

reaktionär-konservativen Geheimdienstklüngels durchzusetzen. Über die persönliche Tragik, die damit verbunden war, muß an anderer Stelle noch berichtet werden, da es sich am Schicksal Otto Johns zeigte, daß es zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR kein ideologisches Zwischenfeld gab, von dem aus zur Lösung des deutschen Problems beizutragen war.

Die sich im Gefolge der Entwicklung des Jahres 1953 ergebende Polarisierung der Kräfte ließ bei mir den Entschluß reifen, mein Eindringen in die Zentrale des Gehlen-Dienstes zu forcieren. Allerdings durfte ich nichts überstürzen, sondern nur die mir gebotenen Möglichkeiten in der GV ausnutzen. Da war einmal das Versprechen, das Reile mir bei seinem Wechsel in die Zentrale in Pullach gegeben hatte, mich dorthin nachkommen zu lassen, und andererseits gab es den persönlichen Konflikt zwischen dem Leiter der Generalvertretung, »Leidl«, und »Hans Friesen« – also mir. Diesen Konflikt eskalierte ich, indem ich mich permanent bei der Zentrale über »Leidls« rüde und schmierige Praktiken beschwerte. Dies konnte ich auch deshalb tun, weil ich wußte, daß meine »Gegenspionage« (III F) von der Organisation anerkannt und ich nicht fallengelassen werden würde. Dennoch blieb bei diesem Spiel der Kräfte ein gewisses Risiko, über das ich nicht immer mit den sowjetischen Offizieren beraten konnte; diese waren übrigens auch nicht ganz so optimistisch, was mein Eindringen in die Zentrale anging.

Doch schon am 21. August 1953 mußte mir mein GV-Leiter »Leidl« schriftlich mitteilen – ich hatte durch eine Krankheit eine schöpferische Pause von den Querelen erhalten –, daß ich im Oktober 1953 in die Zentrale versetzt würde. Er schrieb mir scheinheilig: »Nur die Gewißheit, daß Sie bei der Zentrale ein Referat übernehmen, welches eng mit uns liiert, aber leider unterbesetzt ist, hat mich bewogen, dem Wunsch von Leiter 30 (Gehlen; Anm. d. Verf.) für eine umgehende Versetzung zu entsprechen.« An dieser Stelle sei mir wieder ein kleiner zeitlicher Vorgriff erlaubt. Sofort nach meiner Entlassung 1969 aus westdeutscher Haft wurde eine »Darstellung« über meine Tätigkeit für die sowjetische Aufklärung in Pullach konzipiert, niedergeschrieben – und fast völlig auf Eis gelegt. Dieses Buch erhielt den Titel »Moskau ruft Heinz Felfe« und wurde bei v. Hase und Kochler in Mainz verlegt.¹⁶ Freizügig verteilte man es an interessierte und dienstbare Journalisten, aber es gelangte nicht in den Buchhandel. Das Ziel

dieses Unternehmens bestand darin, das Klischee des Antikommunismus auf diesem Feld der Auseinandersetzung zu erhalten.

Wie stark die BND-Führung daran interessiert war, überdies einen sowjetischen Aufklärer zu präsentieren, der sich von seinen Auftraggebern distanzierte, zeigten auch die »lukrativen« Geldangebote, die mir für ein Abschwören während der Haft von 1961 bis zu meiner Befreiung 1969 gemacht wurden. Da man dies aber nicht erreichte, drohte der Gehlen-Wessel-Clan mit einer Veröffentlichung von »Kontermemoiren«, falls ich mir nach meiner Entlassung erlauben würde, die Wahrheit niederzuschreiben.

Einige Einflußagenten im bundesdeutschen Nachrichtenmagazin »Der Spiegel« und auch in anderen westdeutschen Illustrierten manipulieren schon seit Jahren mit Teilen dieses Pullacher Papiers, um eine Felfe-Legende nach der Denkart Gehlens zu verbreiten. Doch es ist nicht meine Art, mich Drohungen zu beugen, obschon ich über Jahre Zurückhaltung übte. Als ich dann in Moskau die »geheime« Felfe-Story las, war ich von der primitiven Art der Darstellung allerdings überrascht. Ich möchte jedoch nicht verhehlen, daß ich mich beim Lesen des Manuskripts wenigstens ab und zu amüsiert habe. Etwa, als ich las: Die Nachbarschaft Adenauer/Felfe in Bad Honnef habe ein intimes Verhältnis zwischen beiden gebracht, und anläßlich einer Feier mit meinem »alten SS-Kameraden« seien wir aus dem Weinkeller von Dr. Konrad Adenauer bedient worden. Nun denn, ich hätte mir als Nachrichtenmann keinen besseren Einstieg wünschen können. Doch leider hatte ich dieses intime Vergnügen nicht.

Ähnlich verzerrte oder falsche Darstellungen fand ich im Buch von Heinz Höhne und Hermann Zolling mit dem Titel »Pullach intern«. Was dort über mich berichtet wird, zeigt mir das Bestreben, Legenden und Sprachregelungen zu schaffen, die den BND möglichst gut davonkommen lassen, wobei ich nicht glaube, daß die Autoren etwas falsch verstanden haben, als sie von BND-Angehörigen Material für ihr Buch erhielten.

Im »Camp Nikolaus«

Nachdem ich meine laufenden Fälle bei Freund und Feind abgewickelt hatte, fuhr ich am 1. Oktober 1953 in die Zentrale, um in der »Gegenspionage« der Organisation meinen Auftrag zu erfüllen.

Gehlen wußte genau, wovon er schrieb, und mir war klar, was er mit der »von allen großen deutschen Parteien gleichermaßen anerkannten Leistung« meinte: Es ging um nichts anderes als um den konterrevolutionären Putschversuch gegen die DDR am 17. Juni 1953, dessen Vorbereitung zur Jahreswende 1952/53 bereits auf Hochtouren lief. Ein Beleg dafür ist die vom 29. Juli 1952 datierte »Abhandlung Nr. 6600«, nach der Chiffre meist nur »Juno«-Programm genannt. Es orientierte sich an Washingtons militärischen und außenpolitischen Nachkriegsplänen und widerlegt die von Gehlen geschaffene Legende, daß die Organisation nicht an der Vorbereitung der gewaltsamen Einmischung und eines Kriegs im Jahr 1953 beteiligt gewesen sei. Im Gegenteil, dieses Kriegsdokument wurde von den führenden Köpfen der OG in Abstimmung mit Bonn konzipiert, und die Organisation war dann, im Zusammenwirken mit der CIA, am aktivsten.

Zur Illustration – obwohl bekannt – möchte ich darauf verweisen, daß sich am Vorabend des 17. Juni 1953 höchst interessante Personen in Westberlin aufhielten: Allen W. Dulles, Chef der CIA; Eleanor L. Dulles, Sonderberaterin des US-Außenministers für Berlin-Fragen (man beachte den Titel; d. Verf.); General Matthew B. Ridgway, zeitweilig Befehlshaber der 8. US-Armee während der Korea-Aggression und durch seine barbarische Kriegsführung berüchtigt (später Oberbefehlshaber der NATO in Europa); Otto Lenz, Staatssekretär im Bundeskanzleramt. Am 17. Juni trafen noch Jakob Kaiser, Minister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, und Heinrich von Brentano, der damals Vorsitzender der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion war, sowie der SPD-Vorsitzende Erich Ollenhauer ein. Warum diese illustre Gesellschaft sich dort aufhielt, dürfte heute jedem klar sein.

Die »Abhandlung Nr. 6600« stellte nur die Spitze des Eisbergs dar. Zur Beweisführung erscheint es sinnvoll, einige markante Stellen aus diesem Dokument zu zitieren, in dem unverhohlen die Vorbereitung auf den Tag X vorgedacht wurde. So hieß es in diesem Gehlen-Papier:

»Die Verschärfung der Lage macht es erforderlich, ernsthaft an die Vorbereitung für den E-Fall heranzutreten. *Nach den vorliegenden Erkenntnissen sind die psychologischen Voraussetzungen dafür günstig* (Hervorhebung v. Verf.) ... Aufgrund des Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen Ost und West muß in Europa zunächst

mit einer Periode des Rückzuges gerechnet werden, der erst nach Heranführung weiterer Kräfte eine Periode der stabilisierten Fronten folgen kann. Diesem Stadium eines zukünftigen Krieges müssen daher die Vorbereitungen in erster Linie gelten.«¹²

Im »Juno«-Programm wurden für den III-F-Dienst drei klar voneinander zu unterscheidende Aufgaben formuliert:

1. Vorwarnmaßnahmen,
2. Bekämpfung der gegnerischen Nachrichtendienste aller Schattierungen (I-, II- und III-Dienst) im eigenen Hinterland.
3. III-F-Aufklärung im Hinterland des Gegners.

Mit diesem Programm wurden auch alle Säulen der Organisation auf die kommenden Provokationen orientiert. Besonderer Wert wurde auf die Vorbereitung und spezifische Einstellung der V-Männer vom Kurier bis zum Agentenführer gelegt. Im Programm hieß es dazu:

»Grundsätzlich ist zu sagen, daß neben der Placierung am richtigen Objekt das selbständige Denken und Handeln der V-Leute im Kriegsfall erheblich an Bedeutung gewinnt ... Volle Gültigkeit muß der Grundsatz behalten, daß für jede Quelle, insbesondere in der SBZD, alle Maßnahmen getroffen sind, die eine schnelle Meldungsübermittlung gewährleisten, wenn der Krieg ausbricht oder der »Eiserne Vorhang« noch dichter wird.«¹³

Dabei ist interessant, daß bei den Hinweisen auf die Ausbildung der Agenten darauf aufmerksam gemacht wurde, man könne noch ein volles Jahr dafür verwenden.

Mit dem »Juno«-Programm der Organisation wurde auch die eindeutige Orientierung gegeben, »die Überwachung der obersten Regierungs- und Parteiorgane sowie der in der DDR bestehenden Informationszentren« zu verstärken. Es hieß wörtlich:

- »– Beobachtung von Ansatzpunkten zur Bildung und Verstärkung von Widerstandszentren,
- Angaben über das Menschenpotential, seinen Ausnutzungsgrad und seine Aufteilung auf Wehrmacht und Industrie.«¹⁴

SAMPLING OF cic REPORTING SUMMER OF 1954.

CIC had heavily targetted GV L in which it had maintained interest from 1946 on when Baun established Dienststelle 114. The initial mission given Baun by USFET was cpintresponage against Soviets in US Zone.

FELFE had by early 1954 become the principal target. CIC developed dossiers on a large number of individuals that they associated with him, one way or another. They spent some effort on each of the individuals listed in 28 April 1955 report. But this was only a part of this effort.

CIC was pulling considerable biographic data out of the Pullach files. Complete history of senior GO staff in many cases.

Ludwig Albert and another agent of CIC Offenbach Reg III did extensive analysis. I think it was they who reached the conclusion on Felfe group responsibility for 70 percent of the "Commuists" intel used. There was also a very experienced CIC agent who was regarded as the brains of the CIC group running these operations and has been described to me as a respected analyst. He may have worked on an analysis jointly with Albert and "X899HQ" who was the contact between Albert and Region III. He was probably a senior police officer in Frankfurt-Bonn area, probably Security Group. I assume SG investigation of Albert case identified who was between him and CIC.

Note that CIC source told them prior July 23, 1954 that Gehlen Org internal investigation was focusing on Felfe and Schuetz.

My interest in this is not in Felfe case per se but in the American side of it. None of this information was ever seen, as far as I know, in CIA. CAMPUS was a CIC operation looking for communist penetrations of German intel, police, security and military. It seems to have been a totally uncoordinated activity. There was a growing US Army attack on GO that peaked in June 1955 when General Trudeau stumbled into a meeting with Adenauer in Embassy garden in Washington. He carried and read from cards that basically made the case that Gehlen Organization was too penetrated to join Bomm government.

Adenauer thanked him, taking cards out of his hand. Truman Smith) former MA and Kriegsakademie grad was making the same case in Washington and in Germany with his old friends. It was a bungled effort from start to finish.

CIC was, however, deeply into Gehlen Organization (but mainly GV L as far as I know) and in the same small circle that KGB had penetrated, also mainly GV L and, by extension, III F group in Pullach. It is my view that Herman Baun set

FELFE
LT AL

up a counterespionage effort in early 46 and set the pattern. He was the one who got Bentzinger out of a CIE using Lt. Col. Deane. Why Bemtzing? GV L was an odd tale from the start. I do not think that Trudeau was in the picture on the Campus Operation covering Felfe et al. His case with Adenauer could have been dramatic if he had cited CIC conclusion on Felfe and his circle. His demarche to Adenauer was in June 55 when Albert was still a sensitive CIC source that Tom Dale and his colleagues would not have risked by giving Trudeau info that could threaten Albert.

There is nothing new in the attached extracts but seeing copies of the actual CIC reports made in 1954 makes one pause. I am interested in any info from that era that is relevant and can be discussed.

JHC 25 March 1993

ATTACHED:

28 Apr 55

List of Personalities in 60

10 June 54

FELFE, /16142

13 July 54

FELFE, Heinz
Status of Gabel Org investigation -
Focus on Felfe & Schoetz -

24 June

7070 of data for Felfe group

all documents
then kept
in new volume

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group, APO 757, US Army

SUBJECT

FELFE, Heinz

220949

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAMILY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6


SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-35714

1. SUBJECT, a member of the Gehlen organization, is assigned to Department III-F in the Gehlen headquarters in MUNICH (UTM) 32UPU9134, and is described as ambitious, unrestrained and intriguing.

29 APR. 1955

2. Johannes Paul Heinz FELFE was born in DRESDEN (UTM) 32VVS1257 on 18 March 1918. Just prior to the end of World War II, SUBJECT was a member of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police - Sipo) and held the rank of SS Obersturmfuehrer and Kriminalkommissar. On 6 November 1946, SUBJECT was released from a British POW camp and came to HONNEF (UTM) 32ULB7412, at which place he decided to take up residence. On 21 December 1946, SUBJECT was joined by his wife Margarete Ingeborg, born 16 September 1918 in DRESDEN, and a child, Hans Ulrich, born 7 March 1944 in DRESDEN. SUBJECT had acquired a place of residence at Bismarkstrasse 13, later resided at Asbacherstrasse 4. Subsequent to their settling in HONNEF, another child, Ursula Ingeborg, was born 3 October 1948. SUBJECT's wife made the unregistered move from DRESDEN, Zastrowstrasse 11, on 21 December 1946.



5. In 1951, SUBJECT, who also has an identity card with the name FELFE-FREIBERG, possibly originally his correct name, became an employee of the Gehlen organization and was assigned to Department III-F in KARLSRUHE (UTM) 32UMU2528,

6205

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
24 June 1954

PREPARING OFFICE
Region III, 66th CIC Group, APC 757, US Army

SUBJECT
FELFE, Heinz

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

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COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

III-35714

1. Continued investigation concerning the information furnished by the Communists regarding the Gehlen Organization last winter has revealed that at least seventy (70) percent of the information could have come only from the former Sicherheitsdienst (SD) group within the Gehlen Organization to which group SUBJECT* belongs.

[REDACTED]

2.

[REDACTED]

13 APR 1955

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~DECLASSIFIED BY 3030/...~~
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CONFIDENTIAL

1

GEHLEN, THE SD AND FELFE

An early draft - Too General to be of much use in book.

FELFE

Heinz Felte, by 1953 a well established staff member in Pullach, within months had become, I now know, a major interest of CIC. Heinz Felte is the principal subject of a number of 1954 CIC reports which describe the individuals of a group of former RSHA Amt VI members who are assisting each other to survive in a defeated and occupied Germany. "Sanitized" versions of these reports, released in the 1980s under the Freedom of Information Act, do not clearly reveal which of this large and complex group are CIC employees, which are informants and which themselves are targets of CIC. They are very actively ~~very actively~~ in touch with one another in spite of the tribulations of travelling and communicating in a Germany with a virtually destroyed infrastructure. The story of this circle of young former SS officers is of interest mainly because one of their circle, Heinz Felte, managed to find his way into the sensitive inner circle of Gehlen's security and counterespionage staff.

FELFE
6 CIC

In the winter of 1953-1954, the Soviets made a major attempt to destroy Gehlen's support in Bonn and among the Western intelligence services. An orchestrated release of information on penetrated and compromised Gehlen operations in East Germany was accompanied by a devastating propaganda effort that did, indeed, do serious damage to Gehlen's reputation. A CIC report dated 24 June 1954 ~~provides the conclusion that~~ CIC analysts had concluded that Felte and his SD associates were the sources of seventy percent of the information exposed by the East German communists in this major propaganda operation. This, in 1954, should have sounded the alarm in American intelligence. ~~Almost forty years later, I find this particularly so since highly professional analysts in my own staff in Pullach came to approximately the same conclusion at approximately the same time. It was not until I read the sanitized CIC 1954 more than thirty years later that I concluded that someone must have seen the full CIC reporting as well as ours from Pullach. I am perplexed as to why this did not happen. As it turned out, Felte came under suspicion in Pullach but was not arrested until four years later -- and then only when Golenewsky, a UB officer dealing with the KGB in Warsaw, served up to CIA an item that precisely sealed Felte's fate. This may have been a KGB move to bring Gehlen, by then the BND President, into a new crisis of confidence. Felte was brought to trial in West Germany, convicted and eventually permitted to go to the GDR. His significance in history ends at that point. He had done enormous damage. We are left with the question of repressibility for permitting the SD circle, within and outside of CIC and the Gehlen Organization, to make the Felte case possible.~~

states

Be more precise here

seven

FELFE
↓
Gehlen

Some of the blame should probably go to a specialized Gehlen CI and CE organization in Karlsruhe. Its cover as a firm manufacturing Jalousies, which it actually did. It was headed by a former Abwehr member, true name Benziger alias Leidl. It can be said that Leidl had a tendency to mill about among former police and security officials from the Hitler era that were officially political outcasts in Germany. His operation was an anomaly in an organization that at least on the surface enjoyed the respectability of the German General Staff that had been exonerated by the National Court of Justice at Nuremberg. But the principal responsibility rested with Gehlen himself. Gehlen clearly never accepted the concept underlying the automatic arrest categories agreed by the four allies in the closing months of the war. Gehlen had known and found merit in the personality and performance of Schellenberg. Late in the war, after the 20th of July had finished off the Abwehr, Schellenberg had inherited many of the former Abwehr operating teams on the Eastern Front. Herman Baun, leaders of Leitstelle I Ost played an important role for Fremde Heere Ost and, more important, for personal support in getting Gehlen's family into safe territory in the last days of the war.

From the beginning, Gehlen appreciated that he could not challenge the broad condemnation of the entire SS and the RSHA and accepted as an agreed policy that the use of Gestapo and RSHA former officers was unacceptable. Periodically, reports from other Western intelligence organizations, from German authorities including the police and security organizations that evolved along with the State and Federal German governmental structures revealed that one of Gehlen's field offices scattered throughout West Germany, Austria and Berlin were making operational use of experienced SD officers. In each instance, Gehlen agreed to take corrective actions. I recall that on one occasion we presented a summary of six cases where former SD officers ostensibly were members of the organization. But there were only two elements of Gehlen Organization that seemed disinclined toward operational use of what, under the rules of the occupation, were politically unacceptable German. One of these was the Leidl operation in Karlsruhe that obviously had a preference for experienced SD officers of fairly junior rank. The other element of the Gehlen Organization that offered a far more complex issue were the millions of Eastern European refugees that flooded the American, British and French occupied zones and the very large community of Germans with long professional interests in Eastern European affairs.

I remain convinced that Gehlen, once the war ended, had very little interest in any foreseeable political or military use of refugees from the East. Week in and out for all of the

BENZIGER

Gehlen & SD

Gehlen & E. Europe
DPs

years that I knew him, Gehlen showed no interest in getting involved in the large and highly diversified activities of the West, including the United States, that were carried out in or from Germany and relied heavily on participating roles for the Eastern refugees. This conscious disassociation with refugee activities created a sharp break with Fremde Heere Ost wartime activities. The German command on the Eastern Front made every conceivable effort to enlist the support of ethnic and nationality groups that appeared highly disaffected with Soviet communism. General Kuestring, prewar military attaché in Moscow and a recognized specialist on Russia had been close to Fremde Heere Ost during the war. Gehlen's closest aide in the postwar years, Heinz Danko Herre, had ended the war as the senior German General Staff officer on Vlassov's staff and narrowly escaped the fate of Vlassov and his staff who were immediately after the war, turned over to the Russians by the US Seventh Army, taken as far as Prague and summarily executed. Herre had been closely associated with General Kuestring and German foreign office Russian experts Gustav Hilger and "Jonny" von Herwarth. He maintained these contacts after the war and occasionally met with Russian, Ukrainian and perhaps other refugees. These were clearly peripheral and personal interests that enjoyed no particular priority from his superior, Reinhard Gehlen.

There were on Gehlen's staff in Pullach senior staff members responsible for following Soviet affairs, quite aside from Soviet order of battle, an area of questioned superiority in the analysts carrying on directly from years in Fremde Heere Ost with the additional advantage of daily and in depth dialogue with Western experts on the Soviet armed forces. All of these were senior staff members with whom CIA and other American Soviet experts were in close contact. Most of these had wartime backgrounds centered on the regular military commands on the Eastern front.

On arrival in Pullach I saw on organizational charts and had described to me the "Professoren" which included individuals reestablishing themselves in postwar academia -- many specialists on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I would have expected former members of the Wannsee Institute in Berlin to have found a niche in the "Professoren." It is my impression that this loosely associated group shared some common ground with the huge Russian and Eastern European refugee community that assembled in Munich as researchers, political analysts and programmers. As the years went by, I heard almost nothing more about the "Professoren" and assume that most of them found a more interested and more affluent sponsor in Frank Wisner's OPC and the information war that ran on until the Berlin wall came down and the Soviet Empire collapsed.

The SD circle apparently had its connection to the Gehlen Organization through Dr. Emil Augsburg and may have at some

point involved General Six. Both may have been simply part of the lingering connection between Gehlen and the wartime association Eastern European and Soviet specialists within the framework of Fremde Heere Ost. It seems probable that it was Augsburg which came close to bringing Klaus Barbie into an American intelligence effort beyond his association with CIC. It is also likely that Augsburg played a role in getting Felde into the headquarters. But it would probably be necessary to study the relationships of Leidl in these matters to really understand them.

There appear to be numerous overlapping interests of CIC and the East German Service (i.e. an arm of the KGB) -- both attempting to penetrate the Gehlen Organization. For example a Gehlen field case office in the Stuttgart area, one Albert, found life too complicated and committed suicide in 1954 or 1955. CIA and Gehlen security people immediately moved into investigate; they found Albert had been leading a triple life -- a very active and respected case officer in a Gehlen field office in Stuttgart, an active agent of CIC -- possible an element of CIC's Operation Campus and certainly a witting spy for, ultimately, the KGB. I have forgotten just how Albert fitting into Leidl's operations and the SD circle that included at times, Felde, Barbie and Augsburg.

This circle of former SD members located mainly in the Munich, Augsburg and Stuttgart area of southern Germany but with connections in the Rhineland, northern Germany and Kassel near the GDR border. Mary Ellen Reese zeroed in on this group in her requests to the CIC archives in Camp Holabird using the Freedom of Information Act. Hundreds of reports were released to her after heavy deletions of what CIC considered sensitive data. Regardless of this screening process, she managed over a period of several years to assemble a meaningful description of the activities of this SD circle in the decade after Germany's surrender on May 7, 1945.

More than 45 years later students, serious authors, historians and investigative media reports continue to put forth widely differing analyses, interpretations and opinion on several interrelated issues touching on the evolution of the BND, the extent of its staffing by former SD -- or even Gestapo -- members, Felde's remarkable SD and the role of Reinhard Gehlen as an individual.

1. The Felde Penetration

Gehlen and his top staff had every reason to be knowledgeable and interested in the activities of GV L, Leidl's operations and the extent to which this circle of former SD officers were known to be, in one capacity or another, into the Gehlen Organization. Heinz Felde was a principal figure in this complex. Dr. Klausner headed

Gehlen's CE staff during all the years that I was in Pullach. He had an adequate staff of professionals, many of them excellent professionals, with whom my staff of security and hostile intelligence specialists, including Toivo Rosvall, Jeano Evans, Ed Petty and others, were in close contact.

The BND was created on 1 April 1956, I left Germany that summer and within a year became Chief of CIA's Eastern European Division and remained in that post through 1959. Thus, for roughly 11 year I had, within CIA, a direct responsibility for our interests in Germany. Prior to that, in 1946 and 1947 was I chief of the Counterintelligence Branch in the intelligence staff of the Senior US Army Commander in Heidelberg. And in part of 1947 and early 1948 I was the de fact operational manager of both intelligence and counterintelligence activities of US Forces in Austria, within the intelligence staff of the US High Commissioner. During the war I strictly a combat officer moving through North Africa, Italy, France and across Germany to hear the ceasefire just as I had crossed the Austrian border near Kitzbuhel. For sixteen years, with no real interruption, I had been a participant in the Transition of Germany from enemy to ally.

At least a year before my departure from Germany, Ed Petty had developed an elaborate analysis around the hypothesis that there had to be an active Soviet or East German penetration of Klausner's staff. Felfe was suspect. After reviewing Petty's work within my American staff, I asked Gehlen to subject himself to a detailed briefing by Ed Petty. He accepted this offer. It is my recollection that he did not disagree with the analysis nor the evidence that placed Felfe and, as I recall, a second member of that staff in the status of suspect penetrations.

It was not until 1958 that Felfe was arrested. The critical item of information that led to the arrest came, as I recall, from Golienevsky, a CIA source in the UB in Poland who was the UB liaison contact with the KGB. Why did it take four years to nail down the role of Felfe from the time both CIC and my staff in Pullach identified Felfe as a possible penetration? Did CIA have access to the CIC reporting on Felfe and his SD circle? Did the analysts in CIC who were following the continuing investigation of Felfe share their analysis with CIA?

CIC's Interest in Felfe

During the winter of 1953-54, The East Germans launched a devastating campaign to discredit Gehlen through revelations of a number of compromised Gehlen operations into East Germany. This was a major propaganda effort to destroy Gehlen's political support in Bonn and the Western services.

END OF FEFELFE CASE

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It did not fully achieve this aim but did great damage to the Gehlen's position. The expose' of Felde four years later may have been a Soviet initiative to further embarrass and weaken the new BND headed by Gehlen.

CIC had by June 1954 investigated the operations revealed by the East German authorities and conclude that "at least seventy percent of the information could have come only from the former Sicherheitsdinst (SD) group within the Gehlen Organization to which group Subject (Heinz Felde) belongs." This report from Region III, 66th CIC Group, was dated 24 June 1954. It states that CIC is continuing investigation of this matter. I saw this report first when Mary Ellen Reese brought it to my attention. I have no recollection that we either received or focused on this explicit effort to identify Felde as a major penetration of the Gehlen Organization. It was obviously not an insignificant routine report. In this CIC report released to Mary Ellen Reese half of para.1 and all of paras. 2.,3., and 4. have been deleted. But CIC screeners elected to leave the key introductory sentence intact.

While CIC was conducting its analysis of the blow up of Gehlen operations in East Germany, precisely the same exercise was underway in Pullach within the American staff and with at least selected members of the German staff. There is no evidence of any link between these parallel efforts.

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THE SICHERHEITSDIENST CIRCLE TO WHICH FELDE BELONGS

In CIC, Felde was a thoroughly researched and investigated subject by 1953. CIC interest in him probably predated his entrance into the Gehlen Organization. A 10 June 1954 CIC report provides a detailed summary of Felde's personal history from 1941 through 1950.8 history. Felde had been in the RSHA VI office in Switzerland from 1943 to 1945. By 1945 he was an SS Obersturmbahnfuhrer. During 1947 to 1949 he worked for the British on German communist party matters which was followed in 1950 by work in the Kaiser Ministry on Refugee Affairs working for Dr. Dellinghausen and one Bodenz. .

Felde's contact that led to employment in the Gehlen Organization was Dr. Emil Augsburg. Dr. Augsburg was a German of Polish origin who had worked from 1936 to 1938 as an expert on Eastern nationalities in the Wannsee Institute in Berlin which was taken over by the RSHA in 1938 and renamed the Federal Institute of Geography. Augsburg was working in Poland in 1939 just prior to the outbreak of hostilities. In 1941 he was wounded near Moscow but recovered and undertook a mission in southern Russia and the Caucasus in 1942. By 1944 Augsburg had been promoted to Sturmbahnfuhrer. the 7970 CIC in a report dated 1 February 1948 request

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FELDE

Dr. Augsburg

permission to drop Emil Augsburg as an informant because of reorganization of the "Peterson net" and because Augsburg is in touch with the Vlassov group. A 24 June 1954 report on Felde is from sources A,B,C and D -- all deleted. These presumably are other members of the SD circle who are in touch with CIC. Another CIC report identified Augsburg as a source of on Kurt Werk, an informant of Region IV since March 1946 reporting on Soviet influence in Germany, on DP groups and as valuable because of connection to German intelligence personnel. Emil Augsburg and Klaus Barbie are both listed as sub-sources of Werk.

Augsburg is, in CIC reports, identified as a member of the Gehlen Organization and is obviously associated with this circle of former SD members.

KLAUS BARBIE

Klaus Barbie, who in the late 1980s suddenly became a news story in connection with French efforts to extradite him for a trial based on his role as an SS Hauptsturmfuehrer in Lyon during a period in late January and early February 1947 the war. A CIC reports contains details of Barbie's travel at in late January and early February 1947. He goes to Kassel and stay eight days at the home of Becker, then on to Marbug to obtain a letter to contact Dr. Hoffman with whom he spends three days in B----burg. Hoffman asks Barbie to deliver a letter to a Dr. Winnich in Welzheim near Stuttgart. As a guest at the home of Dr. Winnich, Barbie met a Dr. Zarf, a former SS Untersturmfuehrer. Barbie then returns to Kassel to again stay with Becker until 1 February when Barbie proceeded to Munich to contact Otto who contacted Hirschfeld and Dr. Augsburg who "seem sincere in contacting former SD personnel." Otto and Barbie proceeded to Schorndorf and then returned to Munich. Barbie alone then proceeds to the Hotel Zur Post in Furstenfeld where Barbie again meets Dr. Augsburg, Hirschfeld and an unidentified woman. Barbie introduced himself as Becker. Barbie then travels to Schorndorf to again meet Hirschfeld, a former SS officer, Hirschfeld told Barbie that he was a liaison man for German intelligence people now working for American intelligence. Brigadefuehrer (Major General) Six and Dr. Augsburg. Hirschfeld offered Barbie the documentation. Barbie wanted to see Hauptsturmfuehrer Schreiever to inquire about General Six. To get Schreiever's address, Barbie returned to Kassel one Naumann to get Schreifer's address. The local CIC raided Becher's house just as Barbie arrived. Barbie escaped out the window the proceeded to Munich to see Otto again who was unable to provide him with Schreiever's address. On 6 March Barbie returned to the home of Dr. Winnich in Welzheim near Stuttgart. On 15 March Barbie met with Hoffman in Welzheim. Barbie then went with Otto to Buchloe, a town near Ulm, and met with former SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Schulz seeking from him information on a former Abwehr Captain employed by the Americans under the name of _____ Peterson in Memmingen. Barbie, who had resided in Memmingen, had recognized

Barbie

Peterson as Merk. Schulz told Barbie that Peterson could be found at 12 noon in Cafe Weinsiegl in Memmingen. Barbie and Otto met again in Munich on 21 March at the Loewenbrau Restaurant where Hirschfeld was waiting for them. He took them to Feldafing, a small town on the west side of the Strarnbergr

as a salesman for leather goods. Barbie decline v (to who has a leather factory near the Bahnhof which is financed, he said, with SD money at the end of the war, he loaned an unidentified woman. Barbie clearly was highly active in this CIC group in the early postwar years. A CIC report of 11 December 1947 states that Barbie is to be transferred to ECIC for interrogation. ECIC, actually the United States Center for Interrogation and Detention at Oberuersel near Frankfurt a. Main. In reporting on Barbie's penetration of the Frenmch (presumably on behalf of CIC). A report on Klaus Barbie links him with the same Kurt Werk who shows Barbie as well as Emil Augsburg as his sources.

GBOOK35

KGB AND CIC PENETRATIONS OF THE GEHLEN ORGANIZATION USING
FORMER SD AND GESTAPO MEMBERS

Remarkably, the large number of CIC reports released under the FOIA authority more than thirty years after the events they record, reveal clearly that CIC, in the period 1946 through 1948, knowingly employed members of the SD, including the notorious Klaus Barbie, Dr. Emil Augsburg and others. There were indications that the Gehlen Organization, at that time known as TIB (probably a misleading Army cover designation as Technical Intelligence Branch), was involved in the same SD circle. CIA, not created until 1947, was almost certainly not a player in this 1947-1948 Odyssey of Klaus Barbie and the apparent competition between TIB and CIC for his services. It was Barbie who made the choice to become an agent of CIC in Munich, operating in the Memmingen and Kempten area near the French Zone of Occupation. Five years later CIC and the Gehlen Organization were clearly still operating within a circle that included former SD and Gestapo members. This CIC effort in 1953 and 1954 led Region IV to the conclusion, in a report dated 23 June 1954, that Heinz Felfe and the SD circle with which he was identified, had to be the source of seventy percent of the information on the Gehlen Organization that had been surfaced in 1953 trials and publicity in East Germany. A second CIC report dated the same date, i.e. 23 June 1954, stated that the official files of the Gehlen Organization described Heinz Felfe by his true name and as a former member of the SD. I first learned of these reports in the late 1980s when questioned about them by Mary Ellen Reese in connection with her book on Reinhard Gehlen. She told me that she had obtained them from US Army archives.

My own official interest in matters reported by CIC in the 1946 to 1948 period was as Chief of the Counterintelligence Branch of the Third US Army G-2. Since the 970th CIC belonged to USFET in Frankfurt and not to the Third US Army in Heidelberg, I probably remained wholly innocent in this period of the frenetic networking of former SD member under the eyes of CIC in the heart of the American Zone. The Odyssey of Klaus Barbie, based on his activities from early 1947 into late 1948, roughly 20 months, tells a great deal about the freedom enjoyed by the SD members and the extent to which SD and Gestapo members were consciously being used by American intelligence, including the CIC. Although the names of some of the players had changed, the same game was in process five years later in the 1953 and 1954 period. but by then the stakes were considerably higher. We were well into the Cold War.

As a result of the eventual discovery of Heinz Felfe as a KGB agent and the information that became available in the

CIC + TAC - GO
SD CIRCLES

FELFE

press after his arrest in 1961 and his trial in 1963 we now know that there was still, in the early 1950s, an active SD circle in the same geographical setting as in earlier years. It was still centered in Stuttgart and Munich. In the meantime, TIB had become widely known as the Gehlen Organization. CIC, now designated the 66th CIC, and the counterintelligence arm of the Gehlen Organization were both in the period 1953 and 1954 well connected in these SD and Gestapo circles in southern Germany. The game had become more deadly. By 1953 the KGB too was deep into the SD circle of which KGB agent Heinz Felfe was, by CIC's calculation, the leader and principal source of KGB knowledge of Gehlen's agent operations in East Germany -- and presumably elsewhere.

CIA, By the early 1950s, in contrast to the 1946 to 1948 period, CIA could no longer be indifferent to what went on in the Gehlen Organization. On my recommendation in late 1948, CIA had become responsible on 1 July 1949. I had been directed to stay on to carry out the task of taking a more thorough look at the Gehlen Organization in order to develop a longer term policy for dealing with it. In my opinion, both the US and German governments had decided on long term plan for the Gehlen Organization by the end of 1950. In 1953, we should not have been so inadequately informed of the CIC and KGB penetrations of this SD circle and the Gehlen Organization. CIA had been thrust, under pressure from the Pentagon, into taking over the Gehlen Organization. This step carried with it an obligation by the Pentagon to support the CIA effort and, indirectly, contribute to the ongoing process of developing balanced national defense community within the German Government. On 1 July 1953 the US Senate had passed with a unanimous vote to support the rearmament of Germany within NATO. By June 1954, when CIC was busily monitoring what it clearly viewed as a KGB penetration of the Gehlen Organization, with Heinz Felfe identified and named as the probable principal agent, it was unthinkingly irresponsible for senior officers in the chain of command in Germany and Europe not to have sounded the alarm. Gehlen by June 1954 had one foot solidly planted in the door of the future BND office in Bonn; Chancellor Adenauer's cabinet had voted unanimously to build service around the Gehlen Organization; senior officials were in an advanced phase of the administrative process of taking over responsibility for the Organization. Moreover, there was, by mid-1954, a steady flow of former German officers from the Gehlen Organization into the ranks of the evolving German military establishment. The legalization step which Gehlen had assumed would be on 1 April 1954 had again been postponed -- particularly because of the controversy raised by the 'expose' and show trials in East Germany. The KGB propaganda operation, exploiting a serious, but not a fatal flaw, in Gehlen's security practices, had achieved a partial success in its effort to derail Gehlen's effort. In the