be called the SM-3 Block IB. We're a little bit anal about this, but that's the way we laid it out.

That capability, along with better sensors -- and the beginning deployment of these airborne sensors, should they manifest themselves in the way we think they will -- will allow us to move from a relatively small area -- and I talked about Philadelphia to Washington, D.C. -- this would be at least three times larger, based on the ability of the missile and the sensor packages to address the threats that are out there.

So we get a much larger deployment capability. And we'll also bring in the first phase of land-based SM-3. And land-based SM-3 is something that we have today. We have the systems at our test facilities. It's no surprise. We do most of our testing on the land anyway. This is not a stretch. But we'll put together the system in a deployable configuration so that we can move it forward to places like Europe. Okay?

In 2018, we expect to see the next iteration, and that's a little bit further out. And what we're looking for in 2018 is the emergence of the SM-3 Block II, a substantially larger, more capable missile that will deploy both on our ships and ashore. And that missile will allow us, in probably no more than three locations, to be able to cover the entire land mass of Europe, okay, against intermediate- and short-range ballistic missiles, okay. And that's a substantial improvement on where we are. That's an R&D effort.

So at the same time, we're continuing the effort that we have ongoing today on the ground-based interceptor, which is to build a two-stage capability. Those tests will -- are funded, and will continue. So we'll have two ways to address this threat. We believe the leverage will be in the SM-3 as it emerges, that it will be the more effective killer. But until we know that, we are not abandoning the work that we are doing with the ground-based interceptor. Okay?

The last piece of this -- and this is reaching out pretty far into the future, but we're talking 2020 -- is a land-based SM-3 Block IIA, now B, okay? And B is an even more energetic capability that will have a substantial capability to intercept intercontinental ballistic missile type capabilities emanating from Iran. So this gets at additional coverage beyond the ground-based interceptor of the United States and of Europe against intermediate ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

That technology is still out there and still to be proven, and we cannot abandon or scrap the capabilities that we have today in the ground-based interceptor; nor do we intend to. But if these new technologies prove out, what they have that the current system doesn't have is the ability to get at what we call raid size. But we built the original system on the idea of a rogue-nation threat: three to five missiles that could come from either North Korea or Iran. The reality is, we're dealing with hundreds of missiles in the IRBM and medium-range capabilities, and the likelihood of more than just four or five has to be considered now as we start to build this system out.

What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than we what we have with a ground-based interceptor. A single Aegis can carry a

hundred-plus or minus a few, depending on their mission configuration, of the SM-3. So this is a substantial addressal of the proliferation of the threat that we're seeing emerge. If it doesn't emerge, we don't have to build them all, but if it does, we're ready to basically go after it.

And so we've put in place an architecture here that allows us to be adaptable. It is a global architecture.

Let me cover just a couple more things.

First, cost, one of the questions that gets answered. A Patriot costs you about \$3.3 million per missile, okay, and there's other ground pieces to this, et cetera, but the missile itself.

The THAAD missile's about \$9 million.

The SM-3 that we're talking about here in the Block I configuration, about \$9-1/2 (million), \$10 million. We estimate that the newer missiles that we would develop in the future would be in the neighborhood of \$13 (million) to \$15 million, around.

The ground-based interceptor that's in the ground today is about \$70 million.

So you do not want to go after large numbers with the very expensive missiles, unless it's absolutely essential. What we need is an approach that allows us to build the layers in a way that allows us to defend both what we think we're going to have to defend today and what might be fundamentally different as we move to the future.

Second thing: This system allows us to do burden-sharing. The Patriot system is deployed all over the world, to many countries, okay, not owned by the United States; in other words, purchased by those countries. The Aegis system is the same way. Many countries have the Aegis system. So we can modify those systems, upgrade them, keep them up with the technology much cheaper than we can do this buying it ourselves. So we have a capability for burden-sharing.

In the R&D side of the equation, as we look at this SM-3, Block II, we estimate that R&D effort is going to probably cost us about \$3-1/2 billion. The Japanese government has already kicked in over a billion dollars towards that investment. And that investment will net us a capability that is far beyond just worrying about the Pacific and the Japanese. This is a significant opportunity to work in a global construct to both field and fund and maintain this capability in a way that we had not been able to do in the past.

The other piece here is the integration. We don't necessarily need to have all American systems. We're right now integrating the Israeli Arrow system into this capability. We are looking at other partners, both in the sensor and the weapons side, because it does not have to be just American weapons and just American sensors.

That's the beauty of this command-and-control suite. And so that gives us the opportunity to leverage our investments, in a way that we did not have with the solely GBI system.

The last piece that I'll talk to here is, like I said when I started, this is consistent with the budgets that we submitted in '09 and '10. We'll have this debate as we submit the '11 budget.

And that's part of the reason for the timing now, is to make sure that that debate is allowed to occur, that we can inform the Congress and the American people and our allies and give them choices, about the way we move forward.

With that, I'll take your questions.

Q I noticed that neither of you said the word Russia in your opening remarks. Can you say to what extent the hope for a better relationship with Russia and Russia's cooperation, in any future sanctions regime or other attempt to counter the Iranian missile threat, to what extent that was a factor in making this change?

SEC. GATES: I think General Cartwright sat in on all the deputies meetings. I sat in on all the principals meetings and the meetings with the president.

The decisions -- the decisions on this were driven, I would say, almost exclusively by the changed intelligence assessment and the enhanced technology. It really was a zero-based look at both the threat and our capability to deal with it.



Now, that said, I think that first of all, the Russians are probably not going to be pleased that we are continuing with missile defense efforts in Europe. But at the same time, there are two changes in this architecture that should allay some of their, what we think, unfounded concerns.

One is their concern that the radar that was going into the Czech Republic looked deep into Russia and actually could monitor the launches of their ICBMs as well. So that's one.

The second is, the Russians believed, despite our best efforts to dissuade them, that the ground-based interceptors in Poland could be fitted with nuclear weapons and become an offensive weapon like a Pershing and a weapon for which they would have virtually no warning time.

The move to the SM-3s, while enhancing our capabilities, that's also a weapon that they simply cannot at least rationally argue bears any kind of a threat to Russia. So those -- and we are very interested, as I have talked to the Russians for the last two years -- we are very interested in having them partner with us. Their Armavir radar in the southern part of Russia could be integrated into this network and could be very effective in helping us, with respect to giving even greater coverage to potential Iranian missile launches.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the people and governments of Poland and the Czech Republic who invested a lot of political capital in trying to sell the old system to their people, and who are already talking about feeling let down in a certain sense by this change?

SEC. GATES: Well, I -- as the president mentioned in his remarks, he's talked to both prime ministers. Michele Flournoy is in Poland and the Czech Republic today, talking to their governments. And I must say, based on the very brief accounts I've gotten, they have been reasonably positive about this.

We are very interested in -- as I indicated in my remarks, in continuing to work with the Czech Republic, in terms of a piece of this architecture. And we are eager to go forward with the framework agreement with the Czechs on this, that would allow that. Clearly, what this represents is, if the Poles are interested in going forward, it meets their concerns about having this capability in Poland. And so I think that this is actually an enhanced opportunity for -- particularly the Polish government, but it also offers opportunities for the Czech Republic as well.

Q Well, because you did mention that there could still be the deployment of an X-Band radar in Europe as part of this. Do you know where that would be? Could it still be in the Czech Republic?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It's probably more likely to be in The Caucasus that we would base that, because it's to get the early tracks. So that likely would be more down in The Caucasus.

Q A question for you, Mr. Gates, and then for General Cartwright. A lot of people are going to be wondering why should we trust the intelligence assessments that you're laying out today, when the intelligence community got it so wrong in the buildup to the war in Iraq. What can you tell them?

And to General Cartwright, roughly how many Aegis vessels will be deployed to the Mediterranean or the Gulf area on a rotating regular basis?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think the important thing is to go back to what General Cartwright was saying and what I said in my opening statement. This gives us some capability very soon.

The other alternative gave us no capability until later in the decade. So if there were going to be a breakout scenario, we would have no hedge before 2017, 2018, with the original program that I approved in December of '06. This gives us at least some capability early on and then an increasingly enhanced capability through this entire period. So the notion -- I mean, the fact is, this gives us many more options than the original program gave, which is one of the reasons that I felt very strongly in support of it.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: And I think, I mean, along the same lines, I mean, I'm relatively sure that the intelligence estimates will be wrong if we've got a good adversary, so the intent here is to develop a system that sufficient agility to accommodate that. That would be point one.

The second -- to your question, our deployment scheme in and around Europe for the Aegis capability in 2011 is really one that meters against the threat, how it emerges. So how many do we need, and in what areas? What's going on in Europe? What is the political situation? In other words, is there a threat against a particular country, et cetera?

But on a day-in, day-out basis, we're looking probably for what we would call a 2.0 presence, maybe a 3.0 presence, so three ships at any given time in and around the Mediterranean and the North Sea, et cetera, to protect areas of interest, and then we would surge additional ships. And part of what's in the budget is to get us a sufficient number of ships to allow us to have a global deployment of this capability on a constant basis, with a surge capacity to any one theater at a time.

SEC. GATES: And I would remind you that the FY '10 budget contains the funds to convert six additional ships to Aegis capability.

Q (Do you see it as ?) 24, (roughly, doing this ?)?

SEC. GATES: I don't remember.

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: It's somewhere in -- 24, 27 is where we've done that.

Q On Afghanistan --

SEC. GATES: Let me -- let's do several more on missile defense and then I'll come -- if there's time left.

Thom.

Q Yes. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Israel was mentioned a couple of times earlier.

It's no secret that here in Washington, there is concern that Israel, fearing an existential threat, might attack Iran pre-emptively to stop its nuclear program.

Since we don't really understand the lay down and scope of this, would this system in some way be used, by the administration, to say to Israel, you will be protected, please do not attack Iran.

SEC. GATES: Well, clearly one of the elements of our efforts, with the Israelis, is to enhance their missile defense capabilities principally against the Iranian threat. And clearly the more we do, in this area, we hope that it will reassure them that perhaps there's a little more time here.

We are all concerned about Iran running out the clock on us on their nuclear program. And, but our view is, there is still time for diplomacy and, I might say, sanctions to persuade the Iranians that their security will be diminished, by going down the track of nuclear weapons, rather than enhanced.

(Cross talk.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Could I just add on to that? Just because I think the issue here is much broader than just Israel.

I mean, if this system emerges the way we think it is, if the testing bears out, what you really are doing here is providing another form of deterrence, credible deterrence, that is an alternative to an offensive-only capability.

And that's got to register. It has registered in the Pacific, as you've seen by the investments of the South Koreans and the Japanese, in response to North Korea. So this is broader than just Israel, for the same reasons that the secretary talked to.

Q Can you explain why X-band radar in the Caucasus might be more -- less of a threat to Russia than the Czech radar? And what is -- by 2011, how many medium-range missiles from Iran could they conceivably launch toward Europe? Is this just one or two? Or are we in the hundreds?

SEC. GATES: On the capabilities of the X-band radar, the history major will defer to the general.  
(Laughter.)

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: On the X-band radar, what we're trying to get -- the first question really has to do with Russia and their perception of a threat, from the radar that would have been in the Czech Republic.

And that radar is an omni-directional radar. In other words, it sees 360 degrees. And it has a very deep peering capability into Russia.

And the worry would be that we would be able then to see very early the launches if Russia were launching their ICBMs and that could be perceived as destabilizing. The X-band radar is a single directional. In other words, when you put it down, it points in a single direction. And it will be very clear that it is pointing south towards Iran.

What you want to do is get that radar as close as you can to be able to get the initial launches and understand where the missiles are going, whether they are just tests or whether they are threatening. And so the X-band radar gives you that capability very quickly.

Q Mr. Secretary, as we know, the Iranian ballistic missiles pose also a threat to the Gulf, to the Arab countries of -- in the Gulf. How this new architecture would affect your defense strategy in the Gulf region?

SEC. GATES: I don't want to get into it in too much detail, but the reality is we are working both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis in the Gulf to establish the same kind of regional missile defense that would protect our facilities out there as well as our friends and allies. I've addressed this issue two years running in Manama, in meetings of defense ministers before the Manama conferences. And I would say -- and we already have Patriots out there and we have Aegis ships out there.

So -- and we are looking at -- we have very strong bilateral relationships in developing missile defense with several of the countries in the Gulf. And now what we're encouraging is to layer on top of that multilateral cooperation as well.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned before that Michele Flournoy will be in Europe as part of this roll-out. Can you talk about when and how Russia was informed of these changes and what their reaction was?

SEC. GATES: I don't know the answer to that.

Q (Off mike) -- ask a little bit more about the architecture, specifically. You mentioned the SM-3 Block IA and B to start. I'm curious, how many sites will you need to start with the IA and IB? And will Czechoslovakia -- or the Czech Republic and Poland be part of that, or will they have to wait till the II comes on board? And is that an optimal location for either of those systems, architecturally?

GEN. CARTWRIGHT: Initially -- and it's the IB that we would start with, the land-based system, so about the 2015 time frame. And it's actually relatively agnostic to the where. And so the Czech Republic, Poland, are both candidates.

It's certainly something that they have to have a say in, though, as to whether we go there. There are other candidates in that region, and then obviously deeper into Europe, that would be good sites for the SM-3.

So the good news is, it really is not as particular about exactly where it's located. So you've got a wide range of choices. Any of those countries have the opportunity to participate in it. And then, even if we, let's say, had three countries that wanted it, and only needed one, the general construct is, each box will have about eight missiles, so we can move this around and disperse it even more, for greater survivability and for a better assurance of our allies that they are in fact protected.

Okay, we have time for one more on missile defense and then --

Q If I could just --

(Cross talk.)

SEC. GATES: No -- (laughs) -- and then, we'll take a couple on other subjects. Yeah.

Q Mr. Secretary, the plan you just announced may have sense from the U.S. perspective, but for many people in Poland and for Polish government, the most important part of missile defense program was the presence of U.S. military in Poland. And now you're offering Poland another five, seven years of talks. Polish government invested a lot in promoting missile defense in Poland. It was the U.S. government that pressed Poland to agree to host the missile defense. What would you say to those who invested their lot in this program in Poland? And another question, have you --

SEC. GATES: Well, one at a time --

Q Have you consulted this new approach with the governments of Poland and Czech Republic --

SEC. GATES: Yes.

Q -- before?

SEC. GATES: Yes. The answer that I would give to Poles asking that question is, we still want to partner with Poland. We still want Poland to go forward with the ratification of the agreements that we have with them, including the SOFA. We would prefer to put the SM-3s in Poland, in place of the GBI -- the ground-based interceptors. That will still involve a presence of the U.S.

They may be there earlier than they would have been with the ground-based interceptors, because, as I said, they would not become operational until probably 2017, 2018. We're talking about 2015 now. So I think that there are -- all of the same opportunities for partnership between the United States and Poland that existed under the previous program continue to exist under this program.

Q On Afghanistan and the McChrystal assessment, some are calling for it to be publicly released. It's now classified. I'm told that clearly some parts of that assessment are sensitive. But other parts clearly have been talked about by McChrystal openly in a number of interviews and others.

Can you explain to the American people why they can't get their own assessment from McChrystal about his views on Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think, there's been a lot of talk this week and the last two or three weeks about Afghanistan. And frankly from my standpoint, everybody ought to take a deep breath.

The president announced at the end of March -- when he announced his other decisions on Afghanistan and our strategy, he made very clear that after the elections in Afghanistan, we would reassess where we are and whether the strategy decisions that he made, at that time, continue to fit the situation that we face.

General McChrystal's assessment is part of that re-evaluation. And frankly I believe that the president deserves the right to absorb the assessment himself and have his questions and my questions and others' questions relating to the assessment answered before it's delivered.

It is for all practical purposes a pre-decisional document. And it was briefed on the Hill. And my understanding is, it will be made available on the Hill, if not passed out to everybody, so the people's representatives will have access to it.

And I think we just -- we need to understand that the decisions that the president faces are perhaps some of the most -- on Afghanistan are some of the most important he may face, in his presidency, about how we go forward there.

And this is a situation in which I think this decision process should not be rushed. If there are urgent needs, I've just authorized in the last 10 days or so, within the troop levels the president has approved, sending another 2,500 to 3,000 critical enablers that General McChrystal has asked for.

And I'm prepared to ask for the flexibility to send more enablers, if we need to, before the president makes a decision on whether or not to send significant additional combat troops.

But my view is, as the president said yesterday, it's important to make sure we've got the strategy right before we start talking the resource issue. And frankly, some of the questions we're asking are outside of General McChrystal's area of authority. They have to do with the political situation, they have to do with focus and so on. And so I think there's a sort of a sense of -- I felt a sense of building momentum that's sort of demanding a decision in days, if not a week or two. And I just think that, given the importance of the decisions that the president faces, we need to take our time and get this right.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q On the resource issue, on McChrystal, some of us are told that McChrystal has completed his report on troop requests, the options for troop requests, and is awaiting Washington to ask for his request. What's your --

SEC. GATES: We're working -- we're working through the process by which we want that submitted.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I ask you something else? The president, of course, is about to award yet

another Medal of Honor posthumously to a family of a soldier who died in an act of courage in the war. People, still, are getting very curious why, in awards in Afghanistan and Iraq, there is no living Medal of Honor recipient. What's your view? Has no one performed an act of courage worthy of the Medal of Honor, and lived through it?

SEC. GATES: This has been a source of real concern to me. And I would tell you, it was one of -- I think it was one of President Bush's real regrets, that he did not have the opportunity to honor a living Medal of Honor winner -- or recipient, I should say.

The -- we are looking at this. There are -- I would -- without getting into any details, there are some in process. But it is, as everybody knows, a very time-intensive, thorough process. But I would say that I've been told there are some living potential recipients that are -- that have been put forward.

Q Mr. Secretary --

Q Back to Afghanistan, if we can, the vice president said today in an interview the decision about troop levels will be made after all the present troops are in place, the civilians are in place and the election is determined - solely focusing on the objective.

Is he right in saying that no decisions on troop levels will be made until after even the civilian surge is finished --

SEC. GATES: I don't --

Q -- which might be the beginning of the year?

SEC. GATES: I don't want to get into the timing. The president will make his decision when the questions that he has asked and the assessments that are going on have been completed. And I don't think anybody should put any conditions on that.

The troops he's already approved are almost all there at this point. The civilian surge is beginning to flow. It remains to be seen how long it will take to see the outcome of the election. But I would tell you there is no question that the -- that the nature of the election in Afghanistan has complicated the picture for us.

Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

### POW/MIA Recognition Day

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Friday, September 18, 2009*

Good morning. I too would like to thank you all for coming: veterans' groups, MIA/POW organizations, leaders of the Department of Defense, and distinguished guests.

We pause today to remember, honor, and show solidarity with our troops who have been captured or gone missing in America's wars – and to affirm that we will never forget our duty to bring them home.

The return of the remains of Navy Captain Michael Scott Speicher, shot down in Iraq in the early hours of the Gulf War 18 years ago, closes a prolonged and terrible period for his family. It is a reminder of the burdens borne by tens of thousands of military families down the years.

No nation in history has gone to such care, expense, or effort to locate its fallen. U.S. government dive-and-salvage teams, forensic scientists, and investigators scour the globe to seek a full accounting. Here are some of the most recent results of their work: Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Earl Hopper, who died in 1968; Army Private David Woodruff, captured in 1951 in Korea; and Army Air Forces Staff Sergeant Jimmie Doyle, who died in 1944 – all were returned to their families, this year, and buried with full military honors.

This work continues. We do it mindful of what we owe POW/MIAs and their loved ones. And we do it in affirmation of our strongest belief as a people: that every life is precious.

Our special guest today is Admiral Jeremiah Denton. In 1965, then-Commander Denton led an air attack on a military installation in North Vietnam. When his A-6 Intruder was shot down, he began what would turn out to be seven years and seven months in Vietnamese prison camps. He was brought before the press so that he would denounce his own country. He refused. What's more, his blinking in the television lights was Morse code. He spelled out the word "torture," confirming what was happening to American POWs at the hands of their captors. For his courageous resistance, he received the Navy Cross.

Back home, his wife, the late Jane Maury Denton, was keeping the faith. She was active on his behalf, and was among the first to band together with other citizens to form the advocacy groups we know today – helping to insure that the U.S. government pays attention and does everything it can to locate MIAs and help POWs during their captivity.

What Jeremiah Denton and his fellow prisoners experienced is testimony to how comrades-in-arms cope in the harshest of circumstances. As he later wrote: "Our little


network bound us together in common cause, and gave us the power to resist beyond ordinary physical endurance. It was a tender bond of faith and love, and we saw for the first time the true fellowship of man."

Ladies and gentlemen, may I introduce to you Admiral Jeremiah Denton.


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS AT POW/MIA RECOGNITION DAY CEREMONY

Sept. 18, 2009



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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates addresses the audience during the National POW/MIA Recognition Day ceremony at the Pentagon, Sept. 18, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates shakes hands with retired Rear Adm. Jeremiah A. Denton Jr. as Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, looks on during the National POW/MIA Recognition Day ceremony at the Pentagon, Sept. 18, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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Marine Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, left, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, and retired Rear Adm. Jeremiah A. Denton Jr. walk to the annual observance of National POW/MIA Recognition Day at the Pentagon, Sept. 18, 2009. Denton, a guest speaker who also served as a U.S. Senator from Alabama, described his own experiences as a prisoner of war for nearly eight years.  
*DoD photo by Robert D. Ward*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

September 18, 2009

### Media Availability with Secretary Gates and Minister of Defense. Czech Republic Martin Bartak

(Note: Minister Bartak's remarks are provided through an interpreter.)

SEC. GATES: It is my pleasure to have the opportunity to meet with Minister Bartak today. We had a very good conversation. We obviously talked about the new architecture for missile defense and about the fact there will be a U.S. missile defense in Europe.

We talked about opportunities for future cooperation. I said that we would welcome Czech participation in the new architecture. And we will look for opportunities to do that. We will continue our bilateral research efforts in missile defense.

We've agreed that there will be a high-level defense group meeting, in Prague hopefully early this fall, the primary purpose of which will be to examine further opportunities for enhancing the security relationship between the Czech Republic and the United States.

We had a very good exchange. I thanked the minister also for Czech efforts in Afghanistan. And we talked about NATO and all in all had a very good meeting.

Mr. Minister.

MIN. BARTAK: (In English.) Thank you.

I will speak Czech to make it easier for our reporters.

(Through interpreter.) I would like to thank for the opportunity to meet with the secretary of Defense of the United States and in particular with a view to the current situation, where we were notified about a decision about missile defense.

This trip wasn't planned for this purpose, because the main purpose of this trip was to develop our cooperation not only in military but also in other areas, such as scientific and research development.

And we also brought the message that even though our preliminary elections were moved, but we don't know the date when they are going to take place in fact, this administration is going to lead the country in a stable manner and it won't affect negatively any of our commitments. And we will do our best to lead the country in a stable manner until the regular elections take place.

And Secretary Gates already described the meeting in detail, so I would only add that the discussions were not focused only on missile defense but also on the cooperation that is going to take place as soon as possible, and we are going to reach very tangible results soon.

And the main message for the home would be that the missile defense doesn't end here. Actually, we are going to reevaluate it, and we are going to cooperate and we are going to figure out a way how Czech Republic can be involved in the future missile defense as well. Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Okay, we have time just for one question from this side. Yes.

Q Prague Daily [Monitor] Newspaper, the Czech Republic. Mr. Secretary, what are -- what flexibility does the new system -- or will the new system provide, should the intelligence on Iran change again in the future?

SEC. GATES: Well, the original program that I recommended would have had no capability against short- and medium-range missiles until, probably, 2018. What the new system provides is a -- is some capability, beginning in 2011, that will grow steadily each year in terms of its sophistication and its coverage of Europe. The next phase would begin in 2015.

So if the intelligence is wrong -- and I was in that business long enough to know that that happens -- we actually are better able to deal with a changed situation in which the intelligence assessments are wrong, with the new architecture than we were with the old one, because there was no intermediate stage, if you will, with the ground-based interceptors at that time.

The other aspect of this is, as we talked about yesterday -- is that the ground-based interceptors were really designed primarily to deal with perhaps -- well, probably no more than five targets. And we were assuming those would be longer-range, perhaps intercontinental ballistic

missiles. What we have seen with the Iranians is that they are producing and deploying significant numbers of short- and medium-range missiles. And so they could overwhelm -- even when the 10 interceptors were in place, a salvo like that could overwhelm it. So this, I think, provides significantly more protection, should the intelligence forecast be wrong.

Q (Off mike) -- first question for the Defense minister. Mr. Minister, would you be interested in hosting any of the -- of these new interceptors?

And for Mr. Secretary, NATO has said today -- the NATO secretary-general has said today that the U.S., Russia and NATO should link their systems. Can you say what, if any, assurances you've gotten from Russia on whether that is indeed possible; what short-term steps could be taken for something like that to happen, since it's been discussed in the past? And what do you say to the Republicans on the Hill who say that they do not trust this intelligence?

MIN. BARTAK: Czech Republic is definitely interested in being part of missile defense in future as well, but it would be too early to talk about hosting the interceptors of missiles yet. It depends on our future technical meetings and how the new concepts of anti-missile defense is going to develop. Obviously, the decision will be up to the administration that will be at power at that time. And we are not talking about near future, it might be in a couple of years.

SEC. GATES: What was the first part of your question, Lita?

Q The secretary-general has suggested that the U.S., NATO and --

SEC. GATES: Yeah. The -- there was no discussion of any of this with the Russians, to the best of my knowledge. For two years -- more than two years -- I have encouraged the Russians to be our partners in this missile defense.

The Russians have a radar in southern Russia, the Armavir radar, that actually would fill a gap in coverage. And we would welcome the Russians networking with this -- with us in this. We think that we could make that happen.

One of the attributes of this changed architecture is that we are now able to network the capabilities, the radars, of several different kinds -- of several different kinds and of several different countries, so we're actually in a better position with the new architecture to be able to integrate a Russian contribution than we were before. But there were no -- to the best of my knowledge, as we put this proposal together, there were no conversations with the Russians.

In terms of those who question whether we're over-relying on intelligence, as I suggested to your Czech colleague, I probably am more familiar with the risks of overreliance on intelligence than anybody, because I've seen how often it's been wrong. And as I say, I think that this architecture gives us -- if the intelligence is wrong and the Iranians develop a capability sooner than the intelligence is saying, this architecture gives us a better chance of being able to cope with it than the program that I signed in December 2006, just because of the new technologies that are available, that give us more flexibility.

And as -- you know, the reality is also we are going to continue the R&D [research and development] on the ground-based interceptors as a fall-back.

Thank you all.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the U.S. miss a chance to get a concession from the Russians?

(No response as the secretary leaves the microphone.)

New York Times  
September 20, 2009  
Pg. WK10

## **A Better Missile Defense For A Safer Europe**

By Robert M. Gates

Washington--THE future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama's proposed shift in America's missile-defense plans on the continent — and it is important to understand how and why.

First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East — the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.

That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 — and likely much later.

Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.

The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.

Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short- and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan. Even so, our military will continue research and development on a two-stage ground-based interceptor, the

kind that was planned to be put in Poland, as a back-up.

Moreover, a fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and ground-based sensors we now plan to use. These systems provide much more accurate data, offer more early warning and tracking options, and have stronger networking capacity — a key factor in any system that relies on partner countries. This system can also better use radars that are already operating across the globe, like updated cold war-era installations, our newer arrays based on high-powered X-band radar, allied systems and possibly even Russian radars.

1124

One criticism of this plan is that we are relying too much on new intelligence holding that Iran is focusing more on short- and medium-range weapons and not progressing on intercontinental missiles. Having spent most of my career at the C.I.A., I am all too familiar with the pitfalls of over-reliance on intelligence assessments that can become outdated. As Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago, we would be surprised if the assessments did not change because “the enemy gets a vote.”

The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example, the new proposal provides some antimissile capacity very soon — a hedge against Iran’s managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan. Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue. Of course, considering Russia’s past hostility toward American missile defense in Europe, if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected — and welcome — change of policy on their part. But in any case the facts are clear: American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we hope, in other NATO countries as well.

This proposal is, simply put, a better way forward — as was recognized by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland when he called it “a chance for strengthening Europe’s security.” It is a very real manifestation of our continued commitment to our NATO allies in Europe — iron-clad proof that the United States believes that the alliance must remain firm.

I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.

I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983. But I want to have real capacity as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies to combat future threats.

The bottom line is that there will be American missile defense in Europe to protect our troops there and our NATO allies. The new proposal provides needed capacity years earlier than the original plan, and will provide even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program. We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe.

*Robert M. Gates is the secretary of defense.*



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

September 27, 2009

### Secretary Gates Interview on ABC's This Week with George Stephanopoulos

STEPHANOPOULOS: And we begin with the secretary of defense, Robert Gates, Welcome back to "This Week."

GATES: Thank you.

STEPHANOPOULOS: National security was front and center all week long. Let's begin with Afghanistan. We saw the leak of General McChrystal's review, and he concluded that the United States has about 12 months to reverse Taliban momentum and that, without new troops, the strategy laid out by the president is likely to fail. And I want to show what the president said back in March when he laid out that strategy. He called it "new and comprehensive."  
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

OBAMA: This marks the conclusion of a careful policy review. My administration has heard from our military commanders, as well as our diplomats. We've consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, with our partners and our NATO allies, and with other donors and international organizations. We've also worked closely with members of Congress here at home. (END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Now, this was clearly a carefully considered strategy. And now the president is telling us -- he told me last week that he can't approve General McChrystal's request until we get the strategy right. Why the second thoughts on the strategy?

GATES: I don't think there are second thoughts so much as, you know, when he made his decisions at the end of March, he also announced that he would -- we would be reviewing the policy and the strategy after the elections...

STEPHANOPOULOS: But he said the tool was in the tactics, not the strategy.

GATES: Well, I -- I think that he -- he clearly felt that we would have to reassess where we are after the election. Now, in addition to having a flawed election in Afghanistan, we now have General McChrystal's assessment.

When the president made his comments at -- at the end of March, his decisions, obviously, General McChrystal was not in place. We now have his assessment. He has found the situation on the ground in Afghanistan worse than he had -- than he anticipated.

And so I think what the president is now saying is, in light of the election, in light of McChrystal's more concerning assessment of the situation on the ground, have we got the strategy right, were the decisions in -- that he made at the end of March the right ones? Do we need to make some adjustments in light of what we've found?

And once we've decided whether or not to make adjustments in the strategy, then we will consider the additional resources.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But did -- but didn't General McChrystal take these problems of the election into account? He didn't even deliver his report until August 30th, which was after the elections. Dennis Blair, the head of national intelligence, said back in February or March that we could foresee that there would be problems with this election.

GATES: Well, I think -- I think that the potential magnitude of the problems in the election really didn't become apparent until the vote count began in early September. So -- so I think it was really after he submitted his - his assessment.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So now we have a real dilemma. Does that mean that the United States is re-thinking whether it can even -- whether it can bolster President Karzai's government, whether we have to give up on it?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, the Afghan people have gone to the polls, and we have the two election commissions -- one internal, one international -- that could still come to conclusions, even if they throw out some fraudulent ballots or a number of fraudulent ballots, that there was a clear winner.

The key is whether the Afghans believe that their government has legitimacy. And everything that I've seen in the intelligence and elsewhere indicates that remains the case.

STEPHANOPOULOS: It does seem, though, that you're caught in a dilemma right now. You've got your commanding general on the ground who's given you this report. He's said that troops -- more troops are necessary or you risk failure.

That report has been endorsed by the head of Central Command, David Petraeus. Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to Congress and said we probably need more troops.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Yet the president is saying that we need to think about the strategy right now. And it really creates the impression of a rift between the civilian leadership, you, as secretary of Defense, the president, and the uniformed military.

GATES: I don't think that's the case at all. I talked with -- I had an extensive conversation on the telephone with both General McChrystal and General Petraeus on -- on Wednesday. General McChrystal was very explicit in saying that he thinks this assessment, this review that's going on right now is exactly the right thing to do. He obviously doesn't want it to be open-ended or be a protracted kind of thing...

STEPHANOPOULOS: How long will it take?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, I -- it's not going to take -- I think it -- it's a matter of a few weeks. And people should remember that the debate within the Bush administration on the surge lasted three months, from October to December 2006.

So I think it's important to make sure we're confident that we have the right strategy in place, and then we can make the decisions on additional forces.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Yet the clock really does seem to be ticking, again, to go back to General McChrystal's report. He says that if we don't turn the tide in the next 12 months, we risk failure. So every week that goes by puts the soldiers who are on the ground at risk, doesn't it?

GATES: But having the -- having the wrong strategy would put even more soldiers at risk. So I think it's important to get the strategy right and then we can make the resources decision.

As I say, I don't expect this to be protracted process. The reality is that, even if the president did decide to approve additional combat forces going into Afghanistan, the first forces couldn't arrive until January.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So what are the options right now? You have said in the past that you didn't believe what some people are recommending -- stepping up drone attacks, stepping up missile attacks, using special forces -- you don't believe or haven't believed in the past that that's sufficient to contain the Taliban.

GATES: I think that most people who -- the people that I've talked to in the Pentagon who are the experts on counterterrorism essentially say that counterterrorism is only possible if you have the kind of intelligence that allows you to target the terrorists. And the only way you get that intelligence is by being on the ground, getting information from people like the Afghans or, in the case of Iraq, the Iraqis.

And so you can't do this from -- from a distance or remotely, in the view of virtually all of the experts that I've talked to.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So if that -- if that's not going to work, and then you have General McChrystal who said in his report that you need a full-blown counterinsurgency campaign, counterinsurgency is the answer, that certainly seems to be endorsed by General Petraeus. Is there a middle ground between those two poles?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think people are -- are, frankly, so focused on -- on the comment that -- in General McChrystal's report about additional resources that they're neglecting to look at the rest of what's in his report and that -- where he talks very explicitly about the fact that -- that a preoccupation with the resources or with additional forces, if you don't have the strategy right, is a mistake.

And -- and he, as I say, he understands this process that's underway. But -- but what he talks about in most of that assessment is not resources, but a different way of using U.S. forces and coalition forces in Afghanistan.

It talks about accelerating the growth of the Afghan national security forces. It spends a lot of time talking about how we stay on side with the Afghan people. This is mostly what McChrystal's assessment is about.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But it's a resource-intensive strategy, isn't it? He says that the troops have to probably be more lightly armed and engage more with the population. And it's hard to ignore that stark conclusion: Success is not ensured by additional forces alone, as you point out, but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure. Failure.

GATES: Well, that's what we're discussing. And how do we avoid that?

STEPHANOPOULOS: And, as you said, you hope to have this done in a few weeks and you want to avoid failure, as well, but the president has not made any -- any decision at all on resources? Has he -- has he ruled it out?

GATES: No, I haven't even given him General McChrystal's request for resources. I have the -- I -- I'm receiving the -- the report. I'm going to sit on it until I think -- or the president thinks -- it's appropriate to bring that into the discussion of the national security principles.

STEPHANOPOULOS: That's what -- General McChrystal says we have to have more troops to avoid failure. Where we've had a lack of clarity is on what success means in Afghanistan. You pointed out at the beginning of this year what it was, and he said we're not -- we shouldn't expect a Valhalla in Afghanistan.

The president's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, was asked for his definition of success last month, and here's what he said.  
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

HOLBROOKE: I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue, we'll know it when we see it.  
(END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Is that good enough?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think we know it when we see it, and we see it in Iraq. I think that success in Afghanistan looks a great deal like success in Iraq, in this respect, that the Afghan national security forces increasingly take the lead in protecting their own territory and going after the insurgents and protecting their own people. We withdraw to an over-watch situation and then we withdraw altogether.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Which first required a surge in Iraq.

GATES: It did require the surge. And that's -- the issue that we will be looking at over the next several weeks -- the next couple of weeks or so -- is, do we have the right strategy?

And that includes the question of -- of, is the -- is McChrystal's approach, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command commander, the right approach? And if so, then what -- what would be the additional resources required?

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me turn to Iran. The president has put Iran on notice that they're going to have to allow inspectors into this secret site which U.S. intelligence discovered for enriching uranium. President Ahmadinejad says that President Obama is mistaken and the United States owes Iran an apology. Is Iran going to get one?

GATES: Not a chance.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So what happens next? The president has said that this site is not configured for peaceful purposes. Now, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded -- of the U.S. government -- concluded that Iran had stopped its active nuclear weapons program in 2003. Does the president's conclusion -- that this site is not configured for peaceful purposes -- mean that that intelligence estimate is no longer operative?

GATES: No, not necessarily. But what it does mean is that they had a covert site. They did not declare it. They didn't -- if -- if this were a peaceful nuclear program, why didn't they announce this site when they began to construct it? Why didn't they allow IAEA inspectors in from the very beginning?

This -- this is part of a pattern of deception and lies on the part of the Iranians from the very beginning with respect to their nuclear program. So it's no wonder that world leaders think that they have ulterior motives, that they have a plan to go forward with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, why would they do all this in such a deceptive manner?

STEPHANOPOULOS: U.S. intelligence had been tracking this site for quite some time before President Obama made it public. Is this the only secret site that we know of?

GATES: Well, I'm not going to -- I'm not going to get into that. I would just say that we're watching very closely.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Does the United States government believe that Iran has an active nuclear weapons program?

GATES: I think that -- my personal opinion is that the Iranians have the intention of having nuclear weapons. I think the question of whether they have made a formal decision to -- to move toward the development of nuclear weapons is -- is in doubt.

STEPHANOPOULOS: The U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency said a couple of weeks ago that Iran is closer to what he called "breakout" capacity on developing a nuclear weapon. What does that mean exactly? And how much time -- if they do, indeed, have the intent -- how much time do we have before Iran has a nuclear weapons capacity?

GATES: Well, I think "breakout" in the -- in the ambassador's terms means they have enriched enough uranium to a relatively low level that if they have another facility where they could enrich it more highly, that they have a -- they have enriched enough at a low level that they could, in essence, throw out all the IAEA inspectors, change the configuration of the -- of the cascades and the enrichment capability, and enrich it to a level where they could use it -- where they could make it into weapons-grade uranium.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And you say you personally have no doubt that they want weapons. Can that weapons program be stopped with sanctions?

GATES: I think that what is critical is persuading the Iranians that -- or leading them to the conclusion that their security will be diminished by trying to get nuclear weapons, rather than enhanced.

And I think that, because of the election, we see fissures in Iran that we have not seen before, not in the 30 years since the revolution. And I think that severe sanctions, if the Iranian -- that, first of all, we -- we have created a problem for the Iranians with this disclosure.

And so the first step is the meeting on October 1st with the P5- plus-one, with the Iranians, to see if they will begin to change their policy in a way that is satisfactory to -- to the great powers.

And then, if that doesn't work, then I think you begin to move in the direction of severe sanctions. And their economic problems are difficult enough that -- that I think that severe sanctions would have the potential of -- of bringing them to change their -- their policies.

I think -- you asked me, how long do I think we have? I would say somewhere between one to three years.



STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me turn, finally, to Guantanamo. We have just a couple of minutes left. A major story in the Washington Post suggesting that the president's deadline of January 22nd for closing Guantanamo will not be met, and White House officials tell me that at least some prisoners will still be in Guantanamo on January 22nd and beyond. How big a setback is that? And how long will it take to finally close Guantanamo?

GATES: When the president-elect met with his new national security team in Chicago on December 7th...

STEPHANOPOULOS: 2008.

GATES: ... last year, this issue was discussed, about closing Guantanamo and executive orders to do that and so on. And the question was, should we set a deadline? Should we pin ourselves down?

I actually was one of those who said we should, because I know enough from being around this town that, if you don't put a deadline on something, you'll never move the bureaucracy. But I also said, and then if we find we can't get it done by that time but we have a good plan, then you're in a position to say, "It's going to take us a little longer, but we are moving in the direction of implementing the policy that the president set." And I think that's the position that...

STEPHANOPOULOS: That's where we are. So the deadline of January 22nd will not be met?

GATES: It's going to be tough.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And -- and how many prisoners will be there on January 22nd, do you know?

GATES: I don't know the answer to that.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But, as you said, it's going to be tough and likely will not be met?

GATES: We'll see.

STEPHANOPOULOS: One -- one other deadline question. When you were working for President Bush, you used to keep a countdown clock on your desk, counting down the number of days you had left to serve. Is that clock still there?

GATES: No, I threw the clock out. It was obviously useless.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So you're in for the long haul?

GATES: We'll see. The president-elect and I, when we first discussed this, agreed to leave it open.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Gates, thank you very much for your time today.

GATES: Thanks a lot.

ABC; CNN  
September 27, 2009

## Interviews With Secretary Gates

**This Week (ABC), 10:30 AM**

GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS: And we begin with the secretary of defense, Robert Gates.

Welcome back to "This Week."

National security was front and center all week long. Let's begin with Afghanistan. We saw the leak of General McChrystal's review. And he concluded that the United States has about 12 months to reverse Taliban momentum and that without new troops, the strategy laid out by the president is likely to fail.

And I want to show what the president said back in March when he laid out that strategy. He called it "new and comprehensive."

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: This marks the conclusion of a careful policy review. My administration has heard from our military commanders, as well as our diplomats. We've consulted with the Afghan and Pakistani governments, with our partners and our NATO allies, and with other donors and international organizations. We've also worked closely with members of Congress here at home.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Now, this was clearly a carefully considered strategy. And now the president is telling us -- he told me last week that he can't approve General McChrystal's request until we get the strategy right.

Why the second thoughts on the strategy?

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: I don't think there are second thoughts so much as when he made his decisions at the end of March, he also announced that he would -- we would be reviewing the policy and the strategy after the elections --

STEPHANOPOULOS: But he said the tool was in the tactics, not the strategy.

GATES: Well, I -- I think that he clearly felt that we would have to reassess where we are after the election. Now, in addition to having a flawed election in Afghanistan, we now have General McChrystal's assessment. When the president made his comments at the end of March, his decisions, obviously, General McChrystal was not in place. We now have his assessment. He has found the situation on the ground in Afghanistan worse than he had -- then he anticipated.

And so I think what the president is now saying is in light of the election, in light of McChrystal's more concerning assessment of the situation on the ground, have we got the strategy right? Were the decisions in -- that he made at the end of March, the right ones? Do we need to make some adjustments in light of what we've found?

And once we've decided whether or not to make adjustments in the strategy, then we will consider the additional resources.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But did -- but didn't General McChrystal take these problems of the election into account? He didn't even deliver his report until August 30th, which was after the elections. Dennis Blair, the head of National Intelligence, said back in February or March that we could foresee that there would be problems with this election.

GATES: Well, I think -- I think that the potential magnitude of the problems in the election really didn't become apparent until the vote count began in early September. So I think it was really after he submitted his assessment.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So now we have a real dilemma. Does that mean that the United States is re-thinking whether it can even -- whether it can bolster President Karzai's government or whether we have to give up on it?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, the Afghan people have gone to the polls and we have the two election commissions, one internal and one international, that could still come to conclusions, even if they throw out some fraudulent ballots or a number of fraudulent ballots, that there was a clear winner.

The key is whether the Afghans believe that their government has legitimacy. And everything that I've seen in the intelligence and elsewhere indicates that remains the case.

STEPHANOPOULOS: It does seem, though, that you're caught in a dilemma right now. You've got your commanding general on the ground who's given you this report. He's said the troops -- more troops are necessary or you risk failure. That report has been endorsed by the head of Central Command, David Petraeus. Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went to Congress and said we probably need more troops.

Yet the president is saying that we need to think about the strategy right now. And it really creates the impression of a rift between the civilian leadership -- you, as secretary of Defense, the president -- and the uniformed military.

GATES: I don't think that's the case at all. I talked with -- I had an extensive conversation on the telephone with both General McChrystal and General Petraeus on Wednesday. General McChrystal was very explicit in saying that he thinks this assessment, this review that's going on right now is exactly the right thing to do. He obviously doesn't want it to be open-ended or be a protracted kind of thing.

STEPHANOPOULOS: How long will it take?

GATES: Well, I -- you know, I -- it's not going to take -- I think it's a matter of a few weeks. And people should remember that the debate within the Bush administration on the surge lasted three months, from October to December, 2006.

So I think it's important to make sure we're confident that we have the right strategy in place and

then we can make the decisions on additional forces.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But the clock really does seem to be ticking again, to go back to General McChrystal's report. He says that if we don't turn the tide in the next 12 months, we risk failure. So every week that goes by puts the soldiers who are on the ground at risk, doesn't it?

GATES: But having the -- having the wrong strategy would put even more soldiers at risk. So I think it's important to get the strategy right and then we can make the resources decision because, as I say, I don't expect this to be protracted process. The reality is that even if the president did decide to approve additional combat forces going into Afghanistan, the first forces couldn't arrive until January.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So what are the options right now? You have said in the past that you didn't believe what some people are recommending -- stepping up drone attacks, stepping up missile attacks, using Special Forces.

You don't believe -- or haven't believed in the past that that's sufficient to contain the Taliban.

GATES: I think that most people who -- the people that I've talked to in the Pentagon who are the experts on counterterrorism essentially say that counterterrorism is only possible if you have the kind of intelligence that allows you to target the terrorists. And the only way you get that intelligence is by being on the ground -- getting information from people like the Afghans or, in the case of Iraq, the Iraqis.

And so you can't do this from a distance or remotely in the view of virtually all of the experts that I've talked to.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So if that -- if that's not going to work, then -- and then you have General McChrystal, who said in his report that you need a full blown counterinsurgency campaign, counterinsurgency is the answer. That certainly seems to be endorsed by General Petraeus.

Is there a middle ground between those two poles?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think people are, frankly, so focused on -- on the comment that -- in General McChrystal's report about additional resources that they're neglecting to look at the rest of what's in his report. And that -- and where he talks very explicitly about the fact that a preoccupation with the resources or with additional forces, if you don't have the strategy right, is a mistake.

And he, as I say, he understands this process that's underway.

But what he talks about in most of that assessment is not resources, but a different way of using U.S. forces and coalition forces in Afghanistan. It talks about accelerating the growth of the Afghan national security forces. It spends a lot of time talking about how we stay on side with the Afghan people.

This is mostly what McChrystal's assessment is about.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But it's a resource-intensive strategy, isn't it? He says that the troops have to probably be more lightly armed and engage more with the population. And it's hard to ignore that stark conclusion. Success is not ensured by additional forces alone -- as you point out -- but continued under-resourcing will likely cause failure -- failure.

GATES: Well, that's what we're discussing and how do we avoid that?

STEPHANOPOULOS: And, as you said, you hope to have this done in a few weeks and you want to avoid failure, as well. But the president has not made any decision at all on resources? Has he ruled it out?

GATES: No, I haven't even given him General McChrystal's request for resources. I have the -- I'm receiving the -- the report. I'm going to sit on it until I think -- or the president thinks -- it's appropriate to bring that into the discussion of the national security principals.

STEPHANOPOULOS: That's what -- General McChrystal says we have to have more troops to avoid failure. Where we've had a lack of clarity on what success means in Afghanistan. You pointed out at the beginning of this year what it was. And you said we're not -- we shouldn't expect a Valhalla in Afghanistan.

The president's special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, was asked for his definition of success last month and here's what he said.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE (Special Envoy, Pakistan and Afghanistan): I would say this about defining success in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the simplest sense, the Supreme Court test for another issue, we'll know it when we see it.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Is that good enough?

GATES: Well, I think we know it when we see it and we see it in Iraq. I think that success in Afghanistan looks a great deal like success in Iraq, in this respect, that the Afghan national security forces increasingly take the lead in protecting their own territory and going after the insurgents and protecting their own people.

We withdraw to an overwatch situation and then we withdraw altogether.

STEPHANOPOULOS: This first required a surge in Iraq.

GATES: It did require a surge. And that's the issue that we will be looking at over the next several weeks -- the next couple of weeks or so, is do we have the right strategy?

And that includes the question of is the -- is McChrystal's approach, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command commander the right approach? And if so, then what -- what would be the additional resources involved?

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me turn to Iran. The president has put Iran on notice that they're going to have to allow inspectors into this secret site which U.S. intelligence discovered for

enriching uranium. President Ahmadinejad says that President Obama is mistaken and the United States owes Iran an apology.

Is Iran going to get one?

GATES: Not a chance.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So what happens next? The president has said that this site is not configured for peaceful purposes. Now, the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate concluded -- of the U. S. government concluded that Iran had stopped its active nuclear weapons program in 2003.

Does the president's conclusion, that this site is not configured for peaceful purposes mean that that intelligence estimate is no longer operative?

GATES: No, not necessarily. But what it does mean is that they had a covert site. They did not declare it. They didn't -- if this were a peaceful nuclear program, why didn't they announce this site when they began to construct it? Why didn't they allow IAEA inspectors in from the very beginning?

This is part of a pattern of deception and lies on the part of the Iranians from the very beginning with respect to their nuclear program. So it's no wonder that world leaders think that they have ulterior motives, that they have a plan to go forward with nuclear weapons.

Otherwise, why would they do all this in such a deceptive manner?

STEPHANOPOULOS: U.S. intelligence had been tracking this site for quite some time before President Obama made it public.

Is this the only secret site that we know of?

GATES: Well, I'm not going to -- I'm not going to get into that. I would just say that we're watching very closely.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Does the United States government believe that Iran has an active nuclear weapons program?

GATES: I think that -- my personal opinion is that the Iranians have the intention of having nuclear weapons. I think the question of whether they have made a formal decision to -- to move toward the development of nuclear weapons is in doubt.

STEPHANOPOULOS: The U.S. ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency said a couple of weeks ago that Iran is closer to what he called break-out capacity on developing a nuclear weapon.

What does that mean exactly? And how much time -- if they do, indeed, have the intent, how much time do we have before Iran has a nuclear weapons capacity?

GATES: Well, I think breakout in the ambassador's terms means they have enriched enough uranium to a relatively low level that if they have another facility where they could enrich it more highly, that they have a -- they have enriched enough at a low level that they could, in essence, throw out all the IAEA inspectors, change the configuration of the cascades and the enrichment capability, and enrich it to a level where they could use it -- where they could make it into weapons grade uranium.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And you say you personally have no doubt that they want weapons. Can that weapons program be stopped with sanctions?

GATES: I think that what is critical is persuading the Iranians that -- or leading them to the conclusion that their security will be diminished by trying to get nuclear weapons rather than enhanced. And I think that because of the election, we see fissures in Iran that we have not seen before -- not in the 30 years since the revolution. And I think that severe sanctions, if the Iranian --- first of all, we -- we have created a problem for the Iranians with this disclosure.

And so the first step is the meeting on October 1st with the P5 plus one, with the Iranians, to see if they will begin to change their policy in a way that is satisfactory to the great powers.

And then, if that doesn't work, then I think you begin to move in the direction of severe sanctions. And their economic problems are difficult enough that -- that I think that severe sanctions would have the potential of -- of bringing them change their policies.

I think -- you asked me how long do I think we have? I would somewhere between one to three years.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me turn, finally, to Guantanamo. We have just a couple of minutes left. A major story in the "Washington Post" suggesting that the president's deadline of January 22nd for closing Guantanamo will not be met. And White House officials tell me that at least some prisoners will still be in Guantanamo on January 22nd and beyond.

How big a setback is that and how long will it take to finally close Guantanamo?

GATES: When the president-elect met with his new national security team in Chicago on December 7th --

STEPHANOPOULOS: Two thousand and nine.

GATES: -- last year, this issue was discussed, about closing Guantanamo and executive orders to do that and so on.

And the question was, should we set a deadline? Should we pin ourselves down?

I actually was one of those who said we should because I know enough from being around this town that if you don't put a deadline on something, you'll never move the bureaucracy. But I also said and then if we find we can't get it done by that time but we have a good plan, then you're in a position to say it's going to take us a little longer, but we are moving in the direction of

implementing the policy that the president set.

And I think that's the position that --

STEPHANOPOULOS: That's where we are. So the deadline of January 22nd will not be met?

GATES: It's going to be tough.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And how many prisoners will be there on January 22nd, do you know?

GATES: I don't know the answer to that.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Is it -- but, as you said, it's going to be tough and likely will not be met.

GATES: We'll see.

STEPHANOPOULOS: One -- one other deadline question. When you were working for President Bush, you used to keep a countdown clock on your desk, counting down the number of days you had left to serve. Is that clock still there?

GATES: No. I threw the clock out. It was obviously useless.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So you're in it for the long haul?

GATES: We'll see. The president-elect and I, when we first discussed this, agreed to leave it open.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Gates, thank you very much for your time today.

GATES: Thanks a lot.





U.S. Department of Defense  
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## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

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### Secretary Gates Interview on CNN's State of the Union with John King

KING: I'm John King, and this is "State of the Union." A wrenching debate over whether to send thousands more U.S. troops to Afghanistan. And startling revelations about a secret underground bunker in Iran.  
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GATES: This is an illicit nuclear facility.  
(END VIDEO CLIP)

KING: And a candid assessment of the pressing global challenges from Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

Plus, the political divides on foreign policy and health care. We'll talk to two influential senators, Republican Bob Corker of Tennessee and Democrat Evan Bayh of Indiana.

Then, our "American Dispatch" from the Mississippi Delta. Unemployment is pushing 20 percent, things look bleak, and every job matters.

This is the "State of the Union" report for Sunday, September 27th.

We'll get to our interview with the Defense Secretary Robert Gates in just a moment, and you won't want to miss his thoughts on the new nuclear showdown with Iran and the president's debate over sending thousands of more troops to Afghanistan.

First, though, let's set the scene with some remarkable new images of the Iranian nuclear facilities at the heart of this high-stakes confrontation. You see Iran up on the map here. The world, for some time, has been watching 17 nuclear facilities. You see them highlighted there across Iran. Well, we want to zoom you in now to the new area of interest the world has been watching more closely. You see the Iranian city of Qom here. Some facilities to the north.

This is an image I want to show you now. Watch it load up on the screen. This is a little more than three years ago, almost four years ago, near Qom, out in the desert. You see some rudimentary construction here, but look at all this open space. Now watch closely as we fast forward to an image from January of this year. This one takes a moment to load, stay with us. You see here a dramatic change in that landscape, including deep underground construction. Let me go back to that. Sorry, we'll come right back to it.

Come to January here, it will load right up, deep underground construction here, including steel reinforcement beams underneath, more construction over here, even more construction up in here. Now, remember, this is January, just eight months ago. This is a dramatic new image just into CNN yesterday. We want to show you once we bring this up. Here's January. Watch us fast forward now. This is now. A building constructed here where you saw that underground ditch. This was all open a few minutes ago, tunnels into the hillside. Up here, covered again, more tunnels into the hillside.

Again, we want to put this into context for you by coming back in time. Here is this image, the area four years ago, three, four years ago, rudimentary construction. Here we are now, a major facility under way,

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underground access, ventilation up here, ways out up in the countryside. All of this in an area under the control of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

So the question now for Secretary Gates and others, what does the Obama administration know and what actions will it take? (BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)

KING: Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us.

We learned as the week came to an end about a new underground secret Iranian nuclear bunker, and the president described it this way. "The size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program."

Tell us more about what we know, and do you have any doubt Iran was using this facility or planned to use this facility to develop nuclear weapons?

GATES: We've been watching the construction of this facility for quite some time, and one of the reasons that we waited to make it public was to ensure that our conclusions about its purpose were right. This is information shared among ourselves, the British, the French, as we've gone along. And I think that, certainly, the intelligence people have no doubt that this is an illicit nuclear facility, if only because the Iranians kept it a secret. If they wanted it for peaceful nuclear purposes, there's no reason to put it so deep underground, no reason to be deceptive about it, keep it a secret for a protracted period of time.

KING: Take me back in time. You say you've known about it for some time, dating back into the Bush administration. You, of course, were serving in the Bush administration. How far back?

GATES: Well, it's hard for me to remember, but at least a couple of years we've been watching it.

KING: At least a couple of years. Because the former vice president, Dick Cheney, is on record as saying in the closing months of the administration, he was an advocate for possibly using military action against some of these Iranian sites. Was this one of his targets, this area we've just learned about?

GATES: Well, I think I'll just let his statement speak for itself.

KING: All right. We know -- and correct me if I'm wrong, please -- that you were skeptical about that, in fact, opposed to that. You didn't think that was the way to go. Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has said publicly many times how skeptical he is about the military options here. I just want you to help an American out there who says, we can't trust Ahmadinejad, this has been going on for years. We don't think sanctions will work. Why don't we do something about it? Explain to that person out there, whether they work in the United States Congress or whether it's just an average American, when you look at the contingencies that you have available to you and the president has available to him, are there any good military options when it comes to these deep underground facilities?

GATES: Well, without getting into any specifics, I would just say we obviously don't take any options off the table.

My view has been that there has been an opportunity through the use of diplomacy and economic sanctions to persuade the Iranians to change their approach to nuclear weapons.

The reality is, there is no military option that does anything more than buy time. The estimates are one to three years or so. And the only way you end up not having a nuclear capable Iran is for the Iranian government to decide that their security is diminished by having those weapons as opposed to strengthened.

So I think, as I say, while you don't take options off the table, I think there's still room left for diplomacy. The P5 plus 1 will be meeting with Iran here shortly. The Iranians are in a very bad spot now because of this deception, in terms of all of the great powers. And there obviously is the opportunity for severe additional sanctions. And I think we have the time to make that work.

KING: I want to get to that diplomacy in just a minute, but when you shared this intelligence with others, I want to ask you specifically about the case of Israel, which you know in the past has been very skeptical about the diplomatic route. And many have thought perhaps Israel would take matters into its own hands because it is in the neighborhood. What did the Israeli government, specifically the Israeli military, say when they learned of this intelligence, about this new second facility?

GATES: Well, Israel, obviously, thinks of the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel.

We've obviously been in close touch with them, as our ally and friend, and continue to urge them to let this diplomatic and economic sanctions path play out.

KING: And as that goes forward, President Sarkozy was quite skeptical and he was very clear, this year, December, he wants to see progress or else we'll see tougher sanctions. From your perspective, what sanctions would have the most teeth, would work?

GATES: Well, there are a variety of options still available, including sanctions on banking, particularly sanctions on equipment and technology for their oil and gas industry. I think there's a pretty rich list to pick from, actually.

KING: If you look at that list, though, in some of those cases, you'll find the suppliers, gasoline, imports, some of the equipment and technology would be China, would you not?

GATES: China's participation is clearly important.

KING: And the early indications are they will or won't help?

GATES: Well, I haven't had -- I haven't had an opportunity to talk to the president or those who were with him in Pittsburgh, so I don't know the nature of the conversations that they had with the Chinese there, but I do have the sense that the Chinese take this pretty seriously.

KING: Let me ask you about the situation in Iran, as this diplomacy goes forward. You're the defense secretary now. You have been the director of Central Intelligence. When you look at post-election Iran, all the talk of turmoil, reports of tension between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, Ahmadinejad and the reforms, is the water bubbling or is the water boiling in the sense that you just see trouble or do you see potential seeds of revolution?

GATES: Well, I guess I would say it's simmering. It's clear in the aftermath of the election, that there are some fairly deep fissures in Iranian society and politics, and probably even in the leadership. And frankly, this is one of the reasons why I think additional and especially severe economic sanctions could have some real impact, because we know that the sanctions that have already been placed on the country have had an impact. The unemployment among youth is about 40 percent. They have some real serious problems, especially with the younger people.

So I think that we are seeing some changes or some divisions in the Iranian leadership and in society that we really haven't seen in the 30 years since the revolution.

KING: And if you think sanctions work and this is a clear violation -- they hid this from the world, they hid this from everybody, in clear violation of their commitments -- why wait? Why not slap tougher sanctions now? Why wait until the end of the year?

GATES: Well, the opportunity exists in the October 1st meeting and over the next few weeks to see if we can leverage publicizing this additional illegal facility and activity to leverage the Iranians to begin to make some concessions, to begin to abide by the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

GATES: I think we are all sensitive to the possibility of the Iranians trying to run the clock out on us. And so nobody thinks of this as an open-ended process.

KING: And so, lastly, on this point, this facility, obviously, is not on-line yet. It is under construction, not on-line. So Iran's capability in terms of being ready to perhaps have a nuclear bomb, in the past, the public statements have been a year to three away. Is that still operational?

GATES: That would be my view.

KING: The defense secretary, Robert Gates.

We'll be back in just a moment with another big decision facing the secretary and the president, whether to send thousands more U.S. troops into Afghanistan. Stay with us.  
COMMERCIAL BREAK)

KING: We're back with the defense secretary, Robert Gates.

Very momentous decision. Recommendation you will have to make to the president, the president will

have to make to the nation about whether to send thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of more troops into Afghanistan. I want to start with a threshold question. Do you have full confidence in the commanding general, Stanley McChrystal, on the ground in Afghanistan now?

GATES: Absolutely. I think we have in General McChrystal the very best commanding officer we could possibly have there.

KING: Does the president share that?

GATES: I believe so.

KING: And then is it a logical extension then to go on to say, if you have such full confidence, that if General McChrystal says, I need 40,000 more troops, he will get them?

GATES: I think we are in the middle of a review. The president, when he made his decisions on strategy in Afghanistan at the end of March, said that after the Afghan elections, that we would review where we are and review the strategy.

We now, in addition to that, have General McChrystal's assessment of the situation. He found a situation in Afghanistan that is more serious than we had thought and that he had thought before going out there. So we're in the middle of a process of evaluating, really, the decisions the president made in late March to say, have we got the strategy right? And once we confidently have the strategy right, then we'll address the question of additional resource...

(CROSSTALK)

KING: As you know, some of your friends on Capitol Hill are saying, why wait, in the sense of because of the ominous warnings, General McChrystal sounds, in his report, among them, this: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near term, over the next 12 months, while Afghan security capability matures, risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

If the situation is that dire and he believes he needs more troops, why wait?

GATES: Well, first of all, I would like to remember – remind people that the debate within the Bush administration over the surge took about three months, from October to December 2006.

It's very important that we get this right and there is always a dialogue between the chiefs – the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Centcom commander, and our commander in the field. We had the same kind of dialogue with General Odierno about the timing of pulling our combat units out of Iraq. And the conclusion of all of that was actually for General Odierno to take some additional risk. And it has proved to work very well.

So the question is, there has got to be some dialogue between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander of Central Command, as well as General McChrystal, and then a discussion among the president's national security team.

KING: You know the conversation in town, though, some, understand the surge debate, find this one rather remarkable in the sense that you now have General McChrystal, part of his report has leaked out, saying he needs more troops. Admiral Mullen has testified to Congress recently he believes we're going to need more troops. Some see an effort to almost put the president in a box before he deals with the other issues.

If you have the military, the admiral and the generals on record saying we need more troops, does the president really have a choice to say no?

GATES: Well, I think the president always has a choice. He's the commander-in-chief.

The reality is, do we need additional forces? How many additional forces? And to do what?

And it's the "to do what?" that I think we need to make sure we have confidence we understand before making recommendations to the president.

KING: Help me on that point, because there's a lot of questions about the legitimacy of the election. Did President Karzai commit fraud to the level at which he perhaps has stolen the election? The political vacuum could be months. You may have to make your decision uncertain as to the political leadership in Afghanistan unless you wait. There could be a runoff. There could be contestments (ph) and challenges. Would you prefer some sort of

power-sharing arrangement to move past this vacuum?

GATES: Well, I don't think it's up to us to tell the Afghans how to organize their government. The reality is that you still have an election process playing out. You have both the Afghan and the international election commissions evaluating the ballots. And if they come to a conclusion that there was a real winner, then I think it has legitimacy for both the international and the national -- and the Afghan audience.

But I think, above all, what's important is whether or not the government of Afghanistan has legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghans. All of the information that we have available to us today indicates that continues to be the case.

KING: Let's turn to the debate back home. You try to stay of the politics, but it does influence what happens in this town. As you know, a growing number of people on Capitol Hill want a clearer exit strategy. They want benchmarks. They want to know where the end is. Some have even said -- a few, but some have said we need a time line to get U.S. troops out. And now a liberal organization that was very vocal in the Iraq political debate is urging its members to call the president, e-mail the White House and say, don't send tens of thousands more U.S. troops to be stuck in a quagmire.

Is Afghanistan a quagmire?

GATES: I don't think so, and I think that with a general like McChrystal, it won't become one. I think that we are being very careful to look at this as we go along. We've put out metrics so that we can measure whether or not we're making progress. And if we're not making progress, then we're prepared to adjust our strategy, just as we're looking at whether adjustments are needed right now.

So I think that the notion of time lines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think, would all be a strategic mistake. The reality is, failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States. Taliban and Al Qaida as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, Al Qaida recruitment, operations, fundraising, and so on.

I think it would be a huge setback for the United States.

GATES: I think what we need is a strategy that we think can be successful and then to pursue it, and pursue it with confidence and resolution.

KING: You mentioned the history, and you're a student of history, and you're on the record talking about how this did become a quagmire for the Soviets, who had about 120,000 troops in Afghanistan. And you have said many times the Afghan people began to view them as occupiers, not as friends.

Where's the line for the United States so that you don't cross that very same line?

GATES: Well, I think the analogy of the situation with the Soviets really doesn't hold. The Soviets' presence in Afghanistan was condemned by virtually every country in the world. They conducted a war of terror against the Afghans. They probably killed 1 million Afghans, made 5 million of them into refugees, tried to impose an alien social and cultural change on the country.

So the situations are completely different. And I think that the -- I think the Afghans continue to see us as their ally and partner.

KING: General McChrystal, in an interview that will air on "60 Minutes" tonight, talks about the breadth and the geographic spread of the violence in Afghanistan. He says, "It's a little more than I would have gathered."

We've been at this nearly eight years. Why are we still surprised?

GATES: Well, I will tell you, I think that the strategy that the president put forward in late March is the first real strategy we have had for Afghanistan since the early 1980s. And that strategy was more about the Soviet Union than it was about Afghanistan.

KING: You served in the Bush administration. That's a pretty broad damnation of the Bush strategy.

GATES: Well, the reality is, we were fighting a holding action. We were very deeply engaged in Iraq. I increased -- I extended the 10th Mountain Division the first month I was on this job in January of '07. I extended -- I

put another brigade into Afghanistan in the spring of 2007. And that's all we had to put in there. Every we were -- we were too stretched to do more. And I think we did not have the kind of comprehensive strategy that we have now. **1142**

KING: And if it comes to the point of sending more, this time, if the president agrees and General McChrystal gets -- maybe it's 20,000, 30,000, or 40,000, do we have the troops now? If you needed 40,000, could you find it?

GATES: Well, I think, if the president were to decide to approve additional combat forces, they really probably could not begin to flow until some time in January.

KING: We're about out of time. I want to ask you a couple quick questions in closing. One is, do you see any chance now, because of the delays in the political problems, that the administration will keep its promise to close Gitmo, the Guantanamo Bay detention center, in one year, as promised?

GATES: Well, I think -- I think it has proven more complicated than anticipated. I will be the first to tell you that, when the president-elect's national security new team met in Chicago on December 7th, I was one of those who argued for a firm deadline. Because I said that's the only way you move the bureaucracy in Washington.

And you have to extend that date, if at least you have a strong plan, showing you're making progress in that direction, then it shouldn't be a problem to extend it. And we'll just see whether that has to happen or not.

KING: And lastly, you served eight presidents. What makes this one unique, or is there anything unique when it comes to these decisions of war and peace?

GATES: He is very analytical. He's very deliberate about the way he goes through things. He wants to understand everything. He delves very deeply into these issues. I'm not going to get into comparing the different presidents. I very much enjoy working for this one.

KING: Mr. Secretary, thank for your time.

GATES: Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Association of the United States Army

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Monday, October 05, 2009*

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Thank you, Secretary McHugh. John was sworn in as secretary of the army last month, and I speak for the entire Department of Defense in saying we're glad to have him onboard. For a decade and a half, he represented the district that includes Fort Drum. His support made that installation one of the Army's best. Through his work on the House Armed Services Committee – including as ranking member – he has been a forceful champion for all soldiers, and I know he will continue his advocacy on their behalf. Secretary McHugh, thank you once again for taking on this responsibility. Although I will tell you, I leaned over to him during the opening ceremony and said, "beats the hell out of a committee hearing doesn't it."

And of course my warmest thanks to AUSA for the invitation to attend your annual meeting. It's a real honor to speak at the opening of this conference with its focus on NCOs – the steel spine of the Army. My first encounter with NCOs came back in January 1967 when I was a brand new second lieutenant with the Air Force. It took me all of about a day-and-a-half before I figured out who it was that really made the military run, or who at least made us junior officers run: the noncommissioned officers. So I did what my sergeant suggested and the two of us did my job pretty well.

Every morning, one of the first people I see when I walk in my office is an Army NCO. And, as you might expect, he's almost always there when I leave as well: Sergeant Jason Eason, an E-5 who has been on two tours in Iraq, is here with us today. Jason, welcome. Thanks for your service.

As Secretary of Defense, I pay every bit as much attention to what NCOs say now as I did when I was a very green second lieutenant. I always make it a point to meet with and listen to NCOs around the country and in the theater – where they are serving with such honor and distinction. Last month, I had the opportunity to attend the Medal of Honor ceremony for Army Sergeant First Class Jared Monti, the second Army NCO to receive the Medal of Honor during the recent conflicts. His is a story of true valor. And there are so many others. And in fact, it is hard to believe that only six Medals of Honor have been bestowed since 2001 – all posthumously.

With all that our nation has asked of the Army in recent years – and all that troops like Sergeant Monti have given – it is important for our soldiers to know that they have such a strong advocate in this organization. For more than half a century, AUSA chapters across the country, and the headquarters here, have aided the troops and the families at home and – especially relevant today – when our soldiers are deployed. This takes many forms, from care packages to family-support conferences to scholarship donations – all unified by a single purpose: giving our soldiers and their

families the support they have earned.

I spoke to this gathering in 2007, less than a year after I became secretary of defense. There's an old saying about the one-year mark in Washington. For the first six months, you wonder how the hell you got here. For the next six months, you wonder how the hell the rest of them got here. I might add that, after nearly three years, you start wondering how the hell you're still here.

Much has happened since I last spoke with you, from the changing nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the economic crisis facing our country. Of course, we have a new commander-in-chief. I can tell you that President Obama is committed to the well-being of every soldier and to making sure they have the tools to do their job. And the First Lady has made it a personal priority to support and champion our military families.

If you had asked me in October of 2007 if I would be addressing this forum two years later – still as secretary of defense – I would have told you you were crazy. But, when President Obama asked me to stay on, I thought about all the troops we have in combat who are serving their country far from home and often under fire. I thought especially about the soldiers who have borne the brunt of the wars with repeated and lengthy tours – who continue to re-enlist and redeploy with a great sense of purpose in their mission and a great sense of pride in their country. I thought about their sacrifices and the sacrifices of their families. I thought about all those things and knew that I could only say yes to the new president. Our troops are all doing their duty. And I had to do mine. And having the chance to serve with them is the greatest – and most humbling – experience and honor of my life.

Today, I want to talk about the Army: the current challenges we face; what the Department of Defense is doing for our soldiers right now and what it needs to do in the future; and, finally, some thoughts about where the service needs to go in the years ahead.

First, however, a few words about the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. As you know, in June, the U.S. mission in Iraq underwent a sea change as we turned security in urban areas over to the Iraqis. That was a significant step as we dramatically reduce our presence early next year following elections, and continue to shift to a purely advise and assist mission. General Odierno said last week that violence is down 85 percent over the past two years – an accomplishment made possible by the hard work and sacrifices of many thousands of U.S. soldiers.

At the same time, Afghanistan has been on a different, and worrisome, trajectory – with violence levels up some 60 percent from last year. I believe that the decisions that the president will make for the next stage of the Afghanistan campaign will be among the most important of his presidency. So it is important that we take our time do all we can to get this right. And in this process it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations – civilian and military alike – provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately. And speaking for the Department of Defense, once the commander-in-chief makes his decisions, we will salute and execute those decisions faithfully and to the best of our ability.

Even as we consider the future, I am prepared to respond to urgent needs and will keep pushing to get troops the equipment they need. IEDs remain the number-one cause of casualties in Afghanistan. And let there be no doubt that, as long as our troops are in harm's way, the Department will do everything it can to destroy these IED



networks and to protect those heroes in the fight. To accomplish this:

- I have ordered additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to Afghanistan – including the most advanced drones and new platforms such as the MC-12;
- Thousands of enablers, including additional EOD teams, are en route; and
- The first MRAPs designed specifically for Afghanistan's rugged terrain – the M-ATVs – were delivered to theater last week, only three months after the initial contracts were awarded. In the next year, we will field thousands of these life-saving vehicles.

Our nation is understandably weary after six years in Iraq and eight years in Afghanistan. Of course, the challenges America faces in these campaigns are reflected back here in the demands placed on an Army under strain. Easing that strain and getting the troops what they need drove many of the changes reflected in the Fiscal Year 2010 budget. The broad goal was to improve and institutionalize support for troops and their families, rebalance the Department to address a wider range of threats, and, correspondingly, reform how and what we buy.

Let me start with some of the programs we have to support families. We all know the old saying that you recruit the soldier, but you re-enlist the family.

- The base budget we submitted earlier this year includes \$9 billion for family support: child care, spousal services, and housing, among others. Perhaps more important, we shifted funds from supplemental war bills to the base budget – to ensure that these family programs won't go away when the wars do.

- Another change is the new GI Bill – approved by Congress last year and just coming on line. The generous benefits are a just reward for our service members and a badly-needed update to the old GI Bill. Also, for the first time, troops can transfer benefits to family members – an idea I pushed at the suggestion of an Army spouse at Fort Hood. On that point, I should note that I always value meeting with Army spouses because, as you are well aware, they are never afraid to speak their minds.

- At the same time, we have added funds for the wounded, ill, and injured; traumatic brain injury; and psychological health programs to make sure our troops get the care they need when they return home. This includes a major effort by the Army to educate the force to prevent suicides and address the unseen wounds of war – to approach mental health in much the same way as physical health. The dramatic rise in suicides is a huge concern of mine – and I take heart that the Army is every bit as concerned. The vice chief of staff is spearheading the service's effort to reduce suicide, and I can tell you that it is both General Casey's and General Chiarelli's personal mission to address this problem. Aside from the conflicts themselves, taking care of our wounded warriors must be our highest priority.

- The Department of Defense is doing more for military families than it ever has. And yet, when I visit bases around the country, there is often a disconnect. I believe we must do a better job delivering assistance – especially new programs – to those who need it most. We have to make it easier for them to know what's out there so they can take advantage of these initiatives.

Strong recruiting and retention – though influenced by the economy – continue to show the willingness of young Americans to serve:

- The active Army has surpassed recruiting and retention goals recently, allowing

the service to reach its goal of enlarging to 547,000 soldiers earlier this year. Considering the stress on the force, and upcoming deployment rotations, I've also authorized a temporary expansion of an additional 22,000 soldiers to get through this high-demand period. This temporary increase will not add new force structure but will fill out the units we already have. The goal is to end stop-loss and increase dwell time.

- The Army has eliminated most waivers, and this year will exceed 90 percent for the number of recruits with high-school diplomas.

- And finally, efforts continue to make this a single Army, with the Guard and Reserves receiving the comparable training and the same equipment as the active force. Though the pace and types of missions will change, the reserve components' operational responsibilities will continue.

Even with all these efforts to mitigate the stress on the force, the reality is that a significant numbers of soldiers will continue to be deployed for the near- to mid-term. In fact, right now there are more soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan combined than were deployed to those two countries during the height of the Iraq surge.

America's soldiers continue to excel on the battlefield – doing extraordinary things under incredible pressure. As we look to the future, it is the great innovation and shifts in the Army these last few years – institutionally and operationally – that must guide the service going forward. What have we learned in the last few years and how is it relevant to the potential conflicts of tomorrow?

The challenge I posed to the Army two years ago was to retain the lessons learned and capabilities gained in counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. From all I've seen, heard, and witnessed, that certainly has taken place. In fact, today's Army bears but a passing resemblance to that of eight years ago – a force mostly designed to repeat another Desert Storm. The Army we have is a supremely adaptable and flexible force – able to deploy rapidly, operate with more autonomy, and slide along the scale of the conflict spectrum to confront very different types of threats.

Let me give a few examples.

First of all, on the technological side. There have been tremendous advances in our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities – advances that have led to an unprecedented fusion of intelligence and ops on the ground. Other communications improvements have led to much greater command and control, and more tools to improve this further are getting out to the field. The Army has recognized that the most important part of its procurement strategy is the network as opposed to the platform. In coming years, there should be revolutionary breakthroughs in the ability of our troops to see themselves and other allied forces – even if the inevitable fog of war and resourceful enemies prevent us from ever achieving total situational awareness.

There have also been entirely new concepts from the war zones. One of the most important is the Advise and Assist Brigade – the AAB – that has three main functions: traditional strike capabilities, advisory roles, and the enablers and command and control to support both functions. In July, I visited the first AAB deployed to Iraq. I was impressed with the ability to retool a standard brigade combat team in only a few months and with relatively small force augmentation. By the end of next year, we plan for the Iraq mission to be composed almost entirely of AABs, and the expectation is that, some time down the road, the same will be true in Afghanistan.

There is, unfortunately, still a lingering view that advisory positions are second-tier jobs – an assumption that needs to be addressed through assignments and

promotions. The advisory, train, and equip mission is a key role for the Army going forward, given that America's security will increasingly depend on our ability to build the capabilities of other nations. These capabilities are all the more necessary considering the steep human, political, and financial costs of direct U.S. military intervention.

Under the leadership of General Dempsey, the Army has also put its training and doctrine process on a war footing. At the Combined Arms Center, the doctrinal cycle has been reduced dramatically. For example, the AAB doctrine was developed and fielded in only a couple of months – proof that the Army has accelerated its ability to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. This is a key advantage not just in a counterinsurgency, but in any type of conflict, where the 75 percent solution fielded in months is often far better than a 99 percent solution that might take years. We cannot allow the Army's ability to swiftly adapt at the institutional level to become ossified down the line.

Perhaps the greatest change, however, is on the ground level with the men and women on the front lines. Young officers and NCOs at the front have always had to make profound life-and-death decisions. In today's conflicts, their responsibilities are even greater and more complex: playing the roles of warrior, diplomat, mayor, economist, city engineer, and tribal liaison – all often at the same time. We must ensure that the kind of mental agility, entrepreneurial spirit, and independent judgment required to be effective downrange carries over into future assignments. It's a safe bet that a leader who thrives in an environment of this complexity can adapt quickly to other missions and other forms of war. But, looking forward, we must find a way to retain seasoned young officers and NCOs and give them opportunities to use these same talents when they move on from combat positions of momentous responsibility to more mundane assignments in the bureaucracy. Their battlefield experience must form the core of an Army prepared to fight wars in the future.

That brings me to a larger point. For the last few years, there has been a concern that our force is too focused on counterinsurgency, and has lost its edge for complex, conventional operations involving multiple brigades or divisions. The experiences of the British colonial army before World War One and the Israeli military in Lebanon have even been cited.

This is a legitimate concern, and we continue to work toward finding the right balance. But the notion that the changes we have seen amount to turning the Army into some sort of counterinsurgency constabulary that is losing its core competencies – above all, to shoot, move, and communicate – does not reflect the realities of the current campaigns. Take, for example, the battle of Sadr City last year. In that campaign, U.S. troops had to synchronize air power, artillery, and ISR, all while maneuvering through an incredibly complex urban environment and coordinating with numerous dispersed units.

And let there be no doubt that modernization plans for the full spectrum of warfare continue. The Army is accelerating the development of the Warfighter Information Network and will field it – and proven FCS spinoffs – across the entire force. I remain committed to the Army's ground-vehicle modernization program – but it has to be done in a way that reflects the lessons we've learned the last few years about war in the 21st century, and that incorporates the Department of Defense's nearly \$30 billion investment in MRAPs.

We have to recognize that the black-and-white distinction between conventional war and irregular war is an outdated model. Simply possessing the ability to annihilate other militaries in a conventional fight in no way insures we can achieve our strategic goals – a point driven home in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In reality, the future will be more complex. Where all conflict will range across a broad spectrum of operations and lethality. Where even near-peer competitors will use irregular or asymmetric tactics and non-state actors may have weapons of mass destruction or sophisticated missiles.

Even as we prepare for the future and pursue modernization plans, we must always recognize the limits of technology – and be modest about what military force alone can accomplish. Advances in precision, sensor information, and satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains that will continue to give the U.S. military an edge over its adversaries. But no one should ever neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of war or succumb to the techno-optimism that has muddled strategic thinking in the past. That is especially true for the ground services, which will be in the lead for – and bear the brunt of – irregular and hybrid campaigns in the future.

Let me close with a final thought. For eight years now, the Army has been in a constant state of war. Our soldiers have been deployed over and over again, and taken the fight to increasingly battle-hardened and lethal enemies. The stakes have been enormous; the tales of heroism and sacrifice extraordinary. Hundreds of thousands of brave warriors have volunteered to serve their country knowing they probably would go to war. They have endured time away from family and friends. And they have risked their lives for their fellow soldiers.

There is no way to overstate the challenges facing our Army. But when I think about the individual soldiers – their honor and their courage – I am confident that the United States Army will continue to meet those challenges and – as always – exceed every expectation in the years ahead.

Thank you.

No. 088-09 October 01, 2009

Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates to Participate in Discussion on American Power and Persuasion at George Washington University

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates will be jointly interviewed in front of the George Washington University community by GWU School of Media and Public Affairs Director Frank Sesno and CNN Chief International Correspondent Christiane Amanpour.

The interview, on the reach and limitations of American power, will take place at Lisner Auditorium at 7 p.m. EDT on Monday, Oct. 5, 2009. It will be broadcast as an hour-long special on CNN at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, Oct. 6, 2009.

Tue, 06 Oct 2009 19:41:00 -0500

Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton with CNN Anchor Frank Sesno and CNN Chief International Correspondent Christiane Amanpour October 06, 2009

A Discussion Panel with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton at the George Washington University School of Media and Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.

FRANK SESNO, CNN ANCHOR: Well, let me welcome you both to the George Washington University. Thank you for being here. There will be no quizzes or exams after this, but we'll try to have this as intriguing a conversation as we can.

And I - as I mentioned, Christiane - excuse me - Christiane's got her program, and we're very much looking forward to seeing it there and around the world. I should also mention that America Abroad Media is turning this into an hour-long special. It will be distributed both domestically and international - internationally as an hour-long special on public radio and available to all other media, many of whom are here. So, welcome.

HILLARY CLINTON, US SECRETARY OF STATE: Thank you.

SESNO: Christiane?

CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, HOST OF CNN'S 'AMANPOUR': Welcome.  
Welcome to you both.

We've been sort of searching back in the annals of recent history and we can't really find an example such as this, where two sitting Secretaries of State, in charge of some of the most important briefs at the moment, sitting on stage in an interview such as this. So, we just wanted to start by asking you, how often do you speak together? What is it like working together? Do you pick up the phone and call each other whenever you like? How does it work?

CLINTON: Well, we actually spend a lot of time together, and it is mostly at the White House, in the Situation Room, which is this room that is especially set up for secure conversations, a windowless domain that we spend a lot of time in, and we also talk outside of those formal meetings.

But it's been a real pleasure for me to work with Bob over the last nine months. And a lot of the decisions and the reasons we end up in the Situation Room are, you know, pretty serious and challenging ones to tackle and try to come up with our best advice to the president. But, you know, Bob has a - a lot of experience, which I certainly appreciate, and also a good sense of humor, which makes everything a little bit better.

ROBERT GATES, US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE : You know, most of my career, the Secretaries of State and Defense weren't speaking to one another (crosstalk) and - and it

could get pretty ugly, actually. And so -

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I mean, it's terrific to - to have the kind of relationship where we can talk together, because the truth of the matter is if the bureaucracies realize that the principal get along and work together and are on the same page, it radiates downward. And when people discover it's not career-enhancing to try and set your principal's hair on fire because the other person is doing something horrible, it makes a huge difference and not just at this level, but all through the bureaucracy and the interagency.

SESNO: So what is it that -- by doing this and by sending the signal from the top -- that you are trying to change? You've both talked a lot about taking the country in new directions and -- for the 21st century. But what are you trying to prove by this in terms of actual implementation?

GATES: Well, I don't -- I don't think we're trying to prove anything. It's just we get along. We work together well. I think it starts with, frankly based on my experience as secretary of defense, being willing to acknowledge that the secretary of state is the principal spokesperson for United States foreign policy. And once you get over that hurdle, the rest of it kind of falls into place.

And I think it's really just a matter of "this is the way we work together". As I say, we're not trying to prove anything. It's just this is what works. And this is how government ought to work.

CLINTON: You know, Frank, I think that, you know, when Secretary Gates was given this responsibility in the last administration, he immediately began making clear that we had to have a coherent and unified foreign policy. The instruments of American power in defense, diplomacy and development needed to be working together.

And before he was a part of the Obama administration, he had gone on record several times talking about the need for us to work more closely together between our civilian capacity and our military force. So when President Obama asked Bob to stay on, I knew that he understood the kind of "whole of government" approach and was really dedicated to try to make sure that we were doing the best we could for our country.

His years -- his decades of service to America give him a perspective that is very useful. And I mentioned this before, but Henry Kissinger, following up on what Bob had said, said that it was the first time that he found that the, you know, State Department, the White House, and the Defense Department mostly through Bob and me and -- and General Jones, were all saying the same thing.

Now that doesn't mean we don't have differences of opinion or see issues from slightly different perspectives, but we have an enormous amount of respect for each other, we listen to each other, and we work through, give our best advice to the president and then support the president's decision.

AMANPOUR: So given that you're involved in a very difficult situation right now, the war in Afghanistan, the place where I've spent a long time -- I want to start by asking you, do you think you can win there? Both of you -- I'd like to know whether you think you can win?

CLINTON: Well, I think, Christiane, what we're looking at, as we meet to advise the president, is what do we need to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan, because we see the region as the area of concern that will, you know, promote American interests and values, protect our country as well as the allies and other interests that we have around the world.

So I think it's a -- it's a -- a very thoughtful analysis about what is it we need to do. And -- and we're, you know, we're trying to look at it from ground up and make sure that we're examining every assumption, because what's important is that at the end of the day, the president makes a decision that he believes in, that he thinks is going to further our core objectives of, you know, protecting our country, preventing attacks on us, trying to protect our interests and our allies. And that's what we're -- we're attempting to do.

AMANPOUR: Secretary Gates, the majority of the American people believe that America can win in Afghanistan.

Do you think America can win in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, from the time I've took this job, I have tried, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, to avoid terms like "winning" and "losing," because they become very loaded in our domestic debate, but they also become loaded around the world.

I think the key thing is to establish what our objectives are and can we achieve our objectives?

And the answer to that question is absolutely.

SESNO: Well, let me ask you about our objectives, because back in March, President Obama said several things. He said "our clear and focused goal" -- that was his term -- was to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda. He said, for the American people, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was the most dangerous place in the world; that Afghanistan was an international security issue of the highest order; and that if the Afghan government were to fall to the Taliban, the country will -- and I'm quoting him here -- "be again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can."

Has any of that changed from them until now and this review?

CLINTON: No.

GATES: I don't think so.

CLINTON: No.

SESNO: So staying the course and -- and having this government survive and not fall to the Taliban and disrupting and dismantling al Qaeda is the objective -- is the goal of this review that you're going through?

CLINTON: Well, Frank, the -- the goal remains, as the president said last spring -- what we are -- I think rightfully -- doing is examining the strategies and tactics to achieve our goal. And I happen to think that's a good thing. You know, it -- it is difficult enough to deal with the challenges emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan and the continuing threats from al Qaeda. But to do it when there is so much pressure to make a snap decision, never to ask the hard questions, is really counter-productive.

And I admire the president for saying, as he did last spring, you know, we're going to reassess this. He appointed a new commander. That new commander was asked to assess it. He has a special representative based in the State Department with a whole government team constantly being asked, are we making progress?

So I think what we're going through in asking ourselves OK, we know what the goal is, is what we're doing most likely to achieve that goal, is what a very decisive and intelligent, you know, commander-in-chief would do.

So we're going to come up with what we think is the best approach, but the goal remains the same.

GATES: I think it's important to remember that, as Secretary Clinton said, that the president indicated very explicitly in -- at the end of March that we would revisit the strategy after the election in Afghanistan. Now, at least a couple of things have happened. One is the new commander has done an assessment and found the situation that -- in Afghanistan, that is more serious than we anticipated when the decisions were made on March. So that's one thing to take into account.

The other is clearly a flawed election in Afghanistan that has complicated the picture for us.

And so, it seems to me, under these circumstances, and particularly -- I mean let's be honest, the president is being asked to make a very significant decision. And the notion of being willing to pause, reassess basic assumptions, reassess the analysis and then make those decisions seems to me, given the importance of these decisions, which I've said are probably among the most important he will make in his entire presidency, seems

entirely appropriate.

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AMANPOUR: So you've both spoken just now very highly of General McChrystal. You've talked about the new commander, his important reassessment and changes on the ground.

There are obviously two basic choices that you have, either to go all in or to scale back. Some who are talking about scaling back talk about less nation-building, talk about more Predator strikes, perhaps more focus on -- on Pakistan rather than in Afghanistan.

In a public speech in London to military personnel, General McChrystal, when asked about that, flatly stated that it wouldn't work. Can we just show you what he said?

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

GEN. STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE, AFGHANISTAN: No. And the first -- the first reason is, I believe, you have to navigate from where you are, not from where you wish you were. We are in Afghanistan. We've established relationships, expectations both with the Afghan people, the Afghan government, in the region, and I believe Afghanistan has its own value. It's stability now.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

AMANPOUR: So do you believe that by scaling back over the next 12 to 18 months you can win in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think, as you know, we are not going to talk about where the president ought to go or the options in front of him. I mean, I think I just gave a speech this morning in which I said that the president deserves the candid advice of his senior advisers, both civilian and military, but that advice should be private.

All I will say is, first of all, I think Stan McChrystal is exactly the right person to be the commander in Afghanistan right now. He was my recommendation to the president to lead this effort. And I have every confidence that no matter what decision the president makes, Stan McChrystal will implement it as effectively as possible.

AMANPOUR: Could I ask you about the nature of private advice? You have said it; others have said it; General Jones said it this weekend. You know that, during the lead-up to the gulf -- to the second Iraq war in 2003, many of the one-star, two-star, other generals and military officials didn't stand up and challenge the premise that only a certain amount of troops were necessary, and that was deemed to have been a big mistake and deemed to have wasted a lot of time, for instance, in Iraq. Do you not think that General McChrystal must give his honest assessment in public, because of what happens when that honest assessment was not given?

GATES: I think the important thing is for the president to hear the advice of his commanders and to have the advantage of hearing that advice in private. In all the decisions that were made during the surge in Iraq, the president -- I structured a process where the commander in the field, General Petraeus, the then-commander of Central Command, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff each had an opportunity to present their views privately to the president on what ought to be done.

I think that's the way the process ought to work. I think the president -- this president has made it clear he is prepared to spend whatever time is needed in person, not only with the Joint Chiefs and the chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but with General McChrystal, to make sure they have had plenty of time to present their views directly to him. That's a commitment he has made to me directly, and I intend to make sure that it's exercised.

AMANPOUR: Could I just ask, Secretary Clinton, what you think about the nature of the debate over the advice? Is -- are not the American people entitled -- is this not the premise of American democracy, that the American people are entitled to hear the same advice and that members of the U.S. Congress, who are going to have to weigh in on this, as well, should hear this advice?



CLINTON: Well, I think that there's a timing to all of this. And I agree completely with Bob that, in the process of trying to tee up these decisions for the president, it is very important that he get the most thoughtful, candid advice from everyone. And, remember, he's getting advice about what will work not just from the military, but from the civilian side, as well. And I think that that is the way to begin any kind of decision-making process.

Now, there's no doubt that, as decisions get made, they will be, you know, fully available for the public and for the Hill. Consultations are going on with the Hill all the time.

But I -- I think it's important to put this into perhaps some historic perspective. You know, it is unusual for all advice about military matters to be in public for a president. Now, there is a lot of second-guessing that might go on and historical perspective, but this process that President Obama has put together is, I think, one of the most open, most thorough that I've read about. And it is very much an invitation for everybody to come to the table, and that's what we're doing.

AMANPOUR: We'll be right back with more on this subject right after a break.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: To advance security, opportunity and justice, not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces. We need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers. That's how we can help the Afghan government serve its people and develop an economy that isn't dominated by illicit drugs.

And that's why I'm ordering a substantial increase in our civilians on the ground. That's also why we must seek civilian support from our partners and allies.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

SESNO: Secretary Clinton, you've heard that, President Obama speaking in March about the need to increase the number of civilians -- the civilian surge it's called -- but the civilian task has been -- or the civilian personnel has been way under-tasked. When you came into office, 300-some-odd civilians. You're trying to move to 1,000 by the end of the year or just under it.

CLINTON: Right.

SESNO: That's a big increase.

CLINTON: Right.

SESNO: But compared to the tens of thousands of the military, it's just a drop in the bucket. Is that really going to change the dynamic? What should the balance be in a conflict zone like Afghanistan if you're going to accomplish the goals that you're out to accomplish?

CLINTON: Well, Frank, I think what we are attempting to achieve is remarkable in a short period of time. As you say, back when the president made those remarks in March, we had about 300 civilians, Americans, in Afghanistan. We will have close to 1,000 by the end of this year.

But it is a kind of a chicken-and-an-egg issue. We want to focus on development, particularly agriculture, rule of law, good governance, economic development, women's empowerment, those kinds of issues. But in order to operate in many of the places in Afghanistan, you have to have a level of security.

So there has to be a commitment to make an area as secure as possible. Because remember, when an American goes in, that person will always be accompanied by, you know, NGOs, Afghans. So the numbers are much bigger than just the direct American hires, because there are a lot of Americans working in Afghanistan who work for charities or nongovernmental organizations.

But our assessment was that, you know, we needed to focus on how to help the people of Afghanistan lift themselves up, have their own opportunities, and it goes in hand with our military effort. 1154

SESNO: Secretary Gates, you in many ways launched this conversation a couple of years ago with a speech where you talk -- and you said that we will not kill or capture our way to victory in these places. What should our civilian diplomats be doing that the military is now doing?

GATES: Well, they are -- there are a lot of civilians out there and doing things...

SESNO: But not enough, right?

GATES: Well, let's -- let's step back, first of all, to that point two years ago when I said -- when I sort of gave my "man bites dog" speech of the secretary of defense, saying there wasn't enough money going to the Department of State.

The reality is, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development were starved for resources for decades. Now, just -- just let me give you an example. Working for me are 2 million men and women in uniform. Secretary Clinton has I think somewhere south of 7,000 foreign service officers. If you took all the foreign service officers in the world, they would barely crew one aircraft carrier. So, you know, just to keep things in perspective.

(Cross talk)

Well, and we have partnered. And the reality is that  that the civilians who do end up in Iraq and Afghanistan in the provincial reconstruction teams and in the other activities, rule of law, agriculture and so on have a disproportionate impact to their numbers. And I talked to brigade commanders and -- and one or two civilians, working with them, have an enormous impact. And these are the colonels who are the brigade commanders who talk about this.

So, you know, do we want more civilians? Absolutely. We will take all the civilians that we can get out there.

SESNO: But -- but my -- my question was, what are the things that the military is now doing that should be handled and are better handled by our diplomats?

CLINTON: Well, Frank, let -- let me just answer that, because a lot of what happens when our military -- and they've been doing an incredible job against a really ferocious enemy in Afghanistan, particularly along the south and along the border -- without civilians, it's very hard to make the transition from, you know, the soldier or the Marine holding the automatic weapon who has been trying to rout out the Taliban to going and trying to help a farmer get enough yield out of his wheat crop so that he doesn't want to grow poppies.

I mean, that's -- that's, you know, an issue that is very difficult for the military to take on a sustained basis. But in the last several years, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it was young lieutenants, captains, majors, they were doing that.

They were trying to do both jobs. And at a certain point, we need to support them. And I appreciate what Bob said about how it affects -- trained civilians are force multipliers. They can begin to do the civilian interaction with, you know, tribal elders and others that will help to make the environment more secure that our Marines and soldiers have helped to create.

AMANPOUR: And -- and part of what's happening is that the Afghan people are not getting as much economic development, therefore, not as much help and hope as -- as one might have brought forward when this started.

So the question I have for you, sir -- both of you, actually -- is that there had been some talk over the weekend about how the United States believes that perhaps al Qaeda has been diminished, the threat from the Taliban is not as great as one might have thought.

So I want to know what you think about the momentum of the Taliban, their long-term prospects, given the fact that today, 80 percent of Afghanistan has a permanent Taliban presence, compared to 72 percent a year ago and 54 percent the year before that. They seem to be winning territory rather than losing. 1155

GATES: I -- I can't improve on -- on General McChrystal's assessment that the situation in Afghanistan is serious and deteriorating. And, you know, there are a lot of reasons for it. You have to go back to 2003, 2004, in terms of the Taliban beginning to reconstitute themselves in Pakistan and so on. I mean that's a historian's debate. We are where we are.

And -- and this -- it kind of goes back to General McChrystal's quote that you aired. You -- you have to start with where you are, not where you wish you were. And -- and the reality is that because of our inability and the inability, frankly, of our allies, to put enough troops into Afghanistan, the Taliban do have the momentum right now, it seems.

AMANPOUR: And do you believe that should -- not next week or next month -- but should Afghanistan fall to the Taliban again, that it would again become a base for al Qaeda to have its operations there?

GATES: I think -- I think the thing to remember about Afghanistan is that that -- that country, and particularly the Afghan-Pakistan border, is -- is the modern epicenter of jihad. It is where the Mujahedeen defeated the other superpower. And their view is, in my opinion, that they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower, which, more than anything, would empower their message and the opportunity to recruit, to fundraise and to plan operations.

So I think you have to see this area in a historical context in terms of what happened in the 1980s and the meaning of the victory over the Soviet Union in order to understand the importance of this symbiotic relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban and -- and the other extremists, frankly.

AMANPOUR: So you think they would come back if Afghanistan fell?

GATES: I don't know whether the -- whether al Qaeda would sort of move their headquarters from the Fatah to -- back into Afghanistan, but there's no question in my mind that if the Taliban took large  took control of significant portions of Afghanistan, that that would be added space for al Qaeda to strengthen itself and -- and more recruitment and more fundraising.

But what's more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, in many respects, is an ideology. And the notion that they have come back from this defeat -- come back from 2002, to challenge not only the United States, but NATO -- 42 nations and so on -- is a hugely empowering message, should they be successful.

AMANPOUR: Welcome back. We're going to continue our conversation with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

We were just talking about Afghanistan and the Pakistan area -- part of your joint solution, hopefully, to this regional -- regional problems that exist there.

The prime minister, the president, the foreign minister of Pakistan have all said and have all been very worried about short-termism, from the United States. They're concerned that if you pull back, then they will have to bank not on the U.S. Again, but on, perhaps, the Taliban, like they did before 9/11.

What do you say to -- to the Pakistani leaders, who are now doing precisely what you asked them to do -- going after the Taliban, after various militants and terrorists in their own -- in their own country?

CLINTON: Well, what we say is that we want to be supportive and provide assistance. And we want to ramp that up. Just this  this last week, a very important piece of legislation, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, that made a commitment to additional aid for Pakistan's civilian government and to deliver services to the people of Pakistan was passed unanimously, on its way to the president to be signed.

And you're right, when we started this review, one of the innovative conclusions we reached was we had to look at both Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Obviously, we had a great commitment in Afghanistan and there had been military assistance and counter-terrorism training provided to Pakistan, but there hadn't yet been a commitment by the Pakistani military and the civilian government, like we're seeing now, to go after the extremists that are threatening them, as well as beyond their borders.

So we are telling them that we think that this is an important commitment that they've made. But, again, I would just ask you to put this in some historic perspective. You know, we -- we live, in the United States, on such a fast pace, that sometimes, you know, a month ago seems like a really long time ago. In lots of the rest of the world, people remember.

And as Bob said, when we partnered with Pakistan to supply the Mujahedeen with the weapons and training that they needed to defeat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, once that was accomplished, we left. And Pakistan feels like we left them holding the bag, because all of a sudden they were awash in weapons, they were awash in drugs. They had all of these, you know, jihadists who had been trained up in conjunction with us. And, you know, we know what happened. We saw that occurring in Afghanistan.

So I think it's rightful of the Pakistanis to say, "Well, how long will your commitment be? How much will you be by our side as we take on these threats to us and, by the way, also to you?"

SESNO: Well, how long is the commitment? Are you prepared to say this evening that the commitment of this country and two of you here to Pakistan is an open-ended commitment, that despite this policy review that's ongoing, that the commitment to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region is not going to be thwarted by short-timerism, or whatever you want to call it, and we're there to say -- the United States of America is there to stay?

CLINTON: Well, what we're doing is defining our objectives, and we're then trying to set forth the strategy and the tactics to achieve those objectives.

SESNO: I mean, the foreign -- if I may -- the foreign minister of Pakistan said the fact that this is being debated -- meaning this whole policy review -- whether to stay or not to stay, what sort of signal is that sending, he said. Isn't this undermining the very Pakistanis whom you have pressured to lean on their own extremists in the Taliban and fight this fight?

GATES: Well, first of all, I think that there is absolutely no reason for the president not to consider very carefully the next steps in Afghanistan. I had lunch with the Pakistani ambassador last week, and I made absolutely clear to him: We are not leaving Afghanistan.

This discussion is about next steps forward. And the president has some momentous decisions to make. And while there may be some short-term uncertainty on the part of our allies, in terms of those next steps, there should be no uncertainty in terms of our determination to remain in Afghanistan and to continue to build a relationship of partnership and trust with the Pakistanis. That's long term. That's a strategic objective of the United States for -- for a number of reasons that Pakistan is a strategically important country.

So I -- you know, if -- if it makes them nervous that we're talking about this for a couple of weeks, frankly, I think that's a transitory problem.

SESNO: I just want to button one thing up. You were talking earlier about your advice and your comments, your public comments, to keep the advice to the president private and candid. Are you trying to muzzle McChrystal?

GATES: Absolutely not. I will tell...

SESNO: Will we be hearing -- will -- will we be hearing him speak publicly again?

GATES: You know, I was going to -- I was actually -- I was actually going to pile on to Hillary's comments earlier before we went to the break. Look, when we did the

surge in Iraq, there was no public discussion during that surge by the people involved in that debate. The president made his decisions. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I then went to the Hill to testify. And General Petraeus then followed us. 1157

That is exactly what is going to happen in this instance. There will -- I -- I have told people on Capitol Hill, the minute the president makes his decisions, we will get General McChrystal back here as quickly as possible and up onto the Hill, because I will tell you, there is no one more knowledgeable and more persuasive on these issues than Stan McChrystal.

But it would put -- I believe it would put General McChrystal in an impossible situation to go up in a hyper-partisan environment to the Hill before the president made his decisions and put the general on the spot. I just think that's wrong. I think it's wrong for General McChrystal, and I think it's wrong for the president. And as far as I'm concerned, in this job, I'll do everything in my power to prevent that until the president has made his decisions.

(commercial break)

AMANPOUR: I want to know if you can tell us, what precisely was agreed between the U.S., Iran, and the other powers sitting at that table in Geneva? Did they actually agree to ship out their low-enriched uranium?

CLINTON: Well, there were -- there were three agreements: one, that there would be inspections, and those inspections are going forward, and they're going forward quickly of the undisclosed sites that the president and Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy announced a little over a week ago in Pittsburgh.

They agreed that, in principle, the Iranians would ship out their LEU for reprocessing to be returned for their research reactor. There will be a team of experts meeting to determine exactly how that will be carried out within 10 days.

And they agreed that there will be another meeting, which means that this process doesn't just drag on without any, you know, continuity.

So we think that, on those three big issues, this was a worthwhile meeting. But as the president has said and I and others have also made clear, this is not by any means a stopping point. There is much more to be done. We expect much more.

We know that the Iranians need to understand that they have run a nuclear program that has violated international rules and Security Council resolutions, which they have to bring, you know, into compliance, making it more transparent and accountable. So we have -- we have work ahead of us, but I think that, on balance, what came out of the meeting in Geneva was positive.

AMANPOUR: Just to follow up on the low-enriched uranium, you know, one Iranian diplomat told the press that actually, no, there wasn't that agreement, and I'm asking you whether there is some miscommunication. Are they just agreeing to buy enriched -- further enriched uranium and not ship theirs out? Or do you understand that they are going to ship the bulk of theirs out?

CLINTON: Well, nothing is finished until it's finished. And there's a meeting of technical experts -- I believe it's October 18th -- to see how to put into action what we certainly believed was an agreement in principle. But there's a lot to be done before that actually happens.

SESNO: Do you think the Iranians actually want to resolve this?

CLINTON: We don't know yet. We don't know.

SESNO: Think this is credible?

GATES: I agree with Hillary. I think -- I think the jury's out. And -- and what we have to do is keep them to tight enough deadlines and specific enough requirements that we have some indication of whether they're serious or not.

SESNO: I mean, there's already -- there's already some substantial criticism

of this, that -- that from -- from -- from some who are saying that this is another way for the Iranians to play for time and that, in effect, they're being rewarded for <sup>1158</sup> flouting U.N. resolutions all these years if they can take the uranium that they shouldn't have enriched to begin with, get it sent out, and have it brought back, enhanced, and be able to use in a power plant?

CLINTON: Well, but -- but think about what we're -- what we're seeing here, and that is that the uranium that they have enriched would be used for a research reactor, which everybody knows they've been running, which they are entitled to run, but it would not be used for other purposes.

So, yes, does it buy time? It buys time. It buys time for us to consider carefully their response, the sincerity of their actions, and, you know, we're moving simultaneously on the dual track. I mean, we always said we had a track of engagement, and we have begun that with this process, but we also said we would be working with likeminded nations and convincing others to stand ready with tougher sanctions were we not successful.

AMANPOUR: Can I ask you, Secretary Gates, has your opinion, your intelligence, has anything changed regarding your assessment of whether they're trying to make a nuclear weapon?

GATES: My personal belief all along has been that they have the intention of -- of developing nuclear weapons. Whether they have actually begun that program or not is -- is hard to say, whether they're begun a weaponization program.

But I think, you know, the question is, can we over time or can we in a limited period of time bring the Iranians to a conclusion that  that Iran is better off without nuclear weapons than with them, and not just in the security sense, but economically and in terms of their isolation in the international community, and so on.

(not on tape                      And because -- I mean, my view is, the only long-term solution to this problem, at the end of the day, is the Iranians themselves deciding having nuclear weapons is not in their interest. And if we can't convince them of that, then an array of other options are open.

But our hope, my hope for ever since I took this job has been that -- that we could, through -- through both carrots and sticks, persuade them of a smarter direction for Iran.

AMANPOUR: Isn't the -- the -- I mean, there are basically, I think, three policy options, Iran with some kind of nuclear capability, a nuclear program, END NOT ON TAPE) RESUME but with very strict verification, sanctions to try to get them not to enrich, which so far has not -- have not worked, plenty of holes, plenty of black market, or the military option, which you yourself have cast doubts upon its efficacy. Isn't the -- the real nub of the debate right now to figure out some kind of way of verifying and inspecting and being able to know if they plan to do something else with their uranium, other than for peaceful purposes, as they claim?

CLINTON: Well, that is, of course, part of the change in calculation that Bob was referring to. We have a very clear objective of trying to persuade the Iranians that their calculation of their security interest and their economic interest should take into account the consequences of sanctions, for example, of increased defensive measures taken in Europe and in the gulf region. You know, we just worked through this missile defense decision, and, you know, clearly, our new adaptive approach toward missile defense is aimed at protecting our NATO allies and most of Europe from a short- or medium-range Iranian missile.

We have begun to talk with a lot of our other friends and allies about, you know, what they need to feel that they would be adequately protected.

Now, this is not in any way to concede what Iran should do going forward, because some people say when we talk defensive, that means that we're conceding that they are going to end up with a weapon.

No, not at all. We are trying to influence the calculation and the decision as to whether or not they should move toward weaponization.

GATES: Some people have said, in so many words, that I'm kind of woolly<sup>1159</sup>ed in believing that the -- that the Iranians would see not having nuclear weapons as more in their security interests than not.

But the question is, would the Iranians look at that that way if there were proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, if some of their neighbors in the Middle East, beyond those that now have them would develop nuclear weapons?

Is that in their interests?

Do they think that enhances their national security?

I -- I think that's an argument to be made.

AMANPOUR: We were going to continue this line of questions after a break

We're talking about Iran and some way of figuring out the way forward about Iran's nuclear program.

So just a quick one before Frank wants to ask you about smart power.

I just want to know, is it good enough to have a strict verification protocol -- for instance, the additional protocol under the NPT, or, indeed, you know, to have shipping out of the NEU?

Is that good enough, even if it's not perfect?

CLINTON: Well, this is -- this is a question we're not ready to answer because we don't know what the options in front of us are. We don't know what Iran would agree to. We don't know what kind of pressure could be brought to bear in case they don't agree.

So, you know, our goal is, as it always has been, to try to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, which we think would be very destabilizing in the region and beyond. And that's what we're aimed at achieving through this engagement.

GATES: And I want to (INAUDIBLE) what nuclear sites might they be prepared to be transparent about that have not been declared at this point.

SESNO: I want to ask you about -- both -- one last question about Iran. And that relates to what the message is to the people of Iran who have been in the streets; who have opposed Ahmadinejad; who spoke out; in some cases, have been arrested, wounded or worse, standing up to what they see as a stolen election.

The United States has a long history of standing on the side of human rights and democratic reforms and it speaks up for those who have been oppressed.

Are you concerned -- because some are -- if there's so much effort to negotiate with the government in Iran right now and resolve, or at least make progress on this -- progress on this nuclear issue, that those in Iran who want real political change are going to be somehow forgotten or abandoned or will not be the focus of American comment and -- and action?

CLINTON: No, because I think we've been very clear in supporting the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people and in speaking out forcefully against the irregularities of their electoral process.

But what we've concluded is if you look at our dealings with the former Soviet Union, for example, during the cold war, we always pressed them on human rights and we always talked with them about reducing our nuclear arsenals or trying to have some arms control.

These are not either/or. Human rights is at the core of who we are as Americans. We, you know, hope for all people the rights that we enjoy here. But at the same time, you know, just as no American president walked away from summits with the Russian presidents, working to try to achieve the goals that you could possibly find common ground on, that's what we're doing with the Iranians.

AMANPOUR: So that's just what I was trying to press with you, in terms <sup>1160</sup>the verification, just as with the USSR, when there was a verification system in place where you could know whether there was any dirty dealing or cheating going on in time to respond...

CLINTON: But they (INAUDIBLE)...

AMANPOUR: You seem to be going that way.

CLINTON: But they -- they got a weapon. I mean they got a weapon and then they were a nuclear...

AMANPOUR: You're talking about...

CLINTON: The Soviet Union, yes. They got a weapon. They were a nuclear weapons power. And then we did deterrence and containment and a lot of negotiation.

What we're trying to do in today's world, where the information about nuclear technology is much more widely known, certainly than it was in the late '40s and early '50s, we're trying to convince Iran that this is not in their interests to do. And that is -- you know, that is  that is a different perspective than finding out -- waking up and finding out the Soviet Union, you know, had the A bomb and we had to deal with it.

SESNO: Let's talk about 21st century diplomacy and how it's changed and -- and what you're doing, because you both addressed this, different terminology that's often used.

In one particular area, information, I want to talk a little bit for a moment here. You call it strategic communication, you call it public diplomacy, but it's connecting with the rest of the world. It's learning back from what others are saying. It's influencing leaders and persuading publics and knocking down myths or propoganda and maybe, in some cases, propogandizing ourselves.

A lot of this is now done by the military. There is no one person in charge of this.

How should this very important information battle be waged and who should be in command?

CLINTON: Well, let me give you two quick examples.

SESNO: The State Department?

CLINTON: Yes. You know, a -- a battlefield conflict zone requires the military to respond to, you know, rumors, attacks. They have to have a strategic communications effort. But it must be part of a broader national public diplomacy outreach effort.

I'll give you two quick examples. We were just talking about Iran. We learned that during the height of the demonstrations about the election that Twitter was a major source of information for people who were protesting.

CLINTON: And we -- and we thought that was a good vehicle, but we were told that Twitter was going to have to shut down for 48 hours to do some upgrades to the software. So we called and said, Please don't shut down, because this is a major communications loop for people on the streets.

In Afghanistan, what we've learned since we got in there -- and these great young civilians who work for me in the State Department working with these great young military leaders working in the -- in our armed forces, they realized that we didn't have a secure environment for cell phones to operate.

So we began looking for places we could put up cell towers. We began looking for how we would incentivize businesses in Afghanistan to spread their cell phone coverage. Why? Because the Taliban and their allies use cell phones to intimidate people. We found out that they were running FM -- illegal FM stations literally off the back of motorcycles. And they were telling people, "We're going to behead this person, we're going



to do that."

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So we are competing in that space. And, you know, obviously, we have to work together, but we have the lead on it, because it needs to stand for more than just our military might. It needs to represent all of our national interests and values.

AMANPOUR: We're going to take another break and well be back in just a moment.

SESNO: One of the concerns in the strategic communications field is that, in the conflict situation, in too many cases, it's the man or the woman in the uniform with the gun who is the -- in a sense, the frontline communicator and also the diplomat at times. So though you say you want her and State and the diplomats, the civilians to be in command of that, of necessity, our military, our men and women in uniform, are placed in -- in that -- in that role. What should change?

GATES: Well, I think, in the battlefield -- on the battlefield, not much can change. And I think one of the most extraordinary things that we have seen both in Iraq and Afghanistan is the extraordinary innovativeness and sophistication of NCOs and junior officers in terms of interacting with the populations and in terms of trying to build trust. I don't think it can be any other way on the battlefield.

Once -- once security is established, then I think that's the place where the civilians come in and -- and -- and take the lead in this. But -- but I think one of the things Americans can be incredibly proud of is -- is how well young men and women who are not professionals in the communications world and -- and, frankly, who in many cases don't have the language and -- and haven't studied the culture and so on established personal relationships in these -- in these countries that matter a lot and that create a tremendous foundation on which we can build.

We're doing a lot in the department in terms of language training, in terms of cultural education and so on, for troops that are going out, so that they're sensitive to the different cultures that they're dealing with, but in terms of the first-line operators, they're quite extraordinary.

SESNO: You've both talked -- yes, in a few. I just want to -- I just want to button this up, because we are going to move to your questions in a moment, to the audience questions in a moment, but you've talked a lot, as well, about the under-resourcing of our nation's diplomats. We heard you talk about that a moment ago, but also the need to re-tool how these -- how this toolbox of -- of diplomacy and information and military and economics are all brought to bear to have power and persuasion and influence in the world.

You've taken that on, sometimes unpopularity and controversially in your own institution, which you believe needs to change in fundamental ways, whether it's weapon systems, the F-22. You've spoken about how you have to take on retired generals and the military contractors and congressional members.

So what advice would you have to her if -- if -- if the tools of diplomacy and another bureaucracy called the State Department is to move to the 21st century? So go ahead and have a little moment here.

GATES: Well, first of all, my -- my view is the American toolbox should contain something other than hammers, OK? (applause)

And -- and I -- my view is that the challenge that Secretary Clinton faces is not so much within the Department of State, but rather the willingness of the Congress to give her the resources that are needed to conduct these activities. And -- and the truth of the matter is  and I'm really on thin ice here...

SESNO: Oh, but keep going.

GATES: ... the Congress is structured in such a way that our committees of jurisdiction tend to look at things in stovepipes. So Hillary's committees look at foreign policy in terms of diplomacy and so on and AID. Ours look at it in terms of the military. The intelligence folks have their committees.

And -- and so, except maybe at the very top level of the Congress, I think there are not people who have the same integrated view of the challenges facing our country and the opportunities we have to deal with them that we do sitting in the Situation Room. 1162

And the question is, how do you -- how do you build a constituency in the Congress over a period of time not only to grow the civilian national security part of our government, meaning the non-DOD part, but to provide the tools that are necessary and that take years to build, in terms of talent and -- and capacity, to be able to conduct America's relationships abroad? And I -- I think that's a challenge.

SESNO: Do you have an answer to that?

CLINTON: No, go ahead.

SESNO: OK.

AMANPOUR: Well, I was just struck by what the Secretary said about I think there should be parts left of the hammer. And I want to go back to Afghanistan, because...

GATES: Well, I'm all for hammers. I just want something other than hammers...

AMANPOUR: In a...

GATES: ..or in addition to.

AMANPOUR: In Afghanistan, the notion of bombing from the air and going after militants from the air has caused a lot of civilian casualties and a huge drop-off for American public support amongst the people there.

Do you think that it's possible to continue using that as a primary weapon against -- against militants, just in terms of its effectiveness?

And do you think that it's moral to use that as a primary attack against the militants?

GATES: Well, I think one of the principle changes that General McChrystal has -- has brought -- and I will give General McKiernan credit, his predecessor, for beginning to move away from the use of airpower, and particularly in offensive operations. And I think General McChrystal has underscored this. And a central element of his strategy in Afghanistan is to get away from the use of air power and the potential for mistakes that create civilian casualties and that every civilian casualty is a strategic defeat for -- for the countries trying to help the Afghan government and people.

And I would just say this. We will continue to use air power to defend our own troops. If they are in trouble, we will use air power to defend them.

Where -- where I think General McChrystal has drawn a line is in using air power in offensive operations.

SESNO: So let us go now to your questions from the floor. We're going to ask you to keep your questions as -- to identify yourself. We have two levels of participants (NOT ON TAPE -- students from the School of Media and Public Affairs and from The Elliott School. Give us your name, your school and a brief response -- a brief answer, a brief response. We'll get in as many as we can.

Go ahead.

KATELYN DOWNS: OK. Hi. My name is Katelyn Downs and I'm a senior here in the School of Media and) RESUME TAPE: Public Affairs. I'm from Columbia, Maryland.

My question is for Secretary Clinton.

On your first two foreign trips as secretary of State to the Middle East and Asia, you embedded local bloggers in your traveling press corps from each country that you

visited. You also participated in Web casts where you answered viewers' questions. You were cast in Beijing and over 10 million viewers, where you discussed climate change. **1163** We were just discussing Twitter.

My question to you is, how do you see new media in the future of public diplomacy?

And what types of strategies do you think would be most effective in the future that use new media?

CLINTON: Well, that's a great question because I think that new media is the reality. And part of what we're trying to do is to bring that into public diplomacy and make it one of those tools in the toolbox, to try to not just have government to government contacts and official sorts of communication, but really try to reach out to the people in countries to have a better idea of who we are and what we stand for.

I think there has been a tremendous opportunity because of President Obama, where people really have opened up to America again. And we're trying to fill that with content. We're trying to make it as interactive as possible, give people around the world the idea that we really care what they think about. I mean we may not always agree, but we're back to listening. We're back to engaging.

Because in today's world, there's too many sources of information coming at people and we need to be part of every possible approach that can be taken.

So I think it's -- it's critical and we've got some great young people at the State Department who are designing this for us. And I feel very good about the -- the start that we've made. But we have a long way to go.

SESNO: And you -- and you're hiring?

CLINTON: We're hiring. That's right. We are actually hiring. We're increasing -- all things hopefully coming through in our budget -- we're increasing the numbers of foreign service and civil service personnel, because the -- the need is so great.

SESNO: We have some very qualified people here.

Next question, please?

QUESTION: Hi, my name is Carlos. I am from Sao Paulo, Brazil, and I'm also in the Elliott School. My question is for Secretary Clinton.

Madam Secretary, what do you think of the political crisis in Honduras at the moment right now and the apparently intensifying battle between left and right politics in Latin America, what does that mean for democracy in general in Latin America and also for U.S. relations with Latin America? And do you think the current situation in Honduras could foreshadow similar events in other countries, specifically those led by leftist presidents in Latin America?

CLINTON: Well, I'm glad you asked that, because very often we don't talk enough about our -- our nearest neighbors in this hemisphere. And we've spent a lot of time with this new administration working with our friends and allies, because you're right. There has been a pulling away from democracy, from human rights, from the kind of partnership that we would want with our -- our neighbors.

So in Honduras, we're standing for the principle of democratic and constitutional order. And we have done that, I think, much to the amazement of many of the very leaders you're talking about who have become increasingly anti-American in their actions and their messages.

So I think it's important that the United States do everything we can to prevent either the hijacking of democracy by people who get elected once and then decide there never should be a real election again or by the return to military coups, where people are elected and, even if you disagree with them, they should finish out their term in an orderly way.

So we're -- we're working very hard to reach a conclusion in Honduras that

will permit the elections to go forward, that will follow what President Arias of Costa Rica did in the San Jose Accords to try to get Honduras back on the path to a -- a more sustainable democracy.

(NOT ON TAPE The people in Honduras deserve that. They really have struggled hard to get to where they were before there was the disruption and the exiling of President Zelaya. And we hope that we can help them get back on the right path.

SESNO: We have time for one last question. Go ahead.)

RESUME TAPE QUESTION: Good evening. My name is Seth Himan. I am a junior in the Elliott School of International Affairs. I'm from Bay Ridge, Brooklyn.

My question tonight is to you, Secretary Gates. You both mentioned how you were pleased with the Pakistani government and how they were combating the Taliban in Afghanistan. That being said, it is -- it is a known fact that the Pakistanis are always worried about the Indians and their -- their presence, especially being a nuclear power.

I was wondering if you could talk about -- if you believe that the ISI and other members of the Pakistani military apparatus, if they are still supporting the Taliban as a counterweight to India?

GATES: Well, you know, I first started dealing with the ISI when we were partnered working against the Soviets and supporting the Mujahedeen in the early 1980s. And Pakistanis, obviously, established very close relationships with a variety of the Mujahedeen groups, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and -- and -- and a number of others.

There obviously is the question of whether they have sustained those relationships and -- and what the nature of those relationships might be. We talked to them about this, and I think that the clear -- the clear path forward is -- is for us to underscore to the Pakistanis that we -- we are not going to turn our backs on them as we did in 1989 and 1990.

We turned our backs on Afghanistan. We turned our backs on Pakistan. They were left to deal with the situation in Afghanistan on their own.

Their worry is what happens in the future. Will we be there? Will we be a constant presence? Will we be supportive of them over the long term?

I think, in terms of the way they look at Afghanistan, the way they look at the region, it depends on the degree of confidence that they have in us that we will be a reliable partner of theirs going forward. I think that shapes the view of the Pakistani government, and that includes the ISI.

AMANPOUR: There's so much more to talk about, but thank you both very, very much for joining us.

Thank you, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Thank you, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Thank you to Frank Sesno and to all of George Washington University. Good night.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### George C. Marshall Award

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Friday, October 16, 2009*

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Well Brent, thank you for that gracious and mostly factual introduction. I've known Brent for more than three and a half decades – since I first went to work for him at the National Security Council in the early summer of 1974. As I recall, at that time President Nixon's final appeal in the Watergate case was being heard by the Supreme Court. Working for Brent in the White House at that time was sort of like being a deckhand on the Titanic.

As you can also imagine, Nixon's NSC wasn't exactly a hotbed of admiration for the Department of State. Foggy Bottom was viewed as a bunch of guys in striped pants with last names for first names, who occasionally took time out of their busy days to implement the president's foreign-policy. As they say in Washington, my views have "matured" over the years.

So on that note, let me also thank Secretary Clinton for her kind words and for her strong leadership of the Department of State. It is a real pleasure working with her.

And, of course, my gratitude to all those who has made today's celebration of George Marshall's life possible – and especially his family members who are with us.

And my apologies for not being able to stay with you for lunch. President Obama is visiting Texas A&M this afternoon and I think felt he needed some cover.

Receiving this award is a true honor. The placement of my name anywhere near that of George Marshall is also incredibly humbling. That said, I will admit that we share at least one trait: our repeated failures to retire from public service. Army chief of staff was to be Marshall's final job in the government. Then President Truman called him at his beloved farm in Leesburg and asked him to be special envoy to China – mere days into a much-deserved retirement. After that came secretary of state. And when Marshall later agreed to be secretary of defense, it was pitched as a six-month deal. He stayed twice as long. And it sounds familiar.

You know, in some ways, the United States Army has trouble with General Marshall's legacy. Last year I told the graduating class at Virginia Military Institute – General Marshall's alma mater – that I enjoy teasing West Pointers about the lack of a statue of Marshall at West Point. I tell them that surely an Army General widely acknowledged to be the architect of victory in World War II deserves more than a plaque at one of the entrances to the football stadium.

George Marshall is one of my personal heroes for many reasons beyond his inability to retire. His portrait hangs behind my desk in the Pentagon. When I speak to students at our war colleges or the military academies, I invoke him as an example of the kind of leader everyone should aspire to be: the apotheosis of unshakeable loyalty

combined with the courage and integrity to tell superiors things they didn't always want to hear – from General "Black Jack" Pershing to President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Secretary Clinton told us about General Marshall's accomplishments as secretary of state, and after lunch General Casey will talk about his role as Army chief of staff. In brief, I suppose it was a noteworthy accomplishment that he expanded the Army from less than 200,000 soldiers to more than 8 million in only a few years and crushed the Nazi and Japanese war machines. And, perhaps it was also noteworthy that he managed to save Berlin, advocate the creation of NATO, and rebuild an entire continent's economy. But I might suggest that one of his tasks as secretary of defense was even more daunting – a challenge that has eluded a number of secretaries and led to untold frustrations and complications throughout the decades: and that of course is getting the Departments of State and Defense to work together.

Marshall's skill in navigating the bureaucratic trenches probably had its root in his austere personality. Marshall once said, "I cannot afford the luxury of sentiment, mine must be cold logic. Sentiment is for others." When FDR once called him "George," Marshall corrected him: "General Marshall." His biographer said he was "impatient of verbiage, of protocol, and of the polite palaver that often lubricates the wheels of administration." And in a city that has, on rare occasions, elevated showmanship over substance, Marshall eschewed pomp and circumstance. The journalist Alistair Cooke once described him as performing his duties "with all the ardour of a certified public accountant."

That mien was, in many respects, a manifestation of his intellect – of his deeply, contemplative nature. This is not say that he was always correct, even when he had thought through an issue. Some of his early views on efforts to save Britain at the expense of arming America were flawed. And, as in all wars, there were mistakes and setbacks, both strategically and operationally.

But, more often than not, on the big things – those that really mattered – Marshall's strategic vision yielded profound wisdom: about his country, about the world, about the nature of man. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, he knew already that the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month signified only an interlude between great and furious storms. So he started writing down the names of all competent officers he met in his various posts. Years later, those officers would lead the American Army in World War II.

Then, only three months after the guns had fallen silent in 1945 and that great tragedy had ended, he warned that "maintaining the peace" required addressing, in his words, "the pittance of food, of clothing and coal and homes" in Europe – the intellectual seeds that would in time grow into the Marshall Plan.

His foresight was, I believe, rooted in his acceptance of man as a flawed creature, and an international landscape that reflected that stark and unfortunate reality – truths we can still absorb today. There were no holidays from history for Marshall. As he noted, "tragic consequences" followed wherever humanity "walked blindly" or "ignored the lessons of the past."

That was never George Marshall's course in life. His was, thankfully, a life of action driven by purpose. In a special convocation speech to Princeton students in 1948, Marshall exhorted them: "The development of a sense of responsibility for world order and security, the development of a sense of the overwhelming importance of the country's acts, and failures to act in relation to world order and security – these, in my

opinion, are the great 'musts' for your generation." And I would add, for future generations as well. In his willingness to serve America and the world throughout the great travails of the 20th century, George Marshall more than affirmed the worth of these 'musts' and the purposes to which he devoted himself. And in persisting in this affirmation for all his living days, he made of himself an ideal that we should all aspire to emulate.

Thank you very much for this high honor.


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS AT GEORGE C. MARSHALL FOUNDATION AWARD CEREMONY

Oct. 16, 2009



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates addresses the audience during the George C. Marshall Foundation Award presentation at the State Department in Washington, D.C., Oct. 16, 2009. Gates received the award for a lifetime of distinguished service to his country.  
DoD photo by Cherie Cullen  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks with retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft during the George C. Marshall Foundation Award presentation at the State Department in Washington, D.C., Oct. 16, 2009. Scowcroft served as national security advisor for Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush.  
DoD photo by Cherie Cullen  
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
Member of the George C. Marshall Foundation Council of Advisors retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, left, and Chairman of the Board John B. Adams, Jr., present the George C. Marshall Foundation Award to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates during a ceremony at the State Department in Washington, D.C., Oct. 16, 2009. Gates received the award for a lifetime of distinguished service to his country and his focused, bipartisan leadership of two of the nation's most important institutions, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.  
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS AT POINTS OF LIGHT FOUNDATION FORUM


Oct. 16, 2009



President George H.W. Bush, right, greets Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in College Station, Texas, prior to a Points of Light Foundation forum at which Bush and President Barack Obama were scheduled to appear at Texas A&M University, Oct. 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*


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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, along with former Secretary of Treasury and State James A. Baker, second from left, join former President George H.W. Bush and former First Lady Barbara Bush, in greeting President Barack Obama as he arrives in College Station, Texas, prior to attending the Points of Light Foundation forum held at Texas A&M University, Oct. 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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President Barack Obama, at podium, speaks after being introduced by former President George H.W. Bush, left, and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, second from left, during the Points of Light Foundation forum at Texas A&M University, in College Station, Texas, Oct. 16, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO HAWAII, JAPAN, KOREA, AND SLOVAKIA

October 19 – 24, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### U.S. PACOM Change of Command

*As Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Camp Smith, Hawaii, Monday, October 19, 2009*

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Thank you, Admiral Keating. Good morning – or should I say “Aloha” – to our distinguished visitors. This visit to beautiful Hawaii is the first stop in what will be one of those not-exactly-relaxing-around-the-world trips. So I’ve assigned a special security detail to make sure no one in the delegation “forgets” to catch the departing flight.

It’s an honor to join you to say farewell to an outstanding naval officer, and valued friend and colleague, to welcome a new commander, and to take stock of this storied organization’s accomplishments.

To the Keating family: Tim’s wife, Wanda Lee, whom I will honor shortly for her work on behalf of the men and women of Pacific Command. His son, Daniel, and his wife Kristen; daughter, Julie; and son-in-law, Paul. Thank you your service and for everything you have done for our Navy and your country. I continue to be amazed by the sacrifices and resilience of our military families.

As Admiral Mullen just described, Admiral Keating brings to a close a stellar 40-plus year career that has taken him to every corner of the globe – in the cockpit, on land, and at sea – to the highest levels of command and responsibility. Recognizing his accomplishments at NORTHCOM, his unique skills, and strategic vision, I recommended Admiral Keating two-and-a-half years ago for what would be his final and most important assignment: the leadership of America’s oldest and largest combatant command.

Leading a military organization in this part of the world requires a deft touch, a diplomat’s sensibilities, a scholar’s sense of the past, and a commercial tycoon’s business savvy. Admiral Keating has provided all of that and more. PACOM has its share of challenges: complex national and international agreements, relations and rivalries; vast distances within its boundaries; the ever-present danger of man-made and natural disasters; and the threat of international terrorism. The relative stability of the region belies the historic, economic, and cultural rip currents that exist just below the visible surface. This area of responsibility includes 36 nations and more than 50 percent of the world’s population, and more than \$1 trillion in trade annually with the United States. There are long-standing alliances with old friends like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand – along with new partnerships with other nations based on shared interests and values.

By following through on Admiral Keating’s strategic vision, the men and women of this command have accomplished much over their commander’s tenure:

**1173**

- Delivery of millions of pounds of humanitarian relief to hundreds of thousands affected by earthquakes, tsunamis, and floods – including the recent natural disasters in the Philippines and Indonesia;
- Numerous medical outreach missions – including the USNS Mercy deployment and Operation Pacific Angel that treated nearly 100,000 people in six nations;
- Growing trilateral cooperation between the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan;
- Advances in ballistic-missile defense capabilities, as shown by several successful tests and the shoot-down of an errant satellite;
- The ongoing transition of United States Forces Korea to Korea Command slated for 2012;
- Joint Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Accounting Command recovering and identifying over 200 individuals from conflicts as far back as World War I and as recent as Vietnam; and
- Over 200 joint and multinational exercises with our regional partners.

This is on top of providing approximately 30,000 troops, manning five combat-ready carrier strike groups, and 44 ships participating in three expeditionary strike groups supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is our nation's good fortune to have Admiral Robert Willard ready to take the helm at Pacific Command. He has served and commanded in this region and was the 34th Vice Chief of Naval Operations. He was most recently the commander of Pacific Fleet, so he knows full well the challenges and opportunities here. His past experiences will serve him in good stead as he takes command. We wish Admiral Willard, his wife Donna, and his family all success.

And we wish Admiral Keating, Wanda Lee, and their family all the best as they begin a new chapter in their lives. Tim, I hope you have better luck with retirement than I did.

Thank you.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

October 20, 2009

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Press Availability with Secretary Gates En Route From Hawaii to Tokyo

First, just a word or two about the trip in general, clearly, three stops after a change in command ceremony today in Honolulu, first stop in Japan and clearly the first Cabinet level meeting with the new government, looking forward to that being back. It's been about two years since I was in Tokyo.

My message will be pretty much the same as the message I delivered two years ago. We welcome the new government in Japan. We look forward to working with it. We appreciate their desire to review certain policies. President Obama's administration has done the same thing. But I would say that with respect, particularly to the Futenma replacement facility that, as I say, we welcome their review, but we think we need to progress with the agreement that was negotiated. This has been in negotiation in the works for 15 years. All of the elements of it are interlocking. And so it is important to continue with it.

They're really, as far as we're concerned, are no alternatives to the arrangement that was negotiated. We've looked at over the years at all these alternatives and they are either politically untenable or operationally unworkable, so we need to proceed with the agreement as negotiated. And it's hard for me to believe that the Congress would support going forward in Guam without real progress with respect to the Futenma replacement facility.

So that will -- that will be a theme, certainly, of my visit to Tokyo as we look for ways to strengthen our cooperation with this new government. As I say, I'm looking forward to the visit. I think there's some real opportunities going forward for further cooperation and partnership with one of our strongest allies.

In Korea, the main theme will be the annual security consultative meeting. We will review progress toward the transfer of operational control in April 2012. I'm very pleased with the progress that's being made on both sides. I'm very optimistic. And then in Bratislava, obviously, the main theme there will be Afghanistan. I suspect that Afghanistan will come up in Tokyo and Seoul as well. And there are obviously a large number of needs in Afghanistan and we'll be prepared to offer suggestions for these countries in terms of economic assistance and other ways in which they might be helpful if they were willing to do so. But that's essentially a decision that has to be made by each of these governments and then, of course, in Bratislava, we'll be talking about General McChrystal's assessment and his recommendation.

So why don't I stop there and take your questions.

Q (Off mike.) Security standpoint, is that something that will be viable from your perspective -- (inaudible) --

SEC. GATES: Yeah. If the constitutional processes in Afghanistan lead to a runoff election, my understanding is that virtually all of the countries that sent in additional forces to help with election security, have kept those forces in place and I think we and they would be able to provide security along with the Afghan forces for such a runoff should that prove to be necessary.

I think the key consideration before us at this point is actually less security than with the passage of time, the weather. And so getting something done before winter sets in will clearly be very important.

Q (Off mike.) How would the possibility of a runoff affect the Obama administration's deliberations over our troops? Could you make that decision -- (inaudible) --

SEC. GATES: Well, I think as I say, the weather becomes a limiting factor in terms of a runoff. The reality is, even though the president has some further significant decisions in front of him, we already have 68,000 American troops on the ground in Afghanistan and almost 40,000 troops from other countries. They're not all just staying in their tents while we wait the outcome of the election. They're out doing operations. They have a mission. And so this is an ongoing process it seems to me. Whether -- I read in the paper since we left Washington that there had been some comments by Robert Gibbs and by Rahm that we're getting close to the decision phase on Afghanistan. And so I think, I think we're looking at the juxtaposition of these two things during the next very few weeks. But we're not just going to sit on our hands waiting for the outcome of this election and for the emergence of a government in Kabul.

We have operations underway and we will continue to conduct those operations.

Q (Off mike.) Just to update us, where are you now on the decision to sending more troops in -- (inaudible) -- and my understanding of what Gibbs and Rahm said was that -- (inaudible) -- decision on strategy -- would not be made until the government in Kabul can be stabilized. In other words, whether we know there will be a runoff or not.

SEC. GATES: My view is that whatever emerges in Kabul is going to be an evolutionary process. I indicated, I've indicated on a number of occasions after the election in August that the outcome of the election and the problems with the election have complicated the situation for us, but the reality is, it's not going to get simple, it's not going to be complicated one day and simple the next. I think that we will have to do is we and our international partners work with the Afghan government in building legitimacy and helping them tackle the problem of corruption. But I see this as a process, not something that's going to happen all of a sudden where one day you have a big problem and the next day you don't have any problem.

I think we're going to have to work with this going forward and I believe the president will have to make his decisions in the context of that evolutionary process.

Q (Off mike.) Do you think the runoff is -- (inaudible) --

SEC. GATES: I'm no expert on Afghan constitutional theory. One theory that I've heard is that there were there to be an agreement between President Karzai and Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Abdullah did not run in the runoff, that there would not be -- there would be no need for a runoff under those circumstances, but this is all internal Afghan politics at this point, and I think they basically have to sort it through themselves.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, I think that we've had a very deliberative process. We've looked at a lot of different aspects of the situation there. A lot of the discussion has not been focused on troop levels, but on the civilian assistance, on dealing with the corruption problem, dealing with questions of legitimacy, better coordination of the assistance programs and on what kind of an approach we take with respect to reintegration of the Taliban.

So there have been a lot of subjects reviewed in this, partly as a result of the situation that General McChrystal found and reported on in his assessment that represented a more challenging situation in Afghanistan than we thought we faced when the president made his decisions in late March, and then also, obviously, the complications associated with the elections.

So I think it has been a thorough process, and I think we are now moving to the point where the president will begin to address some specific options and then make his decision. I mean the truth is there are also some realities that affect the timetable here, for example, I'm going to be out of Washington all this week and so is Admiral Mullen in Asia. I think Secretary Clinton is going to be gone several days next week. So it's just a matter now of getting the time with the president when we can sort through these options and then tee them up for him to make a decision.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think we are beginning to see the civilians flow and the reality is as I've said before, the civilian aspect of this is a big force multiplier. And so you don't need huge numbers of people if you have people who are experts and know exactly what needs to be done. The key is that whatever, however many civilians there are, they cannot operate in any of these environments without security. And so the security has to be established before they can begin to tackle the challenges of economic development and governance and rule of law and so on.

So that's the condition, precedent, for the civilians to have the impact they need to have.



Q (Off mike.) consequence to U.S.-Japan alliance if the Japanese government cannot meet its agreement?

SEC. GATES: Well, I don't want to speculate on any hypotheticals. This is an agreement between our countries, between our governments and, frankly, I have every confidence that both sides will fulfill the commitments that they have made in this agreement.

Q (Off mike.) Economic options -- (inaudible) -- for more troops anymore? -- (Inaudible) --

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm prepared to come with a full menu, but what I want to do, I'm not coming with a view to making any specific requests of either of these governments. But they both have had a role in Afghanistan in the past, and I am prepared to discuss with them the areas that where I see additional assistance could be helpful and that's a full range of things. And if they're more comfortable with assistance in areas such as helping with the sustainment of the Afghan National Army and police in financial terms, we're helping with economic development and so on; we're perfectly prepared to discuss those with them. But it's their individual decision and I am not making any specific asks of either of these governments.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: That's correct.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, we -- the location of the airfield was settled as I understand that in substantial measure to address environmental concerns on the part of the Okinawans and the Japanese government and if there is -- as we've indicated that there could be some flexibility in terms of the location, but that's really a matter between the Okinawa government and the government of Japan and Tokyo.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, I think the thing to remember is that General McChrystal's assessment and also his resource request is going up through the NATO chain of command as well as through our own chain of command. The reality is this is an alliance issue and I think my view all along has been we ought to do this in a way that if General McChrystal has an additional set of needs, it should not be looked upon as exclusively the responsibility of the United States to respond.

And so I think having a discussion of that and the fact that this is a continuing shared responsibility makes it entirely appropriate to have that conversation in Bratislava before decisions are made by the United States. This is an alliance issue,

and, frankly, since the NATO summit last spring, I have seen more energy and more commitment on behalf of both the military and civilian leadership in the alliance than I have seen in the previous two years that I was in this job. 1178

So my hope is and still recognizing some of the domestic political challenges that some of them face. So my hope is that we can have a serious discussion about how we address how things have changed in Afghanistan since last spring and a way forward in which the alliance can share these responsibilities and work with the Afghan government to move the situation in a more positive direction.

Q What has changed since two years ago? What do you see that's caused this change?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'll be honest, I'm not entirely sure. But I just have -- both Admiral Mullen and I have sensed it in our contacts with our counterparts and in meetings that we have had and telephone conversations, there seems to be and I would refer to you Prime Minister Brown's comments in London the other day. There seems to be a renewed commitment that we have to do this and get this done right, and I think that's all to the good.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Actually, it's less a matter of the challenge of the military, both our and the Afghan security forces providing security for the election than it is having a weather situation where people just can't get to where they need to go to the ballot. That's the biggest problem.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: The one thing that is clear in all the polling and everything I've seen is, regardless of anything else, pretty consistently, fewer than ten percent of the Afghan people want to see a return of the Taliban. So the key is: How do we move forward in a way that takes advantage of that hostility to the Taliban and perhaps, in no small measure due to memories of what it was like when the Taliban ran the country, and do so with the Afghan people having confidence in the legitimacy of their government and not just the government in Kabul, but at the district and provincial levels as well. And as I said earlier, I think that that is a process, it's not something that's going to happen overnight or in a very short period of time. And we just have to work together with the Afghans to move in that direction. But the fact that 90 percent of the Afghan people do not want the Taliban to return means that I think we have some tremendous opportunities there. And I think the key is reversing the momentum on the Taliban and preventing them from controlling populated areas, areas of economic production, lines of communication and so on.

So I think these things can move in parallel, obviously, it would be easier had the election come out in a different way and been conducted without the kind of irregularities that have been identified and if all had been clear-cut, begin early in September. But we just have to work with the situation that we find as far as I'm concerned.

Q (Off mike.)

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SEC. GATES: As I've said, I'm prepared to discuss a broad range of needs in Afghanistan, but I think that's entirely up to the government of the Republic of Korea. I'm not going to try and -- as I said earlier, I'm not going to make any asks of anybody on this trip. But we do have a common interest in moving forward in Afghanistan.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, first of all, I think the important thing is to recognize this is a contribution that the Japanese have made to the international community. A number of countries benefit more from the refueling than the United States does. And so I don't see the refueling as being a favor to the United States, but rather a contribution that the Japanese have made that is commensurate with its standing in the world as the second wealthiest country and one of the great powers.

So it's clearly a sovereign decision on the part of the Japanese government and I'm sure we'll talk about it. But I intend to talk about it in the form that I just described.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: It obviously serves a number of countries, but that's really up to the Japanese. I will make sure they understand that it's a valuable contribution, but if they choose to make a contribution in a different way, then that's up to them.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: First of all, on missile defense, we have a very strong partnership with the Japanese already and we are looking at ways to continue to enhance that. Similarly, my understanding is the South Koreans also are looking at ways to strengthen their missile defense in light of all the launches that the North has been carrying out. So I think we will continue to pursue this with both governments, but we start with an already strong foundation with respect to missile defense in Japan.

What was the first part of your question?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: When this became a problem a while back, we looked at some options and there are some alternatives. I have to confess that I haven't looked at those contingency plans recently, so I'm not really up to speed on what they are.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: No. No. I think things are going very well and based on the steps that both sides have taken, I think that everything is very much on track for meeting the deadline and after I met with Korea's president in Washington a few months ago, there has been continued progress in areas such as Camp Humphreys and some of the other steps involved in this process.

So I'm feeling quite confident that we will be able to meet the deadline.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm obviously encouraged by the Pakistani operations. I think the terrorist attacks that have been launched inside Pakistan in recent days made clear the need to begin to deal with this problem and so we, obviously, are very supportive of what the Pakistanis are doing. But it's very early yet, I think, the best I can tell the effort has only been underway for a few days.

Q Thanks.

SEC. GATES: Thank you all.

Q Thank you very much.

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

October 21, 2009

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Joint Press Conference with Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

STAFF: Secretary Gates, please.

SEC. GATES: Thank you, Mr. Minister. And let me express to you my thanks for hosting these very productive talks.

Japan and the United States are nearing the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security - a half century of partnership and cooperation based on shared interests and shared values. It is the cornerstone of our security policy in Asia.

There will be many opportunities over the coming year to celebrate all that we have achieved together. The true legacy of the last 50 years is the enormous potential we have to strengthen our ties in order to tackle security challenges as an alliance of equals in the 21st century.

Minister Kitazawa and I discussed a range of matters of mutual interests. I should note that many of these issues will also be on the agenda for the president's visit next month, and I would add -- I passed on to the prime minister and the foreign minister and defense minister how much President Obama is looking forward to coming to Japan next month.

The issues we discussed included the importance of our bilateral realignment road map, its strategic benefits to the U.S., Japan and the region -- (inaudible) -- the importance of moving forward expeditiously on the road map as agreed.

There are the challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan where I expressed

my appreciation for all that Japan's self-defense forces have done in that region with regard to refueling and economic reconstruction and security assistance. We appreciate Japan stepping forward in other areas such as piracy, and the international community will continue to expect Japan to exercise leadership in meeting global security challenges. 1182

There is the possibility of strengthening bilateral coordination on regional disaster response, a priority for both of our governments.

The minister and I spoke about how to work together as an alliance to achieve our shared objective of a denuclearized North Korea. And we discussed the importance of Japan's host nation support, which the U.S. views as a strategic pillar of the alliance that reflects Japan's commitment to our relationship.

We look forward to working with the new government here in Japan, and I especially look forward to working alongside Minister Kitazawa and building on the legacy of the last 50 years to strengthen and deepen our partnership for the future.

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

Q (In Japanese.)

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

SEC. GATES: First of all, we are very sympathetic to the desire of the new government in Japan to review the realignment road map. This was done at the beginning of the administration of President Obama and the United States. It was done in a timely enough way that Secretary of State Clinton was able to sign the Guam International Agreement in February with the Japanese foreign minister.

Our view is clear. The Futenma relocation facility is the lynchpin of the realignment road map. Without the Futenma realignment, the Futenma facility, there will be no relocation to Guam. And without relocation to Guam, there will be no consolidation of forces and the return of land in Okinawa.

Our view is this may not be the perfect alternative for anyone, but it is the best alternative for everyone, and it is time to move on.

We are -- feel strongly that this is a complex agreement, negotiated over a period of many years. It is interlocking -- (inaudible) -- immensely complicated and counterproductive. We have investigated all of the alternatives in great detail and believe that they are both politically untenable and operationally unworkable.

With respect to a time limit, we have not talked in terms of a time limit, but rather the need to progress as quickly as possible.

And finally, with respect to some modest change in the runway of a few tens of meters or whatever, we regard that as a matter between the government of Okinawa and the people of Okinawa and the government here in Tokyo, and our only caveat would be that it not slow the implementation process.

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

Q How about Bloomberg? Viola?

Q Secretary Gates, on Afghanistan, considering some of the concerns that have been raised about a potential rift between the military and the White House because of delays in making a decision on Afghanistan strategy, do you think it's important to make a decision before the November 7th runoff scheduled in Afghanistan? And have you come to a decision in your own mind about the best way forward?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I would just say that these stories may make good reading, but they are not a reflection of reality. There has been a very close, collaborative effort between our military officers and the civilian side of the government meeting almost on a daily basis, including our commanders in the field as we work our way through the complicated issues associated with the election in Afghanistan and also the more difficult situation that General McChrystal found when he got there.

So these rumors of some kind of a rift, I think, are just not accurate and do not reflect the close working effort between our military and civilians, both in the Department of Defense and with other elements of the government as we try and work our way through this very complicated situation in Afghanistan.

My concerns and the comments that I made yesterday with respect to legitimacy were really about the overall legitimacy of the Afghan government in the eyes of its own people, and it goes well beyond simply having an outcome to the presidential election in Afghanistan. Clearly, having the runoff, getting that behind us and then moving forward is very important, and I think that having some clarity in that makes a lot of sense because I think it gives us the likelihood of an outcome pretty quickly. But I think that we need to be realistic that the issues of corruption and governance that we are trying to work with the Afghan government on are not going to be solved simply by the outcome of a presidential election. This is going to be a work in progress, an evolutionary effort, and we need to be realistic about them.

Q (In Japanese.)

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

SEC. GATES: The minister has actually characterized my views quite accurately. I expressed our appreciation for the replenishment effort and made clear that it made a contribution to a number of nations. The reality is the United States is not the primary beneficiary of the replenishment effort; others of our partners are, and we'll have to look at alternatives should the replenishing mission end. But I also, as the

minister said, made clear that as far as we're concerned, that's a decision that's up to the government of Japan. That said, there are robust opportunities for additional 1184  
of assistance to Afghanistan. I know that there is interest in economic development and agricultural development, but I would also say that a real need is for financial support for the expansion and sustainment of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police, and we would only hope that Japan's contribution will be commensurate with its standing as one of the greatest powers in the world.

Q (In Japanese.)

Q Dan De Luce, AFP.

For both of you, given how much has changed in the U.S.-Japanese relationship since the alliance was founded and the new government's desire here to modify or adjust that alliance, what does Japan concretely have in mind at doing to change or alter or improve the alliance? And then for the U.S. Defense Secretary, what should the role be of the U.S. military here and in the region? And should that role be scaled back or somehow changed?

MIN. KITAZAWA: (In Japanese.)

SEC. GATES: I commented to the minister this morning that one of the biggest changes that I had seen between the time I left the government in 1993 and returning to government in 2006 was the extraordinary improvement in the relationship between the United States and Japan and how much closer the alliance is now than it was even 13 years ago, 15 years ago now.

It seems to me that the primary purpose of our alliance from a military standpoint is to provide for the security of Japan. This defense umbrella has protected Japan for, now, nearly 50 years. It allows Japan to have a defense budget, a self-defense force budget of roughly one percent of GDP. But I think the alliance also represents a shared interest between the United States and Japan in terms of regional security, and the capabilities that we have here in Japan make an important contribution to that regional security in a time, if anything, is becoming more complex with developments in North Korea and elsewhere than in the past.

I would say there are many opportunities to expand the relationship. We already are doing a great deal together on missile defense as the minister mentioned earlier. We're talking about how we can expand our military-to-military cooperation and interoperability in areas such as disaster assistance and humanitarian relief where we both have common interests.

I made the comment to the minister in our meeting that in some ways as you look around this part of the world and recent developments in places like Indonesia and the Philippines, the greatest enemy seems to be Mother Nature, and we have the capabilities to deal with the consequences of some of these disasters, working together.

So I think that there's great opportunity to expand this relationship and strengthen it, even as we strengthen our relationships with our countries in the region.




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETINGS WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS

Oct. 20, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates extends his hand in a gesture of gratitude to Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa after a joint press conference at the Ministry of Defense in Tokyo, Oct. 21, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama at Kantei in Tokyo, Oct. 21, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Foreign Affairs Minister Katsuya Okada greets Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates upon his arrival at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Oct. 20, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### U.S.-ROK Military

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Yongsan Garrison, Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday, October 21, 2009*

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Ambassador Stevens, National Assembly member Kim Sung-Un. Thank you, General Fil, for that introduction. General Paik Sun Yup, thank you for being with us today. You honor us by your presence.

I want to speak for a few minutes, and then we'll do some question and answers, and then we'll leave time at the end for me to have an individual picture with all of you, in front of these flags, and a chance to shake your hands, and thank you for your service, and give you a coin.

To the American servicemen and women with us today, I want to extend my appreciation for your willingness to serve and continue serving. While our country's attention is understandably – and rightfully – focused on the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, you should never forget how important your work is to the national security of the United States. You are the latest in the long line of American warriors who first fought – and then stood watch – on this, one of the few remaining “frontiers of freedom” left over from the last century's epic struggle. And I thank you for it.

I am very pleased that this is a combined gathering with personnel from the Republic of Korea's armed forces. This event, and this audience, symbolizes the close ties between our two militaries and our two countries – bonds that were first forged in the crucible of blood, heartbreak, and shared sacrifice nearly six decades ago. It is an alliance that is as strong and necessary as ever, even as it evolves and transforms to suit the new security realities of this uncertain and dangerous new century. At the outset, I want our Korean allies to know America will continue to stand with you, shoulder-to-shoulder, as a close friend and reliable partner.

Any change in a relationship as deep and long-held as ours, no matter how welcome, inevitably leads to some degree of trepidation and uncertainty – especially as real dangers continue to haunt this peninsula. So in the next few minutes I'd like to offer some thoughts about the state of the alliance: where we stand today and where we need it to be headed together in the future together – issues that you, as part of this alliance's combined cadre of military officers and senior non-commissioned officers, will be working for years to come.

I should start with the Joint Vision Statement set forth by our heads of state earlier this summer. It recognized that the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty remains the cornerstone of our security relationship. But the Joint Vision Statement did not merely reflect on the alliance's past. It also envisioned a future in which the Alliance is developing – from a relationship focused on the static

defense of territory, to an active strategic partnership here on the peninsula and beyond.

This change is taking form through the transition of wartime operational control to the Republic of Korea – when the ROK Armed Forces will assume its proper lead role in the defense of its national territory. The ROK military's tradition to being the supported command in 2012 is the culmination of a series of shifts towards greater responsibility over the past three decades. These shifts have reflected the evolution of the U.S. role – from protector of a war-torn land to the role of a full partner with one of the world's most dynamic economies and capable militaries.

Today, the ROK military is well positioned to take the lead in the combined defense of this country. We enthusiastically support the Defense Reform 2020 agenda, a bold plan of modernization that will produce a more agile, deployable, and effective force. This future force will be not just more capable of defending the peninsula, but be a contributor to regional and global security as well. The recent announcement of a new, specialized peacekeeping unit in the ROK military is especially welcome in that respect.

As President Lee said on Armed Forces Day three weeks ago, Korea's military must "adapt and transform to new environments and new types of threats" – to not only protect the homeland, but also transform into a force that can also "carry out roles commensurate with its growing stature as a global Korea."

As America's military has learned from the experience of transforming in the midst of two wars, changing proud and successful institutions is no easy task. The challenge for the Republic of Korea is that which has vexed America's defense establishment: how to achieve the right balance between emphasizing traditional strengths and preparing for emerging missions; between the conventional and irregular; between direct military action and building the capabilities of key allies and partners. And to do all of these things with limited time, knowledge, and resources.

As with all of our allies, we encourage the Republic of Korea's political leaders to make an investment in defense appropriate to Korea's emerging role as a contributor to global security, and commensurate with the threat you face on the peninsula.

America's long-term military commitment here recognizes that the peril posed by the North Korean regime remains, and in many ways has become even more lethal and destabilizing. Despite the hopes and best efforts of U.S. and Republic of Korea leaders, the character and priorities of the North Korean regime have sadly not changed. Its armed forces can still inflict enormous destruction south of the demilitarized zone, though North Korea's ability to launch another conventional ground invasion is much degraded from even a decade or so ago.

Today, it is North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and proliferation of nuclear know-how and ballistic missile weapons and parts that have focused our attention – developments that threaten not just the peninsula, but the Pacific Rim and international stability as well. There should be no mistaking that we do not today, nor will we ever, accept a North Korea with nuclear weapons. We will work, as an alliance and with other allies and partners for the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.

Towards that end, the United States is committed to providing extended deterrence using the full range of American military might – from the nuclear umbrella

to conventional strike and missile defense capabilities. To be sure, the United States will maintain an enduring and capable military presence on the Korean Peninsula. Our long-term commitment is signified by our plans to make three year accompanied tours the norm for most U.S. troops in Korea – similar to arrangements we have in Europe.

But this security relationship is not defined solely by how the alliance is organized to uphold these mutual security commitments. We must restructure the way we are postured, the way we operate, and the way we think. Your daily cooperation and working relations – the connective tissue of this alliance – will increasingly deal with a number of non-traditional missions and security issues, including:

- Non-proliferation;
- Ballistic missile defense;
- Regional security cooperation, to include cooperation with Japan;
- Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
- Global peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations; and
- Other areas yet unforeseen.

The shift in the U.S.-Korea Alliance reflects wider changes underway in Asia's security architecture. For most of the Cold War, security and stability in the Pacific Rim were provided by a series of bilateral alliances between the United States and our closest allies – the hub and spokes model, if you will. Those ties and obligations remain strongly in place. But what we are seeing more of, and would like to encourage, is more security cooperation among our traditional allies and with other partners in the region. A recognition that virtually all the most pressing and dangerous security challenges – from piracy to proliferation – will require cooperation among multiple nations of shared interest.

The Republic of Korea, of course, has deployed and fought alongside the U.S. military in a number of contingencies over the past 50 years – including Vietnam and Iraq. I see a different dynamic and logic to Korea's international military role today. In the past, deployments were considered something that Korea was doing for the United States. Going forward, Korea's international military contributions should be seen as what they are – something that is done to benefit your own security and vital national interests.

The will and the ability of the ROK to act regionally and globally are entirely consistent with your obligation to lead the defense of this peninsula. The United States and the Republic of Korea are invariably bound by the same mutual interest in peace and stability around the world – bringing new resonance to the words “we go together.”

I would like to direct my closing comments to our hosts and friends in the Korean military.

As many of you know, our honored guest, General Paik, some time ago published his memoirs of the Korean War. In his book he described his first interactions with the American army – including fighting alongside the U.S. 27<sup>th</sup> Regiment, the “Wolfhounds,” in the war's early weeks.

In the battle of Tabu Dong in August 1950, General Paik – then a 29-year-old division commander – personally led an allied counterattack that repelled the invaders

from a key ridge. Reflecting on that battle, he later wrote: "I learned in this first combined ROK-U.S. operation that success depended on mutual trust. If the [North Koreans] kicked us out of the hills, the Americans would be trapped in the valley. And if the [North Koreans] punched through the Americans, we would be isolated in the hills. Thus, if the men of each army did not trust the other, neither would have the confidence to fight."

We can be hopeful that such carnage and suffering inflicted on this country and her warriors are fading into hallowed memory. We can also be confident that, nearly sixty years later, the Republic of Korea military is poised to lead the defense of your homeland and protect your nation's security interests around the world. And the shared values, mutual trust, and bold leadership that General Paik demonstrated and identified as the key to this friendship will continue and grow stronger.

I thank you for your time today, and look forward to your questions.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 828-09  
October 23, 2009

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### 41st U.S.-RoK Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communiqué

The following is the text of a joint communiqué issued in Seoul, Korea, on Oct. 22, 2009.

1. The 41st Republic of Korea – United States Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul on October 22, 2009. ROK Minister of National Defense Kim, Tae Young and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. Before the SCM, the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lee, Sang-eui and the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, presided over the 31st ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on October 21, 2009.

2. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the commitment of the ROK and U.S. Presidents to build a comprehensive strategic Alliance of bilateral, regional and global scope, based on common values and mutual trust, as set forth in the Joint Vision for the Alliance of the ROK and the U.S. on June 16, 2009. They also agreed to closely cooperate to implement and build upon the Joint Vision through continued development of measures for the direction of ROK-U.S. defense cooperation, thereby further strengthening the Alliance for the 21st Century.

3. The Minister and the Secretary reiterated that the ROK and the U.S. will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. They discussed North Korea's missile and nuclear tests in April and May 2009 and recent short-range ballistic missile launches. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed these acts clearly violate UN Security Council resolutions and Six-Party Talks agreements; undermine the global non-proliferation regime; and constitute direct and grave threats to peace and stability not only for the ROK and regional neighbors, but also the entire international community. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to closely cooperate on the full and faithful implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, and to continue joint efforts to achieve the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks.

4. Secretary Gates reiterated his support for the ROK Government's efforts to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and develop inter-Korean relations for mutual benefits and common prosperity through dialogue, while making the denuclearization of North Korea a top priority. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to further strengthen defense cooperation, ensuring combined readiness to effectively address future challenges and emerging needs in the security environment. They reaffirmed the important role that the ROK-U.S. Alliance has in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

5. The Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed the two nations' mutual commitment to the fundamental mission of the Alliance to defend the Republic of Korea through a robust combined defense posture, as well as to the enhancement of mutual security based on the Mutual Defense Treaty. They also agreed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance remains vital to the future interests of both nations in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, and stressed their determination to ensure sufficient capabilities of the combined forces for the security of the Republic of Korea. Secretary Gates reiterated the firm and unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK using both capabilities postured on the Korean Peninsula and globally available U.S. forces and capabilities that are strategically flexible to deploy to augment the combined defense in case of crisis. Minister Kim and Secretary Gates acknowledged this commitment is further demonstrated and strengthened by extending and normalizing tour lengths for all service members assigned to Korea to three years, along with the commitment to maintain the current U.S. troop level in Korea.

6. Secretary Gates reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence for the ROK, using the

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full range of military capabilities, to include the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. Minister Kim conveyed his appreciation for the U.S. commitment and both sides agreed to work closely together to enhance the effectiveness of extended deterrence.

7. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to consult closely on the future combined force posture, making enhancements as necessary, to ensure that robust forces and capabilities are available to deter aggression against the ROK and defend against that aggression should deterrence fail. They also agreed to cooperate to maintain appropriate preparedness to implement the shared vision of regional and global contribution in support of mutual security interests.

8. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the ROK-U.S. Alliance plays a significant role in fostering the peace, stability and prosperity in the region. They further agreed to work jointly to develop cooperative relations and to promote multilateral security cooperation in the region and globally, highlighting the important role that regional partners play in helping advance mutual interests of both the ROK and the U.S.

9. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the ROK and the U.S. will continue to enhance close Alliance cooperation to address wide-ranging global security challenges of mutual interest, including through peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. In this regard, Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the ROK's continued support to promote peace and stability in areas such as the Gulf of Aden and Lebanon. Minister Kim also expressed his appreciation for the U.S.' active support to enable the Korean military unit deployed to the Gulf of Aden to successfully conduct its missions. Secretary Gates noted with appreciation the Korean government's May 26, 2009 endorsement of and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as a significant demonstration of cooperation in the global effort to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), acknowledging the importance of mutual support and cooperation on PSI-related activities, including exercises and information -sharing.

10. The Minister and the Secretary received a report on the results of the ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting from the Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), General Walter L. Sharp, which highlighted that the combined defense posture is capable and ready to "Fight Tonight," and that it is prepared to effectively respond to any threat or provocation.

11. Having agreed with the CFC Commander's report that the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK military forces is proceeding smoothly and on schedule, and in accordance with the Strategic Transition Plan (STP), the Minister and the Secretary reaffirmed their intent for the transition to occur on April 17, 2012. They also reaffirmed that the implementation of the STP will be regularly assessed and reviewed at the annual SCM/MCM, with a close eye on North Korean threats, and reflected in the transition process. In this regard, they further noted the importance of the OPCON Certification Plan in ensuring the transition is implemented methodically to validate that the combined defense posture remains strong and seamless. The Minister and the Secretary praised the successful results of the Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) exercise held in August 2009 as a demonstration of the capabilities of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff in leading the combined warfight. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to receive Interim Certification Reports and Final Certification Report at the SCMs until the transition is completed.

12. To ensure that the combined defense remains robust, the Secretary reaffirmed that the U.S. will provide specific and significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities. Secretary Gates further noted the U.S. commitment to contribute U.S. enduring capabilities to the combined defense for the life of the Alliance. Additionally, the Minister and the Secretary agreed that the two militaries have made substantial progress on the development of military plans and strategic documents related to a range of situations to ensure the combined defense is prepared for an effective response. They agreed to continually conduct combined exercises for the maintenance, development, and readiness of a strong combined defense posture, both during the transition of wartime OPCON as well as afterwards.

13. The Minister and the Secretary received a report on the results of the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Initiative (SPI) meetings over the past year, and expressed satisfaction that, through close consultations, the ROK and the U.S. are making significant progress on important issues in further developing the Alliance, including: ensuring an effective combined defense, proceeding with the implementation of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) relocation and camp returns, and articulating a shared future vision for the Alliance. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to continue SPI consultations in 2010 and beyond, based on the significant accomplishments of the past five years and the mutual desire to continue to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

14. The Minister and the Secretary acknowledged the progress on USFK base relocation and camp returns. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to work closely together to complete successfully base relocation and camp returns, noting that the efficient and effective completion of these cooperative joint efforts are in the best



interest of both nations. The Minister and the Secretary agreed to minimize challenges and to strive for rapid completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The Minister and the Secretary expressed satisfaction with the agreement on the Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure (JEAP), established in March 2009 to facilitate bilateral cooperation for camp returns, noting that the JEAP is expected to be successfully applied to complete the return of seven facilities, including Camp Hialeah, by the end of the year. **1193**

15. The Minister and the Secretary expressed satisfaction with the 8th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), signed on January 15, 2009, effective from 2009 to 2013. Secretary Gates offered his appreciation to the ROK, emphasizing that the ROK's host nation support significantly contributes to a stable stationing environment for USFK. The Minister and the Secretary shared the view that the new SMA will play an important role in enhancing the combined defense posture and strengthening the Alliance. Both sides agreed to work closely together to implement the recently agreed in-kind contribution program.

16. Secretary Gates expressed sincere appreciation to Minister Kim for the courtesy and hospitality extended to him and his delegation by the Government of the Republic of Korea, and for the excellent arrangements which contributed to the success of the meeting. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the discussions during the 41st SCM and 31st MCM contributed substantively to strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance and further enhanced the development of the bilateral defense relationship into a comprehensive strategic Alliance. Both sides agreed to hold the 42nd SCM in Washington, D.C. at a mutually convenient time in 2010.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETINGS WITH KOREAN OFFICIALS

Oct. 22, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates talks with South Korean Prime Minister Chung Un-chan during their meeting at the Government Complex in Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 21, 2009. Gates is in South Korea to discuss a broad range of defense issues with local leaders.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center front, U.S. Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, left rear, and U.S. Navy Adm. Robert F. Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, right rear, attend a wreath laying ceremony at the Korean National Cemetery in Seoul, Republic of Korea, Oct. 22, 2009.

*DoD Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates attends a wreath laying ceremony at the Korean National Cemetery in Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 22, 2009.

*DoD Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Photo Essay


## Gates Visits Seoul, South Korea



South Korean Prime Minister Chung Un-chan, left, talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates during their meeting at the Government Complex in Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 21, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates gives his remarks to U.S. and Republic of Korea soldiers during a town hall meeting on Yongsan Army Garrison in Seoul, South Korea, Oct. 21, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

October 23, 2009

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Press Conference with Secretary Gates During the NATO Defense Ministers Meeting

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I just finished a working session with my NATO colleagues, a meeting where we discussed a range of institutional and operational issues affecting the alliance.

A major topic this morning was the -- America's plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe. I reinforced what the president and I said yes -- last month, that the changes proposed will provide for a more capable and flexible missile defense system sooner than was the case under the previous plan, and with a greater capacity to adapt as threats evolve. While this was not the appropriate occasion for any kind of formal endorsement, I came away with the impression of quite broad allied support for our new approach.

In this session, we also noted several NATO milestones. In Kosovo, the Kosovo Security Force has attained initial operating capability, an accomplishment in which NATO played a critical role.

NATO's new dedicated heavy airlift wing performed its first mission, resupplying Swedish forces in Afghanistan. And after much effort, the Allied Ground Surveillance program went into effect.

We also discussed NATO's role in Afghanistan; in particular, reforming ISAF's operational culture, supporting the training mission and improving the ability of ISAF to counter improvised explosive devices. There'll be a more in-depth discussion of Afghanistan this afternoon, with troop-contributing nations' working lunch, and then again the RC South meeting.

But I will say that many allies spoke positively about General McChrystal's assessment.

As you know, the United States government is currently reviewing our strategy and posture for Afghanistan and central Asia. This NATO ministerial presents an opportunity to consult with allies as part of our review of General McChrystal's assessment and forces request. Other nations have put more than 35,000 troops on the

ground in Afghanistan, and their views are important to us as we consider the way ahead. I assured the allies this morning and will state again this afternoon that the United States has no intention of pulling out of Afghanistan or abandoning our core mission there, a mission we deem critical to our national security and vital national interests. 1198

The United States continues to appreciate the military and nonmilitary contributions of the international coalition in Afghanistan. We are especially mindful of and grateful for sacrifices of allied troops who are in the fight and taking casualties in this dangerous and complex effort. And we pay tribute to all they have achieved and all they have sacrificed.

With that, I'll take a couple of questions.

(Tom?)

Q A question from The New York Times. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Among those who spoke positively about General McChrystal's assessment, were you among those who have now endorsed counterinsurgency efforts there rather than the narrower counterterrorism mission?

And with this broad endorsement of General McChrystal's vision, does it require significant contributions of new troops, whether Americans or from the allies, to do the big job of protecting the population and training?

Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Well, again, this wasn't a session for any kind of formal endorsement. And I think most ministers were expressing personal opinions of the assessment.

I would say that first of all, I was in a listening mode. We are here to consult. And clearly one of the things that I think the president is expecting from me is to bring back the views of our allies on some of these issues. They are already making a substantial contribution.

My only interventions this morning, with respect to counterinsurgency, had to do with the need for a common NATO and ISAF counterinsurgency doctrine and also that we have a more common approach to training, for carrying out counterinsurgency, that there isn't enough shared experience in terms of what works and what doesn't work.

So that was pretty much the limit of it. And so you know, as I say, there was -- there was informal conversation about this. But for this meeting, I'm here mainly in listening mode.

Q (Inaudible) -- with El Pais from Spain.

Secretary -- (inaudible) -- with missile defense, what is the role that you foresee for Russia in the whole system and the new concept that Washington is thinking about? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: One of the great attributes of the phased adaptive approach of our new approach to missile defense is that it is much easier for us to connect our system with the radars and anti-missile capabilities of our allies. That's also true of Russia. The reality is, with this new system, it will be much easier to tie it in with Russian capabilities should they choose to join us.

So, for example, they have a radar in southern Russia that would be a real asset to the overall defense of Europe, particularly from Iranian missiles. And as I have said for a long time, they -- we would welcome Russia's partnership on this. This new system would actually make connecting or tying in that Russian radar easier than the previous system.

Q (Inaudible) -- from German television. Mr. Gates, there were reports in the American press that the U.S. thinks about sending another 13,000 troops to Afghanistan. You have already sent, I think, 21,000 troops this year. And can you give us an idea whether this figure is correct and whether you think about sending them when you know that (who is ?) president in Afghanistan? Is there any connection?

Is there any connection?

SEC. GATES: That was an inaccurate story in the American press. The number of 13,000 in addition to the 21,000 was fundamentally a mistake in math and also a failure to recognize that there were a number of troops, something on the order of 7,000 troops, that had been approved to go to Afghanistan by President Bush and that were -- but actually did not arrive in Afghanistan until President Obama was in office.

President Obama knew that when he made his decision. The total number of additional forces that we've added under President Obama, trainers, combat forces and enablers altogether is the 21,000.

Q Thank you.

Q Mr. Secretary, Nick Childs from the BBC. There seems to be general agreement on the need to get the strategy right, and then the need for deliberation on Afghanistan. But in your listening mode, did you detect any concerns from your colleagues about the length of time that the administration is taking over working out its position on the way forward, and whether there were any concerns perhaps there needed to be a decision soon on this?

SEC. GATES: There wasn't a word said about that, not one. I think that there were a number of comments, however, on the importance of governance in Afghanistan, on improved governance, and on the legitimacy of the government going forward, and the

need to deal with the issue of corruption. But in terms of the -- of the review going on in the United States, there wasn't a word said about that by any of our allies, a **1200** none I heard.

Q (Inaudible) -- Slovakia.

I would like to ask you how did you feel about the support and about the new proposal of the U.S. concerning missile defense in Central Europe from the allies, and especially how did you feel about the support expressed by Slovak Republic? Thank you.

SEC. GATES: I met with -- I met with the Slovak minister of defense and deputy prime minister just a little while ago. I think that they are supportive of the direction that we're going. I think that they made reference to a statement that was made yesterday that was based on outdated information, and I think they'll be addressing that -- later today, perhaps. Leave that up to them.

But I felt that -- as I mentioned a second ago, that there was quite broad support for the new approach, and interest in, again, extending our hand to the Russians to invite them to partner with us in this.

Q Mr. Secretary, Viola Gienger from Bloomberg News. Did you get a sense of what -- how deep and how strong the support would be from the NATO allies in the event that a decision is made that more troops would be needed for Afghanistan? What is your sense of how much support you might expect, compared to how much you're getting now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'd -- again, this was not the forum for anyone to express a view of any commitment or anything like that. As some of you have heard me say, I think that since I've been at this now almost three years and after the NATO summit this last spring, I detected a commitment and an energy on the part of our allies, both in uniform and civilians, in terms of their determination to participate with us in Afghanistan and see this through to a successful conclusion.

Although this was not the -- although the troop generation conference won't be until next month, there were a number of allies who indicated they were thinking about or were moving toward increasing either their military or their civilian contributions or both. And I found that very heartening.

I think we lose sight of the fact that, just as we have doubled the number of Americans in Afghanistan over the last 15 months or so, the reality is, the number of our partner nations, the number of their troops has doubled as well, to almost 38,000 at this point. So people really have been stepping up to this. And I think it remains to be seen the -- as the secretary-general made clear, the troop-request part of General McChrystal's overall assessment and resource request is working its way through the NATO chain of command. It really wasn't discussed today. It'll be there for a -- at an appropriate time.

But I just -- I would say -- again, I have felt both over the last number of months but even after this morning's session there seemed to be a renewed determination to see this through.



Q Several NATO ministers have said they were -- wanted to wait for the White House strategy decision and the election both, before making their decisions on any commitments. **1201**

But you earlier this week seemed to separate those two items, thinking that the strategy should go forward, regardless of election results; that that's a complicated matter.

Were you able to share that? Or have you received any input back, from the ministers here, about whether -- needing to wait for clear leadership, clear credibility, before making any kind of decision forward?

SEC. GATES: There really wasn't anything said about that during the meeting. Again the focus -- we're going to hear from General McChrystal this afternoon. A lot of -- I think a lot of what people had to say, about Afghanistan, was being put off until the working lunch that is going to be focused on that, when we will also have defense Minister Wardak of Afghanistan and a number of our partner nations in that lunch. So they really didn't go down that road in the meeting this morning at all.

Last question.

Yeah, way in the back.

Q Mr. Secretary, with the mounting endorsements of General McChrystal's approach from senior U.S. officers, NATO chiefs of defense, and we heard from the secretary-general, from the ministers this morning, is the president still considering a major deviation from broad counterinsurgency in his strategy review?

And if it is going to be broad counterinsurgency, won't that certainly involve the need for more troops?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, you know, drawing conclusions at this point is vastly premature. We're looking at a full range of activities. And our strategy in Afghanistan -- as has been said publicly in Washington and as I've said, we're not pulling out. I think that any reduction is very unlikely.

The question is, do we have the strategy right, in light of the situation we face? Does it need refinement in some way; and if it does need some adjustment in light of the events that have taken place over the last number of months, including the election and so on. And then, what are the implications of that in terms of General McChrystal's resource request?

As has been said in Washington, I think that the analytical phase is beginning to -- is coming to an end, and that probably over the next two or three weeks we're going to be considering specific options and teeing them up for a decision by the president.

Thank you all very much.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETINGS WITH NATO LEADERS

Oct. 23, 2009



U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, far left, meets with NATO defense ministers as they attend the ministerial in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with NATO defense ministers at the ministerial in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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


U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, shares a word with U.S. Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, center, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, and U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of NATO and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, right, during a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.

McChrystal, the top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, made an unexpected appearance at the meeting.

*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*

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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, shares a word with U.S. Navy Adm. James G. Stavridis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and Antonio Maria Costa, U.N. Executive Director of the Office on Drugs and Crime, during the NATO defense ministerial in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates meets with Slovakian Defense Minister Jaroslav Baska during the NATO defense ministerial in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, walks with U.N. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to attend a NATO meeting of defense ministers in Bratislava, Slovakia, Oct. 23, 2009.  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Mental Health Summit

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Monday, October 26, 2009*

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Well thank you. First, let me start by thanking everyone who made this summit possible. It is no easy feat to put on a meeting of this size and complexity – and on a topic of such importance to the well being of our men and women in uniform.

I would also thank Secretary Shinseki. From the battlefields of Vietnam to the highest ranks of the United States Army, Secretary Shinseki's almost 40 years of military service were characterized by unparalleled devotion to the troops in his charge. Now it is Secretary Shinseki's responsibility to see that all who have served receive the care they have earned. I can think of no better champion for our veterans, and no better partner for the Department of Defense when addressing these issues.

In a few minutes, Secretary Shinseki will outline some of the broader issues facing the Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs when it comes to mental health. I want to use my time here to reaffirm the Department of Defense's commitment to face squarely and doggedly the psychological consequences of today's conflicts within the ranks of the U.S. military. Beyond waging the wars we are in, treatment of our wounded, their continuing care, and eventual reintegration into everyday life is my highest priority. I consider this a solemn pact between those who have risked and suffered and the nation that owes them its eternal gratitude.

So I want to talk about three main topics:

- First, the nature and scope of mental-health issues within the military;
- Second, what the department is doing to help troops and their families cope with these ailments; and,
- Finally, what more needs to be done now and in the future to mitigate the effects of stress from the ongoing military campaigns.

I should start by noting that these kinds of gatherings, and the attention being paid to mental health issues, are so important because in the past unseen injuries such as post-traumatic stress and Traumatic Brain Injury were not accorded the full attention they deserved.

Of course, these kinds of ailments, in one form or another, have been around as long as war itself. Historical examples date back to ancient Greece where the Spartans called it "fear shedding." After the American Civil War, the term "soldier's heart" was used; in World War I they called it "shell shock"; later "combat fatigue"; and in the 1970s, it was known simply as "Post-Vietnam syndrome."

The protracted military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq – and the repeated deployments of much of America's ground forces – have brought a new focus to the signature wounds of these wars and on the psychological health of the force and their

families. According to a RAND study last year, there could be more than 600,000 service members with TBI, PTSD, or similar illnesses. Some signs are apparent – severe depression, or even suicide. Others are more elusive and sometimes ill-defined, arriving in the form of nightmares, anxiety, or unexplained and uncontrollable anger. Other acts, seemingly unrelated, bear this enemy's indelible fingerprints: petty thefts, fights, spousal abuse, drug or alcohol abuse. Today, it is all too clear that TBI, post-traumatic stress, and numerous other related mental ailments are widespread, entrenched, and insidious.

This department has, over time, realized that military medicine must have the same expertise, focus, and standards of excellence to address psychological wounds as we do for physical injuries. Over the past two years, the Department of Defense has made some significant steps in the right direction.

Starting with the budget: The Fiscal Year 2010 budget includes some \$3.3 billion to support injured service members, which includes funding for:

- Additional case managers and mental health providers;
- Developing a streamlined Disability Evaluation System with the VA;
- Constructing a dozen more Army Warrior in Transition complexes; and
- A number of other initiatives to improve quality of life for the wounded, from increasing staff at Family Assistance Centers to enhancing severance disability pay.

The department has nearly doubled the budget for psychological health and TBI to almost \$1.2 billion from last year, including \$400 million specifically for research and development. Beginning in FY 10, many of the psychological health programs that had been funded through supplemental appropriations will become part of the services' base budget – so that funding and institutional support for these important programs do not go away when the wars do.

Moreover, we have worked to close the gaps in staffing and treatment for psychological health in the military medical system:

- In October 2007, the department began requiring that initial mental health specialty-care appointments be available to TRICARE Prime beneficiaries within seven days;
- Psychological health staff has grown by almost 2,000 providers in the military-treatment facilities and by more than 10,000 in the TRICARE network; and
- By 2011, there will be an additional 200 mental health providers available from the National Institutes of Health.

Construction has already begun in Bethesda on the National Intrepid Center of Excellence, which will do for TBI and PTSD what the Center for the Intrepid in San Antonio has done for the physical rehabilitation of amputees and others severely wounded. These state-of-the-art centers are only possible because of the generosity of hundreds of thousands of Americans and major donors such as the Fisher family. I am grateful to everyone who has helped bring these centers into being.

At the same time, the uniformed services have made mental health a priority and initiated new programs with the support and advocacy of the highest ranks. The Army chief and vice chief of staff are spearheading the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction, and Suicide Prevention – which includes a five-year, \$50 million study with the National Institutes of Mental Health, considered the largest study of suicide ever undertaken. The Army is putting renewed emphasis on garrison leadership and chain-of-command responsibilities. These include early recognition of

**1207**

warning signals and intervention – in the hope of preventing the kinds of tragedies that have destroyed careers, families, and lives.

I would also note that all this military research and activity on psychological stress may have positive ramifications for society at large – for understanding and treating the effects of traumatic events on civilians who suffer from accidents, natural disasters, personal tragedies, or crime.

These are all positive steps. But it is clear that the department can and must do more.

For example, paperwork for injured troops can still be frustrating, adversarial, and unnecessarily complex. We need to continue refining roles and responsibilities between DoD and VA, and finding better ways to share information – a goal both Secretary Shinseki and I are committed to.

There is also a chronic shortage of mental health professionals in or near the biggest military installations – particularly in remote, and rural areas. Even with our push to acquire more professionals, there is a significant lag between our elevation of this issue and qualified professionals arriving where they are needed. For example, the Army has added nearly 900 behavior health providers of all types since 2007, an almost 50 percent increase. That still leaves the service with a shortfall of more than 330 specialists based on current requirements – a gap that will grow to more than 500 if the Army follows through on recommendations to put uniformed providers in every brigade.

Since this is long-term problem, there must be an expansion of recruiting at medical schools around the country. All told, the department clearly needs more uniformed mental health experts, as well as greater access to outside professionals who understand the issues faced by service members and their families.

The Army has employed various mechanisms – bonuses, scholarships, plus outreach and training programs – to grow the ranks of behavior health providers. The services' initiatives have included:

- A new Masters in Social Work program developed with Fayetteville State University that turned out its first graduates this year;
- A shift in hiring policies that permits legal non-residents of the U.S. to fill critical behavior health shortages; and
- A pilot program that allows older healthcare providers to enter the Army, serve two years, and then return to civilian life.

We hope and expect that these efforts will bear fruit with real benefits for the Army family over time.

Then there are the circumstances facing military families under the strain of repeated deployments. We know that parents, spouses, children, and caregivers are under compounded states of stress. During deployment, they run single-parent households all the while worrying about the safety of their loved one overseas – a situation made more difficult by constant updates on the television and the internet about attacks and losses – or the overdue daily e-mail from a spouse or parent. When the longed-for reunion happens, the stress simply moves to other facets of their lives. Military members who are irrevocably changed by what they have endured during their combat tour find themselves quickly reintegrated with families that have also evolved and changed during the time apart.

The department and the services have committed substantial resources to alleviate

these stresses on families – and good work is being done in programs such as DoD's Deployment Health Clinical Center. But I have also found from my visits to military posts that there is a real disconnect between the programs that exist and the awareness among the rank and file of the help that is available – and, as just mentioned, the availability of help. We must do a better job of understanding these dynamics, addressing them, and making sure that our people take advantage of new and existing programs.

I consider this above all a leadership issue. Military leaders must educate themselves about what resources are available locally, and then identify the most effective way to communicate with subordinates and reach families with that same information. For example, all the services have family-support or readiness groups – the primary avenue to communicate with those closest to the deployed service member. Part of a commander's responsibilities – and arguably a basis for judging his or her leadership effectiveness – is making these support groups more effective by reaching more people. If you have recommendations that will improve the way we help or communicate with the troops and their families, I can assure you I will do everything in my power to get it done – whether that means more funding, new authorities, or cutting through bureaucratic barriers.

Failure to take advantage of some of the programs we offer is, I believe, also related to my greatest concern: that, despite our best efforts, there is still a stigma associated with seeking help for psychological injuries. To that end, last year we changed the question on the Standard Form-86 security questionnaire regarding counseling for combat-related stress and, in particular, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder – to ensure that troops know that admitting psychological treatment is not an impediment to getting or keeping a security clearance. The department has also launched the Real Warriors Campaign, a national multimedia public-education effort designed to combat this stigma.

However, there is no greater ally in this cause than service members themselves, from the highest ranks to the lowest. Major General David Blackledge, from whom you will hear this afternoon, General Carter Ham, Captain Emily Stehr, and Navy Cross recipients Jeremiah Workman and Marcus Luttrell – among others – have all been spreading their message of help, brotherhood, and healing for anyone suffering from the unseen wounds of war.

The examples provided by these brave warriors reinforce the message that there is no weakness in asking for help. To the contrary, it takes tremendous courage and strength – and gives troops the skills to identify and deal with future symptoms from a position of confidence and strength. Completely removing the stigma may very well be the work of generations, but we will continue to do everything possible to chip away at it.

A few final thoughts. The war in Afghanistan has now surpassed the Revolutionary War by roughly three weeks – the longest war America has ever fought with an all-volunteer force. We are, in a very real sense, in uncharted territory. The recent good news about Army recruiting and retention numbers should not be grounds for complacency. Our troops and their families have shown remarkable resilience, but we don't know the limits of their endurance and the consequences once those limits are passed. The humbling fact remains that there is so much we still don't know about post-traumatic stress and other psychological problems. Relapses can occur with little



**1209**

or no warning. Advances can come from both the research lab and the kitchen table.

This reality makes it imperative that we continue the work that has already begun. The military medical community, in the Department of Defense and in the Department of Veterans Affairs, is supremely dedicated to this issue. Our attention will not flag, and our dedication will not falter.

As I noted at a Wounded Warriors family summit last year, at the heart of our volunteer force is a contract between the United States of America and the men and women who serve in our military: a contract that is simultaneously legal, social, and sacred. That when young Americans step forward of their own free will to serve, they do so with the expectation that they and their families will be properly taken care of should something happen on the battlefield. That eternal commitment is engraved in stone, high on the walls of Abraham Lincoln's memorial. His words echo through time, calling on us today to "care for him who shall have borne the battle."

All of you are part of that effort, and you have my gratitude. I look forward to working with you in the future as we strive to improve the lives of all the brave Americans who have borne the battle.

Thank you.

Secretary Gates Hosts PRC Counterpart

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates hosted Gen. Caihou Xu, vice chairman of the People's Liberation Army Central Military Commission for meetings today at the Pentagon. The two reaffirmed the consensus reached by President Obama and President Hu Jintao in April to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century. They agreed on the need to work together to address the issues of Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Both sides agreed to strengthen efforts to build a sound and sustainable military to military relationship. They discussed ways to further develop and improve the military-to-military relationship and agreed on the need to improve mutual understanding and trust between our armed forces. Toward this end, Gates stressed the the value of maintaining continuous dialogue based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues and gained agreement from Xu on a series of military- to-military contacts and exchanges focused on:

\* Promoting high-level visits: In 2010, Gates will visit China, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael G. Mullen will also visit China after receiving his counterpart for a visit in the United States.

\* Enhancing cooperation in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief: The two sides agreed to conduct a joint maritime search and rescue exercise.

\* Deepening military medical cooperation, particularly in the area of pandemic disease: The two sides agreed to conduct subject matter expert exchanges.

\* Expanding service-level exchanges between our two armies.

\* Enhancing the program of mid-grade and junior officer exchanges.

\* Promoting cultural and sports exchanges between the armed forces.

\* Invigorating the existing diplomatic and consultative mechanisms in order to improve military maritime operational and tactical safety of the two armed forces when we operate near each other: The next opportunity will be the Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement discussions that will be held in December 2009.

Following his meeting, Xu laid a wreath at the Pentagon Memorial. His Oct. 24-31 visit includes stops at U.S. Naval Academy, Fort Benning, U.S. Strategic Command, Nellis Air Force Base, Naval Air Station North Island (including a tour of the USS Ronald Reagan), and a follow-on visit Nov. 1 -3 to the U.S. Pacific Command.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 872-09  
November 05, 2009

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### Secretary Gates on Ft. Hood Shooting

"I am deeply saddened by the tragic events today at Fort Hood. My thoughts and prayers are with the families of the fallen, the wounded, and all those touched by this incident. There is little we can say at this point to alleviate the pain or answer the many questions this event raises, but I can pledge that the Department of Defense will do everything in its power to help the Fort Hood community get through these difficult times."



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### 20th Anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C., Tuesday, November 10, 2009*

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Now first, let me take a moment to say that I have just returned from Fort Hood, Texas, where I joined the president in a memorial service for those we lost in a horrific attack last week. I also had a chance to spend time with many of those who were wounded and with the families of the fallen. The president and I are committed to a thorough accounting of what happened, and to seeing that the shooting victims and their families have everything they need to recover from this ordeal.

So as we gather tonight to celebrate the life- and freedom-affirming events of decades past, we should not forget that America's military family remains in mourning. And, as we sit here, thousands of troops at Fort Hood, and at military bases across this country, are preparing to say goodbye to their loved ones and deploy to a distant and dangerous battlefield.

Tomorrow is Veteran's Day, when we pause to remember the contributions and the sacrifices of all who have worn America's uniform. And so at this point, I would ask everyone here to pause for a moment of silence – for those so ruthlessly attacked at Fort Hood last week and their families, and out of gratitude to veterans who have served in the defense of their country.

It is an honor to be in such distinguished company to commemorate the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to reflect on the role of President Ronald Reagan in bringing about the end of the Cold War. There are a number of old friends and colleagues here tonight – faithful public servants all, who – at least for the most part – have shown themselves to be much better at retirement than I have been.

Those of us fortunate enough to have worked for Ronald Reagan carry with us many fond personal memories – of his kindness, his common decency, and perhaps above all, of his sense of humor. I recall one meeting in the Oval Office in early November 1985. As the Deputy Director for Intelligence at CIA, I was one of the briefers. I was seated next to President Reagan, just a few feet away, in the Oval Office, and I began my presentation on the stresses on the Soviet system and the corresponding opportunities it presented for the upcoming summit. It was a historic inflection point: the first time, I believe, since the Cold War started, that an American president was told by his intelligence service that the survival of our superpower adversary was in doubt in a foreseeable future.

Well, a minute or two into my briefing, a high-pitched screech came out of the president's ear – a high-pitched noise – and if I could hear it, I knew how painful it must be for him. His eyes got wide. He reached up and adjusted his hearing aid in his left ear. I resumed talking. A couple of minutes later, the screeching noise started

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again. The president, with some disgust, reached up, plucked the hearing aid out of his left ear, pounded it in his palm, and as he was putting it back in his ear, leaned over to me and whispered, "It's my KGB handler trying to reach me."

This was a briefing President Reagan received before his first meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev at the 1985 Geneva Summit. At the time, a number of people – in and out of the administration – were advising that the president's goal for the summit should be to just get by – to do what was necessary to survive the encounter with the younger and allegedly craftier Soviet leader.

Well, we all remember how things turned out. After Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev surely did not become best friends, but they at least became the best of adversaries and, between them, set in motion developments that would ultimately lead to the events we commemorate this evening.

And at this point, let me thank the Reagan Library for bringing this exhibit to the Library of Congress. It is a window into a subject I want to discuss with you tonight: how President Reagan, through his sound instincts, his firm decisions, and his inspiring words, made and seized opportunities and in so doing helped bring the epic struggle between two nuclear-armed superpowers to a peaceful and – at least from our point of view and history's – successful end.

Ronald Reagan was, of course, the ultimate Cold Warrior. As president, his first priority was to restore America's military strength, given that nearly 15 years of Soviet modernization and cuts in our defense spending had narrowed, and in some areas erased, America's strategic edge over the USSR. A broad U.S. defense build-up began early in the Reagan administration, with more advanced planes, and ships, and submarines, and combat vehicles, and nuclear weapons added to the American military arsenal. Including a bold initiative to begin developing a missile-defense system designed to render those destructive weapons obsolete. With the strong and courageous support of our NATO allies, intermediate-range missiles were put in Europe to counter the earlier deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

President Reagan would use force when necessary. Many remember the 1986 Gulf of Sidra incident with Libya, but actually the world – and Libya – discovered there was a new sheriff in town as early as August 19th, 1981. Libya had extended its claimed territorial waters by 12 miles to what Qaddafi called the "line of death." And so it would be. President Reagan sent in the USS Forrestal and the USS Nimitz to assure U.S. freedom of navigation. Two Libyan fighters came out to challenge them. Big mistake. Under Ronald Reagan's new rules of engagement, two F-14 Tomcats, without hesitation, splashed the two Libyan fighters.

This willingness to use American power was a lesson that others would learn as well. But President Reagan was circumspect about putting – or keeping – American troops and America's credibility at risk without a clear mission or strong odds of success. Rather than provoke a direct, and potentially catastrophic, military confrontation with the USSR, President Reagan's approach was to impose ever stiffer costs on the Soviet Union for its Third World adventurism. Reagan expanded the "Containment" playbook far beyond Europe and took the fight to the enemy world-wide. From Afghanistan to Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia and elsewhere, Soviet surrogates now faced their own lethal insurgencies.

And, as we all remember, his stirring words and his administration's actions, both overt and covert, gave hope to dissidents and millions of others trapped behind the

Iron Curtain. While countering the Soviets – with varying degrees of fervor and success – had been a common feature of every administration since the end of World War II, under President Reagan this struggle gained new moral energy, purpose, and a sense of urgency.

One small but telling anecdote: Early in the Reagan administration, Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, continued to stay in touch with CIA director Bill Casey about Poland – a cause and a country dear to Brzezinski's heart, and to the heart of the new Pope, John Paul the Second. In one conversation at a cocktail party, Zbig complained to Casey that funding for one of his favorite Polish covert actions had been reduced. Casey asked how much it would take to remedy the problem. Zbig said about \$18,000. The next day, a man showed up in Brzezinski's office, unannounced and unidentified, and handed him a briefcase containing \$18,000 in cash. Brzezinski, more than a little nonplussed, nevertheless passed it to a Polish visitor on his way home – where it was put to good use.

The sum total of these measures large and small communicated loud and clear, at home and abroad, that post-Vietnam, post-malaise, America was back – strong and resolute. As for the Soviets, President Reagan – nearly alone – had the bedrock conviction that their rotting system was vulnerable and could be brought down. Not as some vague, sweep-of-history eventuality – but something he could see in his lifetime.

How best to take advantage of this vulnerability? President Reagan understood that erasing the impression of U.S. political and military weakness would ultimately reap diplomatic rewards and strategic breakthroughs. He embraced the importance of military strength, and speaking blunt truths about the Soviet system and Soviet behavior. Remember the "Evil Empire" speech in 1983? Drove Moscow nuts. No one spoke these truths with more credibility or more eloquence. But President Reagan also had the insight, the sense of the historical moment, to know when it was time to sheathe the sword, soften the tone, and re-engage, even with our most implacable and dangerous enemy.

Reagan knew this early on, even during the most tense days of the first term. In August 1984, following what was arguably the most dangerous 18 months of the Cold War since the Cuban Missile Crisis, we witnessed him weighing Secretary of State Shultz's information that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko might be interested in a meeting with the president during the UN General Assembly. All such meetings had been suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. President Reagan responded that he wanted to see Gromyko. Secretary Schultz makes clear in his memoirs that this was the president's choice, and his alone; that Secretary Schultz had not even made a recommendation. We can now see that this small gesture was the beginning of a turning point.

Reagan was often accused by liberal critics of shunning engagement with the USSR. Reagan only half-jokingly responded that it was kind of tough to engage with the Soviet gerontocracy when its leaders kept dying on him. After all, three of his counterparts expired within three years between 1982 and 1985. But finally, in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and Reagan had somebody to deal with. In Gorbachev's first months there were a series of offers, proposals, and promises to make reforms at home while reducing the threat of confrontation abroad. It was not that Gorbachev was to be seized upon as some sort of savior. But rather, from the standpoint of presidential leadership, the challenge – and the historic opportunity –

was to make the most of what Gorbachev claimed to be offering.

And even in the midst of glasnost, and START, and reduced superpower tensions, President Reagan again and again would return to words strong and true – making them, as Margaret Thatcher said, “fight like soldiers” – to give the Soviet leader and the system he was trying to save a final push into history’s dustbin.

Which brings us to Berlin, and its scar upon European civilization: the wall that, as of June 12th, 1987, had divided that city and its people for nearly 26 years. President Reagan stood at the Brandenburg Gate that day and – against the advice of many in his government – uttered those famous six words: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” Those six words not only rebuked the dictators of the Warsaw Pact; they voiced a fundamental truth. That freedom was a worthier path. That those who were hemmed in by the Wall, those who thirsted for political, economic, and religious freedom in East Germany and in the other captive nations, would eventually stand up, demand it, and attain it.

President Reagan also said in that Berlin speech that the United States would pursue arms-reduction treaties with the Soviet Union even as we retained the ability, through force of arms, to deter acts of aggression. He made clear that we did not value ICBMs, tanks, or warships in and of themselves. They were all negotiable. No, the West’s differences with the East – the democracies’ dispute with communism – was, he said, “not about weapons but about liberty.” The Cold War was a struggle of ideas and economic systems, and he insisted that this not be forgotten.

Nor was the exclamation about the Wall a total surprise. Other U.S. officials at various times and in various ways had called for its removal. One interesting historical footnote, highlighted by the historian James Mann: President Reagan’s Berlin speech outraged Erich Honecker – the East German dictator – in that he, Honecker, was not even mentioned. Like any insecure bureaucrat, he felt slighted and out of the loop. President Reagan had gone over his head to Gorbachev, thus calling attention to the fact that the Honecker government’s power was founded not on the consent of the East German people, but on the writ and the whim – and the guns – of its Soviet overlord.

All told, President Reagan’s statecraft was a subtle two-step: to push and prod for reform, democratic and economic, while being willing to parlay with his Soviet counterpart, and eventually agree to deep cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Often he was a number of steps ahead of his critics on both the left and right, some of whom could not make sense of the combination. But I believe Ronald Reagan was far more shrewd and in control of events than either his critics or many of his supporters thought.

Six months after the Berlin speech, President Reagan sat down with General Secretary Gorbachev and signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, which abolished, for the first time, the use of all intermediate and shorter-range missiles by the two countries. And two years later, the Wall that I never imagined would come down in my lifetime was finally breached.

On November 9th, 1989, I was working in the White House as deputy national security adviser. No one who watched on television will ever forget the images of East and West Germans that night dancing on top of the Wall, hacking away bits of it for keepsakes, and finally taking down whole sections with construction equipment. The next day, President Bush spoke with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl by

**1216**

telephone. I was the note-taker on the call. Chancellor Kohl told President Bush that it was like "witnessing an enormous fair" with "the atmosphere of a festival." There were hundreds of thousands of people in the street, he said – and no violence. Within two years, the other Soviet satellites had broken free as well, and again, largely without violence. The effort to reform communism, as suspected, actually ended up sweeping it away. For its foundation was force and terror and without them, communism could not survive.

Today, almost 20 years later, 20 years after the Wall fell, we marvel at the different world we live in. It is still a dangerous place, to be sure. In many ways geopolitics are much more complex than when two nuclear-armed superpowers taunted and tested each other. But communism's demise holds lessons for us even now. They include the enduring value and the broad appeal of freedom – political, economic, spiritual. And the idea that free men and women of different cultures and countries can, for all the squabbling inherent in democracy, come together to get the big things right, and make the tough decisions to deter aggression and preserve their liberty.

And this gives us reassurance, as each new generation always, at some point, is called upon to make that stand. It is a sad reality that in our time and in the future, as through all of recorded history, there will be those who seek through violence and crime to dominate and intimidate others. We saw this on 9/11. We see it today in Afghanistan, where more perseverance, more sacrifice, and more patience will be required to prevent the terrorists who attacked us from doing so again. We see it anywhere nations, movements, or strongmen are tempted to believe that the United States of America does not have the will or the means to stand by our friends, to meet our commitments, and to defend our way of life. As President Reagan said just over a quarter century ago: "It's up to us, in our time, to choose and choose wisely between the hard but necessary task of preserving peace and freedom and the temptation to ignore our duty and blindly hope for the best."

I close with a quote from Anatole France, who wrote: "To accomplish great things, we must not only act, but also dream; not only plan, but also believe." President Reagan was a great president who acted and planned, but most importantly, he dreamed, and he believed. And he truly accomplished great things.

This evening, as those of us fortunate enough to have known and served Ronald Reagan gather on this historic anniversary, let us be thankful for this great and gentle man, the country he inspired to believe in itself again, and the people and the nations he freed.

Thank you.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Veterans Day Message

*Message by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 11, 2009*

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On this our ninth Veteran's Day since the attacks on September 11th, let us take a moment to remember those, past and present, who have served our nation in uniform.

Today we remain a nation at war with hundreds of thousands of men and women deployed far from home. Those serving on the front lines face hardship, danger, and a ruthless and resourceful enemy. Their families keeping vigilant watch for their loved one's return serve and sacrifice as well.

This Veteran's Day is especially poignant given the atrocity that took place at Fort Hood, where those who stepped forward to serve were cut down as they were preparing to deploy. The thoughts and prayers of the entire country are with the wounded and the families of the fallen. Our hope is that time will eventually assuage the anguish that this terrible act has caused.

Our nation cannot fully repay the debt owed our veterans and their families, but we can use this opportunity to reflect and remember what these brave Americans have done. David Lloyd George, speaking during the opening months of World War I, the conflict that began this day of remembrance, said: "The stern hand of fate has scourged us to an elevation where we can see the everlasting things that matter for a nation – the great peaks we had forgotten, of Honor, Duty, Patriotism, and clad in glittering white, the towering pinnacle of sacrifice pointing like a rugged finger to Heaven."

To America's veterans: on behalf of a grateful nation, thank you for your towering pinnacle of sacrifice on behalf of your countrymen.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO OSHKOSH, WI

November 12, 2009

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

November 12, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary Gates Enroute to Oshkosh, Wisconsin

SEC. GATES: We'll get on with this so we can get onto our health-food lunch.

By the way, I would note that it will be warmer in Oshkosh than it was in Washington.

The purpose of this trip is really a focus on the counter IED fight. This has become a serious problem for us in Afghanistan. More than 80 percent of our casualties are coming from IEDs. It's a very different kind of challenge than in Iraq. The terrain is different, the road system is different -- both paved and unpaved and nonexistent.

The composition of the IEDs is different to a considerable extent. In Iraq they were mostly -- they've mostly based on artillery shells and so on. And in Afghanistan, we find that a lot of them -- especially the bigger ones -- are made from fertilizer, like ammonium nitrate, with mines as detonators.

The networks are different -- structured differently in Afghanistan than in Iraq. So it's a different kind of fight that we face here. We need both an offensive and a defense capability. The offensive capability is being able to take down the networks. And just the big find of ammonium nitrate a few days ago, that's the kind of thing we're looking for -- and at the same time defense in terms of protecting our troops.

We have a lot of different elements at the Pentagon working on this issue -- obviously, the Joint IED Defense Organization. We have a lot of different elements working on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We're obviously producing these MRAP all-terrain vehicles that we'll see today. We're upgrading some earlier Cougar MRAPs with a new kind of suspension so that they can go off-road. And the command is changing its own tactics, techniques and procedures.

And one of the things that I've asked for, for example, is the mujahadeen used these same kinds of IEDs in a different way □ in a different form against the Soviets. So let's go back and look at the playbook that they used against the Soviets to see if there's something that we could learn in terms of adapting our tactics, techniques and procedures.

My concern □ principal concern over the last few weeks has been whether all of this is being properly integrated and prioritized and aligned and whether we're adaptable and agile enough. And so I've decided that I need to focus my attention on this problem as one of my top priorities for say the next six months. I'm creating a department-wide task force on the counter-IED threat in Afghanistan. It'll be co-chaired by Dr. Carter, the undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Lieutenant General Jay Paxton, the J-3 of the Joint Staff.

And the whole purpose of this, really, is to make sure that we get the troops what they need to protect themselves, and also the tools to be more effective at taking down these networks.

Now, this MRAP-ATV is really another great example of partnership with industry. This company in July produced 46 MRAP-ATVs. They will produce about 660 this month and they will go to 1,000 next month. And as I mentioned, we're also upgrading probably somewhere on the order of 600 or 700 Cougars that are used principally by the Marines.

Obviously, if the president makes a decision to increase the number of troops in Afghanistan, we would look at this in terms of whether we needed to buy more.

I will meet with the task force and expect a report from them monthly □ as I say, probably for about six months. I just want to make sure that all of these different organizations in the department are moving together and cooperating □ breaking down the stovepipes so that we've got the maximum possible effort working with the command. And I want the command □ General McChrystal and company □ to have a lot of say in this in terms of how we do this. So that's one of the reasons for the co-chairs of the task force to link it to the field.

So the main purpose for this trip is simply to come up and thank these folks for what they've done. It's been an extraordinary effort on their part. We're flying most of these in right now and the effort is to get them to the troops as quickly as possible.

Q Can I ask you to follow up on that just a bit? What role did the IED situation in Afghanistan play in your deliberations in figuring out whether or not there should be an expansion of U.S. force? Are you at all concerned that you, essentially, may be sending tens of thousands more into -

SEC. GATES: It was not a significant factor.

Q You said you might look at buying more of these particular vehicles if that □

SEC. GATES: If the president decides to send more troops, we would probably look at buying more than the 6,600. 1221

Q How many more?

SEC. GATES: That would depend on how many nice try! That would depend on how many how many troops the president decides to send.

Q Mr. Secretary, there were reports yesterday that the president rejected all of these four options you talked about yesterday at the White House. Is that how you understand it you were there or is it more that he was asking for revisions or asking questions about more options?

SEC. GATES: I did not I'm not going to get into the details, but I would say that it was more: How can we combine some of the best features of several of the options to maximum good effect? So there is a little more work to do, but I think that we're getting toward the end of the process, as Robert Gibbs said the other day.

I would say one more thing, though: I've been at this business a long time. And I have been appalled I realize this is not your self-interest to write I have been appalled by the amount of leaking that has been going on in this process. And I think a lot of different places are leaking. I'm confident that the Department of Defense is one of them.

To have details of options that are being considered out there in the middle of the president's deliberative process I think does not serve the country and does not serve our military. And frankly, if I found out with high confidence anybody was leaking in the Department of Defense who that was that would probably be a career-ender, because it is contrary to every kind of discipline there ought to be in a decision-making process involving the president.

Q Did you have any reaction to General Eikenberry's cables?

SEC. GATES: No. I'm not going to just as I'm not going to talk about my recommendations and the views that I've expressed, I'm not going to talk about anybody else's apropos see the last answer. I don't want to fire myself by the end of the day. (Laughter.) Although it's a thought!

Q It's not leaking I mean, just, I mean, kind of, reaction to this cable saying

SEC. GATES: I'm not going to give you a reaction.

Q Just about a more general point: What about the debate about whether putting more troops in Afghanistan makes it easier (inaudible) easier to bring the U.S. troops

out? Or does this allow the Kabul government to hang back and not step up? (Inaudible.)

1222

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that's one of the issues. How do we signal resolve, and at the same time signal to the Afghans □ as well as to the American people □ that this isn't an open-ended commitment.

Q I have a question about Fort Hood: How could this happen with all the attention on mental health? What are you doing to make sure it doesn't happen again?

SEC. GATES: Well, this is another one where, frankly, I'm kind of sore. I mean, obviously, what happened at Fort Hood was horrific, as the president said.

But having different organizations and different people leaking information in a situation that involves potential criminal prosecution I think is unconscionable. People are looking at it from their own narrow perspective. And people better wait until all the information is in before we have an understanding of what happened and what might be done to be able to prevent such a thing from happening again.

But everybody out there with their own little piece of the action □ I think, first of all, I worry a lot that it has the potential to jeopardize a criminal investigation. Everything will be made public and clear at an appropriate time. I just don't want to jeopardize this investigation. And people don't know □ people who are leaking don't know how their piece of the information might fit into that or affect it.

So my view is everybody ought to just shut up!

Q If at the end of that process it turns out that the Army had information □ or that it existed elsewhere in the Defense Department that information that this fellow really may have been a mental health threat or terrorist threat, would you consider that a firing offense?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm not going to get into that as a hypothetical. We'll wait and see what the circumstances are and what the facts are. I just don't know what the facts are at this point.

MODERATOR: Anything on the counter-IED effort?

Q In RC south, the effort to buy ammonium nitrate fertilizer has only been allocated \$50,000. Do you feel that's enough?

SEC. GATES: Well, I'm open to anything that will take that stuff off the market. It's illegal in Afghanistan, as I understand it, but it hasn't been enforced. So my attitude would be to try and treat it like we do narcotics. To the degree we could get it off the market, get it under control and capture as much of it □ and if we have to pay for some of it, I'm open to that.

You know, when one of these 1,500 pound IEDs goes under □ goes off under an MRAP and tears it in half, it tells you what these things can do. So I'm open to anything that will help save the lives of our troops.

Q On the M-ATVs, do you envision buying □ if you do buy another several hundred more of them, do you envision buying them all from Oshkosh or, what's your plan, will you open it up like you did with the MRAPs?

SEC. GATES: I don't know. We'll have to wait and see. The first thing would be to decide whether we need to buy more...

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that this was another example □ Oshkosh □ of a successful industry-government partnership to get urgently needed equipment. Can you cite another case that you consider as favorably □ as successful as this one?

SEC. GATES: The original MRAPs.

Q The original MRAPs?

SEC. GATES: The original MRAP program was the first major Defense procurement program to go from concept to full-scale industrial production in less than a year since World War II.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with the rate at which these vehicles are being finished with the government-furnished equipment and then sent to Charleston to be sent overseas?

SEC. GATES: As best I can tell. I think they're doing as well as they possibly can.

Q A couple of weeks ago, a representative from □ (inaudible) □ meeting with Task Force □ (inaudible) □ in Afghanistan in terms of getting ISR □ (inaudible). Do you think you are going fast enough □ (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: We're doing that. It's supposed to be □ as I understand, it's supposed to be full-operating capacity next month.

So great idea! I think we'll do that.

Q They kind of have to plan □ Oshkosh has to plan, obviously, their labor force

going beyond next, roughly, May or June when they finish this round of orders. How soon do you think you'll be able to give them an idea □ **1224**

SEC. GATES: Probably pretty soon after the president makes a decision.

Q (Inaudible) □ what some of these new, very large IEDs can do to an MRAP. Is there any contradiction in your buying □ spending so much money and effort on smaller, lighter ones at a time when bombs are getting bigger?

SEC. GATES: Well, they're not a lot lighter, they're just more maneuverable. And I'm told they provide pretty much the same protection as the original MRAP for the troops. They just have different capabilities. And we've said from the very beginning: There is nothing □ whether it's an Abrams Tank or anything else □ that can defend our troops against everything.

But I think that MRAPs have been proven time and time again to save the lives and limbs of our soldiers and Marines. And I think they're worth every dime the taxpayers are spending on them. And I'm very grateful to the Congress, which has voted the money for these things □ both the original MRAPs and the MRAP-ATV □ with full support.

Q Mr. Secretary, you talked earlier about how you might need to ask for more MRAPs if more troops are sent to Afghanistan.

Has the White House asked for a cost estimate for all these various options? And how much is the potential cost of adding more □ (inaudible) □ factored into discussions?

SEC. GATES: There have been cost estimates prepared, but I think the key thing is what's most important for our national security.

Q Are you □ I wanted to go back when you said that one of the key issues is how do you signal resolve, that this isn't an open-ended commitment.

SEC. GATES: Right. How do you signal resolve and at the same time, signal that it isn't □ we're not going to be there forever.

Q And do you think that the president was satisfied yesterday □

SEC. GATES: I think this is one of the issues that we've been talking about.

Q And is there □ do you think there's a reasonable exit strategy in all the discussions under way now?



SEC. GATES: Well, I think the first thing is to get it right in the first place. And I think I'll just leave it at the □ at what I said about the difficulty of how you get that right, how you get that balance right.

MODERATOR: Any left on counter IED □ and then we're going to wrap it up.


Q Yeah. I have one, which is how do you compare and contrast the success of the efforts to obtain the MRAP, the MRAP-ATV with acquisition/procurement in general from major Defense contractors?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think we've learned a lot from this. And I think we're □ I mean, one of the things that Dr. Carter is doing is making some fairly significant changes in the way we go about major acquisitions with a lot more emphasis on fixed pricing and on better contracts □ contracts that put performance awards in the right place in the process.

And I think, you know, you have to draw a distinction, in my view, between equipment that is on the cutting edge of technology and equipment that's basically using existing technologies in the way you do these contracts. And I think the MRAPs and MRAP-ATVs fall into that latter category.

MODERATOR: Okay. (Inaudible.)

SEC. GATES: Okay. Thanks.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Oshkosh Factory Worker Talk

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Oshkosh, Wisconsin, Thursday, November 12, 2009*

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Well, I won't be too long, because I know that here – of all places – you have more pressing work to do. I came to Oshkosh to see this operation firsthand, and to get a status update on the production of the M-ATV. Above all, I came to thank everyone here for what you are doing to support American troops in Afghanistan by bringing these life-saving vehicles on-line so quickly.

What is taking place here is an amazing display of industry and dedication to the war effort. The M-ATV's lighter weight, independent suspension system, and greater off-road mobility is well suited to Afghanistan's rugged terrain and will make a real difference in our operations there.

In July, this factory produced 46 M-ATVs. Last month that figure rose to more than 380, and November output is expected to exceed 660 vehicles – all towards meeting a total military requirement of more than 6,600. Peak production of 1000 vehicles per month starts next month. The wars don't stop for the holidays and neither will you.

This has been a team effort with many moving parts – in the military and industry, as well as elsewhere in the private sector. Suppliers of tires and other components have stepped up, as have the manufacturers of other components. Through the efforts of the U.S. Transportation Command, the M-ATVs are shipped or flown to Afghanistan.

Some historical context to your efforts. For years, the number-one killer of U.S. troops in Iraq was Improved Explosive Devices. Months after becoming defense secretary, I made MRAPs the Defense Department's top acquisition priority, and 1,500 shipped to Iraq at the end of 2007. The last time an American industry moved from concept to full-rate military production in less than a year was World War II.

Soon after we started sending MRAPs in large quantities to Iraq, I visited with some troops there and asked for their feedback on the vehicles. One sergeant major said I quote "MRAPs are the best!" Actually, he used a different four letter word. The sergeant major went on to say, "Troops love them, commanders sleep better knowing the troops have them."

Eventually more than 15,000 MRAPs were shipped to Iraq, and they continue to protect our troops today even as we draw down our forces. This record, and your work today, proves what industry and the military can accomplish together. And reminds us that new platforms can be developed, built, and deployed in a short period of time – and the best solution isn't always the most elaborate.

Having said that, we must never forget there is no failsafe measure that can prevent all loss of life and limb on this or any other battlefield – especially against a

ruthless and resourceful enemy. That is the crude reality of war. But vehicles like the M-ATV and the MRAP, combined with the right tactics, techniques, and procedures, provide the best protection available against roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices. Furthermore, IEDs of various degrees of lethality and sophistication will be with us for some time. And so the need for these kinds of vehicles will not soon go away.

As you know, the president and his national-security team are considering options for the way ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even as these necessary deliberations continue, the Department of Defense is pressing ahead – making sure that troops at the front today have the best available equipment, weapons, and protection this country can provide. That is why thousands of M-ATVs will soon be on their way to Afghanistan. And that's why I've approved a deployment of more aviation, intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets, plus other enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams.

A final thought. During the world wars of the past century, the war effort mobilized the entire American economy. That is not the case with most of our industry today, defense included. But you all have the opportunity to work on one of the few projects where your efforts have a direct and immediate impact on men and women fighting on the front lines. With every vehicle you complete you are saving American lives and giving our troops the tools they need to accomplish their mission and come home safely.

For this effort, you have my appreciation and respect – but more importantly, you have the thanks of countless moms and dads, husbands and wives, and sons and daughters of the best troops deployed in Afghanistan.

So thank you very much.

Reuters.com

November 12, 2009

## **Pentagon Chief Lauds Oshkosh's Afghan Truck Out**

By Jim Wolf, Reuters

OSHKOSH, Wisconsin--U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates heaped praise Thursday on Oshkosh Corp (OSK.N), a Wisconsin truck maker, for speeding potentially lifesaving all-terrain trucks to U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

"What is taking place here is an amazing display of industry and dedication to the war effort," he said after touring the main production plant for a new class of sand-colored, armored, off-road vehicles.

Rushing the trucks to the field is a high priority because more than 80 percent of U.S. casualties in Afghanistan are caused by roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, Gates said.

The company aims to build 1,000 of the vehicles per month by the end of this year, up from 46 it built in July after receiving the initial contract on June 30.

Overall, Oshkosh is due to produce about 6,600 of the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle, or M-ATV. Gates, speaking to reporters on his flight here, said the Pentagon might buy more if President Barack Obama decides to add troops as part of a review of Afghanistan options expected to wind up soon.

Gates said he was setting up a Defense Department-wide task force to boost U.S. offensive and defensive efforts against roadside bombs and other improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. He said he would make this a top personal priority for the next six months and he wanted monthly updates from the task force. It is be co-chaired by the Pentagon's chief weapons buyer, Ashton Carter, and Lt. Gen. John Paxton, the joint chiefs of staff official in charge of operations.

The new M-ATVs are lighter, more nimble and better suited to Afghanistan's rugged mountain terrain than the MRAP used in Iraq, its larger mine-resistant, ambush-protected predecessor.

Gates made speeding the larger MRAPs to Iraq the Pentagon's top acquisition priority months after becoming defense secretary, initially in for President George W. Bush.

The last time the U.S. military had moved from concept to full production of new equipment in less than a year was World War 2, he told assembled Oshkosh workers. Gates said Oshkosh's quick increase in production of the M-ATV's was a reminder that "the best solution isn't always the most elaborate."

On the eve of Gates' visit, the company said Wednesday it had received a new, \$438 million order for the Afghanistan-bound armored trucks.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

November 12, 2009

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### Media Availability with Secretary Gates from Oshkosh, Wisconsin

SEC. GATES: First of all, it's been a real pleasure to visit Oshkosh and the factory and the test facility here. I really appreciate what the folks here are doing in terms of the service they're rendering to our troops. This is clearly an extraordinary vehicle.

The improvised explosive devices cause about 80 percent of our casualties in Afghanistan. It's a different situation than Iraq. We needed a different vehicle. And I think this clearly will meet the need. An incredible ramp-up of production, and, obviously, the sooner we get them into the theater to the troops, the better.

The counter-IED issue is a big one. As I indicated earlier, we're establishing a task force to work this problem, make sure all of the different elements -- (inaudible) -- are coming together, and working it together, we have a lot of capability, and we just want to make sure we put it all together in the best possible way to help save the lives of our troops and help them be successful in their mission and bring them home safely.

Q Mr. Secretary, what does the nature of this vehicle and the need for a vehicle like this say about the war we're fighting?

SEC. GATES: Well, it really is a reflection of how different Afghanistan is than Iraq. What became clear when we sent MRAPs, regular MRAPs, into Afghanistan is that they did not have the kind of all-wheel capability that was needed in the very rough terrain. Afghanistan doesn't have nearly as many roads or paved roads as Iraq did, so there was a need for a significant off-road capability.

So all of those features made it a difficult engineering assignment, because we wanted to maintain the same level of protection for the troops in the cab as the MRAPs we have in Iraq, but at the same time have greater off-road agility.

Q Again, explain why you came here and wanted to see this yourself, in person.

SEC. GATES: Well, again, I think, as I say, improvised explosive devices cause somewhere over 80 percent of our casualties. This vehicle is one mean to addressing that threat.

We need both an offensive and a defensive capability. The offensive capability is taking down the networks that build these things and that build the IEDs and bury them. The defense is this kind of vehicle as well as increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

And I basically wanted to come up here, see the vehicles for myself and, perhaps above all, thank the people in the factory for the amazing job they're doing. And I told them over there that there aren't many places in manufacturing in America where you know that the vehicle you're working on today is going to save some soldier or Marine's life tomorrow.

Q (Inaudible) -- Isn't this a moving target, though? I mean, every time we've developed something -- (inaudible) -- to counter the IED threat, they come up with a different idea?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have to be flexible as well. And you know, not every IED is 1,500 pounds. And the fact is, the records that we have from both Iraq and the limited experience with MRAPs in Afghanistan shows that it saves lives, and it saves limbs.

There's no vehicle that will provide perfect protection, and we know that going in. But this is such a significant improvement over what we already have. And as I say, it's a multifaceted challenge we have to do more intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance. We have to disrupt the networks. We have to get the right kind of forensic labs in Afghanistan. We have to make sure that the tactics, techniques and procedures that are being used when you have one of these vehicles or when you're out is very important.

The reality is, we're dealing with a country, because there aren't a lot of roads, if you can get off the roads and into off-road terrain, the chances of avoiding IEDs are significantly greater. So it's a combination of all of these things to deal with this threat.

Q Mr. Secretary, you're sending more of these vehicles over. Do you think you're going to send more troops over to go with them?

SEC. GATES: Well, that's up to the president.

Q Can you relate any personal stories from any of these that have already gone over where they've performed particularly well or --

SEC. GATES: Oh, yeah. When I was at Tallil in Iraq -- not this vehicle, because we're just getting them into theater -- but when I was in Tallil in Iraq in the spring, they showed me an MRAP that had been attacked, and the vehicle was largely destroyed. And there were two soldiers standing in front of it, that had been in it when it was attacked. And they were completely unscathed. And they're two buddies, one of them had a broken ankle, and one of them a dislocated shoulder or something.

And I called on a soldier. There was an article in The Washington Post a while back on MRAPs. And I called on a soldier at Walter Reed, and he had that article in the bed with him. And he said the MRAP saved his life.

Q Sir, on another topic --

Q (Inaudible) -- somebody else? What about the ISR piece of this? There's been a big push on this. You set up the ISR Task Force -- (inaudible.) -- we still need to do more ISR. Where does that stand, and how much more?

SEC. GATES: Well, we're pushing a lot into the theater. It's a little bit like the IED problem itself. It's not just the air frames, both the Predators and Reapers and the Liberty aircraft, it's the ground analysis, ground stations, interpreters, intelligence analysts, pilots and crews for these things, because you still need somebody on the ground to pilot it.

And so we're moving as fast as we can. The Air Force has significantly expanded its capability. And we intend to keep expanding it.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say something about Ft. Hood -- (inaudible)?

Q Sir, we understand formal charges are being brought today. Understanding that the investigation is ongoing, is there anything you have learned to this point that you wish the military had done differently or could have done differently -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: No. My view is, I intend to wait until all the facts are in, until we have a comprehensive view of what has happened. And frankly, I abhor the leaks that have taken place, because the people who are leaking are leaking what they know, which is one small piece of the puzzle. And what's more, they don't know whether or not what they're leaking might jeopardize a potential criminal investigation and trial.

And so my view is, people who have a piece of this frankly ought to keep quiet and let the authorities go forward with this in an organized and comprehensive way.

Q Mr. Secretary, this new task force, what exactly are you hoping to take away from this? What new thing will this bring?

SEC. GATES: I want to make sure that we have replicated in Afghanistan all the capabilities we have built up in

Iraq -- the forensic labs, the analysis, the tactics, techniques and procedures. And then, what new do we need to do? What different kinds of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance do we need in Afghanistan? Because it's a different kind of target than in Iraq.

We have people working all of these different pieces. What I worry about is that all the pieces aren't fully integrated. And that's the primary task of the task force really, to make sure we've integrated all the capabilities that we have to go after this challenge. And if they identify a need for something new, then so we can go get it and get it into the hands of the troops and the commanders.

MODERATOR: Sir, one more.

Q You referenced the world wars. You're a history expert in your education. Can you draw the parallels to what's going on now to the way the country ramped up for the world wars, industry, business and what's going on now?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that the thing to remember is, as difficult as these wars are, compared with World War II, the scale is extraordinarily different. After all, in World War II, at various times, we had between 8 (million) and 12 million men and women in arms, and most of them deployed around the world.

We not only were equipping them, we were equipping the Soviets, we were equipping the English and everybody else. So it required a mobilization of the entire country.

This is more specialized. And one of the things that we worry about a little bit is that such a small proportion of the population, namely our volunteer men and women in uniform, are bearing this burden, and the rest of the country goes about life as normal.

Now, my concern about that is mitigated because of the extraordinary commitment of people like those here at Oshkosh working on these things, but also the different communities and the way they react to their men and women in uniform when they come home, whether they're in the National Guard or the Reserve or when they just come home on leave. The way they get treated in airports, the way they're greeted when they come back from the theater tells me that the country really understands the burden that they're bearing and it deeply values it and appreciates it.


And I just would tell you, as somebody my age, to contrast the period toward the end of Vietnam and after Vietnam, just couldn't be more stark.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES


PHOTOS OF MEETING AT M-ATV PRODUCTION PLANT IN OSHKOSH, WI

Nov. 12, 2009






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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tours M-ATV production facility, Oshkosh, Wis., Nov. 12, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tours the M-ATV production facility, Oshkosh, Wis., Nov. 12, 2009.  
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Defense Secretary Robert Gates talks with World War II veteran Clarence Jungwirth, 90, a 64-year veteran of Oshkosh Corp., during a tour of the company's M-ATV production plant, Oshkosh, Wis., Nov. 12, 2009.  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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**Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff      November 19, 2009**  
**Navy Adm. Mike Mullen**

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### **DoD News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon, Arlington, Va.**

SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I have a short statement about the Department of Defense review process relating to the Fort Hood shootings.

At the outset, I should tell you that we will not discuss any details of the ongoing criminal investigation. That inquiry, and any related military justice proceeding, must by law be carried to completion without outside interference, and must be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.

Furthermore, during this time, senior DOD leaders, both civilian and military, must be careful to avoid statements or actions that could be perceived as attempts to influence that process. I urge other senior leaders to be mindful of this, and urge those with firsthand knowledge of the facts to refrain from comment unless expressly authorized.

The shootings at Fort Hood raise a number of troubling questions that demand complete but prompt answers. As you know, the president ordered a government-wide review to look at all intelligence related to this matter, how such intelligence was handled, shared and acted on within and between individual departments and agencies.

An initial response on that review is due back November 30th.

Today, I am announcing that the Department of Defense will conduct a separate review to ensure the safety and health of DOD employees and their families. We do not enter this process with any preconceived notions.

However it is prudent to determine immediately whether there are internal weaknesses or procedural shortcomings, in the department, that could make us vulnerable in the future. To this end, I've ordered a 45-day review with three areas of emphasis.

First, to find possible gaps or deficiencies in Defense Department programs, processes and procedures for identifying service members who could potentially pose credible threats to others.

Second, to assess among other issues personnel reliability programs, medical screening programs, service member release and discharge policies and procedures, pre-and-post-deployment health assessment programs, periodic counseling sessions and procedures on the reporting and handling of adverse service member information.

And third and finally, to examine the sufficiency of both the department's domestic physical security programs, at Department of Defense facilities, and its emergency response capabilities for mass casualty events at our facilities.

Former Army Secretary Togo West and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark have

agreed to head this 45-day review. And I thank them for their public service and their contribution in what will be an intense effort.

Both are intimately familiar with the department and devoted to the safety of Defense Department employees and their families. And I know that they will conduct a serious, thorough and honest assessment.

As part of this review, each service will appoint a senior official to work with Secretary West and Admiral Clark, on service-specific issues. In light of the Fort Hood incident and unique challenges, the Army will conduct a more in-depth, detailed assessment whether Army programs, policies and procedures reasonably could have prevented the shooting.

Those findings will be submitted as part of the Army's contribution to the departmental review.

This initial review is by no means the end of the process; rather, it is just the beginning. Its results will inform and largely shape a department-wide follow-on examination of any systemic institutional shortcomings, an examination I expect to be completed within four to six months.

This more in-depth review will entail each service selecting an investigative panel. These panels will in turn report their findings to a DOD-level panel which will assess the findings and identify needed changes in policy and procedure, as well as areas where additional resources are required. Among other issues, this review will cover topics such as service member support programs, care for victims and families of mass casualty events, how we assess and sustain the performance of healthcare providers, and overall stress on the troops and their families.

In all of these, I promise the Department of Defense's full and open disclosure. There is nothing any of us can say to ease the pain for the wounded, the families of the fallen, and the members of the Fort Hood community touched by this incident, pain I saw vividly and firsthand yesterday in Mountain City, Tennessee. All that is left for us to do is everything in our power to prevent similar tragedies from occurring in the future.

Laura?

Q Secretary, do you believe that there were management failures at the Army from what you know now? What should happen as a result if you do believe that? And does the fact that you're launching a department-wide review indicate a lack of faith in the Army to investigate itself?

SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, the latter is not at all the case. I think -- I think the Army has every capability to investigate itself. But all of the services potentially have some of the same problems that the Army's trying to deal with.

And that's why -- and, for example, let's just say the security of our facilities: that's not limited just to the Army. So I'm -- I have -- I have every confidence in the Army's ability to do this. But I think it's important that we look at it from a departmental-wide perspective.

I have -- I have not seen -- I mean, the whole purpose of what I've just laid out is to answer the first question that you've asked, to determine whether in fact there were lapses or problems. But more importantly -- and it's really focused more on where we are today and looking ahead -- what can we do to prevent something like this from happening again?

I don't know if you want to add anything to that.

ADM. MULLEN: No, that's all right.

Q One of your three items you said you wanted to look into was whether you could identify service members -- if the department could identify service members who could do this again. What are service members supposed to -- supposed to do when they suspect someone? Is this a call for the Army to -- sort of rat each other out, or to report to superiors? Because that seems what has happened with Major Hasan, with the report to -- by his superior at Walter Reed. What -- so what's supposed to happen next?

SEC. GATES: Well, as you've indicated, I mean, that's one of the three areas that I -- that I'm asking the -- this panel to look into -- Admiral Clark and Secretary West -- is what are those procedures, and do they need improvement.

Q There is one detail of the investigation that, since it's already on the record, I'll ask you about.

Yesterday, Attorney General Holder said he was disturbed by information that Hasan had e-mail communications with Anwar al-Awlaki. And I wonder if you were also disturbed by that.

SEC. GATES: I'm going to wait before I draw -- it's -- yes, it's disturbing. But before I draw any conclusions about it, I want to find out all the facts.

Q Sir, what is your advice to, say, an Army family right now, going in and out of Fort Hood or another base, that is now perhaps looking at their neighbors with suspicion? What are you telling them? What should they be watching for?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- you know, I remember being on the outside of the government after 9/11, and the cautions that President Bush and others in the government exercised against identifying certain categories of people as -- as potentially suspicious.

And the thrust of their remarks was that, in a nation as diverse as the United States, the last thing we need to do is start pointing fingers at each other, particularly when there's no basis in fact for it. So until all the evidence is in, I think that the comments about how we treat each other still ought to apply. And I know this is an issue that's of concern to the services.

ADM. MULLEN: I would add to that, Kim, that it doesn't take this kind of direction to have leaders recognize the challenges that are associated with this. Every base, every unit, literally leaders have I think immediately grabbed this to look within, to kind of see where they are, and to look at what -- whether there's potential or not, and to reassure members and families that not only do we take it extremely seriously, we are looking at it, and to really come together in what is, you know, what was certainly a tragic, tragic incident, and a reminder of the times in which we live, and that leaders are in fact taking action, literally, before this guidance to ensure that it doesn't happen again.

SEC. GATES: Joe --

Q What is your message to the Muslim community in uniform? Because they're very -- they're caught by this incident.

ADM. MULLEN: My message to all those in uniform, including Muslims in uniform, is how much we appreciate their service, the difference that they make; that the -- I have, for my entire career, the diversity of our force is one of its greatest strengths; and that, not unlike what the secretary said, that no one should -- should draw any rapid conclusions. And we need to ensure that we treat everybody fairly -- I mean, before this incident and after this incident -- everybody fairly. And there are procedures that exist in all the services to look at our people and our programs, and evaluate ourselves routinely. And I am sure that leaders are doing that.

SEC. GATES: Joe.

Q Will this review look specifically at the mental health ranks within the Army, where, you know, the allegation has been made that a shortage of mental-health professionals may have let unqualified people continue on rather than being drummed out. How specific to the case before us will this be versus a general look at personnel policy?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think they're going to -- as I've indicated here, they are going to look at how we deal with stress of our healthcare providers. And I would say that it shouldn't be limited only to mental healthcare providers.

You know, you talk to the -- you go to the hospitals, and you talk to the nurses and the doctors and those who care for these grievously wounded young men and women, and, I mean, their level of commitment -- and I can't imagine the burden on them of doing that all day, every day. And so I think one of the things, for their own benefit, if nothing else, is for us to take a look at how are we helping them deal with stress, given the circumstances that they face.

ADM. MULLEN: Can I -- I'd just add to that that clearly there is a shortfall, and it's across the department. It's about 20 percent or so. It's a little more significant in the Army, in terms of the statistics. And that is represented -- representative of the shortfall that we actually have.

In the country, we've recruited significant numbers in the last several years. We've increased the mental health providers for both members and families in the last several years, but we certainly haven't closed that gap.

SEC. GATES: And it gets harder as you get to more rural areas, in terms of finding the -- an adequate number of mental healthcare providers.

One of the things that we're looking at, for example, is whether the military medical education system can expand beyond -- how much it could expand beyond doctors and try and provide opportunities for the training of psychologists and counselors and so on. To -- in -- and we would pay for that in exchange for a period of commitment to serve and then go into the communities. Because one of the things that -- as the chairman has just implied, one of the things we're discovering as we go around trying to hire people all over the country is that there really is a national shortage of these folks.

Q Mr. Secretary, based on the facts that you have now, about Hasan and what happened that day, is it fair to characterize the shooting as a terrorist attack?

SEC. GATES: I'm just not going to go there. I -- as I said in the very first paragraph, I am first of all -- as the senior person in the departmental chain of command, I am the least able to render opinions on these kinds of issues. I'm going to wait until the facts are in. And we'll let the military justice system take care of it.

Q Do you think it's possible they'll draw a conclusion, to that end, as a result of the criminal investigation?

SEC. GATES: I have no idea.

Q One of the threats that's obviously being looked at is the issue of whether the intercepted e-mails should have been shared with the Pentagon earlier. Given your background in the intelligence world, how much of a concern is it, do you think? I mean, is that relationship -- as far as intelligence-sharing between civilian intelligence agencies and the Pentagon, is that what it should be?

SEC. GATES: Well, without reference to this case, I will tell you that the sharing of information, between the intelligence community and the Department of Defense and I would say law enforcement, is so far superior to what it was when I left government in 1993.

It's dramatically different and dramatically better. And so you know, one of the things everybody is looking at and, after all, the purpose of the president's requirement, in terms of looking at who had what intelligence when and shared it with whom, is to answer your question. And we won't know the answer to that until it's over.

Barbara.

Q Short of someone in the U.S. military making a direct, specific, public threat, when you're in the military, what is allowed and not allowed for someone who might be described as becoming self-radicalized? What are they allowed to do, in terms of making Internet or e-mail contact with people known to the U.S. government to be of a radical bent, to belong to certain groups which are not in line with U.S. government policy? What is allowed here?

ADM. MULLEN: Well, I think -- I mean, we all have private lives. And basically in any command, you typically are not overly involved unless -- in private -- in the private lives of people that serve, in the command, unless circumstances surface that there are some difficulties and challenges.

And leaders, mid-level NCOs in particular, are intimately -- oftentimes intimately involved with challenges that young -- that actually any people would have, across a wide spectrum of areas. And the expectation that leaders engage so is very much there.

So, as leaders become aware of something like this over time, you know, my -- not -- or something else -- my expectation is that that gets surfaced in the chain of command. And commanders, whether they're squad leaders right up through battalion commanders or ship commanding officers, are -- they routinely deal with these kind of things when they are -- when they are made known. The question is, how are they made known? And that varies depending on the kind of situation you're talking about.

Q So, Admiral, if you had a young sailor in your command making statements of a radical nature, what -- what would -- what would be the appropriate course of action?

ADM. MULLEN: My -- without trying to map it to the -- to the current incident, you know, my expectation is for -- you know, for any commander to -- certainly to be aware of those kinds of things, and then to take appropriate action; to certainly not sit idly by, but to address it. And there are a lot of different ways to address it.

And you know, a single -- a single proclamation, if you will, doesn't, in and of itself, necessarily mean anything. You got to put it into the circumstances.

Q Let me ask you, what's your expectation of any sharing of information between the criminal investigation and this broad review you've laid out in terms of any patterns or any shortfalls they saw in the Hasan case that might not bear on the criminality aspect, but might show a systemic problem that your -- that your larger review should take a look at?

SEC. GATES: Well, clearly we are going to have to be careful as we put together the terms of reference and as we go forward to ensure that we don't do anything to complicate or jeopardize the criminal prosecution. And so we will have some very clear guidelines in terms of the information that we're seeking. But the information that we're seeking in this shorter review really is -- really can, I think, be almost entirely isolated from the criminal investigation because we're really looking at the whole rest of the country in terms of what are our security capabilities, what are our capabilities for responding to a mass casualty event. And that might not be -- that might not be an act of murder; it may -- it might be a natural disaster of some kind. How -- what are our policies and procedures? Going back to the first question, what are our policies and procedures in certain of these areas on how we deal with these certain kinds of problems.

So I think -- I think we can deal effectively with the questions that are being posed without creating difficulties for the criminal prosecution. But at the same time, there'll be some very clear guidelines.

Q Can I ask you -- we haven't talked to you since the -- this horrendous event, but what was your initial reaction when you heard this -- the -- heard of the shooting? And what are one or two of the unresolved questions in your mind as a citizen you'd like answers to?

SEC. GATES: Well, I mean, my reaction was, I'm sure, the same as almost everybody in the country. It was one of horror. And I would just answer the second part by saying the most important thing for us now is to find out what actually happened, put all the facts together and figure out a way where we can do everything possible so that nothing like this ever happens again.

Q Sir, I would like to ask you about your meeting on Tuesday with the Saudi Prince bin Sultan. Could you give us an update about that meeting? Did the prince deliver any request, any message? And what are your views about the conflict -- the current conflict in Yemen?

SEC. GATES: Well, we have a -- we obviously have a very close -- (coughs) -- excuse me -- military to military relationship with the Saudis and an ongoing arms sales program with them. And I would just leave it at the fact that we reviewed the programs that are -- for which there are outstanding requests and those that the Saudis may be thinking about. We did discuss the situation in Yemen, and he -- the assistant secretary -- basically outlined for me the Saudi view of the situation there. I'd just leave it at that.

Yeah.

Q Just wanted to ask you about Iraq -- (coughs) -- excuse me -- about Iraq and the veto of the election law there in January. How does that impact the drawdown? And are you concerned by that -- the pace the drawdown might be impacted? And is the U.S. military basically in limbo waiting for Iraqi politicians to come (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: No, I would say -- I would say that we have -- we are continuing to proceed on the assumption that the drawdown will take place as General Odierno has described it. Frankly, we were very heartened when the election law was passed. And we hope that the concerns that have been expressed can be resolved quickly and a -- and new legislation passed so that the election can take place within the constitutional framework, meaning before the end of January.

Q (inaudible) a push to slide things to the right (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: I would say we've seen nothing at this point that would make that necessary.

Q Sir, on Afghanistan, are you in favor of setting a precise timeline for the transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan forces starting next year, as Gordon Brown and NATO secretary-general suggested?

SEC. GATES: Clearly, a very important part of the strategy in Afghanistan has to be the increase in the size of the Afghan national security forces and their training, and partnering with us. There is -- and central to the strategy is the ability to transfer responsibility for security, as soon as conditions warrant, to the Afghans

themselves.

In my mind, I see this happening very much along the lines that we saw in Iraq, where we partner, then we pull back to a tactical overwatch situation, and then a strategic overwatch situation as the local security forces -- meaning Afghan or Iraqi -- take increasing responsibility. And I think, as happened in Iraq, that is more likely to happen in Afghanistan on a province-by-province or even district-by-district level.

But clearly there is a desire, I think, on the part of all of us to begin this process of transferring security responsibility as soon as possible. But it would be counterproductive to transfer that responsibility before the Afghans were ready and had the capacity to sustain the security when we turn it over. So I'm not -- I'm -- I am -- I think I would rather have those on the ground in Afghanistan make the judgment call about when a province or a district was ready to be turned over rather than a specific -- specific dates.

That said, my assumption would be that there will be some districts and some provinces where that handover could come relatively soon. But again, in terms of specific dates, I would leave that more to the folks on the ground.

I don't know if you want to add anything to that.

ADM. MULLEN: (Inaudible).

Q It sounds like 2010 seems pretty -- may be too early for you.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think -- I think it's -- I think it's too early to say. I'm -- you know, things turned pretty quickly in Iraq once they started to turn, so I think -- I think we just have to wait and see.

Q You expressed concern about the rate at which you can get forces and their equipment into Afghanistan, given the terrain. Can you give us some sense of how important it is to you that whatever is decided in the coming weeks will happen quickly? And are you confident that the stuff can get in there as fast as it needs to?

SEC. GATES: Well, let me make a couple of comments and then invite the chairman to comment.

First of all, the situation in Afghanistan is very different than the situation we faced in Iraq in the sense that we do not have the same kind of transportation access to Afghanistan that we did in Iraq, where we were able, over a five-month period or so, to bring in five brigade combat teams. So almost everything of consequence has to go in by air.

We are in the middle of major drawdowns in Iraq. We are replacing forces in Iraq. We are replacing forces in Afghanistan. And so the ability of the receiving end to receive significant quantities of equipment and people in a relatively short period of time is very different than the situation in Iraq. So that's the challenge we basically face in terms of just the logistics of the issue.

I think that -- first of all, let me -- let me be clear. We identified weeks ago the critical enablers that could be sent to Afghanistan before the end of the year. There were roughly 2,700, 2,800 of them. We have sent all of those in. So no critical medical or route clearance, counter-IED [improvised explosive device], ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] assets have been held up by this review process. And I anticipate that as soon as the president makes his decision, we can probably begin flowing some forces pretty quickly after that. But it is a bigger challenge than certainly was the -- was the case in Iraq.

ADM. MULLEN: We had, in Iraq, a place -- a staging base in Kuwait. We don't have that in Afghanistan, clearly, and we don't have the infrastructure in Afghanistan.

And I want to -- I want to give a plug to a bunch of unsung heroes here; that we oftentimes focus on, you know, the front end, the warfighters if you will, the combat troops per se, although everybody on the ground I also believe is in combat and in a combat zone. But those that oftentimes don't get credit are the logistics support. They are -- they've been magnificent.

And we've worked the potential Afghanistan challenge for weeks, and we think we have a way ahead. But as the secretary said, it's not going to be five brigades -- it's not going to be a brigade a month because of the infrastructure piece -- the ability to receive it, literally, in Afghanistan -- as well as all the other moving parts here that are moving in and out of the AOR.

SEC. GATES: Jim.

Q Do you expect a decision next week? Do you expect a decision next week?

SEC. GATES: We'll have the decision when we have it.

Q Mr. Secretary, back on the Fort Hood review. You have a proven record of demanding accountability. Is one of the goals of this review to determine if, in fact, there was any kind of negligence? And in turn, would you demand accountability for that?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that clearly part of what the Army -- as I indicated, the Army is going into this particularly at Fort Hood in great depth, and I would -- I would assume that if there are questions of accountability, that the Army would address those internally. But I think we'll just have to wait and see what their review surfaces before we go down that road.

Elizabeth.

Q Back on Afghanistan. There's been a lot of discussion about holding the Karzai government responsible for corruption and somehow leveraging troops against the corruption. Is there any -- do you think there's any merit, or is there any discussion about asking President Karzai to take steps to clean up corruption and then holding up troops until he does that, as they flow in?

SEC. GATES: My view -- my view on all of this is that improvements in governance in Afghanistan will be evolutionary. We are not going to go from a situation where we have a fair amount of dissatisfaction now to believing that these problems have been solved in two weeks or a month, or on the basis of a single speech.

And again, my personal view is that you do have to exercise what leverage you have, but the question is whether that -- whether that's applied on a province-by-province level, district-by-district, ministry-by-ministry. And this, I expect, will be a continuing dialogue between ourselves and the Afghans.

We're there to help them. But corruption and a lack of good government -- governance -- are real impediments to the success of both the Afghan government and our own efforts. And so they clearly are an important element, as you've been reading from Secretary Clinton's comments and the president's and others.

Last question. Yeah.

Q Good. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, do you have to file financial disclosure forms? Senator McCain says such disclosure should be required for retired generals who advise the military. Do you agree with that?

ADM. MULLEN: This refers, obviously, to the story that came out a couple days ago, Tom, I think, and I've read the story and subsequent reports with respect to that. And I think -- and the services are actually taking a look at this. And I think that's the proper purview for this, services and combatant commanders who actually do this.

Secondly, I think this is a group of individuals who provides incredibly valuable, seasoned, wise advice in many -- in many ways. But at the same time, I think we have to be terrific stewards of the taxpayers' money, and we have to be aware of any conflicts of interest or a perception of conflicts of interest.

So I think in that -- as the services look at this, we'll -- we'll come to an understanding of where we are and what we should do in the future. And I really wouldn't want to say anything else at this point on top of that.

SEC. GATES: Okay. Thank you all.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you want to discuss something about India?

SEC. GATES: Looking forward to seeing him.

Q Thank you.

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and German Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

November 19,  
2009

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### Media Availability with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and German Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg

SEC. GATES: Well, it was my pleasure today to welcome to Washington, and to the Pentagon, my new German counterpart, the federal minister of defense, Minister zu Guttenberg. I congratulated him on his new appointment. I know he's a well respected voice in Germany on national security and foreign policy issues. So I look forward to working with him. He's also a great friend of the United States, where he has many friendships.

We agreed to consult on a frequent basis on common challenges we face as close allies, particularly in Afghanistan, where Germany is the second-largest contributor to Afghan national police training, the third largest troop contributor to the ISAF mission and the fourth largest provider of civilian development assistance.

The minister briefed me on his recent trip to Afghanistan, and I took the opportunity to congratulate Germany's continued leadership and steadfast response to increased violence in Regional Command North.

We've also welcomed Chancellor Merkel's initiative with her British and French counterparts to convene an international conference on Afghanistan in January of next year. We exchanged views on several other common issues, including the new NATO strategic concept, Iran, and advancing nuclear nonproliferation. So I look forward to a long and productive relationship with the minister.

MIN. GUTTENBERG: So am I, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much for the warm welcome I have received here, and some noise above. (Laughs.) (Inaudible) -- flying over -- (inaudible) -- get it -- get it done.

And it's -- first of all, it's a pleasure to be back in Washington in this -- in this new position I'm -- I'm having at the moment, for this time now. And I sense that we have more than just a good fundament to work together. And we will work together on those topics we have been discussing for years, but we also were -- found the point that we will need creativity, that we will need ideas, and that we will need common strategies to tackle the challenges we have on both sides of the Atlantic.

We talked about Afghanistan, about the challenges ahead of us, about the possibility and the necessity of this conference at the beginning of next year. And I described to the secretary the current German position and the discussion we are having in Germany, but also, I told him that our commitment in regarding Afghanistan is firm and stays to be firm; that was one of the points.

Then we also talked about the future of NATO. I think this is also of utmost importance for us as alliance partners, that we should use the momentum next year, when we are not only talking about the new strategic concept but also about all the efforts NATO has to make to stay not -- to stay an instrument for international security, and all the other terms related to that.

It's very good to know to have so many friends here to work together with and to build up -- to build up a, let's say -- or to build on the fundament that we have built together during the last couple of years.

And thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think we will keep the close contact we have -- we have -- we

have seen today; we could -- we could work with. And thank you for the reception I -- I've had today. And we will see each other tomorrow in Halifax. And we will probably have a possibility to continue our talks and to exchange our views very closely.

Thank you very much.

SEC. GATES: I think we're doing one question from each side.

Ann.

Q A question for both of you, please.

The announcement yesterday that Germany would extend its commitment, in Afghanistan, did not come with an announcement of further troop deployments there or an increase in the number that you currently have. Do you anticipate adding troops to your mission, in Afghanistan, next year alongside the expected American increase?

And to Mr. Secretary, would you like to see that happen even before -- such a commitment even before the NATO force generation meeting?

MIN. GUTTENBERG: Well, first of all, we will prolong our existing mandate which has -- which includes a total number of 4,500 troops. We are still the third largest troop supplier for Afghanistan.

But I told the secretary that we are now eagerly, as you probably all are, waiting for the president's speech and about -- we're waiting for the new concept or for the new strategic ideas from our American friends.

And what we also need as a second pillar for any -- for the discussion also in Germany is a clear commitment by the -- by the Afghan government. And today was an interesting day in Afghanistan. And we will see what will be the result of it.

And we need more than just words. We need action also in Afghanistan by the Afghan government. And I told the secretary that basing on those two pillars and also on the -- on the conference at the end of next January, Germany will certainly reassess -- will certainly reassess its mandate and make decisions then after the conference.

SEC. GATES: As I've said for three years, and without specific reference to Germany but to all of our -- the now 43 troop contributing nations, we can use all the help we can get. But frankly I think at this point, until the president has announced his decisions, going beyond that and being specific, with respect to any particular country, is probably premature.

Q (Remarks in German.)

MIN. GUTTENBERG: (Remarks in German.)

Q (Remarks in German.)

MIN. GUTTENBERG: (Remarks in German.)

Okay.

I was -- I've just been asked about certain discussions we have in Germany from time to time, that some of the partners are being perceived as, let's say, lonesome decision makers and of not acting together as we could in a perfect world. And I said my perception is different, that we specifically feel during the last, not only the last couple of weeks but also months, that we can only come to success together, and that this togetherness is the basis for any success in Afghanistan.

And I was then asked whether Germany has a chance also to deliver its own ideas and to bring in its own ideas. And then I said certainly Germany's always willing to bring in our own ideas and that we can spell the words of confidence also correctly.

Thank you very much.

SEC. GATES: Absolutely. I'll walk you to your car.

MIN. GUTTENBERG: Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Thank you.

By Gerry J. Gilmore  
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Nov. 19, 2009 - Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates welcomed new German Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg to the Pentagon today.

Guttenberg was appointed as Germany's defense minister Oct. 28, replacing Franz Josef Jung.

After meeting with Guttenberg in the Pentagon, Gates told reporters that he and his German counterpart "agreed to consult on a frequent basis on common challenges we face as close allies, particularly in Afghanistan."

Germany, which has more than 4,000 troops in Afghanistan, is the second-largest contributor to Afghan National Police training, Gates said. Germany also is the third-largest troop contributor to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, Gates added, and the fourth-largest provider of civilian-development assistance.

Gates said he congratulated Guttenberg for Germany's continued leadership and steadfast response to increased violence in northern Afghanistan. Guttenberg recently returned from a visit to Afghanistan.

Gates said he and Guttenberg welcome German Chancellor Angela Merkel's initiative with British and French counterparts to convene an international conference on Afghanistan in January.

Other common issues, such as the new NATO strategic concept, Iran, and advancing nuclear nonproliferation, also were part of today's discussion, Gates said.

The German government yesterday approved a one-year extension of Germany's troop

deployment to Afghanistan, according to news reports. Guttenberg said he told Gates today that Germany's commitment regarding Afghanistan "is firm."

Guttenberg said he and Gates also discussed the need for NATO to continue as an instrument for international security.

The German defense minister thanked Gates for welcoming him to Washington, noting he would meet the U.S. defense secretary again tomorrow at a security conference held in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Asked by a reporter if Germany would boost the number of its forces in Afghanistan, Guttenberg replied that his country would maintain the current number of about 4,500 troops.

Guttenberg said his government is awaiting President Barack Obama's decision regarding the way ahead in Afghanistan. Germany, too, is concerned, he said, about allegations of corruption within Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai's government.

Karzai, who was elected to a second five-year term, today pledged to address the corruption issue at his inauguration ceremony in Kabul.

"We will see what will be the result of it," Guttenberg said of Karzai's vow to attack corruption. "We need more than just words; we need action also in Afghanistan, by the Afghan government."

Meanwhile, Guttenberg said, Germany is awaiting developments regarding potential change in U.S. strategic policy in Afghanistan, the Afghan's government's resolve to fight corruption, and the outcome of the international conference on Afghanistan in January.

Germany "will certainly reassess its mandate" regarding its troop presence in Afghanistan and make decisions after the conference, Guttenberg said.

"We can use all the help we can get," said Gates, noting 43 countries contribute troops to the mission in Afghanistan. However, he cautioned against speculation about potential troop plus-ups by other nations engaged in Afghanistan.

Until Obama announces his decisions regarding Afghanistan, Gates said, any guesswork about other nations' troop contributions "is probably premature."

Guttenberg said he believes that Germany is an equal partner among the coalition nations engaged in Afghanistan. "Togetherness is the basis for any success in Afghanistan," he said.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

November 19, 2009

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### Secretary Gates Remarks at the National Guard Joint Senior Leadership Conference, National Harbor, Md.

SEC. GATES: Thank you, General McKinley.

It's certainly a pleasure to be here with all of you today. And general, even though you're off stage I will say even though it has been a year since you earned your fourth star, it is still great to see it on your shoulders.

As many of you know, to live and work in the District of Columbia is to be surrounded by politicians and be submerged in politics. Will Rogers once said, "Politics is the best show in town. I love animals and I love politicians and I love to watch both of 'em play either back home in their native state or after they have been captured and sent to the zoo or Washington." I would prefer to watch from my native state.

I have been honored to speak to the Guard community and leadership a number of times as Secretary of Defense. Over that period, we've seen two important firsts for the National Guard team. I have already mentioned one, the elevation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to four-star rank. In addition, Lieutenant General Steven Blum was appointed as the deputy commander of United States Northern Command. We are focused on creating a pathway for a Guard officer to take command of NORTHCOM. (Applause.)

It is recognition long overdue. America's citizen warriors, more than 450,000 in all, are part of a tradition that began long before the Declaration of Independence. Their service and character follow from the first minutemen and soldiers, like Henry Knox, who went from being a Boston bookseller to the father of American artillery and the first Secretary of War. That tradition of service carries through to battlefields far from home, where the Guard has transformed from a strategic reserve to an essential part of America's operational army.

In light of this heritage and today's strategic realities, I'd like to address three main areas this morning. First, what our National Guard has accomplished over the past year here at home and around the world; second, the things we are doing to better care for our Guard and their families; and third, how do we, as leaders, better enable these patriots to successfully contribute to America's defense at home and abroad.

This past decade the men and women of the Guard have been, "Always Ready, Always There." Since 9/11, some 300,000 – almost 70 percent of guardsmen – have served in anti-terrorist operations around the world. As was recently announced, the Second Brigade Combat Team of the Iowa National Guard will deploy to Afghanistan next year. In all, nearly 65,000 guardsmen are deployed in support of overseas operations. Further, the Guard's State Partnership Program boasts more than 60 bilateral partnerships between states and foreign countries, creating an enduring presence and fostering security cooperation.

Domestically, the National Guard was indispensable to the smooth and secure transition between presidential administrations and made a life-and-death difference during a number of natural disasters and emergencies.

More than 10,000 National Guard troops from 14 states and the District of Columbia under the commander of General Bolden provided security and logistical support for the swearing-in of President Obama.

The following month, when ice storms knocked out power to more than half a million homes, more than

4,000 Kentucky National Guard troops mobilized and went door-to-door to provide assistance, delivering more than a million meals and two million bottles of water.

When March floods swamped North Dakota, nearly 3,100 National Guard soldiers and airmen from that state and neighboring Minnesota monitored and repaired levees, operated sand-bag centers, and provided security to residents affected by the floods.

In September, after a tsunami struck American Samoa, the Hawaiian National Guard launched search and rescue and medical missions within 24 hours to support relief efforts. Guard C-17s hauled almost 700,000 pounds of supplies and equipment.

In Puerto Rico, in response to a devastating refinery fire last month, over 300 firefighters from the Puerto Rico National Guard battled and extinguished the flames. And every day since September 11th, thousands of Air National Guardsmen support Noble Eagle missions protecting America's critical infrastructure and governance sites.

As we've seen, for several years, the Guard has been busy with both overseas deployments and Homeland Security missions, a pace of operations that adds stress to the force and their equipment. It is our obligation as leaders to make sure that Guardsmen and their families are taken care of, properly equipped, and set up for success, and I'd like to address a few of those issues now.

Something that is of interest to everyone in uniform and their families is the question of dwell time. Our active-duty force is working to get dwell-time ratios back up to two years at home and one year deployed. In addition, we have expanded the active Army's end strength by 65,000 since I became Secretary of Defense, and I ordered a temporary increase of another 22,000 soldiers earlier this year. This growth allows the active Army to rely less on the reserve component, thus reducing some of the demand and the stress on the National Guard. I know that predictability is extremely important to the members of the reserve component, who balance and coordinate the timing of their service with full-time jobs. The Air National Guard has used long-range scheduling for predictability and individual volunteerism for flexibility to reach a nearly 1 to 5 ratio in terms of dwell, with the Army National Guard close behind, approaching 1 to 4.

As I have said on a number of occasions, one of my very top priorities is taking care of our men and women in uniform and their families including our citizen soldiers. Last month, I visited with some of the service's foremost experts on PTSD and mental health care. We know that parents, spouses, children and caregivers are under compounded states of stress. During deployment, they run single parent households, all while worrying about the safety of their loved ones overseas, a situation made more difficult by constant updates on the television and the Internet about attacks and losses. Military members who are irrevocably changed by what they have endured during their combat tour find themselves quickly reintegrated with families that have also evolved and changed during the time apart. For guardsmen, there is the added challenge that they are scattered across the state or country, lacking access to the full support of military neighbors and a full service military installation.

That is why efforts such as the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program are so important. This program provides information, services, referrals and active outreach to soldiers, spouses, employers and youth through every mobilization stage. From its inception in March in 2008 through May 2009, the program has hosted nearly 100,000 soldiers and 100,000 family members. This active outreach is key because many troops and their families are unaware of how many resources are at their disposal.

During these difficult economic times, we must also do everything we can to safeguard the job security of the guardsmen who deploy. Toward that end, the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve program has attracted more than 4,700 volunteers supported by staff throughout the United States and its territories. Employer-documented support over the past few years has grown from 20,000 participants to over 50,000. This provides peace of mind that an individual who is called to duty by their country will have that job upon returning home.

You've made great strides in all of these areas to reduce stress and improve the quality of life for the force, but don't let up. Our current engagements will keep forces on foreign soil at some level for years to come.

In addition to caring for guardsmen and their families, we also need to make sure that the National Guard has the right policies and institutional support, especially relating to funding, equipment, training and mobilization. With a four-star at the table, the Guard now has more bureaucratic weight to throw around when it comes to the Pentagon's budgetary process, which as you know is not always the most edifying spectacle. In recent years this department's leadership has pushed to provide the men and women of the National Guard with access to the best equipment possible. As you know better than anyone, what used to be the norm was a hand-me-down process of passing older equipment from the active force to the National Guard.

Everyone in uniform, regardless of component, should have the finest equipment possible, especially when called to deploy overseas. To this end, over the last three years the department has committed nearly \$16 billion total for the Army and the air -- for National Guard procurement. And over the period leading to FY '13, my hope and plan has been that we will spend a total of about \$40 billion between FY '07 and FY '13 in terms of providing top-line equipment for the Guard. The equipment on hand rate for the Guard, which averages about 70 percent historically, has improved from just under 40 percent in 2006 to nearly 80 percent by the end of this fiscal year. And our objective is to reach roughly 90 percent by 2015.

A few words on the Punaro Commission, whose recommendations continue to be a high priority for the department. The staff is working the 53 committee recommendations that I approved in my November 2008 memorandum. While much still needs to be accomplished, there have been several high points. This includes establishment of the Yellow Ribbon program and significant progress on the oversight of equipment readiness and transparency of Reserve Component procurement funding.

Finally, I'd like to address what I know is a top-of-the-mind issue for many of you -- contiguous mobilization. Earlier this month, at the request of General McKinley and the state adjutants general, I granted the Secretary of the Army the authority to allow for contiguous training in certain cases. I really wrestled with this, worried that our soldiers would see it as breaking faith with my decision in January 2007 to limit mobilization to 12 months. But I was persuaded that contiguous training may lead to improved combat preparation for our RC service members. Just as important, I was told that, by grouping training together immediately before federal mobilization, reservists, their families and their employers may realize more stability and predictability within the deployment cycle. (Applause.)

I appreciate that, because that truly was a difficult decision for me. And I want to emphasize that I do remain committed to our 12-month mobilization policy. Further, this exception to policy is limited to one year until we have hard data on its impact and effectiveness. Contiguous training alone will not completely solve the core issues relating to pre-and post-mobilization training. During the next six months or so we will be gathering information to support an analysis that we hope will provide a clear way ahead. I am thankful to the leaders who brought this issue to my attention and I am pleased that the process we followed was deliberate, with well-considered solutions proposed and fully vetted.

In closing, please convey to your guardsmen my thanks for their significant contributions to our national security. Their selfless and rapid response to every contingency and mission is a great testimony to their patriotic service. Further, with the policy changes and continued commitment to modernization, we have guaranteed their ability to contribute to our nation's security for many years to come.

The service guardsmen render to the nation in the cause of freedom around the world represents the best America has to offer. When fate sows destruction on our own soil or the nation sounds the call to arms, you, like your predecessors, leave your homes to aid those in need and secure the freedom we all hold so dear. For your service and your dedication, I salute you.

Thank you. (Applause.) Thanks.

We do have 15 minutes or so for some questions and there are microphones here in the center aisle, so let's give it a go.

I used to say when I was the director of CIA, you could ask any question you wanted and I'd answer any question I wanted. I'll try to be more forthcoming than that.

Q Sir, I'm General Ron Chastain, an Arkansan Guardsman assigned at U.S. Army Forces Command. And I would like to know with the war focus shifted to Afghanistan, would you please comment on the roles that you see in Afghanistan for the Reserve Component?

SEC. GATES: Well, I've already approved a number, as I mentioned earlier in my remarks, the Iowa National Guard is going to be sending a brigade to Afghanistan in 2010. I expect that the Guard will continue to play a significant role. And to tell you the truth, there are some areas beyond combat where I think that the Guard may be able to make a real contribution. Most of the agricultural development teams that we send are from the Guard. And I will tell you that the reaction that we get, and not just in Afghanistan, but from other countries when we send guardsmen with this kind of experience, it has a huge impact. And so I think the Guard will continue to play a quite varied role in Afghanistan ranging from combat to providing some of the assistance in terms of development and rule of law and governance that are so important to our success there.

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary, Major General Tim Lowenberg, adjutant general of the state of Washington. In your prepared remarks, you referred to the DOD budgetary process and many in this body are concerned about an apparent disconnect between DOD policy and doctrine commitment to homeland defense as America's top priority and resources that follow.

Could you comment please on if homeland defense really is our top priority, when will we begin making programmed budget commitments and resources? And when will those resources follow?

SEC. GATES: Well, we're in the middle as you probably are aware of the Quadrennial Defense Review and of the four general themes in the QDR, homeland defense is clearly a top priority.

One of the things we're trying to do this year is with this QDR, one of the criticisms that I've been told about going back 20 years is a disconnect between the QDR and resource allocation. And one of the things we're trying to fix this year in the QDR is to make sure that the themes that are being emphasized in the QDR make an appearance in the FY '11 budget.

And so I think in terms of the programming for this, we're going to have to deal with the issue that you raised to make sure that we have the long-term capability and long-term procurement programs to give the Guard what it needs in this arena.

Q Thank you. We are deeply appreciative of the funding we've received through the supplementals for the Mission Essential Ten, but our concern remains program budgetary commitments and resource investments for the future years. So thank you, Mr. Secretary, for that.

SEC. GATES: Well, based on past history, your concern is clearly warranted.

Q I'm Brigadier General Deborah Rose from the great state of your home state, Kansas. As you know, there is no such thing as purple money and working in a joint force headquarters, there is a need for funding that we can use for our domestic, our unique National Guard role of domestic operations.

Do you see a way ahead for the chief of the National Guard Bureau to receive funds that are separate from the Army or the Air Force that might be used for that purpose?

SEC. GATES: This issue has not been brought to my attention before. We will certainly take a look at it.

Q Mr. Secretary, over here to your left, stage left.

SEC. GATES: Oh, okay.

Q Good morning, sir. Steve Danner, adjutant general of the state of Missouri. We were the first ones to put the agriculture development team into Afghanistan in Kandahar province. You stated in an article that you wrote earlier this year and I'll quote here, "Apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, however, for decades, there's been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular warfare or conflicted to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts being Iraq and Afghanistan."

Sir, I'd like maybe a comment on the think tanks in Washington now talk about a civilian surge. And it's been my opinion that we've had a civilian surge in the sense that the citizen soldiers of the National Guard are your civilian surge with those special civilian capabilities to bring governance and infrastructure, reconstruction programs to Afghanistan.

And I'd like your thoughts about a formal structure of the agriculture development teams and PRTs and those entities that are working on more of the peacekeeping and governance programs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

SEC. GATES: The Secretary-General of the U.N. many years ago, Dag Hammarskjold in referring to peacekeeping said, "It's not a soldier's job, but often only a soldier can do it."

I think that there's a question of sequencing here when we have -- and it ties in with the capabilities we can bring -- when the security situation still is not stable enough for civilians to be deployed. It seems to me what's really important as we clear, hold and build that the build -- that these are not sequential. We have to hold and clear or clear and hold, but we need the development assistance. We need money like the CERP funds [Commander's Emergency Response Program] in there not when security is completely established, but right after we've cleared.

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We need people as General Petraeus did in Iraq, as soon as we've cleared an area literally the next day or the same day, we need somebody in there with some money and some capability that begins putting young men to work and putting a shovel or a broom in their hands instead of a gun. And it seems to me that's often the situation where the Guard and the expertise in the Guard can provide the initial response in areas in Afghanistan until the security situation is stabilized enough for the civilians to come in.

Now, the truth of the matter is as I've said for almost two and a half years now, the civilian elements of our government that were expert in these areas have been neglected for a very long time. When I retired in 1993, the Agency for International Development had about 16,000 employees. It was an expeditionary agency. Most of those people had the kind of expertise in agricultural development, rule of law, governance, water systems, irrigation systems and so on. And they expected to be deployed to developing countries. They expected to live in primitive conditions. And they expected to have situations that were occasionally dangerous. And that was part of their career and that was part of what they wanted to do with their lives.

The Agency for International Development now has about 3,000 employees and it's mainly a contracting agency. So we've lost that civilian capacity that played such an important role for us in the developing world all through the Cold War. And so I think that until, and it is beginning to change under both Secretary Rice and now under Secretary Clinton and with the support of two successive presidents and the Congress, the State Department is beginning to get the kind of funding that is necessary for -- to rebuild these capabilities. But it's still a ways in the future and, in my view, there has to be a role. There will be a role for us and particularly as one of the central themes in the QDR is the development of partnership relationships with other partner relationships with other countries so that we can help them build their capacity so we don't have to send soldiers in there. Part of that will be helping them with some of their development and I think the partner relationships that exist between a number of our state Guards and these other countries and I will tell you every time I meet with a minister of defense of a country where we have those kinds of relationships, they bring it up with me.

So I think that there will be an institutional role for the Guard in this arena, but I will tell you I don't think it's a function we should take over as a long-term significant mission of men and women in uniform. I think this is basically a civilian task and we ought to be there to help them. We ought to be there when we're in a situation like Afghanistan where the security may not be as strong enough for civilians to go in, to have people in there working on agricultural development and so on as the first phase so that we aren't waiting too long to begin showing people ways in which their lives can improve on a daily basis.

My own view is we need to be very cautious about some of the big projects that people think about for development. That reminds me of the way the Soviet Union did business. What we need and what works, in my view, is to do things that can be done quickly and that in a small village can show people that their lives have actually changed for the better by ISAF troops being there. And it can be a well. It can be an all-weather road for local farmers. It can be a little bridge. It can be a one room schoolhouse. You can do a lot of these small projects within the framework of the dollars that we have available. But the most important thing about them is that the Afghans see them and the local Afghans see their lives getting better because we're there. The first stage of doing that, I think, can be done by our military forces and especially by the National Guard, but longer term, that mission has to go to the civilian side of the government.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your leadership. (Applause.)

Q Mr. Secretary, Major General Ride, I'm the TAG [state adjutant general] of Pennsylvania with regard to the C-27 Joint Cargo Aircraft, sir.

You changed this program from a joint mission to a single service Air Force mission. Can you explain your reasoning for phasing out the Army Fixed Wing Direct Support Mission?

SEC. GATES: Well, this was a very interesting development because it actually took place at my conference table, but in a conversation between General Schwartz and General Casey, and they made the arrangement right then at the table that the Air Force would take over this mission.

Now, this is going to require some cultural change on the part of the Air Force in terms of being responsible for that kind of a mission in support of the Army, and these two chiefs of staff are working that out right now.

With respect to the C-27s, the answer is pretty straightforward: We have a finite budget. We have significant unused capacity in our C-130 fleet. The capabilities, the C-130 can use 95 percent of the runways that the C-27 can, maybe more. They obviously have about three times the capacity. And so we just need to make



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better use of the C-130 fleet. We've got about 430 or so C-130s in our fleet, less than 50 of those are dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have significant excess capacity in the C-130 fleet. There are about 200, 220 of them that are in the category of available. And so to spend the money on the C-27s, we're still going to build a certain number of C-27s, but we're going to limit that by and try and make better use of our C-130 fleet, but at the same time, that will require the Air Force changing the way it does business in terms of insisting on full loads and things like that to provide the kind of day-to-day support for the Army that Generals Casey and Schwartz are talking about.

Q Mr. Secretary, Colonel Kevin Gerdes, J1 from Minnesota.

First of all, thank you for your support of the Yellow Ribbon program. This has truly been a program that has -- (applause) -- this program has truly touched the lives of many service members and their families.

Mr. Secretary, the challenge that we run into is, again, going back to the previous question about purple money, the policy encourages us to make these joint workshops and conduct joint events, yet fiscal policy presents a restraint on how we can conduct that with purpose violations when we try to incorporate Marine Corps Reserve, Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve into an Army National Guard program.

And sir, I just ask for your support on possibly looking at ways that we could alleviate this policy or change policies, especially in the fiscal arena to support this.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think it's important for one reason that I've been talking to the leaders of the Reserve Component, both the reserve and the Guard for the last couple of years. If we are to create a pool of general officers that are qualified to take command of a combatant command, one of the prerequisites for that is joint experience. We have to create an effective pathway that provides the opportunity for that kind of joint experience so that that pool of leadership can develop and genuinely become qualified to take one of these combatant commands. Now, I'm sure there are a lot of other reasons why this would be a good idea, but let me, again, this is one where the fiscal policy issues haven't been brought to my attention and I'll take a look at it.

Q Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### National Guard Bureau Senior Leadership Conference

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, National Harbor, Maryland, Thursday, November 19, 2009*

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Thank you, General McKinley. It's certainly a pleasure to be here with all of you today. And general, even though you're off stage I will say even though it has been a year since you earned your fourth star, it is still great to see it on your shoulders.

As many of you know, to live and work in the District of Columbia is to be surrounded by politicians and submerged in politics. Will Rogers once said, "Politics is the best show in town [America]. I love animals and I love politicians and I love to watch both of 'em play either back home in their native state or after they have been captured and sent [to] the zoo or Washington." I would prefer to watch from my native state.

I have been honored to speak to the Guard community and leadership a number of times as secretary of defense. Over that period we've seen two important firsts for the National Guard team. I have already mentioned one: the elevation of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to four-star rank. In addition, Lieutenant General Steven Blum was appointed as the deputy commander of United States Northern Command. We are focused on creating a pathway for a Guard officer to take command of NORTHCOM.

It is recognition long overdue. America's citizen warriors – more than 450,000 in all – are part of a tradition that began long before the Declaration of Independence. Their service and character follow from the first minutemen and soldiers, like Henry Knox, who went from being a Boston bookseller to father of American artillery – and the first Secretary of War. That tradition of service carries through to battlefields far from home, where the Guard has transformed from a strategic reserve to an essential part of America's operational army.

In light of this heritage and today's strategic realities, I'd like to address three main areas this morning:

- First, what our National Guard has accomplished over the past year here at home and around the world;
- Second, the things we are doing to better care for our Guard and their families; and
- Third, how do we, as leaders, better enable these patriots to successfully contribute to America's defense at home and abroad.

This past decade the men and women of the Guard have been "Always Ready, Always There." Since 9/11, some 300,000 – almost 70 percent of Guardsmen – have served in anti-terrorist operations around the world. As was recently announced, the Second Brigade Combat Team of the Iowa National Guard will deploy to Afghanistan

next year. In all, nearly 65,000 Guardsmen are deployed in support of overseas operations. Further, the Guard's State Partnership Program boasts more than 60 bilateral partnerships between states and foreign countries, creating an enduring presence and fostering security cooperation.

Domestically, the National Guard was indispensable to the smooth and secure transition between presidential administrations and made a life-and-death difference during a number of natural disasters and emergencies.

More than 10,000 National Guard troops from 14 states and the District of Columbia under the command of General Bolden provided security and logistical support for the swearing-in of President Obama.

The following month, when ice storms knocked out power to more than half a million homes, more than 4,000 Kentucky National Guard troops mobilized and went door-to-door to provide assistance, delivering more than a million meals and two million bottles of water.

When March floods swamped North Dakota, nearly 3,100 National Guard soldiers and airmen from that state and neighboring Minnesota monitored and repaired levees, operated sand-bag centers, and provided security to residents affected by the floods.

In September, after a tsunami struck American Samoa, the Hawaiian National Guard launched search and rescue and medical missions within 24 hours to support relief efforts. Guard C-17s hauled almost 700,000 pounds of supplies and equipment. In Puerto Rico, in response to a devastating refinery fire last month, over 300 firefighters from the Puerto Rico National Guard battled and extinguished the flames.

And, every day since September 11, thousands of Air National Guardsmen support NOBLE EAGLE missions protecting America's critical infrastructure and governance sites.

As we've seen, for several years, the Guard has been busy with both overseas deployments and homeland security missions – a pace of operations that adds stress to the force and their equipment. It is our obligation as leaders to make sure that Guardsmen and their families are taken care of, properly equipped, and set up for success, and I'd like to address a few of those issues now.

Something that is of interest to everyone in uniform and their families is the question of dwell time. Our active-duty force is working to get dwell-time ratios back up to two years at home and one year deployed. In addition, we have expanded the active Army's end strength by 65,000 since I became Secretary of Defense, and I ordered a temporary increase of another 22,000 soldiers earlier this year. This growth allows the active Army to rely less on the Reserve Component, thus reducing some of the demand – and the stress – on the National Guard. I know that predictability is extremely important to the members of the Reserve Component, who balance and coordinate the timing of their service with full-time jobs. The Air National Guard has used long-range scheduling for predictability and individual volunteerism for flexibility to reach a nearly 1 to 5 ratio in terms of dwell, with the Army National Guard close behind, approaching 1 to 4.

As I have said on a number of occasions, a top priority of mine is taking care of our men and women in uniform and their families – including our citizen-soldiers. Last month, I visited with some of the service's foremost experts on PTSD and mental health care. We know that parents, spouses, children, and caregivers are under compounded states of stress. During deployment, they run single-parent households,

all worrying about the safety of their loved ones overseas – a situation made more difficult by constant updates on the television and the internet about attacks and losses. Military members who are irrevocably changed by what they have endured during their combat tour find themselves quickly reintegrated with families that have also evolved and changed during the time apart. For Guardsmen, there is the added challenge that they are scattered across the state or country, lacking access to the full support of military neighbors and a full service military installation.

That is why efforts such as the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program are so important. This program provides information, services, referrals, and active outreach to soldiers, spouses, employers, and youth through every mobilization stage. From its inception in March of 2008 through May 2009, the program has hosted nearly 100,000 soldiers and a 100,000 family members. This active outreach is key because many troops and their families are unaware of how many resources are at their disposal.

During these difficult economic times, we must also do everything we can to safeguard the job security of the Guardsmen who deploy. Toward that end, the Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve program has attracted more than 4,700 volunteers supported by staff throughout the United States and its territories. Employer-documented support over the past few years has grown from 20,000 participants to over 50,000. This provides peace of mind that an individual who is called to duty by their country will have that job upon returning home.

You've made great strides in all of these areas to reduce stress and improve the quality of life for the force, but don't let up. Our current engagements will keep forces on foreign soil at some level for years to come.

In addition to caring for Guardsmen and their families, we also need to make sure that the National Guard has the right policies and institutional support – especially relating to funding, equipment, training, and mobilization. With a four-star at the table, the Guard now has more bureaucratic weight to throw around when it comes to the Pentagon's budgetary process, which as you know is not always the most edifying spectacle. In recent years this department's leadership has pushed to provide the men and women of the National Guard with access to the best equipment possible. As you know better than anyone, what used to be the norm was a hand-me-down process of passing older equipment from the active force to the National Guard.

Everyone in uniform, regardless of component, should have the finest equipment possible, especially when called to deploy overseas. To this end, over the last three years the Department has committed nearly \$16 billion total – army and air – for National Guard procurement. And over the period leading to FY13, my hope and plan is to spend a total of about \$40 billion between FY7 and FY13 in terms of providing top-line equipment for the Guard. The on hand rate for the Guard – which averages 70 percent historically – has improved from just under 40 percent in 2006 to nearly 80 percent by the end of this fiscal year. And our objective is to reach roughly 90 percent by 2015.

A few words on the Punaro Commission, whose recommendations continue to be a high priority for the department. The staff is working the 53 commission recommendations that I approved in my November 2008 memorandum. While much still needs to be accomplished, there have been several high points. This includes establishment of the Yellow Ribbon program and significant progress on the oversight of equipment readiness and transparency of Reserve Component procurement

funding.

Finally, I'd like to address what I know is a top-of-the-mind issue for many of you – contiguous mobilization. Earlier this month, at the request of General McKinley and the state adjutants general, I granted the Secretary of the Army the authority to allow for contiguous training in certain cases. I really wrestled with this, worried that our soldiers would see it as breaking faith with my decision in January 2007 to limit mobilization to 12 months. But I was persuaded that contiguous training may lead to improved combat preparation for our RC service members. Just as important, I was told that, by grouping training together immediately before federal mobilization, reservists, their families, and their employers may realize more stability and predictability within the deployment cycle.

[APPLAUSE]

I appreciate that, because that truly was a difficult decision for me. And I want to emphasize that I do remain committed to our 12-month mobilization policy. Further, this exception to policy is limited to one year until we have hard data on its impact and effectiveness. Contiguous training alone will not completely solve the core issues relating to pre- and post-mobilization training. During the next six months or so we will be gathering information to support an analysis that we hope will provide a clear way ahead. I am thankful to the leaders who brought this issue to my attention, and I am pleased that the process we followed was deliberate, with well-considered solutions proposed and fully vetted.

In closing, please convey to your Guardsmen my thanks for their significant contributions to our national security. Their selfless and rapid response to every contingency and mission is a great testimony to their patriotic service. Further, with the policy changes and continued commitment to modernization, we have guaranteed their ability to contribute to our nation's security for many years to come.

The service Guardsmen render to the nation and the cause of freedom around the world represents the best America has to offer. When fate sows destruction on our own soil or the nation sounds the call to arms, you, like your predecessors, leave your homes to aid those in need and secure the freedom we all hold so dear. For your service and your dedication, I salute you. Thank you.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No. 915-09  
November 20, 2009

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### DOD Statement on Fort Hood Independent Review

The Department of Defense today released a statement by Togo West and retired Adm. Vern Clark, co-chairs of the DoD independent review related to Fort Hood.

"In light of the shooting at Fort Hood, Secretary Gates has asked us to lead a department-wide review to ensure the safety and health of DOD employees and their families.

"The secretary has given extensive guidance on areas to be examined – areas that cover a broad range of issues, programs, policies, and procedures. Considering the scope of this review, its short deadline, and its importance to the Department of Defense, we will be focused intently on our work during this time. At the end of this process, we will be more than willing to discuss our findings.

"This task is a solemn responsibility, and one that we undertake with humility and a firm commitment to fulfill the department's – and the nation's – obligation to keep our troops, their families, and all DoD employees safe."

For additional information, media may contact OSD Public Affairs, Lt. Col. Jonathan Withington at 703-697-5131.

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**U.S. Department of Defense**  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)  
**News Release**

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE****No. 917-09**  
**November 20, 2009**

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**DOD Announces Military Commissions Actions**

Today, prosecutors in the Office of Military Commissions announced they intend to ask the convening authority to refer new charges under the recently-enacted Military Commissions Act of 2009 against Abd al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Abdu al-Nashiri, in connection with the bombing of the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, in October 2000. The bombing resulted in the deaths of 17 sailors and injuries to many more.

This announcement follows the attorney general's determination on Nov. 13, 2009, that a military commission was the proper forum for prosecution of al-Nashiri.

The prosecutors are reviewing this and other cases identified by the attorney general as appropriate for trial in a military commission and anticipate making further announcements soon.

As part of the process of moving forward with the prosecution of al-Nashiri, on Nov. 19, 2009, in response to a request from the prosecutors, the convening authority dismissed without prejudice the pending charges against al-Nashiri. This dismissal without prejudice is a procedural action permitting new charges to be referred at a later time.

A charge is merely an accusation; an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO CANADA

November 20, 2009



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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

November 20, 2009

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Media Availability with Secretary Gates and Canadian Minister of Defense Peter Mackay

MIN. MACKAY: Ladies and gentlemen, "mesdames et messieurs" -- (continues in French). Very honored and pleased to be here in the city of Halifax at the Citadel with Secretary of Defense Bob Gates. We've just had an opportunity to sit down, as we have on a number of occasions, and discuss important bilateral issues between Canada and the United States.

We had a very open and frank exchange, which is typical of previous meetings that I've had with Secretary Gates, both in the United States and at other conferences that we've attended together. And we discussed important issues to both countries and areas of cooperation, whether they be cooperation around the existing relationships in NORAD or NATO, our continued participation and efforts in the Permanent Joint Board of Defense, which is a historic working group that allows for an exchange of information around defense-related and security matters.

And we talked about the Arctic, our mutual concerns around the changing environment in the Arctic, and focus on security around North America, including the new component part of NORAD, which is the maritime approach. That's apropos of where we find ourself today. Here in a port city like Halifax, renewed focus on maritime security is something that is of great interest to the United States and to Canada.

And I expressed my appreciation on behalf of all Canadians for the tremendous support that we've received around the security for the coming 2010 Olympic Games, which will be held in Vancouver, British Columbia, on the other coast. And that, again, is a symbol of the tremendous working relationship that we've had, the tremendous level of cooperation that we've had on defense and security matters and the economic implications, of course as well, of our relationship.

So I want to again emphasize how much I appreciate the presence of Secretary Gates, his delegation, and to all of you for attending this bilateral meeting here in Halifax, which is also occurring at the same time as the very first German Marshall Fund security conference here in the city of Halifax, which is well-attended internationally. And Secretary Gates will take part in the opening of that conference later this afternoon.

So Bob, over to you.

SEC. GATES: Thanks, Peter. I'm really pleased to be here in Halifax, and want to thank you for the beautiful weather. The -- some while ago, Minister Mackay suggested to me that we have a meeting dedicated to the bilateral issues that we have between us. It seems like over the past two years or so every meeting we've attended together has been focused almost exclusively on Afghanistan, and it was past time to tend to our -- to our own neighborhood and the issues that we have together. So I appreciate your suggesting this meeting and our getting together.

I'm also honored to be the keynoter at the international security forum here in Halifax later this afternoon that Minister Mackay was instrumental in putting together.

We conferred on a range of shared security challenges on the continent, in the -- in this hemisphere and on the global stage. We affirmed that NATO is the foundation of the U.S.-Canada defense relationship, and that ensuring this organization is aligned with emerging missions and security threats is important; it needs to evolve as we deal with a more and more sophisticated kind of threat to ourselves.

And we focused on rejuvenating the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and assigning new tasks to the broad relevant to our defense dialogue. As Peter indicated, we talked about expanding our dialogue with respect to the Arctic, and also encouraging and broadening Canada's participation in the security realm here in the Western Hemisphere. Our continued cooperation on these matters can only enhance the safety and security of both our countries.

Before closing, I would -- I'd just note that last week both the United States -- the United States celebrated Veterans Day and Canada celebrated Remembrance Day, which provided both of us an opportunity to honor the service of our men and women in uniform and also a chance to reflect on the sacrifices of our allies.

The United States is deeply appreciative and thankful for the skill and the contribution and the dedication of the Canadian troops in Afghanistan. Their bravery and their sacrifice is recognized by all in the United States.

And I would just like to thank the people of Halifax for their hospitality.

MIN. MACKAY: Thank you.

Dan, do you want to -- oh, we're going to have a few questions. So --

STAFF: We will now take questions.

Q Good morning, gentlemen. Murray Brewster with the Canadian Press.

Secretary Gates, could I ask you -- I'm sure you're aware of the controversy regarding the handling of prisoners here in Canada. I was wondering if the United States has had similar concerns, if you were aware, or when did the United States become aware of any concerns it might have had over the Afghan treatment of prisoners.

And Minister MacKay, at the same time, I'm wondering if you have any concerns, given the fact that the British did halt their transfer of prisoners to Afghan authorities in June, and whether you feel that there are appropriate safeguards in place, given that fact.

SEC. GATES: I became aware of the issue here in Canada about three hours ago, when I saw the front page of one of your newspapers. And so I have clearly no knowledge of what is involved here, and I just defer to the minister.

MIN. MACKAY: Thanks.

Murray, the issue around the handling of detainees by Afghans, as you quite correctly pointed out, has been of concern for some time. Obviously we've been receiving information from various sources, and we do track how other countries -- the British, the United States, the Dutch and others -- have approached this, of handling and turning over detainees.

The reality is, this is a responsibility of the Afghan authorities that we want to enhance and support. We've made decisions in the past, as you're aware, to halt transfer of detainees when credible allegations have come forward. And what we are there to do is enhance their capabilities.

And we've invested quite heavily in their justice system -- in the physical correction centers, penal system that they have in place -- the training of prison guards including female prison guards and putting in place better practices, for their handling of detainees.

And that's what we're there to do, to increase their capacity, so that they can have a better human rights situation and obviously adhere more with international conventions and improve their standards. That's very much what we're there to do.

(Remarks in French.)

For Secretary Gates, President Karzai has talked about taking control of security within his five-year term. And President Obama has said he does not want to pass the Afghan war off to the next president.

Is it too soon to start talking about an endgame? And if not, how do you do that, as other countries including Canada prepare to pull their troops out?

And to Minister MacKay very briefly, if Canada plans to continue its civilian work, beyond the 2011 withdrawal of troops, how do you plan to maintain that civilian work without a significant security presence?

Thank you.

SEC. GATES: Our goal clearly is to enable the Afghans to take responsibility for their own security. I think all of us who have troops in Afghanistan look for the day when we can turn over that responsibility and begin bringing our troops home.

I think that there is a -- there is a common interest here on the part of the Afghans and on the part of the international community to do that.

I think it's important to point out, though, that, even when the time comes that the security forces may draw down, I think all of these nations intend to be engaged in Afghanistan and in trying to help Afghanistan develop governance and their economy over the long term. We are not going to do what we did in 1989 and turn our backs on Afghanistan.

But what we would hope is that, within a reasonable period of time, that we could begin transferring responsibility for security over to the Afghans as they are capable of taking responsibility for it, and begin drawing down our forces. The exact timing on that will depend, clearly, in substantial measure on the conditions on the ground. But I think everybody's hope is that it will come sooner rather than later.

MIN. MACKAY: Firstly, I want to say that, you know, the Canadian forces and the whole-of-government approach -- so our diplomatic efforts, our aid efforts -- will continue unchanged until the year 2011. So we're almost two years out from that particular point.

Clearly, to come to your question specifically, we have had discussions with other countries, including the United States, around issues of force protection on certain projects. I'll give you one example: the Dahla Dam project, which was protected by a forward operating base that was predominantly Canadians; it's now predominantly Americans. So there's an example of a -- of a project, an important one that has to do with irrigation in the Arghandab valley, for giving farmers the opportunity to get away from poppy production and into wheat production, where there will be a transfer of the

security responsibilities. And yet the project will continue.

**1261**

And for things such as immunization of children, which we're heavily involved in to bring down mortality -- immortality -- mortality rates for children, the school projects, the building of roads and other irrigation and aqueduct systems, there is a means to continue that even without the Canadian military present.

Now, having said all that, these are important discussions that will continue.

There's a great deal of anticipation as to the decision that will be taken quite shortly, by the American administration, about troop deployments.

**Have a good day!** But in the meantime, we are fully committed, uncaveated, doing our work in Kandahar province as we have thus far, extremely proud, as Secretary Gates has said, of the work that's being done by the men and women in uniform, as part of this NATO-led, U.N.-backed operation, at the invitation of the Afghan government.

And big challenges remain. But there is very demonstrable progress that can also be pointed to. And the quality of life of Afghans has been greatly enhanced, as a result of the unprecedented and courageous efforts of our military and that of our allies.

Q Hi. Allan Woods, Toronto Star newspaper.

Minister MacKay, there are reports this morning that there will be, contrary to your promises in the House of Commons, no debate, no vote on what shape a role Canadian diplomats, aid workers and soldiers may be playing in Afghanistan after 2011.

I wonder if you can clarify that or tell me why that is.

MIN. MACKAY: I don't know where you're getting that, Al. I don't know what the source is.

Q It's a report -- a report in a newspaper this morning, a published report.

MIN. MACKAY: So it must be true. (Laughs.)

Q So that's not your understanding.

MIN. MACKAY: No. That's news to me.

**1262**

Q Okay.

And Secretary Gates, I wonder if it is sustainable that countries like Canada, the Netherlands simply pull out with the expectation that the U.S. is going to pick up -- pick up the burden.

Is that sustainable for your -- for your military?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, it is sustainable.

I mean, we very much recognize the parliamentary processes that go on in these countries. And the contribution that both Canada and the Netherlands have made has been tremendous.

It is our expectation that both countries will run through the tape, as it were, in terms of staying in the fight until the -- until the deadlines that they have come upon us.

But there is complete appreciation and sympathy for the casualties that both countries have suffered. I think Canada proportionally has suffered more casualties than perhaps any other country in the -- in the alliance.

And so we know that this is coming for the Dutch in 2010 and for Canada in 2011.

And General McChrystal is planning appropriately.

Q Julian Barnes with the L.A. Times. Mr. Secretary, how central is Kandahar to the campaign against Taliban? And do you hope that, in the next year, allies can significantly improve the security there for the people of Afghanistan?

And, Mr. Minister, is Canada expecting or do you need major reinforcements in Kandahar to improve the security in the next year?

SEC. GATES: I would say that Kandahar is clearly a critical -- of critical importance in Regional Command South and in Afghanistan. It is, in many respects, the home turf of the Taliban. We have sent -- some of the Marines that have gone into Afghanistan have gone to Kandahar to work with the Canadians and to work together. It's clearly important. There are several other areas of critical importance, but sure, Kandahar's very important.

MIN. MACKAY: Well, I would certainly agree with that. Canada has been -- started deploying down in 2005, been in the thick of it, if you will, in Kandahar province and, in particular, around Kandahar city, where you'll find the vast majority of the population in the province.

As far as your question on the security situation there and Canada's role, we have contracted, if you will, our area of responsibility to focus on protection of the local population. We've embarked upon a practice of liberating some of the villages and towns within that proximity to Kandahar city, and then holding and building and turning over that security responsibility to Afghan security forces, both police and the army.

I would note at this time that General McChrystal's report very much puts a stamp of approval on that type of approach, that sort of clear, hold, build and transition into Afghan security responsibility. And so we'll continue to do that. And I say with great pride that the Canadian forces have been quite successful in that regard.

They're also working very closely with American forces in particular but our other NATO allies who are deployed into southern Afghanistan in that region, in Kandahar, in particular. And I believe that's the critical piece. That is the cornerstone of the conflict. It is the homeland of the Taliban. It's in close proximity to the Pakistan border. We all know the challenges that still exist there.

But clearly, the focus is upping that security quatum to the point where the Afghans themselves can take that responsibility and we can move into and transition into the reconstruction and development that is going on simultaneously. But make no mistake, none of that can happen, none of the good work that's being done by diplomats and aid workers can occur without the security that's being provided by NATO and allied forces.

Q But if I could press, are you more likely to be successful in that mission if you were to get more U.S. forces into Kandahar?

MIN. MACKAY: Well, I would say more forces. And in fairness, the United States has contributed mightily. They've been in the leadership role. But this is an international mission, and I think it's fair to say that there is an expectation that all NATO countries will up their game and look for ways to contribute. And there are a number of ways in which they can contribute. But what's needed, frankly, right now is combat soldiers. And the insurgency has proved very resilient, but protecting people while we build the country and while we build their security capacity is everyone's focus and fixation right now.

STAFF: We'll take two more single questions.

Q All right. It's Ross Lord with Global National Television. Mr. MacKay, if Richard Colvin is as unreliable, uncredible, as you suggest he is, how can your government allow him to stay in what is an extremely important position in Washington?

MIN. MACKAY: Well, again, as you know, Ross, decisions about promotions and placement of civil servants is not a partisan exercise. Those are decisions taken internally. I think there would be outrage if the government simply started hiring and firing based on politics. 1264

I'm not attacking in any way and I would take umbrage to any suggestion that this is personal against Mr. Colvin. The discussion is around evidence that he gave at a parliamentary hearing, which I find, quite frankly, unsustainable.

I don't believe it's credible. I don't believe it's backed up by fact. And what we have to deal with in a parliamentary hearing, as we do in a court of law, or another judicial or public inquiry, is evidence that can be substantiated. That evidence and the suggestion that every single Taliban prisoner that was taken into custody and turned over was tortured is simply not credible and cannot be sustained by facts.

Q (In French.)

MIN. MACKAY: (In French.)

Q Mr. Secretary, just building on something you mentioned yesterday, understanding that stemming corruption in Afghanistan is probably going to take some time, what kinds of leverage other than troops, which you seem to suggest is probably not as feasible, would be effective in this situation? And what types of things would you consider would be the most -- the most feasible at this point?

And Mr. Minister, if you'd like to respond as well.

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that actually Secretary Clinton has addressed this during her trip. The reality is that the international presence in Afghanistan has provided a significant influx of assistance dollars and contracts and so on. So it seems to me that the place for us to start is to -- is to deal with corruption that may be associated with contracts we're letting or work that we are having done, and development projects that we're undertaking in partnership with others, including with the Afghans.

So I think the place to start is where we have a direct interest and where we control the flow of dollars, if you will, into the situation.

I think that it's -- you know, the reality is, we have some very good ministers in Afghanistan. The minister of the Interior, the minister of Defense -- just to mention two that I work with closely -- I have high regard for. We have some very good governors. So this is not -- this is not all a bleak picture.

There are some bright spots as well, and the key is, sort of as in the military situation, to strengthen that and to -- and to make it more widespread. But I think that the place to start is the place where we have the greatest leverage, and that's where we're writing the checks.



STAFF: Thank you very much, ladies and gentleman. Thank --

MIN. MACKAY: I'd just -- I'd just respond very briefly only to echo much of what Secretary Gates has said. With respect to governance, it's clear that all NATO allies, the United States, Canada, expect a reliable partner. It will be very interesting -- and we're all watching very closely -- to see the new Cabinet that the president will name.

I would also very much associate myself with the comments about Ministers Atmar and Wardak. I've worked closely with both of them. They're extremely able gentlemen. And the composition of that new Cabinet is going to be very important. And the president -- you heard yesterday President Karzai emphasize his commitment to deal with the subject of corruption.

In order to continue on the development side -- and putting the military to one side for a moment -- we are going to continue to look for other areas to expand into. Agriculture, in particular, I think is something that all countries have been focusing on, giving them a sustainable agriculture sector, looking for alternative crops, obviously, to poppy, and giving them the seed, and in fact helping them develop markets for things such as pomegranate and beets and barley and wheat. That will be a significant breakthrough to developing an economy for Afghanistan.

But again, none of it can happen without the umbrella of security. And Canada is committed in the long term to play a role on that development side.

And we will be there for Afghanistan in the future.

If I could just finish on one final note, I expressed to Secretary Gates and the American delegation Canada's solidarity with the United States during a difficult time over the tragedy at Fort Hood. And Canadians very much sympathize with the military families and those who were lost in that incident, as we have on other occasions when we've taken casualties. And this is, again, a very difficult price you pay for liberty and freedom and the efforts that are being made on the security front.

So we're very grateful for this abiding, historic relationship that we have with our neighbors to the south, and I think it's evidenced today by the presence of Secretary Gates here in Halifax, my home province of Nova Scotia.

And again, I want to express my appreciation to you, Bob.



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### German Marshall Fund Security Conference

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, Friday, November 20, 2009*

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Thank you, Peter. It's an honor to be here for the first Halifax International Security Forum. When Minister MacKay invited me to this gathering some months ago, I was all too pleased to accept – and not just because the accommodations are a little more plush than at the former military base in Cornwallis, where we held the RC South meeting last November.

A special thanks to the German Marshall Fund for putting this event together. The Marshall Fund, since its inception nearly four decades ago, has been an important source of expertise on the transatlantic relationship. The importance of these bonds was reinforced to me 10 days ago when I addressed the Reagan Library's 20th anniversary celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall. That celebration, and the life- and freedom-affirming events we commemorated, were a reminder of the longstanding cultural, political, and security bonds between the two continents, and, more importantly, a reminder of what can be achieved when we stand together to advance common interests and confront common threats.

As this conference is the first of its kind in North America, I'd like to address some of the security and defense issues that are especially pressing to this continent, and in the Western Hemisphere writ large. At the Summit of the Americas in April, President Obama urged a "new sense of partnership" to fulfill the promise of prosperity, security, and justice for the people of this hemisphere. He called for a sustained engagement based on mutual respect, common interests, and shared values – a message that I would like to amplify today.

This engagement and this partnership are so necessary because the emerging security challenges we face are increasingly interconnected, and the non-traditional threats require a collective approach. These challenges – from narco-trafficking to natural disasters – require an uncommon degree of coordination among the national-security, homeland-defense, and criminal-justice agencies of our governments – as these threats do not fit into the neat, discrete boxes of 20th century organization charts.

In the next few minutes, I will discuss some of those security challenges, highlighting promising areas of cooperation, and offering some thoughts on the way ahead, particularly as relating to human rights and the role of our militaries. In all of these areas, the United States aspires to be a partner of choice in the Americas – a friend of every nation and every person seeking a future of security, dignity, and freedom.

A starting point for this discussion is the long-standing relationship between the

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United States and Canada – the subject of my meeting this afternoon with Minister MacKay. I know that Afghanistan is on everyone's mind – with the president soon to announce his decisions on the way ahead for the United States and our partners. In Afghanistan, the Canadian military has more than distinguished itself in battle in some of the most dangerous parts of the country. Canada has been a major contributor to the international military coalition, with more than 2,800 troops currently deployed, plus a strong commitment to support future development and governance efforts. It was Canadian soldiers, along with our British, Dutch, Danish, and Estonian allies, who largely held the line in the south before U.S. reinforcements arrived in strength earlier this year. With more than 130 fallen heroes – among the highest of coalition members on a per capita basis – the Canadian army has certainly paid the price and borne a heavy burden in Afghanistan. We call on our other allies and friends to do what they can on behalf of this noble and necessary campaign – an effort that will, as I said last week, require more commitment, more sacrifice, and more patience from the community of free nations.

The formal defense ties between the United States and Canada date back to 1940, when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister King signed the Ogdensburg Declaration and established the Permanent Joint Board on Defense – an arrangement of lasting value to this day. Last year, I was pleased to join Minister MacKay in Colorado Springs for the 50th anniversary of the founding of the North American Aerospace Defense command – festivities that marked a half-century of shared commitment by the United States and Canada to protect our continent. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially since the attacks of [September] 11th, NORAD has evolved from focusing almost exclusively on detecting a nuclear first strike to confronting an array of diffuse threats to our homeland from land, air, and sea:

- In 2006, the United States and Canada signed an expansion of the NORAD agreement to include a maritime warning mission;
- Last December, we signed a new emergency management cooperation agreement; and
- The U.S. military is prepared, as needed, to provide support to security efforts for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver.

We have also been encouraged to see Canada taking a more active security role across the hemisphere, and globally as well:

- Canada has provided police training in Mexico to combat the drug cartels;
- Canada has helped build the capacity of Jamaica's Counter-Terrorism Operations Group, a unit of the Jamaica Defense Force that thwarted an airline hijacking in April without any casualties;
- Canada has demonstrated hemispheric leadership, hosting the 2008 Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas at Banff – a gathering which, in addition to fostering dialogue among neighbors on defense and security matters, created a region-wide working group to improve cooperation for disaster assistance; and
- Internationally, last year a Canadian admiral led Combined Task Force 150, a multi-national fleet comprised of about a dozen warships to patrol the waters off the Horn of Africa for pirates and terrorists.

Canada and the U.S. are both Arctic nations – an item on our bilateral agenda today and a subject of a panel at this conference. We share an interest in developing more icebreaking ships for mobility and improving domain awareness to support search-and-rescue in light of increased tourism up north. Even as the U.S. “resets” relations with Russia, we will work with Canada to ensure that increased Russian activity in the Arctic does not lead to miscalculation or unnecessary friction.

I should also use this occasion to say that the United States still remembers warmly the prompt and generous Canadian response to Hurricane Katrina – a package consisting of warships, helicopters, 900 troops including combat engineers, and thousands of pounds of relief supplies.

Which brings me to the first of several shared security challenges we face in this hemisphere: the threat from natural hazards.

Katrina was the most devastating of a number of natural calamities that have hit the region in recent years. As our neighbors to the north and south came to the aid of the U.S. during those dark days, the resources of the U.S. military are available when the people of this hemisphere are struck by natural disasters – from the response of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in Haiti after Hurricane Ike last year, to work by U.S. Army and Air Force personnel providing life-saving aid just last week after devastating flooding and mudslides hit El Salvador.

The melting of the polar ice cap in the Arctic, plus the frequency and intensity of weather events in this hemisphere – with the corresponding need for military humanitarian assistance missions – calls for a greater attention to the security implications of climate change. For the first time, our Quadrennial Defense Review – at the direction of the U.S. Congress – will examine the U.S. armed forces’ ability to respond to the impact of global warming.

We also know that the unprecedented freedom of movement in this hemisphere, while providing enormous economic benefit, also allows more opportunities for dangerous, criminal elements to exploit gaps and weaknesses – in governance and sovereignty – within and between our nations. This situation creates an alarming potential nexus between the traditional scourge of narco-traffickers and the emerging threats posed by international terrorist networks. The same means and routes used to transport drugs could also be used for dangerous weapons and materials. Drug runners, for example, still use low-flying aircraft, but they are also building home-made, semi-submersible vessels that can carry tons of cargo and are very difficult to detect in open waters.

In Colombia, the FARC showed how an outlaw group can use ungoverned space to re-arm and re-train while funding operations through the narcotics trade. But the progress Colombia has made in recent years with U.S. assistance also shows that it is possible to counter, and ultimately defeat, these threats – and to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for human rights and the rule of law.

In all, when it comes to interdiction and law enforcement, we cannot expect to make headway on narcotics without a multi-faceted, multi-national comprehensive approach to the problem. We need to work together to fortify judicial institutions and the rule of law; in this way these nations will be better prepared to counter these pernicious threats. In concert with other U.S. government agencies, the NGO community, Canada, and other nations we can assist in providing the breathing room needed for Western Hemisphere democracies to develop their fullest economic and political

potential.

The role of the Department of Defense – and it is a limited role – is to detect and monitor trafficking while providing the training and equipment that allows our partners in the region to pursue drug gangs and stymie the flow of illegal narcotics. The United States, for its part, is committed to reducing its demand for illegal drugs and also to stopping the flow of illegal guns and cash across our southern border. Toward this end, the President has made it a priority to ratify the illegal trafficking in firearms convention.

To deal with the narcotics trade and other challenges, in addition to our bilateral assistance efforts, we are also looking to encourage more collaboration among other nations that traditionally have not worked together on security matters:

- The U.S. government and our Caribbean partners are organizing the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, a multi-national effort to combat illicit trafficking with other international partners invited to participate as observers;
- Some \$45 million has been directed to build upon best practices and develop new modes of cooperation in the Caribbean. One area of focus will be counter-narcotics, as drug gangs under increasing pressure in Mexico may seek to route more of their products through the Caribbean; and
- The U.S. Southern Command hosts the annual Tradewinds exercise with a number of Caribbean militaries – the goal being to improve regional coordination in areas such as search and rescue and drug interdiction.

An example of what can be achieved: Recently Mexico, Colombia, and Guatemala – working together with the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force-South – detected, monitored, and then captured a semi-submersible craft that was carrying several tons of drugs. We are encouraging partners from outside the region – many with a keen interest in stemming the flow of drugs to their own countries – to participate in these efforts. The United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Spain, for example, have liaison officers at Joint Interagency Task Force-South and participated in Operation Carib Royale and Operation Carib Venture.

The Department of Defense is prepared to provide military assistance when needed and where appropriate. But progress on complex security challenges requires a commitment of resources and political will from our partners as well. Working with Mexico and Central America, supported by funds appropriated by Congress, the Merida Initiative seeks to support efforts to counter drug trafficking organizations. We are truly grateful for the support we have received from Congress enabling these efforts. We think first of Mexico's northern border, but Mexico's southern border is equally challenging. Efforts to help our Central American and Caribbean partners to counter drug trafficking organizations will focus on improving their ability to monitor and to react to violations of their air and maritime domains.

Before closing, I'd like to make two further points.

First, I believe it is not only possible, but it is imperative, that we take on these shared threats in a way that is respectful of human rights and human dignity. Violent crime represents a major threat to security in much of the Western Hemisphere. The police forces in a number of countries are overwhelmed and often outgunned, creating a culture of insecurity. Some countries have assigned law enforcement responsibilities to their military forces. Strong human rights programs are vital when conducting military responses in such complex environments. It is clear – even to this veteran of

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CIA and Cold Warrior – that security gains will be illusory if they lack the public legitimacy that comes with respect for human rights and the rule of law. The U.S. military has faced some of these issues in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the treatment of detainees, and in the protection of civilians. We have much to learn from each other in the human rights realm.

As I mentioned earlier, Colombia has recognized the need to observe these norms in its campaign against the FARC, and despite setbacks has shown increased determination to root out human rights violations. And even as Mexico battles ruthless drug lords committing unspeakable crimes, the Mexican government is working to address rights concerns through training programs in its armed forces. The United States has made it a point to integrate human rights instruction into our joint training and education in programs such as the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies.

The second, and related point pertains to the role of the U.S. military. Though I am addressing these issues as Secretary of Defense, it is imperative to keep front and center that the military is in a supporting, not a lead role, in dealing with most of the problems I've described this afternoon.

The work of U.S. regional combatant commands in security cooperation and building the defense capacity of partners remains essential. To be sure, there are certain capabilities – manpower, logistics, technology – that only the military can provide. Indeed, many years ago, UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld said in reference to peacekeeping that it's not a soldier's job but sometimes only a soldier can do it. Nonetheless, there is some discomfort among civilian NGOs and agencies about what is seen as an increasing role by the U.S. military in development, humanitarian assistance, and, in some cases, public diplomacy.


On a number of occasions, I have emphasized the importance of rebuilding and modernizing the civilian instruments of U.S. national-security apparatus, and I've warned against a "creeping militarization" by default of some aspects of our foreign policy if those deficiencies aren't addressed. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have committed to achieving a better balance between defense capabilities on the one hand and civilian development and diplomacy capacity on the other. This shift applies to homeland security capabilities as well, such as the Coast Guard and border patrol.

For much of the Western Hemisphere, the issue is more the proper role and authorities of the military relative to law enforcement, politics, and civil society. These are difficult matters, and I believe that gatherings such as this one can go a long way toward gaining a better understanding of these issues, to benefit the people of this region.

In working through these issues, and in confronting the range of vexing security challenges that this century has presented us, the nations of this hemisphere should know, along with our trans-Atlantic partners, that the United States is committed, in President Obama's words, to a "new chapter of engagement" – one that is comprehensive, sustained, and reflective of the aspirations of the people of the Americas.

I thank the German Marshall Fund for the opportunity to speak today, and I look forward to taking a couple questions.


Thank you.



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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Canadian Minister of National Defense Peter MacKay listen as David Danskin, Heritage Presentation manager Mainland Nova Scotia Parks Canada, gives them a tour of the Citadel in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Nov. 20, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates shares a laugh with Canadian Minister of National Defense Peter MacKay during a tour of the Citadel in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Nov. 20, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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Canadian Minister of National Defense Peter MacKay and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates conduct a bilateral meeting at the Citadel in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Nov. 20, 2009.  
*DoD photo by Cherie Cullen*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Holiday Season Message

*By Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 25, 2009*

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This time of year calls on Americans to reflect on and give thanks for the freedoms and prosperity we enjoy. Of course, we can only do so because of those who put their lives on the line every day: the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who bear repeated deployments, hardships, and danger – without fail and without complaint.


Many have made the ultimate sacrifice. Our nation will always honor their memory. For the loved ones of the fallen, I offer my deepest sympathies and prayers for your loss. And, in the wake of the shootings at Fort Hood, know that I am committed to ensuring that our home bases are safe and secure.

I know the holiday season can be especially difficult for service members and their families, who may be separated from each other by thousands of miles. To the families of our men and women in uniform: know that the American people are indebted to you for the sacrifices of your husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, and sons and daughters.

This will be my third holiday season spent as Secretary of Defense. During these years nothing has impressed me as much as the determination, resilience and good humor of those who defend our nation. This holiday season, along with "Happy Thanksgiving," "Happy Hanukkah," and "Merry Christmas," I would add two words on behalf of millions of your countrymen: "Thank you."



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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Statement on Afghanistan to the Senate Armed Services Committee

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, December 02, 2009

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Mr. Chairman, members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting us to testify today. Last night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular:

- The nexus among Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan;
- Our objectives and how the President's strategy aims to accomplish them; and
- The military forces required.

As the president first stated in March, and re-emphasized last night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and to prevent its return to both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating Al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be un-tethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.

While Al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen Al Qaeda's message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.

Taliban success in re-taking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of multiple, modern armies – the current direction of events – has dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing. The lesson of the Taliban's revival for Al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory – as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda.

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan – a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists. The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border of more than 1,500 miles. Giving extremists breathing

room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, just in the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and stability, carrying out – with Al Qaeda's help – escalating bombing attacks throughout the country. It is these attacks, and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad seven months ago, that largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. And we know the Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al Qaeda.

A related point with respect to Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We must change that perception.

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for Al Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.

Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists – as was the case 20 years ago – would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the Al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe.

It is true that Al Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations – from Munich to London to Denver. But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location – including Somalia, Yemen, and other possible redoubts – is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the United States and the world.

Some say this is similar to the “domino theory” that underpinned and ultimately muddled the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we have very real – and very recent – history that shows just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their mission. Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.

A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan – one that is sustainable over the long term by their governments – is vital to our national security. By the same token, the current status quo in Afghanistan – the slow but steady deterioration of the security situation and growing influence of the Taliban – is unacceptable. So too is the status quo ante – a largely ungoverned region controlled by extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.

The president's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's momentum

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and reduce its strength while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country.

We will focus our resources where the population is most threatened, and align military and civilian efforts accordingly – with six primary objectives:

- Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the U.S., our allies, and the Afghans;
- Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communications;
- Disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing Al Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan;
- Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by Afghan National Security Forces;
- Increasing the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces and employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan government within 18 months; and
- Finally, selectively building the capacity of Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.

This approach is not open-ended “nation building.” It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state – the likes of which has never been seen in that country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.

It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating Al Qaeda by building the capacity of the Afghans – capacity that will be measured by observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage of time.

The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical – and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province by province, depending on conditions on the ground. The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided “overwatch” – first at the tactical level, and then at the strategic level. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos, and into Taliban hands.

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police through intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in combat. It also means achieving a better balance between national and local forces; increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities; engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory; and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation efforts.

At the strategic level, the president’s plan will achieve a better balance between investments in the central government and sub-national entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and

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regional level, there will be a shift to work through existing, traditional structures rather than building new ones. In all of these efforts, we must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes for reviewing our – and their – progress.

As the president announced, the United States will commit an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces – the U.S. contribution to the fight – will be deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The first of these forces will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within two to three weeks.

In all, since taking office President Obama has committed nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of approximately 100,000. We are looking to NATO and our other partners to send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our Allies must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds. We will seek some five to 7,000 troops from NATO and expect the Allies to share more of the burden in training, equipping, and funding the Afghan National Army and police.

Let me offer a few closing thoughts.

It is worth remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan – though serious – does not begin to approach the scale of violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was confirmed as secretary of defense three years ago this week. With all the resources already committed to this campaign – plus those the president has just announced – I believe the pieces are being put in place to make real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months.

The president believes, as do I, that, in the end, we cannot defeat Al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan.

The president's decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia – all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital interests. So, I ask for your full support of this decision to provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need to be successful.

This will take more patience, perseverance, and sacrifice by the United States and by our allies. And, as always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who have volunteered – and in many cases re-volunteered – to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally necessary mission.

## CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS

Congressional Hearings

Dec. 2, 2009

## Senate Armed Services Committee Holds Hearing on Afghanistan Assessment

## LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES

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LEVIN:

Good morning everybody. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, welcome. Thank you all for your many contributions to our nation. Today the committee receives testimony from the president's senior advisers on his strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which the president set out last evening.

The United States has important security interests in the Afghan- Pakistan region. Instability in Afghanistan or the return of the Taliban to power would not only provide fertile ground for Al Qaida and other extremists to regroup and renew plots against the United States and its allies, but it would also threaten the stability of neighboring Pakistan, a nuclear armed country.

For the sake of our military men and women who are or will be deployed in harm's way, as well as the well-being of our nation, we've got to get the strategy right. Our purpose and our mission, what we are trying to accomplish, must be clear.

I agree with the president's emphasis on the training and rapid growth of the Afghanistan national security forces and transitioning responsibility to the Afghan government for Afghanistan security.

Indeed, I have long believed that the most urgent need in Afghanistan is to provide the training from basic training to mentoring, to side-by-side partnering on the battlefield, along with the equipment and the other support elements to rapidly build the capabilities of the Afghan army and police. An Afghan surge should be our goal, and any U.S. surge should be related to that goal.

The president has also called for increased contributions from our NATO allies. We need not only to "Afghanize" but to "NATO-ize" the Afghanistan mission.

I also agree with the president's emphasis on the importance of efforts to reintegrate local Taliban fighters into Afghan society. An adequately funded plan for reintegration is long overdue.

The president's strategy also makes clear that our commitment to the future of Afghanistan requires action from the government of Afghanistan. That means recruiting the soldiers and police needed to quickly expand Afghan forces. It means serious anti-corruption efforts. It means national reintegration and reconciliation policies, and retention and support for honest, competent ministry officials.

President Karzai has pledged to do these things, and President Obama rightly insists on holding them to that pledge. Setting the July 2011 date to begin the reduction of our forces is a reasonable way, under the circumstances, to produce the sense of urgency in the Afghan government that has been lacking up to now and that is essential to success.

I believe the principal mission of U.S. troop increases in Afghanistan should be to accelerate the transition to Afghan forces taking the lead for providing Afghan security. This is an important part of the approach outlined by the president.

Where I have questions is whether the rapid deployment of a large number of U.S. combat forces without an adequate number of Afghan security forces for our troops to partner with serves that mission.

A critical component of transitioning to Afghan responsibility will be the on-the-job partnering of Afghan forces with U.S. and coalition forces. That partnering is vital to success in Afghanistan, for the Afghans and for us. But the current shortfall in terms of partnering is not a shortage of American combat troops. It's a shortage of Afghan troops.

In the key province of Helmand the ratio of U.S. troops to Afghan troops is about five U.S. troops to one Afghan soldier. We are now partnered with about 2,000 Afghans in Helmand. The desired ratio, according to Pentagon doctrine, is close to the opposite: three Afghans for one U.S. soldier or Marine.

So we have enough troops in Helmand right now, about 10,000, to partner with more than 20,000 additional Afghan troops, more than are expected to be available to partner with us there next year, according to Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Great Britain.

If so, doubling the number of U.S. troops in the south will only worsen a ratio under which our forces are already matched up with fewer Afghan troops than they can and should partner with.

General James Conway, the commandant of the Marine Corps, said in September, "If I could change only one thing in the south of Afghanistan it would be to have more Afghan troops."

A few days ago, General Conway reiterated the point this way, quote, "To have American Marines standing on a corner in a key village isn't nearly as effective as having an Afghan policeman or an Afghan soldier." Well, it seems to me that the large influx of U.S. combat troops will put more U.S. Marines on street corners in Afghan villages with too few Afghan partners alongside them.

Partnering with, equipping and in other ways empowering Afghan forces to provide security for their country will demonstrate our resolve and commitment to a stable future for Afghanistan and the region. That should be the stated mission, and troop increases should be judged by whether they advance that mission.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for joining us today to discuss the vital issue of Afghanistan.

Let me first reiterate, as I said yesterday, that I think President Obama has made the right decision to embrace a counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan and to resource it properly.

I would have much preferred that General McChrystal received the entire force he had requested, but I've spoken with our military and civilian leaders and I think the 30,000 additional U.S. troops that the president has called for, plus greater force commitments from our allies, will enable us to reverse the momentum of the insurgency and create the conditions for success in Afghanistan.

I support the president's decision and I think it deserves the support of all Americans, both Republicans and Democrats. What I do not support -- what I don't support and what concerns me greatly is the president's decision to set an arbitrary date to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

A date for withdrawal sends exactly the wrong message to both our friends and our enemies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the entire region, all of whom currently doubt whether America is committed to winning this war.

A withdrawal date only emboldens Al Qaida and the Taliban while dispiriting our Afghan partners and making it less likely that they will risk their lives to take our side in this fight.

Yes, our commitment to Afghanistan is not open-ended. Yes, large numbers of U.S. combat troops will not remain there indefinitely, and yes, this war will one day end, but it should end when we have achieved our goals.

Success is the real exit strategy. And when conditions on the ground have decisively begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should start to return home with honor -- not one minute longer, not one minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July 2011, which our enemies can exploit to weaken and intimidate our friends.

MCCAIN:

I am eager to hear from our distinguished witnesses how we can say, as the president did last night, that our withdrawal will begin in July 2011 no matter what, but that this arbitrary date will also take into account of conditions on the ground. That seems logically incoherent to me, and I welcome some clarity on this matter.

Another concern that I have to do -- that I have is to do with the civilian side of our counter-insurgency strategy. Greater military force is necessary to succeed in Afghanistan, but it's not sufficient. I am confident in our military strategy and leadership, and I believe our troops can do everything that General McChrystal laid out in his assessment of this summer.

I believe we can clear and hold, but I am concerned that we and our allies do not have a unified plan to build, to work with and support our Afghan partners in Kabul and beyond as they build their own nation, their own economy, and their own free institutions.

I'm also concerned by reports of divisions in our embassy and by major differences between our commander and our ambassador. We can only succeed in Afghanistan if we have a joint civil military campaign plan unified at every level from top to bottom, much as Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus established in Iraq during the surge.

I look forward to hearing what progress we're making on creating such a joint civil military effort.

I've been critical of the president during the past several months, but that is now behind us. Our focus going forward must be on winning the war in Afghanistan. I emphasize "winning." And this depends as much on the substance of our policy as the signals we send to actors in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region.

The president was wrong to signal our intention to begin leaving Afghanistan on an arbitrary date, but the fact is we now have the right mission. We now have the right leadership. And we now have a request for sufficient resources to succeed.

So our friends can know that we will support them. Our enemies can know that we will defeat them. And all can know that we are committed to the long-term success of Afghanistan and Pakistan as stable states that can govern themselves, secure themselves, and sustain their own development.

Though the nature of our commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and their region will change over time, our commitment to their success will endure.

We now have an opportunity to build a bipartisan consensus in support of a vital national security priority: defeating Al Qaida and its violent extremist allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan and ensuring that these countries never again serve as bases for attacks against America and our allies.

Americans need to know why winning this war is essential to our country's security. They need to know that things in Afghanistan will get worse before they get better. That, unfortunately -- casualties will likely rise in the year to come, but that ultimately we will succeed.

I look to the president and to our witnesses here today to lead an unflinching effort to build bipartisan support for the war in Afghanistan, both among the public and here in Congress. I will be an ally in this effort, and I pledge to do everything in my power to ensure that we win this war -- not just end it, but win it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator McCain.

I understand that the order that our witnesses desire to be recognized is Secretary Gates first, then Secretary Clinton, then Admiral Mullen.

Secretary Gates, welcome.

GATES:

Actually, I think the secretary of state's microphone is the only one working, so perhaps we should allow her to be the only witness today.

(LAUGHTER)

GATES:



But Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to testify today.

Last night, President Obama announced a renewed commitment and more focused strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind his decisions, in particular the nexus among Al Qaida, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan; our objectives in how the president's strategy aims to accomplish them; and the military forces required.

As the president first stated in March and reemphasized last night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida and to prevent its return to both countries.

The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating Al Qaida and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another as much as we might wish that to be the case.

While Al Qaida is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen Al Qaida's message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on the winning side of history.

Put simply, the Taliban and Al Qaida have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaida leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.

Taliban success in retaking and holding parts of Afghanistan against the combined forces of multiple modern armies -- the current direction of events has dramatically strengthened the extremist mythology and popular perceptions of who is winning and who is losing.

The lessons of the Taliban's revival for Al Qaida is that time and will are on their side; that with a Western defeat they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory -- as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.

Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaida.

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists.

The two countries, bound by ties of tribe and faith, share a porous border of more than 1,500 miles.

Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and a more coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. Providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region.

GATES:

Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's own domestic peace and stability, carrying out, with Al Qaida's help, escalating bombing attacks throughout the country.

It is these attacks and the Taliban's movement toward Islamabad seven months ago that largely motivated the current operations by the Pakistani army. And we know that Pakistan Taliban operate in collusion with both the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Al Qaida.

A related point with respect to Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing in military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner. We must change that perception.

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most of the country and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas could in short order become once again sanctuary for Al Qaida, as well as a staging area for resurgent military militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.

Success in south and central Asia by Islamic extremist, as was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the Al Qaida narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fundraising and more sophisticated operations. Aided by the Internet, many more followers could join their ranks, both in the region and in susceptible populations across the globe.

It is true that Al Qaida and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to London, to Denver. But what makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location -- including Somalia, Yemen and other possible redoubts -- is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism, the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home.

For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the United States and the world.

Some say this is similar to the domino theory that underpinned and ultimately muddled the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we have very real and very recent history that shows just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space, safe havens and government -- governments complicit with and supportive of their mission.

Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993, Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.

A stable security situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, one that is sustainable over the long term by their governments, is vital to our national security. By the same token, the current status quo in Afghanistan, the slow but steady deterioration of the security situation, and growing influence of the Taliban is unacceptable.

So too is the status quo ante: a largely ungoverned region controlled by extremists in which the United States had little influence or ability to gain actionable intelligence on the ground.

The president's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country.

We will focus our resources where the population is most threatened and align military and civilian efforts accordingly, with six primary objectives: reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action by the U.S., our allies and the Afghans; denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication; disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing Al Qaida from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan; degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by Afghan national security forces; increasing the size and capability of the Afghan national security forces and employing other local forces selectively to begin transitioning security responsibility to the Afghan government within 18 months; and, finally, selectively building the capacity of Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.

This approach is not open-ended nation-building. It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern centralized Western-style Afghan nation state, the likes of which has never been seen in that country. Nor does it entail pacifying every village and conducting textbook counterinsurgency from one end of Afghanistan to the other.

It is instead a narrower focus, tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating Al Qaida by building the capacity of the Afghans, capacity that will be measured by observable progress on clear objectives and not simply by the passage of time.

The essence of our civil military plan is to clear, hold, build and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer 2011 is critical -- and, in my view, achievable. This transfer will occur district by district, province by province, depending on conditions on the ground.

The process will be similar to what we did in Iraq, where international security forces provided overwatch, first at the tactical level and then at the strategic level.

Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long haul.

We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see a descent into chaos and into Taliban hands.

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police through an intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in combat.

It also means achieving a better balance between national and local forces, increasing Afghan unconventional warfare capabilities, engaging communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory, and bolstering Afghan-led reintegration and reconciliation efforts.

At the strategic level, the president's plan will achieve a better balance between investments in the central government and sub-national entities. At the national level, the focus will be primarily on reforming essential ministries and pressing for the appointment of competent and honest ministers and governors. At the local and regional level, there will be a shift to work through existing traditional structures rather than building new ones.

In all of these efforts, we must have a committed partner in the Afghan people and government. That is one reason why there will be very clear and definitive timeframes for reviewing our and their progress.

As the president announced, the United States will commit an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 to 24 months. These forces, the U.S. -- the U.S. contribution to the fight, will be deployed and concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

GATES:

The first of these forces will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within two to three weeks. In all, since taking office, President Obama has committed nearly 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. force of approximately 100,000.

We are looking to NATO and to our other partners to send a parallel international message of strong resolve. Our allies must take the lead and focus their resources in the north and west to prevent the insurgency from establishing new footholds.

We will seek some 5,000 to 7,000 troops from NATO, and expect the allies to share more of the burden in training, equipping and funding the Afghan national army and police.

Let me offer a few closing thoughts. It is worth remembering that the security situation in Afghanistan, though serious, does not begin to approach the scale of violence that consumed Iraq and confronted our forces there when I was confirmed as secretary of defense three years ago this week.

With all the resources already committed to this campaign, plus those the president has just announced, I believe the pieces are being put in place to make real and measurable progress in Afghanistan over the next 18 to 24 months.

The president believes, as do I, that in the end we cannot defeat Al Qaida and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The president's decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia, all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital interests.

So I ask for your full support of this decision to provide both Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal the resources they need to be successful.

This will take more patience, perseverance and sacrifice by the United States and by our allies. And, as always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who have volunteered, and in many cases re-volunteered, to serve their country in uniform.

I know they will be uppermost in our minds and prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally necessary mission.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Secretary Gates.

Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON:

How did you get this to turn on?

(CROSSTALK)

(UNKNOWN)

There you go.

CLINTON:

OK, thank you.

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify before so many former colleagues and friends. My experience on this committee helped form my views on many of the issues facing our nation, and it's a privilege to be here before you now in this different role.

Yesterday President Obama presented the administration's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Today Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and I will all be providing you with additional details.

But let me speak briefly at a more personal level about why we are making this commitment.

Simply put, among a range of difficult choices this is the best way to protect our nation now and in the future. The extremists we are fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan have attacked us and our allies before.

If we allow them access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001 they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again. They could drag an entire region into chaos. Our civilian and military leaders in Afghanistan have reported that the situation is serious and worsening, and we agree.

In the aftermath of September 11th, I grieved with sons, daughters, husbands, wives whose loved ones were murdered. It was an attack on our country and an attack on the constituents I then represented.

I witnessed the tragic consequences in the lives of thousands of innocent families and the damage done to our economy and our sense of security. So I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our nation from such violence.

The case for action against Al Qaida and its allies has always been clear, but the United States course of action over the last eight years has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus. And while our attention was focused elsewhere the Taliban gained momentum in Afghanistan and the extremist threat grew in Pakistan -- a country with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges.

It was against this backdrop that President Obama called for a careful, thorough review of the strategy. I was proud to be part of that process which questioned every assumption and took nothing for granted.

And our objectives are clear. We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to eliminate safe havens for those plotting to attack against us, our allies and our interests. We will help to stabilize a region that we believe is fundamental to our national security.

And we will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past.

The duration of our military presence is not open-ended, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops begin eventually to come home.

Accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American people will not be easy. It will mean sending not only more troops, but more civilians and more assistance to Afghanistan and significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan.

The men and women carrying out this military civilian mission are not members of a list or items on a PowerPoint slide. They are our friends and neighbors, our sons and daughters, our brothers and sisters. And we will be asking them and the American people to make extraordinary sacrifices on behalf of our security.

I want to assure this committee -- that I know takes its oversight responsibility so seriously -- that we will do everything we can to make sure their sacrifices are honored and make our nation safer.

The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. And the beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of opportunity.

We have real concerns about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan government, and we will continue to pursue them. But in his inauguration speech last week, that I was privileged to attend, I witnessed President Karzai's call for a new compact with his country.

He pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver for the people of his country. His words were long in coming, but they were welcome. They must now be matched with action.

The Afghan people, the United States and the international community must hold the Afghan government accountable for making good on these commitments.

We will help by working to strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan society so we don't leave chaos behind when our combat troops begin to depart.

CLINTON:

The president has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility, something that President Karzai assumed would happen and which we took as a very good sign of a renewed understanding of the necessity of Afghanization.

That transition will begin in the summer of 2011, when we expect Afghan security forces and the Afghan government will have the capacity to start assuming ownership for defending their own country.

As the president has said, we will execute the transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. But we think a timeframe for such a transition will provide a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government.

It should be clear to everyone that, unlike the past, the United States, our allies and partners have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region. So our resolve in this fight is reflected in the substantial commitment of troops and in the significant civilian commitment that will continue long after combat forces leave.

That civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and advisers are helping to craft policy inside government ministries, providing development assistance in the field and working in scores of other roles. When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next day. And as operations progressed our civ-mil coordination is growing even stronger.

We are on track to triple the number of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. On average, each of these civilians leverages 10 partners, ranging from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs.

It's a cliché to say we have our best people in this job -- in these jobs, but it happens to be true.

When I was in Kabul a few weeks ago I meet with an American colonel who told me that while he had thousands of outstanding soldiers under his command, none of them had the 40 years of agricultural experience of the USDA civilian serving alongside his battalion, or the rule of law and governance -- at governance expertise of their civilian experts from the State Department.

He told me, "I'm happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we need more of them." The president's strategy will make that possible.

Not only do we have the right people to achieve our objectives we also have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high impact assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector -- the traditional core of the Afghan economy. This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield.

We will also support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who renounce Al Qaida, abandon violence, and want to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of conviction but due to coercion or money.

So all Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens, and reintegrate into their society.

A regional diplomacy complements this approach by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan; and working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries from competition for influence to cooperation and economic integration.

We also believe a strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner in the fight against violent extremism. And people in Pakistan are increasingly coming to view that we do share a common enemy. I heard this repeatedly during my recent visit.

So our relationship needs to be anchored in common goals of civilian rule, robust economic development, and the defeat of those who threaten Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the rest of the world.

We'll significantly expand support intended for Pakistan to develop the potential of their people. We will do so by demonstrating a commitment to Pakistan -- that has been questioned by the Pakistanis in the past. And we will make sure that the people of Pakistan know that we wish to be their partner for the long term, and that we intend to do all that we can to bolster their futures.

Now, we're not going to be facing these challenges alone. We share this responsibility with governments around the world. I will go to Brussels tomorrow to begin the process of securing additional alliance commitments of troops, trainers and resources. We expect Secretary General Rasmussen to have an announcement today about the progress we're making in that effort.

Ambassador Holbrooke, our special representative, is already there consulting with our allies. And we're also asking the international community to expand its support to Pakistan. Our objectives are shared by people in governments across the world, and we are particularly reaching out to Muslims everywhere.

Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the president's plan represents the best way we know to protect our nation today and in the future. The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetimes.

We will not succeed if people view this effort as a responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single country.

We owe it to the troops and civilians who will face these dangers to come together as Americans, and come together with allies and international partners who are ready to step up and do more.

We have to accomplish this mission. And I look forward to working with you to help meet this challenge. Thank you all very much.

LEVIN:

Thank you very much, Madam Secretary.

Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN:

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your time today.

Let me state right up front that I support fully and without hesitation the president's decision. And I appreciate the opportunity to contribute to what I believe was a healthy and productive discussion.

I've seen my share of internal debates about various national security issues, especially over the course of these last two years. And I can honestly say that I do not recall an issue so thoroughly or so thoughtfully considered as this one.



Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice throughout this process, and every one of us used it.

We now have before us a strategy more appropriately matched to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, and resources matched more appropriately to that strategy -- particularly with regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010.

And given the stakes in Afghanistan for our own national security, as well as that of our partners around the world, I believe the time we took was well worth it.

Secretary Clinton and Gates -- Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you through the large policy issues in question. I will not repeat them. From a purely military perspective, I believe our new approach does three critical things.

First, by providing more discrete objectives it offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ their forces. They will still work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida, and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people who remain the center of gravity.

They will still pursue major elements of the counter-insurgency campaign desired and designed by General McChrystal, which as we all know involves at least some measure of active counter-terrorism operations.

MULLEN:

But now they will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on Al Qaida's leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and accelerating the growth of competent Afghan national security forces.

At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing space for the Afghans to secure their own people and to stabilize their own country. It's about partnering and mentoring just as much if not more than it is about fighting. Where once we believed that finishing the job meant to a large degree doing it ourselves, we now know that it cannot truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans themselves.

Fully a third of the U.S. troops in theater are partnered with Afghan forces, and I expect that number to rise significantly throughout 2010.

Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives commanders on the ground the resources and the support they need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to accomplish these more limited objectives.

I've said it before and I believe it still today, this region is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism. It is the place from which we were attacked on 9/11. And should we be hit again, it's the place from which I am convinced the planning, training and funding will emanate.

And Al Qaida may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more sophisticated. We saw that

just a few months ago in the Korangal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional small unit tactics.

Their fighters are better organized and better equipped than they were just one year ago. In fact, coalition forces experienced record high violence this past summer, with insurgent attacks more than 60 percent above 2008 levels.

And through brutal intimidation, the Taliban has established shadow governments across the country, coercing the reluctant support of many locals and challenging the authority of elected leaders and state institutions.

Indeed, we believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. To say that there's no serious threat of Afghanistan falling once again into Taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the insurgency's most public statements.

And to -- and to argue that, should they have that power, the Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of Al Qaida on Afghan soil, is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see every day of collusion between these factions on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

The cost of failure is then grave. That is why the president's decision for an extended surge to Afghanistan of 30,000 additional forces is so important. It gets the most U.S. force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.

It validates our adherence to a counter-insurgency approach. And it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible chance to set the security conditions for the Afghan people to see our commitment to their future, for the Karzai government to know our strong desire to see his promised reforms, for the Afghan Taliban to understand they will not -- they cannot -- take back Afghanistan; and for those beyond Afghanistan who support the Taliban or would see the return of Al Qaida to realize the futility of their pursuit.

I should add that this -- these reinforcements come on top of the 21,000 troops the president ordered shortly after taking office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the southern Helmand valley.

But as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of troops and no amount of time will ever be enough to completely achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy public administration. This, not troop numbers, is the area of my greatest concern.

Like everyone else, I look forward to working with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the interagency and international communities, as well.

And that brings me to my final point. The president's new strategy still recognizes the criticality of a broad-based approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in isolation, anymore than he views the ties between Al Qaida and the Taliban as superficial.

He has called for stronger and more productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is likewise under the threat from radical elements and whose -- and whose support remains vital to our ability to eliminate safe havens.

He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort. And that is happening: more contributions by other NATO nations and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the Afghans.

His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more achievable strategy than we've had in the past, one based on pragmatism and real possibilities. And speaking for the 2.2 million men and women who must execute it and who, with their families, have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of eight years of constant combat, I support his decision and appreciate his leadership.

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you so much, Admiral Mullen.

We're going to have a six-minute round, and then we'll ask members to strictly adhere to that six minutes so we will all have an opportunity to ask questions.

There's been some confusion -- excuse me -- about whether the beginning date for U.S. troop reductions is set for July 2011 with the pace of those reductions being condition-based or whether the 2011 July starting date itself is dependent on conditions on the ground.

And Secretary Gates, which is it?

GATES:

(OFF-MIKE) Mr. Chairman, it is -- July 2011 is when we expect the transition process to begin.

Our view is that...

LEVIN:

But is that date conditions-based or not?

GATES:

No, sir.

LEVIN:

OK. Next question, the -- and this has to do with the partnering ratio. There are currently just over 10,000 U.S. troops in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan, and they are partnered with only 1,500 or so Afghan soldiers.

The partnering goal for the United States is almost the reverse, as measured in units: three Afghan companies to one U.S. company.

Now, paraphrasing the National Security Council's director for Afghanistan, the three Afghan to one U.S. ratio helps prevent Afghan units from relying too much on the U.S. unit to the detriment of the Afghan unit's development.

LEVIN:

So the current number of troops could and should, under our own doctrine, be partnering with 20,000 or so Afghan troops in Helmand. We don't need more troops to partner more Afghans. We have more than enough for that purpose. Nor do we expect 20,000 or more Afghan troops to be assigned to partner with us in Helmand next year.

According to Prime Minister Brown of Great Britain, there will be 10,000 more Afghan troops deployed to Helmand in the coming year to be divided approximately equally between U.S. and British forces for partnering.

So, first, Secretary Gates, are my numbers correct?

GATES:

Let me defer to Admiral Mullen.

MULLEN:

Chairman, I think your numbers, as far as those that are currently partnered, are (inaudible) the availability of Afghan forces in the south, in Helmand.

(CROSSTALK)

LEVIN:

And in terms of what we expect to be deployed by Afghanistan for their troops in...

MULLEN:

Yes, sir, it sounds about right.

LEVIN:

OK.

Now, I thought I heard the president, at the meeting yesterday in the Old Executive Office Building, say that we would not have our troops clear an area unless they could turn the cleared area over to Afghans.

Now, Secretary Gates, did I hear him correctly? And if so, how is that possible, given the paucity of available Afghan forces?

GATES:

Well, let me start, and then invite Admiral Mullen to chime in.

First of all, clearly, as I've indicated, accelerating the growth of the Afghan National Army and police is vitally important.

But we are also looking, as I had suggested in my remarks, at local forces as well, partnering with local security forces. So there are -- there is more than just the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army in this mix.

And the plan clearly is that we will not transition security responsibility to the Afghans until the Afghans have the capacity in that district or that province to -- to be able to manage the security situation on their own, with us and our allies initially in a tactical overwatch and then a strategic overwatch situation.

The reality is that the circumstances, very much as in Iraq, differ from district to district and province to province. So the ability of the Afghans to take this on will depend on -- on the circumstances in each of these -- in each of these areas.

And in some, it will take fewer Afghans. But clearly a big part of this is additional training, both basic training but then partnering in combat as training, to put more and more Afghans into the fight and into a position where they can take responsibility for security.

And particularly in the context of degraded Taliban capabilities -- I mean, one of the purposes of the U.S. going in with additional forces is not just to partner with the Afghans and not just to train the Afghans, but to degrade the capabilities of the Taliban. And -- and so you have the situation of which the capabilities of the ANSF are rising at a time when our combat forces are degrading the capabilities of the Taliban.

And it's the point at which the Afghans are able to handle that degraded threat that we would make the transition.

LEVIN:

So do I understand from your answer then that we -- there will be situations where our troops will be clearing an area and not have Afghans available yet, at that point, to turn that cleared area over to. Is that fair?

MULLEN:

Mr. Chairman, I think it is.

LEVIN:

All right.

MULLEN:

But if I can, just -- just briefly. When General McChrystal showed up in June, there were virtually no units partnered. There are some 280 units out of 351 right now who are partnered.

(CROSSTALK)

LEVIN:

With some partners, not -- not the three to one ratio?

MULLEN:

No, sir, we're not there yet. But this is companies by companies. This is in training and in fighting.

LEVIN:

My final question because I'm out of time. What will be the Afghan army's projected size by July 2011?

GATES:

The goal -- the goal by December of 2010 is 134,000.

LEVIN:

No, my question is July of 2011.

MULLEN:

It will be about 170,000.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

Senator McCain?

MCCAIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Mullen, I think it's important to tell the American people it's very likely that casualties will go up during the course of this troop increase that's envisioned.

MULLEN:

Senator McCain, I -- when we added the Marines, when the 21,000 went in, I was very clear about the potential there, that casualties would go up. And I don't think there's any question that that is part of the risk associated with these additional troops and that they will go up.

MCCAIN:

I think the American people need to understand this.

MULLEN:

Yes, sir. I -- I agree with you.

MCCAIN:

Secretary Gates, in answer to Chairman Levin's question, if I understand your answer, Chairman Levin said was it condition- based, the withdrawal plan for July 2011, and you said no.

Will we withdraw our forces based on conditions on the ground or based on an arbitrary date, regardless of conditions on the ground?

GATES:

What we're talking about, Senator McCain, is the beginning of a process, not the end of that process. Approximately 60 percent of Afghanistan today is not controlled by Afghanistan -- by the Taliban or has significant Taliban influence.

MCCAIN:

I say with respect, Secretary Gates -- my question is will the date of withdrawal of 2011, which the president said, be based on an arbitrary date of July 2011 regardless of conditions on the ground?

GATES:

I think it's the judgment of all of us in the Department of Defense involved in this process that we will be in a position, in particularly uncontested areas, where we will be able to begin that transition in July 2011.

MCCAIN:

Well, let's suppose you're not. Let's suppose you're not. Let's suppose that conditions on the ground so that our commanders believe that it would jeopardize the success of the mission if we start a withdrawal in July of 2011, will we do it anyway?

GATES:

Well, I think that we will be in a position -- the president has indicated that we will have a thorough review of how we're doing in December of 2010. And I think we will be in a position then to evaluate whether or not we can begin that transition in July.

MCCAIN:

The president -- I say with great respect, Secretary Gates, the president announced that we would begin withdrawing, a hard date of July of 2011, which is -- I don't know why that date was particularly picked, which may be time in another session. But -- so he's announced that. But at the same time he said conditions on the ground would.

Now, those are two incompatible statements. You either have a winning strategy and do as we did in Iraq, and then once it's succeeded then we withdraw. Or we -- as the president said, we will have a date beginning withdrawal of July 2011. Which is it? It's got to be one or the other.

MCCAIN:

It's got to be the appropriate conditions or it's got to be an arbitrary date.

I -- you can't have both.

GATES:

Where we begin the transition is, I think, what is -- what is the -- is the key factor here, Senator. As I suggested, we're -- we will have a thorough review in December 2010. If it appears that the strategy's not working and that we are not going to be able to transition in 2011, then we will take a hard look at the strategy itself.

MCCAIN:

Well, I -- I say with respect, I think the American people need to know whether we will begin withdrawing in 2011 or -- and conditions are ripe for that or whether we will just be withdrawing no matter what. And I think...

GATES:

Our current plan is that we will begin the transition in local areas in July of 2011. We will evaluate in December 2010 whether we believe we will be able to meet that objective.



MCCAIN:

I think -- I think that's got to be made very clear, because right now the expectation level -- the American people, because of the president's speech, is that we will be withdrawing as of July 2011 regardless of conditions on the ground.

I think that's a wrong impression to give our friends. It's the wrong impression to give our enemies. It's the wrong impression to give the men and women who want to go over there and win. Not start withdrawing on an arbitrary date. And that's -- unfortunately that has not been made clear at all.

And by the way, Admiral Mullen, the Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual says, quote, "Counter-insurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment. The populous must have confidence in the staying power of both the counter-insurgents and the host nation government."

By announcing a date for withdrawal, don't you think that that kind of contradicts the Army -- the counterinsurgency manual?

MULLEN:

Sir, I believe, and the military leadership believes by mid-2011 we'll know how this is going. And the secretary talked to the assessment. And, in fact, it's General McChrystal's view that this -- these additional forces will allow him to reverse the momentum and head us in the right direction.

We will have very solid indicators at that point. And then, obviously, the July 2011 date is a day we start transitioning -- transferring responsibility and transitioning. It's not a date that we're leaving. And the president also said that is -- will be based on conditions on the ground.

(CROSSTALK)

MCCAIN:

And it makes no sense for him to have announced the date, but we'll -- I'm sure we'll continue this discussion.

Secretary Clinton, I appreciate your statement, but we'd like a lot more specifics.

We know that there are divisions within the embassy in Kabul. We know that cables were leaked that the ambassador there was against any -- any increases in troops there. We know that relations within the embassy, at least three factions.

And we also know that the ability of State Department personnel has been significantly limited, as it was prior to the surge in -- in Iraq because the environment is not safe for them to go out and operate.

I'm -- I have great confidence in the military operational planning. And I'm confident it can succeed. But as I said earlier, I don't see the build component yet. And I would like for you to submit to this committee a -- a very specific plan, just as we are receiving a very specific military plan, on exactly how we're going to achieve the build part of it, which I think there is an adequate model for it in the case of Iraq.

So I appreciate your statements. And I agree with you about the quality of personnel. I have yet to see a comprehensive, cohesive, convincing plan to implement the essential civil side of any successful surge.

CLINTON:

Well, Senator McCain, first, let me say we are more than happy to submit a plan. We have, obviously, been working with our committee of jurisdiction and authorization on a very close ongoing basis, and we'll be happy to share a lot of the information with you. And we would welcome your response and your advice.

I have to say, however, that, you know, the process that we engaged in solicited opinions. And I thought it was a great tribute to the president and to General Jones that the White House ran a process that actually sought out and -- and made it clear that diversity of opinion was welcomed. And I thought it was useful to hear from a variety of sources. It wouldn't surprise you, as it didn't surprise me, that people had different opinions based on their perspective.

But as Admiral Mullen just eloquently said, the president's made a decision. There is no division. There is absolute unity and a commitment to carrying out the mission. And we'll be happy to share the specifics of that with you.

MCCAIN:

Thank you very much, and thank all the witnesses who we appreciate enormously their contributions to our country.

LEVIN:

We're going to take advantage -- thank you, Senator McCain. We're going to take advantage of the presence of a quorum here now to take one minute to consider the 1,938 pending military nominations, as well as the civilian nominations of Clifford Stanley to be undersecretary of defense, Frank Kendall III to be principal deputy undersecretary of defense, Erin Conaton to be the undersecretary of the Air Force, Terry Yonkers to be assistant secretary of the Air Force, and Lawrence Romo to be director of the Selective Service.

Do I hear a motion to, en bloc, approve those nominations?

LIEBERMAN:

So moved.

LEVIN:

Is it second?

(UNKNOWN)

Second.

LEVIN:

All in favor say, aye.

LIEBERMAN:

Aye

(SENATORS RESPOND, "AYE")

LEVIN:

Opposed, nay.

The ayes have it. Thank you very much.

Senator Lieberman?

LIEBERMAN:

Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and...

GATES:

By the way, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(LAUGHTER)

LEVIN:

I knew you would -- you would appreciate that intervention.

GATES:

Yes, I do. Thank you (OFF-MIKE).

(CROSSTALK)

LIEBERMAN:

Thank -- one more item of business.

LEVIN:

I included the 1,900.

(UNKNOWN)

OK.

LIEBERMAN:

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton and Admiral Mullen for your excellent opening statements and for all the hard and effective work that you did in support of the policy that the president announced last night.

I agree with what Senator McCain said, that the president has made the right decision in embracing a counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan and resourcing it properly.

In making this decision, President Obama has respectfully disagreed with a majority of members of his own political party, according to every public opinion poll I've seen. And therefore I think it's fair to say that the president has quite literally put our national security interests ahead of partisan political interests.

I hope that fact will inspire and encourage a majority of members of both political parties to do the same and to thereby show that America's political leadership is still capable of suspending partisanship at the water's edge when our security and our troops are on the line.

As chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I'm very grateful that President Obama argued so effectively last night that the war in Afghanistan is a war of necessity because its outcome is inseparable from our security here at home. That is why I believe there is no substitute for victory over the Islamic extremists and terrorists in Afghanistan.

A war of necessity must not just be fought it must of necessity be won.

LIEBERMAN:

Last night, in the most controversial paragraph of his speech, President Obama said that we will, quote, "begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011," end quote.

That troubled me when I heard it, but then the president added words that reassured me which were that, quote, "We will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground," end quote.

This morning Secretary Gates, in your opening statement, you added more detail, I think, to the -- to the -- and Admiral Mullen, you did, too -- to the -- the mode by which we will begin this transition in July of 2011.

And I'm particularly struck that you refer to it as a transfer of security responsibility and you also say that it will be very much like what we did in Iraq that -- that where international security forces provided overwatch, first at the technical level, then at the strategic level.

So Secretary Gates, I want to ask you if I -- as I read your words today, if I'm correct in concluding that what will definitely begin in July of 2011 is a transfer of security responsibility to the Afghans, but may not include immediately a withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan.

GATES:

No, and that is -- that is correct. I think as we turn over more districts and more provinces to Afghan security control, much as we did with the provincial Iraqi control, that there will be a thinning of our forces and a -- and a gradual drawdown.

I would remind folks here, since this is the second surge I've been up here defending, that -- that the surge in Iraq lasted 14 months...

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

GATES:

... January '07 to March '08. And -- and, frankly, it was pretty apparent to the Taliban -- or to -- to our adversaries in Iraq, rather, all along that that was a very tentative situation because we were up here defending it practically every day.

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

GATES:

And so the notion that our adversaries in Afghanistan are not aware of the debates in this country and the debates in Europe and elsewhere is, I think, unrealistic.

LIEBERMAN:

I -- I agree.

(CROSSTALK)

GATES:

So they know these -- they know these things. But the reality is, this is going to be a process. And -- and I think it has much in common with the way that we begin to draw down in -- in Iraq.

LIEBERMAN:

So -- that -- to me that says that we may transfer -- we're likely to transfer, am I right, security -- security responsibilities to the Afghans in the areas that are -- are most stable, that are most uncontested at the beginning.

(CROSSTALK)

LIEBERMAN:

And -- and at the beginning we probably will put our troops back a ways just to see how that works rather than taking them out of the country.

GATES:

We're not just going to throw these guys into the swimming pool...

LIEBERMAN:

Got it.

GATES:

... and walk away. I mean, the reality is, first of all, those transfers are going to take place in the most uncontested places in Iraq (sic)...

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

GATES:

... in Afghanistan. So just as in Iraq, you may have some districts and provinces being transferred to Afghan security responsibility and at the very same time have extraordinarily heavy combat going on in other provinces around the country, which is exactly what we saw in Iraq.

LIEBERMAN:

And am I right that in the -- in the policy that the president announced last night which does begin a transfer of security responsibility of July 2011 to the Afghans, there is no deadline for the end of that transfer? It will be based on conditions on the ground.

GATES:

It will be based on conditions on the ground. But by the same token, we want to communicate to the Afghans...

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

GATES:

... this is not an open-ended commitment...

LIEBERMAN:

I agree.

GATES:

... on the part of the American people and -- and our -- and our allies around the world.

LIEBERMAN:

And I agree with that.

Admiral Mullen...

GATES:

Because we have to build a fire under them, frankly, to get them to do the kind of recruitment, retention, training and so on for their forces that allow us to -- to make this transition.

Let me just draw one other analogy to Iraq. In Iraq, once it was clear the surge was working, it was pretty plain that the Iraqis wanted us out...

LIEBERMAN:

Right.

GATES:

... about as fast as possible. The security agreement and everything flowed from that. That's not entirely clear in Afghanistan. They live in a very rough neighborhood.

And so we have the -- the -- the balancing act here. And, frankly, the -- the centerpiece of our debates for the last several months of how do you get the Afghans to begin to step up to responsibility for their own future, their own security in a way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once again become the safe haven for Al Qaida?

That's figuring out that balance in terms of how you incentivize and get a sense of urgency to the Afghans and at the same time signal resolve to our adversaries was the tough part of this for us.

LIEBERMAN:

Well, I appreciate that answer. I think you've -- you strike exactly the right balance. And I -- I appreciate what you said. We're not just going to throw the Afghans into the pool and -- and -- and run away until we're sure that they can swim on their own.

And to me, that's the essence of moving down the road to victory in Afghanistan.

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, senator.

Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Inhofe?

INHOFE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was going to head up with the -- start up with the end -- end status and end state, but it's been pretty well covered right now. I would only say this, though. I would -- probably speaking on behalf of all of the members up here, because all of us have been both to Afghanistan and Iraq. And the troops themselves, they -- they want to win and they don't really -- they don't like to even talk about a -- a -- a withdrawal date and that type of thing.

Let me just mention -- ask you a quick question Admiral Mullen. Most of the time when commanders talk about different options and courses of action, they talk about the risk involved. And the risk is usually from low, medium or high.

What was the risk -- or was there a risk level associated with General McChrystal's 40,000 increase?

MULLEN:

Notionally and broadly moderate, but the real critical path here is the development of the ANSF, the Afghan security forces, which we all think is high risk, particularly on the police side. That's one of the reasons he shifted to partnering and one of the reasons that -- that we are devoting our best people, best leaders, resources to accelerating that so that we can do what secretary of defense...



(CROSSTALK)

INHOFE:

OK, and I'll pursue that in just a minute here. And so I would assume that the number 30,000 would be -- would be a little higher risk than the moderate risk, then?

MULLEN:

Sir, I -- I...

INHOFE:

Both...

MULLEN:

... what I said in my statement is General McChrystal's going to get these forces this year, and in an -- as fast as we can get them there.

INHOFE:

OK.

MULLEN:

His biggest concern is to reverse the momentum. He thinks he can do that with these forces. He's going to get them on the same timeline he asked for.

INHOFE:

Yes, I understand.

MULLEN:

And at about the same level.

INHOFE:

Now, I was privileged to be with General Jones the last week that he was on the job over there, and I know some of the differences between Afghanistan and Iraq.

But I've been asked a lot of the times -- and I think we should get on record. If we are looking at, during the peak of the surge in Iraq, of about 165,000 Americans and this -- when you start with 68,000 and add 30,000 to it -- you're talking about 100,000, in a country that's about twice the size of Iraq.

Why does it take fewer -- what's the major reason it takes fewer of our troops, our participation in Afghanistan relative to the size as it did in Iraq?

MULLEN:

One of the, I think, great strengths for the review was to focus the objectives specifically, and in particular focus the objectives on key population centers. And so the troops that General McChrystal has asked for and that -- and that -- that will add up to about 100,000 do that in key areas that -- in particularly the Pashtun belt, where he fundamentally believes with these troops he can turn this around.

So while those -- while the -- the ratio is a guide, it is not sacrosanct. And he's able to focus where we need to focus to get at this insurgency and in that -- and actually it was -- the same was true in Iraq. It's just that this need with respect to these ratios and these numbers is about right for Afghanistan.

GATES:

Let me just add one sentence. And that is one of the reasons why the contribution -- the added contributions from our allies and partners are so important. Because basically we want them to take responsibility for the northern and western parts of Afghanistan so that we can concentrate and focus our efforts in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

INHOFE:

Secretary Gates, the -- I think one thing that all of you said in your opening statements is we need greater participation by the Iraqis, the ANA, and we also need greater participation by the non-American coalition. We all agree with that.

On the -- and I happened to be over there in '03 when we were taking -- turning over the training of the ANA to the Afghans, and it happened to be Oklahoma's 45th Guard Unit that was in charge of that.

They -- they -- they contend that they're great warriors, and yet you looked around, and I have ever since then, you see so many of these young, healthy Afghans that are walking the streets who ought to be in the military.

What can we do differently than what we've done in the past to encourage a greater participation with the ANA?

GATES:

Well, let me start, and then ask Admiral Mullen to contribute. One of the things that they are doing that actually I think makes a -- makes a real difference is significantly increasing the pay, both for the police and the -- and the army.

The reality is that, based on the information available to us in many instances, the Taliban actually pay more than the Afghan government. And so one of the things that -- particularly in terms of retention is to increase their pay. And I think most people believe that that will have a -- have a real impact.

INHOFE:

OK.

MULLEN:

The secretary talked earlier about retention, recruiting, and, clearly, incentivizing that from a pay standpoint is critical. The other fundamental difference from a -- from several years ago, really since General McChrystal got there, is this partnership piece.

What I think you saw, Senator, was mentoring and training teams, that kind of thing.

INHOFE:

That -- that's correct.

MULLEN:

This is partnering and it's getting everybody off their bases and out with the community. So that that - those two differences are -- are...

(CROSSTALK)

INHOFE:

I appreciate it. I was going to ask the same question about what can we do differently in terms of encouraging more of the non-American coalition forces.

I was pleased with the one statement that the president made when he talked about when the fact that he had actually talked to some of the NATO allies before coming out with this.

I wish he had done the same thing on the third site in Poland. But by doing that, do you think that's going to encourage them, make them feel they're more a part of this? Was that a good move?

GATES:

Absolutely, and -- and I...

INHOFE:

And what else can we do to encourage more of the non- American coalition?

GATES:

Well, we have -- Secretary Clinton has been talking to her counterparts. I've been talking to my counterparts. And we -- and we are hearing 1,000 here, 800 there, and so on.

I think that we will make the 5,000 to 7,000 goal.

And I think -- you know, as somebody who has been critical of the allies and was once derided by my British colleague for megaphone diplomacy -- because I was giving them such a hard time on this. It's -- it's -- we have to realize that the non-U.S. forces have increased in the last two years from about 17,000 to 18,000 troops to almost 44,000. So with this add we will be at nearly 50,000 non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and I think that's a pretty significant commitment.

INHOFE:

Yes, my time has expired. But for the record, Madam Secretary, you made the statement about Karzai and the speech that he made and all this. I hope it's not just empty words. But if you would, for the record, give us your indication -- your feelings about what he can do now to accomplish what you had suggested?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CLINTON:

I -- I certainly will, Senator, but if I could just quickly add. One of the most important parts of his speech was his assertion that Afghan forces would be taking responsibility for many important parts of the country within three years, and that they would be responsible for the entire country within five years.

And that is very much along the lines of the kind of partnering and transition that we think is realistic. We just have to keep the feet to the fire and keep pushing it forward.

INHOFE:

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Reed?

REED:

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Chairman.

There's been much made about this withdrawal goal as arbitrary. But let me ask you, Admiral Mullen, this was based on the advice of General McChrystal and your advice about your expectation of the -- what the situation on the ground would be in 2011 given these additional resources and change of policy, is that correct?

MULLEN:

We -- we -- I have a very clear view, and I think so does Generals Petraeus and McChrystal, that by mid-2011 we will know whether we are going to succeed here or not. That has -- that has been something that we've discussed and we agreed on. That's why getting these forces in so quickly is so important to try to reverse this thing.

And it's -- and some of it is based on the fact the Marines have been in Helmand this year, so in fact the Marines will be in one of the toughest places for three fighting seasons, if you will, '09, '10 and '11. And we think with the additional forces we will have very strong indicators about how this is going and -- and our ability to transfer and transition at that point.

REED:

So you wouldn't describe the date as arbitrary?

MULLEN:

No, sir. It -- it -- it wasn't arbitrary. That said, what the president also said is it would be responsible and it would be based on conditions. And it's -- you know, all of us can look out and think, you know, speculate what those conditions will be. But I think we have to be careful about that. But that is the goal right now.

GATES:

I would just clarify, if I could, Senator?

REED:

Mr. Secretary?

GATES:

The -- the July 2011 date was chosen because it will be two years after the Marines arrived in Helmand.

REED:

And giving them the fighting opportunities, for want of a better term that -- fighting obligations or fighting challenges that...

(CROSSTALK)

REED:

The issue of the deadline also raises the issue of our posture in Iraq. There is a deadline there, Mr. Secretary, and that is a legal deadline -- which I understand couldn't be changed without the permission of the Iraqis, even if conditions deteriorated. Is that correct?

GATES:

That's correct. The -- all of our combat forces are to be out by the end of August 2010, and all forces out by the end of 2011.

GATES:

We do have some flexibility in terms of the pacing of the withdrawals between now and the end of August, but even with the hiccups over the elections the problems with respect to the election law, at this point General Odierno does not see any need to alter the pacing of the drawdowns in Iraq.

REED:

There is -- that is -- that was a great do by the Bush Administration, is a hard deadline without conditions. Is that correct?

GATES:

That is correct.

REED:

One of the other aspects of this was the process of deliberation that went into it. It took time, but from your comments this morning that time, I sense, was well spent. In one aspect of this I think, Admiral Mullen, was the original plan by General McChrystal would not have had the flow of forces as quickly as the final plan adopted by the president is that correct.

GATES:

And in particular with respect to the NATO forces that again they're not committed yet, that we would hope to certainly making it -- we're hopeful that they will be available more quickly and that we will do everything we can to get as much capability in as quickly as possible, but I don't want to overstate that.

REED:

Right.

GATES:

It is accelerated to some degree but I don't want to overstate that, but it really gets him the forces he needs this year to turn this thing around.

MULLEN:

And I would add that the final component of his original request, the final Brigade combat team would not have arrived in Afghanistan until the summer of 2011.

My own personal recommendation was there's no need to commit to that since it's so far in the future. And so to Admiral Mullen's point earlier, fundamentally General McChrystal is getting more troops faster than under the original plan.

REED:

And under the -- all right let me just rephrase that. This process as you've suggested has produced in your minds a better proposal across the board than originally was submitted by the individual components, the Ambassador, General McChrystal, the San Chom (ph), et cetera, et cetera.

GATES:

I'm convinced everybody in the process feels that way because one of things that clearly -- one of the concerns that I had coming out of the March decisions was that they were interpreted very broadly as -- and in the press and elsewhere, as a commitment to full scale nation building and creating a strong central government in Kabul.

And broad understandable skepticism over such broad objectives and it sounded very open ended, so one of the principal components of the dialogue over the last three months is how do we refine and narrow the mission to make it achievable and achieve the objectives in terms of our own security.

REED:

Mr. Secretary, some of the criticism of even talking about a date regardless of whether it's a hard unconditional withdrawal as in Iraq or proposal of the president is that it would embolden the enemy on one hand, or on the other hand they would lie low and wait us out.

It strikes me is that the Taliban has been emboldened quite aggressively over the last several years without any type of deadline and if they sit it out what will you do if they simply gave up the operational space to us for 18 months or two years.

GATES:

Well we certainly would welcome them not being active for the next 18 months because it would give us open field running with our allies and the Afghans to build capacity.

I think as you make the point, we are already in a situation in which they are embolden and in which they are being aggressive and where they have the momentum right now and so it's not clear to me what more they could do then they're doing right now.

The forces that we're sending in are intended, in the first instance, as the Admiral has said, is to reverse that momentum and deny them the ability to control territory.

REED:

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Sessions?

SESSIONS:

Thank all of you for all your presentations this morning and for your service to the country. We only got one commander-in-chief and I want to be supportive. I think this plan is within the framework of something I think can be effective.

I intend to support you and examine it as we go forward to make sure that we're fulfilling our role here in Congress is oversight and responsibility to our constituents. So I want to thank you for your presentations.

Secretary Gates we talked earlier this year about two grandiose expectations about a country that has as many difficulties and is as poor as Iraq -- as Afghanistan. And you recognize that in your answer to our questions and I'd like to pursue that a little bit.

That is what can we realistically expect and how can we create stability and order in Afghanistan as soon as possible so that we can reduce our troops as soon as possible in that -- from that country.

Most of the talk I've been hearing and your statements indicate a commitment to an Afghan national army which I assume is commanded and directed from central government in Kabul.



But you did indicate in your statement that -- that you would want to engage communities to enlist more local security forces to protect their own territory. I heard former Secretary Brzezinski this morning on television talk about the need for local militias.

I see and Mr. Former President Musharraf from Pakistan, his op-ed in the Washington -- in the "Wall Street Journal" saying that Afghans for centuries have been governed loosely through a social compact between all the ethnic groups under a sovereign king.

And that -- so again how do you envision making progress to transitioning to local security forces and to what extent must those forces be directly accountable to Kabul and to what extent can they be local?

GATES:

The balance that we have to strike and we -- we do -- I have believed ever since I got this job that we have been too focused on the central government in Kabul and not enough on the provinces and the districts and -- and -- and the tribes.

The key here is community security organizations that -- that are willing to work with the government in Kabul and that do not become the militias for warlords. The balance we're trying to strike and what General McChrystal cares about a lot as does everybody else is how do we encourage these local policing functions.

Some of the -- some of the efforts that I've seen in Wardak Province where they recruit locals and the tribal elders are telling me that the roads that have been closed by the Taliban for years have been reopened by these local groups, but they are within the framework of the provincial governor and the district leadership so that they are not operating independently working for warlords.

So figuring out how to encourage that kind of activity and build on it but keep it within the frame work of people who are in governing positions and not just independent warlords is the key to that effort. But that kind of sub-national, sub-provincial effort I think ultimately will play an important role in all of this.

SESSIONS:

Of course the National Guards in -- every state had a National Guard is to -- the governors still appoint the commanders of those National Guards in America. And they -- I think there is a sense of loyalty and fierce commitment to local areas in nations like Afghanistan that we may not be fully respecting. I -- I think you're on the right track with that thought.

One of the generals who I met in the Pentagon recently had a picture of one of the local officials on his wall and he was very impressed with it. A very strong leader and was doing good work. I'm not sure that how well he would perform if he thought that everything had to be run through the national government.

GATES:

I would just -- I would just add, Senator, I think that one of the key's here is you know in a country that is as rural and as tribal as Afghanistan, I think one of the challenges in recruiting people for the army and the police is getting them to leave their local area.

And that's why I think these local security activities if we can if we can work with the Afghans to keep them within a governance model have such promise because these -- these guys are basically protecting their own turf.

SESSIONS:

I couldn't agree more. And they can be paid what for them would be a good way but far less then it would cost to have an American soldier there. Mr. Secretary, I regret to have to raise the problem with the tanker competition. I noticed that Northrop Grumman team has announced a concern so great that they are announcing they may pull out from the competition.

A number of serious changes were made in the RFP. Each one of those tilted against a transformational aircraft, tilted against a larger aircraft, an aircraft that could provide more cargo capacity and more other capabilities. And the initial RFP was received very -- with great concern by the Northrop team.

And well they could because it's quite different from the original RFP, there's no doubt about that and all the changes tilted in the way I've mentioned. So I guess my question briefly to you is, do you believe that competition is important in this aircraft for the Defense Department and the Warfighter?

And number two, will you consider discussing some of these matters and be open to changing an RFP if it's not a fair and does not do the job that you need for the Defense Department? Or has a final decision been made to make absolutely no changes in this entire process of discussion as produced no alteration in the -- in the -- what the tentative RFP that's out there?

GATES:

We promised a fair and highly transparent process. We believed that the RFP is even handed. We are in a comment period and we have received a lot of comments both from the competitors and from the Congress and others. The comment period is coming to a close.

If -- if we were totally locked in to not changing anything we wouldn't have gone through the comment period. So we will look at the comments that have been made and make a judgment at that point. We believe that both of the principal competitors are highly qualified and we would like to see competition continue in this process.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Bill Nelson?

BILL NELSON:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your public service, for your continued public service. During the '70s and the '80s I had the privilege of serving with Congressman Charlie Wilson in the House of Representatives.

And Mr. Secretary, I am -- I am so happy to see in your statement and I quote you, "We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989 when we abandon the country only to see it descend into civil war and then into Taliban hands." And it was Charlie Wilson at that time who singly had been in large part responsible for us getting in in the first place that fought us getting out. So thank you for stating the United States policy as strongly as you have.

Now, I'm going to ask you and Secretary Clinton a couple of questions that I think for the long term, other than the policy that was announced last night by the president with regard to the military activities, for the long term we've got to integrate the military with the other agencies of government to help stabilize the country.

BILL NELSON:

For example, the Congress has provided our commanders in the field with the Commander's Emergency Response Funds or CERF funds. To quickly initiate reconstruction projects and provide immediate assistance to the Afghan communities after they've actually finished their combat.

But we don't seem to have done a great job in how do you move from the post conflict reconstruction projects often overseen by the military to the long term development projects overseen by civilians.

And so I wish you all would address, how our Defense and State working together to make that transition for the long term in Afghanistan more seamless. And then Secretary Clinton, the State Department has undertaken a major review of U.S. assistance programs including the agricultural assistance, particularly with regard to malnutrition as well as alternate livelihoods to growing the poppies.

The U.S. has tended to favor large development contracts using third-country nationals instead of investing in the Afghans themselves, the grassroots efforts that employ Afghans and therefore providing them with the skills and assist in getting their crops to market. So if you would share with the committee about your review of the agricultural assistance and how we're going to work to make it more effective as you and defense work together, please.

GATES:

Well, first I would say that it is -- this situation in Afghanistan has been, shall we say, personally of interest to me having worked with Charlie Wilson back in the 1980s and -- which was always an interesting experience.

I think one of the problem -- first of all, the specific answer to your question is Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal are, as we speak, working on their joint civil-military campaign plan, which I think will establish the basis for the kind of transition that you're talking about.

But I -- but I would tell you one of the obstacles, at least in my opinion from observing, is that the Department of State does not have the kind of flexibility in the way that it spends money and the ability to do so quickly and make commitments quickly and have agility because of the number of restrictions and processes that they have to go through, with respect to their funds.

And frankly, I think one of the things that the CERP funds, we learned both in Iraq and Afghanistan, is that that kind of flexibility and agility has been a huge asset for the United States in both places.

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Nelson, let me start by saying that it's been a real privilege working with Secretary Gates and the Defense Department in trying to figure out how to have a more integrated civilian-military strategy.

Secretary Gates has been one of the best advocates that the State Department and USAID have for increasing our funding, our personnel, our flexibility and agility so that we do have the resources and capacity to be quickly responsive.

What we have done in the last 10 months is, number one, to investigate very thoroughly what was on the ground in Afghanistan and we didn't particularly come away impressed. As I said in my testimony, there were a little over 300 civilians. Many of them were on six month rotations. You looked at their in-country time. A lot of them spent time out of the country. They did not have well-defined missions.

Most of our civilian aid going into Afghanistan had been contracted out without adequate oversight or accountability. We stopped all contracts going into Afghanistan. We began doing a complete scrub of them. I'm not saying that we have yet perfected our oversight, but we have been working very hard to improve it dramatically.

We are strongly supporting the special inspector general. We would actually like to learn from the mistakes that are being made in a timely way, rather than waiting as we did in Iraq and being told that we've wasted tens of billions of dollars, which is just, you know, unacceptable.

We also began to recruit civilians who were well-suited for the jobs we needed. There was a tendency in the past, for both Iraq and Afghanistan, to basically tell Foreign Service officers, civil service officers in both state and USAID that, if they went and spent their six months in one of those two places they would have an advantage in getting the next best assignment.

So if you wanted to end up in Paris you'd go to Baghdad for six months whether your particular expertise and experience was needed or not. So we have painstakingly, under the leadership of Deputy Secretary Jack Lew, actually matched each individual to the job that was required.

And we will triple the numbers that we have on the ground by early January. We've also required all of our civilians to train at Camp Atterbury in Indiana, where our military PRT members train, so that we can from the very beginning start integrating our civilian- military forces.

I think that we're learning a lot of lessons as we go, but you put your finger on one of our biggest problems. The CERP funds that are accessible to our military forces, both in and immediately after combat operations, are a tremendous tool for doing projects, for winning allegiance. It's even being used, as it was in Iraq, for enticing people off the battlefield, as you know.

There's nothing comparable on the civilian side. I mean, we have to requisition money. We have to wait. I mean, you know, a young captain can access CERP funds in a matter of hours. An experienced agricultural specialist, a rule of law specialist has to wait weeks if not months to get a project approved.

So if we're going to be successful and if we're going to frankly be the kind of partners that our military needs, we have to have more tools. We're getting more resources, but the budget situation is going to be very tight, as everybody knows. And whether our civilian personnel will have the resources they need to be the partners they are required is going to be challenging.

So we will come with a very specific set of asks, but your question really goes to the heart of what we are trying to achieve. And the final point I would make is that, you know, we have civilians in the State Department and from USAID serving all over the world in very dangerous settings.

You know, they are in war conflict areas like Eastern Congo without any security support. But when we have our troops on the ground, as we do in Iraq or in Afghanistan, we try to take even additional measures to make sure that our people can get around.

But as Senator McCain said it's very difficult because of the security situation, so what we are doing is partnering more by embedding our civilians with our troops. That carries a mixed message, as you might guess, because we're trying to have a civilian face on it, but we have to have enough security to function, so this is a highly complex assessment.

We send individuals on the civilian side, the Defense Department sends units, battalions, brigades and so we are trying to do something that's never been done before and we need the advice, the help, the resources that are required.

BILL NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since we have to be successful at the end of this trial time, we'll look forward to that appropriation request, Madam Secretary, and see if we can act expeditiously on it. Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Chambliss?

CHAMBLISS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairmen, and thanks to all three of you for your leadership at this very critical time in the history of the world, not just our country.

Secretary Gates, I thought the president did a good job last night of laying out the scenario as well as the way forward. However, having just heard your opening statement, I thought you were much stronger, even much more powerful.

And I hope that you will carry the message you brought to this committee to our friends in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan because, as you said, the perception among the Paks has got to be that we're going to be there. The perception among the Afghans has got to be that we're going to stay there for the long term.

Otherwise, as one of the Taliban commented in the Afghan press when I was over there last week over Thanksgiving, that if the president comes out and says that in 2013 the United States is out of here, then we're going to sit back and just wait until 2013.

We all know that's the case so you're exactly right and I do truly hope that you will take that message to our folks in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan at the leadership level.

Admiral Mullen, you made a comment that I want to drill down on for just a second. You said you -- we will know by mid-'11 if we're going to be successful.

Now let's assume that we are being successful, that General Clark is doing well down in RC-South, that General Scaparotti is doing well in RC-East moving against Hakani, that the Paks are stepping up in a greater fashion and helping us out.

What does this mean with the president having said that we're going to start bringing our troops home in 18 months? But if we are successful, what does that mean with respect to the bringing home of troops?

MULLEN:

Senator Chambliss, you actually -- you -- you I think very accurately captured the overall situation.

The Paks have started to move. We've got a new government, new -- a newly elected president in Afghanistan. We've got great commanders on the ground in our leadership. We've got an increased level of supports, not just in terms of numbers but really support from our NATO allies. And we -- and we have a very unpopular insurgency with respect to the Afghan people.

So I think there are great opportunities here over the next 18 to 24 months and that one of the reasons it's so important to turn this to get these troops there, is to, as I've said before, turn this insurgency around. And General McChrystal believes, General Petraeus believe, I believe, we can do that over the course of the next 18 to 24 months.

That will then provide an opportunity to get at the kind of transition as far as security responsibility and thinning of our forces, if you will, to start that.

It's very difficult to know exactly what the conditions are -- will be, but they will be -- if we get this right, they'll be a lot better in the east and a lot better in the south and -- and provide us an opportunity to do that which is why -- and to the -- on the other side, if we are unable to do that by then, I think we have to reassess our strategy.

CHAMBLISS:

So what I'm hearing is that there is flexibility in that timeline based upon success or lack thereof.

MULLEN:

I think the timeline is clear. I think the flexibility is in where we transition, where we turn over responsibility, and this is something we all understand and that we think we'll be able to do that. It's a little difficult to predict exactly where that's going to occur right now.

CHAMBLISS:

All right.

GATES:

Senator, if I might just add...

CHAMBLISS:

Sure.

GATES:

... because I appreciated your comments about the longer term. Now, what I'm about to state is just my opinion because frankly this wasn't a part of our dialogue over the past two or three months or not a significant part of it.

But in my mind, I think that particularly if the Afghans want us to, we need to think in terms of a -- of a very long-term willingness to work with the Afghans in terms of military training, in terms of equipping, the kind of long term partnership we have with many countries around the world, where we have a certain military presence in that country.

But it's not a combat presence. It's -- it's a training and equipping and -- and that kind of a role, but one where we are clearly seen as their continuing partner. That would be my personal opinion of -- of how I would see this unfolding long term after our combat forces are principally gone from Afghanistan.

CHAMBLISS:

And I appreciate that and -- and my worry is though that the headline in the Islamabad Press today is that president sending 30,000 troops. They're coming out in 18 months. So that's why I think it's important you carry your message, and all of you, the message of exactly what we mean by that 18 months.

Secretary Clinton, I have not always been a fan of the -- of the work that USAID has done but I've been in Afghanistan, not just last Thursday but about six months ago also, and had the opportunity to visit with your folks.

And I will have to say that they are doing an amazing job over there with respect to educating children. We've gone from 900,000 to 6 million. We've still got another 6 million to go, but it's because of, in my opinion, of what AID has done and with the security that's being given by the military that we are seeing those children educated which for the long term I think is the biggest issue that we've got.

Now you are -- I told your folks that while we're surging troops and we assumed the other day that we knew what the president might say, and he did, but there -- there also needed to be a surge on the civilian side. And you have indicated that you're plussing up those folks. Same thing they told us the other day.

But I worry about what's going to happen in 18 months because security in Afghanistan has got to be the way forward, not just for -- from the military standpoint but your folks on the ground. The State Department civilians have got to have security in order to be able to improve the lives of the Afghans.

So I'd just like your comment on whether or not you think the levels you're talking about enough? Are you going to ask for more resources, for more people? Where do you see the way forward?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator, thank you for those very kind words which are so well-deserved by our people on the ground in Afghanistan and elsewhere. They -- they are really responding to the mission and -- and working extremely hard but, of course, they have to do so within a secure environment.

You know, our -- our civilians are out around the country. They are also, of course, in Kabul working with government ministries. USAID is certifying ministries so we can determine which ones are accountable and transparent enough to receive additional funds from us. So they are truly working at all levels of the Afghan government and in many different sectors of society.

But security is a key element as to whether than can be effective. Now, a lot of our civilian workers are, you know, they're veterans of other very difficult security environments. They are willing to go places that a lot of folks are not and I give them great credit for that.

And I think we just have to come to you with our best estimate as to what it will be -- what will be required to have the kind of civilian surge you just referred to because as we put additional troops in, we want to have more civilians embedded with them. We want to have them right there on the ground when combat is over, to begin the building process in partnering with their civilian counterparts.

So we are tripling the number that we found when we got there, and we're changing their mission and requiring much more of them, but the numbers are going to have to grow if we expect to deliver on what is required.

CHAMBLISS:

You've got an amazing P.R. team down in Leskerge (ph) doing great work.

CLINTON:

Thank you.

LEVIN:



Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Ben Nelson?

BEN NELSON:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me add my appreciation to the three of you for your continuing service as well. I've been a longtime advocate for benchmarks or measurements to develop in the conduct of our -- our missions so we can measure progress and continue to be objective in gauging the efforts in Afghanistan-Pakistan. I know this administration is committed -- our allies are -- are committed to proffering these objective benchmarks.

Are -- are we in the process of developing new benchmarks in connection with the new mission so that we can determine whether we're 25 percent towards -- successful towards achieving certain goals, 50 percent, or a lot more needs to be done?

And then, if we are in the process of doing that, will we be in a position to change the benchmarks as things develop on the ground? I guess I'd start with you, Secretary Gates.

GATES:

The answer is yes, and I mentioned earlier that we -- the president has made it clear that there will be another thorough-going review in a year, in December of 2010, but we have developed some clear benchmarks in terms of not only the security arena but -- but in terms of Afghan forces' recruitment, retention, fielding, partnering and so on.

And the president's made it pretty clear, and I think mentioned to the congressional leadership yesterday, that he is expecting to get monthly reports on how we're doing against these, but we also have some -- have benchmarks on the civilian side as well.

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Nelson, our civilian, military and intelligence agencies have all developed a range of benchmarks, and they're in a constant process of being refined. And as Secretary Gates said, we're going to be looking to report on those going forward.

The military has their own benchmarks, but as Admiral Mullen referenced, we have taken a much closer look at districts, who controls what, what the capacity of governance is, whether there's a shadow government, how much of national sovereignty can be asserted. So we're looking at those kinds of yardsticks of measurement on the military side.

On the civilian side, a lot of it depends upon our assessment of where we're starting. As Senator Chambliss said, when President Karzai took office there were a little less than a million students in school and they were virtually all boys. Now there are 7 million, and about 40 percent are -- are girls. But there are 5 million to 6 million yet to go, so that's a very clear benchmark.

In the agricultural area, we've already rehabilitated irrigation canals. We've worked closely with the agricultural ministry. We helped them, as did other international donors with whom we coordinate, to

provide heartier seeds so that they had a bumper wheat crop. They just had their first big shipment of apples and pomegranates to India. We are supporting their acquisition of better fertilizer and farm equipment.

So again, there are measurable benchmarks. How much is the agricultural economy improving? How many people are employed? What is the relationship to a lower poppy crop and a higher licit kind of list of crops? And we are working with the governance and rule of law challenges as well.

So in each of these areas we have realistic expectations. We are trying to have good measurements, and we will be carefully following that to see what kind of progress we're making.

BEN NELSON:

Well, I appreciate that. I think that is critically important to not only determining how we're doing, but also I think in keeping the support of the American people in -- in seeing that progress is in fact being made and where it isn't, that a plan is now in place to try to change the direction.

And in that connection, do we have any specific ideas about how to assist President Karzai in rooting out, if we can assist -- be of assistance in that, rooting out the corruption within the government? It's one thing to tell him that that's what needs to be done. It's another thing to expect it to be done, and can we be of assistance, which I think probably will assure us of some success?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Nelson, we have made a number of requests of the Karzai government. Obviously, who is put into the cabinet, who are named as governors who hold other responsible positions, is key to everything that happens going forward.

We have focused our efforts in four areas, first, to enhance law enforcement cooperation. When I talk about the civilian work that is being done, I don't want just to talk about the State Department and USAID.

We have a lot of very experienced officials from DEA, from FBI, from the Department of Justice, as well as places like the Agriculture Department, et cetera, and we are enhancing intelligence sharing and cooperation on corruption and major crime.

We are certifying Afghan ministries, and there are some that we believe are -- are functioning well enough now that we can, with confidence, provide funding, holding their leadership accountable, and others that we're not going to touch. We're not -- you know, until they're cleaned out, they're not getting any United States civilian assistance.

Third, we do want to strengthen the special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction. We are asking for additional resources on the ground with auditors because we want real-time reports.

And fourth, we are supporting the Major Crimes Task Force and other Afghan anti-corruption efforts. The Major Crimes Task Force is a vetted Afghan unit supported by U.S. and British law enforcement officials. It's focusing on corruption as part of its mandate. It's recently charged several Afghan officials, and others are under investigation.

So ultimately, it's up to the Afghans to end corruption, and we have an expectation of that, but we have no illusions that this is going to happen easily or quickly. But we know how important it is to be working to try to root it out.

GATES:

I would just add, Senator, that -- I mean, I think we have to be honest with ourselves that the massive influx of money into Afghanistan that is being -- that comes from ourselves and our international partners is -- is a -- a huge factor in this -- or a significant factor. And as Secretary Clinton has suggested, I think we need to go back and look at how we are disbursing -- dispensing money and how we are doing contracting and so on. I -- a subject I know is near and dear to Senator McCaskill's heart.

But how -- how can we leverage the areas where we're writing the checks into minimizing the opportunities for that money being siphoned off on its way to the purpose we intend?

CLINTON:

Senator Nelson, if I could just add because Secretary Gates raised an issue that is connected with this, and that is our contracting processes, something Senator McCaskill is focused on. If you think about the long supply chain lines that we have getting into Afghanistan when our equipment, our food, everything that our troops use, our civilians depend on, largely comes from the outside.

When a ship docks at Karachi and the -- the goods get loaded onto trucks, and then the trucks start that long trip through Pakistan up into Afghanistan, I mean it's a very difficult environment to operate in.

And there's a lot of evidence that in addition to funding from the Gulf and the illegal narcotics trade that siphoning off contractual money from the international community and the -- in terms of just outright fraud and corruption but also intimidation and extortion, is a major source of funding for the Taliban.

So you know, we just have to be honest here about how complex and difficult this problem is and how, frankly, it is not all an Afghan problem so...

BEN NELSON:

Well, thank you. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN:

Thank you Senator Nelson.

Senator Graham?

GRAHAM:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Excuse me, thank you all for coming. I know it's been a difficult process you've been involved in. As you were debating what to do, did all of you realize this is the last best chance America has to get it right in Afghanistan?

CLINTON:

Yes, sir.

MULLEN:

Yes, sir.

GRAHAM:

OK. Politically, militarily, otherwise, now...

CLINTON:

And we also realized how sad it was that we were trying to make that decision eight years later.

GRAHAM:

Yes, ma'am, and it is sad.

CLINTON:

It is.

GRAHAM:

It would have been sad to have lost in Iraq. It would have been devastating.

CLINTON:

Well, we'll talk about that offline sometime.

GRAHAM:

There you go. But we're talking about the future now. We're talking about winning I hope. Rank consequences of a failed state in Afghanistan to our national security interest, one being inconsequential, 10 being grave. Where would you put a failed state in Afghanistan in terms of our national security interest, Secretary Clinton?

CLINTON:

Well Secretary Graham, I would put it at a 10. I think a failed state that is totally lawless, that is a safe haven for terrorist, particularly the syndicate of terrorism headed by al-Qaida poses a direct threat to the security of that United States of America.

GRAHAM:

Think that's a very -- do both of you agree with that? OK, I think that is a good evaluation as to those who criticize the president. I think all three of them are right. He did this because he realized it was a 10, too, I hope, and I'm sure he did.

The July 11th withdrawal statement, Mr. Secretary Gates, who is the audience for that statement?

GATES:

I think that there are at least two audiences -- two principal audiences. One audience -- and -- and a very important one -- is the Afghan government that -- that they must accept responsibility in terms of their own governments, in terms of their own security forces, in terms of accepting their responsibility and understanding that and taking ownership of this conflict on their own soil. That it's not just going to be fought by foreigners on their behalf.

I think the other audience, frankly, is the American people who are weary of eight years -- after eight years of war, and to let them know this isn't going to go on for another 10 years.

GRAHAM:

But there're other people listening and I guess that's my problem because I can understand the frustration of the American people. We've been here eight years and it seems to be that it's not working out the way we would all hope.

And I can understand that but I can't understand letting Afghanistan go back into the abyss again. That's my dilemma. On December the 10th -- or December 2010 you will begin to evaluate Afghanistan anew. Is that correct -- our progress?

GATES:

Well we're going to have a continuing process but there will be a full scale reevaluation of where we stand in December, yes.

GRAHAM:

My question is, will the decision -- will the evaluation decision be how fast we withdraw or whether or not we should withdraw?

GATES:

I think it will be principally about whether the strategy that we put in place is working.

GRAHAM:

Is it possible in December 2010 to reach the conclusion it is not wise to withdraw anyone in July of 2011, is that possible?

GATES:

I think the president as commander-in-chief always has the option to adjust his decision.

GRAHAM:

So it is not locked in that we're going to be withdrawing troops in July 2011? We're going to look throughout the process, particularly in December 2010, and make a decision then as to whether we should withdraw at a certain pace or not withdraw at all. Is that correct?

GATES:

I guess the way I would phrase it is that it is -- it is our plan to begin this transition process in July of 2011 if circumstances dictate in December I think, as I say, the president always has the -- the freedom to adjust his decisions.

GRAHAM:

OK. Admiral Mullen, is it your understanding that it's possible in December 2010 not to begin to withdraw in 2011?

MULLEN:

Well I'd -- I'd reiterate the president has choices as the president...

GRAHAM:

So his statement last night did not bind him to start withdrawing in 2011? That's the understanding of this panel?

GATES:

I would say to refer Secretary Clinton I think it was a clear statement of his strong intent.

MULLEN:

Yes.

GRAHAM:

Right, and -- and I understand why he'd want to let the American people know that we're not going to be there forever, but this is a critically important event. I think -- I think that the success of this operation depends on will and resolve.

And I just don't want the July 2011 statement to be seen by our enemy which is not one of the audiences you mentioned, which I think are listening, that we have somehow locked ourselves into leaving.

The question is have we locked ourselves into leaving -- Secretary Clinton -- in July 2011?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Graham, I do not believe we have locked ourselves into leaving but what we have done, and I think it was an appropriate position for the president to take -- is to signal very clearly to all audiences that the United States is not interested in occupying Afghanistan. We are not interested in running their country, building their nation. We are trying to give them the space and time to be able to build up sufficient forces to defend themselves.

It is the best assessment of our military experts, as evidenced by Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, General Petraeus, General McChrystal and others, that by 20 -- by July 2011 there can be the beginning of a responsible transition that will of course be based on conditions.

Here's what the president said, "That allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011. We will execute this transition responsibly taking into account conditions on the ground."

And to me that is exactly the appropriate approach for the president to take. And as Secretary Gates has said, his authority and his responsibility as commander-in-chief require him to be constantly assessing, which he will do.

GRAHAM:

Well, thank you. My time is up but I would just like to remind everyone there is another audience that wasn't mentioned by Secretary Gates. It's the enemy. They have a vote in this war. They are a participant in it.

And finally the last question, if you could, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would you grade NATO in terms of their effectiveness as a fighting force over the last several years?

GATES:

I think that it -- I think that it varies from country to country, Senator.

GRAHAM:

Thank -- I'm sorry.

MULLEN:

And I -- Senator, I mean they have -- they have bled and died...

(CROSSTALK)

GRAHAM:

And I know they have, but give them an A to an F, NATO as an effective fighting force, an A to an F, not just part of it, all of it.

GATES:

Senator, in all honesty, I don't think any good purpose is served by doing that. I would say that those of us -- those who have been fighting with us in the South, the Australians, the British, the Dutch, the Danes, the Canadians, the Poles, I'd give them all an A.

GRAHAM:

Great.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Webb?

WEBB:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me -- let me begin by, again, communicating my respect for all three of you for the service that you have given our country and for the good of our country in a lot of different ways, and for the process that this administration has gone through with you and others, such as General Jones, in terms of trying to work out -- you may call it the best possible formula. Perhaps it's the most realistic in your view. There's not a lot of good in the options that are available in this part of the world.

There's been a lot of time spent on the notion of the dates that were mentioned in the president's speech. I would prefer to focus, as -- as I have in the past, on the conditions that might bring about an endpoint to our involvement. I would like to see an endpoint.



And this is something that you can expect to hear more from -- from our perspective on, over the coming months, what exactly is going to bring about the conditions under which we can end our involvement.

There's also been a good bit of discussion about the nature of the Karzai government and issues such as corruption. I would like to defer a dialogue on that until tomorrow. I'm on the Foreign Relations Committee, but I would like to address this tomorrow.

I think perhaps we may reach a point where we might encourage the Afghans to examine their constitution that was arrived at, at the Bonn conference in '01, to try to enable greater devolution of this government so you can get into issues such as local authority and corruption at a local level.

Where I really would like to spend my time today is how we're separating out who actually should be confronted as an enemy on the battlefield. As all of you know the defining characteristic, throughout the history of Afghanistan, has been its resistance to foreign influence and particularly foreign occupation, and I would say very successful resistance.

And when we talk about the Taliban, we're -- we're talking about terms that we use interchangeably, but which aren't particularly interchangeable. We have a pretty vicious government which we assisted in getting rid of.

We have an ideologically charged group right now that operates principally in Pakistan, which is associated with the forces of international terrorism.

And then we have a third group which many believe is the group that is growing with the greatest speed who, from the perspective of many Afghans, is ideological only in the sense that it resents our presence and is not viewed as a terrorist organization specifically or even aligned with terrorist organizations.

It's viewed by many in Afghanistan as a popular movement who doesn't particularly like a central government and whose size can actually be elevated, its recruitment process can be increased, by the wrong application of American force.

And in that respect, rather than being an element that is aligned with international terrorism, it is viewed by many Afghans as a -- something of a region militia that doesn't particularly want to threaten the United States' interests outside of Afghanistan.

And I would like to hear from you and I will start -- Admiral Mullen, perhaps you can start this, but anyone who wants to contribute. How will these distinctions, in terms of history and in terms of participation, made as you developed the policy that was now announced?

MULLEN:

A very tired people of war, the citizens of Afghanistan, and very much waiting on the fence to see which way this is going to go. All the information I've gotten, both personally when I've been there as well as from the commanders on the ground, indicate not only are they tired, they're not very supportive -- not supportive at all of the Taliban, very small percentage.

And -- and I'm talking about the -- the last group more specifically. We believe there's an awful -- there's a large percentage of that group which can be reconciled and reintegrated with the right

approach. The other thing, in a larger sense that I've watched over the last couple of years, which is of growing concern, is the collaboration of these -- of the Taliban.

And I -- I got that they have -- they can have somewhat ideologically different perspectives, but they have come together in ways that actually are hugely concerning to me on both sides of...

WEBB:

Well, let me -- since -- Admiral, since my -- my time is running out, I want to seize on something you just said because I think it's a very important clarification that you can make here.

If those are people who can be brought over...

MULLEN:

Right.

WEBB:

... to our view and if we're having trouble recruiting in the national army which we seem to be, while the size of this element seems to be growing, how are you making the distinction in terms of operational policy that would give them reason to change their affiliation?

MULLEN:

I -- I -- I actually I think it's if I understand your question correctly is really done through direct engagement at the local level. And we've seen very recently numbers of them say, you know, I don't want to do this anymore.

But we've got to have -- as you think you understand as well, or better than anybody, we've got to have a secure environment in which they can do this and we that don't have that in many places. So General McChrystal's actually very optimistic with -- and -- and others -- very optimistic with respect to doing this but we can't do it without a level of security we just don't have in many of these places.

WEBB:

So you do have an optimism that over time these are people who...

MULLEN:

Yes, I -- I do.

WEBB:

... despite the characterization that we presently use can be convinced to affiliate with the...

MULLEN:

I think they can.

WEBB:

... national army?

MULLEN:

I mean in -- in the end I think the only way that we're not going to occupy them is to not occupy them. I mean that's -- that is a challenge that we are going to, you know, over time -- I mean we're committed to not doing that. The president spoke to that last night.

But that's a message obviously we have to deliver, in fact, not just -- not just speaking to it and to give them responsibility for their own security and there's a big part of their strategy that focuses locally.

Secretary talked about it early to not turn it back into warlordism and that's a very delicate balance. But the commanders on the ground that I've engaged with are comfortable that -- that this is -- this is very possible.

LEVIN:

Thank you.

WEBB:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Thune?

THUNE:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Clinton welcome back to the committee. Secretary Gates and Admiral, thank you very much for your service. I think there's been already some discussion about the Afghan police, Afghan security forces at least in terms of the numbers.

I'm interested in knowing how analogous the situation there with the training and equipping of the Afghan security and police forces to Iraq? And just in terms of their capacity to take over battle space and how that fits in with the timeline that you have laid out?

What made the Iraq surge, I think, so effective, the counter-insurgency strategy there was that the Iraqi security forces eventually were able to step up and provide security for the population, and do you see parallels there and how quickly might we expect that capacity and capability to grow?

MULLEN:

I think Senator it's very much tied to the momentum piece which is going against us right now. And that turning this momentum around in a positive way makes a lot of things possible, including improved retention, improved recruiting and reduced attrition and a much ANSF. That's why the security piece and the momentum piece is so critical.

There are many analogies, I think, that are comparable between both Iraq and Afghanistan. Very concerned about creating mid-grade leaders on, you know, junior leaders as well as officer leaders on both the ANA and ANP. That was a significant challenge in Iraq more so on the police side than on the army side.

Again, the same was true in Iraq. In fact it was really late '07 before the police in Iraq really started to step out and -- and the leadership was there. And I think we have to be -- we have to be careful with comparisons.

This is a force that's a -- certainly on the Army side, you know, they've been in the fight. They've been in a fight a long time. They're good warriors. They have taken to this partnership approach that General McChrystal has -- has put in place. So I think there's a lot of potential there.

There are similarities and there are differences and we're trying to take advantage of those lessons to -- to -- to integrate those into an accelerated a training and equipping plan right now for them.

THUNE:

Let me ask -- the president last night said that, "We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who abandon violence." General Petraeus has previously indicated that we lacked the nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the Taliban to identify and distinguish between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements of the Taliban.

And I guess my question is how do we go about reliably identifying the reconcilable elements of the Taliban?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator, there are several efforts already under way to answer the questions that General Petraeus and others have posed. As you might know, General McChrystal has asked General Lamb, a retired British general who was instrumental in the work that was done in Iraq to come to Afghanistan to advise him.

The Afghans themselves led by President Karzai have a pretty good idea of who they think can, if persuaded, be reintegrated. But this is a very much a case by case effort. And there are certain aspects of it that we are very insistent on.

One, that they have to renounce any ties to al-Qaida and they have to renounce violence and they have to be willing to reintegrate into Afghan society in a peaceful way. We know that some of the Taliban will not renounce al-Qaida. They are too closely interconnected.

We know that others who call themselves Taliban want to have a continuing means of, you know, acting in a military capacity. And we want them, you know, to have to give up their commitment to violence and maybe join the army if that's appropriate, to join one of the community defense initiatives.

But this is very painstaking work and we have very high expectations for who we would support reintegrating.

GATES:

Let me just -- let me just add to that. I think that here again there maybe some -- some parallels with Iraq. First of all, I think reintegration, particularly at the front end, is going to be retail not wholesale.

And -- and it is going to -- we will end up as we did in Iraq turning to local leaders that we have confidence in who will in turn then vouch for these people. And -- and who will essentially pledge their community to the reliability of -- of these people that are willing to come away from the Taliban.

A second point, we think that there's a fair percentage of the foot soldiers in the Taliban that basically do this for pay. And -- and so creating economic opportunities as an alternative in order to support their families is another vehicle for this.

And finally to the Admiral's point, security is essential. Somebody who -- I mean there are too many examples of people who have tried to leave the Taliban and themselves and all of their family been killed.

And so until -- in retaliation -- and so until we can provide a secure environment at the local level that -- that gives them some confidence they will not be retaliated against, it will be a problem.

THUNE:

My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you very much, Senator Thune.

Senator McCaskill?

MCCASKILL:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to echo some of the comments of some of my colleagues that I think the president is very fortunate to have the three of you and our country is even more fortunate. I appreciate your service and I appreciate how hard you have worked at coming up with the best answer among the list of very bad choices.

It won't surprise you that I want to talk a little bit about contracting. I will tell you that we've made progress. When I joined this committee in 2007, no one could tell us how many contractors were in Iraq. There wasn't even a number available. We have made progress.

Now, I want to talk a little bit today if I have time about SPOT, the database that we put in place to try to track contractors and the problems that are arising about a -- a lack of consistency between State, USAID and DOD on how they're utilizing this database and how much we can rely on the numbers.

But to the extent that we can rely on the numbers, we know we have around, as of June, we have approximately 75,000 contractors in Afghanistan and 5,200 private security contractors in Afghanistan.

And the interesting thing, one of the stark differences between the contracting force in Afghanistan and that in Iraq is the predominance of Afghans in our contracting force. Fifty-thousand plus of the contractors are Afghans and 5,000 of the 5,200 private security contractors are Afghans.

It's not clear to me whether this has been purposeful or situational, and I would -- if briefly you -- any of you could address whether or not this is purposeful or situational?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator, I share the experience you just described because in February, when I asked to see a list of all the contracts in Afghanistan, at that time we couldn't produce such a list and so we have been trying to not only get a handle on the contracts but try to persuade contractors to employ more Afghans, so I think it's probably both.

I think it is to some extent a message but it's also just the reality of who is there and what the mission requires. Clearly, what we're trying to do is review every single contract. We stopped every one until we had a better idea of what they were for, who they went to.

We're trying to -- to assert more State Department, USAID oversight and that's why we asked Ambassador Tony Wayne to go to Afghanistan to run the civilian side and we have to do a better job coordinating with not just our friends at DOD but all the other government agencies. So we really welcome your efforts and we want to be as cooperative as we can.

MCCASKILL:

Let's talk a little bit about LOGCAP 4. Good news, we competed it. Good news, we ended up with three different companies that are eligible for contracts under LOGCAP 4.

Not as good of news -- I think, I understand the reality of why this probably occurred -- we have now instead of one monopoly on logistical support for our troops, we now have two monopolies in that we have given the contracts on a regional basis as opposed to a task basis.

Fluor has gotten the north, DynCorp has gotten the south, and they are not task competing. They have, in fact, been selected -- it's my understanding from the research we've done -- to, in fact, do everything in those regions.

I understand the efficiencies you get by doing that but what it really brings up, again, is the incredible importance of monitoring and oversight, because when you have one company doing all the work even though it's not the whole contingency operation, it is certainly -- it is within the north and the south.

And what I was worried about is there was testimony this summer that we had 600 oversight positions vacant in Iraq and Afghanistan. I -- it wasn't clear from the testimony that was given at the time how many of those positions were in Afghanistan, but are we plussed up to where we need to be with oversight and monitoring of these logistical contracts that cost us way more than they ever should have cost us in Iraq?

GATES:

Well, as is often the case with these things, you're probably better informed than we are, but -- but what I will tell you is I can almost certainly tell you we do not have as many contract monitors in Afghanistan as we want.

And one of the things that I have mentioned both at the White House and -- and within the Department of Defense as we talk about 30,000 troops and so on is let's not forget about contract monitors, logistical experts and so on to make sure that we're doing this right.

And so what I would like to do, Senator, is -- is take your question for the record and we'll get back to you on the vacancy -- the number of vacancies we have for contract monitors in Afghanistan.

MCCASKILL:

That would be great.

MULLEN:

Senator, if I could -- if I could only add one thing and this goes back to your first question. When I've in particular asked this question in RC-East of General Scaparotti and his people a few months ago with respect to the -- the -- who gets the contracts, it was a very specific effort there to hire Afghans first and -- and that, I think, is represented in the numbers that you're talking about which to me makes all the sense in the world.

You've got to obviously have somebody qualified but to be able to put that kind of income into that country is -- is really critical.

CLINTON:

Senator, could I just add one other consideration that I -- I wish we could take into account? There is an inherent tension between more monitoring, more auditing, more contract oversight and the kind of flexibility and agility that we were talking about with Senator Bill Nelson's question.

We have to figure out how to manage risk without being adverse to risk. We have to give our people in the field, and I'm talking just on the civilian side right now, enough discretion to be able to make

smart decisions and yes, maybe even make some mistakes because they might have made an investment where it didn't pay off but it, you know, was worth trying.

So it -- it's complicated and we want to account for every single penny but we also want to be sure we have enough flexibility to be smart as we try to do the job we've been given. So I don't know what the answer to that is but I'd ask for your consideration as we move forward so we strike the right balance.

MCCASKILL:

I think -- I understand that tension, and it is a real tension. I think, unfortunately, the lesson learned in Iraq was that there wasn't enough of that tension. It was all about we need it today. We need it tomorrow. We don't care what it costs, get it here.

And so finding that balance is what we're talking about here. That's why the data being input correctly and why the oversight personnel is so important because if we don't have those, we never create that tension.

And that's my concern and particularly -- my time's up and I don't have time to go into CERP -- but I do think we need to take a hard look at CERP and whether it has morphed into something other than what it was intended to be. Whether we're doing too many big projects, are we monitoring or are we just obligating?

And I know we've done about \$1.6 billion in CERP in Afghanistan since 2004, I think we need to continue to look at that CERP and I will -- I'll do some questions for the record on the CERP funds since I don't have time in my questioning today.

And we'll look forward to continuing to work on these issues with you and your great folks that are trying hard and thank you again. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you Senator McCaskill.

Senator LeMieux.

LEMIEUX:

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good morning Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen. I've not had the opportunity to talk to you about these issues because I'm a new senator but I appreciate that opportunity today.

Let me say first that I want to join my colleagues in commending the president for his recommendation for adding the additional troops. I think it's the right thing to do. I had the opportunity to go to Afghanistan in late October and meet with General McChrystal and Admiral -- or Ambassador rather Eikenberry, and talk about these issues. And I believe that the counter-insurgency strategy is the right tactic that we need for success.



There's been a lot of discussion this morning about the 18 months and what that really means. I appreciate the elaboration that was given. Let me ask you this question. In every plan you hope for a successful ending and you must have in your minds what that successful ending looks like.

If we are able to meet the president's commitment to remove troops in July of 2011, and I guess this question would first go to Secretary Gates, how do you envision success looking like at that time?

GATES:

Sure. I, first of all, let me just again underscore that what we were talking about in July of 2011 is the beginning of what we expect will be a gradual process of -- of thinning and reducing U.S. forces.

I -- I think the end state in Afghanistan looks a lot like what we see in Iraq, and that is the gradual transfer of responsibility for security to the indigenous forces and government and having a security situation that allows us to draw down our forces.

We have gone from 20 brigades to -- soon to be 10 brigades in Iraq. We have the agreements that we talked about earlier in terms of combat forces being out at the end of August 2010.

And so what you will see in my view is a map, if you will, that changes colors in different places at different times but increasingly in terms of -- of the Afghan government's control, or the control of -- by local governments, district governments, provincial governments that are associated with the national government and hostile to the Taliban and to al-Qaida.

And so I think this gradual transfer of security responsibility with a continuing role on our part as a partner for that country in the long term is -- is what I would call success in Afghanistan.

LEMIEUX:

And to follow up on the questions of Senator Ben Nelson in terms of benchmarking, do you have specific benchmarks that you have put in place for this next period, this 18-month period when the withdrawal of American troops would begin?

That would say there would be only this many American casualties or this many of other, you know, Afghan troops trained? We talked about that before. Are those benchmarks in place now as you work forward in the next 18 months?

GATES:

Well, we would not -- we would not have U.S. casualties as a benchmark but we have some very specific benchmarks both for us and for the Afghans and for our international partners as well in terms of whether they are fulfilling the commitments that have been made.

LEMIEUX:

Just to touch quickly on the international partner issue, you mentioned bringing 5,000 to 7,000 more troops from international partners. In the past you have been, as you say, somewhat critical of those troops and you wanted to make sure that those troops were caveat free.

Do you believe that these troops that are coming hopefully the 5,000 to 7,000 troops will be, as you said before, caveat free and be able to fully engage?

GATES:

One of the positive developments I would say of the last year, but especially since the NATO summit last spring has been a fairly steady reduction in the number of caveats that are being imposed by -- by governments.

And I think they are realizing -- you heard the German defense minister a couple of weeks ago for the first time in Germany refer to what is going on in Afghanistan as a war or war like. So they are I think domestically beginning to deal with the realities of Afghanistan and -- and I think that has contributed to a reduction in the caveats.

LEMIEUX:

Secretary Clinton we haven't talked a lot today about Pakistan. And certainly Pakistan is a huge -- of huge importance in the success in this region. What commitments do you think we will get from Pakistan to continue in their efforts? I know they launched this offensive in Waziristan that's been somewhat successful and continues on.

Where do you see their participation in the next 18 months to make sure that we're succeeding?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator, they have certainly demonstrated over the last year their commitment and willingness to take on the Pakistan Taliban who directly threaten them. I spent three days in Pakistan recently and spoke at length with both the civilian and the military intelligence leadership, as well as many citizens, press and others.

And I think the unity of support that the people of Pakistan are showing for this effort is profoundly significant but as we have said, it is not enough. It is difficult to parse out the different groups that are operating within Pakistan all of whom we think are connected in one way or another with al-Qaida and partition some off and go after the others.

So it will be our continuing effort. And Admiral Mullen has been instrumental in working on this with his counterparts to make the case that the Pakistanis have to do more against all of the insurgent terrorist groups that are threatening them, that are threatening us in Afghanistan and the Afghan people, are threatening other neighbors in the region. And we hope that we'll be able to make that case successfully.

LEMIEUX:

Does Pakistan understand now that having a stable and secure Afghanistan is in their national interest?

CLINTON:

Well I think that they certainly understand that having an unstable, destabilizing Afghanistan that offers launching grounds and training for those who threaten them is not in their interest.

LEMIEUX:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator LeMieux.

Senator LeMieux and others have talked about the benchmarks and you've indicated that they exist in the current -- whatever the current forum is. Would you submit those to us for the record? We saw an earlier version, but we'd like to see the current version of the benchmarks for the record. If there's any classified benchmarks just -- we will of course honor that.

Senator Udall?

UDALL:

Thank -- thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to the three of you. The unanimity that you represent by being here together is -- is powerful and inspirational and want to thank you along with the members of the committee for your -- your leadership and your service.

I too hope that -- and will do my part to ensure that the politics in this important policy debate we're having end at the water's edge, and again, your presence here today makes that statement loud and clear.

Secretary Clinton, if I could just follow up on Pakistan. Do you have any concerns that the July 2011 transition date sends a message to the Pakistanis that we're going to leave the region, that we're not committed in a long-term way?

CLINTON:

Well, again, I think that the -- the messages that are being heard by different audiences are consistent with their perspectives. And as Senator LeMieux seemed to imply in his question, there is a lot of concern in Pakistan about what our commitment means both in terms of whether we put more troops in or not, whether we leave them in or not.

The Pakistanis, understandably, worry that our actions in Afghanistan increase cross border efforts that threaten them which they are not obviously in favor of seeing increased. So we -- we have worked very hard with our Pakistani counterparts to explain that we have a long-term commitment to Pakistan.

We are not going to be in and out the way we have in the past. We want to be partnering with the Pakistanis. We want to be supporting their democracy and their development. And that is independent from Afghanistan, but that we have unfinished business in Afghanistan and that requires us to take the steps which the president has outlined.

But that we also are asking for more help from the Pakistanis to go after al-Qaida and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban inside their own territory.

UDALL:

So in an ideal world, we would get the job done militarily in the short term and in the medium and long term, we would have a presence in the region economically, diplomatically and politically?

CLINTON:

Well, as -- as we have with so many other countries, obviously, we have troops in a limited number of countries around the world. Some have been there for 50, 60 years. But we have long-term economic assistance and development programs in many others and we think that's a likely outcome in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, that we would be there with a long-term commitment.

UDALL:

Let me turn if I would and could to the civilian surge. I have a close friend who follows what's happening very closely and he said, "Who's going to be in charge of the civilian surge?" And I've heard some discussion of an ISAF commander civilian counterpart for the civilian efforts that we're going to put forth.

Secretary Clinton, could you speak to whether there would be an official who's in charge of the surge and what sort of authority that person might have?

CLINTON:

Well, we are -- we are actually discussing that with our allies. It's one of the issues I will be talking about in Brussels. You know there's a United Nations presence in Afghanistan. There is also the NATO ISAF presence.

Not everyone who contributes civilian aid is a member of NATO or ISAF but they all are members of the United Nations, so how we coordinate and better hold accountable our civilian aid is a matter of great concern to all of the contributing nations, both the troop contributing, non-troop, civilian, non-NATO, et cetera.

For example, Japan has just announced a significant civilian commitment of \$5 billion. They're not a member of NATO. They don't have troops in NATO ISAF. So we're looking at the United Nations, we're looking at NATO ISAF, but we're going to come up with a coordinating mechanism that can meet the needs of all the various parties who want to contribute to Afghan -- to Afghanistan's future.

UDALL:

And Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, I assume that General McChrystal understands the importance of that -- that hand-off and that coordination.

GATES:

Nobody wants it more than he does.

(LAUGHTER)

UDALL:

Let me turn to the Secretary and Admiral Mullen. Given that this increase in the troops in Afghanistan will occur prior to the official draw down in Iraq, what effect do you see this additional deployment having on dwell time and the length of deployment cycles and reset, and then the services required to take care of our troops both here at home and in theater?

MULLEN:

Senator, not -- not just tied to this decision, it's something I think that we watch very carefully and have for the last several years. And what is happening in the Marine Corps -- and the ground forces, obviously, absorb the brunt of these deployments.

What we've seen happen in the Marine Corps is actually moving out to almost two to one. They're like at 1.5 to 1 right now. We want to get to a point where they're home twice as long, the two, as they are deployed.

And in this deployment cycle, General Conway thinks he'll be able to continue to progress out in that direction, with the exception of some of the smaller, more critical enabling kind of capabilities over the next year or so.

On the Army's side, they're -- we're actually making progress as well, moving away from one to one, not as rapidly. And with this deployment and decision, we -- we expect it to probably take a couple of more years to get to a point where he's out to two to one.

The Iraq draw down is taken into consideration in all this and that -- we're still being able to gradually improve, although extremely concerned about the continued pressure, stress and strain that our ground forces -- our military and our ground forces in particular and their families have gone through so we're paying a lot of attention to that.

General Casey sent a note to the secretary and I yesterday saying -- and -- and reemphasizing what he'd said before that this can be managed. Certainly there are challenges associated with that, but he's comfortable that he can lead his Army through this, at this enormously important time.

UDALL:

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator Collins?

COLLINS:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates, I'm going to explore with you an issue that Senator Graham raised and it's an issue that you touched on in your testimony. I think it is a fundamental question and that is why Afghanistan?

In your statement, you list primary objectives of the strategy, one of which is preventing al-Qaida from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan. Yet we know that al-Qaida has a presence in as many as 20 countries. And in Yemen, for example, al-Qaida is strong enough that it -- a cell there was able to launch a successful attack on our embassy just a year ago.

So the fundamental question to me is how will it make us safer to invest more troops and more treasure in Afghanistan as long as al-Qaida still has the ability to establish safe havens in other countries?

What is it about Afghanistan that makes it critical that we invest more troops, more civilian personnel, put more people at risk in that country?

GATES:

Well, first of all, as the president indicated last night, this is the country where, when the Taliban governed it, the attack against us was launched in 2001. It is the only country from which we have been attacked successfully.

Al-Qaida is still -- the al-Qaida presence and its leadership in the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan is still the wellspring of inspiration for extremist jihadism everywhere. Afghanistan is where these extremists, in many respects, consider that they defeated the Soviet Union and contributed enormously, in fact, give themselves credit for its ultimate collapse.

Whether it's in the United States and the plots that we continue to see or in Somalia or Yemen, the fact is that the inspiration and oftentimes the guidance and strategic leadership comes from the al-Qaida leadership that is there in that border area.

What we have seen in the last year develop is a -- an unholy alliance if you will of al-Qaida, the Taliban in Pakistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan. And these people work off of each other's mythology (ph), off of each other's narrative and success of one is -- contributes to the success of the other.

If anything the situation, I think, is more serious today than it was a year ago because of the attacks of the Taliban in Pakistan on Pakistan and the effort of al-Qaida in collusion with the Taliban in Pakistan to try and destabilize Pakistan itself.

More safe havens on the Pakistani side create opportunities for success in Afghanistan but we know from historical experience that safe havens and Taliban control of space in Afghanistan not only gives them the opportunity to organize better attacks against the West on our allies and friends, but now creates an opportunity for them to further destabilize Pakistan.

This area, as the president said last night and as I've said in my opening remarks, this area that we're talking about, Afghanistan in particular, is the epicenter of global extremist jihad.

And if we don't -- if that -- if that center were to disappear, if that leadership were to disappear and al-Qaida were defeated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, I think you would face a very different and very significantly less important threat from these various regional movements that put enormous emphasis on their alliance with al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Whether it's al-Qaida in the Maghreb, whether it's al-Qaida in the Horn of Africa, they put enormous value on this connection back into the al-Qaida that have fled Afghanistan. So I think Afghanistan has a unique place in the historical narrative of these extremists that makes it especially important to us, and as the president said last night, preventing the Taliban from returning and defeating al-Qaida in our vital national interest.

COLLINS:

Thank you. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates has given an excellent answer to the question of why Afghanistan. My question for you is can we succeed despite the brilliance of our leaders, the courage of our troops, the efforts of the civilian components?

Is this an impossible task? We have a corrupt and ineffective government as a partner. We've seen in the last two years even with the presence of NATO troops, the government lose control of much of the country. Can -- can this work despite everybody's best efforts?

CLINTON:

Senator, we believe it can. And I think it is important to underscore your question because along with the question about who is the enemy, this is the critical question as to the commitment that the president has made.

The reasons why we do believe success is possible is number one, we -- we think that the Afghan leadership and the people of Afghanistan are ready for an approach that makes them more accountable, responsible and a true partner.

You know, I've been to Afghanistan as you know in the past. In this last trip, I was struck by what Defense Minister Wardak told me. He said it was the first time with General McChrystal now in charge of NATO ISAF that they really -- that the Afghans felt like they were full partners.

They'd been invited in to NATO ISAF headquarters. They were getting access to intelligence that they'd never been given before. I mean his enthusiasm for the new leadership that we have on the military side was striking to me because I've known him for all these years. And he has been truly a good soldier, just trying the best he could under very difficult circumstances but he didn't feel like he was fully supported or partnered until relatively recently.

Secondly, I think that the wake-up call about the deteriorating situation has not only been heard by the United States but by our friends and allies. I think that there was an attitude perhaps that OK, the Americans want us there. We'll show up. We'll do the best we can.

And as Secretary Gates said, some of our NATO ISAF troops were extraordinarily brave and courageous and successful. You know, others were kind of just, you know, there to fulfill a commitment. But there seems to be a new awareness that this is not just America's fight. And I'm very encouraged by that.

Thirdly, look, I've spent a lot of time with and around Karzai and I really believe that if we work with him in a more effective manner, we will get a better outcome from him and from the team around him.

He has some very good cabinet ministers who are doing really excellent work. There need to be more of them. They need to be supported more. They need to be held accountable. But my sense from the very long and candid conversations I had with him is that there's a window of opportunity here that we have to seize.

And finally, I think that the impetus that the president's decision is giving us will change the reality on the ground. The president's announcement last night, the resolve that he's showing, the fact that very obviously this is not an easy political call for him to make, it has significant budget implications for our country, I think will help to summon the very best of everybody and will give us the chance at success that I believe we can achieve. So I'm not -- I'm not naive about how hard this will be, but I think it's the right decision and I think it -- it can lead to success if we implement the way we should.

COLLINS:

Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Hagan?

HAGAN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too wanted to echo my sentiment about having you here and the service that you are providing not only to our president, to our country, but I want to thank each and every one of you, and the fact that you spent three hours already asking questions.



I'm going to -- some of these questions you've already talked about a little bit, but let me just ask another specific concerning NATO. Obviously, the president talked about the -- the fact that we're going to look to NATO to help send more additional troops.

And I think that we -- we do know that some of them are constrained by some of the mandates that their countries have put on them. And I think, Secretary Gates, you mentioned a little bit about that. But I do know that some of the countries have mentioned in the past about starting their own withdrawals.

In particular, I believe Germany has suggested a transition by 2013 and they have 4,000 troops. Canada suggesting some pull-out in 2011 in Kandahar, they have 2,500 troops. The Italian leaders, 2,800 troops, leaving Herat by December 2011, Dutch leaders suggesting they might want to pull out by 2010.

And I was just wondering if that is still a concern and I'll ask Secretary Gates if you have some information on that?

GATES:

Well, it is a concern. The only two firm decisions that have been made that I'm aware of are that the Dutch will leave next year with their forces and the Canadians by the end of 2011. These are parliamentary decisions that have been made.

Frankly, our hope, just going back to Secretary Clinton's final remarks and the response to previous, Senator Collins, I think our hope is that -- and I think our hope is that the president's speech last night and his decisions will help change the political dynamic among some of our allies.

And -- and I must say just the first -- sort of the first reactions that I saw on the news this morning from the Europeans, I think, were very encouraging. President Sarkozy's comments, the comments of the NATO secretary general, and so on.

And so I think -- I think that -- I'm not aware of a German commitment or any kind of firm decision to leave at a particular time, but our -- our hope is that what the president has decided will -- will change the political dynamic.

The truth of the matter is the governments -- and Admiral Mullen and I run into this all the time -- the governments of our allies are really very strongly supportive of what -- of the mission in Afghanistan, and -- and the military and defense leaders in these countries, and I think probably also the foreign ministers, very supportive.

The problem is, some of these governments are in very delicate coalition governments and -- and so their domestic politics are a real concern for them in terms of what they can do. The will is there. The political capacity to deliver is -- is -- is -- has been a challenge for some of them.

And I think our hope is that what the president has decided will help change that dynamic. But specifically to your question, I'm only aware of the Canadians and the Dutch that have a specific deadline.

HAGAN:

I was also wondering about the -- the budgets. I know that as many countries are -- experience a decline in the economy right now. Budgets are tight. And Admiral Mullen, I was wondering how this is effecting NATO and particularly some of the PRT projects. And how do you foresee Admiral Stavridis addressing these issues?

MULLEN:

Well I mean he's -- he has, not unlike you've heard from Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, he has been incredibly active in engaging the leadership, both civilian and military leadership, of -- of these NATO countries.

And what I haven't seen -- certainly that they have concerns just like we do with respect to the budget, but -- and I -- for me, it really -- a demarcation point was the NATO summit in April where, I mean, the support and enthusiasm and -- and actually hard work to figure out how we can do this better together has -- has -- it's just taken a marked turn for the positive, very unlike anything that I've seen two or three -- for the previous two or three years.

There are concerns about budgets in each of these countries, and yet they continue to -- in many cases now they've added more troops, more capabilities. They're making contributions in very difficult economic times. Not as many as we would like sometimes, but again, the overall thrust and approach from the -- from our NATO and other non-NATO contributing nations has been very, very positive and I'm encouraged by that.

HAGAN:

Thank you. I wanted to follow up...

GATES:

Could I -- Could I just say...

HAGAN:

Please.

GATES:

... because I -- I think when I listed some of our NATO allies, and the contribution that they have made and the sacrifices they've made, and giving them an A in response to Senator Graham's question. There was -- there is a non-NATO ally that has played a significant role with us in Regional Command South, and that's the Australians. And I wouldn't want to omit the contribution and the sacrifice they've made.

HAGAN:

They're doing a great job.

CLINTON:

I -- I would just add, we don't want to get in trouble with any of our friends or allies. There are many smaller countries that have really punched way above their weight. And we'll submit for the record a list of all of them because we are also seeing a number of them.

The polls, for example, have been extremely responsive and very helpful. So there's a -- there are a lot of other countries that have done their part and we also are seeing in, you know, in some -- in some ways more of a -- an international element to this. And again, when all of this is put together, we'll submit that for the record.

HAGAN:

I see that my time is up, but I did want to say that I know that the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade from Camp Lejeune is fighting the terrorists in Afghanistan as well as Fort Bragg's 82nd Airborne. And I wanted to echo the support that I have from North Carolina on behalf of all the -- the troops that are serving us in such a valiant way. Thank you.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Hagan.

Senator Wicker?

WICKER:

Well, thank you to all three members of our panel. It's been a long and good hearing and you all three have been wonderful. I have to say at first, I want to thank Senator Sessions for bringing up the issue of the tanker. And Secretary Gates, I -- I want to say that I agree with everything you said.

There were -- there were minimal discrepancies last year that caused this award to Northrop Grumman to be -- to be tossed out. And -- and one can only read the RFP this year as -- as almost directing a lighter, smaller and inferior product. And I think Northrop Grumman is absolutely justified to take itself out of the competition at this point. I hope that can be rectified.

Admiral Mullen, how quickly can we deploy these additional troops -- 30,000 American troops and their equipment to, not just theater, but the ultimate destination, and how difficult will that be?

I noticed in the press yesterday a White House official said, the president is saying this has to happen so the military will make it happen. How difficult is that going to be?

MULLEN:

It is -- a big difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is we don't have a Kuwait. So what we deploy to Afghanistan in great part goes straight in and it's not as robust from an infrastructure standpoint, et cetera. So the logistic challenges are significant. That said, Secretary Gates said...

WICKER:

Significantly greater?

MULLEN:

They're significantly greater than -- than Iraq, but we've been working this for months and Secretary Gates said in his opening statement, actually the first part of the -- the first troops will be there in a couple weeks and are already under orders since the president made his announcement last night.

Significant number of them to arrive in the spring, March-April timeframe, and roughly 20,000 to 25,000 by the July timeframe and that is getting them in, getting them prepared and obviously getting them on mission.

WICKER:

And when will we be at 30, sir?

MULLEN:

Pardon?

WICKER:

When will we be at 30?

MULLEN:

Later in the summer is the -- is the estimate. Summer, fall, for and the precision there -- well, one of the things that the president did in his decision was give the commander on the ground the flexibility to say what troops he wants when and we're working our way through that, quite frankly, with General McChrystal given that flexibility, and -- and so it will take us a while to be exact but the vast majority of them will go by the summertime and certainly finish out by the fall.

WICKER:

Have we ever done it that quickly before?

MULLEN:

Yes. In fact, in Iraq we actually even did it more quickly because we had a better infrastructure.

WICKER:

Under -- under less difficult circumstances?

MULLEN:

Well, I'm not say -- I'd say less difficult circumstances.

WICKER:

All right, sir. I'm sort of batting cleanup on -- on our side. About the allied troops, our hope for 5,000 to 7,000 additional troops from those allies, and by the way, let me say, I'm glad, Secretary Clinton, that you hastened to add that the smaller deployments are also appreciated.

Secretary Gates, you've mentioned specifically several countries as getting an A and I'm afraid that those that weren't specifically named may be wondering what their grade is going to be? But it -- it -- it appears from what you say, the firm affirmation we have actually takes us in the wrong direction. The two -- the two firm numbers we have mean less allied help.

So our decision not to do the 40,000, rather to do the 30,000, is based on a hope and not based on any assurances from these allies. I think that's the testimony today, but I just wanted to nail that down.

GATES:

Well, I -- the situation that we have is that we have received private commitments from some countries, but because they have not yet announced them at home, we're not in a position to -- to make that announcement for them. I will just give you an example. I made two telephone out of -- I made two telephone calls the day before yesterday and we have -- I -- I received the assurances of between 1,800 and 2,000 troops and those...

WICKER:

Additional troops?

GATES:

Yes. So -- and -- and we've all been talking to different people. So I think there's a fair degree of optimism in terms of the additional troops. And I would also make the point that I made earlier in the hearing, with respect to the 40,000.

Well, early in this process it seemed to me that because the final brigade combat team that General McChrystal had asked for could not deploy before July of 2011, that there was no need to make a commitment to that upfront. That I would rather use a smaller number on the American side to leverage

both the Afghans and the allies, but General McChrystal essentially is going to get more troops earlier than he would have with the original 40,000 request.

WICKER:

Thank you very much.

Admiral Mullen, somebody -- they just handed me a little sheet of paper, let me see if I can ask this quickly. You -- you've been doing this a long time. You're a graduate of Annapolis in advanced degrees.

When in history has a commander ever announced both a surge and a withdrawal at the same time? And I -- I think it's been very rare in history. And -- and if so, what gives us a comfort level that this sort of approach is going to work?

MULLEN:

I have great comfort in the -- the quickness with which we will deploy these forces to reverse the momentum which is absolutely critical. I spoke earlier to my belief that we will know well by mid-2011 where we stand in which direction, whether we're succeeding, or whether we're not.

And that, from my perspective, what the president said was to start to transition. Transfer responsibility, which is critical as we turn -- I mean, it really is the way hope, as it has been in Iraq, transfer that security responsibility and then start to transition, based on the conditions on the ground at the time.

I think that it's doable. That, from my perspective, makes sense at this point based on our overall understanding of the situation and so from that standpoint, again, I'm very supportive of the decision. And the -- and the message that it sends to the Afghans, to our allies, the -- the commitment, the resolve that this additional troop force shows as well. All those are really positive message. But come mid-2011, we're going to know whether this is working or not.

WICKER:

Well, I'm -- I'm going to support this commander-in- chief, because the alternative is unacceptable, but perhaps you would like to, or Secretary Gates, submit for the record, if you can think of ever an occasion in history when a commander has announced both a surge and a withdrawal at the same time.

You're in a very difficult position. You've had to parse words today and make sense out of a contradictory policy, a policy that at first blush on its face is a paradox and a contradiction. I expect the left is going to rise up this afternoon based on testimony, based on your answers to Senator Graham and protest vehemently the statements that you've made about the flexibility and about the president always having the opportunity to change his mind and do what's right for the country and right for national security.

I'm going to support this President. I put great stock, Admiral Mullen, in -- in your statement that you enthusiastically and without hesitation, without qualification, support this policy and I wish you well. I want to be your teammate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Wicker.

Senator Begich?

BEGICH:

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all three of you and being one of the last, most of my questions have been answered but I do want to -- I -- I don't think you're necessarily in a difficult position.

I think you've done very well for the last three hours answering questions very directly and the policy. And the comments you've made that this patience that we have as a country of what more sacrifices we have to make in the sense of the civilian end, the military end, the president spending the time to review the policy and set it out in great flexibility, I think has been the right move.

So I disagree with my counterpart on the other side or my Republican friend. But I would say that one thing that I want to put to rest and I want to make sure I'm clear on this because I think you've said it 100 times and I'm going to pound this one more time and that's on the whole issue of withdraw.

It -- you've made it very clear, withdraw and transition are similar but different. And that July occurs and it's kind of statement I hope that I'm right on this, that July occurs in '11 withdraw will occur in some form. It might be 100 troops, might be 50,000 troops, undetermined.

It may last one year. It may last one month. It might last three years. But the withdraw process which really is a transition process is a goal that we're shooting for in 2011, is that what I understand?

GATES:

Yes.

BEGICH:

OK. I've heard and we're going to hear this I hate to say this even though I think this committee is very bipartisan, spending the time to look at this issue, there's agreement all across the board here supporting the president's mission here and I agree with it 100 percent.

But this whole issue of the withdrawal, everyone's kind of pulled it apart. And really what you've done is set a target giving the Afghan government a target of what we're trying to shoot for and the sense of when we think their commitments need be to be at the highest level possible that -- making this transition.

And then there'll be decisions made at the end of December leading into July of what level that might be. It might be very small, it might be very large, but that's undetermined yet but that's the target. Am I correct in saying that?

MULLEN:

Yes, sir.

BEGICH:

I'm hoping we're not going to...

GATES:

December -- December is more about...

BEGICH:

Internal reading (ph).

GATES ... strategy working.

BEGICH:

Right.

GATES:

Are we headed in the right direction? Are -- are things moving the way we anticipated they would? The decisions with respect to transition would begin in July as you've described it.

BEGICH:

Great. I -- I'm just hoping as we move forward on this discussion we're not going to beat the withdraw issue over the head so many times that it's not hard. It is a target. A target that may mean a few people, it may mean thousands of people. But that will be determined as a strategy plays out, and again, I want to just echo that.

Hopefully we'll be done with that discussion. We'll support the commander-in-chief, and you all and the efforts of our troops on the ground and the effort we need to do in Afghanistan. In that I want to ask you a little more in-depth in regards to the Afghan troops and how you see them training up?

I know you've had some target amounts of 134,000 December 2010 and moving that up to 170,000, I think, by July in hopes. How confident if you were to measure on a percent scale of 100 percent obviously 100 percent confident that you can reach that successfully? And what would be one or two challenges that may it cause it to not get to that goal?

MULLEN:



Well, I think the -- the -- that area is the highest risk area for us. We all identified that throughout and believe that and that's where General McChrystal is. We've put great leadership in place to address that. It's got to be led by security or we can't get there. I -- I mean so that we can create an environment in which more participate.

Fundamental shift in the partnership piece which is a -- which is a significant breakthrough on how to do this and we have a lot more confidence in that regard. But it's one of the reasons we really have annual targets so that we can look at how we're doing and adjust accordingly.

Secretary talked early about retention, attrition you know all those challenges that we have more so on the police side then on the army side. So I think we're very clear eyed on what the challenge is and we are going to assess ourselves rigorously throughout the process. But it -- it is probably the, you know, the biggest challenge that we have with respect to meeting the goals that we've set out for ourselves.

BEGICH:

Very good. Secretary Clinton, I want to follow up with you. I -- I'm actually very supportive of you getting as much flexibility with the use of your monies. I would even offer to suggest that as we deal with the defense appropriation bill why we don't figure out how to fix this now rather than waiting until next summer because we'll lose eight or nine months which every month, every day seems critical.

So I would look to you and the administration of a suggestion seeing that we haven't done the defense components so why not figure out how to make that happen? But your number, I think you said you're going to triple up or get to about 970 give or take a few there, but you also indicated that you need more in -- in time.

Have you figured out what that number is? I agree with you. I think as we do the military plus up the civilian component is critical and I appreciate your review and change that you've done to really focus on this component and getting unified efforts with that military. I think that is critical. Have you thought of a number or is that something you could give to the record at some point?

CLINTON:

Senator, thank you. I -- I'm hesitant to state a number now but we will provide it to the record. But there is a larger idea that I think your question suggests. We -- we should start looking at our budgets as national security budgets.

If we're really intent upon having an integrated civilian military strategy, and again, I have to compliment Secretary Gates who's been an advocate of this long before I ever thought I'd be sitting here at this table in this position.

We have to be willing to look across the government at a whole of government approach to something as critical as our national security and the mission in Afghanistan and that's going to take some changes in how we do business and how we think about it.

So I would obviously welcome the continuing support from this committee and others as we try to get it right. You know, we have -- I mean this will be I'm sure the subject of the Appropriations Committee but where's the money going to come from? Is it going to be part of the budget? How is it going to be costed out?

All of that has to be worked through between the government -- our government, the administration and the Congress. But as we're doing that I think we've got to quick stove piping our efforts and start thinking more holistically which is really what our policy intends to present.

BEGICH:

My time is up. And Secretary Clinton I want to 100 percent agree with you. This hearing today, and I want to thank the chairman for doing this, that's it's what I consider three critical pieces to the equation are sitting in front us today and not just one component.

So I really do appreciate comments and anything I can do as individual member I'll be happy to do that. Thank you again for all your service and thank you for bringing forward three hours of answers to many questions.

LEVIN:

Thank you very much, Senator Begich.

Senator Kirk?

KIRK:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all let me add a word with my colleagues to thank you for your patience this morning, but far more importantly for your patriotic service to the country and your service to our commander-in-chief.

I wanted to just follow up a little bit on Senator Collins' question. When, if I understand I, when General McChrystal advocated a strategy along these lines it wasn't just the troops he said and I'm quoting here, "A foreign army alone cannot beat an insurgency. The insurgency in Afghanistan requires an Afghan solution. This is their war."

And he went on to say, any success must come, quote, "by, with and through the Afghan government." In other words, without a legitimate, credible, reliable Afghan governmental partner, it sounds to me like the strategy would be flawed.

And by all reports that we have, President Karzai had been installed basically as a result of a flawed election and if not a fraudulent election, by default. And that he presides over a culture of corruption and dependent on, unfortunately, an opium economy.

And what I'm concerned about is whether we are taking a leap of faith here with respect to our Afghan governmental partner and irrespective -- not irrespective of that but related to that, if we're going to send 30,000 more troops and spend additional United States dollars, should we not be looking for more indices or evidence that he truly will be a partner that has the response from his own citizens and support of them so that we're not just in there without him and maybe unfortunately, being perceived as quote,/unquote, "occupiers."

So on the one hand obviously, Secretary Clinton, you, as you said, have been closer to him. You've heard the words, but I think a lot of us are wondering whether this is for real on their side.

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Kirk, first let me say with respect to the strategy and the execution, I think it is fair to say that probably the two experts in the world right now on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism are in counter-insurgency, General Petraeus and counterterrorism, General McChrystal.

They are very committed and confident that we will see success. Now, they could be wrong. You know we're all human and we can make different assessment or reality can turn out to be a lot more ugly and difficult than any of us imagined.

But on the -- on the side of the positive with respect to the strategy, I certainly put a lot of stock into what they say and up the chain of command to Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates. It is absolutely the case that General McChrystal pointed out one of the salient features of the campaign that we are waging and that is to have a good, solid partner in the Afghan government.

I think it is unfair to paint with such a broad brush the president and government of Afghanistan. And to basically declare that they are incapable and unwilling to defend and protect their own country and that they are fatally flawed. I do not believe that.

I believe that it is a much more complex picture, as most human situations are. And I believe that the way that our government interacted with President Karzai and his government over the last several years bred a lot of the confusion and the inadequacy that we are now having to contend with.

I am not making the case that this is a perfect partnership, but I think it has the elements of real progress if we are smart enough as to how to put them together into a winning strategy. So the people on the ground, the people who are responsible for implementing this strategy including Ambassador Eikenberry, who full heartedly endorses the president's definition of our mission, believe it's hard but doable. And that is what I believe.

And as we, you know, say the proof is in the pudding. We're going to find out because of the president's decision. I think your caution has to be kept in mind. But I also believe that we've got to come at this with a sense of resolve, determination and a cautious optimism that we can make this work. And I think that there is a very strong argument that we can.

GATES:

I would just like to pitch in and echo Secretary Clinton's comments about the dangers of painting the Afghan government with too broad a brush. The reality is, as she indicated earlier, there are some number of ministers, and I would say including two that we work the most closely with in Defense and Interior, who are quite competent and quite capable and have been good partners for us.

Similarly, when we see a good governor go into a province, we have seen a situation turn around literally in months when a competent, honest governor is put in place. And there are more than a few of those in Afghanistan. All the problems that you've described and that have been discussed here this morning are real. They exist.

But -- but there are enough examples of the kind of people we need to partner with who are already in the Afghan government or are governors that I think is what contributes to, I won't say optimism, but a feeling of some confidence that this is going to work.

KIRK:

Thank you. One other question and it goes back to the Pakistan situation. And with the nuclear capabilities there, the place is rife with al-Qaida whereas less so according to General Jones on the Afghanistan side.

Could you just give us a little bit of flavor about the thinking why another option which might more directly or readily address the president's concern and his mission, the option of trying to secure and seal the Afghanistan-Pakistan border while we're working to ensure the security and stability of nuclear weapons and doing what we can to destroy the safe havens in Pakistan while we seal the border so the terrorists aren't fleeing back into Afghanistan as one strategy as opposed to the 30,000 troops in Afghanistan.

MULLEN:

Sir, there's -- there are a lot of views on borders around the world. My experience and the experience of an awful lot of people that have been doing this for a long time is borders are pretty tough to seal. And certainly this one is probably as tough as any in the world.

So at least from my perspective, it doesn't mean we shouldn't have security out there because we have and in fact we're working very hard to establish centers that are manned by both Afghanistan and Pakistani military members, and we've got one to better secure that border. But I think that getting to the point where you think you can secure that is just -- it has not -- I -- I don't think that that can be done first of all.

Secondly, the focus on Pakistan and it's been mentioned here and I won't belabor it, is absolutely vital here. And I -- but it really -- it's a sovereign country. They've really done a lot. A lot of us a year ago would not have predicted that they would have undertaken the -- the efforts that they have to go into South Waziristan and Swat before that.

We're working to support that and their interests, you know, what we're also -- our interests are very much mutual because of the threat that's been discussed before. It's going to take some time to do that.

And then there's that long-term partnership actually on both sides of the border that is absolutely critical. When -- when I go there, I mean, one of the questions that comes very quickly from military and civilians in both those countries is are you leaving? Are you going to abandon us again?

And -- and the importance of the president's message last night and this decision is a significant step in that direction that that's not the case and I -- we can't afford to do that again.

KIRK:

Thank you very much. And thank you all very much again for your service and your patience.

LEVIN:

Thank you, Senator Kirk.

Senator Bayh?

BAYH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't know whether this is a case of saving the best for last or simply the last for last, but I'm -- have been very gratified to hear the testimony of these three distinguished Americans here today.

Admiral, I want to thank you for your lifetime commitment to our armed forces. Secretary Gates, I want to thank you for your continued service. The president was wise to ask you to remain and you are a true public servant to decide, in spite of the advantages of private life, to remain. I'm grateful to you for that.

Secretary Clinton, I remember with a great deal of fondness our service on this panel together, literally side-by-side and the journey that we took together to Afghanistan several years ago. I can't help but think that if we'd had the kind of nuanced and complex analysis at that point perhaps we wouldn't be here today, but we are.

And I am gratified that all of you, along with the president, took the time to think this through to maximize our chances of getting it right. So it's good to see you again.

On a somewhat lighter note, I haven't had a chance to see you since the news about your daughter was announced. Congratulations.

CLINTON:

Thank you very much.

BAYH:

The bottom line for me, and several of you have stated this, there are no easy answers here, there are only difficult choices. And it seems there are no guarantees, but it does seem to me the strategy you've settled on maximizes the chances of success, maximizes the chances that we will be able to ultimately leave Afghanistan not temporarily but permanently, while securing the national security interests of the United States, and that's what this ultimately has to be all about.

I think it's important to note that I'm sure none of you want to be here recommending that we spend more money in Afghanistan or that we send more troops to Afghanistan, but we have to remind ourselves and the American public that we are there because we were attacked from that place, and 3,000 innocent Americans lost their lives as a result of that. And we owe it to the American public that we maximize the chances of that not happening again. I think your strategy does that.

Regrettably, we are likely to remain under threat from radical Islam and organizations like al-Qaida no matter what we do. If we leave, we run the risk of it returning to a safe haven from which attacks can be launched on our homeland. If we stay, regrettably, our servicemen and women are placed in harm's way. But I do think the strategy you've settled on maximizes the chances of minimizing those combined risks on an ongoing basis and so I thank you for that.

I want to -- although neither one of them is here -- I want to thank Senator Lieberman for his comments. I think he was exactly right when he pointed out -- look, you're receiving some tough questions from both the right and the left today.

The president is not doing this because it is politically expedient. He's doing it because he believes it's in the national security interests of the United States. That's the kind of decision making I want to see in a chief executive, and I think it is the kind of decision making he has, with your help, exhibited here today.

I want to associate myself with some of the comment of Senator McCain and several of our colleagues on the other side of the aisle, who are going to support this president in his decision making.

For those who believe that the ability to forge bipartisan decision making is just impossible in Washington, their comments today are evidence that that is not necessarily so. And so I want to thank them for putting partisanship aside and choosing to support our commander-in-chief in a very difficult situation.

I do take issue with a couple of things that were raised by Senator McCain and I would associate myself with your comments. I think that the notion of having -- and I think, Secretary Gates, you mentioned this -- demonstrating both resolve as well as a sense of urgency simultaneously is exactly the combination we need to exhibit here.

So we demonstrate resolve by maintaining our commitment but at the same time we insist that the Afghans have the sense of urgency, which is ultimately going to do more than we can do, to make this a successful undertaking.

So by having an exit strategy in place, I think we say to them, "We are with you but only so long as you do your part." I think that's vitally important to the ultimately success of this undertaking.

And I personally don't find it incompatible to have a deadline that we aspire to meet, we do everything to meet, that we expect to meet, but at the same time, of course, take into account changes in facts on the ground that may occur over the next year and a half.

And as you pointed out, this is a longer period of time than it took for the surge in Iraq to prove to be successful. So I think it's important to keep that in mind.

I do have two brief questions and you've been very patient and you've stayed a long time, but these are two critiques that have been offered and I want to give you an opportunity to address them. You have in part already.

But you hear some people say, "Well, the Taliban and the al-Qaida are two different phenomena and we can address combating al-Qaida without really having to combat the Taliban within Afghanistan."

You've pointed out that the Taliban is not a homogenous group, there are differences and we are going to try and appeal to the reconcilables to try to peel them away from the unreconcilables, but there is still a hard core there.

And I think the words you've used are -- one of you used the words that they "collude in some of their operations, that there's a symbiotic relationship between the unreconcilable elements of Taliban and al-Qaida."

So I'd like to give you a chance, both secretaries, to address this issue which I understand your testimony to get to. With regard to that irreducible hard core of the Taliban, it simply is not possible to defeat al-Qaida or minimize the risk from al-Qaida without also combating that -- that unreconcilable element of the Taliban.

GATES:

Well, I -- I would just say that we have to remember that it's the part of the al-Qaida -- the part of the Taliban that we think is irreconcilable that in fact provided the safe haven for al-Qaida. And there -- there is just a significant amount of intelligence of al-Qaida identifying themselves with the Taliban's aspirations in Afghanistan and -- and the Taliban talking about their relationship with al-Qaida and the message that al-Qaida has.

The Taliban are -- are clever. We wouldn't be in the situation we're in, if we did not face an adaptable and -- and clever adversary. They recognize that the reason they're not in power right now is because they allowed al-Qaida to launch the attack against the United States.

So every now and then you'll see some report or another that the Taliban is saying, "Well, let's downplay the relationship with al-Qaida so we don't get hit again."

And -- but the fact is there is plenty of evidence of these two organizations and their -- as I put it in my opening statement -- their "symbiotic relationship" and what has made it more dangerous over the last year, as I said earlier, is that now we have the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Taliban in Pakistan whose target is the Pakistani government and who are working closely with al-Qaida, along with their compatriots in Afghanistan.

BAYH:

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Clinton, anything you would like to...

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Bayh, in addition to the inspirational and aspirational role that al-Qaida plays, they provide very specific services. They help to provide funding. They help to provide targeting and training and equipping.

Very often, they have their planners working closely with the elements of the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to target, you know, both institutions of the respective governments as well as international sites, embassies of other countries and certainly our own -- our own presence and our troops.

I -- I don't think there's any doubt any longer that there has been a developing syndicate of terror and those tentacles reach far and wide. Yes, they do reach to Somalia, to Yemen and to the Maghreb, et cetera, but they are focused and grounded in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

And so it's -- you know, it's our assessment that it's -- it might have been possible if we had gone at it somewhat differently in the beginning of this war to have, you know, captured and killed enough of the al-Qaida and the Taliban leadership to have made a difference but we are where we are right now and we know that the training that is done and the communication that is done out of that area poses direct threats to us, our friends and our allies.

BAYH:

Thank you. If I can permitted one final question, another point of view that's offered -- voices that are raised -- suggests, well, we're focusing on the wrong place. Al-Qaida is now principally located in the tribal areas of Pakistan. We should focus on Pakistan. Why are we doing this in Afghanistan?

My understanding of your testimony here today is that number one, were we to adopt that strategy the Taliban would over time reassert itself in Afghanistan having safe havens there from whence to launch attacks to America and our interests, number one.

Number two, we can't go into Pakistan. We have to try and build up the Pakistanis' capability in dealing with the problem on the ground there. And number three, we are doing that -- this is not an either/or choice and, in fact, if you made it one, ignoring one would undermine the other, so we have to look at this -- these two feeders in conjunction, doing both simultaneously to ensure that we combat the threat.

So if you'd care to address this notion that we could do one but not the other which seems to be out there in the minds of some -- some...

MULLEN:

They're inextricably linked and there -- there's no question that if the Taliban, and their strategic goal is to take over the government again in Afghanistan, if they came back, that they certainly have all the ability to provide that kind of safe haven and -- and they -- again, they are so linked across that border, I mean the linkage between these two countries.

In my travels, I mean nothing is more evident than that. So you -- that's why the present strategy, even in March, drove this to a regional approach, not a single country approach. You just can't do one without doing the other.

GATES:



Let me just say -- and this may be the last thing I say in this hearing -- but what -- what is essential is -- for our national security -- is that we have two long term partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan and -- and quite frankly, I detest the phrase "exit strategy" because what we are looking at over time is a transition in our relationship with the Afghans.

A relationship that now, where there is the preponderance of a military relationship as we try to secure the country and put it in a position where they can accept responsibility for -- for their own security, and -- and frankly, to prevent al-Qaida from -- from coming back.

But over time, as we are successful in that, the civilian component and the development component of our relationship with Afghanistan will become predominant. We may have a small residual military training and equipping role with Afghanistan in the future but this goes to the point I made in my testimony.

We will not repeat the mistake. We must not repeat the mistake of 1989 and turn our backs on these folks and when we've got the security situation with them under control, then the civilian and the development part must be the preponderant part of our relationship far into the future.

BAYH:

That's one of the truly refreshing things. You know, in past administrations from time to time there had been friction between the Department of Defense and the Department of State, but here you're working hand-in-hand and, in fact, understand that you both have to go forward together to truly get the job done on a permanent basis and so I'm most gratified for your collaboration.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your patience.

LEVIN:

Thank you very much, Senator Bayh.

Our witnesses -- you've been excellent. You've been responsive. You've been more than patient because we promised you that you'd be out of here by 12:30. I believe we owe you 10 minutes and a lot more than that. Thank you.

CLINTON:

Thank you.

CQ Transcriptions, Dec. 2, 2009

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List of Panel Members and Witnesses

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SEN. DAVID VITTER, R-LA.

SEN. SUSAN COLLINS, R-MAINE

WITNESSES:

SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN (USN), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Statement on Afghanistan to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

*As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 216 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., Thursday, December 03, 2009*

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Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee:

I would like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind the president's decisions, in particular:

- The nexus among Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Pakistan, and Afghanistan; and
- Our objectives and how the president's strategy aims to accomplish them.

As the president first stated in March, and re-emphasized on Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies and to prevent its return to both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Defeating Al Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be un-tethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.

While Al Qaeda is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment, the success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen Al Qaeda's message to the Muslim world: that violent extremists are on the winning side of history. Put simply, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaeda leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.

The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for Al Qaeda is that time and will are on their side. That, with a Western defeat, they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory – as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaeda.

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan – a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists. Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. By the same token, providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban, in just the last year or so, has become a real threat to Pakistan's domestic peace and stability, carrying out – with Al Qaeda's help – escalating bombing attacks throughout the country.

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of Afghanistan and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban-ruled areas could in short order become, once again, a sanctuary for Al Qaeda as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan. Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists – as was the case twenty years ago – would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the Al Qaeda narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fund-raising, and more sophisticated operations.

It is true that Al Qaeda and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations – from Munich to London to Denver. What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location – including Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere – is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home. For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for this country and the world.

Some say this is similar to the “domino theory” that underpinned and ultimately muddled the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we have very real – and very recent – history that shows just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their mission. Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.

The president’s new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and reduce its strength while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country.

The essence of our civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build, and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer of 2011 is critical – and, in my view achievable.

July 2011, the time at which the president said the United States will begin to draw down our forces, will be the beginning of a process – an inflection point, if you will – of transition for Afghan forces as they begin to assume greater responsibility for security. The pace and character of that drawdown – which districts and provinces are turned over and when – will be determined by conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual – but inexorable – process. It will be similar to the gradual but steady, conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in Iraq about 14 months after the surge began there.

As with so many issues in the national security and defense arena – the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 U.S. combat troops – on top of the 21,000 already ordered by the president earlier this year – sends a sure message of the president’s resolve to both our partners and our adversaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When this buildup is complete, total U.S. force levels in Afghanistan will have more than doubled under President Obama’s orders, to about 100,000 troops. Whether you agree with what we are doing are not, there should be no doubting – at home or abroad – this president’s commitment to the success of this mission.

On the other hand, we have to send an equally strong message to the Afghan

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government that, when all is said and done, the United States military is not going to be there to protect them forever. That the Afghans must step up to the plate and do the things necessary that will allow them to take primary responsibility for defending their own country – and do so with a sense of purpose and urgency. This is the balance we are trying to achieve – and I believe the president's plan provides both the resources and flexibility to do so.

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police through intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos, and then into Taliban hands.

Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts.

The president believes, as I do, that, in the end, we cannot defeat Al Qaeda and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan. The president's decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan, and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia – all necessary to protect the United States, our allies, and our vital interests.

As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who have volunteered – and re-volunteered – to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and in our prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally important mission.

Thank you.

## CQ CONGRESSIONAL TRANSCRIPTS

Congressional Hearings

Dec. 3, 2009

## Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing Assessing Afghanistan

LIST OF PANEL MEMBERS AND WITNESSES

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KERRY:

The hearing will come to order.

Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen, we welcome you here today. Thank you very much for joining us, and we appreciate your coming to share more details about the president's plan; and for consulting and partnering with Congress on the decision, obviously of enormous consequences, for our soldiers, our security and our country.

This is a decision that the president of the United States has made, but ultimately all of us share responsibility for its consequences. Given the complexities of our challenge, the seriousness of the sacrifices ahead, and the absence of strategy over much of the last eight years, I believe the president exercised important leadership by taking the time he needed to make the right decision, even as political pressure mounted in different directions.

His words and your testimony show that the administration has confronted tough realities, carefully weighed all of the options, and arrived at a comprehensive, considered path forward. I believe that the president appropriately narrowed the mission in Afghanistan. What he presented to the American people is not an open-ended nation-building exercise or a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, and nor should it be.

The president was right to frame our commitment to Afghanistan in the context of all of our national priorities, from the drawdown in Iraq to our urgent challenges at home. And he was correct to consider our mission there in terms of our enduring interests in Pakistan.

Over the last days I've heard a number of people saying that we're in Afghanistan today because that is the place from which we were attacked. Frankly, eight years later, that's simply not good enough. We have largely expelled Al Qaida from Afghanistan. Today, it is the presence of Al Qaida in Pakistan, its direct ties to and support from the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the perils of an unstable nuclear-armed Pakistan that drive our mission.

What happens in Pakistan, particularly near the Afghan border, will, in my judgment, do more to determine the outcome in Afghanistan than any increase in troops or shift in strategy. Congress has provided \$7.5 billion in non-military aid over the next five years to help address the crucial Pakistani dimension of the president's plan. That is a beginning.

But I believe, and I think other members of the committee share the belief, that there is more that we can and must do with the Pakistanis, all of which can alleviate the pressure of Afghanistan, indeed even determine the outcome in Afghanistan.

And I believe it is important for the Pakistanis to understand that our commitment to them and to the region is long term, even as troops are reduced in Afghanistan.

In fact, the conditions that permit a reduction in American troops in Afghanistan are a benefit to Pakistan. The president was correct to define success in terms of our ability to empower and transfer responsibility to Afghans as rapidly as possible, while simultaneously achieving a sufficient level of stability to ensure that we leave behind an Afghanistan that is not controlled by Al Qaida or the Taliban.

As I've said before, to each extra family that is asked to send a husband, wife, son or daughter into harm's way, the deployment of a single additional soldier makes all the difference. But a public debate that reduces a difficult mission in a complex region to a simple headline, "Ready Number of Troops," does us all a disservice.

What will matter most on the ground in Afghanistan is not the number of troops, but what they will do and how they are integrated into a broader civilian and military strategy.

I returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan in October with serious concerns. That even if additional troops are able to clear the enemy and hold an area, even in the limited areas where we will operate, unless we are able to build and transfer leadership to local Afghans, unless the governance and development pieces are in place, we risk squandering the gains time and time again. And right now, our military will tell us that in many places that tripartite capacity is not there.

There are three principal conditions that I still believe must guide the tasking of additional troops. First, are there enough reliable Afghan National Army and police forces to partner with American troops and eventually take over responsibility for security?

The president has recognized the critical importance of speeding up training and mentoring. And to date, we struggle to do so on the scale required, and I look forward to hearing your plans today to increase that training capacity and to quickly move Afghan security forces into the center of the fight.

Second, are there local Afghan leaders with whom we can partner? We have to be able to identify and cooperate with tribal, district, and provincial leaders who command the authority to help services and restore Afghans' faith in their own government.

Third, is the civilian side ready to follow swiftly with development aid that brings tangible benefits to the local population? The president has outlined a surge in civilian personnel, which will be crucial to locking in any of our military gains and bringing stability to Afghanistan. I know, Secretary Clinton, that you've been working on that task, and we look forward to exploring it with you today.

I would hope that just as the exit strategy is based on the conditions on the ground, so too should our strategy for any escalation be based on conditions on the ground.

I continue to believe that, absent an urgent security need, we should not send American troops in to clear places unless we are confident that we have the Afghan partners and resources in place to build on those victories and transfer both security and government functions to legitimate Afghan leaders.



I still remain concerned that additional troops will tempt us beyond a narrow and focused mission, and with 30,000 troops rushing into Afghanistan, I believe we'll be challenged to have the civilian and governance capacity in place quickly enough to translate their sacrifice into lasting gains.

Through conversations with the president and vice president in recent days, and the president's speech, I've been assured that the administration recognizes the need to meet these conditions. How we answer these challenges will go a long way toward determining our overall prospects for success. And we're all eager to hear in detail how we better -- how we can do better than we've done on each of these components.

Everyone understands that President Karzai's efforts and follow-through will be critical to the outcome. And we all understand that our ultimate goal, the cornerstone of our strategy, is to empower and transfer responsibility to the Afghans.

Some are trying to make much of the president's target deadline. I think we learned in Iraq that when our policy is to be in another country with troops for, quote, "as long as it takes," our hosts are very good at taking as long as they want.

The president is correct to set a target. It will help create a sense of urgency. And for the Afghans who chafe at foreign boots on their soil, it sends a message that while America will remain committed to the Afghan people, we aren't interested in a permanent occupation.

We can all agree that the next 18 months are crucial to reversing the momentum and laying the groundwork for a stable Afghanistan, one where the police and army can play a greater role in serving their citizens; and whose government focuses squarely on reclaiming legitimacy with the Afghan people; and where we have intelligence in place to engage in the counterterrorism missions that for years ahead we will need to be able to engage in.

We should all recognize that Americans, all of us, fundamentally share this challenge. The Senate voted unanimously to go to war in Afghanistan. It should humble all of us that today there are simply no easy options. We have no choice but to grapple with the complexities, reach the conclusion that best serves the American people, and work in partnership with other branches of government. And that is how a democracy fights a war.

The president's speech offered a vision of the path forward, but a great many questions remain, including how, simply beyond adding more resources, the U.S. and Afghan civilian strategy will improve, what balance we will strike between securing population centers and venturing into the Afghan countryside, how we intend to finance this increased commitment, and, crucially, how we intend to improve our partnership with Pakistan.

We look forward to the conversation this morning.

Senator Lugar?

LUGAR:

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen.

LUGAR:

We appreciate very much that you have come to the Foreign Relations Committee today.

The presence of all three of you underscores that success in Afghanistan depends on both military and civilian programs. We must sustain this civil military approach, given the interlocking elements to the newly announced strategy.

As we consider our course in Afghanistan, we (inaudible) according to how well they contribute to the United States national security.

The ultimate purpose of committing tens of thousands of new troops and tens of billions of additional dollars to the war effort in Afghanistan must be to enhance United States security and our vital national interests in the region.

Now, this may seem to be an obvious point, but during long wars, specific tactical objectives can become ends in themselves, disconnected from the broader strategic context or in accounting (inaudible) finite resources.

Pursuing Al Qaida or the Taliban and improving governance and economic opportunity in Afghanistan are important, but when our country commits the level of forces contemplated by the president to a sustained war, the objective must be absolutely fundamental to United States' security.

This is especially true at a time when our armed forces have been strained by many years of high deployment rates, our capacity for new government debt is limited, and our nation has not fully emerged from a severe recession.

The president made the case on Tuesday that what happens in Afghanistan can directly impact the safety of Americans. I believe that most Americans accept this point, based on the reality that the 9/11 attacks were conceived in Afghanistan and that the Taliban forces who protected Al Qaida are likely to become more resurgent if we leave.

But much more discussion is warranted on whether the Afghanistan mission is so central to our core national security that it necessitates huge spending increases and the deployment of a large portion of our finite combat capability.

In essence, we have to ask whether the costs of this deployment are justified than our overall national security context and whether we are mistakenly concentrating our forces to fight a terrorist enemy in a specific location, even as the global terrorist threat is becoming increasingly diffuse.

Terrorist cells that are associated with or sympathetic to Al Qaida exist in numerous countries: in Africa and the Middle East. Terrorist attacks were perpetrated in Europe by home-grown cells. Killing Taliban fighters and training Afghani soldiers and policemen are unlikely to substantially diminish these broader terrorist threats.

Moreover, the results of even the most skillful civil military campaign in Afghanistan are likely to be imperfect in the long run.

I do not doubt that the application of additional United States allied forces will result in a military setback for the Taliban. During this time, it is hoped that progress can be made in building Afghani security forces.

But over the long run, we should recognize that problems stemming from tribalism, corrupt governance and lack of economic opportunity in the country of Afghanistan are almost certain to persist, complicating efforts to ensure the central government can effectively govern the country and resist the Taliban when allied troops are withdrawn.

Even if the president's plan achieves the very best stabilization scenario, allowing for U.S. withdrawals on the schedule he contemplates, we may be responsible for most of the Afghan's (inaudible) defense and police budgets indefinitely in our budgets.

Perhaps, most importantly, it is not clear how an expanded military effort in Afghanistan addresses the problem of Taliban and Al Qaida safe havens across the border in Pakistan. If these safe havens persist, any strategy in Afghanistan will be substantially incomplete. Specifically, will Pakistan work with us to eliminate the leadership of Osama bin Laden and other major Al Qaida officials?

As hearings in our committee have underscored, the potential global impact of instability and a nuclear-armed Pakistan (inaudible) anything that is likely to happen in Afghanistan. The future direction of governance in Pakistan will have consequences for non-proliferation efforts, global economic stability, our relationships with India and China, and security in both the Middle East and South Asian regions, among other major issues.

The president did not dwell on Pakistan in his speech on Tuesday evening -- perhaps because sensitivities in that country to American influences and intentions are extremely delicate. But the president and his team must justify their plan not only the basis of how it will affect Afghanistan, but also on how it will impact our efforts to promote a much stronger alliance with Pakistan, but embraces vital common objectives.

Now, how you made these observations? I want to recognize that the president has been confronted with extremely difficult choices in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He and his team have worked through the problem carefully and deliberately to reach their conclusions. There aren't no (ph) options available that are guaranteed to succeed. And every conceivable course, from complete withdrawal to maintaining the status quo, to the plan outlined by the president, to an unrestrained, unlimited counter-insurgency campaign, has its own set of risks and costs for the United States.

The president deserves credit for accepting ownership of this difficult problem as we go forward, and for his clear advocacy expressed in his speech on Tuesday night.

Congress and the American people now must evaluate whether this course has a reasonable chance to succeed -- if success can be defined; and whether the objectives outlined are worth the expenditure of American and Afghan lives and treasure.

In this situation, the advocacy of the president and his national security team must be as broad-minded and thorough as his policy revealed (inaudible) to be. Within months, the president is likely to ask Congress for additional funds related to Afghanistan. In the meantime, the administration must be prepared to answer many difficult questions about his strategy as the American people study the potential consequences of the president's decision.

Once again, I thank our distinguished witnesses for their leadership, very substantial leadership, and I look forward to hearing their testimony today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

Let me just say that Senator Dodd may have to leave at some point during your testimony because he has to chair the -- the Bernanke hearings -- confirmation hearing today. So we respect the fact that that would be the reason he might have to go.

DODD:

I could've brought them here, Mr. Chairman, and have a joint hearing...

(LAUGHTER)

... between the Federal Reserve chairman and the...

(CROSSTALK)

KERRY:

And maybe he could've told us how to pay for this.

Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.

Mr. Secretary, if you would follow secretary of state, and then Admiral Mullen.

We look forward to your testimonies.

If you want to summarize, we can put your full testimonies in the record. Thank you.

CLINTON:

Thank you very much, Chairman Kerry and Ranking Member Lugar, and to all the members of this committee.

It is an honor for me to be here to testify before you, and also to continue the dialogue. Both the chairman and the ranking member's statements, as would be expected, were extraordinarily thoughtful, raised a lot of the hard questions that we're grappling with, and posed the challenges that we have to meet, both the administration and the Congress together.

And I want to thank the committee for the constructive role that it has played in helping us to address the difficult issues raised in the region of the world that we are focused on today.

When President Obama addressed the cadets at West Point, he set forth both the rationale and the difficult choices that his policy represents. At the end of a very long and thoughtful process that consisted of 10 meetings with the president and his national security team, and probably three times that many among the rest of us without the president.

The president concluded that among a range of very difficult decisions, this is the best way to protect our nation now and in the future. Extremists who have taken root in the border area of Pakistan and Afghanistan have attacked us before, they've attacked our allies. They are now attempting to destabilize, if not overthrow, the Pakistani government and take back enough control, if not the entire country of Afghanistan.

We believe that if we allow Afghanistan to become a failed state, if we allow the extremists to have the same safe havens that they used before 2001, they will have a greater capacity to regroup and attack again, and also to continue to provide the leadership, the operational and logistical support that they currently provide to global extremism.

We believe they could drag an entire region into chaos. And we know that, based on the reports from our military and civilian leadership, the situation in Afghanistan is serious and worsening.

Now, I know we don't want to go back in history and anchor our decision totally on what happened on September 11, 2001, but I think it does have to be part of the national debate.

The damage done with those attacks against our economic and military power centers was also an attack on my constituents, because at that time I had the honor of serving as senator from New York. I witnessed the tragic consequences to the lives of thousands of innocent families, the damage done to the economy, and the damage to our sense of security.

So I feel a personal responsibility to help protect our nation from such violence. And I entered into the very intense consultations we've been engaged in with that as my overriding goal, but without any preconceived notion of exactly the best way to meet that goal.

The case for action against Al Qaida and its allies has always been clear, but the United States' course of action over the last eight years has not. The fog of another war obscured our focus.

And while our attention was focused elsewhere, the Taliban regained momentum in Afghanistan and the extremist threat grew in Pakistan -- a country, as you know well, with 175 million people, a nuclear arsenal, and more than its share of challenges. So it was against this backdrop that the president called for this careful, thorough review of our strategy.

Our objectives are clear. We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to eliminate safe havens for those plotting against us, our allies and our interests. We will work to find reliable partners in the region to help us stabilize it, which we think is fundamental to our national security.

We will develop a long-term, sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past, primarily our abandonment of that region.

The duration of our military presence will be limited, but our civilian commitment must continue even as our troops begin coming home. Now, accomplishing this mission and ensuring the safety of the American people is not easy. It does mean sending more civilian troops and assistance to Afghanistan and significantly expanding our civilian efforts in Pakistan, which we have begun to do under the leadership of the chairman, the ranking member, and this committee.

We will be asking the young men and women who not only serve in the military, but are part of our civilian service team to be taking great risks and facing extraordinary sacrifices. I want to assure the committee that we will do everything we can to ensure that their sacrifices make our nation safer.

Now, the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan is serious, but it is not, in my view, as negative as frequently portrayed in public. The beginning of President Karzai's second term has opened a new window of opportunity.

We obviously have real concerns about the influence of corrupt officials in the Afghan government, and we will redouble our efforts to pursue them. But in his inauguration speech last month, I witnessed President Karzai call for a new compact with the Afghan people and the international community.

He pledged to combat corruption, improve governance, and deliver.

CLINTON:

His words were long in coming, but they were certainly welcome. They now must be matched with action. The Afghan people, the United States, and the international community must hold the Afghan government accountable.

We will help by working with our Afghan partners to strengthen institutions at every level. The president has outlined a timeframe for transition to Afghan responsibility.

As he said in his speech, the additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate our handing over of responsibility to Afghan forces as we begin to transfer our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.

Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground. This is not a cliff; this is a transition. The timeframe for the transition provides a sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government.

But it should be clear to everyone that unlike the past, the United States and our allies will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan. Our resolve in this fight is reflected in the commitment of troops since the president took office and in the significant civilian commitment that will continue long after our combat forces begin to leave.

Our civilian effort is already bearing fruit. Civilian experts and advisers are helping to craft policy inside government ministries. We are engaged in a process of certifying those ministries that we feel confident in providing funding for, and we will not provide it if we cannot certify them.

When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the very next day.

As our operations progress, our civ-mil coordination is growing even stronger. We are on the track to triple the number of civilian positions in Afghanistan to 974 by early next year. When we started there were about 320. They had six-month rotations.

Our checking of their duty rosters showed that a lot of them didn't spend more than 30 to 60 days inside of Afghanistan, even though they'd been assigned there. We have totally revamped how we are providing civilian assistance, and we believe that we are beginning to make a difference.

Each of these civilians leverage not only on average 10 partners from locally employed staff to experts with U.S.-funded NGOs. But what we're finding most interestingly is they leverage expertise within the United States military.

When you put an agricultural expert embedded in a battalion and -- along with the commanding officer of that battalion, they go looking for soldiers with ranching and farming experience, we have a real force multiplier.

And when I was in Kabul two weeks ago meeting with our civ-mil teams, those are exactly the kind of stories that I was told. And the military who are responsible for the clearing phase of our military operations told me repeatedly how important the civilian presence was. As one said to me, "I'm happy to supply whatever support these valuable civilians need, and we need more of them." This strategy will make that possible.

Not only do we believe we have the right people to achieve our objectives, we believe we have a sound strategy. We will be delivering high-impact economic assistance and bolstering Afghanistan's agricultural sector, the traditional core of the Afghan economy.

A number of my former colleagues have talked with me in the last months about the importance of agriculture and how they tried for eight years to help create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation -- in effect draw insurgents off the battlefield by moving them from poppies to pomegranates. Well, we have taken that advice seriously.

We also will support an Afghan-led effort to open the door to those Taliban who are willing to renounce Al Qaida, abandon violence, and wish to reintegrate into Afghan society. We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do not do so out of ideology, theology, or conviction, but, frankly, due to coercion and money.

The average Taliban fighter it is -- our information -- receives two to three times the monthly salary than the average Afghan soldier or police officer.

Our regional diplomacy complements this political approach, by seeking to mitigate external interference in Afghanistan and working to shift the calculus of neighboring countries. And that, of course, leads me to Pakistan.

A strong, stable, democratic Pakistan must be a key partner for the United States, and an ally in the fight against violent extremism. We've seen progress over this past year as people in Pakistan increasingly come to the view that we do share a common enemy. I heard that repeatedly during my recent visit. But we have a long way to go.

We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the potential of Pakistan and its people, demonstrating a long-term commitment. I spent three days in Pakistan last month, and most commonly I heard over and over again, "You left us before, will you do it again? You walked away. You left us holding the problem that you helped to create."

We want to send a clear message, as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation does, that we intend to be committed over the long term.

We will not be facing these challenges alone. We have 42 other troop-contributing countries. Our NATO ISAF allies have already made significant contributions. After this hearing, I will leave for Brussels

to begin the process of securing additional Afghan commitments. Ambassador Holbrooke is already there consulting with our allies.

We've had a very encouraging response in the conversations we've had thus far. And we're looking beyond NATO to build the strongest, broadest possible global coalition. Japan just announced a \$5 billion commitment to Afghanistan. We think other governments are beginning to recognize that this is a common fight against a common enemy.

Let me conclude where I began. We face a range of difficult choices, but the president's plan represents the best way we know to protect our nation today and in the future.

The task we face is as complex as any national security challenge in our lifetime. We will not succeed if people view this effort as the responsibility of a single party, a single agency within our government, or a single country.

We owe it to our troops and our civilians who will face these dangers to come together as Americans - and come together with our allies and the international partners to help accomplish this mission.

I look forward, as always, to continuing to work with you to achieve that goal. Thank you.

KERRY:

Thank you Madam Secretary.

Secretary Gates?

GATES:

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I'd like to provide an overview of the strategic thinking and context behind the president's decisions -- in particular the nexus among Al Qaida, the Taliban, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and our objectives, and how the president's strategy aims to accomplish that.

As the president first stated in March and reemphasized Tuesday night, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida and its extremist allies, and to prevent its return to both countries.

The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal.

Defeating Al Qaida and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions. They cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.

But Al Qaida is under great pressure now and dependent on the Taliban and other extremist groups for sustainment. The success of the Taliban would vastly strengthen Al Qaida's message to the Muslim world that violent extremists are on the winning side of history.

Put simply, the Taliban and Al Qaida have become symbiotic, each benefiting from the success and mythology of the other. Al Qaida leaders have stated this explicitly and repeatedly.



The lesson of the Afghan Taliban's revival for Al Qaida is that time and will are on their side. That with a Western defeat they could regain their strength and achieve a major strategic victory, as long as their senior leadership lives and can continue to inspire and attract followers and funding.

Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary even if not sufficient to the ultimate defeat of Al Qaida.

At the same time, one cannot separate the security situation in Afghanistan from the stability of Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of 175 million people, now also explicitly targeted by Islamic extremists.

Giving extremists breathing room in Pakistan led to the resurgence of the Taliban and more coordinated, sophisticated attacks in Afghanistan. By the same token, providing a sanctuary for extremists in southern and eastern Afghanistan would put yet more pressure on a Pakistani government already under attack from groups operating in the border region.

Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban in just the last year or so has become a real threat to Pakistan's domestic peace and stability, carrying out with Al Qaida's help escalating bombing attacks throughout the country.

Failure in Afghanistan would mean a Taliban takeover of much, if not most, of Afghanistan and likely a renewed civil war. Taliban renewed -- Taliban ruled areas could in short order become once again a sanctuary for Al Qaida, as well as a staging area for resurgent militant groups on the offensive in Pakistan.

Success in South and Central Asia by Islamic extremists, as was the case 20 years ago, would beget success on other fronts. It would strengthen the Al Qaida narrative, providing renewed opportunities for recruitment, fund-raising and more sophisticated operations.

It is true that Al Qaida and its followers can plot and execute attacks from a variety of locations, from Munich to London, to Denver. What makes the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan uniquely different from any other location, including Somalia and Yemen and elsewhere, is that this part of the world represents the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home.

For them to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for this country and the world.

Some say this is similar to the domino theory that underpinned and ultimately muddled the thinking behind the U.S. military escalation in Vietnam. The difference, however, is that we have very real and very recent history that shows just what can happen in this part of the world when extremists have breathing space, safe havens, and governments complicit with and supportive of their mission.

Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, in 1993 Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.

The president's new strategic concept aims to reverse the Taliban's momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country.

The essence of our civil military plan is to clear, hold, build and transfer. Beginning to transfer security responsibility to the Afghans in summer of 2011 is critical and, in my view, achievable.

July 2011, the time at which the president said the United States will begin to draw down our forces, will be the beginning of a process, an inflection point, if you will, of transition, where Afghan forces begin to assume great responsibility for security.

The pace and character of that drawdown, which districts and provinces are turned over and when, will be determined by conditions on the ground. It will be a gradual but inexorable process. It will be similar to the gradual but steady conditions-based drawdown that began to take place in Iraq about 14 months after the surge began there.

As with so many issues in the national security and defense arena, the real challenge in Afghanistan is finding the right balance. The prompt dispatch of some 30,000 U.S. combat troops on top of the 21,000 already ordered by the president earlier this year sends a certain message of the president's resolve to both our partners and our adversaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

When this build-up is complete, total U.S. force levels in Afghanistan will have more than doubled under President Obama's orders to about 100,000 troops. Whether you agree with what we are doing or not, there should be no doubting at home or abroad this president's commitment to the success of this mission.

On the other hand, we have to send an equally strong message to the Afghan government that when all is said and done, the United States military is not going to be there to protect them forever. That the Afghans must step up to the plate and do the things necessary that will allow them to take primary responsibility for defending their own country, and do so with a sense of purpose and urgency. This is the balance we're trying to achieve, and I believe the president's plan provides both the resources and the flexibility to do so.

Making this transition possible requires accelerating the development of a significantly larger and more capable Afghan army and police to intensive partnering with ISAF forces, especially in combat. Even after we transfer security responsibility to the Afghans and draw down our combat forces, the United States will continue to support their development as an important partner for the long haul. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos and then into Taliban hands.

Let me offer a couple of closing thoughts.

GATES:

The president believes, as I do, that in the end we cannot defeat Al Qaida and its toxic ideology without improving and stabilizing the security situation in Afghanistan.

The president's decision offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia, all necessary to protect (inaudible), our allies, and our vital interests.

As always, the heaviest burden will fall on the men and women who have volunteered and re- volunteered to serve their country in uniform. I know they will be uppermost in our minds and in our prayers as we take on this arduous but vitally important mission.

Thank you.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Secretary Gates.

Admiral Mullen?

MULLEN:

Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, and distinguished members of this committee, thank you for your time today.

I'd also like to express my appreciation for all the work this committee has done to get the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill passed. And there -- in these discussions it can be easily lost that \$7.5 billion is actually non-military aid, which I think, having spent a lot of time in that part of the world, is absolutely critical.

And the other part of it is that it's over an extended period of time. For too long in Pakistan, as many of you know, it's been year- to-year. And so that five year commitment is really significant.

And I want to ensure you, in the debates and the deliberations that we've had in the administration with respect to this strategy in this region, that there was an enormous amount of time spent on Pakistan.

And, Chairman, specifically to your -- your focus on this, that that was a very critical part of the discussion, as well. And, by and large, the principals agreed on the need to have a sustained, long- term partnership approach with Pakistan, even given the complexities there.

And then the linkage -- I've come to believe that the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan is almost absolute. And that the outcome in Afghanistan bears directly on Pakistan's future, and how they'll act and how they see their future. So a stable, supportive Afghanistan will make a big difference in how Pakistan sees its future.

I support fully and without hesitation the president's decision and appreciate the opportunity to contribute to what I believe was a healthy and productive discussion. I've seen lots of internal debates on national security issues in the time that I've been chairman, but I can honestly say that there's not one issue that was so thoroughly and thoughtfully considered as this one, as in fact it should be, as Secretary Clinton said, because this is the most complex national security issue that faces us.

It's also, in my -- in my belief, directly tied to our vital national interests.

Every military leader in the chain of command, as well as those of the Joint Chiefs, was given voice, and every single individual used it. We now have before us a strategy that more appropriately matches us to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan, and resources -- resources matched more

appropriately to that strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum as quickly as possible, focusing immediately on 2010.

And given the stakes in Afghanistan for our own national security, as well as that of our partners around the world, I believe that the time we took was -- was well worth it. Secretaries Clinton and Gates have already walked you through the policy issues -- the large policy issues in question, and I won't repeat them here.

But from a purely military perspective, I believe our new approach does three critical things. First, by providing more discreet objectives, it offers better guidance to commanders on the ground about how to employ their forces.

They will still work to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven. They will still strive to protect the Afghan people who remain the center of gravity in Afghanistan. They will still pursue major elements of the counterinsurgency campaign desired and designed by General McChrystal, which as we all know involves at least some measure of active counterterrorism operations.

But now they will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on Al Qaida's leadership, and by more effectively working to degrade the Taliban's influence, and by streamlining and accelerating the growth of competent Afghan national security forces.

At its core, our strategy is about providing breathing space for the Afghan's to secure their own people and to stabilize their own country. It's about partnering and mentoring just as much, if not more so, than it is about fighting and combat.

Where once we believed that finishing the job meant to a large degree do it ourselves, we now know it cannot truly or permanently be done by anyone other than the Afghans themselves.

Fully a third of the United States troops in theater are partnered with Afghan forces as we speak, and I expect that number to rapidly grow over the next year.

Secondly, but not insignificantly, this new strategy gives commanders on the ground the resources and the support they need to reverse the momentum of the Taliban insurgency and to accomplish these more limited objectives.

I said it before and I believe it still today that this region is the epicenter of global Islamic extremism. And I acknowledge that there are federated terrorists globally, but this is the epicenter. It's the place from which we were attacked on 9/11, as has been discussed. And should we be hit again, it's the place from which I am convinced the planning, training, financing and leadership will emanate.

Al Qaida may, in fact, be the architect of such an attack, but the Taliban will be the bricklayers. Though hardly a uniform body, Taliban groups have grown bolder and more sophisticated.

I saw that just a few months ago in the Korengal Valley, where Taliban forces attacked coalition outposts using what I would call almost conventional small unit tactics. Their fighters were better organized and better equipped than they were just one year ago. That's been the case for the last three years.

In fact, coalition forces experienced a record number -- a record level of violence over the last year, up 60 percent in 2009 when compared to 2008. And through brutal intimidation, the Taliban has established shadow governments across the country, coercing the reluctant support of many locals and challenging the authority of elected leaders and state institutions.

Indeed, we believe the insurgency has achieved a dominant influence in 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. To say there is no serious of Afghanistan falling once again into Taliban hands ignores the audacity of even the insurgency's most public statements.

And to argue that, should they have that power, the Taliban would not at least tolerate the presence of Al Qaida on Afghan soil is to ignore both the recent past and the evidence we see everyday of collusion between these factions on both sides of the Af-Pak border.

The cost of failure then is grave. That is why the president's decision for the extended surge to Afghanistan of 30,000 additional troops is so important. It gets the most U.S. force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative.

It validates our adherence to a counterinsurgency approach, and it offers our troops in Afghanistan the best possible chance to set the security conditions for the Afghan people to see our commitment to their future, for the Karzai government to know our strong desire to see his promised reforms, and for the Afghan Taliban to understand they will not and cannot take back Afghanistan, and, finally, for those beyond Afghanistan who support the Taliban or who would see the return of Al Qaida to realize the futility of their pursuit.

I should add that the reinforcements come on top of the 21,000 troops the president ordered shortly after taking office, troops which have already made a huge difference in the southern Helmand Valley.

But as I have testified before, Mr. Chairman, no amount of troops in no amount of time will ever be enough to completely achieve success in such a fight. They simply must be accompanied by good governance and healthy public administration.

This, not troop numbers, is the area of my greatest concern. Like everyone else, I look forward to the working with the Karzai government, but we must have the support of the interagency and international communities as well.

And that brings me to my final point. The president's new strategy still recognized the criticality of a broad-based approach to regional problems. He does not view Afghanistan in isolation, any more than he views the ties between Al Qaida and the Taliban as superficial.

He's called for -- for a stronger and more productive cooperation with neighboring Pakistan, which is likewise under the threat from radical elements and whose support remains vital to our ability to eliminate those safe havens.

He has pledged, and we in the military welcome, renewed emphasis on securing more civilian expertise to the effort, more contributions by other NATO nations, and a realistic plan to transition responsibilities to the Afghans.

His is a more balanced, more flexible, and more achievable strategy than we've had in the past, one based on pragmatism and real possibilities.

And speaking for the 2.2 million men and women who must go execute this and who, with their families, have borne the brunt of the stress and the strain of eight years of constant combat, I support the president's decision and appreciate his leadership.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Admiral.

Thank you, each of you, for the comprehensive statements that are very, very helpful.

Let me focus in, if I can on -- Secretary Gates, you particularly talked about the nexus with respect to the Al Qaida-Taliban relationship and why Afghanistan is important in that.

Last night I had dinner with a group of congressmen, a number of who either don't see the nexus or don't accept it, or, you know, somehow feel that we can get by notwithstanding whatever nexus there is; that it doesn't rise to the level -- in a sense, building on Senator Lugar's opening statement where he sort of talked about the question of, you know, being fixated on Al Qaida and committing a certain number of troops that may be out of proportion to the level of threat.

You both, both Secretary Clinton and you Secretary Gates, addressed this in your statements, but there's a way in which I think somehow in the statements you don't always hear the exclamation point of it.

I'd like to ask you -- I mean, if we have Congress and we have members of this committee who disagree with the decision and who feel that somehow that nexus is not sufficient; that it brings this national security threat to a level that says you got to have 100,000 troops, et cetera -- you know the arguments.

What I want you to now, if you can, is put the exclamation point on it. You know, what's the -- you know, how do you convey, through your experience and the stakes that you're trying to protect, what is really at stake here so people understand why the president, who clearly at West Point said, you know, he doesn't take this decision lightly -- and we all understand that, nobody would to make this kind of commitment.

What is it, in the simplest of terms, that compels you to say, Al Qaida in Pakistan remains a sufficient factor to require 100,000 troops in Afghanistan?

GATES:

First of all, I would say that I consider the situation today in this respect more dangerous than it was a year or 18 months ago. Because it is clear that just on the Pakistani side of the border that Al Qaida is deeply involved with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan -- the Pakistani Taliban -- in planning attacks against the Pakistani government and people and attempting to destabilize that government.

And the Al Qaida provides them with technical information, provides them with operational information and support.

Al Qaida also is supportive of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist group that is responsible for the bombings in Mumbai. And Al Qaida is providing them with targeting information and helping them in their plotting in India -- clearly with the idea of provoking a conflict between India and Pakistan that would destabilize Pakistan.

They also are very much involved with the Afghan Taliban. And so they are supporting all of these different groups in ways that are destabilizing, not just for Afghanistan, but for the entire region. And Al Qaida is at the heart of it.

And whether or not the terrorists are home-grown, when we trace their roots, they almost all end up back in this border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether they're from the United States or Somalia or the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

GATES:

And so what we see is Al Qaida, despite their being under pressure and despite their limited numbers, and despite the fact that there are few of them in Afghanistan right now, that they are taking advantage of the situation in the region to play a very destabilizing and dangerous role.

What they have learned, as I suggested in my remarks, is that in an ungoverned space, you have the opportunity to recover, reconstitute and reassert yourself, which is exactly what the Taliban did in Pakistan over a period of about three years; and now are in a position where, with their momentum, are challenging, successfully to this point, significant numbers of modern armies.

So the -- the point is that if given -- if parts of southern and eastern Afghanistan once again come under the control of the Taliban, that would be space in which the Al Qaida could reconstitute itself very much as the Taliban did in Pakistan just in recent years, and then expand their operations and their capabilities to launch attacks against Europe and the United States and really all over the world.

KERRY:

So -- go ahead.

CLINTON:

Chairman, you know, I would just add to what Secretary Gates said, the following three points.

First, we have increasingly come to see these organizations not as separate independent operators that occasionally cooperate with one another, but as part of a syndicate of terrorism. They -- the level of operational cooperation, training equipping, financing has grown exponentially. And at the head of the table, like an old mafia kind of diagram, sits Al Qaida.

And Al Qaida still has much greater access to the financing that comes from the Gulf and is able then to support a lot of their Taliban partners in their various undertakings. Al Qaida's experience in recruiting foreign fighters has aided and abetted certain of the Taliban operations inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani military has told us that they've picked up foreign fighters in South Waziristan

and they continue in training of new recruits, people that then go off to Yemen or Somalia, or indeed Denver, has a -- a global reach that is unmatched.

Secondly, as Admiral Mullen said, the planning and the sort of brains of the operation, with respect to plots against us, remains Al Qaida, but increasingly the Taliban are the bricklayers. You know, the recent arrests here in our own country trace back to Pakistan and trace back, certainly in the case of Zazi, directly to a -- an Al Qaida-originated training camp and training program.

But finally, and perhaps most chillingly, the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear power raises the stakes enormously. There is no doubt in any of our minds that Al Qaida seeks nuclear material, seeks access to nuclear weapons. The challenges within the Pakistani military that Admiral Mullen can address, because he's done yeoman's work in working on building a better relationship.

We walked away from the Pakistani military, you know? We were sanctioned. We couldn't cooperate with them. And there's a real gap between the leadership of the Pakistani military that ever trained in or connected with the American or the British or the Australian military and sort of the younger officers.

And there's a -- there's a -- there's a real struggle going on for influence, for the kind of advantage that would give this syndicate of terror just a horrific challenge to all of us. But I think -- if Admiral Mullen, if you have the time, to -- to add to that.

MULLEN:

Chairman, I -- I certainly agree with the nexus, and I've watched it over the last year to two that these groups are coming together. And -- and this -- this -- Secretary Gates talked about the linkage between the LET and Al Qaida. And it's actually not -- so it's not local anymore. And that's -- that is an example of the collaboration that's going on with -- with all these units.

I was struck, as I'm sure you were, in Mumbai that a -- a terrorist outfit could literally generate that kind of attack and then bring two nation states closer to conflict. That is not the -- an achievement lost on -- on anyone that observed that. And those kinds of plots continue. The ability to destabilize Pakistan, seeking that nuclear -- those nuclear materials and weapons. It's extraordinarily dangerous.

And I recognize both the -- the -- the price we pay in blood and treasure and the cost that it costs our government specifically. The -- these and -- and my own view of this is that -- that without addressing this, the potential risks of something recurring on the order of what happened before is out there, and the enormous costs that are -- would be associated with that.

So this decision and investment now is absolutely critical. And the terrorist central cells that are there on this border, that's really -- this is really the headquarters. There -- there are other franchise cells throughout in places like Yemen and Somalia, but this is the most dangerous one. They all need to be addressed. This has a significantly more capable center of gravity, if you will, because of all the organizations that are associated with Al Qaida in this border area.

KERRY:

I appreciate that.



GATES:

Can I just add one sentence?

KERRY:

Please?

GATES:

Just in terms of underscoring the central role of Al Qaida in the Afghan-Pakistan border area.

The reality is that Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula places high value on their affiliation with Al Qaida in that border area. And there is ample intelligence showing other terrorist groups that basically are in the application process to become affiliates of Al Qaida. So the central mythology and the central role of these people is still there.

KERRY:

Well, let me just say that I think that it's going to be very important in the next days to really build this linkage and case so that people have a real understanding of the importance.

And it obviously begs the question -- and I don't want to abuse the time periods here, so I won't ask it now. I'm sure colleagues will follow up on it. But it clearly begs the question of Pakistan's cooperation, and what we can expect in these next months. And I'm sure colleagues will follow up on that.

I did note -- want to mention congratulations on Chelsea's engagement. I just finished playing wedding planner for my younger daughter, and my advice is hire a professional.

(LAUGHTER)

CLINTON:

Are -- are you available?

(LAUGHTER)

KERRY:

I am not -- distinctly not a professional.

Senator Lugar?

LUGAR:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me follow up on your questions, as well as the responses of the witnesses.

Secretary Clinton, in your testimony, on page 2, you said, "We will work with the Afghan and Pakistani governments to eliminate safe havens for those plotting attacks against us, our lives, and our interests."

As a third point, you said, "We will develop a long-term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so we do not repeat the mistakes of the past."

Now -- each of you in -- in your testimony, in response to the thought that Al Qaida may be diffuse as well as other terrorist groups (inaudible). But this border area is significantly different, Admiral Mullen pointed out again, and significantly different as a base for the greatest threat.

And Secretary Gates, you just mentioned how even the Maghreb and (inaudible) when they sort of feed in to either discourage (inaudible) intellectual, whatever you want to call it, leadership that is coming out of the situation.

Now, the problem that I want to -- ask each of you to express is that we have heard you say we believe that a strong, stable democratic Pakistan -- must be a key partner for the United States, an ally against violent extremism. Of course, that is correct.

But a number of historians (inaudible) come before this committee in previous discussions of this. And they've made comments such as this, fairly or not, that the Al Qaida in Afghanistan has sometimes been useful for Pakistan to at least influence, if not, control things over in Afghanistan so that India would not have an influence.

When the Indians were here visiting with you recently, they certainly have expressed some feeling exclusion that came not only from Pakistan, but Pakistan's use of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Now, recently the three of you have (inaudible) diplomacy in Pakistan and collectively with the president, the vice president, General Jones and others; have convinced the Pakistani military that they ought to do something about Pakistani Taliban in Swat Valley and elsewhere, and maybe that's a change in their viewpoint. But we -- we still get back to the point that we're talking about this border area.

And it has two countries. On one side, we are going to place additional troops dealing with these 11 provinces in Afghanistan. What is not clear is precisely what is going to happen in Pakistan in this alliance of the (inaudible) U.S. and Pakistan, in this case.

And you will say, well, for good reason. Don't be naive. This is a very difficult situation. As you said, Secretary Clinton, we have a long way to go. This is a growing relationship.

You've been out on the countryside visiting places the president of the country has not chosen to visit as he's huddled there in the capital -- a very tough business.

But what I -- I suppose asking today -- and I agree with the chairman, all the concentration on the number of troops, the number of months, whatever is going to happen in the urban areas of the 11 province -- this is -- this is important. But -- but what is crucial is whether any of the three of you, or the three of you collectively, or the president, the vice president, General Jones, anyone else in your team is going to be able to deal with the leadership in Pakistan, whether it be the civil, military or intelligence leadership.

So as a matter of fact they are prepared to face what we are all seeing as the problem: the border area, Al Qaida there, Osama bin Laden there. No one wants to talk about Osama bin Laden. Isn't this a major target? Isn't this a reason why continued warfare is necessary?

If it is so, we better talk about it directly to the Pakistanis. And this being a public hearing, the Pakistanis are hearing that loud and clear. And -- and they're going to have to respond.

Now, it -- it's all well and good for us to say they've got to be stable over the long run because they've got nuclear weapons, and this is -- well, of course, they need to be stable. They understand that. They often have resented us talking about their nuclear weapons, quite apart from the thought we might protect them and the nuclear weapons in our own interests.

Now, what I'd like to ask of any of the three of you is, progressing from the president's plan, that's not the end of the story. Whether this plan works or not depends upon maybe personal diplomacy and the ability of leadership in Pakistan to come to very different significant conclusions from the past in terms of their welfare. How rapidly can this occur? In twelve months? Eighteen months? Two years?

In other words, it better occur soon or they -- we're going to have the shifting of people back and forth across the border even as we have military success, as we will, in the provinces of Afghanistan.

Will anyone want to respond?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator Lugar, I'll start, and then I'm sure my colleagues would want to add to what I say.

I share your sense of urgency, your analysis of the challenges that we confront, but I think we have to look very clear-eyed at where we are starting from.

When I went through my round of confirmation hearings and then sort of introductory hearings in the House -- and that was back in January -- I said at the time that it was hard to believe that the Pakistani government was not going after the direct threats that it faced from within its own borders, and that caused a big outcry in Pakistan.

But I think it's significant that we're sitting here today, having seen two major military operations after the failure of some kind of accommodation and unsuccessful peace agreements were finally recognized.

CLINTON:

We are now making the case to our counterparts in Pakistan, both in the civilian and the military leadership, that the efforts they have made against the TTP, primarily in Swat and now in -- in Waziristan and the Mehsud tribal core, are necessary but far from sufficient efforts to protect themselves. That this syndicate, this network of terrorism has to be addressed; that whatever the utility of any of these groups might have been in the past, they have morphed into a form that poses a threat to the Pakistani government.

And this is an argument that I think takes time to make. It is certainly an argument each of us plus others have carried repeatedly and will continue to do so.

But there's a great gulf of mistrust. Secretary Gates can speak very eloquently, since he was involved in the 1980s in working with the Pakistani government to put together the Mujahedeen that led to the overthrow of the Soviet Union, but which the Pakistanis feel like we then walked away from helping them cope with.

And they accommodated themselves. They went into survival mode and maybe even saw some certain advantages flowing from those relationships, advantages that they were kind of making lemonade out of lemons in order to obtain.

So I think your analysis is right, but we're dealing with a sovereign country that has a very clear idea of who they think their overall enemy is -- mainly India -- but who has slowly been convinced because of what's happened inside their own territory that they have to take action. And I think that that will continue to lead to positive steps.

LUGAR:

Thank you.

KERRY:

Senator Feingold?

FEINGOLD:

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor to have this distinguished panel of witnesses here today. I'm pleased that the president has set a goal for when we'll be reducing troop levels.

However, I am disappointed that he's decided to escalate our military presence and did not give any goal or timeframe for when our massive military operation in Afghanistan will actually end.

I do not support the decision to prolong and expand a risky and unsustainable strategy in the region. And while I support ongoing civilian engagement in Afghanistan and counterterrorism efforts in the region, I do not believe more American lives should be risked for a war that no longer serves our most pressing national security interests.

We must promptly transition to a sustainable, targeted counterterrorism strategy for the region and the world, one that is agile and global as the enemy we confront, Al Qaida.

So (inaudible) in focusing so much of our attention and resources on Afghanistan, I think we need a comprehensive global strategy that divides Al Qaida from populations that have principally local grievances. We need to improve our intelligence capabilities, build partnerships with legitimate local partners, and, if appropriate, utilize targeted tactical operations.

Secretary Gates, you've argued that we must continue to pour our resources in Afghanistan or it would be perceived as a victory by Al Qaida. And I'd say I am somewhat less concerned about the perception of victory and more focused on the actual defeating of Al Qaida for real.

I think the best way to do that is to recognize that we're dealing, as you have recognized, a global -- with a global enemy with a very limited presence in Afghanistan. Al Qaida's stated objective is to bankrupt the United States. So I guess my first question is, do you at least acknowledge that investing over \$100 billion in just one country in one year alone risks degrading our long term ability to relentlessly pursue Al Qaida around the globe? Secretary Gates?

GATES:

I think -- first of all, just for clarity, the cost that we are looking at for fiscal year 2010 for both the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will be about \$20 billion less than we spent in 2008. And I realize that's small comfort given how much we spent in 2008.

But I think the -- I go back to the chairman's -- to the chairman's comment. What are the consequences? What are the costs of Taliban being able to control space in Afghanistan and on the Pakistani side of the border that gives Al Qaida the ability to reconstitute itself and perhaps provoke a war between India and Pakistan or get access to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.

FEINGOLD:

Mr. Gates, I understand that's your view of not doing something. My question is, once we spend this \$100 billion, what are the consequences for our resources in all the other places that we're talking about?

(CROSSTALK)

FEINGOLD:

There's another side to this.

GATES:

Well, I think -- I think that we have, frankly, adequately resourced the effort to go after terrorism on a global basis. We certainly have had successful operation, some of which have been in the newspapers.

But -- and we are devoting a lot of effort and have received resources from the Congress to the kind of partnering that you have described in terms of trying to root out these terrorist organizations.

I will tell you, having come back to government after being gone for 13 or 14 years, the -- the improvement in the quality of our intelligence, in terms of being able to go after terrorists and in the depth of our intelligence liaison relationships with other countries, is a world apart from what I saw in 1993 when I retired. So we have made, I think, good investments, and these investments continue in terms of going after the global threat. But it's important to recognize where the home nest is and to deal with that, as well.

FEINGOLD:

Well, I appreciate that. I question whether we're adequately resourcing some other critical places around the world that I've spent a fair amount of time studying. I won't get into the specifics of it, but it's something we can discuss in the future.

Admiral Mullen, in his assessment General McChrystal stated that even a properly resourced military strategy would still leave large swathes of Afghanistan outside government control. Indeed as we've increased levels of troops in the south, attacks have grown more deadly in the north. What are the chances that an increase in troop levels will only push militants into different regions?

MULLEN:

Sir, the principal threat is, I think, will continue to remain in the south and in the east. We recognize in the north over the last year or so that it has gotten more difficult.

But General McChrystal -- General McChrystal is confident that the spread, if you will, there and also to some degree to the west, although not really significant at this point, can be -- can be handled by our NATO forces. And, in fact, the NATO forces that -- we have expectations for receiving additional NATO forces here, commitments in the near future to address that.

His main effort is in the south. That really is where he will focus most of his troops, supported by his efforts in the east. And then that really gets to the most critical areas from a posturing standpoint, from a border standpoint.

And the intent of this strategy, and his certainly to support it, is not to do counterinsurgency all over the country. We don't see it growing to a point, at this point, where it would turn into something equal to the kind of threat that we have and see in the south and in the east up north.

FEINGOLD:

Admiral, several witnesses testified before this committee that the majority of people who are currently fighting in Afghanistan do not have an international terrorist agenda, but rather, quote, "tend to coalesce against what is perceived as an outsider." And one former CIA station chief in Islamabad has testified that if we send 40,000 additional troops to Afghanistan it would only produce 40,000 additional militants.

Actually I'd like both you and Secretary Clinton to answer this. Is there a danger that our current strategy has provoked greater militancy and has thereby made it harder for us to isolate members of Al Qaida?

MULLEN:

We haven't seen this. I think General McChrystal said not to long after he got there -- and this gets to the whole occupation issue. We know we're not an occupying force. Obviously, our actions need to support our intent with respect to that, which is very clear.

But the Afghans that we engage with are much more concerned with what we do with our forces as opposed to how many they are. McChrystal has shifted the focus to secure them, population security for them. That's what they seek more than anything else right now.

So we certainly -- while I recognize that particularly because of history, we haven't seen that extensively, nor have we seen an extensive generation of additional militants per say, although that is a concern. And we're looking to get as many of them off the battlefield in this new strategy as possible, as well, with respect -- by reconciliation, reintegration, et cetera. But that's got to happen through security, better security.

FEINGOLD:

Thank you.

Madam Secretary?

CLINTON:

Senator, I would just add three points. One, General McChrystal significantly changed the way that our military forces in NATO ISAF conduct themselves with respect to the civilian population. He significantly tightened the rules for air support for any kind of combat in order to limit the number of civilian casualties. And he also issued orders concerning nighttime raids, particularly with the use of dogs.

When I was in Afghanistan I had a number of people tell us that made a huge difference.

Secondly, in every reliable research that I have access to there is no appetite for the return of the Taliban whatsoever. What we have seen an increase in over the last several years has been more hedging -- that people are understandably nervous about what's the outcome, and, "Who's side should I and my family end up on?" But there is no appetite for the return of the Taliban. And we do not see what is a legitimate concern to keep in mind: the potential reaction that would lead to increased insurgents.

We also know that a lot of the people who are in the Taliban do not share the overall goal, which has morphed. You know, the Mullah Omar core group that heads the Afghan Taliban and is closely allied with Al Qaida has morphed into not just a nationalistic Islamist group but now kind of buying into this caliphate idea. And, therefore, a lot of the people who have been conscripted, in effect, into service on behalf of the Taliban have no real allegiance.

So part of the challenge here -- and it's something that we are working on with President Karzai. Obviously we have a whole team embedded in NATO ISAF under retired British general, General Lamb, who had played a major role in Iraq with the Sons of Iraq and the Awakening, is to begin to do a much more thoughtful job to separate out.

I mean, the Taliban are a home-grown entity. The Talib (ph), the students, you know, they rose up in part against the oppression of the Soviet regime, the chaos of the warlord era, and a desire to have an Islamist state that imposed sharia, order, et cetera.

So we know that there is an opportunity for those who renounce Al Qaida violence, et cetera, to be reintegrated and to play a part in the political system. Now, we might like their political agenda -- I'll just put that on the table. You know, Senator Boxer and Senator Shaheen and I would not particularly be enthusiastic about a non-violent, peaceful Taliban political movement that legitimately played within

the democracy. But, you know, there is that possibility that I think we have to recognize if they do move into reintegration.

FEINGOLD:

My time's up. I just want to say, Madam Secretary, thank you for a thoughtful answer.

I'm sure you'd agree that it's at our peril that we minimize the potential feelings of the Afghan people for an extended presence there. I know you're aware of that, but be so careful not to minimize the importance of that.

I thank the chair.

KERRY:

Thank you, Senator Feingold.

Senator Corker?

CORKER:

Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank each of you for your service. I very much respect the positions that each of you hold, and realize that there are no easy answers. I know this has been very complex, and I know it's very agonizing to come before panels like this when you're part of the administration.

I do hope -- and I see the chairman has left -- but since this is so Pakistan-centric, I hope that Anne Patterson -- I know she's here -- will be made available, and we will have hearings with her and others involved in Pakistan -- maybe Petraeus. My understanding is we're trying to set up McChrystal and Eikenberry this next week. Is that correct?

CLINTON:

Senator Corker, that is correct. And we would certainly make any witness available. We might want to suggest that you plan a short public hearing and a longer classified hearing. I think that would be very, very useful to get at a lot of the issues that both Senator Lugar and Chairman Kerry have raised.

CORKER:

Well, I think if we're going to have the classified briefing -- which would be great -- the station chief in Pakistan would be very beneficial. But y'all can make those decisions.

I hope at least we'll have a public hearing with Anne Patterson, who is an outstanding ambassador and certainly knows what's happening in that area.

CORKER:



You -- you can't help but be in Afghanistan and -- and know that part of what is driving what we're doing there is just the inertia, the fact that we're there and we're loathe to -- to leave before success, whatever that means, and the fact that we're trying to prove to Pakistan and Afghanistan citizens that we're -- that we're -- that we're real friends.

So my point is, is much of what you all have said no doubt is true, but there's an underlying current that creates an inertia, I think, for us to be there. And I know a lot of comments have been made about the fact that it's very clear what we're doing now, and maybe we weren't clear in the past, and there's no doubt we were not clear in the past.

I would say that I still -- I have average intelligence. And I think it's still pretty unclear to me what we're doing. I know last March the president announced a more narrowed mission, supposedly. It was evident to me it was anything but a more narrowed mission. I know on September 22nd, General Jones came in and created -- and showed us the metrics that are being used to measure what's happening. I know the chairman was present.

It was very evident -- and I don't mean to be pejorative -- but we were nation-building in Afghanistan. The metrics very much lay out a nation-building in Afghanistan. Richard Holbrooke has got a whole team of people that he would call it rebuilding a nation, because he certainly goes back in history to the times when Afghanistan was more of a functioning country.

But my point is, you know, look, there's no question that the metrics laid out in September were nation-building. I met with Secretary Gates, who I greatly respect, at the Pentagon, and we talked about a partial nation-building. And now we talk about, you know, coming home in 18 months with our troops. I realize civilians will stay after that point in time, and I realize that the -- the coming home part, based on testimony yesterday, was really just a throwaway comment to sort of appease people who are concerned about the build-up.

So to me, it's really not clear -- and I think that the American people who are going to be -- the -- the civilian side in particular is going to be for decades, the whole budget of Afghanistan today is about \$890 million to 400,000 security troops we're talking about, or about \$10 billion a year.

And I'm wondering, Madam Secretary, whether it would make sense to really lay out clearly what all of this means from the standpoint of support for the next several decades, the amount of civilian activity, and -- and just from the standpoint of security, what we really anticipate doing over time.

I know in 18 months the build-up security-wise is going to be lesser than 400,000, but I know over time, at least unless it's changed again, that has been our goal between Afghan police and army.

So I would say to you that it's been very unclear and it's been like a sine wave over the last nine months as to what we're actually doing there. So I'd love some edification.

CLINTON:

Well -- well, Senator Corker, I'll do my best. And then perhaps I could bring in some reinforcements here on either side of me.

First, let me just provide the context the best I can. In our view, looking back, we never adequately resourced the mission in Afghanistan. That's just a fact. I think this committee's work and reports certainly give a lot of credence and support to that view.

There were basically 30,000 troops for a number of years with an additional, you know, 30,000, 40,000 NATO troops, and we didn't really have the kind of commitment that we were -- that we were needing. We also transferred a lot of the assets that should have been used to support the troops we had in Afghanistan to Iraq. That's just a fact, as well.

So when the president took office, there were backed-up requests for additional troops that had been in the pipeline. And I personally know several of the people who were commanders on the ground in Afghanistan going back to '01. There were always additional troop requests, which, because of the move toward Iraq, were never given what was requested.

So that's part of the history. There was a pending troop request that the Bush administration -- and Secretary Gates can speak to this -- looked on favorably as they were going out the door, 17,000 troops, and then a request they left for President Obama of 21,000.

And so right out of the bat, the president is, you know, given a -- what is a 38,000 troop request, and he orders a very quick study that Bruce Riedel, a very experienced intelligence professional, headed up, along with Richard Holbrooke and Michele Flournoy from the Defense Department.

And as the president said when he made the announcement back in March, we're going to go forward with these troops. They've been pending. There seems to be an argument for them. Our goal is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaida. We're changing commanders, something that is rare to do, but we're going to look at this again as soon as the election's over, because the election season in Afghanistan was taking hold.

Well, that's exactly what we've done. Unfortunately, the election lasted a very long time, until, thanks to Chairman Kerry, we finally began to bring it to a conclusion.

So I -- I don't blame you, and I don't blame anybody for wondering, you know, where we are because of the history we inherited and our effort to, frankly, make sense and rationalize what was happening and to put it into an integrated civilian-military strategy.

One of the first things President Karzai said to me when I saw him in Kabul was, "I'm confused." You know, and he talked about how -- he said, I understood what we were supposed to be doing from '01 to '05. It was the war on terror. And then, all of a sudden, I start hearing people in your government saying we didn't need to kill bin Laden and Mullah Omar, and I didn't know what that meant.

Well, so there's been some confusion, which, frankly, this administration has been trying to sort through, and we think we've got it about as right as you can get it, given where we started from.

There is no doubt that putting these additional troops in, in our mind, is necessary to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, to demonstrate clearly to both the Afghans and the Pakistanis that we are serious about our resolve to work with them to try to stabilize their two countries, improve their security situation, and that we know it cannot be just a military undertaking. That's why we're emphasizing the civilian side of it.

So ultimately, Senator, we are going to have to maintain civilian support for Afghanistan and Pakistan going forward. We think that's in our national interest to do so.

But I just want to make one final point. The July 2011 date is the date on which we begin to transfer authority and responsibility to Afghan security forces. Now, what we have tried to demonstrate is that

the pace, the size of the drawdown is going to be determined in a responsible manner based on the conditions that exist at the time.

And if things are going well, a larger number of forces will be transitioned out, and the Afghans will be expected to take on greater responsibility. So it is not contradictory to set a date certain, yet to condition it on the reality that we confront at that time.

GATES:

Let me just say a word. I know that -- time to move on. But, first of all, one of my concerns coming out of the decisions in March was that it was clear they were interpreted as -- as providing for full-scale nation-building and creating a strong central government in -- in Afghanistan.

CORKER:

As were (ph) the metrics.

GATES:

Neither of which -- neither of which is -- is achievable in any realistic timeframe or sustainable, given the costs and everything else. So I would describe in just a few sentences what I believe our strategy is today, what -- what these decisions represent.

It is to reverse the momentum of the Taliban. It is to deny them control of territory in Afghanistan. It is to degrade their military capabilities and, at the same time, grow and strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan national security forces so that they can manage the internal security of their own country, because they're dealing with better capabilities on their side and degraded capabilities on the Taliban side.

This allows us to pull the bulk of our combat troops out and return, in terms that Senator Feingold put it, to more of a counterterrorism mission because we don't have to worry about the security situation inside Afghanistan. You cannot do pure counterterrorism unless you have a government or provincial and local governments that create a hostile environment for the Taliban and that allow us to gather the information and intelligence that we need to do the -- to do the counterterrorism.

KERRY:

Thank you very much.

CORKER:

Mr. Chairman, you stepped out for a second...

(CROSSTALK)

KERRY:

Well, I heard that, and I'm happy -- happy to do that.

CORKER:

Yes, we're going to have a second round, just -- are we -- are we planning to do that or...

KERRY:

If we have time, we will try. Let's see where we are. I'd like to do a second round, if they're able to, but we have a time constraint. We'll see what we can do.

Senator Boxer?

BOXER:

Thank you very much.

And thank you, all -- all of you, for your dedicated service to our nation. We all appreciate it.

In 2001, every senator voted to go against those who attacked us using Afghanistan as the base. And President Bush, in a lot of our views, turned away from Afghanistan, clearly, and toward a disastrous Iraq war. And many of us repeatedly urged an end to that war and a refocus on Afghanistan. Well, here we are many years later, and Secretary Clinton is explaining the results of that neglect.

So five months ago, when our president asked for 21,000 additional troops for Afghanistan, I supported that request. It wasn't easy for me, but I felt it was important to give him that chance to refocus. We also included in that request funding for the women there who have borne the brunt of the Taliban.

The president said at that time he needed those 21,000 troops -- now, this is just five months ago -- to, quote, "take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east and give greater capacity to partner and train with Afghan security forces." That's what he's saying again now.

I agree with that mission. So I voted. We sent 21,000 more troops. And here's the thing: We're told, since we sent those troops, that the situation has deteriorated. And I would like to put into the record an interview with General McChrystal in which basically he said the Taliban -- the fight against the Taliban has gone downhill, and that was since the 21,000 troops were sent.

So I would ask you, why did the situation get worse in Afghanistan after we sent 21,000 more troops? And I guess I'd start with Secretary Gates.

GATES:

Well, first of all, the -- the full number of troops that the president authorized did not actually ultimately arrive in Afghanistan until the late summer, early fall. The Marines arrived in southern Helmand in July, and -- and, in fact, the reporting that we're getting is that things have begun to get better in southern Helmand, where the Marines are.

So part of it has been -- first of all, it's been -- I think, when General McChrystal did his assessment, it was really -- at least as far as I'm concerned -- the first thorough going assessment in the field on how things were going since -- since I became secretary in December of '06. And -- and I think what General McChrystal found through doing that assessment and traveling all over the country and looking at the situation was, as -- as you just cited, that the situation was serious and deteriorating.

The -- we got his report in late August. And -- and as you know, we've had this dialogue and -- and effort inside the administration to determine what to do on the basis of that assessment.

But fundamentally, where the troops have arrived, the situation has stabilized and, in some cases, gotten better. And -- and what General McChrystal basically has said, that to stabilize the other areas, these additional forces are -- are necessary.

And maybe Admiral Mullen would like to add to that.

BOXER:

Well, before he does -- and I will, of course, turn to Admiral -- I just want to put in the record a GAO study that shows, as we added more troops, the violence actually escalated. And this -- this interview by General McChrystal was at the very end of September.

So, Admiral Mullen, could you explain -- here's what I'm getting at. You know, I voted with reluctance, because I believed more troops would help our situation. We added the troops. The violence got worse.

Now we're being told we should add more troops. And I guess what I'm asking you is, how can we now leap to the conclusion that more troops will mean less violence when -- when the opposite seems to have occurred?

MULLEN:

Ma'am, General McChrystal's assessment -- and I agree with the secretary of defense -- that it really was the first thorough, comprehensive assessment that I've seen from a -- from a commander, one.

MULLEN:

Two is we've talked about under-resourcing this campaign for a long time, for a good four or five years. Seeing the insurgency just get worse, particularly starting in '06, it's been very evident we couldn't resource it and get the troops there because of our commitments to Iraq.

BOXER:

OK, OK.

MULLEN:

So it's where we found ourselves. And I think the strategy that the President laid out in March is significant in many ways, focused on the region, not just on Afghanistan -- Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, specifically.

I've argued -- and certainly it has occurred many months ago that we need to have a national debate and discussion about this, because I think that's been lacking because of our focus on what was the top priority for all of us, as directed by President Bush. So we're all learning as we go.

I wanted...

(CROSSTALK)

BOXER:

I'd like to follow it up and ask you -- and as you explaining this to add this information. As I see it -- and I know this is correct unless you disagree -- that we now have 68,000 American troops on the ground. There's 36,231 NATO troops. That's 104,231.

There's roughly 94,000 Afghan troops. And we won't count the 93,000 Afghan police, so we'll that aside. That's 200,000 versus 22,000 Taliban and 100 Qaida.

So my concern is -- and this is why I interrupted you, just to get your focus on this -- it doesn't seem to me to be a question of the numbers of troops. It's hard to say that 200,000 versus 22,000 is that different than 230,000.

It's the mission. And -- and -- and I guess what I'm trying to probe here is how are we going to change the mission from what President Obama said when I gave him my vote for the 21,000 troops, which seems to me the same mission he's talking about now?

MULLEN:

Three quick thoughts. One is, as we add more troops and -- and face this growing insurgency, the level of violence is going to go up. It did in Iraq in the surge. It will do that here as well.

And -- and I want to be very clear that a very, certainly tragic, part of this, so will our casualties. That should not be out of the sight of anybody with respect to this, over a period of time. But it is the path to actually reduce the number of casualties, and a lower level of violence, first of all.

Secondly, McChrystal has changed the focus specifically to focus on the key population centers. Secretary Clinton talked about reducing the number of civilian casualties. Complete change in focus from a leadership perspective.

Thirdly, he's changed dramatically how we partner with the Afghan security forces, which we weren't doing before. We were mentoring them, training them. Now we're in the field with them, planning, living, fighting, et cetera.

So those are fundamental shifts to get at achieving the success that I think is possible with these additional forces.

BOXER:

OK. I really appreciate it. That's the best argument I've heard, but I still have tremendous doubts about the numbers. I just think -- what you're saying we ought to be doing with the numbers (inaudible).

Last question has to do with our forces who are incredibly stressed. I know Secretary Gates...

KERRY:

(inaudible) Senator.

BOXER:

This is the last question. Divorce is up. Suicide's up. Psychological wounds. So my quick question -- I really need to ask it is. We know some of our men and women are going back six, seven times. Are you confident, Secretary Gates, that we're no longer deploying servicemembers who are currently struggling with significant mental health problems from their prior tours?

GATES:

I think the only thing I can say in response to that is we are making every effort not to do that. We have put in place some very intensive screening processes. We have hired an enormous number of mental health care providers.

We are trying to do everything we can to identify those who have problems, to encourage those who have problems to come forward and get treatment. The Army leadership, in particular, has been very aggressive in this area.

Can I -- can I say with certainty that we're not deploying somebody who has severe problems? No. But I can tell you, we're making every effort to avoid doing so.

BOXER:

Thank you.

KERRY:

Senator Risch.

RISCH:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for coming here today and helping and being engaged in this national dialogue on this important issue that we really need to do.

I view this really not as a Republican problem or a Democrat problem. This is an American problem. After all, we were all Americans before we were Republicans or Democrats. And as polarized as this country is politically, this is an issue that we really, really all need to pull together on. And I appreciate you coming here and engaging in this conversation.

Regarding the president's recent announcement on strategy, I think that, obviously, he had choices as the commander in chief. And I think anyone who knows anything about this issue has to be -- has to have empathy for what he went through in making this decision.

This is a problem that one could characterize only as a Rubik's cube on steroids. I mean, it -- it has so many facets. It's -- it is -- it is difficult to wrestle with.

And the conclusion reaches quickly is that there are no good choices. There are only choices to be made that would be in the best interests of the American people.

Secretary Clinton observed that we don't hear much about positives from there, and that is true. And, obviously, the media is much more interested in the negative than the positive.

But, you know, our objective when we went into Afghanistan, and I think everyone would agree with this, was to get Al Qaida, to stop Al Qaida, to squelch Al Qaida. And that objective really has been met.

We have run Al Qaida out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Taliban remained. And that -- the relationship that Secretary Clinton described between Al Qaida and the Taliban complicates the issue tremendously.

And the difficulty that we hear, of course, is that the Al Qaida has now migrated into western Pakistan. And there is a -- a slow drip, if you would, of those people migrating into Yemen and Somalia, which is going to cause us a problem in the future, I would think.

But in any event, I think that's a positive that we should look at. And the fact that we have driven Al Qaida out of Afghanistan, but we have to remain -- we have to deal with what's left over.

This is question that I have -- hopefully, a brief question. As we build up now in Afghanistan as the president has said we are going to do, and you look at what's happened in Iraq, would agree or disagree with whether we should have gone there in the first place or whether the surge was good or bad, things seem to be generally better in Iraq today than what they've been.

When you went through this exercise, was any consideration given to stepping up the drawdown in Iraq as we build up more quickly in Afghanistan? That is, did you consider stepping up the schedule for withdrawal from Iraq? Could I get a brief answer on that?

GATES:

The answer is no. General Odierno has a plan in terms of the drawdown to get our combat forces out of Iraq by the end of August 2010, and all of our forces out by the end of 2011.

He has found that the conditions, the improved conditions that you referred to in Iraq, have allowed for the early withdrawal of at least one brigade, but that was based on the decision -- on the situation in Iraq itself.



So there really, in none of our discussions, either in the Pentagon or in the interagency, was there a discussion of accelerating the drawdowns in Iraq.

RISCH:

Thank you.

MULLEN:

If I could just add to that. In addition to the brigade, General Odierno has been very aware of the requirements for some of the key things -- smaller forces, enabling forces -- that he has -- that he has agreed to transfer into Afghanistan.

So he's been very supportive of this overall approach, albeit very consistent with what the secretary said in terms of interagency considerations.

RISCH:

Thank you. And I'd encourage that we keep an eye on that. And anything that can be done to accelerate that I think would be beneficial to everyone.

Secretary Clinton, you articulated about as well as I've heard, trying to thread the needle on the business of our commitment. I heard you use the word "commitment." I heard you use the term "long haul." And those are at odds with a date.

And that's a difficult needle to thread, because those people have got to be convinced that we do have a commitment, that we're there for the long haul, and yet we say July 2011.

And while, you know, we really need to be clear on this. Because the enemy is going to take their calendar out, they're going to circle July of 2011, and say, "Well, you know, just like America we're going to re-evaluate whether we're going to step down until then and gear up at that point."

So I -- and, again, I know it's a difficult needle to thread, because the American people, including myself, want to see success, they want to see us out of Afghanistan. And yet at the same time, the people there have got to be convinced that somehow we're going to protect them if they cooperate with us.

So I -- and with all due respect -- and I don't mean this maybe the way it's going to sound -- but I heard -- Secretary Gates, I heard you talk about a target yesterday when you were talking about July of 2011. And yet the impression I got from the president was it isn't a target as much as a hard date for starting to draw down. But those two things are very difficult to reconcile.

So, again, I'm -- I'm being critical here without an answer, but that is a difficult needle to thread, but you're going to have to do it.

GATES:

Let me just start briefly by saying that -- that I think through the course of the questioning yesterday what I was trying to make clear is that the date of July 2011 to begin thinning our forces and transitioning our -- the security responsibilities to the Afghans is a firm date that the president has established.

But the pace of that drawdown, the location of the drawdown and so on will be conditions-based and, to use his words, a responsible drawdown, as we have done in Iraq. But there should be, as I said in my opening statement, and as Secretary Clinton just said a few minutes ago, July 2011 is the time that the president has picked when we have to begin drawing down.

Now, let me -- let me just reiterate that the balancing act that we've -- the balance that we've tried to establish here. We are sending a signal, a significant, I think, commitment to be successful in Afghanistan with the deployment of these additional forces.

But at the same time -- and as I said yesterday, one of the things that became clear at the end of the surge in Iraq was that the Iraqis wanted us out of the country as quickly as possible. That is not necessarily the case in Afghanistan. They live in a rough neighborhood, and our sense is there are a number of Afghans that would like to have us hang around, and the United States Army and Marine Corps protect them for the indefinite future.

So one of the purposes of this date, an important element of this date, is to put the Afghans on notice that -- and give them a sense of urgency that they must begin to accept their responsibility for their own security, and it's going to start then.

So they have to get their men recruited, get them trained, and get them into the field and into combat with us. So it's a combination of sending a message of commitment, but at the same time putting the Afghans on notice that the time is coming when they are going to have to establish their own security, or maintain their own security.

RISCH:

I couldn't agree with you more that the sense of urgency really seems to be lacking there, and they -- they need to be, as the chairman had said earlier, they really need to have a sense of urgency instilled in them. And they think in terms of centuries. We think in terms of months. So it's a difficult proposition.

Thank you very much.

MULLEN:

Senator, could I just add one comment to that? I mean, this date has also been described as arbitrary. It's not arbitrary at all. On the military side, we feel that that -- that timeframe between roughly July 2009, when the Marines arrived in Helmand, and into July of 2011, we will know whether we're going to be successful or not.

And so, -- and thinking that this is the -- believing this is the right strategy and that we will be successful, we think that time of beginning the transfer of security responsibility and the transition is the right time. And then again -- that responsibly and based on conditions.

But it was not an arbitrary date. It is the third year -- third summer, if you will, that the Marines will be in Helmand, and we will have a clear indication from three seasons, if you will, at the heart of the fighting season there, that -- which way this is going.

RISCH:

Thank you, Admiral.

KERRY:

Senator Menendez?

MENENDEZ:

Thank you.

Thank you all for your service to our country. I think (inaudible) a debt of gratitude, especially at a most difficult time.

MENENDEZ:

You know, Admiral Mullen, I heard you say that the under-resourcing of our engagement in Afghanistan over the last four or five years has brought us where we are today. So that to me means that our adventure in Iraq has created a set of circumstances where we have under-resourced our efforts in Afghanistan. Is that a fair comment?

MULLEN:

As I indicated, I think, in my previous comments, clearly the priority and the direction I had, both as chairman and as a chief of a service, was to resource Iraq. And we were balancing deployments, balancing time at home, and we could not resource Afghanistan.

MENENDEZ:

So you couldn't resource Iraq and have resourced Afghanistan as you needed to?

MULLEN:

That's correct.

MENENDEZ:

Now, I -- I look at this July 2011 date, and I see it as clearly aspirational. And I think we need to be honest with the American people. Can any of you tell me that after July 11th that we will have tens of thousands of troops years after that date?

GATES:

I think that the president and we have been clear that July 2011 is the beginning of a process of drawing down in Afghanistan. That process will be based on the conditions on the ground. That -- you know, the president is very -- I think I can speak for him, and Secretary Clinton can correct me if I get it wrong -- the president throughout this process was very concerned about an open-ended conflict of -- of just unending commitment of significant numbers of troops and dollars in this.

And so I think that, you know, he has not put deadlines in terms of when our troops will all be out, but clearly, he sees the -- he sees the July 2011, as I said in my opening statement, an inflection point where we begin to drawdown those forces in Afghanistan and -- and with a view to transferring this responsibility to the Afghans over a period of probably two or three years.

MENENDEZ:

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that, and you've reiterated it several times. Let me go back to my question. Can any of you tell this committee that, in fact, after July of 2011, we won't have tens of thousands of troops for years after that date?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator, I can tell you what the intention is. And the intention is...

MENENDEZ:

I don't want -- Madam Secretary, I don't want to hear what the intention is. I want to know, can you tell the committee that there won't be tens of thousands of troops after July of 2011, for years after that? It's unlikely, right?

CLINTON:

No. I -- I can only answer the way that I am comfortable in giving you the best information available at the moment, and that is that there is a convergence of opinion between us and President Karzai in his second term.

In his inaugural address, he said he wanted the responsibility and would be prepared for the responsibility within three years for Afghan control over many important parts of the country. Right now, about 60 percent of the country is not contested.

And within five years, the Afghans would be responsible for their entire security. So that is his aspiration. It happens to be very much in line with what we want to see happen. There will be, starting

in July 2011, troops withdrawn based on conditions. Sitting here today, I would believe that we will be able to start the transition as planned in 2011.

We also know that there will be probably for the foreseeable future a drawdown and transfer out of combat troops, but a request for continuing logistical support for the Afghan security force. So, you know, that is the kind of, you know, target that we're aiming at.

MENENDEZ:

Admiral Mullen, what is the -- is it true that right now the Afghan army only has about 10,000 soldiers that can operate without us being alongside them?

MULLEN:

It is a small percentage, yes.

MENENDEZ:

So what we are talking about is a massive increase that we seek in the Afghan army, which presents a daunting obstacle, considering the fact that finding sufficient literate recruits and reversing what is an abysmal retention rate is a huge challenge. Something we haven't done in eight years we're going to do in 18 months.

And a large national army also requires a strong and capable central government to command it and clearly a permanent foreign subsidy. So when I hear these dates, I believe that they are as solid as quicksand and at best aspirational.

And I appreciate the aspiration, but the reality is, as someone who has to cast a vote for that money that will be coming forth, I can't tell the people of New Jersey or this country that we are doing that clearly on aspirations. I think we need to be a lot more honest about our assessments.

You know, I -- I see -- this is putting a lot of eggs in President Karzai, who has been there since 2001, first as a transitional president and then as an elected president. And what has he presided over? He's presided over massive corruption, where, you know, anywhere between 20 percent or 40 percent seems to be the going rate of skimming off of the taxpayers' money, where members of his family and members of certain ministers' families ultimately seem to do very well in business transactions. They travel to some of the best places in the world. They have bank accounts overseas, outside Afghanistan, and we want to say that we're really going to condition them?

I'd like to see us condition their travel and their bank accounts to make sure that we're not going to see the continued corruption. That's a serious effort to have some type of control and say that we're not having a blank check.

You know, I -- I look at President Karzai when he makes his speech about my brother Taliban. Well, maybe there will be a day of reconciliation, but first you've got to fight the Taliban before you get to the point of reconciliation, so that they understand there is a need for reconciliation.

And so it worries me that a lot of what we're putting our eggs in here is someone who doesn't even speak in the terms of fighting the enemy and an Afghan police that is so riddled with corruption and is cooperating with the Taliban.

And then I look at the disadvantage of having Karzai there. If our national security is as you've defined it, as creating stability and creating an opportunity for the Afghan government to ultimately have the space and the time to fulfill what is ultimately nation- building, we still will have the security issue as a concern if Karzai doesn't perform 18 months from now. We still will have that security issue.

So as you've defined our national security interests, whether Karzai performs or not, we will be stuck in that set of circumstances. And that's a real problem.

I don't get a sense we have a clear civilian counterpart. Even General McChrystal says, who is my civilian counterpart? And do we really believe that 974 civilian personnel versus 100,000 troops is going to meet the -- the civilian aspect of this?

And finally, I get no sense that we have a Pakistan strategy. We have been talking about offering them a strategic relationship. They don't seem to want a strategic relationship. They want the money. They want the equipment. But at the end of the day, they don't want a relationship that costs them too much. And it seems to me, the more we build up our troops in Afghanistan, the more reliant we become on the Pakistanis in a variety of ways.

So I just don't get the sense at this point in time of a comprehensive policy that says that I should vote for billions of dollars more to send our sons and daughters in harm's way in a way that we will ultimately succeed in our national security goals.

I hope I can be convinced before that vote comes. But as of right now, I'm not.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Do you want to convince him right now?

CLINTON:

I'll wait and do that, Mr. Chairman. We'll bring in more reinforcements.

KERRY:

Senator Isakson?

ISAKSON:

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thanks to all of you for your service and your commitment to the country. And I know the last thing you want to talk about anymore is July of 2011, but I do want to try and focus on something.

I've been very impressed, quite frankly, with what you all said yesterday in Armed Services, what you've said today, Admiral Mullen. I saw you this morning on Fox with regard to this July 11th date.

Secretary Clinton -- and I quote -- said in her speech, "Just as we have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account the conditions on the ground." You have said today, Secretary Gates, that the goal is to clear and hold, build, and transfer, which is what we did in Iraq. We transferred authority. Now the Iraqis are in control, and I think that's the goal all of us want.

The problem on the July 11th date is the concern a lot have that there's one constituency we're not talking to yet. We're talking to the American people who want to win and come home. That's what they want to do. We're talking to Afghans and Karzai, yes, we want you to take responsibility. We're not going to be your surrogate army, and we're not going to stay forever, and that's important.

But the Al Qaida and the Taliban are the other constituency. And this July 11th date, if they interpret it as an end game for us, gives them some opportunity.

So I think statements like what you said, Secretary Clinton, about being determined by the outcome on the ground and the circumstances on the ground. Admiral Mullen, you've been quite clear we need (inaudible) you even said yesterday, Secretary Gates, the president has the -- can change his mind any time he wants to based on the circumstances that take place.

But -- and I'm -- I'm not asking a question here, but I'm going to tell you why part of the confusion still exists with some of us who are scared about sending the wrong signal. As Press Secretary Gibbs this morning, according to an article by Chip Reid of CBS News, in responding to a question about the July 11th date, said the following -- and I quote -- "The president told me it is locked in, there's no flexibility. Troops will start coming home July 2011, period. It's etched in stone." Gibbs said he even had the chisel.

That type of statement is not helpful to that constituency being Al Qaida and the Taliban, who don't need to be encouraged that there's a tolerance level beyond which we won't go in this battle, because each of you said that this is the epicenter of Islamic terrorism. I believe that, as well. The intelligence that all of us have seen is that way.

And as we speak to our constituencies, the Americans and the Afghans, we've got to also understand we're talking to the Taliban and Al Qaida. And our resolve has to be there, or the commitment we're making to these troops is not going to have the force behind it that it needs to have.

So that's -- I'm not asking you a question. I don't want to put you between Mr. Gibbs and -- and yourselves and your excellent testimony today, but that is the open question that to me has to be dealt with in delivering the message. And I won't -- I won't ask any of you to have to respond to that, but I think it's important.

Two questions for me. On the Taliban and Al Qaida, are we tracking their source of arms? Do we know where they're getting their -- their -- you had referred, Admiral Mullen, to the skill level of the -- the encounters we had had most recently with them, which tells me they -- they have both the equipment and the leadership that -- that they can fight a pretty doggone good battle. Where are they getting this from? Is it -- is it coming from Iran? Is it coming out of Pakistan? Is it a combination? Do we know?

MULLEN:

The -- the probably most significant threat that we see for our people is the IED network that is growing in Afghanistan, and actually an awful lot of that is home-grown. It's -- there's not a lot coming in from the outside.

Rather than specific arms, certainly, financing, we're trying to pay attention to that, where they're getting their finances from. Some of it is coming from the opium piece; some of it's coming from the gulf; some of it's coming from the fact that they tax like crazy. You know, they -- they tax all the locals.

So trying to impact that -- and actually, we've put people in place to focus on this specifically in Afghanistan. So from that standpoint, those -- those are the focus areas, rather than the individual weapons. At least it's my experience in that part of the world, you don't run into anybody who doesn't have a weapon. It's a question of who they're going to use it against. So -- so from that standpoint, we're -- we're hard after that.

GATES:

Let me give you an example on the IEDs. The most devastating IEDs that are being used against our troops and against our MRAPs and so on is -- is based on ammonium nitrate, a fertilizer. It's illegal to have that fertilizer in Afghanistan, so there's clearly a smuggling network that is bringing in huge quantities of these. One of the -- one of the IEDs that went -- went off under one of our MRAPs and blew it in half was 1,500 pounds of this ammonium nitrate.

And what they do is basically use as a triggering device mines that are left over from the Soviet area, so there's a lot of stuff left over from -- from a period when, frankly, some of us were involved in shipping a lot of arms into Afghanistan.

ISAKSON:

Thank you for that answer.

Secretary Gates, you and Secretary Clinton both -- and, Secretary Clinton, I have your statement here - - about -- talking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, you said, "We'll develop a long-term sustainable relationship with Afghanistan and Pakistan so that we do not repeat the mistakes of the past." And I think in your testimony, you referred to the mistakes of the past. Is that in the context of -- of inconsistent engagement with Pakistan? Is that the mistake you were referring to?

GATES:

I think that the -- it was really turning our backs on both Afghanistan and -- and Pakistan. The Pakistanis -- and it goes to a question that was asked earlier. I mean, the truth is, there is a great deal of mistrust on the part of the Pakistanis toward us. They believe we have abandoned them or betrayed them on several different occasions, only the most recent of which was in the late '80s and early 1990s.

And -- and so we have a lot of work to do in trying to convince them that we're not trying to take over their country, that we're not trying to take control of their nuclear weapons, and that we are actually interested in a long-term partnership with them.



GATES:

But it is because -- and I was deputy national security adviser, and then DCI at the time -- you know, we were dealing with the collapse of -- the collapse of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe. I mean, it wasn't we were twiddling our fingers, twiddling our thumbs at the time, but the fact remains, the United States turned its back on Afghanistan.

And the irony is -- and I was talking to the House Foreign Affairs Committee about this yesterday -- the irony is that Charlie Wilson over there who was so successful in getting money for CIA and -- to give to the Mujahedeen the weapons to beat the Soviets, after the Soviets left, tried to get money for the civil society in Afghanistan, and where he was able to get hundreds of millions for the weapons, couldn't get very small amounts to try and build schools and so on. So that was the mistake in both -- in both countries.

ISAKSON:

Thank you very much.

I thank you again for your service to the country and your patience with the committee today. Thank you.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Cardin?

CARDIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I also want to echo my sincere appreciation to all three of you for your service to our country. I tell you, I had the greatest confidence in your abilities and your commitment, and I thank you for that. I know you're -- you're -- you're doing your best and that you're working together as a team.

And, Secretary Gates, you pointed out this is part of a coordinated strategy to deal with the epicenter of terrorism, which is in the Afghan-Pakistan border areas. I want to raise one other issue. You talked about external forces that are supporting the terrorist organizations and the recruitment strategies.

Well, one of the strategies I thought the administration was pursuing was the closing of Guantanamo Bay, not only because it was ineffective in what we are trying to accomplish, but also that it was -- at least a recruitment symbol for terrorist organizations. We've fallen behind on that.

Can you just comment briefly to me whether we are still committed to -- and how important that is, as part of our strategies on dealing with terrorists?

GATES:

We very much are committed to closing Guantanamo. We have very detailed plans on how to do that. We are, I think, in the final stages of selecting a facility and -- and we are at the same time in the process of identifying detainees that we believe can be transferred to other countries. I think there are about 215 detainees left. We've identified, I think, 116 at this point that we think can be transferred.

The president has every intention of doing this, and we will do it. The logistics -- principally, the logistics of it have proved more complicated than -- than we...

(CROSSTALK)

CARDIN:

How important is it...

GATES:

But I think we're about there.

CARDIN:

How important is this in regards to our strategies against terrorism?

GATES:

Well, one of the reasons why I articulated the opinion that we should close Guantanamo not long after I got this job in -- at the end of 2006 is because I'd -- you know, the irony is, Guantanamo's probably the best prison in the world today, elliptical trainers, reading rooms, flat-screen TVs, and probably the most highly disciplined guard force in the world.

But it -- it -- it has a legacy. And what I said three years ago is, there is a taint, and it is a recruiting tool for -- for Al Qaida and -- and -- and for other terrorists and -- and Islamic extremists.

So I think that there is unanimity in the administration that we need to get this done and -- and as soon as we can finalize the logistics, I think you'll see pretty quick progress after that.

CARDIN:

Let me say from the outset that I am unconvinced on the need for the additional troops, so I have concern about committing more Americans to this effort. First, let me get the number. The president's authorized 30,000, but as I understand it, that number could be more than 30,000, when you talk about the -- the backup support troops?

GATES:

During our discussions, one of the things that has -- that I've tried to make clear consistently is that, when you're looking ahead, it is impossible to foresee every need. And -- and where I do not -- where I have asked the president for some flexibility is in -- in medics, in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, in counter-IED capabilities, in short, road clearance engineers, those things associated with safeguarding the lives of our troops.

And I have asked him for a modest amount of flexibility on that. And it's in the range of about 10 percent of the -- of the 30,000. My hope is that -- that I won't need to use much, if any, of it, but -- but trying to look ahead a year or more, I felt that having some flexibility was important, particularly in terms of safeguarding our troops.

CARDIN:

I understand that. So we are really looking at potentially 33,000 additional troops?

GATES:

Potentially.

CARDIN:

OK. Just so we -- we get the number right.

Now, with adding more troops, we raise the stakes. I want to talk about the benchmarks. You talk about the circumstances on the ground will dictate the withdrawal -- the stand-down of troops in July 2011. We have benchmarks that are currently being developed for Afghanistan.

I would like to just hear more specifics as to, what would be the circumstances on the ground that would affect your recommendation on troop levels starting in July? Are we talking about the performance of the Afghan government? Is that part of what we're looking to, how they control the security of their country? Are we looking at the number of -- of military that they have ready to stand up?

Are we looking at the cooperation we received internationally from the international community as part of this? Are we looking at the activities of the Taliban and specifically how much of the nation they control or how many Al Qaida are actually in Afghanistan?

What -- and I hope you could be specific as to, what are we looking for, as far as the circumstances on the ground, so that Congress and -- can at least carry out our responsibility in evaluating this request so that we know what we're looking at 18 months from now, what expectations we can expect. And can you be specific on this, any one of you?

MULLEN:

Two of the highest-risk areas from my perspective, with respect to this strategy, one is Karzai and his government. And I -- and I mean that down to the sub-district level, not just in Kabul. And the other is

the development of the Afghan security forces. And we've set annual targets, year-to-year targets for that development, some of the reasons that have already been discussed here.

But with respect to the Karzai government specifics, good ministers, good governors, anti-corruption, local governance. Is the money actually going to the people? Are goods and services getting to the people in the villages? Reintegration, reconciliation.

ANSF, the annual targets that I talked about specifically, we've got to reduce the attrition rate, increase the retention rate specifically, and then they will transition to more security forces in the lead.

Corruption in particular in the police -- on the police side, which has been mentioned.

International support, we expect offers -- we need to see those and actually what they're -- what they're doing on the ground, not just military, but civilian, as well. There are non-contributing nations, Japan being one recently contributing, agreed to contribute up to \$5 billion to Afghanistan.

Pakistan, shifting their strategic calculus, do we see that happening? Because we've got to work with them to get at these safe havens for Al Qaida. So those are some of the -- at the -- at the major level...

CARDIN:

Well, I would hope we could be more specific. Let me just challenge you on one, the corruption of the Karzai government, which has been well-documented. Does that mean that if progress is not made, we reduce our troop levels quicker, where progress is made, we keep more troops there? How does that translate to U.S. troops being in theater? Is -- is -- is it a positive sign for removing troops or a negative sign, corruption?

CLINTON:

Senator, what we're looking for is capacity and effectiveness. We believe that corruption is one of the reasons why the Karzai government has not developed the capacity it needs, nor has it been effective enough.

I mean, I don't want anybody to think that we're trying to aim towards some zero corruption standard in Afghanistan. I mean, that doesn't exist anywhere in the world, and particularly in that part of the world.

But what we do expect to see is a government that delivers more for the people, thereby obtaining the allegiance of more people in more parts of the country, that can support the effective ministers and the effective governors, especially where we need them. We each have experiences with different ministries that we think are quite competent and very professional, you know, the defense ministry, the interior ministry, increasingly the finance and the education and the agricultural ministry.

You know, I didn't -- I didn't have time to respond to Senator Menendez at the -- at the length and with the thoroughness that his long litany deserves, but this is not all a negative picture. And I think it's - it's unfair -- it's unfair to our efforts. It's unfair to the efforts of many people inside the Afghanistan government who are truly making a positive difference in the performance that we would expect from a functioning government.

We have to do a better job in the international side to coordinate our aid, to get more accountability for what we spend in Afghanistan. But much of the corruption is fueled by the money that has poured into that country over the last eight years. And it is corruption at every step along the way, not just in the palace in Kabul.

You know, when we are so dependent upon long supply lines, as we are in Afghanistan, where everything has to be imported, it's much more difficult than it was in Iraq, where we had Kuwait as a staging ground to go into Iraq. You offload a ship in Karachi and, by the time whatever it is -- you know, muffins for our soldiers' breakfasts or anti-IED equipment -- gets to where we're headed, it goes through a lot of hands.

And one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban is the protection money. That has nothing to do with President Karzai.

So I think we need a -- we owe you a more careful unpacking of a lot of the concerns. And we will endeavor to provide that.

CARDIN:

I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you, Senator.

Senator Webb?

WEBB:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I'd like to welcome all three of you again after our brief exchange yesterday. It's interesting to hear how different committees approach the same -- same situation. Welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to say, first of all, that I think we have pretty -- pretty broad agreement about the concerns that we are facing in Afghanistan, I mean, even -- even among members who have -- who have been pretty vocal here today.

The question really is to continue to examine the process that we are proposing in order to address those -- those questions. And I think there have been some really excellent points made today.

With Senator Feingold, we talked about the concern that I've had for -- for a number of years here, that we are losing our maneuverability. We did it in Iraq. We -- we -- we are in -- in danger of -- to a certain extent of losing it in Afghanistan as we face a threat to this country that has a high degree of -- of mobility.

And Senator Corker, I think, made some really valid points. And you've heard again and again this question about timeline versus concept. And I'm going to -- I'm going to mention something on that again.

But before I do, I want to just -- Secretary Gates, I want to give you my view on something that -- that you said, just to clarify my view for the record, when you said that, in -- in your view, a lot of Afghans don't want us to -- to leave, and that being one of the motivations behind putting some sort of a date on the beginning of the leaving process. I would say perhaps that's -- that's more true among people who are in the government than it is Afghans writ large.

I would comment there's a Asia Foundation survey this year which shows that 56 percent of those surveyed were sympathetic to anti-government groups that used violence against us. And this is a country, as I mentioned yesterday, that has a long history of opposing any sort of foreign occupation, so that's -- that's the other side of this.

And I think there was some legitimacy in the concern that Senator Boxer mentioned with level of violence that might be engendered by military presence in areas where there's a perception of occupation. And we discussed that yesterday. I won't go into it again today.

But I'd just like to lay out three basic thoughts here. One is, if we're talking about a stable, supportive Afghanistan, which is something that came up in testimony, it's very difficult, particularly if we're talking about being there long term (ph), as Secretary Clinton, you've mentioned, it's very difficult to do that without a stable, viable government of some sort.

And I'm curious -- and I've mentioned this a number of times before -- about the process through which this government was formed. The constitution that formed this government as a result of the Bonn agreement, which on paper created a centralized system and might be needed -- or might be an adjustment needed, constitutionally or otherwise, that devolves some sort of power, if realistically we're going to look at stability in the provinces and -- and above.

And the second is, you can't grow a national army of 400,000, including national police, without people who are willing to -- to support that concept.

WEBB:

And we're having a very difficult time in -- in growing that. And I've not heard anything from the president through yesterday to today. And Admiral Mullen, I'd like your thoughts on this with respect to where we are in terms of meeting the goals that we announced in terms of growing that national army.

And then third, you can't really talk about this timeline. I think this is probably one of the greatest difficulties of the way that this has been presented. It's very difficult to talk about a withdrawal without clearly bringing (ph) up in a firmative (ph) way what the conditions on the ground will be that will enable this process to begin. And I think that's something that has -- we haven't really heard in these exchanges form yesterday and today. What is this going to look like not necessarily specifically province by province? But what is this environment going to look like when this turnover can occur? So those are the three questions that I would have and Secretary Clinton, I'd very much like to hear your views on the nature of this government and how we can operate there long-term without addressing some way to perhaps change the constitution?

CLINTON:

Senator, I'll take number one. I think Admiral Mullen can take number two and Secretary Gates can be our clean up hitter. I think you raised a very profoundly important question and it's something that I began discussing with President Karzai during my last visit. There has to be the decentralization of government functions and authority that reflects the way the country actually operates. I think this has to be undertaken in a very clear process headed by, motivated by the interests of the Afghans themselves. I think the bon (ph) constitution which was a credible effort made a number of assumptions that were at variants with the both the past and the current reality within Afghanistan.

So this is -- this does seem to be a conversation that President Karzai is willing to engage in. There are certain red lines for him as there would be for any president of a sovereign country. But he was very open to it, looking for ways to bring in some of the traditional decision making processes like the loya jirga and make it a part of an ongoing governmental authority. There's a lot there that we should be looking at. And so I think your suggestion is one that will be talking to him further about. And just finally I think too that the way that the government currently functions is something that could not necessarily have been predicted eight years ago at bon (ph).

WEBB:

I'm going to agree with you on that by the way. I think in the context of '01 it was an accomplishment to have achieved this constitution.

CLINTON:

That's right. And so now I think it is time to take stock. And there are many different ideas being discussed. And what we need is to make this an Afghan process. I just want to reiterate and close with this. The last thing in the world we want is a bunch of international experts flying in to Kabul to tell the government and the people of Afghanistan here's how you must construct your government. But let's work together to get the lessons that have been learned and then try to translate them.

WEBB:

The challenge would be for Karzai to understand that in the long run that would be in his self-interest, I would say.

CLINTON:

Well not only that, it would be in the interests of his legacy...

WEBB:

... in the interest of the Afghan people, yes.

CLINTON:

You know, one of the things that President Karzai has said to me is that, you know, his family has fought for Afghanistan for 300 years. I mean he carries that sense of patriotism very close to his heart. Now we may have different views about how he sees his role and how he's conducted it. But I think it is a serious mistake not to put yourself into the shoes of the other person and to actually listen and understand how they see the reality they inhabit. And so that's part of what we're trying to get better than it's been over the last several years.

WEBB:

Thank you.

MULLEN:

Quickly, Senator Webb, we're on the Army side about 96,000 right now. That said we're sort of in the 55 to 60,000 that actually are out there in the field. And so we've got to work on the overhead aspect of this. One of the real fundamental changes that McChrystal's put in place is the partnership piece. So I mean we have company, platoon, squad-sized units out...

WEBB:

... In terms of growing the size of the Afghani national military, where are we from where the goals would have been at this point? Are you on target in terms of growing the size of the, the actual size of the Afghan national army?

MULLEN:

I mean the targets just recently got reset by McChrystal. So were 93,000 (ph) in the army right now. We need to be at 134 about 12 months from now, by next September (ph) roughly. And that kind of increase each year to build to whatever the eventual outcome is aspirationally (ph), notionally (ph) 400,000 but between both the army and the police specifically. But our -- but we've got to reduce the retention, or got to increase retention significantly, reduce the attrition and increase recruiting.

One of the things is just incentives. I mean the Taliban make a lot more money than the national security forces right now. So General McChrystal is as we speak increasing the pay very significantly for the security forces which we think will have an impact. So we think we understand what the specifics are, what we need to do. But it's really about now executing that and we don't underestimate, particularly on the police side, the significance of the challenge and the risks that are associated with that. In the end, they're the ones that are going to provide the local security, they're the ones that are going to be able to hold on which to build in the long run and we know that.

WEBB:

Thank you.



KERRY:

Let me just say that we're going to run up against a timeframe here. There's going to be a vote I think somewhere in the next ten or fifteen minutes.

WEBB:

All right. Well, let me just in terms of the third question that's been discussed a good bit. So I want to leave it as an observation so we can move the hearing on and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you very much, Senator.

And in addition to that, Secretary Gates I know, has to leave at noon sharp. And Secretary Clinton needs to leave for Brussels. So we do want to try to wrap it up if we can. I know that we need a second round.

MULLEN:

Chairman, I'd be glad to stay. I'm kidding. I'm going with my boss.

KERRY:

We would love to have had a second round but this will be an ongoing conversation and I think we'll have some chances. Maybe even get the committee together for a good conversation rather than just a hearing. And I think if you're willing to do that, I think it would be very helpful at some point in time.

Senator Shaheen?

SHAHEEN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to begin by thanking each of you...

KERRY:

And I'm here to tell you I don't know why we have a hurricane above us here today. I apologize for it...

GATES:

We thought it was a Senate bowling alley.

KERRY:

Be news to me. I don't know.

SHAHEEN:

I want to applaud each of you and the president and everybody who's been involved in the very thorough review of what our strategy should be in Afghanistan. New Hampshire is this week sending another 140 National Guard members over to Afghanistan and as you pointed out Secretary Clinton, these are mothers and fathers, sons and daughters. And we owe them and all of the men and women serving there a mission that they can understand, and support, and I think it's appropriate also that we continue to have a rigorous debate in Congress and in the Senate about what we're going to do. So thank you all for that.

There have been a number of mentions about the importance and the potential for reconciling certain Taliban elements and the importance of that to the success of what happens in Afghanistan. Have any of those overtures begun? And who do we see is going to do those kinds of negotiations? How do we envision that happening?

GATES:

First of all, we have tried to in our discussions to differentiate between reconciliation and reintegration. It may seem like a semantic point. But we consider reconciliation to be what opportunities are there with Taliban leaders to bring them over along with the people who are fighting for them. I think the general view is that until the momentum shifts against the Taliban, the likelihood of significant reconciliation in those terms is not very bright. So that's part of changing the momentum is beginning to get these guys to think differently about the future. With respect to reintegration, this is really about getting the foot soldiers to decide that they don't want to be a part of the Taliban anymore. And we have some very limited, anecdotal information about people deciding they didn't want to fight for the Taliban anymore and going back to their villages.

But the key here and we think that there is some significant percentage of these foot soldiers who actually are doing this for pay or who have been intimidated into doing it. So if we can provide economic opportunities, or the international organizations, or whoever, or our efforts on agriculture can create more opportunities for them to earn a salary, that the security piece is absolutely central. Because there are also too many stories of people who have wanted to quit the Taliban who not only themselves have been killed but all of their family have been killed. So the security environment in a village or in a district has to be such that these people that want to put down their guns and pick up a plough can do so without the fear that they and their entire families will be massacred. And, again, this is a matter of establishing the security.

But it's also a sense of Secretary Clinton referred earlier to more of a hedging on the part of the Afghans because of their uncertainty of whose going to win. Because the winners -- if the winners are the other side and they picked our side, they will be killed. And so they are waiting to see where the momentum is shifting and, frankly, it's this shift of momentum that we think is important and that is a fundamental purpose behind this surge of troops to push the Taliban back and create an environment in which these people as they look at this situation decide which way they want to go, go our way, go the way of the Afghan government.

SHAHEEN:

Thank you. Secretary Clinton, I know you're on your way to a NATO meeting and I had the opportunity a couple of weeks ago with Secretary Gates to be part of the first of a forum on global security with a number of our NATO allies and was on a panel with the German foreign minister and was impressed with his willingness to look at Germany's role in their NATO mission. And just wondered what message you're going to take to our NATO allies to encourage them to talk to their publics about the importance of the mission in Afghanistan?

CLINTON:

Well, Senator we have been reaching out vigorously to our counterparts, certainly the president has spoken with a number of heads of state, the vice president, Secretary Gates, myself, National Security Advisor Jones. And we've gotten a very encouraging response. Secretary General Rasmussen at NATO has been very positive about the president's decision and has carried that message to capitols across Europe. And I think that as the weeks ahead unfold, there will be significant announcements of additional troops. Our hope is that the aggregate of the troop announcements will be between five and 7,000. That would give us a lot more leeway in many of the parts of the country that we want to continue to make sure are secure. It would help with the performance of certain functions as well as the important role of training the police and the army. So we are encouraged. There will also be an international meeting at the request of Prime Minister Brown and Chancellor Merkel at the end of January which is a very important event for a lot of our NATO ICAF allies. So I think that we will see in real terms the delivery on the rhetorical support that the president's decision has engendered.

SHAHEEN:

And will your discussions also include better coordination of the different NATO forces who are in Afghanistan. Well that's certainly is a conversation that we are in the midst of. I held a meeting when I was in Kabul with about a dozen of the NATO ICAF foreign ministers who were there for the inauguration. And one of the points that I stressed is how we have to do a better job coordinating our civilian aid. How we would like to see a civilian counterpart to General McChrystal who, who is the commander of the NATO ISEF forces.

Not all the ISEF members, as you know, are in NATO, so trying to structure this the right way is challenging. But there is a great and growing understanding of why we need to do a better job with all of the partners, NATO, ISEF, the United Nations.

Obviously, the United States believes that we have to play a major role in this because of the burdens that we have assumed. But we want the international support as well.

(UNKNOWN)

Thank you. And I'm out of time, but I just wanted to urge follow-up on what we heard from Senators Webb and Cardin, that the measures of how we're going to determine our success over the next 18 to

24 months I think will be very important to make sure that we understand, and that the public understands, what we're looking at that shows us that we're being successful.

Thank you.

KERRY:

Senator Casey.

CASEY:

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want to thank Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen for at least two things, Your public service at this time in our nation's history, as well as the review that you just conducted along with the President, which was both thorough and essential, contrary to some of the commentary around Washington.

I wanted to return to a topic that I know have some explored to some degree already, and that's President Karzai and his government. We know that, as we've heard on a number of occasions, that in order to get this right, and we have to get this right.

I can't imagine a more serious, grave situation we've faced in recent American history. But to get it right you have to get the security right, the governance part of this right, as well as other issues like development.

And to get governance right, President Karzai has to be a full partner in this. I was in Afghanistan and Pakistan in August, and I know that when you're on the ground in a country for a couple of days, I know that those few days in any country doesn't confer omniscience on any senator.

But I have to say that meeting with him in August of 2009 and May of 2008, in both instances, but more immediately or more urgently in August of 2009 I came away very troubled by his answers to questions I and others have posed to him. And stunned by some of things he said or did not say in those meetings.

So I keep returning to this question among others when we analyze our strategy. So I guess I wanted to get a sense of in a very specific way, I know Secretary Clinton in your testimony you rightly and appropriately said the Afghan people, the United States, and the international community, will hold the Afghan government accountable for making good on its commitments in President Karzai's recent pledges.

I guess I want to get a sense of -- and I know you understand the importance of this -- what specifically will we do to hold him accountable? Both him personally, but also his government?

CLINTON:

Well, there are a number of steps. You know, we have been working closely with the Afghan government in support of a major crimes tribunal. We have enhanced our cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence, FBI, DEA, Department of Justice, in order to clearly and unequivocally present evidence of corruption that we expect action to be taken on with respect to charging and

prosecuting and removing from office and seeking restitution from those against whom a case can be made.

We are also working to certify ministries as to which will or will not receive money from the United States. And we want that to be part of our coordination, to go back to Senator Shaheen's question, so that we can have an internationally accepted standard for transparency and accountability in these governments.

We are working closely and encouraging the right decisions in our view to be made about members of the new cabinet, governors to be appointed, and the like. So there's an intense ongoing consultation.

I would think that probably Ambassador Eikenberry and other members of his leadership team spend many hours every day in direct consultation and conversation with not only President Karzai, but others in positions of responsibility.

So we're moving on all of these fronts, Senator Casey, and it's not easy, and we think that our intentions are clear and we expect to see progress made. But again, I don't want to paint some utopia that we are attempting to achieve.

That's just not in the cards. It's not in the cards anywhere. And the United States has been deeply involved in other countries going back 60 years, often with combat troops on the ground, where there was massive corruption, where there was instability, where there were fraudulent elections.

And you know you just -- you know, you have to have a certain level of strategic patience here in order to see things through. And I think that President Karzai and his government have been under more scrutiny than probably most ever have been. I mean, we do a lot of business with a lot of countries that have elections where the leader is re-elected at 98 or 99 percent. And we don't say a word, we just keep going.

Now, the difference is we have our young men and women, military and civilian, in a combat situation and we have to expect more. But we need to point it the a broader context of, you know, what we done around the world for decades, and the kind of efforts that proved successful and in keeping with the national security needs of the United States.

CASEY:

I want to commend the work that you've done and Ambassador Eikenberry and others. I know it's not easy, and we're dealing with a sovereign government, so there are limitations to what we can do. But I know how important it is.

I wanted to raise another issue, and whether Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen want to add to anything that we've explored already. But the second element of this is part of getting it right in terms of governance would be what do we do with, or can we have an impact -- a positive impact on -- local and provincial leaders?

One thing heartening to me, as disappointed as I was at some of President Karzai's answers, was that the two ministers that we met with, Minister Wardak as well as (Otmar), army and police responsibilities obviously, were said to be and I think in the limited time we had with them, gave evidence that they're very competent and they've got a lot of skills.

We also met some capable local and provincial leaders. And I'm just wondering whether or not I should say directly, what's the strategy with regard to engaging local or provincial leaders and how does that factor into getting this governance piece right?

GATES:

From the time I -- actually from my confirmation hearing -- I've been concerned that among other things we were too focused on the central government in Afghanistan, and particularly the notion of trying to build a strong central government in a country that had never had one.

And that we weren't paying enough attention to the local and tribal leaders and the traditional institutions in Afghanistan. One of the tragedies of 30 years of war is that many of those local institutions, the tribal shuras and so on, have been significantly weakened as elders have been shot or executed and their authority undermined.

And the Taliban goes after them specifically. And so, I thin a really important part of the President's decisions and our discussions was how are we going to engage at the sub-national level? At the provincial level, at the district level, and at the local and village level?

And it's everything from the President's talked to Secretary Clinton and myself about communications, how do we communicate with those people? Convey to them what we and the Afghan government are trying to do. And so how do we work with them?

And the truth of the matter is -- and we'll get into it with you all down the road -- but in terms of the transfer of security responsibility, in a lot of these districts and areas, it may not be the Afghan national army or the Afghan national police to whom we turn for providing local security.

It may well be a local security force that operates within the context of the provincial government or the district government. We've seen some experiments with in Wardak province and elsewhere and they've worked pretty well.

And so, I think it's going to be a mix. And to answer the question that Senator Webb asked, my view is we will do the transfer of security in the same way we did it in Iraq. And that will be a judgment by the ISEF commanders of when an area is ready, when the local forces are ready to assume that responsibility with us in a tactical, and then a strategic overwatch, sort of a cavalry over the hill, if you will.

And I think that -- But the local security forces and local governments are going to be a big part of that equation. The caution that we have is not to cross the line into reestablishing war lords and local militias that in fact are operating independent of the government, whether at the district or provincial or national level.

CASEY:

I know I'm out of time, but...

KERRY:

Yes. Senator Kaufman, we're on the back seven minutes of the vote, and there's a grace period, as you know. Senator Cardin's going to come back, so we can hopefully get the two last senators in here. But if you want to truncate a little bit, it's your choice.

I'm going to turn it to Senator Kaufman.

KAUFMAN:

OK, I will do that. And look, I want to thank you very much for wrestling, which I find to be -- agree with several statements that were made, one of the most complex problems I've every seen. And the most difficult problem, because it involves lives of the folks that are just the best among us.

And I also want to thank you for the infinite patience to wrestle with us on this issue and the ability to do that. And I can't think of three people who would be better, that I'd be happier to see wrestling with this problem than the three of you.

Now I want to agree with what Senator Casey and a lot of other people said. I think the number one problem here -- there's a lot of problems, so I don't minimize any. But the number one problem is do we have a partner in the Afghan government for success? That to me is the really key question. I spent time, two trips to Afghanistan, met with folks and talked to them. There's a lot of other problems, but that's the number one problem in my mind.

And one of the great things I think about the President's proposal is he came up with a way which I thought no one could to kind of give me some hope that we can do something with the present government. And that is, setting the deadline of July 2011. Because people come in and talk to me.

I've talked to so many people about this, and they say well, we should use our leverage on Karzai. I don't think we have any leverage on Karzai until you sent a date-certain that we're going to leave.

So I think it's very -- I'm kind of in a cleanup position at the end of this thing -- I think it's really important. There's been a lot of confusion back and forth on the deadline, so I just want to make it clear to send a message to the Afghan government. You have no doubt that the President has a deadline of transferring troops out of Afghanistan in July 2011.

Is that fair to say? Is it fair to say therefore, to deal with some of the other problems we have and comparisons have been made here, there is no -- You have no doubt that we will not be adding more troops to Afghanistan after this deployment? Outside of the 3,000 potentially that you have may have to add?

GATES:

That is the commitment that we have made to the President.

KAUFMAN:

That's right. So this is not like what we -- comparisons to Vietnam, or we had promises and then didn't. This is not even like Iraq. This is a firm commitment by the President of the United States, agreed

by the major foreign policy strategic planners in our government that in July 2011 we're going to start drawing down troops and we're not going to be adding more troops.

I think that's a significant message. And I think it's the only message -- If we stick to that message it's the only message that can have help that the Karzai government can in fact be successful.

And because of the lack of time, I will yield to the Senator from New York for questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

KERRY:

Thank you. Before you begin, Senator, I want to thank you, because I've got to take off and vote. And I'll hold the vote open, get them to protect you here. But I really you're coming in.

I know it takes a lot of time, but it does, as you know full well, and Secretary you know perhaps even more, it helps the process to work. And in the end, it's critical to our own deliberative process. So we thank you very, very much for doing that. And I wish you well on your journey.

Senator Gillibrand?

GILLIBRAND:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to each of you for being here. You have provided such extraordinary leadership for our country and we are extremely grateful. I agree with my colleagues, this is the most difficult issue any of us can face.

I'd like you just to touch briefly, if you can, on the issue of Al Qaeda. Secretary Gates and I, last time we spoke, talked about why do you care if Al Qaeda has a foothold in Afghanistan?

He provided very detailed analysis about why that type of foothold would be able to be a launching ground for similar terrorist attacks to 9/11. And also, the overwhelmingly destabilizing effect with regard to Pakistan, which obviously has nuclear weapons. It could propose grave security risks to the United States.

My concern is what's to stop Al Qaeda from moving to Somalia or Yemen or any other place and, to the extent you can talk about this on a non-secure basis, what are some of the things that you intend to do militarily and in other operations with regard to other places Al Qaeda will create potential strongholds?

GATES:

Well, very briefly, as I said in my opening statement, Al Qaeda -- the Afghan-Pakistan border area is the epicenter. It the historic -- it is the site of the historic victory over the Soviet Union by many of these same actors and -- and it is where the planning and the inspiration -- well, certainly the inspiration, much of the training, much of the planning for Al Qaida operations emanates from.

And wherever people have been whether it's Somalia or Yemen or the United States or the United Kingdom, almost always the roots trace back to this where it is -- it is the -- it is the -- it is the home base,



if you will, of -- of this operation. And it's interesting, as I said earlier, how other terrorist groups, including Al Qaida, the (inaudible), Al Qaida, the Arabian peninsula, gravitate and look to that area for leadership and inspiration and legitimacy of their efforts in the context of -- of the terrorist aspirations.

And -- and all I can tell you is that we are very aggressive in going after Al Qaida and -- and we have the authority of the president to hunt them down wherever in the world we find them.

CLINTON:

I -- I would just add, Senator, that Al Qaida has very deep roots now in this border area. You know, they -- they have operated in the case of Bin Laden, Zawahiri and others, even around this area going back 20 years -- well, 30 years, they -- they have a degree of protection from both the Afghan side and the Pakistan side.

If you read the long articles that David wrote -- wrote when he escaped, there is a -- a -- a governmental presence in effect in the ungoverned areas of Pakistan that gives them every reason to believe they're secure. And they're -- and they -- and it's not just one or more people picking up. They have extended families. They have networks of connections that would have to be disrupted.

So I -- I don't -- I don't see that it would be very attractive or easy for them to leave where they are and I'm not sure there is any terrain anywhere in the world that is more hospitable to them. So for all those reasons, I -- I think that's where you -- we'll find them.

GATES:

Maybe most significantly we would love to see them leave there.

MULLEN:

The -- the only thing I add to that is, and it goes to Secretary Gates' comment about having been seen to defeat the Soviet Union, and this would be seen to defeat the only remaining super power, and that is an inspiration for recruiting. It is an acceleration for their global extremists capabilities and -- and it is what in the long run I worry the most about if they are seen to be able to do that.

Even as they are more diminished, which they have been over the last few years, but they are very, very deadly and they seek the same kind of aims.

(UNKNOWN)

Well, thank you again for your testimony and your time. We are extremely grateful for your extraordinary leadership. Thank you.

KERRY:

Secretary Clinton is aware we've had a (inaudible) going on on the floor of the Senate. So there's been a little bit of shuffling back and forth, but I -- I do want to thank Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates

and Admiral Mullen on behalf of our chairman for your -- your patience here today and particularly for your service to our country.

And with that, the Senate of Foreign Relations Committee will stand adjourned.

CQ Transcriptions, Dec. 3, 2009

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#### List of Panel Members and Witnesses

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SEN. RUSS FEINGOLD, D-WIS.

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SEN. ROGER WICKER, R-MISS.

##### WITNESSES:

SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES

ADMIRAL MIKE MULLEN (USN), CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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NBC; CBS; ABC  
December 6, 2009

## Interviews With Gates, Clinton

### Meet The Press (NBC), 10:00 AM

DAVID GREGORY: But first, here they are, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Welcome, both of you, back to MEET THE PRESS.

DEFENSE SECRETARY GATES: Thank you.

SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON: Thank you.

GREGORY: So much of the heat of this debate this week was not about the going in, but about the getting out. This is what the president said about the scope of this mission.

(Videotape, December 1, 2009) PRESIDENT OBAMA: These additional Americans and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. (End videotape)

GREGORY: Secretary Gates, is this a deadline?

GATES: It's the beginning of a process. In July 2011, our generals are confident that they will know whether our strategy is working, and the plan is to begin transferring areas of responsibility for security over to the Afghan security forces with us remaining in a tactical and then strategic overwatch position, sort of the cavalry over the hill. But we will begin to thin our forces and begin to bring them home. But the pace of that, of bringing them home, and where we will bring them home from will depend on the circumstances on the ground, and those judgments will be made by our commanders in the field.

GREGORY: Regardless of the circumstances, though, what you're saying is that withdrawal will take place at that point.

GATES: It will begin in July of 2011. But how, how quickly it goes will very much depend on the conditions on the ground. We will have a significant number of forces in there...

GREGORY: Mm-hmm.

GATES: ...for some considerable period of time after that.

GREGORY: You both, of course, this week have taken tough questions about this issue of a deadline and whether that's a bad thing to signal up front. Three years ago, Secretary Gates, you were asked on Capitol Hill about another war, another debate, another timeline. That was about Iraq. And, Secretary Clinton, you were asked as senator back in 2005 the same question about Iraq and timelines for withdrawal. This is what you both said back then.

(Videotape, December 5, 2006) SEN. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Do you believe if we set timetables or a policy to withdraw at a date certain, it would be seen by the extremists as a sign of weakness, the moderates would be disheartened and it would create a tremendous impediment to the moderate forces coming forward in Iraq?

GATES: I think a specific timetable would give--would essentially tell them how long they have to wait until we're gone. (End videotape)

(Videotape, February 20, 2005) CLINTON: We don't want to send a signal to the insurgents, to the terrorists, that we are going to be out of here at some, you know, date certain. I think that would be like a green light to go ahead and just bide your time. (End videotape)

GREGORY: That was about Iraq. Why are your views different when it comes to Afghanistan?

CLINTON: Because we're not talking about an exit strategy or a drop-dead deadline. What we're talking about is an assessment that in January 2011 we can begin a transition, a transition to hand off responsibility to the Afghan forces. That is what eventually happened in Iraq. You know, we're going to be out of Iraq. We have a firm deadline, because the Iraqis believe that they can assume and will assume responsibility for their own future. We want the Afghans to feel the same sense of urgency. We want them to actually make good on what President Karzai said in his inaugural speech, which is that by five years from now they'll have total control for their defense.

GREGORY: But this is a time certain. Secretary Gates, you just said that the withdrawal will begin regardless of conditions, the pace of withdrawal could be affected. This is a date certain. And when it came to Iraq, you thought that was a bad idea.

GATES: I was opposed to a deadline in Iraq and, if you'd listen to what I said, that that was a date certain to have all of our forces out of Iraq. I'm opposed to that in Afghanistan as well. But I believe that there is an important element here of balancing, sending a signal of resolve, but also giving the Afghan government a sense of urgency that they need to get their young men recruited, trained and into the field partnering with our forces and then on their own. And so I think that the beginning of this process in July 2011 makes a lot of sense, because the other side of it is open.

GREGORY: What kind of casualties should Americans be prepared to suffer in Afghanistan with this new strategy?

GATES: Well, the tragedy is that the casualties will, will probably continue to grow, at least for a time being. This is what we saw in the surge in Iraq. But it's because they're going into places where the Taliban essentially have controlled the territory and upsetting the apple cart, if you will. And what, what, what happened in Iraq is what we anticipate will happen here; we'll have an increase in casualties at the front end of this process, but over time it will actually lead to fewer casualties.

GREGORY: Secretary Clinton, what happens if the strategy isn't working in 18 months' time?

CLINTON: Well, first, David, we obviously believe that it will work. We've spent a lot of time

testing all the assumptions, our commanders have a, a lot of confidence that it will work. But the president has said, and we agree, that we will take stock of where we are every month. We're not going to wait, we're going to be looking to see what's happening. Now, we've had the Marines that were sent in--remember, this president inherited a situation where we had basically lost ground to the Taliban. The war in Afghanistan, unfortunately, was lost in the fog of the war in Iraq. And the president put in troops when he first got there and then said, "But let's make sure we know kind of where we're headed and how to get there." And so we're going to continue to evaluate as we go. But the Marines went into Helmand province last July and, you know, Bob can tell you that the reports are that they're making real headway. So we have confidence in this strategy.

GREGORY: The, the issue of what was inherited came up this week. The president very pointedly said, Secretary Gates, that reinforcements that were requested of the Bush administration on your watch were not provided, and that he provided them when he came into office. Is that true?

GATES: There was, there was, throughout my, my time as secretary of Defense under President Bush, an outstanding request from General McKiernan. And as Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified repeatedly, we just--because of the commitment of forces in Iraq, we did not have the, the ability to meet the resource needs in Afghanistan.

GREGORY: So you don't have any problem with that statement?

GATES: I--no, there was an outstanding troop request, and on my watch.

GREGORY: Let's talk about the mission, and I want to chart a little bit of the evolution of the president's public statements about this. Going back to July of 2008, during the campaign, when he talked about America's commitment to Afghanistan. Watch this.

(Videotape, July 15, 2008) OBAMA: The Afghan people must know that our commitment to their future is enduring, because the security of Afghanistan and the United States is shared. (End videotape)

GREGORY: And yet Tuesday when he spoke to the country, he seemed to dismiss the notion of what he called an open-ended commitment or an "enduring commitment" to Afghanistan, saying this.

(Videotape, December 1, 2009) OBAMA: Some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our war effort. I reject this course, because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost and what we need to achieve to secure our interests. (End videotape)

GREGORY: Secretary Clinton, has the president concluded, as president now, that in Afghanistan the war on terrorism needs to be downsized?

CLINTON: No. And, and I think, David, there is no contradiction between the two statements you just played. We will have an enduring commitment to Afghanistan. We're going to be putting in combat troops. We are going to be joined by 42 partners. We just got a commitment of

an additional 7,000 troops from our NATO-ISAF allies. And we will most likely be continuing once our combat responsibilities have ended in whatever support for the Afghan security forces in terms of training, logistics, intelligence, that will enable them to do what they need to do. At the same time, we will have an ongoing civilian commitment to Afghanistan. So yes, we don't have an open-ended combat commitment. We think we have a strategy that will create the space and time for the Afghans to stand up their own security forces and take responsibility. But we're not going to be, you know, walking away from Afghanistan again. We, we did that before, it didn't turn out very well. So we will stay involved, we will stay supportive, and I think that's exactly the right approach.

GREGORY: But if you have a situation where you're going to begin the withdrawal of troops regardless of conditions on the ground, some critics see that as weakness and a bad sign to the enemy. One of your former colleagues, the former Vice President Dick Cheney, said this to Politico this week about the president's speech: "Cheney said the average Afghan citizen 'sees talk about exit strategies and how soon we can get out, instead of talk about how we win. Those folks ... begin to look for ways to accommodate their enemies,' Cheney said. 'They're worried the United States isn't going to be there much longer and the bad guys are.'" And if you look at some of the response from Pakistan, the very country we need to get to the baddest of the guys who are over in their country with al-Qaeda, there's this, as reported by The New York Times: "Washington's assertion that American troops could begin leaving in 18 months provoked anxiety in Afghanistan and rekindled long-standing fears in Pakistan that America would abruptly withdraw, leaving Pakistan to fend for itself. Both countries face intertwined Taliban insurgencies. 'Regarding the new policy of President Obama, we're studying that policy,' [Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf] Gilani said. 'We need more clarity on it, and when we get more clarity on it we can see what we can implement on that plan.'" Is what former Vice President Cheney's warning about, is that already starting to take place in terms of the attitude in Pakistan?

GATES: Well, first of all, we're not talking about an abrupt withdrawal. We're talking about something that will take care--take place over a period of time. We--our commanders think that these additional forces, and one of the reasons for the president's decision to try and accelerate their deployment, is, is the view that the this extended surge has the opportunity to make significant gains in terms of reversing the momentum of the Taliban, denying them control of Afghan territory and degrading their capabilities. Our military thinks we have a real opportunity to do that. And it's not just in the next 18 months, because we will have significant--we will have 100,000 forces, troops there, and they are not leaving in July of 2011. Some, handful, or some small number, or whatever the conditions permit, will begin to withdraw at that time.

The piece of this people need to keep in mind that's different from Iraq is our need to communicate a sense of urgency to the Afghans of their need to begin to accept responsibility. The Iraqis, after it was clear that the surge was working, clearly wanted us out of the country as fast as possible. In the case of the Afghans, there are those--not everybody, and not a lot of the people--but there are those who would love to have the United States Army stay there in this very rough neighborhood indefinitely. And we want to communicate the message we will not provide for their security forever. They have to step up to that responsibility.

GREGORY: The--it seems to be an important point. Beyond July of 2011, there's going to be a significant amount of, of U.S. troops there. There's going to be about 100,000 once this surge is

finished. How many more years should Americans expect to have a significant force presence in Afghanistan?

GATES: Well, I think that, you know, again, I don't want to put a deadline on it, OK? But, but I think that just picking up on President Karzai's statements in his inaugural address, he talked about taking over security control in three years of important areas of Afghanistan, and all of Afghanistan in five years. I think that we're in that, we're in that neighborhood.

GREGORY: Mm-hmm.

GATES: Two to three to four years. But again, during that period we will be, just as we did in Iraq, turning over provinces to Iraq--Afghan security forces, and that will allow us to bring the number of our forces down in a steady but conditions-based circumstance.

GREGORY: We are also, in a more covert way that's not very well kept as a secret, at war in Pakistan as well. The real al-Qaeda figures, Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, the Haqqani network, the baddest of the bad are in Pakistan and not Afghanistan. What are the Pakistanis prepared to do to destroy them?

CLINTON: Well, David, I think what we've seen over the course of this year is a sea change in attitude by the Pakistanis. If we'd been sitting here a year ago and you'd asked what they were going to do, there wouldn't be much of an answer. Now we can say they're beginning to go after the terrorists who are threatening their very existence as a sovereign nation. They've had two military campaigns in the space of the last eight months, and they are making real progress. What we are discussing and consulting with them over is how all of these groups are now a threat to them. There is a syndicate of terrorism, with al-Qaeda at the head of it. So we're doing everything we can to support them in what is a really life or death struggle. I mean, they just blew up--the terrorists just blew up a mosque in Rawalpindi filled with military officers. These terrorists, with al-Qaeda's funding, encouragement, training, equipping, is going right at the Pakistani government.

GREGORY: Can, can a mission be accomplished without capturing Osama bin Laden?

CLINTON: Well, I, I really believe it's important to capture and/or kill Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri, the others who are part of that leadership team. But certainly, you can make enormous progress absent that.

GREGORY: I want to talk a little bit about history, a history you know well, Secretary Gates, with your work in this region going back decades. This was the editorial in The New York Times days after the Soviet invasion in 1979, I'll put it up on the screen: "Moscow's Backyard Quagmire. By intervening so strongly on behalf of a wobbly Afghan client, the Soviet Union appears to be sinking deeper into a backyard quagmire." A lot of questions about the Afghan client today. You have said, along this process, you were worried about putting more troops in. You said the Soviets had 110,000 committed there and they couldn't win. Why is it different now? Isn't this mission impossible?

GATES: It's pretty straightforward. First of all, the Soviets were trying to impose an alien culture and, and political system on, on Afghanistan. But more importantly, they were there terrorizing



the Afghans. They killed a million Afghans. They made refugees out of five million Afghans. They were isolated internationally. All of those factors are different for, for us, completely different. We have the sanction of the U.N. We have the sanction of NATO. We have the invitation of the Afghan government itself. We have 42 military partners in Afghanistan. We are supporting and protecting the Afghan people. One of the central themes of General McChrystal's strategy is to reduce and keep civilian casualties low. And, and so it's a, it's a very different situation. And what General McChrystal persuaded me of was that the size of the footprint matters a lot less than what they're doing there. And the new strategy that he's put in place, in terms of how we deal with the Afghans and how we behave, I think will make a big difference.

GREGORY: I want to bring it back home and ask you a very important political question, Secretary Clinton. You have heard the reaction from the Democratic Party; liberals using terms like "echoes of Vietnam," that this is risky, that this is a gamble. Vietnam War protester Tom Hayden talked about the immorality of fighting for regime like--that is currently in place in Afghanistan. You've been on the campaign trail running for president, you're a former senator, you know the politics of your party well. What is the message of this president to those Democrats who are not on board? And can you effectively prosecute this war without the base of the party behind it?

CLINTON: Well, David, I think it's clear that anyone who has followed this that President Obama has done what he thinks is right for the country. He is well aware of the political concerns raised that you have just described. I think he deserves a lot of credit for not only delving into this and asking the hard questions, but coming to a decision that has both political and economic costs, but which he has concluded is in our vital national security interest.

I think that we have to look more broadly at what has gone on in Afghanistan. Yes, are there problems with the current government? Of course there are, as there are with, you know, any government. We deal, we deal with a lot of governments that are hardly poster children for, you know, good governance. But look at what has happened. When President Karzai came into office, there were about a million kids in school and they were all boys. There are now seven million and they're 40 percent girls. There's all of a sudden a wheat harvest because of better seeds and fertilizer that is giving people, once again, income from their land. There are so many positive examples of what has changed. Of course there's a lot of work to be done. I mean, good grief, this country was devastated by three decades of the most brutal kind of war. It's recovering. And as Bob as said, you know, they really do want a different future.

GREGORY: But is the, the politics of this, the cost of this, will there have to be a war tax? What will you do to keep the Democrats in line on this?

CLINTON: Well, the president has said he will make sure that the cost of the war is accounted for in the budget. Of--it is, it is an additional expense. Everybody knows that. And we have so many important demands here at home. We would not be pursuing this strategy if we did not believe it was directly connected to the safety of our people, our interests, our allies around the world. And I just hope that a lot of my friends who are raising questions, Bob and I heard them when we were up there testifying, will really pay attention to, you know, the rationale behind the president doing this.

GREGORY: Secretary Gates, you are a hard-nosed realist about this region and about this

struggle, going back decades. Is failure an option in Afghanistan?

GATES: No, I don't think it can be, given the, the nature of the terror network that Secretary Clinton referred to. But we will be monitoring our progress and, and be willing to adjust our strategy if there are, if there are issues. We're not just going to plunge blindly ahead if it, if it becomes clear that what we're doing isn't working. I mean, there are some other alternatives. We, frankly, didn't think that the outcome of the long discussions that we had was that those, those outcomes were probably less likely to work than what we've chosen. We think and recommended to the president a strategy that, that he has decided on, that we believe, all of us--including the uniform military and our commanders in the field--offers the very best chance for our success. And we're--and that's what we're going to count on.

GREGORY: But you say failure's not an option. The president has said, "We will fight this fight and fight it hard only up to a certain point."

GATES: And then we begin to transfer the responsibility to the Afghans.

GREGORY: Right.

GATES: And a lot can happen in 18 months.

GREGORY: You said, when you were last on this program back in March, that you considered it a challenge, the notion that you might stay on for the entire first term as secretary of Defense. What do you say now?

GATES: I'd say that's a challenge.

GREGORY: Will you see this war through, the withdrawal of troops through?

GATES: I, I think that's probably up to the president.

GREGORY: All right, thank you both very much.

CLINTON: Thank you, David.

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**Face The Nation (CBS), 10:30 AM**

BOB SCHIEFFER, HOST: Joining us now in the studio, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

I believe this is the first time we've ever had two cabinet officers in the studio at the same time. So thank you both for coming.

But let's get right to it. Tuesday night, the president made it pretty clear. He is dispatching another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, but for a limited time. Here is the way he put it.

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(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) PRESIDENT OBAMA: These additional American and international troops will allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces and allow us to begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011. (END VIDEO CLIP)

SCHIEFFER: But since he has said that, Mr. Secretary, you have said what the president has announced is the beginning of a process, not the end of a process. You have said this will be a gradual process and based on conditions on the ground, so there is no deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan.

So what's going on here?

GATES: Well, I think what -- what we have -- what the president has done here is balanced signaling our commitment, and now, thanks to Secretary Clinton's and others' good work, NATO's commitment to reenergize our efforts and to reverse the momentum...

SCHIEFFER: But, Mr. Secretary, is there a deadline or is there not?

GATES: There isn't a deadline. There -- what we have is a specific date on which we will begin transferring responsibility for security, district by district, province by province, in Afghanistan to the Afghans.

The process of that and the subsequent thinning of our forces will take place over a period of time and will happen -- and will be done based on the conditions on the ground. And the decision on that will be made by our commanders in the field.

SCHIEFFER: But -- but does that mean, Madam Secretary, that American forces will still be there as we start -- that they're not going to start bringing the troops home; we're just going to begin handing over responsibility?

CLINTON: No. It means that, as we assess the conditions on the ground, we will be transferring responsibility to the Afghans. And depending on the assessment at the time, that means some of our troops can begin coming home. I think that....

SCHIEFFER: Can begin coming home...

CLINTON: Absolutely, can begin coming home.

SCHIEFFER: But not will begin coming home?

CLINTON: Well, you know, Bob, I really believe that the president was very clear in his speech, that we want to evidence both resolve and urgency at the same time.

You know, this is a very big commitment. The president engaged in a deliberative process that led to this decision. And he is resolved to do what he can with these new troops to break the momentum of the Taliban, to begin taking back territory, to stand up the Afghan security forces in an effective way on a faster timetable, and that we believe, based on everything that's going on -- the Marines that are in southern Helmand province got there in July of this year. They will

have been there for two years. As Secretary Gates can tell you, they're making progress.

So it's not an arbitrary time. It is an assessment based on what we see happening, that, yes, we will be able to transfer responsibility and that will very likely mean some troops can come home.

SCHIEFFER: But, in other words, there's not a deadline? Is that what you're saying, that we will look at what things -- what's going on, on the ground, and then we'll decide where to go from there?

GATES: Let's be clear. The -- the date in July 2011, to begin transferring security responsibility and thinning our troops and bringing them home is firm.

GATES: What is conditions-based is the pacing at which our troops will come home and the pace at which we will turn over responsibility to the Afghans. That will be based on conditions on the ground.

SCHIEFFER: So we get to the month, the magic month and he might decide to bring six troops home or something like that? And that would mean...

GATES: Or 6,000.

SCHIEFFER: ... that that's what he's talking about? But it might be six?

CLINTON: Well, you know, Bob, I think it's very hard for any of us to be armchair generals.

SCHIEFFER: Precisely.

CLINTON: What we have done and what the president's direction to the commanders on the ground is very clearly, we want this to move. We want it to move quickly. We want to show urgency about our aims here. And we do expect to start this transition in July 2011. And I think everybody is very clear about that. All of the generals are. We certainly are. But it's hard to sit here today in Washington and predict exactly what that pace will be.

SCHIEFFER: That's why I wondered why he put out this deadline...

GATES: I'll tell you why, because...

SCHIEFFER: ... because if there's one thing we know, that you can't predict what's going to happen in a war.

GATES: The reason that he did, and I started to make this point earlier, is he was balancing a demonstration of resolve with also communicating a sense of urgency to the Afghan government that they must step up to the plate in terms of recruiting their soldiers, training their soldiers and getting their soldiers into the field first to partner with us and our ISAF partners, and then on their own.

So it's an effort to try and let the Afghans know that while we intend to have a relationship and

support them for a long time, the nature of that relationship is going to begin to change in July of 2011. And as the security component comes down, the economic development, and the political relationship will become a bigger part of the relationship. We're not going to abandon Afghanistan like we did in 1989. But the nature of the relationship will change.

CLINTON: And that also, Bob, is in keeping with what President Karzai said in his inauguration because he said that he wanted to see Afghan troops taking responsibility for important parts of the country within three years and to have the total responsibility within five.

SCHIEFFER: Let me just ask you this. What if there's total chaos in 18 months? What if the government has fallen in? Does that mean we'll still begin this process? What would we turn it over to?

GATES: Well, I think the key here is, first of all, it's clearly a hypothetical. And if we thought that was going to be the case, I think we would have perhaps come to a different set of conclusions and the president would have made different decisions.

I mean our military commanders are confident that they will have clear understanding by that time of whether the strategy is working or not. And if it's not, then we obviously will have to reconsider the whole approach.

But our commanders have the confidence and bought into this date as a realistic date in terms of when they will be able to make a judgment and begin this process of handing over security responsibility.

SCHIEFFER: Let me ask you this. Former Vice President Cheney says any time you start talking leaving that that just emboldens the enemy. It causes the Afghans to begin to accommodate the enemy because they get the idea that the bad guys are still going to be there but we're going to leave.

GATES: The reality is the Taliban reads the newspapers, OK. They know what popular opinion is in Europe. They know what popular opinion is in the United States. Whether you announce a date or not, they can tell as easily from reading the news media about political support for these kinds of undertakings themselves. They always believe that they can outlast us.

The reality is though what are they going to do? Are they going to get more aggressive than they already are? We don't think they can. If they lie low, that's great news to us because it gives us some huge opportunities in Afghanistan. We think that we have the opportunity to engage these guys with the additional force we're sending in, make a significant difference in 18 months, get enough additional Afghan troops and police trained that we can begin this gradual process of transitioning security.

SCHIEFFER: Madame Secretary, let me ask you about one thing the president said. In this entire speech, he talked about handing over authority to the Afghans. But he never included the words "win" or "victory" as far as I know in that speech. He just talked about avoiding an open-ended commitment. Have we given up trying to win? Do we think that's no longer possible? Is victory no longer possible?

CLINTON: Well, Bob, I think he talked about success. That's what we're looking toward. We do believe we can be successful.

SCHIEFFER: Well, what is success?

CLINTON: Well, success is doing what we have set forth as our primary goal which is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda. It is also being able to stand up an Afghan security force so that they can defend themselves and partnering with the Afghan government and people so that they will not once again become a safe haven for terrorists.

CLINTON: And I think part of our very careful deliberation over the last months was to ask ourselves really hard questions like, OK, who is the enemy? Is it every young boy who is coerced into joining the Taliban or who decides he can make more money being a fighting member of the Taliban than he can being a member of the Afghan security army? You know, we thought hard about that. And no, we don't think so.

We think those are people that actually, if we reverse and break the momentum of the Taliban which we think can very well happen with the strategy that we're pursuing, that a lot of these people are going to come back over. They don't want to see the return of the Taliban. There is absolutely no evidence that Afghans are in any way supportive of that.

SCHIEFFER: Will there be a civilian surge as well as a military surge?

CLINTON: Yes, there will be. In fact there has been. We've tripled the number of civilians in Afghanistan. When this administration came into office, there were about 320 civilians. They were on most of them six-month rotations. There was in my view not the kind of serious effort that needs to be demonstrated to the civilian aspect of our strategy. We've changed that. We're going to keep building it.

SCHIEFFER: The president made it clear that we expect the Karzai government to improve its performance and clean up corruption. How will we know and what will we do if he doesn't?

GATES: Secretary Clinton made this point pretty clearly in our hearings this week. The reality is the Karzai government has been painted with two broad a brush. The reality is we have several ministries -- interior, defense, agriculture, education, some others -- where you have very competent, honest ministers that are doing a darned good job. We also have governors in important provinces that are making a big difference.

SCHIEFFER: What if he appoints a crook to one of those province governor's jobs? Do we then cut off the aid to that province or what do we do?

CLINTON: Well you know, Bob, we've said very clearly that our aid is going to be based on a certification of accountability and transparency. So there are certain ministries we will not -- American money will not be going to. We've looked at every civilian assistance program and contract. And we've said, look, we're not going to just aid and abet bad behavior. So we will be putting the money where, as Bob said, we think we have people who are doing a good job. And they are. And so part of the challenge here is to begin to make the more difficult, complicated assessments that were not made before.

GATES: I would just like to add one other point and that is, one of the refinements in this strategy is we are not doing full-scale nation building. What we are going to do is focus on the ministries that matter to our success and that contribute to the success of our strategy both with respect to Al Qaeda and stabilizing the security situation.

SCHIEFFER: Let's just take a break right here and we'll come back and continue this. We want to talk about NATO because you're just back from NATO. Back in a minute.

SCHIEFFER: We're back now with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. You are just back from Europe. NATO has pledged 7,000 troops. Let me ask you, Madam Secretary, what will these troops be able to do? Are these going to be fighting troops or are they trainers? What are they?

CLINTON: Well, they're everything we need. They are combat troops. They're trainers. They're support and logistical troops. I think what we saw at NATO...

SCHIEFFER: How many are combat troops?

CLINTON: You know what? It's a little hard to give you that number because combat troops are also training troops. I mean, that's one of the distinctions... (CROSSTALK)

SCHIEFFER: How many are combat and trainers then?

CLINTON: The majority of them are. The majority of them.

SCHIEFFER: A lot of the troops that have gone to Afghanistan have been basically there to hold our hats while we do the hard work.

CLINTON: Well, but you know, a lot of them have really fought and they've sacrificed and they've lost people too. We've had some extraordinary partnerships with a number of our allies. And what was significant about these new contributions is the vote of confidence that it displayed in this strategy.

We know that this is not politically popular in our country or any country. But for the leaders of our NATO allies and our other partners in the international security force, ISAF, to say we really believe this is the right thing to do, we do see it as affecting our national security and we want to be in, you know, we started this fight together. we want to continue it and finish it together was a reflection of the work that we've done all year to rebuild these relationships. You know, the president has made that...

SCHIEFFER: You think there are more coming?

CLINTON: ... a clear priority.

I do. I do think there will be more coming.

GATES: And the fact is with this pledge of 7,000, that will be 50,000 non-U.S. troops in

Afghanistan. That is not a trivial matter.

SCHIEFFER: Let me just ask you this. I want to go on and talk about Pakistan. But it's my understanding now that we have a ratio of one combat troop in Afghanistan to one civilian contractor. Is that ratio going to continue?

GATES: That's not quite right. But there are a lot of contractors... (CROSSTALK)

SCHIEFFER: It's pretty close to that.

GATES: But most of the contractors are, in fact, Afghans.

CLINTON: Yes, that's a very important point.

GATES: And so these are people that we are paying who have real jobs that, frankly, become our allies rather than potential recruits for the bad guys.

SCHIEFFER: So let's talk about Pakistan. There are repeated assertions by U.S. officials that senior leaders of the Afghan Taliban, including Mullah Omar, generally thought to be the main leader, have taken up residence in Pakistan near the town Quetta. They're even calling him the "Quetta shura."

Have you raised this with the Pakistani government? What are they going to do about these people?

CLINTON: Well, we have raised it with the Pakistani government. And you know, I said when I was there that despite the fact that the top leaders of the Pakistani government, you know, say they don't really know that because a lot of these areas, including the one you just referred to, are in parts of the country that are largely ungoverned by the Pakistani government.

That's one of the problems they have, which is why they're going after the Pakistan Taliban, because they ceded territory that they're now trying to get back. But I think that this will be a continuing issue in our ongoing discussions.

You know, if you had told us a year ago that the Pakistani army would be going after Pakistani Taliban, I think a lot of people would have said, no, that couldn't ever happen, that's not the way it works. But they saw the threat to their sovereignty and look at what they did. They just blew up a mosque in Rawalpindi, which is frequently by members of the military. They're going right at the real core institutions of their state. So we've seen a lot of change in this last year.

SCHIEFFER: So what about that? Would we ever go after those people?

GATES: The Pakistani government is -- Pakistan is a sovereign government. We are in a partnership with them. I think at this point it's up to the Pakistani military to deal with this problem.

SCHIEFFER: But as long -- Mr. Secretary, as long as they have a safe haven there, it doesn't



make much difference what we do in Afghanistan.

GATES: But if there is pressure being brought to bear on the Pakistani side of the government against the Taliban, then that is helpful to us.

SCHIEFFER: How safe are the nuclear weapons that Pakistan has?

GATES: We are comfortable with the security of their weapons.

CLINTON: Yes.

SCHIEFFER: And I've asked this question before to other officials, including you, I think. How do you know that?

GATES: Well, we have a good relationship with them. We've actually given them assistance in improving some of their security arrangements over the past number of years. This is not a new relationship. And I think just based on the information available to us, that gives us the comfort.

SCHIEFFER: But I am told that we don't know where all of the weapons are. So how can we be comfortable in saying we think they're safe?

GATES: Well, I think I'll just leave it that based on the information available to us, we're comfortable.

SCHIEFFER: Talk about the relationship. There has been this historic relationship between the Taliban and the Pakistani intelligence services. It's well-documented. Do you believe that relationship still exists?

CLINTON: I think there has been a sea change in the attitude of the Pakistani government, both the civilian leadership as well as the military and the intelligence service.

CLINTON: As they have seen the growing threat to their sovereignty from these groups. Because now, Bob, it's not discreet groups operating for specific missions that might or might not be ones we would approve of; it is now a syndicate of terrorism with Al Qaida at the head.

I think that that's a change. There has been such, as Bob has said, symbiotic relationship grow up between Al Qaida and all these various terrorist groups within Pakistan.

So our argument has been, consistently, that, as the Pakistanis go after those who are directly assaulting them, they have to keep in mind that they are part of a larger threat that exists.

SCHIEFFER: Mr. Secretary, are you optimistic that this will work? And we have about 30 seconds.

GATES: I think that, based on my conversations with our military leaders and the team of -- that we have in Kabul, Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal, I am -- I am optimistic.

SCHIEFFER: And you?

CLINTON: Absolutely, yes.

SCHIEFFER: All right. Thanks to both of you. We really appreciate it.

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**This Week (ABC), 10:30 AM**

GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS, HOST: We begin with the cornerstones of President Obama's national security cabinet, the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton; secretary of defense, Robert Gates. Welcome to you both.

This is the first time you're here together on THIS WEEK. Thanks for doing it.

SECRETARY OF STATE CLINTON: The first time we've been called cornerstones.  
(LAUGHTER)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Secretary Gates, let me begin with you, because there has been so much focus since the president's speech on this call to begin an exit strategy in July 2011. I want to show you what Senator McCain said earlier this week.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R), ARIZONA: When conditions on the ground have decisively begun to change for the better, that is when our troops should start to return home with honor, not one minute longer, not one minute sooner, and certainly not on some arbitrary date in July 2011. (END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: Just two months ago, you seemed to agree with that sentiment. You called the notion of timelines and exit strategies a strategic mistake. What changed?

DEFENSE SECRETARY GATES: Well, first of all, I don't consider this an exit strategy. And I try to avoid using that term. I think this is a transition...

STEPHANOPOULOS: Why not?

GATES: This is a transition that's going to take place. And it's not an arbitrary date. It will be two years since the Marines went into southern Helmand and that two years that our military leaders believe will give us time to know that our strategy is working.

They believe that in that time General McChrystal will have the opportunity to demonstrate decisively in certain areas of Afghanistan that the approach we're taking is working. Obviously the transition will begin in the less contested areas of the country.

But it will be the same kind of gradual conditions-based transition province by province, district by district, that we saw in Iraq.

STEPHANOPOULOS: We've heard that phrase a lot...

GATES: But it begins -- but it begins in July 2011.

STEPHANOPOULOS: No, I understand that. But you about this conditions-based decision-making. And I guess that it's fairly vague term. So if the strategy is working, do the troops stay? If it's not working, do they leave? How -- how is the decision-making process going to go?

GATES: Well, from my standpoint, the decision in terms of when a district or a cluster of districts or a province is ready to be turned over to the Afghan security forces is a judgment that will be made by our commanders on the ground, not here in Washington.

And we will do the same thing we did in Iraq, when we transitioned to Afghan security responsibility. We will withdraw first into tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch, if you will, the cavalry over the hill in case they run into trouble.

STEPHANOPOULOS: And this certainly increases the leverage on President Karzai and his government, Secretary Clinton, which brings up questions similar to questions that were raised by a lot of Democrats during -- after the Iraq surge, including President Obama when he was a senator.

He asked Secretary Rice basically what happens if the Maliki government doesn't live up to its promises.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) SEN. OBAMA: Are there any circumstances that you can articulate in which we would say to the Maliki government that enough is enough, and we are no longer committing our troops. (END VIDEO CLIP)

STEPHANOPOULOS: A lot of people asking the same exact question today about President Karzai, at what point do we say enough is enough, we're no longer going to commit troops?

CLINTON: Well, George, I understand the desire to ask these questions which are all thrown into the future, they're obviously matters of concern about how we have a good partner as we move forward in Afghanistan.

But I think you have to look at what President Karzai said in his inaugural speech where he said that Afghan security forces would begin to take responsibility for important parts of the country within three years, and that they would be responsible for everything within five years.

And from our perspective, we think we have a strategy that is a good, integrated approach, it's civilian and military. It has been extremely thoroughly analyzed. But we have to begin to implement it with the kind of commitment that we all feel toward it.

I can't predict everything that is going to happen with President Karzai. I came away from my meeting with him around the inauguration heartened by a lot of what he was saying. But you know, the proof is in the pudding. We're going to have to wait to see how it unfolds.

**1444**

STEPHANOPOULOS: But if you're really going to have maximum leverage, doesn't he have to know that if he doesn't live up to the commitment, we're going to go?

CLINTON: Well, I think he knows that we have a commitment to trying to protect our national security. That's why we're there. We do want to assist the people of Afghanistan and to try to improve the capacity of the Afghan government.

But I think it's important to stress that this decision was based on what we believe is best for the United States. And we have to have a realistic view of who we're working with in Afghanistan, and it's not only President Karzai, it's ministers of various agencies that -- some of which are doing quite well and producing good results, provincial and local leaders.

So it's a much more complicated set of players than just one person.

STEPHANOPOULOS: There is also the question of Pakistan, the neighbor, and whether they're living up to their commitments. You got in a little hot water in Pakistan when you suggested that they hadn't been doing enough in the past to go after the Taliban.

And, Secretary Gates, let me turn a question about this to you, it's connected to a report that Senator Kerry, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released this week about Osama bin Laden. He suggested that the failure to block his exit from Tora Bora has made the situation there much worse.

In this report, he actually wrote that the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide.

The Pakistani prime minister sort of shrugged off any concerns about that this week, about whether or not he had gone -- done enough to go after Osama bin Laden. He said he doesn't believe Osama is in Pakistan. Is he right? And do you think the Pakistanis have done enough to get him?

GATES: Well, we don't know for a fact where Osama bin Laden is, if we did, we'd go get him. But...

STEPHANOPOULOS: When was the last time we had any good intelligence on where he was?

GATES: I think it has been years.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Years?

GATES: I think so.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So these reports that came out just this week about a detainee saying he might have seen him in Afghanistan earlier this year?

GATES: No, that's...

STEPHANOPOULOS: We can't confirm that.

GATES: No.

STEPHANOPOULOS: So do you believe that one of the reasons we haven't had good enough intelligence is because the Pakistani government has not been cooperating enough?

GATES: No. I think it's because if, as we suspect, he is in North Waziristan, it is an area that the Pakistani government has not had a presence in, in quite some time. The truth of the matter is that we have been very impressed by the Pakistani army's willingness to go into places like Swat in South Waziristan, if one had asked any of us a year or more ago if the Pakistani army would be doing that, we would have said no chance.

And so they are bringing pressure to bear on the Taliban in Pakistan, and particularly those that are attacking the Pakistani government. But frankly, any pressure on the Taliban, whether it's in Pakistan or in Afghanistan is helpful to us because al Qaeda is working with both of them.

STEPHANOPOULOS: You mentioned the actions the Pakistani government has taken. Is Balochistan next? Is that where they have to go next to take out the Taliban?

GATE: Well, I think that the Pakistani government, we sometimes tend to forget that Pakistan, like Afghanistan, is a sovereign country. And Pakistani -- the Pakistani army will go where the Pakistani army thinks the threat is. And if they think that threat is Balochistan, that's where they'll go. If they think it's in North Waziristan, they may go up there. Or they may just winter in where they are right now.

But these are calls that the Pakistanis make. We are sharing information with them. We have had a steadily developing, better relationship between our militaries.

And we will help them in any way we possibly can, but that's their call.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Back to Afghanistan, Secretary Clinton, some have suggested that one of your envoys -- the president's envoy, Richard Holbrooke -- should begin negotiations with those elements of the Taliban who are willing to talk to him.

Do you agree with that?

CLINTON: Well, George, we have said -- and the president made it clear in his speech at West Point -- that, you know, there are two different approaches here.

One is what could be called reintegration. And that is really looking at the lower-level members of the Taliban, who are there through intimidation and coercion, or, frankly, because it's a better living than they can make anywhere else.

We think there's a real opportunity for a number of those to be persuaded to leave the battlefield.

Now, the problem, of course, once they leave -- and we have a lot of evidence of this -- they'll

get killed if they're not protected. And that's one of the reasons why we're trying to get these secure zones.

STEPHANOPOULOS: In other words, they don't believe we'll stay.

CLINTON: Well, and also, just, we need to secure the population. It's one of General McChrystal's principal objectives.

Then the upper levels of the Taliban -- you know, look. They have to renounce al Qaeda, renounce violence. They have to be willing to abide by the constitution of Afghanistan and live peacefully.

We have no firm information whether any of those leaders would be at all interested in following that kind of a path. In fact, I'm highly skeptical that any of them would.

So, we're going to be consulting with our Afghan partners. It's going to be a multiply-run operation to see who might come off of the battlefield, and who might possibly give up their allegiance to the Taliban and their connection with the...

STEPHANOPOULOS: But high-level negotiations are possible?

CLINTON: We don't know yet. And again, I think that -- we asked Mullah Omar to give up bin Laden before we went into Afghanistan after 9/11, and he wouldn't do it. I don't know why we think he would have changed by now.

GATES: I would just add, I think that the likelihood of the leadership of the Taliban, or seniors leaders, being willing to accept the conditions Secretary Clinton just talked about depends in the first instance on reversing their momentum right now, and putting them in a position where they suddenly begin to realize that they're likely to lose.

STEPHANOPOULOS: How is this offensive in Helmand Province going?

GATES: It's actually going very well. And the Marines have already had -- I think one of the reasons that our military leaders are pretty confident is that they have already begun to see changes where the Marines are present in southern Helmand.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Let me (?) the question of costs, which has been raised by our next guest, Senator Russ Feingold. As you know, he's against the escalation announced by the president.

But he's also gone and wrote a letter to the president where he raises -- where he says, we request that you not send any additional troops to Afghanistan until Congress has enacted appropriations to pay for the cost of such an increase, and that you propose reductions in spending to pay for the costs of any military operations in Afghanistan -- a concern shared by many of the American people.

Secretary Clinton, shouldn't this war, if we're going to fight it, be paid for?

CLINTON: Well, the president has said that the costs are going to be accounted for, that the Office of Management and Budget, the Defense Department, the State Department, you know, are going to be working to make sure that we give the best projections of costs we can.

I think that we're going to have to address our deficit situation across the board. There's no doubt about that, and I certainly support that.

But I think we have to look at the entire budget, and we have to be very clear about, you know, what the costs are, as Secretary Gates has said a couple of times in our testimony together. We are drawing down from Iraq. There will be savings over the next two to three years coming from there. And the addition of these troops is going to put a burden on us, no doubt about it.

It is manageable, but we have to look at all of our fiscal situation and begin to address this.

STEPHANOPOULOS: There's also the question of the cost-benefit analysis. And a lot of people look at our own U.S. government intelligence estimates, saying there are fewer than 100 active al Qaeda in Afghanistan and say, why is that worth putting \$30 billion more this year into Afghanistan?

GATES: It is because in that border area, Afghan-Pakistani border, that is the epicenter of extremist jihad. And al Qaeda has close relationships with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and they have very close relationships with the Taliban in Pakistan.

The Taliban in Pakistan have been attacking Pakistani civilians, Pakistani government officials, military officials, trying to destabilize the government of Pakistan.

Any success by the Taliban in either Afghanistan or Pakistan benefits al Qaeda. And any safe haven on either side of the border creates opportunities for them to recruit, get new funds and do operational planning.

And what's more, the Taliban revival in the safe havens in western Pakistan is a lesson to al Qaeda that they can come back, if they are provided the kind of safe haven that the Taliban were.

This is the place where the jihadists defeated the Soviet Union, one superpower. And they believe -- their narrative is that it helped create the collapse of the Soviet Union. If they -- they believe that if they can defeat us in Afghanistan, that they then have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.

STEPHANOPOULOS: But you look at that...

GATES: And it creates huge opportunities for them in that area, as well as around the world.

STEPHANOPOULOS: You were the deputy director of the CIA back in 1985, when Gorbachev made the decision to expand. Eighteen months later, he was pulling out.

What's to prevent that from happening again?

GATES: Well, what he did was agree with his generals to make one last push.

But the parallel just doesn't work. The reality is, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. They killed a million Afghans. They made five million refugees out of Afghans.

They were isolated in the world in terms of what they were doing there.

We are part of an alliance of 42 countries with us, in addition to us, that are contributing troops. We have a U.N. mandate. We have a mandate from NATO.

So, you have broad international support for what's going on in Afghanistan. And the situation is just completely different than was the case with the Soviet Union.


STEPHANOPOULOS: We're just about out of time.




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEDIA INTERVIEWS WITH SECRETARY HILLARY CLINTON

Dec. 5, 2009



1450  
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton talk with ABC's "This Week" host George Stephanopoulos in Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 2009. This was the first time that the two cabinet members appeared together on Sunday morning talk shows and their interviews were taped Saturday evening. DoD photo by Cherie Cullen  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton talk with CBS's "Face the Nation" host Bob Schieffer in Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 2009. DoD photo by Cherie Cullen  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton talk with NBC's "Meet the Press" host David Gregory in Washington, D.C., Dec. 5, 2009. DoD photo by Cherie Cullen  
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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO AFGHANISTAN

December 8 – 11, 2009



U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

December 08, 2009

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### Media Availability with Secretary Gates en route to Afghanistan

SEC. GATES: So let me just talk a little bit about the trip to Afghanistan and what my agenda is.

First of all, with the Afghans, clearly we'll want to talk with President Karzai and Minister Wardak about the president's decision and the implementation of that decision, how we hope to use our troops and the additional troops from our allies in partnering with the Afghan national security forces.

Another major message will be the importance of a long-term relationship between the United States, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and Afghanistan, that we are not going to repeat the experience of 1989, and that obviously, as the security situation improves and we're able, over time, to reduce our forces, that the civilian developmental, economic, other kinds of relations between us and developing countries that are normal will become the predominant part of the relationship. But we intend to be their partner for a long time to come.

I will ask them about the prospects for increasing the retention and recruitment of the Afghan security forces and the training of those forces and the speed with which we can get them into embedded and partnering relationships with our forces and those of the other ISAF countries.

I'll talk to them about the importance for us of capable, honest ministers in areas that are critical for our success, such as defense and interior and others, as well as in key provinces.

With respect to the meetings with the U.S. commanders and our troops, clearly, again, I'll be asking them about their view of the way forward, now that we have the president's decisions, how they are viewing the Afghan capabilities and potential for accelerated growth and partnering.

I'll probably focus a lot on their perception of logistics and the ability to receive the inflow of U.S. forces and equipment in the time frame that we're talking about. And then I have a lot of concerns that are sort of traditional for me that I'll be talking to them about in terms of taking care of the troops.

I want to talk quite a bit about the counter-IED effort, especially in light of this task force I've just formed. I want to make sure that we can preserve the golden hour in terms of medevac with the influx of additional, significant additional U.S. and ISAF forces.

I'll be asking them if they have much experience at this point with the MRAP all-terrain vehicles. There are only a few hundred in Afghanistan at this point. But we'll see if we have any reaction to that; obviously concern about the adequacy of intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance efforts for them.

And I'll be asking about equipment in general. For example, one of the members of Congress told me offline at the hearings the other day that he heard some complaints from some of the soldiers about the straps on their backpacks being too thin and putting too much pressure on their shoulders in ways that leave their hands numb; so just little stuff like that. I'll be asking the soldiers what kind of equipment issues they have that we can do something about back in Washington; obviously talk about civil-military cooperation.

And then a big piece of my conversation, especially with the soldiers, will just be to thank them for their service and for their sacrifice and tell them we're in this thing to win. Some of these units, particularly the Stryker unit, have taken a lot of casualties, so I want to talk to them about that, express sympathy.

Q Secretary, can you describe the discussions that you've had?

STAFF: This is Anne Flaherty -- the new AP reporter.

Q Hi. The discussions that the administration has had with Afghanistan since the announcement or before the announcement. I believe Obama called him Sunday night, Karzai Sunday night, before the big announcement. But you have not spoken to Karzai, or --

SEC. GATES: I spoke -- I have not spoken to President Karzai. I did talk to Minister Wardak about the decision and where we were headed. I think it was -- Monday? I think it was on Monday.

Q What was that conversation like?

SEC. GATES: Basically foreshadowing the president's decisions of the speech and the agenda that we have in front of us, and particularly the importance of recruitment for the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces].

I would say his main concern is the flow of equipment, particularly the Afghan National Army. And so I'm sure that'll be a subject that comes up in my conversations with him.

Q I've heard you say in a statement last week (inaudible) -- talked about 1989 and not wanting to -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, yeah. And as I said to somebody else, I mean, it wasn't like we were twiddling our thumbs at the time. We had the liberation of Eastern Europe, the collapsing Soviet Union. As I recall, we had some issues in Panama. So we were pretty busy.

And frankly, there was just so much on the agenda at that time in terms of all of the evolution of first Poland and then the -- the Polish turn began as early as February 1989 and really accelerated beginning in May. And then we had the succession of East European countries liberating themselves, and then the growing number of problems with the Soviet Union or inside the Soviet Union and tracking all of that; and then, of course, a year later, the first Gulf War. So there was a lot going on. But this is an area that we should have paid closer attention to.

Q How are you going to express this to President Karzai? Are you going to bring up 1989 and say --

SEC. GATES: Sure, absolutely. I mean, they remember.

Q (Inaudible)—is there enough housing available?

SEC. GATES: Well, that's what we'll be talking about. I mean, most of them live in tents anyway. And that's one of the subjects I'll be talking about is how are you going to handle the logistics of these troops coming in.

I will say this. If we would not have agreed to the shorter time line, if the logistics folks and the folks out here hadn't thought it was possible -- and it's going to be a heavy lift; there's no question about it -- but our folks are confident they can get it done.

Q What does a heavy lift mean?

SEC. GATES: Just -- I mean, a heavy lift in terms of a hard job. And it's going to require a lot of effort on a lot of different people's part.

Q (Inaudible)—which units?

SEC. GATES: You probably know that better than I do at this point. (Laughs.) I signed the first deployment orders on Friday for roughly the first 17,000 troops that will flow through March and April.

Q (Inaudible) -- when March and April will arrive?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, they'll begin arriving February, March, April. As I mentioned, the first Marines actually will start arriving next week, and the Marines will flow in probably at a fairly steady pace over the next few

weeks. They may not all be in until February or thereabouts, but the first units are coming in pretty quick.

Q Mr. Secretary, the effort to build the Afghan security force has been going on for many years. What can be done to speed it up and to raise the level of their confidence?

SEC. GATES: Well, a couple of things. First of all, as was mentioned in the hearings last week, I mean, one of the eye openers for us was learning that the Taliban, for the most part, are better paid than the ANSF. So that's something that we and the Afghans have already taken steps to correct. The police are particularly poorly paid. But even the army is less well paid.

And so the army is putting -- they're raising the pay of the police and they're putting in place a number of additional incentives and bonuses and so on for the army in terms of combat pay and various things like that. So that clearly will help. And I think, frankly, that's the biggest obstacle.

And one of the problems -- I mean, it sounds silly on its face, but attrition is higher in the areas on the Afghan National Army -- attrition is higher in the areas where the combat is heavier than it is in places, say, in the west and in the north. And the reason is that there aren't enough of them, and they basically fight until they die or they go AWOL, because there's nobody to rotate in behind them so that they can get a break. So the numbers and beginning to be in a position where you can rotate some of these Afghan soldiers, I think, will be an important part of the retention piece of it as well.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, there's a lot of this. It's late in the game, frankly.

Q Sir, Adam Entous from Reuters. Can you give us a breakdown of the 17,000? What exactly are that 17,000?

STAFF: We can get you a breakdown.

Q (Inaudible) -- where they're going, what they're going to be doing?

SEC. GATES: Well, most of the first troops going in will be going into the south. And I think the bulk of those 17,000 are Marines. But we can get the specifics for you.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: I don't think so. I think some number will also go to Kandahar Province.

Q How surprised were you by-- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, you know, I think I've mentioned to you all before, since spring I have been surprised by the change of tone on the part of our allies. There's been -- and Admiral Mullen has seen it on the uniformed side as well -- there's been a sort of a sense of commitment, a sense of the realization of the importance of being successful in Afghanistan, of the consequences for the alliance of not being successful, and just a greater sense of commitment to this thing.

And the uniformed military in many of these countries has been much more ready to provide additional forces than some of their civilian leaders. But what has been impressive has been the change in tone on the part of the civilian leaders as well.

Q (Inaudible) -- the conversations that you have with them as far as strategy?

SEC. GATES: There was a lot of interaction with the allies. We spent -- a good part of the discussions in Bratislava were about this. And then there have just been a lot of telephone calls and a lot of visits. I mean, I've had the Australian defense minister and the German defense minister both here in the last couple of weeks, several other countries as well.

Q Can you talk about dwell time with this 17,000 and the units -- (inaudible) -- still on the same path to get dwell time back to where you want it to be, or is that a question that's just not known yet?

SEC. GATES: The estimate that we have now from both General Casey and General Conway is that it will not interfere. We will not have to break the one-to-one dwell time. The Marines actually are at about one to

1.5. And General Conway thinks that they will be able to continue pretty much on the same trajectory in terms of getting to one to two that they were on before.

I'll be a harder push for the Army, but it'll -- they will still head in the right direction. It'll just be slower getting to the one to two for the Army. But we're not going to have to break the one to one for anybody. The one exception and the one area that we worry about in some of the forces that are the most stretched are some of those in what we call the enablers -- the helicopters, the intelligence, the counter-IED, road clearance, engineers. Some of these specialists are pushed pretty hard.

Q What is the timeline for the one-to-two?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think General Casey's hope had been that they could get to one to two sometime in 2011. It may take a little longer now.

Q On the NATO issue, when you take into account that the Canadians and the Dutch are going to be reducing their numbers, and when you look at how many of the 7,000 are actually already in the country and just getting extended, is it really that substantial of an increase that you got from NATO?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, I think it's -- frankly, my hope was more -- I mean, my hope was that we could get 5,000. So a commitment for 7,000 is better than I expected. And what I'm hearing coming out of the NATO meeting is that it may go -- that the commitments may go higher than that.

There are several governments that are unwilling to make a commitment prior to the January conference that Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Brown are organizing in London. And then some others have elections early in the year, provincial and other kinds of elections, and would rather not make any new commitments or make a decision before that time.

Q And is it really seven [thousand] when you consider that many of them are already positioned in the country now, because they were sent here for the election and are just being extended out? Is it really --

SEC. GATES: Well, some of that is true. But I think -- my understanding, at least -- I mean, I haven't seen the specific commitments of specific countries, but my impression, at least from the couple of defense ministers that I talked to, was that these are new and additional forces.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: To a certain extent it is. And I think one of the benefits of the change in the command-and-control structure and creating the intermediate joint headquarters puts us in a position to try and establish greater consistency in the training programs and so on, so that people who are being trained by the Czechs or by the French or by the Germans or someone, and those being trained by the U.K. and the U.S., all are essentially getting the same level of training, whether it's -- I think that the differentiation is probably greater on the police side than it is on the army side, but for both.

Q (Off mike.) Before this additional 30,000 troops, are you satisfied with where that stands right now?

SEC. GATES: Yeah, there are -- you know, there are -- it's, in some ways, a matter of averages. The reality is, based on the briefings that I've gotten, for the overwhelming percentage of those who are wounded, they get to a regular medical facility in less than an hour. There are clearly always going to be exceptions. If somebody's in the middle of a five-hour fire fight and the fighting is still going on, a medevac helicopter clearly can't come in and land. But based on what I've been told, the preponderance of those who are wounded can expect to be medevac'd out in less than an hour. And I feel pretty strongly about that.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, you know, it's a good question, and I can't be sure of the answer. I think partly it's the understanding that the situation has gotten more serious. But I do think that it's sort of their perception of a change in tone in Washington. And I know I've been nicer to them since -- than I was earlier. (Laughter.) So --

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think the key thing to remember about the relationship with Pakistan is that it's Pakistan's foot on the accelerator. And we are prepared to move ahead with that relationship and cooperation just as fast as they are prepared to accept it. And so we'll be encouraging them, offering help.

And frankly, you know, the more they get attacked internally, just like this terrible attack in Rawalpindi at the mosque, the more open they may be to additional help from us. But we are prepared to expand that relationship at any pace that they are prepared to accept.

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, you know, they're just in the process of absorbing the president's decisions and so on. And I will tell you, I think we've got one of our best ambassadors in the world in Islamabad in Anne Patterson. So I think there's some real opportunity there.

I mean, the reality is the Pakistanis have done so much more than any of us would have expected or believed a year or a year and a half ago. And so I think I feel pretty good about what they're doing. They're taking some serious casualties. They're in a serious fight. And they just have all the support -- they have all of the support from us we can give them.

STAFF: We'll take one or two more. Hold on. Terry, do you have anything? You don't have to. All right.

Maureen? Elizabeth?

Q (Off mike.)

SEC. GATES: Yeah. Yeah, I actually told him that I'd rather be going where I'm going than where he's going. (Laughter.)

Q (Off mike.)

Q Mr. Secretary, there is an article in the Post this morning about a concern that millions of dollars of equipment is being left behind in Iraq and that some of it should be moved into Afghanistan. Can you talk a little bit about that? Is there a concern or --

SEC. GATES: The Army has been deeply engaged for months in terms of what to do about the equipment left in -- the equipment that we have in Iraq. What of it should be turned over to the Iraqis? What of it should be sent on to Afghanistan? What of it should be brought back to the United States?

We have about a little over three million pieces of equipment in Iraq. I'm told that by September of '10, more than two million pieces of that three million will have been disposed of one way or the other. We have gotten some extra flexibility from the Congress in terms of turning equipment over to the Iraqi army, and we are trying to decide.

Frankly, we just have to figure out, in terms of cost and in terms of logistics, what makes sense in terms of moving it from Iraq to Afghanistan. In some cases, it's just easier and cheaper to buy it new than to take used equipment, pack it up and ship it from Iraq to Afghanistan. But I will tell you, the Army has been working on this in great detail for months now, and I think they have a pretty good plan.

Q Do you have any sense of how that'll break down, that 2 million by next year? How much will be left behind? How much will go to Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: No.

STAFF: Last one. Adam.

Q On the issue of corruption, in your discussions with Karzai on corruption, how big of an issue is this? And have you seen enough action from Karzai so far to satisfy what you've seen -- (inaudible)?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think we'll all be watching the appointments that get made. From my standpoint, as I said at the outset, it is important to us, in terms of all of our success, including the Afghans' success, to have capable and honest ministers in the areas that matter the most to us. For me, that's clearly defense and interior, finance. I think Secretary Clinton would add agriculture and probably education.

And the truth of the matter is, the incumbents in these jobs, as far as I'm concerned, fill that criterion -- those criteria. I mean, I think we've all believed that both Minister Wardak and Minister Atmar are very capable people. And I feel like I have a good partnership with Wardak. He clearly knows what he's doing. He was a general during the fight against the Soviets.

And so, as Secretary Clinton said in the hearings last week, you know, there is a tendency to paint this government with too broad a brush. The fact is there are competent, capable, honest ministers and there are capable, competent and honest governors. And we just need to encourage that.

STAFF: Okay, thank you.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai

December 08,  
2009

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### Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and President Karzai from Kabul, Afghanistan

PRESIDENT KARZAI: (Through interpreter.) Media members, ladies and gentlemen -- (inaudible) -- I'm pleased that we have a very -- (inaudible) -- American -- (inaudible) -- Secretary Gates -- (inaudible) -- Afghanistan -- (inaudible) -- Afghan National Army -- (inaudible) -- Afghanistan -- (inaudible). We had a detailed discussion of all the issues. I'm so happy to see our discussions could help us prolong the relationships and enhance the existing relationships for a better fight against terrorism. (Inaudible) -- thanking the secretary.

SEC. GATES: Thank you, Mr. President. And first let me thank President Karzai. As always, he has been a gracious host and I look forward to continuing our discussion over lunch.

The United States and indeed the entire international community shares President Karzai's vision, as articulated in his inaugural address last month, of an Afghanistan that is capable of defending itself and where peace reigns across the whole nation. That goal underpinned President Obama's announcement last week of our enduring commitment to this country, its people and the region, a commitment highlighted by a major increase in our support here.

To reverse the negative security trends in many parts of this country, to seize the initiative, President Obama is sending 30,000 more U.S. troops to southern and eastern Afghanistan, the first of which are scheduled to arrive within days and most of the remainder by mid-summer.

Afghanistan's international partners have also demonstrated their strong commitment by pledging at least 7,000 additional troops. When all is said and done, some 43 nations will have a force that is nearly 150,000 strong, a clear demonstration of the world's unwavering resolve to help the Afghan people, and all here at the invitation of the Afghans and with the sanction of the United Nations.

The primary objective of this troop increase is to reduce the Taliban's ability to threaten your communities and terrorize your families. Of course, even as we add more troops, we know that you prefer to have Afghans protecting Afghans. That is our desire as well.

Our troops are here only as long as it takes to defeat your enemies. We will fight by your side until Afghan forces are large enough and strong enough to secure the nation on their own, as they have already done in Kabul. Indeed, wherever Afghan soldiers and police are in the fight, they have shown great courage and made great sacrifices.

Often, however, there have not been enough of them, and our meeting focused principally on this challenge, on how best to recruit and retain more Afghan troops. And I reiterated my commitment to do whatever it takes, with training, funding and partnering, to help build Afghan security forces at all levels capable of securing and protecting all Afghans.

I know there is concern that more international troops will lead to more civilian injuries and deaths. Unlike the enemies of Afghanistan, who deliberately target innocent Afghans and lie about it, our top priority remains the safety of civilians. We will continue to do everything in our power to protect casualties. To this end, our

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commanders, especially General McChrystal, have already changed operational guidelines, and as a result, civilian casualties have declined dramatically.

The transition of security responsibility that begins in July 2011 will be gradual and based on conditions on the ground. It will proceed district by district, province by province, as conditions permit.

Our relationship with Afghanistan is a long-term commitment. As security improves and we begin turning over responsibility to Afghans, our relationship in other areas will only grow, especially with economic and political development.

As President Obama and I have said repeatedly, our government will not again turn our back on this country or the region. The United States and our many friends and allies around the globe are determined to defeat those who stand between you and a peaceful and a prosperous future. Together we will succeed and our partnership will flourish for decades to come.

PRESIDENT KARZAI: Well, I guess we should -- perhaps Secretary Gates will take the first question.

SEC. GATES: Anne.

Q Yes, my question is for President Karzai. You have already been working to increase the size of your security forces. What will you do differently to double the size so quickly? How will you sustain the cost of such a large force over the long term? And also, what parts of Afghanistan do you envision that your army will be able to take over in those five years?

PRESIDENT KARZAI: Well, ma'am, that's a very good question. Our effort is to broaden the base of the Afghan National Security Forces, to have them represent the whole country and to have them impute the young men and the women of Afghanistan from all the provinces of the country.

For a number of years, maybe for another 15 to 20 years, Afghanistan would not be able to sustain a force of that nature and capability with its own resources. We hope that the international community, in particular the United States as our first ally, would help Afghanistan reach the ability in terms of its economic ability as well as eventually to sustain the force that would serve Afghanistan with the right numbers and the right equipment.

So Afghanistan is looking forward to taking over the responsibility in terms of paying for its forces and delivering to its forces out of its own resources, but that will not be for another 15 years. That doesn't mean that we will not be taking responsibilities, financially -- (inaudible). We will keep on adding to it, as we are already doing now.

With regard to the parts of the country where the Afghan forces will be taking the lead responsibility, there our timetable is much shorter. We are working hard, as we have now taken the responsibilities for Kabul, to provide the security in such a critical area of the country in another two years, and hopefully, with maximum effort, to add on the whole of the country to have this and be able to be operations and provide security to the whole of Afghanistan in five years' time.

For an institutionalized army and police force, for an institutionalized security force, it will take much longer to reach the standard that we seek, and that's where we hope we'll have the backing of our allies. That means in terms of financial support and training support and the provision of inductees.

You all -- (inaudible.) CNN will come next. Right now, the lady here.

Q (In Arabic.)

SEC. GATES: We already have a significant partnering relationship with the Afghan National Army, and frankly, our hope is that eventually, as more Afghans are trained and enter the army, that all of our operations will be done jointly with the Afghans. We would rather have Afghan security forces out in front and dealing with the Afghan population, for whom to them they would be more welcome.

So, to the degree that the international security forces are operating unilaterally, it is only until we have enough Afghan army and police so that all of our operations can be joint. And, frankly, then our hope is that the Afghan forces will increasingly be operating on their own, with us receding into the background. This is very much the pattern that we have followed in Iraq and we would like to see it happen here, and the sooner this happens, the better for all of us.

Glenn Kessler?

Q Yes, President Karzai, U.S. officials have been critical of corruption in your government. Has the U.S. government given you specific guidelines about who you should support for cabinetship posts and governorships, and do you plan to follow those guidelines?

And then, Secretary Gates, if I might follow up on the earlier answer, does that timeline that the president laid out match with what the administration expects, that it would be five years before this full responsibility taken by the Afghan forces and 15 to 20 years more of U.S. financial and training support?

SEC. GATES: We anticipate -- well, the president has been very clear that we will begin this process of transitioning in July of 2011. That will be two years after the Marines moved into southern Helmand. And I would hope that we not only could meet the timelines that President Karzai has laid out, but that as more Afghans are trained, that we will be able to beat those timelines.

The reality is, as the president has made clear, it is our expectation that on a gradual conditions-based premise, that we will be reducing our forces after July of 2011. But as we have made clear in congressional testimony and on television interviews, we expect that this is a several-year process.

Whether it's three years or two years or four years, I think, remains to be seen. As President Obama has made very clear, this is not an open-ended commitment on the part of the United States. And as I expressed it to President Karzai, our hope is that over time we will see a changing balance in our relationship in which the security component diminishes as the security situation improves and the rest of the relationship -- an economic relationship, a development relationship -- becomes the preponderant element of the connection between the two countries.

I think that there is a realism on our part that it will be some time before Afghanistan is able to sustain its security forces entirely on its own. And whether that's 15 or 20 years, we'll hope for accelerated economic development in Afghanistan. But I think that it is also true that the United States has made clear to our international partners that we expect them to share in this responsibility.

And as President Karzai has pointed out, here too the balance will shift over time as the Afghan economy expands. Then the proportion of covering -- the proportion of the cost of covering -- supporting the Afghan security forces will diminish, and the ultimate size of those forces also remains to be seen. As is often the case after the end of a conflict, you may have a size force that ends up diminishing after the conflict is complete, so the costs would go down as well, quite frankly.

PRESIDENT KARZAI: Well, sir, on the question of corruption, we have had extensive engagement with our partners on this issue. We understand their concerns and we have also expressed our concerns to our partners on the ways and methods of fighting against corruption and the needs of Afghanistan in this regard.

But the bottom line of this is that to the extent that the Afghan corruption that there is, it falls entirely on us, the Afghan people, to fight it, to remove it, and to cut it down to minimum to the best of our abilities. We should do this for Afghanistan. It's a malaise affecting our society. It's preventing us from fullness. It's stealing revenues away from us. The better we function there, the sooner we'll be able to pay for ourselves and sustain ourselves.

Therefore, it's essentially an Afghan concern and one that we find forces in the international community legitimate on this. Therefore, yes, Afghanistan has had this engagement with the United States and our other allies, and Afghanistan is committed to doing all that it can. And we will, certainly, by all means. As we move ahead, you will see that things are being done about it. Yes, we've done it in the past; there will be much more delivery on it.

All cabinet and cabinet forces, the international community is part of the engagement; money to Afghanistan, helping build institutions with us, especially the army and the police and the intelligence, and the areas of economic development will be of particular focus, on culture, on energy, on the continuation of development in roads and education and health. Here too, the resources will be coming.

So we will try our best as Afghans to present a cabinet to the Afghan people that can also be appreciated and supported by the international community.

Q I have a very important question.

PRESIDENT KARZAI: I have a very important question, too.

(Cross talk.)

Q -- corruption of our --

1460

(Cross talk.)

PRESIDENT KARZAI: No, no, no, no, no. No, no. I have promised to CNN so we'll go there. This time we will not get Jazeera. This time it will be CNN.

Q The corruption -- (inaudible) -- corruption in Afghanistan -- (inaudible) -- international community -- who will answer that?

PRESIDENT KARZAI: We will come to that.

Q (Inaudible.)

PRESIDENT KARZAI: As much as I'm interested in this question, we will come to it later.

Q Later.

PRESIDENT KARZAI: CNN?

Q (Inaudible.) One question I had for President Karzai is there's a lot of rumors going around right now about the cabinet. I was wondering if you could answer when we're going to see some results on who the new cabinet will be, what we can expect from it.

And also, my colleague does have a point when he talks about the international community and the corruption within Afghanistan. I'm hoping Secretary Gates could also help with this question.

Much blame has been put on the Afghan government, but there seems to be a lot of finger-pointing as well at the international community by internationals as well as from people within the Afghan government that the international corruption is also widespread through Afghanistan. How is that going to be taken care of?

PRESIDENT KARZAI: On the cabinet, the formation of the cabinet, the date of presenting the cabinet to the parliament, you will hear about it very soon. I was ready today to send at least that 40 percent of the cabinet to the parliament, but then yesterday spoke with Chairman Qanuni of our Wolesi Jirga, who said that many parliamentarians would wish that I sent them the entire cabinet at once, and I find that legitimate. So I'm today sending the short list, so I can send them a complete list hopefully by next Tuesday, Wednesday. I'll try to do it before that but I'll definitely try to send them notice by then.

Not all of the cabinet will change. The ministers who've done very, very well -- sort of proven themselves, and there quite a few of them in the current cabinet that will stay on. Some will go, some will stay. Life will go on. As the cabinet comes in to work, they will still get an evaluation by the press, by the Afghan people, by the international community. So I guess once the cabinet is announced too and proven too, that will not be the end of the process.

Q Can we expect the announcement Tuesday or Wednesday or after the parliamentary (inaudible)?

PRESIDENT KARZAI: We will send it to the parliament and then the parliament will take its time.

SEC. GATES: I testified last week before our Congress that I thought that the international community, including the United States, bore some responsibility for these problems, in no small part because of the enormous amount of money the international community has been spending here in Afghanistan as part of contracting processes and so on.

And I think that one of the things that I've talked with the ambassador about, that I've talked with General McChrystal about and others back in the United States is how can we tighten our procedures in a way that makes it more difficult for money being provided, at minimum by the United States, hopefully by the international community as a whole, to be siphoned off as part of the corruption?

So we do have some responsibility here. It is, as President Karzai said, a real problem here in Afghanistan, but in some respects I think the vast amounts of money the international community is spending has been an enabler, if you will, and has created a -- I guess the simplest way to put it would be a significantly larger temptation than has been perhaps the case in the past.

And so I think we do have a contribution to make. I think President Karzai has taken responsibility for dealing with the problem insofar as the Afghans are concerned. We have to do what we can do to help make it more difficult for people to participate.


PRESIDENT KARZAI: (Inaudible.)

Q Thank you very much.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAMID KARZAI


Dec. 8, 2009



Afghan President Hamid Karzai, right, greets U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, at the presidential palace in Kabul, Dec. 8, 2009. Gates is on his first trip to Southwest Asia following President Barack Obama's decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, walks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, right, at the presidential palace in Kabul, Dec. 8, 2009. Gates is on his first trip to Southwest Asia following President Barack Obama's decision to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, talks with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, right, at the presidential palace in Kabul, Dec. 8, 2009.  
DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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NBC

December 9, 2009

## Interview With Defense Secretary Gates

Today (NBC), 7:00 AM

MATT LAUER: I'm joined now by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates.

Mr. Secretary, it's a pleasure to have you here. Thanks very much.

DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT GATES: Thank you.

LAUER: I know the weather has grounded you a little bit, but you've spent a lot of time here in Afghanistan talking to Hamid Karzai, for example. Can you tell me, is President Karzai and President Obama and are you on the very same page when it comes to the surge, or are there areas of difference still?

GATES: No, I think we're all on the same page. And President Karzai has welcomed the surge, and he seems to be quite comfortable with the time lines that we're talking about in terms of beginning -- the beginning of a process of withdrawal in July of 2011. And there clearly --

LAUER: He feels he can live up to his end of the bargain that allows that withdrawal, the beginning of that withdrawal, to start?

GATES: They're clearly on notice that they need to accelerate their recruitment and training of their troops and get them into the field. And I think he has confidence that they can do their part.

LAUER: During your meeting and after your meeting, he made the comment that it could take up to 15 years for Afghanistan to be able to afford the new and improved and larger military that the U.S. is helping to train. Did that timetable surprise you? And is it in some way saying, "You can begin leaving in 18 months, but leave your wallet"?

GATES: (Laughs.) Well, to be honest, it did surprise me a little bit. But the reality is, as their forces expand and ours begin to draw down, the costs for us will decline. And the truth of the matter is they will begin to assume a greater proportion of this. This is all sort of a gradual transfer, if you will, that'll take place over time.

LAUER: President Karzai is set to name his cabinet next week, and he's under a lot of pressure to name ministers who are not tainted by corruption. Has he shown you the entire list of those ministers? Are you comfortable with them? And was the U.S. in any way given the right to vet any of those ministers?

GATES: He didn't show me a list, but I was very frank with him in terms of our expectation that he would appoint competent and honest ministers, particularly in the ministries that are important to our success, and the same thing with governors and police chiefs.

LAUER: You said something to me on the plane on the way over here that I want to ask you about or get your comments on. You said you can't just say, "Let's send 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan," and when they hit the ground you say, "Okay, guys, go to work." They have to have a place to sleep. They have to have food to eat. They've got to have transportation.

Shed some light, if you will, on the logistical challenges that these surge forces present to you.

GATES: Well, our Transportation Command and Central Command, as well as the commanders here, have been working intensely on this even before the president made his decision, just on a contingency basis. And it'll be tough; there's no question about it. But the truth of the matter is the logistics folks are always the unsung heroes in this thing, and they think they --

LAUER: So you'll be ready when these troops get here?

GATES: They think they can make it work.

LAUER: I want to talk to you about morale, if you don't mind. We've got a war that's dragging into its ninth year now. A lot of troops are on multiple deployments. They've been hearing news that the war is not going well. The conditions here are very rough. And it may sound superficial, but the holidays are upon them, and that's always a difficult time.

Are you worried about the emotional state of readiness of the fighting force here?

GATES: No. I think these people are enthusiastic. They're ready to go. What they want to be is successful. And I think the decisions the president has made will help them be successful. And that's the best thing of all for morale.

LAUER: But are you being proactive enough? According to Stars & Stripes, there's only one counselor for about every 1,100 troops stationed here. We know that suicide rates among -- inside the military are at record highs. So is enough being done proactively to protect the emotional well-being of these people?

GATES: Well, I think we are doing everything we can. We're having a lot of screening before people deploy. We are getting more people into the theater who can be helpful. Don't underestimate the importance of chaplains. They play a big role in this as well.

But at the end of the day, it's really about leadership and people identifying those who are struggling and getting them assistance as quickly as possible.

LAUER: Just to end on a personal note, I mean, there are so many families at home right now and it is the holiday season, and their, you know, family members are here serving their country. What would you like to say to the families back home?

GATES: Well, how much we appreciate their sacrifice. You know, the line is you enlist the soldier and you re-enlist the family. And the families are so important to our success and so important to the success of the all-volunteer force. They are as critical as the soldiers themselves.

LAUER: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, thanks for being generous with your time while we've been in Afghanistan, and thanks for the hitch over. We appreciate it.

GATES: Thank you.

LAUER: Thank you very much.





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Transcript

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Presenter: Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

December 11, 2009

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### Secretary Gates Conducts Town Hall Meeting at Forward Operating Base Warrior, Kirkuk, Iraq

SEC. GATES: (Applause.) I want to thank all of you for coming today, although I suspect more than a few of are -- are volunteered for this duty today. Hope you haven't been standing around here waiting too long.

I know some of you are just finishing up your tours. And I just want you to know how grateful I am for the service that you've rendered over the last 12 months. Whether you're just rotating in or rotating out, you may have noticed that this theater has largely disappeared from the headlines. That's due to the sacrifices of too many of our comrades and too many of the sacrifices back home on the part of their families. But that doesn't mean that this theater isn't still important.

Your mission here is still critical to preserving the gains of recent years. This post, right on the Kurd-Arab fault line, will be increasingly important in the next several months. And your role in fostering cooperation here is essential in ensuring a credible election process and transfer of power.

That's the message that I conveyed to Prime Minister Maliki this morning and the message that I'll convey to Mr. Barzani this afternoon. And this effort will allow the Iraqis to consolidate the gains that they've had.

I just want you to know that as the holidays approach, everybody back home has you in their thoughts and prayers, and they also have your families in their thoughts and prayers. And I hope that when you communicate with your families the next time, that you will pass along to them my personal thanks for the support they give you and for the sacrifices that I know they put up with.

So what I'd like to do is take some questions. And then what I really want to do is have the opportunity to thank each of you individually, get a photograph with each of you and give you a coin, just as a small token of personal appreciation for your service to our country.

So with that, who's the intrepid soul who will have the first question? (Laughter.) Over here. And no, you can't go home with me. (Laughter.)

Q Good morning, sir. Specialist Bacon (sp), HHC Brigade from 1AD, paralegal specialist. My question to you this morning, sir, is, what type of training or operations can we expect to be implemented in reference to detainee operations so that we can prevent incidents such as the incident at the canal in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think that -- or we have some very specialized units in terms of detainee operations. And obviously we're in the middle of a huge transition here in Iraq.

When I first took this job, or maybe six months into it, in 2007, I think we reached a high point of somewhere near 25,000 detainees here in Iraq. We're down now, I think, to somewhere in the neighborhood of about 6,000. And I think that one of the concerns that we all have is, as these folks are released, how many of them are going to end up back in front of us.

And the reality is, there are no guarantees, and we can do as much training in terms of screening these guys; we can observe them; we can try and have the local authorities monitor them. And I think, for the most part,

it's going to work out okay. But I think that the only way to -- with all the training and with all the screening and everything else, the only way to avoid tragedies like that is frankly just for people to stay alert and to be on their guard around when we're dealing with these detainees and as we release them.

I'm not sure that's a satisfactory answer to your question, but I think it's a reflection of reality.

Q Good morning, sir. Staff Sergeant --

SEC. GATES: By the way, I should say there's at least a 50-50 chance I won't be able to answer your question, and I'll tell you an honest answer when I can. (Laughter.)

Q Mr. Secretary, Staff Sergeant Wheeler from the 506th Air Expeditionary Group. My question, sir, is, considering the imminent drawdown of U.S. air forces in Iraq, what do you see our role as the U.S. Air Force's advise and assist mission to the new Iraqi air force?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think it's a -- I think it's a role that I wouldn't be a bit surprised to see agreements between ourselves and the Iraqis that continues a "train, equip and advise" role beyond the end of 2011. They realize that they're probably not going to be ready.

And, in fact, I had this same conversation with some of our folks a couple of days ago in Kabul who were advising the new Afghan air force. And I told them -- you know, they were saying, you know, you can't teach somebody to maintain or fly a helicopter in six months or 12 months.

And I think in both countries, that kind of a role is very likely to continue beyond the end of our combat operations. So I -- you know, there's no agreement at that, for that, here in Iraq yet.

But I suspect as we get on through 2010 and begin approaching 2011 that the Iraqis themselves will probably have an interest in this because -- in fact, I talked to the prime minister this morning about their equipment purchases, training and so on as they look at 2012 and beyond. And they clearly have some concerns.

So as I say, nothing has been said on either side about it at this point. But it wouldn't surprise me at all to see that that's going to be a longer-term relationship between the two countries.

Yeah.

Q Mr. Secretary. I apologize. Staff Sergeant Gomez, Expeditionary, Logistics Readiness.

My question is, as far as ideally, how long do we want to stay in Afghanistan? And realistically how long will we stay in Afghanistan, do you believe, sir?

SEC. GATES: Well, I suspect I speak for most people, both in the service and most Americans, in saying we don't want to be there one day longer than we have to be. And I was at pains to make clear to them when I was in Kabul that, you know, we have no desire to be an occupying force.

We're the first -- we and our partners, international partners, are the first foreign military forces in the whole history of Afghanistan to be there on behalf of the Afghans, instead of trying to conquer them.

I think that we -- I think we face several years in Afghanistan. I think General McChrystal is pretty confident that with the additional forces he's being given that he will be able to reverse the momentum of the Taliban, prevent them from occupying territory and degrade their capabilities, within the next 18 months or so.

That's not the end of the fight. But it certainly will change the way it looks. And I -- that -- the gradual -- the drawdown that we will have after July of 2011 will be -- will be a gradual one. It will be conditions-based. Just as we turned over provinces here in Iraq to provincial Iraqi control, we'll do the same thing in Afghanistan, district by district, province by province.

But I think, you know, we're going to be there not just for the next 18 months, but beyond, for some period of time, I think, until we can degrade the Taliban far enough that an enhanced Afghan security force can handle those guys while we then retire as we have here to, first, tactical and then strategic overwatch, and also focus our efforts on trying to put an end to al Qaeda.

So it's going to be a while, and it's going to be a tough fight, particularly in the next -- in the next 12 to 18 months. And frankly I think it will look a lot like the surge here in the first six or eight months. And the first six or

eight months of 2007 were pretty tough here. But then I think in the longer term it's going to get a lot better.

Q Mr. Secretary, Specialist Pivus (ph), 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 2nd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment. My question to you is, surging into Afghanistan, a request has been made for more combat aviation brigades to move in. A lack of air support for our ground troops -- how is that going to affect the aviation brigades going in, as well as our NATO allies? What role are they going to play in that?

SEC. GATES: Well, there is going to be a need for substantially more combat aviation. And we're trying to figure out how to balance both what's being sent from the States and redirecting capabilities that may have been intended for Iraq. These are issues that we're sort of kind of sorting through right now. We have a pretty good idea who -- in fact, we know clearly who -- who's going in the first tranche.

I assigned the deployment orders last -- a week ago today for about the first 17,000 in the surge to go into Afghanistan. A big component of those are Marines.

I think General McChrystal and Central Command are still sorting out that next 13,000, what the exact composition is going to be. But clearly just given the terrain and everything in Afghanistan, more combat aviation is going to be required.

And frankly a big concern of mine that I started working on, I guess, a year ago is to try and make sure that we come as close as we can, in Afghanistan, to the golden hour in terms of medevac that we've had here in Iraq.

And early in the year, we sent three additional field hospitals and a bunch of additional helicopters. And so as I look at the rotary requirement, it's not only the combat that's important for me but also the medevac capability, with all these additional soldiers going in.

So that's kind of a nonanswer to your question. But the bottom line is, yes, more combat aviation will be required in Afghanistan. And right now we're still working through, beyond the initial 17,000, how many and where they'll come from.

In the back.

Q Sir, my name is Captain -- (inaudible) -- U.S. Air Force, 506th AEG.

In the 1990s, airpower had its rise to prominence and some would say even dominance in U.S. military operations. Now with the irregular warfare and all the subsets, it seems like the Air Force is kind of relegated to a support and secondary role.

So my question is, what is the strategic outlook and posture for the Air Force, besides the nuclear deterrence and ISR?

SEC. GATES: Well, I think, one of the things that we're looking at, just as an example, for the 2011 budget and beyond, as we think about the five-year defense plan, we probably are going to undertake a new long-range strike capability for the Air Force.

I don't want to tell you how old either I or the B-52s are. (Laughter.) But let's just say that when I grew up in Wichita, Kansas, and was about 10 years old, they were testing the B-52s over my house.

So I guess the piece of news is we are probably going to proceed with a long-range strike initiative coming out of the Quadrennial Defense Review and various other reviews we've had going on. And we're looking at a family of capabilities, both manned and unmanned, in terms of capabilities.

I think that -- you know, I mean, as a person who was in the Air force myself, I kind of have an interest in keeping the Air Force going, and -- but I will tell you that the real test for the Air Force over the next 10 months or so, the next -- about the next 10 months is going to be the logistical challenge. And you guys, you all -- or you men and women know this better than most, but the logistics folks and the TRANSCOM folks are really the unsung heroes of these campaigns.

And the challenge for them as we're bringing troops out of Iraq and sending troops into Afghanistan and trying to deal with equipment at the same time is a huge challenge. And this surge would not have been possible in Afghanistan had it not been for some incredibly creative thinking and some hard work on the part of the Air Force, Transportation Command and Central Command.

So I think the Air Force has an important combat role to play in the future, both in the tactical and strategic arena. After all, the biggest procurement program in the Department of Defense today is the F-35. And we're going to end up probably buying, among the three services, about 2,4(00), 2,500 of those aircraft. So that's a big, new capability. So I think we've got a lot of good stuff coming down the road for the Air Force.

Q Mr. Secretary, my name is -- (inaudible) -- 1-9 Cav, 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

You've previously talked about diverting resources from the military to civilian (inaudible), and for better integrating those civilian and military powers. What type of resources would you divert from military to civilian powers? And how do you plan to further integrate this shift in power to your balance strategy, reprogramming the Pentagon for a new age?

SEC. GATES: Let me be very clear: I have never talked about diverting resources from the Department of Defense to anybody else. What I have argued for is more resources for the civilian component, but not at our expense.

When we look at the kind of thing that we have going on here in Iraq, and the kind of partnering and stability operations that you all are increasingly involved in, and we look at the situation in Afghanistan, the civilian component of what we're doing is critical to success for our country. And, unfortunately, the civilian elements of our government -- the State Department, AID and so on -- have been starved of resources for decades.

When I left -- when I retired the first time, in 1993, as director of CIA, the Agency for International Development had 16,000 employees. They were expeditionary. They spoke the languages. They lived in primitive conditions and lived in, often, dangerous conditions in developing countries all over the world.

When I came back to government at the end of 2006, AID had 3,000 employees, and they were maybe -- mostly contract officers. And that capability has to be rebuilt. And the same thing with the Foreign Service.

We will spend more on health care in the Department of Defense this year than the entire foreign affairs budget. If you took every Foreign Service officer in the world, you wouldn't have enough people to crew one aircraft carrier.

So as we try to partner and as we're dealing with development and rule of law and economic projects and infrastructure and trying to give these governments capacity to deal with these issues on their own, a lot of that role has been felt -- filled in the past by our own -- our own troops, and especially by the National Guard -- agricultural development in particular. And we need a permanent U.S. cadre to do that and to partner with us, and they need additional resources to do that. But they don't need additional resources at our expense.

Yeah.

Q Mr. Secretary, Charlie Company -- (inaudible). How is the Army's deployment tempo going to change with the drawdown of troops in Iraq and increased troops in Afghanistan?

SEC. GATES: How is what going to change in the deployment?

Q The deployment tempo. Our dwell time, essentially.

SEC. GATES: Yeah. Obviously, we've got two ground forces involved in these operations, the Marine Corps and the Army. The Marine Corps now has a dwell time of about 1.5-to-one. And General Conway believes that they are on a track, even with the deployments to Afghanistan, of being able to get up to two-to-one: two years at home, one year deployed.

Army units at this point are about 1.1 to 1.2-to-one. And General Casey's view is that he will be able to continue moving in the direction of increasing toward his goal of two years at home, one year deployed. But that will be slowed by the deployments to Afghanistan.

The part that we worry about the most, frankly, is not the units themselves, but it is the people in the critical enablers -- the low-density, high-demand areas, whether it's helicopter pilots; medevac; engineers; route clearance -- all of those -- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. We're pushing those resources very hard. And those are some of the areas where I think some of the stress is the hardest on the force and where the tempo has been the highest. And it's hard to see where there's much relief in the near future for them.

So that's the piece that General Casey and Admiral Mullen and I are probably most worried about. The units -- the dwell time will not decline, but it will increase more slowly than it would have without the surge in Iraq -- in Afghanistan.

Yeah.

Q Good morning, Mr. Secretary. My name is Specialist Millas (ph) of the Second Squadron, 6th U.S. Cavalry. And my question for you, sir, is with the elections coming up next year here in Iraq, if things don't go according to plan as far as the elections kind of getting worse, how is that going to affect the drawdown here?

SEC. GATES: Well, the way things are going right now, General Odierno is comfortable that he can stay with the plan that he has for the drawdown. I've talked to both the prime minister and -- Prime Minister Maliki and to the Presidency Council last night about what can be done to ensure that after the elections there is a relatively quick formation of an inclusive government. That's clearly their objective. And because, frankly, my concern is that after the 2005 election, the fact that it took many months to put a government together really created an opening for the kind of sectarian violence that made things so bad by the end of 2006.

I think things have changed a lot. There is a commitment to not falling back into violence on the part of all of the major players. But I think having the new government formed as quickly as possible after the elections is really important.

At this point, the way everything is going, as I said, I think General Odierno feels like everything's still on track to maintain the same drawdown schedule that he's had for the past several months.

Q First Sergeant Brian Allen, from Bravo Troop 49 Cav., 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cav. Division.

Sir, I read a few days ago you were speaking of Pakistan and their role as we continue to surge in Afghanistan. And I just wanted to ask you, what do you want and what do you expect Pakistan to do, their role, as we continue to -- will it change their role, sir, for the fight against al Qaeda?

SEC. GATES: One of the things that I talked about a good bit at the hearings last week was that in some respects the situation in that region, in my opinion, has become more dangerous over the last year or so. And it's not just because of the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is the collaboration between al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban; but also, the collaboration between al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. And we know that al Qaeda has been involved with the Pakistani Taliban in planning these attacks inside Pakistan that have -- with a view to trying to destabilize Pakistan.

So you have this kind of unholy alliance of al Qaeda, the Taliban on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, as well as other terrorist groups -- what Secretary Clinton calls a syndicate of terror -- that have reasserted themselves in really trying to destabilize both countries, and potentially the whole region.

Frankly, if you had asked me a year ago whether the Pakistani Army would be in Swat and South Waziristan, I'd have said no chance. I think sometimes you get lucky in your adversary, and I think that the Pakistani Taliban made a huge mistake when they moved within 60 miles of Islamabad. And I think that it really put the Pakistani government on notice that these terrorists, these extremists, were a genuine existential threat to the government of Pakistan, and to Pakistan itself.

And so you've seen significant military operations, that have only increased in size and tempo over the last 10 months or so. And we see evidence, we see some evidence in the intelligence, that they're forcing al Qaeda and some of the other terrorists out of South Waziristan. And they're fleeing. And some of them are talking about going back into Afghanistan. So we've kind of stirred up the nest there, and I think that's a good thing.

But I think the Pakistanis have really taken some significant steps over the past year to bring pressure to bear on that border. Because the truth of the matter is, one of the ways that the Taliban was -- in Afghanistan was able to reconstitute itself and grow again was the deals that were made by an earlier Pakistani government that basically gave them sanctuary on the Pakistani side of the border. And what had become -- what I sort of compare as a path from Pakistan to Afghanistan in 2005 and 2006 became a four-lane highway. And the Paks are, I think, doing a good job of putting pressure on their side of the border, and we're obviously going to do an even better job of putting pressure on the Afghan side of the border.

So I think we're pretty pleased with the actions the Pakistanis have taken up to this point.

Q Morning, sir. PFC Chagaris (sp) with 2-3 Field Artillery battalion and 1-1 Armored Division.

Mr. Secretary, yesterday in Baghdad you continued to deliver a message to press Iraqi Kurds and Arabs to settle their differences, because they have the potential to threaten Iraqi security in the long run. Do you feel confident that they will agree to disagree by August 2010, the timeline the president announced to end the war in Iraq? And could their refusal to get along interfere with the president's commitment to remove our troops out of Iraq by late 2011?

SEC. GATES: I think, based on -- I'll -- I met with Mr. Barzani not too long ago, talked to the prime minister about this this morning, talked to the Presidency Council about it last night. I actually think that they've made some real headway in recent -- in recent weeks. And I would give General Odierno and our embassy real credit here, because I think they've played a really important role in facilitating the dialogue between the Kurds and the government, between the KRG and the government.

I would say at this point that, you know, this is perhaps the most worrisome issue here in Iraq as far as we're concerned. But the progress we have seen in the last 18 months or so here in Iraq, and the actions that ultimately by the council of representation -- the Council of Representatives in passing legislation and addressing some of these issues -- I think that there is no question that the Kurds see their future as part of a unified Iraq.

And what's at issue is the terms upon which that kind of goes forward. That's negotiable, and we'll do what we can. But at this point all the evidence that we see indicates that they will work out these differences. And to the degree we can help them, we will do that, but that they will do so in a timely way, so it won't affect our commitments here in Iraq.

Yeah.

Q Morning. Tech Sgt Ramirez (sp) Air Force. (Inaudible.)

My question is, World War II, we fought two fronts. Within four years, we were done took care of business. Why are we still here eight years later? (Inaudible.) Why are we still here?

SEC. GATES: Well, it's a different kind of war. And in World War II, the overwhelming industrial might of the United States and the fact that we were facing conventional forces, where you knew where the enemy was, and he was out there in front of you, not necessarily behind you or to the side or anywhere else.

So dealing with these kinds of terrorists and extremists and insurgents is just a different kind of conflict. And you know, we've been here in Iraq now six years and in Afghanistan for eight. But one of -- one of the points that I make to people is that I think it's a mistake to look at Afghanistan as sort of one eight-year war.

We had a war in 2001-2002, in which we essentially won. And the Taliban was kicked out of Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was kicked out of Afghanistan, many of them killed.

And then things were very quiet in Afghanistan until about the end of 2005, when the Pakistanis created this opening for the Taliban on their side of the border. And the level of violence beginning in the spring of 2006 has just increased significantly.

So I think we in effect have a second kind of war in Afghanistan that started the end of 2005, beginning of 2006. And that's the war we've now been in for three years.

From January 2007 until December 2008, in four different decisions, we were able to increase the troop strength in Afghanistan from 22,000 to about 46,000. But it was still way underresourced.

And I think it's testimony to President Obama's view of the importance of Afghanistan and what we're doing there, to our national security, that in his first year as president, he's already approved some 52,000 new troops to go to Afghanistan. So my view is, the United States really has gotten its head into this conflict in Afghanistan, as far as I'm concerned really, only in about the last year.

And in terms of a comprehensive strategy, the Bush administration worked on a comprehensive strategy toward the end of 2008, handed it off to the Obama administration.

They took that -- took it into account, but did a much broader and I think more thorough effort. And then we just went through it again based on General McChrystal's assessment of the difficulty of the situation in Afghanistan.

So I understand the impatience, and believe me, I understand, as I told the Congress, that the American people are tired of war. But I think that we have begun to resource what we need to do in Afghanistan and have a strategy on how to do it right and be successful is a pretty recent development.

And what the president tried to signal through his decision was that this is not going to be an open-ended commitment; we're not going to be there forever. And so he had a delicate balancing act to perform in terms of providing a reaffirmation of our commitment to be successful there, but at the same time build a fire under the Afghans, that they need to understand they need to step up, get their young men enlisted, trained and in the field, and develop their capability to take this fight over beginning in July of 2011.

And one of the -- one of the myths in the international community is the United States likes war. And the reality is, there is -- other than the first two or three years of World War II, there has never been a popular war in America. When the first President Bush went into Kuwait in early 1991, 15 percent of the American people approved of what he was doing.

So what's required is presidential leadership and explaining why we need to do these things and providing the resources. And the American people always step up, and so does the Congress. And I think President Obama's done that with Afghanistan.

STAFF: Sir, we have time for two more.

SEC. GATES: Okay.

Captain.

Q Good morning, sir. Captain Ash Faulker (ph) -- Captain Ash Faulker (ph), 506 Air Expeditionary Group. Given the high OPSTEMPO we've maintained over the past few years, I was wondering how you propose both fulfilling the need for warfighters here in the AOR while also maintaining the morale and health of our service members back home.

SEC. GATES: Well, this is something we spend a lot of time on, because there is no question that there is strain on the force. What a lot of people don't realize -- just to take the Air Force as an example -- the Air Force has really been in the fight on a continuing basis for 18 years. Since 1991, they have had a presence and a -- and a mission here in Iraq in addition to the conflicts elsewhere. And it obviously takes a toll over time.

We've put a lot of money into the budget in terms of family support programs; in terms of trying to deal better with PTS, trying to identify it, trying to remove the stigma, trying to persuade people to seek help when they've got issues. But the truth of the matter is, we're going to have a high OPTEMPO for the foreseeable future.

And we just need to figure out -- continue working on how can we support our families better, how can we -- are there new programs we should consider, what more can we do, and especially when it comes to the mental health of the force.

It is -- as I say, it is an issue that we spend a lot of time on, and it is a measure of the resilience of the force that people are able to perform in the way that you-all do, and others, as well. But we work on this, I will tell you, every single day.

One of the things that -- one of the things that I'm working on right now that worries me a little bit is I get all these slide briefings in the Pentagon about how programs are working, and then I go out to various posts and bases, and especially if I sit down with spouses and I found out -- find out the real world is very different than the slides that I'm getting back in the Pentagon, in sort of a parallel universe. And so it's very helpful in terms of being able to go back and say, look, it's just not working the way you think it is.

The other thing is the importance of leadership in this, because the -- we have some very good programs, but they're unevenly implemented at different posts and bases around the country. And what that often is a function of is the quality of leadership and how seriously the leadership of those units takes these issues, and not only issues of the health of the -- mental health of the force itself, but the importance of these family support programs.

So one of the things that I've been working with General Casey and General Chiarelli and the other chiefs on is, how can we even out the implementation of these programs at a higher level across the force, and how can we share best practices among the different services in terms of what's working and what's not?

Last question. Yes, sir.

Q (Name off mike) -- 6-1 Cav, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. Mr. Secretary, in the past we have often considered the possibility of military action against Iran should they continue the development of nuclear armament, which they have continued to do. What is the likelihood of the United States going into Iran in the foreseeable future to stop them?

SEC. GATES: Iran is one of the most complex national security problems that I think we've faced in my whole career. There are no good options in Iran. And if we've learned -- one of the things that weighs on me is if we have learned anything from Iraq over the past six years, it is the inherent unpredictability of war.

Frankly, Iran's stiffing the international community on some of the proposals that they actually agreed to at the beginning of October, I think has brought the international community, including the Russians and the Chinese, together in a way that they have not been in terms of significant additional sanctions on the Iranians.

What -- the challenge of the -- first of all, let me just say, you never take any options off the table. But the reality is that any military action would only buy some time, maybe two or three years. So at the end of the day, the way to avoid a nuclear-armed Iran is to put together a package of incentives and disincentives that persuade the Iranian government that they would actually be less secure with nuclear weapons than if they had them -- that they could spark a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East, throughout the region; that their people will suffer enormously from even more stringent economic sanctions.

I think that there's a lot more political turmoil in Iran today than there was before their elections. I think the elections had little credibility with many in Iran, and you're seeing continued turbulence. So there's a political dynamic going on in Iran today that we didn't see a year ago. And what the implications of that are are uncertain at this point.

But I think that you're going to see some significant additional sanctions imposed by the international community, assuming that the Iranians don't change course and agree to do the things that they signed up to do at the beginning of October.

I think we have some time for these efforts to work. But it's clearly -- I talked about the consequences potentially of military action. The consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran in the region are also enormous, and so we'll just have to keep working our way through it.

I'll just tell you, it's -- I was part of the first meeting of U.S. government officials with the new revolutionary government of Iran in 1979 in Algiers, in October 1979. And we reached out to that new government. We met with the prime minister, the defense minister and the foreign minister of Iran at that time. And the national security adviser told them, we accept your revolution. We'll work with you. We'll recognize you. We'll even sell you the weapons that the Shah -- that we had agreed to sell to the Shah.

And they said, give us the Shah. And we went back and forth like that for an hour and a half or two hours. And finally the national security adviser got up and said, to give you the Shah would be incompatible with our national honor. That ended the meeting. Three days later, they seized our embassy, and two weeks later all three of those officials were out of a job; one of them was in jail.

That was the beginning of engagement with Iran. (Laughter.)

Every administration since then has tried to reach out to Iran in one way or another, and that's one of the reasons why I support this administration trying to do what it's done: because if it works then we save ourselves a lot of trouble. If it doesn't, it certainly enables our ability to get the rest of the international community to join with us in bringing pressure to bear on the Iranians.

Okay.

(END OF AVAILABLE AUDIO.)




SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

PHOTOS OF MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LEADERS AND TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN


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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center, meets with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, deputy commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, left, and U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, NATO Training Mission commander, right, while on Camp Eggers in Kabul, Dec. 8, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center, meets with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, deputy commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, left, and U.S. Army Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV, NATO Training Mission commander, right, while on Camp Eggers in Kabul, Dec. 8, 2009. DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, listens to U.S. Embassy Afghanistan's Deputy Chief of Mission Ryan Riccardone, right, while in Kabul, Dec. 9, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, tours the Afghan Army Air Corps training center in Kabul, Dec. 9, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, center, meets with airmen and soldiers that help train the Afghan Army Air Corps in Kabul, Dec. 9, 2009.  
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
1476  
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, meets with U.K. Secretary of State Defense Bob Ainsworth on Camp Eggers in Kabul, Dec. 10, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks, right, with local leaders in Kabul, Dec. 10, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, meets with local leaders in Kabul, Dec. 10, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with U.S. Embassy staff in Baghdad, Dec. 10, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, left, sits with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, right, at the Presidency Council Diwan in Baghdad, Dec. 10, 2009.  
*DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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1478  
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates talks with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki while in Baghdad, Dec. 11, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, greets Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil, Iraq, Dec. 11, 2009.  
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U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, right, meets with Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil, Iraq, Dec. 11, 2009.  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## News Release

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**IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

**No. 991-09  
December 18, 2009**

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### **Joint Statement from Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton on Defense Appropriations**

We strongly urge Senate passage of the Defense Appropriations Bill today, prior to expiration of the current continuing resolution. Passage today will provide important support for our foreign policy and national security priorities and ensure continuity of funding for our troops in combat and for all of the Department of Defense.

Clinton, Gates Urge Appropriations Bill Passage

By Samantha L. Quigley  
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18, 2009 - Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates issued a joint statement today encouraging Senate passage of the Defense Appropriations Bill.

"We strongly urge Senate passage of the Defense Appropriations Bill today, prior to expiration of the current continuing resolution," the statement said. "Passage today will provide important support for our foreign policy and national security priorities and ensure continuity of funding for our troops in combat and for all of the Department of Defense."

The House passed the \$636.3 billion Dec. 16.

If the Senate doesn't pass the bill by the close of business today, the current continuing resolution will expire. While the expiration of the continuing resolution would mean the Defense Department is out of money, it is not necessarily a mandate to pass the bill. Lawmakers could choose to pass another continuing resolution and postpone a final vote.

The Senate did, however, adopt a motion earlier today to limit debate on the topic. Despite limiting debate, a vote on the passage of the bill most likely won't occur until tomorrow.

The bill provides funding to the Defense Department for the budget year that began Oct. 1, providing a 4 percent increase for core Pentagon operations. The bill includes \$128 million for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but does not cover funds for the recently announced troop increase for Afghanistan. President Barack Obama has yet to request that money.

It also includes money for development of an alternative engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Among other things, the bill does not allow for any new F-22 Raptors and trims about \$900 million from the Pentagon's \$7.5 billion budget to train Afghan security forces. That money would be used to purchase about 1,400 more mine-resistant vehicles suited to Afghanistan's terrain.


Requests regarding the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are addressed as well. The bill rejects Obama's request for \$100 million to close the prison, but would allow detainees to be transferred to other facilities.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT GATES

TRIP TO GEORGIA AND INDIANA

December 18 – 19, 2009





U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Commencement Address at the University of Georgia

*As Delivered by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, Friday, December 18, 2009*

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President Adams, thank you for that very kind introduction, although I must tell you that when I was president of A&M I always arranged that I spoke before the student speaker. (Laughter.) President Adams, members of the faculty, Board of Regents – I thank you all for being here, and thank you for the invitation to speak today.

I must say, looking around at the flowing gowns reminds me of a former European foreign minister who was a notorious drunk. And he was on a South American tour, and was attending a reception. Music was playing, he was drunk – saw a person in a flowing gown going by, and asked that person to dance. The person stopped, glared at him, and said, “First, sir, you are drunk. Second, this is not a waltz, this is the Peruvian national anthem. And third, I am not a woman, I am the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima.” (Laughter.) An argument for sobriety – which many of you are probably celebrating today. (Laughter.)

As a former university president, I know the selection of the graduation speaker can be fraught with topics and questions that invite many opinions. As I understand it, one of your seniors advised, “I definitely think they should pick someone famous – not Paris Hilton famous, but someone who has done something important.” I guess it’s all a matter of the definition of “important.”

To friends and family members – a special thanks for the love and support you have given to these young people over many years. Parents, I know that you are swelling with pride at the achievements of your children. Having put a son and a daughter through college, my wife and I know you are also breathing a sigh of relief – and maybe already planning on how to spend your newly re-acquired disposable income. A word of advice: Forget about it. (Laughter.) Trust me on this – if you think you’ve written your last check to your child, dream on. The “National Bank of Mom and Dad” is still open.

Presiding over 39 commencements at Texas A&M taught me the importance of brevity at these ceremonies. I am reminded of the time George Bernard Shaw told a speaker he had 15 minutes to speak. The speaker replied, “15 minutes? How can I tell them all I know in 15 minutes?” Shaw responded, “I advise you to speak very slowly.” (Laughter.) I also know that I am an obstacle between you and a great party. Or perhaps, a plane ride, since, as previously suggested, the Georgia Bulldogs are playing the Aggies later on this month in the Independence Bowl. Just be gentle. (Laughter.)

To the Class of 2009: Congratulations on a great achievement!

I guess today, as you finish one chapter in your life and move on to the next, I am supposed to give you some advice on how to succeed. I could quote the billionaire J. Paul Getty, who offered sage wisdom on how to get rich. He said, "Rise early, work late, strike oil." Or, Alfred Hitchcock, who explained, "There's nothing to winning really. That is if you happen to be blessed with a keen eye, an agile mind, and no scruples whatsoever."

But this morning, I'd like to spend a few minutes on a matter I've thought and cared about for a long time – the obligation of service and citizenship in our great country. We hear a lot in the United States country about our rights as citizens, and woe be to the politician who dares to tinker with what we have come to regard as our entitlements. What we don't hear enough about from our political leaders, commentators, or editorial writers are our responsibilities as citizens.

Later today, I will have the distinct honor of commissioning eight of your classmates, eight of your fellow citizens, as second lieutenants in the United States military. They will take an oath to serve – (applause) – to serve, protect, and defend our republic and the Constitution that this institution's founders signed more than two centuries ago. This is no light commitment, and certainly no segue into a life of ease and comfort. They join an American military that has been actively waging our nation's wars for almost a decade now. This time next year, some of these men and women could be leading troops in Iraq or Afghanistan. And commitments to allies and partners will keep our forces deployed abroad for the foreseeable future. This is the true patriotism of the deed.

Consider Ashley Henderson-Huff, class of 2004, here. She became an Army MP officer and deployed to Iraq, where she would make the ultimate sacrifice for her country. I know that she and her family would be grateful for the dedication of the cadet lounge to her memory this Fall – and for the support this community has shown to the Bulldogs who have fought and fallen wearing America's uniform since September 11th. These men and women are living what Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he wrote: "The man who loves his country on its own account ... not merely for its trappings of interest or power, can never be divorced from it, can never refuse to come forward when he finds that she is engaged in dangers which he has the means of warding off."

The contribution of your recent military graduates is in keeping with a well-documented tradition of service here at the University of Georgia. Colonel "Chargin" Charlie Beckwith, class of 1952, chose a commission in the United States Army even though he had been drafted by the Green Bay Packers. Beckwith would go on to multiple combat tours in Vietnam. But his enduring legacy is the organization he found and led, Delta Force, the world's premier counter-terrorism unit.

As graduates of this esteemed university you have many career options in front of you. But these uncertain and difficult times also present singular opportunities to do the most good for our fellow Americans – to choose a life of service to your community and your country. Nearly 80 years ago, D.W. Brooks was a UGA alumnus with a comfortable perch here as a professor of agronomy. In 1933, he left the teaching position he had held since age 19 and went to work with rural Georgia farmers who, as a result of the Great Depression, had seen their income drop, to average \$72 a year. As Brooks said, it was too late for "talk-teaching" – "do-teaching [would] be a lot

faster." By the end of the Second World War, he had transformed cooperative farming in this state, improved the lives of a generation of southern farmers, and eventually became an agricultural advisor to seven presidents.

The tradition of "do-teaching" is still alive and well here at Georgia. Over the past five years, faculty from the College of Veterinary Medicine have lent their expertise to local veterinarians and farmers in Afghanistan – this kind of work makes an enormous difference in this rural, agrarian nation struggling to overcome decades of war and deprivation.

Serving others can take many forms. Working in the public sector at some level offers a chance to learn the inner workings of our government and build skills that will stand you in good stead with other challenges. And it doesn't necessarily require moving to Washington, D.C. – the only place in the world you can see a prominent person walking down lover's lane holding his own hand. (Laughter.) To serve our country you don't need to deploy to a war zone or a Third World country or be buried in a windowless cube in a gothic structure by the Potomac River. One mundane factoid: Nearly 85 percent of all federal jobs are outside the D.C. area and there are roughly 44,000 positions overseas – in fields ranging from astronomy to zoology.

Whatever the job, serving in government requires a singular commitment to missions and themes larger than yourself, and at times can provide some rather pointed feedback. Margaret Chase Smith, the first woman elected to both the House and the Senate, said, "Public service must be more than doing a job efficiently and honestly. It must be a complete dedication to the people and to the nation with full recognition that every human being is entitled to courtesy and consideration, that constructive criticism is not only to be expected but sought, that smears are not only to be expected but fought, that honor is to be earned, not bought."

Too often those who choose public service are dismissed as bureaucrats or worse, and in many cases politicians run for office running down the very government they hope to lead. In the eyes of many successful private citizens, the burdens of public service have grown too onerous, and public life has become too mean, too ugly, too risky, too dangerous, and too frustrating. I have seen it all and experienced it all since entering government 43 years ago. I have now served eight presidents. But I still believe that public service remains a necessary and honorable calling and, contrary to the perceptions of many, a fulfilling and satisfying opportunity.

I would not trade my experiences at CIA, the National Security Council, and now Defense, for anything. And not all of it was somber and serious. I remember:

- As a 23-year-old second lieutenant briefing a profane, cigar-chomping Air Force general on an Air Force missile base – a character who acted like he had walked right out of the movie "Doctor Strangelove";
- Over 20 years later I recall being called, along with the deputy secretary of state, "Tweedledum" and "Tweedledee" by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. I always claimed to be Tweedledee (laughter); and
- Then there was the time when both the leader of the Soviet Union and the American secretary of state were trying to get me fired. That episode took some time and distance before entering the "funny" column. I also survived both of them.

Let me leave you today with what one of the great women of American history, Abigail Adams, wrote her son, John Quincy Adams, during the war of the American Revolution. She wrote: "These are the times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station that great characters are


formed .... Great necessities call out great virtues.”

We live in a time of “great necessities” – a time when we cannot avoid the burdens of global leadership. The stakes are too high. It is now that America needs its best and brightest, from all walks of life, to come to the fore. If, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, America is to continue to be a force for good in the world – for freedom, justice, and the rule of law, and the inherent value of each person – then the most able and idealistic of our young people – of you – must step forward and accept the burden and the duty of public service.


I just quoted what Abigail Adams told her son, John Quincy. I will close with a quote from a letter that her husband, John Adams, sent to one of their other sons, Thomas Boylston Adams. He wrote: “Public business, my son, must always be done by somebody. It will be done by somebody or another. If wise men decline it, others will not; if honest men refuse it, others will not.”

And so I ask you, the University of Georgia Class of 2009, will the wise and honest among you come help us serve the American people?

Thank you. (Applause.)



Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates speaks at the University of Georgia's Winter Commencement Ceremony in Athens, Ga., Dec. 18, 2009.  
*DoD Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates commissions eight new second lieutenants into the U.S. armed forces at the University of Georgia's North campus Chapel in Athens, Ga., Dec. 18, 2009.  
*DoD Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison*  
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U.S. Department of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

## Speech

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### Commencement Address at Indiana University

*As Delivered by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Saturday, December 19, 2009*

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Thank you President McRobbie, thank you Dean Bertenthal, members of the faculty, parents, and distinguished guests. First, I do want to thank the faculty and the university for this very special recognition. I am deeply honored. And it is an honor and a pleasure for me to be back at Indiana University to help graduate the Class of 2009.

And to all of you who will get your degrees today: Congratulations!

As you know better than anyone, IU is a special place. As all people of good sense are well aware, the proper answer to many a profound question in life is: Because "it's Indiana." A world-class institution like IU attracts legions of men and women from all over the country and every corner of the globe. But I have to think they all benefit from exposure to the Hoosier spirit.

IU will always have a special place in my life. Most importantly, this is where I met my wife. It was 1966, and she was working on a Master's in education. We met on a blind date chaperoning a student hayride as resident assistants in Wright Quad and McNutt. (Laughter.) Yes, chaperoning. It was a long time ago. When Becky tells people about our time together in Bloomington, she tends to dwell less on the romance and more on the fact that I wound up at Nick's most evenings. (Laughter.) By the way, it's great to see Nick's is going strong, taking care of hungry – and thirsty – Hoosiers.

I came to IU's Russian and East European Institute in the Department of History in 1965 to get my Master's degree. Here, as at the other institutions I attended, I found teachers who opened my eyes to the world and the life of the mind. Galvanized by the great issues of the day, I was drawn to the study of our Cold War adversary, the Soviet Union. And that brings me to yet another reason why this place is personally so significant to me: a recruiter from the Central Intelligence Agency recruiter showed up in Bloomington in the fall of 1965. I met with him thinking I could maybe get a free trip to Washington, D.C. I did get that trip. But what began as a lark turned out to be much more. It was my entry into a way of life where I could combine my intellectual curiosity with something greater: service to country.

And it's this combination that I want to speak briefly to you about today, for it is an important potential path open to you at this moment in your lives. Nowadays, when talking about our America, we hear a great deal about freedoms and rights and even the entitlements of citizenship. But, we don't hear so much about is the responsibilities and duties of citizenship. Teddy Roosevelt was eloquent on this point. He said, "No *one* of us can make the world move on very far, but it moves at all only when *each* ... of [us] does his duty."

Over this past decade, doing one's duty has taken on a whole new meaning and required a whole new level of risk and sacrifice – with hundreds of thousands of young Americans in uniform who have volunteered to put their lives on the line to defend us – to set aside their dreams so you can fulfill your dreams. They come from all over the United States and they join up knowing they will likely be sent to war. Four of them will graduate with you today:

Second Lieutenant Christian Litscher, from the "Wild Aces" detachment, United States Air Force, and Army Second Lieutenants Eric Bolin, Nathan Carpenter, and Andrew Roberts, from the "Screaming Bison Battalion." (Applause.)

They join an honor roll of other Hoosiers who have served with distinction:

- Major Adam Lackey, Class of 1999, with the Army's 75th Ranger Regiment, who has six Iraq and

Afghanistan tours combined, to date;

- Captain Jonathan Fields, Class of 2001, who after several overseas tours, including Iraq, came back here to pursue a law degree; and
- First Lieutenant John Donovan, Class of 2007, an infantry officer currently leading a combat outpost in eastern Iraq.

And then there is the example set by Brett Hershey, Class of 2005. His Indiana National Guard commitments took him to Afghanistan, where he made the ultimate sacrifice 30 miles south of Kabul. All of these Hoosiers and their families deserve our admiration, our gratitude, and our respect. (Applause.) They are living what Thomas Jefferson had in mind when he wrote: "The man who loves his country on its own account, and not merely for [its] trappings of interest or power, can never be divorced from it, can never refuse to come forward when he finds that she is engaged in dangers which he has the means of warding off."

These individuals and others like them have justifiably been called the "new Greatest Generation." Yet they stand apart for another reason. They are part of a much larger group of young Americans who are as decent, giving, and compassionate as our nation has ever seen. But what puzzles and troubles me is that so many of that larger group of young people who are so public-minded when it comes to their campus and community tend to be uninterested in or distrustful of our political processes and public service. As a result, I worry about how difficult it has become to persuade talented and capable young people to enter the public arena.

Much of the resistance no doubt stems from the perceived hassles, frustrations, and sacrifices of public life. The skepticism is somewhat understandable. Government is, partially by design of the Founding Fathers, slow, unwieldy, and almost comically inefficient. Will Rogers used to say, "I don't make jokes. I just watch the government and tell the truth." (Laughter.)

I have about seen it all, since first entering government 43 years ago and now having worked for eight presidents. I would add that being head of CIA lets you in for some interesting public commentary, such as the time that "Wanted" posters with my face on them showed up on an east coast campus. I acquired one, and it is a treasured part of my collection. (Laughter.) It's a reminder that a measure of skepticism and irreverence about government officials and organizations is always healthy – indeed, necessary. It curbs overweening power and overweening egos – and in Washington, D.C. there is certainly no shortage of the latter.

Irreverence informed by healthy skepticism is essential to democracy. But cynicism about the people and the institutions that govern and protect our country can be corrosive. Too often those who chose public service are dismissed as bureaucrats or worse, and in many cases politicians run for office running down the very government they hope to lead. In the eyes of many successful private citizens, the burdens of public service have grown too onerous. To them public life seems too mean, too ugly, too risky, too dangerous, and too frustrating.

I have a different view – a view informed by my own experience and by what I see every day: That public service remains a necessary and honorable calling, and, contrary to the perceptions of many, a fulfilling and satisfying opportunity. In fact, if in an unguarded moment you asked the public servants I have known what their motivation was you'd learn that – no matter how outwardly tough or jaded – they mostly were and are in their heart of hearts, romantics and idealists. And optimists. You see, we who have taken this path actually believe we can make a difference, that we can change the lives of others for the better, that we can make a positive difference in the life of our country.

The consuming goal of the first half of my professional life was winning the Cold War. I was lucky enough to see a successful result – with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the liberation of hundreds of millions. The period that has followed though, has been, shall we say, more eventful than many predicted. Our country has been engaged in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, suffered September 11th, and is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have learned yet again that the fundamental nature of man has not changed, and that evil people and forces will always be with us, and must be dealt with through courage and strength, service and sacrifice.

During the War of the American Revolution, Abigail Adams wrote the following to her son, John Quincy Adams. She said, "These are the times in which a genius would wish to live. It is not in the still calm of life, or the repose of a pacific station that great characters are formed. . . . Great necessities call out great virtues."

We live in a time of "great necessities" – a time when we cannot avoid dealing with serious problems here at home, or the burdens of global leadership and responsibility. The stakes are too high. It is now that America needs its best and brightest, from all walks of life, to come to the fore. If, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, America is to continue to be the land of the free and home of the brave, a force for good in the world – for freedom, justice, the rule of law, and the inherent value of each person – then the most able and idealistic of our young people – of you – must step forward and accept the burden and the duty of public service.

I just quoted what Abigail Adams told her son, John Quincy. I will close with a quote from a letter that her husband, John Adams, sent to one of their other sons, Thomas Boylston Adams. He wrote: "Public business, my son, must always be done by somebody. It will be done by somebody or another. If wise men decline it, others will not; if honest men refuse it, others will not."

So I ask you, the Indiana University Class of 2009, will the wise and honest among you come help us serve the American people?

Thank you.