Williams:** Was there any reason other than financial stringency that Bryan, Duke and Pomfret did not fight for higher faculty salaries?

Moss:** I think not. I believe that each of these men might have worked for better salaries had there been the opportunity. The times were not propitious; the opportunity did not come until the post war pressures developed, such as the veteran enrollment, the "sputnik" influence, and the realization that better education in Virginia might attract industry.

Of course, under both Bryan and Pomfret, Duke was a key figure, and I do not think he saw increased salaries as of high priority and demanding much effort on his part. He seemed to me a man who believed that if you asked for little you would be sure to get it. His principal strategy seemed to me to be that of keeping on good terms with the parsimonious leaders of the state political organization. Of course, as merely the agent of the president he was not able to vigorously champion anything. That was the job of the president. Bryan and particularly Pomfret found the best opportunity in pressing for fringe benefits rather than salary. Fighting for salaries would have required pressure on the very powerful and economy-minded political organization and would have stirred inter institutional competition. **

**(Question Number six not included in the original interview but added at a later date and answered accordingly by Mr. Moss)

March 5, 1975

Williams: We'd been talking in earlier interviews about (as I've just mentioned) these differing views on the role of William and Mary. We've talked about Admiral Chandler and how his coming was part of this rejection, perhaps, of the elitist role of William and Mary. In 1960 an administrative concept was set up called the Colleges of William and Mary. In what way do you think this refelcted these differing concepts of the roles of William and Mary?

Moss: I don't think that the differing concepts had very much to do with it. I think that politically it was inescapable that the Richmond and Norfolk divisions of the college would become independent. There was some local desire for this. At the same time, there was a local concern (in fact, one of the members of the board at Old Dominion told me this) that, tied up with William and Mary, they could hope for a good deal of power in the legislature. Richmond, Williamsburg, Norfolk people -- maybe twenty in the delegation form William and Mary -- but that standing on their own feet with only the Norfolk delegation, they would probably not have much influence. Of course, the answer to that was that these two branches didn't get a very good deal out of the William and Mary budget. They were shortchanged. And I think that they have, in fact, flourished independently. But this change was inevitable. All right. There was also the question of how do we untangle this William and Mary mess, not only Chandler, but the whole thing? Wouldn't

William and Mary be better off if it were freed of these divisions? Both of them had gotten us into trouble with the accrediting agencies. They are doing different kinds of work. They are different kinds of institutions. We've got enough to handle ourselves, especially if we grow. Why not separate? And the William and Mary faculty had long hoped for this kind of separation, so that a step in that direction seemed to be in the cards anyhow -- it was just when it would come. And then, of course, elevating Chandler into an overall position as chancellor of this setup seemed to be a step that was easily taken. Do you follow? I think that is approximately the whole story. Now the only way it ties in with this whole cleavage was that the William and Mary faculty had almost overwhelmingly felt that the separation would benefit the college here. These were nothing but a drag on us. And of course, people like Miller and Fowler even despised the divisions. And the divisions felt that they were despised. I think that's the answer.

Williams: At the time of the separation two years later there was a great deal of talk about the expansion of the sciences. I don't know that this particularly had anything to do with the separation, except that it came up at the same time. But William and Mary, some people said, should remain a liberal arts school and let R.P.I. and Norfolk Division go their professional ways, and this business about the cyclotron and VARC, let that be separate from the college in Williamsburg.

Moss: That was the attitude here. Now President Chandler, insofar as he had any background in education or at least in scholar-

ship was in sciences. He had written a book on explosives or torpedoes, I guess it was, which I think was a textbook at Annapolis. At any rate he thought of himself as having some kind of physics background and had a partiality toward physics. Also Mooney had left as head of the department, and he brought in a man named Pittman, who I thought had few qualifications, except that he was willing to do Chandler's bidding. So here was a department that had to be renovated because the new physics and the old physics couldn't be taught by the same people. There was money available for this kind of expansion. There was a prospect of good enrollment because students were going into physics. All this after Sputnik was a big thing. Well, I think the president just put his money on that. Now the attitude in the faculty, which had been accustomed to, you might say, weak science departments -- they were the kind of science departments you would find in a small, liberal arts college rather than research departments -- and the burgeoning of this new department with bringing in alot of people who were eager to get grants for research and eager to develop and had dreams of grandeur -- these we found rather obnoxious, particularly when they were championed by a man like Pittman. And incidentally I have a letter I wrote to Pittman that I should give you because we had an exchange in a faculty meeting. This had to do with the very questions of the curriculum

in physics. Now Pittman almost contemptuously refused to answer a question from Lewis Foster and from others. This was the program; the president wanted it, what do you fellows know about it? He wasn't smart enough to even use that kind of language. He was no good on the faculty floor at all. But the questions that we thought should be answered and on which we were prepared to take the physics point of view if it was presented properly -- we were just scandalized, and I think we voted "no" on that occasion. So they didn't come in with the very cordial reception. We had our fingers crossed also about geology. Geology's past history in the college curricula had been one of "rocking people to sleep" and things like that, so that the thought of geology wasn't particularly attractive to us, but the president wanted it. And in retrospect this was right, and he did get a good department of geology. I think we have reason to be very happy about this, but at that time we were most skeptical. There were issues in the biology department that were personal cleavages, which made affairs particularly difficult, but they came through with a new department. So here was this expansion of the sciences riding rough shod over past arrangements. There was a great deal of faculty anxiety about it, especially when some of these science people in a faculty meeting either proved naive or proved incoherent or they .... Well, at any rate we had had what you might call a nice little faculty forum in which people understood each other, and here were some people

who just didn't fit the folkways any more than a Communist in Parliment would fit British folkways. I think that we should have been more generous and forgiving, but some of this annoyed us a good deal, and it hurt their position with the rest of us.

And then there was some real jealousy about the way that some of these science salaries were just unbelievable to us. (I remember when the man came in heading up the atomic physics business, he was described as a high energy professor of physics instead of the professor of high energy physics. This was in the mimeographed bulletin that was sent around to us. There were things like that.) Now on the matter of VARC, I think in the longrun the faculty opposition to this was correct. Now we saw it as being comparable to the television excursion that the president attempted, which fell flat on its face. And here he was getting interested in this VARC business. People were ready to go along with him, and we'd get our multi million dollar cyclotron and all of this. Wherever you've got many millions of dollars you've got something that's a going thing for a college professor who is getting only $8000 a year. So then, too, we had discovered that NASA was not a comfortable companion. And the thing was going to be located off-campus. So we began to ask the question, and it proved to be the right one, "what is the long-term history of this? Are we going to have it down there, get all involved in it, commit the resources

of the college that might be going to other things to go into this, and then having it fold up at the end of a few years?" And this is what has happened. While it's still down there, they were fighting desperately to find something to do to maintain it because it was obsolescent. And that's a question we've often had to ask: whether a program that we go launching into and investing money in was going to be a suitable program before its physical resources became obsolescent or before the program would be obsolescent. Those were the attitudes at that time.

Williams: You spoke of Chandler's background in science. Do you think that was the main reason why he felt this need to expand the sciences?

Moss: No, this was after Sputnik and the new physics, and I don't think he was very much tied up in this science business because of his own background. I think he appreciated it a little bit more, but I don't think -- he didn't think of himself as a scientist, as far as I know. We did feel, for example, that the physics department was greatly overexpanded, and indeed they found this. And then what could they do? Now I must give them credit for having found enough research money and made enough contracts and so on that they could come out of it. But they were very much inflated.

Williams: You referred to the sciences riding roughshod over the liberal

arts. Is this a case where the liberal arts suffered or that the sciences were built up?

Moss: I don't think that the liberal arts suffered very much. Now for all of us who are accustomed to the small liberal arts college there was a problem of readjustment which we did not handle very successfully, and yet as individuals we had to become accustomed to new ways of looking at things. I found it uncomfortable and I know that many others did. Just how do you do that? What fits in? What's this new kind of institution like? It had to do even with our classroom presentation and things of this kind. Part of it was not only due to what was taking place at the college but taking place in the whole academic environment. And we didn't find it easy. So that some of this business in the sciences was doubly annoying and troubling. Actually I think that the presence of science as a solid, well-supported element in the college -- and some of the people in the sciences were really good, though I think as a group that they had an exaggerated notion of themselves -- but they had some good people. And I think that this did compel us to take on a kind of quality -- I'm not saying a higher level of quality, but some characteristics that we would not have had otherwise. This differed in the different fields as to what it was like. For example, the older philosophy had been built pretty much around logic and the history of philosophy.

Now I saw it that way; maybe the philosophy people would say differently. But this was a rather comfortable kind of philosophy for armchair philosophers. And then here came the impact of existentialism. Here came the impact of logical positivism. So this kind of adjustment was very troubling and wearing, and I'm not sure that it actually -- there were some gains, but it cost more than it was worth. There was plenty that we could have held on to that had been good and solid and all that.

In political science it was a case of the -- we had one very strong movement into what you might call normative theory, which is to say traditional political philosophy. And then you had the people who were interested in political theory as rational analysis and setting up hypotheses and trying these hypotheses, plus the quantitative method. And should we revise all of our work to fit into this? I, who had had my education in the '20s, should I go into this? Well, actually I felt I had done what I wanted in this direction anyhow. I didn't feel that it was worth enough for us to sacrifice. I still don't. Well, this was part of the reaction to the sciences. We also found the sciences were much less troubled about purism than the social sciences and the humanities. I would even say that they looked down their noses at some of the older members of the faculty the same way that some of these older members of the faculty looked down their noses at people inherited from the Chandler regime.

Williams: On these curriculum trends, this impact of the sciences on other disciplines, it was neither a cause nor an effect of the Colleges, because it both preceded and followed the Colleges. Was the point of this Colleges setup to get political pull in Richmond? Would you say that was the purpose?

Moss: No, I think that it was an attempted solution of our internal problems and the organization of the college. I'm not aware that it produced any advantage or disadvantage in Richmond. People in Richmond, or rather the members of the legislature, were on to the fact that William and Mary was trying to have a large representation drawn from Richmond and Norfolk, which was really dishonest. They knew that. And especially as the state policies on higher education came to be more coherent and deal with all the institutions -- see, that was another development. The State Council on Higher Education was coming in about this time, and while it didn't have much influence, it did present the notion of there being a Commonwealth of Virginia policy on issues of higher education, instead of William and Mary, V.P.I., V.M.I., and the University of Virginia, and in that context it was absurd for William and Mary to be running three different kinds of colleges. So that the Colleges of William and Mary was a step in the direction of independence. Oh, incidentally, there was a great deal of joking about the college's title, The Colleges of William and Mary -- I don't know where they got that from, but it didn't seem to fit anything that anybody talked about. Now another point is

that Chandler wanted to introduce the idea of the University of William and Mary. But we are very much wedded to the statement in the charter that the name shall always be "the College of William and Mary in Virginia." Efforts to label it as a university have not been successful. Of course, I feel this is a mistaken notion that a college cannot be at the highest possible level of education. A college doesn't mean that it is limited to a B.A. degree and to undergraduate students; "college" means a collegial organization. Essentially it means faculty government. A college is a group of faculty members who allow some students to come and be apprentices. Now of course, that isn't the conventional American picture. In fact, in Britain, too, a college is more often a technological institution, except for the colleges of Cambridge and Oxford. Well, even President Graves is trying to get around to the idea that this is a small university and so the graduate work. Now that's another element about the sciences: the Ph.D. in physics. There was a demand for doctoral degrees in physics at that time. There isn't now. That was another reason why we might go in. We had many misgivings from the first time they talked about a doctoral degree in physics; we wondered how in the world they would give it if it didn't meet our standards. I still don't think we turned out any brilliant physicists here. Neither have we turned out some brilliant people in other fields. The whole issue of graduate work is another item.

I don't want to go into that now.

Williams: How did this Colleges concept -- or did it -- in any way affect the workings of the Williamsburg operation, as far as the faculty was concerned?

Moss: I don't think it really had any effect at all. I'm not aware of any. No, I don't think it had any effect at all.

Williams: Do you see the final separation and the making of Chandler as the honorary chancellor, sending Norfolk and R. P. I. their own way, as a political maneuver that got rid of Chandler?

Moss: Was it a political maneuver to get rid of Chandler? People looked on it -- the faculty members opposed to Chandler here at the college looked on it that way. I suppose you attributed this to the board. But it was in the cards; sooner or later it would have happened. I think that we immediately felt, "Well, he's gone upstairs. That's fine." There was a little question at first as to what kind of influence he would still exercise after he had gone to that level.

Williams: And what did you find was the outcome?

Moss: It would be difficult for me to say, except as I viewed it myself. There wasn't any general eveidence of anything. I felt, or I have believed, that Paschall and Chandler had a very touchy kind of relationship, but it was one in which Chandler, to a great extent poisoned Paschall against members of the faculty. There was about a year in which we might be said to have a dual administration, with Chandler and Paschall both

playing a role. (It may have been a little more than a year.) But I felt that at that time Paschall -- and I don't want to get ahead into the Paschall administration -- but I felt that at that time Paschall seemed to be responding to some kind of influence that looked as though it came from Chandler. This is my guess by reading of things. If you ask me in what in particulars, I would say chiefly that when Paschall came, I went out of my way to welcome hime and to be cordial. I accepted the Hooker request that we accept Paschall, and I was anticipating the very satisfactory relationship with Paschall and then discovered that this was not the case. Now there were reasons that nothing to do with Chandler, because Paschall was insecure and afraid of the faculty, I think. But I think Chandler fed this, or some of the things that Chandler said and did led to this. This is my interpretation.

Williams: When Paschall was selected he was, as you have said, the state superintendent of public instruction. What type of man would you say that the board had opted for when they chose Paschall?

Moss: Well, we thought that they had fallen into a pattern, just as Hooker had said, in which every state superintendent of instruction, with few possible exceptions, had been given a college presidency at the end of his term. This was part of the political system of the state. I think they just fell back on this as a way of doing things. Obviously this fitted into the his-

torical picture. We had at one time feared that we would get a man named Hall, who was a state superintendent of public instruction. But I was told that we had the good fortune that he had been discovered with his secretary at a hotel room im Washington and that this had pretty well excluded him, so how lucky we were. But at any rate we did not want an ex-superintendent of public instruction, and we did not want a man who had so closely identified himself with massive resistance, as had Paschall. We didn't want a man whose student years here at the college were under the elder Chandler and who regarded the elder Chandler as having been a wonderful person. We were not keen about a man who came from a southside county that had I think succeeded from the Confederacy because it was not sufficiently illiberal. So this all looked pretty bad. Now on the other hand we did have the feeling that in place of a sour, angry admiral we would have a politician who at least had courtesy and a more mellow disposition. That was the feeling that we had about it. Now as time went on we came to know Paschall and to be less happy than we had hoped to be with Paschall. We also wondered how in the world he'd be able to deal with Chandler. Chandler wasn't taking his hand off the wheel of the "U.S.S. William and Mary" without some kind of better transistion than just someone moving in.

Williams: And yet you said all these things -- you weren't happy about getting this type of man, this type of man, and you did. Was

the faculty's reaction, "Well, we could have done worse."

Moss: Yes, I think so. I think so. We'd rather have had the superintendent of public instruction than an ex-school superintendent from Henrico County. We knew there were worse possibilities. There were a good many people eyeing the job on the guess that Chandler would sooner or later go. I can't tell you who these were, but you had inquiries around the state, "How is Chandler getting along down there," you know. You could usually read behind these signals about, "It might be interesting to go down there and do a good job." So we could have gotten lots of kinds of people. I would say that Paschall had an opportunity, when he came to step off on his right foot and everything would be fine. I attribute his not doing it to Chandler, but I may be mistaken about this. You can explain as much about his conduct out of his own personal background as you can attributing it to Chandler.

Williams: You said earlier that you were not going to give an illustration of this, is that right?

Moss: The point I made I think I could give an illustration. There are a good many things that I speculate about and interpret, and I wouldn't ask anybody else to believe it on the grounds that I intuitively reach a judgement. On the other hand, you've got to reach judgements, and these are just judgements.

Williams: When Paschall was selected there had been no formal faculty consultation or faculty search. There was a faculty committee

that recommended to the board types of men -- and I believe they also had some names.

Moss: You mean when Paschall came in?

Williams: When Pashcall came in in 1960, yes.

Moss: I don't remember any of this.

Williams: Well, there was no formal....

Moss: I don't even remember any informal....

Williams: There was a letter written by two members of the advisory committee, and how -- in what capacity they were acting, the letter doesn't say, whether it was personally or not.

Moss: Well, if I had anything to do with that, if I even knew about that, I fail to remember it because it didn't seem to be particularly important. Either I didn't know at all, or else it seemed to me to be quite inconsequential. I think that we did know that moves were taking place. I expect in my own case I didn't expect to be consulted -- I don't think I was on the faculty affairs committee at the time. I may have been.

Williams: But given all the trouble that there had been in '51, why do you think that the board did not come to the faculty?

Moss: Well, you see, they were not changing the top leadership of the college. You might almost say that Paschall was being brought in as the dean of the Williamsburg campus. To put it that way would be regarded as outrageous by many people. But he knew, as I saw at that time, he was coming here not to be president in the full sense, he was coming in to be the chief administra-

tive officer of the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg. I doubt if putting in the man in charge of the Norfolk or Richmond operation would have been considered by the faculty in the same way that the president of the college would be. Now of course when I say that we always -- ever since after Miller -- the faculty had always been consulted about the dean. And therefore, it would have been logical to consult them about the man to replace Chandler on this campus. I think we were so glad to have a change made that we didn't raise any question about this. I think we also regarded it as a transitional situation, too. I think we realized that this colleges business was insubstantial. We might not know what would come out of it.

Williams: You say that you were glad to have someone else come in, which leads me to my next question: it has been said that Paschall was "welcomed as a savior", and yet as you have alluded to, soon some disillusionment set in, partially over expansion. What other factors would you say caused this?

Moss: Well now, this I think that I view largely in personal terms. That is some of this was personally so important to me that I'm not sure I had the general picture. We found Paschall very difficult to deal with, because while he considered himself as one in command of his English language, actually some of it seemed to be to us incoherent and silly. He would interlard his language with some legal terms, "whereas" and "said" and so on. I think he thought this was alot of fun. But it annoyed

us, and when you tried to read what he did write, you couldn't be sure you knew what he was trying to say. And then when we negotiated with him on anything -- and one of the things we did negotiate with him on was the freedom of tenure statement -- we found him very difficult to deal with. We'd bring in one that was a conventional, (to us) obvious, statement, and he would reject it. We didn't know why he rejected it. But then he came out with a statement of his own, which he had gotten from I think George Washington, where this friend of Chandler's had been president. At any rate it was from either there or American University. That looked to us like a shoddy business. It came from an institution not having a good record of academic freedom and tenure. And he put this forward, and he said, "Well, no, that's not the kind of thing." And he didn't seem to understand this. Well, finally after pulling and hauling we did get accepted the thing that we had started with. Why all of this trouble? I don't think that he ever comprehended it; I don't think that he ever wrestled with it. Then we had negotiations on other matters.

In my own case they were questions about the department of government. It seemed to me that it was difficult to deal with him because you could never get a settlement out of him one way or the other. And then finally in the establishment of the Marshall-Wythe Institute, why, this was a most difficult business. I'm not sure just what -- I still can't figure out why he took the positions that he did, unless it was purely a

matter of trying to juggle things until the balls all just fell to the floor, just see how long you could hold it up or something like that. To me, it was incomprehensible, and still is. I don't know whether you want to get into that now or not. It is illustrative, and I can go on with it if you like.

Williams: Why don't you? I was going to ask you another point, but since you have started talking about this ...

Moss: Are you going to ask me about the setting up of the Marshall-Wythe Institute?

Williams: Yes.

Moss: Well, some time, I don't recall just when ... I felt that I had been in the department of government as head too long. There were some things within the department, some quarrels and so on, that I didn't see could be easily reconciled, and I thought it was time for me to get out. I went to him, perhaps to Mel Jones. But at any rate I remember having lunch with the two of them and saying that as long as I was John Marshall Professor of Government and Citizenship and there was the Cutler Trust and so on that I thought it might be worthwhile undertaking some kind of public affairs program under that label. And I had in mind that this would mean bringing to the college some speakers from outside and possibly having a program like the Marshall-Wythe Symposium continue, but not on a grand scale and not very much. However, at the same time the department of sociology was arguing for a research institute like that at the

University of North Carolina, a sort of social science institute (and the Marshall-Wythe School of Government and Citizenship had at one time done something like it on the Hampton Roads study). So I can see what they had in mind, and I believe that they had very definite ideas -- that Ed Rhyne would be the head of this insitute and so on. Now there was a good deal of correspondence -- or maybe I should hold off here for a moment. The lunch conversation that we had was not followed with anything until about two years later. I got a call from I think Mel Jones (or a note) "We'd like to get together with the president." Then the president begins to talk about a public affairs institute, which I had just dismissed. This isn't going to be; there's no reason to think about it any longer. And apparently this was about the time that the sociology department had made their proposal. Well, I was not averse to that. If this was something the administration really wanted to do, why, let's see what could come out of it. However, as our discussions got going it was clear that the sociology people were very uneasy about combining the two, especially since it would certainly mean that I would be the top man in it, and what they argued for was that Ed Rhyne would be the assistant -- I think they said associate director -- and perhaps that I would take care of the public affairs/Marshall-Wythe symposium side while he took care of the research side. Maybe that would be the way out. But none of this seemed to be very easily handled, and neither Mel Jones nor President Paschall contributed anything.

It was rather that they would introduce an element into it which made it more difficult. All right. Finally we did get together and had -- there was a good deal of exchange of correspondence between the president and myself and many meetings, at which we were not always in agreement, then finally a lunch meeting with people from the social sciences and it looked as if we were ready to do it, and there was backing that was sufficient. We had something good. However, this didn't really gel. I've forgotten the details of just why not, but certainly there was this background of the conflict between the government department and myself on the one hand and the sociology department and Ed Rhyne. Now there were several further exchanges. Finally there was one big meeting, and I think the president was insisting that business administration should be involved in this. He was saying, for example, that I would take over the directorship of the business bureau, at least the supervision of it. It might have its own director, just it would be under the umbrella -- the president kept on speaking of this as "An Umbrella." You need somebody to hold up an umbrella! But he just wanted to bring together all of the problem things that were tangential to the main academic program and put it under the institute, so that it was a soup that had too many different constituents. We did have, I think, a couple of meetings. At one of these the president asked the question, and asked it of Kernodle, "Do you

want to have this established regardless of who is head of it?" and Kernodle said, "Yes." Well, I took that as a signal that Rhyne was out and there was no problem. And then there was a meeting at which we had the business administration and other people, and the president at that meeting made me the proposition as to what would be done. I think he had the board resolution already passed and that it was handed around to us. Do we go ahead with this? Everybody said yes, but without any great enthusiasm. And I said, "Yes." To me it was perfectly clear that there was a good deal of uncertainty as to how things would come out of this. I had the feeling, "well, we'd work a way out of it." I thought we could. I was mistaken on this. Abbott, who was then head of the history department, talked to me, and he said, "Don't get messed up in this. You'll be sorry." And I wished later that I had taken that advice. I don't know what the alternatives were, but I realize that it was something of a mistake.

At any rate, it was set up and promises that had been made to what kind of quarters we would have, what kinds of things we would do. And then I found out that the administration was not prepared to fulfill any of these promises. One was that the offices would be in the building with the social sciences. We would not be separated. So their proposal was that I should have the office on the first floor that was then occupied by the dean of women. I went down and found that she hadn't heard anything about this. I looked the office over and talked to her a little bit. It occurred to me that quite obviously what

they were trying to do was to get her out, and one of the ways to do it was to sic me on her to try and take her office. Well, that was a hell of a note! So I just disgarded that and made a bid next for a suitable place in the business administration quarters. And they said, "No, we can't do this. You might have this office in the back," or something like this, you know. So there was no cooperation there. So I went to Dean Jones, and I said, "What about this? This is the way things are shaping up. What are we going to do?" Well, he didn't seem to have any answers. The president didn't have any answer. In other words we didn't have any quarters. Now along with this went some other things of the same kind. We asked for this and asked for that, and it didn't actually materialize. Finally, yes, there was a place over in the library, one of these studies.

Williams: The old library or the new library?

Moss: The new library -- and I could have two of these studies. Well, I wrote back to him, and I said, frankly, this would serve my personal purposes, but it will not serve the purposes of an institute because we were isolated from any ordinary traffic of faculty members by being here. So this is all they could come up with, so all right, we did that. I said I wanted a research secretary, and when I said that she ought to be paid about $9000 a year and ought to have a master's degree in the social sciences, why, they threw up their hands and said, "We can't do anything like that. The highest paid secretary in

the state is in the governor's office and doesn't receive that money." Well, I was using the example of the setup I had in the federal government with O. S. S., where I had a secretary of this type. I was prepared to come down from that. Well, what did they send me? They sent me a little girl who had gotten through high school by the grace of the local superintendent of schools or something like that, and she could barely type. She came in wondering if she could possibly do the job. Well, this was all I could have. I guess they were going to pay her about $2800 a year or something like that. Her last job was as a veternarian's assistant cleaning out the kennels. But she seemed to be a person who had some drive. This was all I've got. This is all I've got in the way of quarters -- let's see what comes of it. Well, it turned out that she did very much better than I would have supposed. She is up there at the Marshall-Wythe Institute now and is a pretty competent young woman, though she still doesn't have anything like a college education. Well, there was that. When I went around to talk to the people in business administration they told me very frankly, "We don't like this setup of the business bureau being under the Marshall-Wythe Institute. We're going to run it the same way, no matter what happens. We are just going to run our bureau ourselves." There were no bad words spoken over this, but it was just perfectly clear that they were going to ignore what had been planned. So under those circumstances

I felt the thing had pretty well been reduced in scope. The question came up at a meeting that we had as to the appointment of an associate director, and the business administration people said, "Well, you'd better find out how big this is going to be as to whether it is going to need more than one person." So we let them ride a little bit. They finally ended up not appointing an associate director which, I think annoyed Rhyne and Kernodle no end. In fact I would say it made it impossible to really have any cooperation. I brought in a program, and the others agreed to it. It was much reduced in scope. It was things I thought we could tackle. Well, that looked to me as though it was -- I felt that the president should have come through with some of his promises. There was also a question of how my contract would be written. I very definitely understood that like a department head, my title would not be in the contract, so that I was still a regular faculty member without any administrative duties. Well, they insisted on putting it in. Finally, I think I accepted that: I don't believe they changed it. Their attitude was, "It doesn't make any difference. It's just as much money, and it doesn't change the status in any way. Why should we go to the trouble of rewriting the contract?" So I didn't fight about it any longer.

And then came the question of the Robertson papers which was, to me, the finish. I went to Washington to see about various contracts up there that would be useful. I talked with an alumnus of the college who was working in one of the Congres-

sional offices. This was Kent Watkins. There were alot of things he was going to do to help me. Then he said, "We don't know what in the world to do with Senator's Robertson's papers. He's got to move out. He has an accumulation of several terms in the Senate. It's all nicely organized in filing cases up there, but where are we going to send them the first of the year when he has to leave the office?" And so well, I can see some very good reasons why we should have those if he wants to give them to the College of William and Mary. He did not want to give them to the University of Virginia because he felt they had not been -- at least this is what I was told -- had not treated Carter Glass's papers adequately up there. So I said, "Well, I think this is a good idea." I talked to McNeill, who was his legislative assistant (administrative assistant) and came on back. I explored what could be done, what I thought should be done, came back, wrote a letter to the president making a recommendation. And I did this -- I didn't want to cross any wires -- I did it immediately when I got back so that he could have the whole thing to do what he wanted. What he did was to write back a letter which was polite, but in effect said, "All of this is now put in the hands of Dean Jones," and I had nothing more to do with it. Well, I had also asked to have an opportunity to discuss the contract over the papers when it was negotiated because I knew what I thought ought to be done about handling the papers. No, I have

nothing to do with this, according to Paschall. So I said, "Well, here is what I proposed. You say I'm not having anything more to do with it, all right. There is nothing I can do." So I wrote McNeill and said, "This is now in the hands of Dean Jones." I felt for the president to have -- if the president had called me in and said, "Well, here's a situation, and this looks like we have to do something to come out of it," that would have been different. But I never had any explanation as to what had gone on. Well, finally I went to Jones, and I said, "Now I've had no explanation for what seems to have been a very inconsiderate action on the part of the president. He hasn't explained what he has done. I'd like to know what it is because there is evidently something wrong somewhere. I don't understand." Well, he told me about the board having been very much troubled because they were after Senator Byrd's papers, and now here were these papers, and they hadn't done anything about it. They ought to have been on the ball trying to get Robertson's papers. And then, I think, though he didn't say so, I think there was also a question in the library as to whether they wanted to do this. I don't think the library was very keen about it. But even what Jones had said wasn't an adequate explanation for what had taken place. So I said, "Well, I'm just through with this as far as Mr. Paschall is concerned." There was no expectation of having any relationship with him

that was going to be satisfactory. That had been growing. It had come out of experiences of the department of government. We had all asked for something and found that it didn't get any reply. Paschall, I think, never wrote me a reply that I could do anything with, and in many cases, he totally ignored my letter. He did have quite a bit about the graduate program in government. Finally he gave us -- well, I won't go into all that right now unless you want me to. But he was difficult to deal with on that. He didn't give us what we wanted. He evidently didn't understand. Several times when I wrote to him I made some reference to unsatisfactory conditions, and he would reply that he was at a loss to understand what I meant. What did I mean? In the case of one faculty meeting I wrote back, and I said, "I mean this, the way that this, and this, and this happened." So I expect he concluded that there was no way he could deal with me, and I concluded there was no way for me to deal with him.

I did have one experience, though, that was quite surprising and sucessful. For a long time we had talked about having an honors program. I was the chairman of a committee to do something about this. We hadn't been able to get to first base. Well, I happened to be out in Denver, and I went to the University of Colorado, which had an excellent honors program, saw the director and went over in detail just what he was doing, just what his budget was, his administrative setup. I put all this down on paper and sent it to the president. I guess my

committee looked it over first. I gave it to the dean and the president. Bob Johnson, who was in the dean's office, was on this committee, I think. He said, "Now look here, Warner, let's go into Paschall's office (this was about four o'clock in the afternoon) -- let's see him." And we went in and put this before him, and he took it right away. As nearly as I could tell, it was because the University of Virginia was making a competitive appeal, you might say, and we were losing some students, or we expected to lose some because of this. At any rate, for reasons other than the program, he was sold on it. But I also think that the fact that it was spelled out in detail, with an administrative setup that he could implement, that he was prepared to go along with it. I think that was the one sucessful contact I had with him.

Williams: You said before that Paschall felt very keenly this sense of competition.

Moss: Now would you repeat that question?

Williams: Yes. I had said that you had referred to the fact that Paschall felt very keenly a sense of competition with the University of Virginia, and you were talking about the honors program that you came in and laid out, and you thought perhaps this had some effect on that.

Moss: I really don't remember other indications that he had this kind of feeling about the University of Virginia. I think that William and Mary people generally, and especially of the earlier days, had this feeling. The later generation didn't

have this feeling because in fact we had a much better undergraduate program than the University of Virginia. Now they might have higher salaries. They might have some very distinguished members of the faculty. They might have a graduate program. But their undergraduate work was not of the quality of William and Mary. We were not merely better, but we were very much better. So we knew that, and we were not unhappy about the University of Virginia. I think the older people, perhaps Paschall and Chandler, were very jealous of the university, and they were competitive in getting state funds. They also found that both V.P.I. and the University of Virginia carried more weight than we did.

Williams: Why do you think it was so difficult to get along with the president? You have given an illustration ...

Moss: My explanation is that he felt insecure because I don't believe that he really felt up to the job in some ways. Having been state superintendent of public instruction and having political influence in Richmond, I don't think he felt many doubts about his ability to swing an ordinary top administrative post. But with the kind of thing that had been going on at William and Mary during the Chandler regime, I think he soon discovered that he didn't have a political sensitivity for this kind of situation. I think that he was as lacking in political judgment on this as was Chandler. And while at first we saw a good deal of him, he began to disappear. People began

to joke that there must be an underground tunnel from the president's house over to his office because nobody could find him. There were times when I saw him on campus, and I felt that he had deliberately avoided talking with me, or that I started a little conversation, and he didn't want to continue. I think that he was very uncomfortable in relation to the faculty. Now his wife was a factor here, too. I remember that one of the first times that I was in their home (some reception or something) she took me to task for having assigned so many different books in a government course. I was polite and sort of turned it off, but frankly, my attitude was, "it's none of the president's business or his wife's business -- certainly not his wife's business -- what books we choose in courses. We're the people that judge that." It was injudicious. There were quite a number of times that I think she felt in a position of being able to give commands and get some response. That was the wrong way to talk to a William and Mary faculty member. I think that maybe she felt after a time she wasn't making any headway, and when you add this to the president feeling it, I think it was really bad.

Now I did feel that I had a way in with him, if it was possible. My father's background is from southside Virginia, just across the river here. I had had a peanut farm across the river; I have plowed in a field; I have done all these things. I know what country talk is. The president seemed to make much of this.

He had a corncob pipe, and he liked to tell the sort of country stories that were a little crude and off-color. He seemed to want to be identified as country. I could have met him a little on plane, but there was really no opportunity to. They tell me that he never travelled north of the Potomac River willingly -- and I can believe it. He was intensely provincial in his feelings. While I don't think he was as crudely discriminatory as some of his neighbors in the Southside, he at the same time, I think, was definitely committed to the anti-black position as far as he could maintain it. And I think he felt this was what was expected of him by the state administration.

Williams: In his capacity as president of William and Mary you're talking about?

Moss: Yes. By the way, another thing that was an issue around the college: one of the many things with Chandler and with Paschall was the question of speakers. Neither one of them ever did anything that was directly an assault on academic freedom here, but indirectly both of them did. They were a problem to deal with. I could have some stories about that but ... some of them I couldn't tell whether they were in the Paschall or the Chandler regime. I know that Chandler told me once that there should be no Negroes speaking on the college campus, whereupon an opportunity shortly came to have the president of Hampton Institute come. And we had him. I just took the position that

what the president said was something that he shouldn't have said, that I had no obligation to follow it. If he wanted to write me a letter that no Negro was to speak on the campus, I would have had a reply. I might have said that one would speak or I might have said that I understood his position or something like that. But this was in casual conversation so we just went right ahead. On one occasion some students wanted to have some students from Hampton. This was creating quite a stir. Finally I think Dean Lambert and I worked it out. At any rate Lambert wrote me a letter saying that it was definitely understood that I would chair the discussion and that I would see to it that everything came off nicely. I saw that letter last night. They didn't want a Russian to speak here, so the students had a Russian from the Russian Embassy -- terrible disappointment to them. They met in the basement of one of the Restoration buildings out at the motor lodge. When this president of Hampton had been here to talk about segregation we thought we ought to have somebody from the other side, so I got Jack Kilpatrick of the Richmond News Leader to come down and talk. And lo and behold, we discovered that places were closed to us because this was a controversial question. Finally I told him at supper that this was the truth, so he talked to us, but he didn't talk on segregation. He talked on the Byrd organization. We had a good meeting.

Williams: Is it true the political science club was banned from campus

after the president of Hampton Institute spoke? I have heard this. Is it true?

Moss: I don't think any retaliatory action of this sort was taken. I don't recall that it was. I think I would recall because I think I would have made an issue out of it, but I don't recall that having been the case. There were one or two penalties that came after some of these things, but I don't recall them right now. They were inconsequential. The students wanted to discuss "the pill". "The pill" had just appeared, and they wanted some kind of discussion. Many of us felt that they were entitled to a discussion of this. It's a big public issue. There are philosophical and moral issues involved. It ought to be discussed. The administration wouldn't allow any -- what they (the students) wanted was a faculty quorum on the subject -- and the administration wouldn't allow it in any building on campus. And so we met in the basement of the Villa Roma over there, you know. And it turned out it was a perfectly good discussion that I would say ended up on a tone that the administration wholly agreed with. But they were doing this kind of thing.

Williams: Why this conservatism on the part of the administration?

Moss: I think the primary thing is that this was the only coeducational state institution, and they were keenly sensitive to the possible comments over the state. Something might happen -- something did happen, as a matter of fact. Something might happen that might get into the newspapers. It might give William and Mary a bad

name. Be very, very careful. I think that was the basis of it. Now Lambert is a very shrewd operator on this kind of thing, and he was in bad with some of the students. On the other hand with some of them he got along very well. I think he would have made a very good F.B.I. director or something like that. He is very shrewd at handling these things. I never felt that he was altogether illiberal. There were times when I thought his was good common-sense liberalism. It wasn't ideological with him. His job was to manage the thing, you see. And he had one kind of president one time and one kind another, and he'd do the best he could. But I think that they were keenly sensitive to criticism. They were afraid of it. This is true the whole time I have been here. Actually, outrageous things did happen. I was told that under the first Chandler administration there were two girls on campus that were operating weekends in Richmond as prostitutes and making their way through. I don't know what happened about that. There was a case of the treasurer of the interfraternity council who operated a taxi service from here to one of the motels, where he had brought two prostitutes down from Washington and established them there and was operating this taxi service. This was found out, so he skipped town and went off with the money. This was in Time magazine or Newsweek. And I heard later that the next time we encountered him he was the finance officer of a military unit. I don't know how that happened. I can tell

you some that were more troubling than these but which didn't get to the public. You can't have a college of this kind without some of this.

I may say another difficulty came with connection with the Center for Overseas Students. The first year we did very well because the students were first-rate. The conditions under which they came were good. The town hadn't caught on to what it was. Everybody was nice and pleasant. The second time we had some difficulties because the foreign students wanted to, you might say, make real contact with real Americans. Now this meant going down to Newport News; this meant picking up some people on the street who didn't turn out to be so good. So I could see some handwriting on the wall, and I was very much disturbed about it, but we got through that year. Then the third year that we did it the administration issued an edict about beer. Now these foreign students in their countries were in the habit of drinking beer and wine, alcohol -- it was nobody's business. And most of them were above twenty-one. In fact, I'm sure all of them were. Most of them were advanced students and responsible people. Some of them were even married, I suppose. And there was an edict on beer: no beer was to be consumed on the campus. And one of the students, hoping to be a good fellow with everybody else, went down and bought a case of beer. He didn't know that there was this rule. But he brought it back and was distributing it to the other foreign students, and who should walk in but one of the watch-

men from around the campus, who looked at this and seemed to be astonished and so on. I didn't pay any attention to him. In fact, I think I told him to get on out and get going. But here was this situation. But of course I used it to educate the students to American situations. I said, "You've had a sample of something. Don't get upset about it. You can work all these things out. This is what you can expect of some American colleges." Well, when the time came to close up the establishment I went upstairs to some of the rooms, and they had festoons of beer cans hanging from the ceiling, had decorated their rooms with big clumps of beer cans. Well, there was that. There was some sex business in which some girl who had been associated with the college got in -- a friend of some of the students got mixed up in it. I'm not sure just what happened. But at any rate, it was clear that we were headed into a major situation if things didn't come to an end pretty soon. Knowing the attitude of the administration, I knew that if something like this broke that there would be a great deal of difficulty. And so I did not want to have another foreign student center at William and Mary. We came through all right, but I could see that with this increasing change we were in for trouble.

I think some of the conservatism is due to the fact that the members of the board were not only sensitive about public opinion but themselves have backgrounds in which they had concerns about things like this. They came from country districts, or they were older and had been brought up with a different kind

of mores than we have now, things like that. Conservative on political issues? Yes. Take the basic avowed conservatism of Virginia politics: add the fact that this was in the McCarthy and post-McCarthy era; add the fact that you have an admiral who thinks he knows something about foreign affairs and the ex-superintendent of public instruction who has fought for segregation, comes from the Southside. Clearly this kind of thing, the conservatism -- the third congressional district, which I would say is the most influential in Virginia, is downright reactionary. They can't find a candidate who is far enough to the right for them.

Williams: While we are talking about conservatism, maybe it is a good time for me to ask this question: why do you think that the political protests of the '60s were so mild here at William and Mary in comparison with other colleges in the United States?

Moss: Well, one reason is the kind of conservatism on the part of the student body. These students, by and large, came from, you might say, suburban backgrounds. Now some of the student leaders of all this protesting over the country came from places like Westchester County and suburban backgrounds, but well-to-do. Ours are not well-to-do suburban. They are people who have just come to a level of affluence. I think that probably most students at William and Mary had no more than one parent who had gone to college, and probably not one. In other words they had made their social gains during the post-depression and war years and wanted to hold onto them more than they

wanted to make new gains, and in fact, they resented the upsetting of their affairs. Do you follow me? Some of the ablest had come from the neighborhood of Washington. They are the sons and daughters of civil servants. Why does a man become a civil servant? Because basically he's looking for a sure thing. He's not an adventuresome person. I think they came from that kind of conservative background. Now on the other hand we did have some who came from that kind of background who were radical. For example, Rennie Davis had a brother and sister who were here at the college. They were in my classes. We had some others. But the bulk of the students at William and Mary were not excited about this kind of thing. I would also say that the educational program at William and Mary was not one to stir them much in this direction. This wasn't one of the advanced institutions, as [was] Berkeley. I think, too, that probably the impact of the Vietnam War was not quite as great on our student population as some others. You ask why -- I don't know. I just know that while they shared some of the views on Vietnam that others did, it didn't become as much of a belligerent matter for them. We also had a contingent of students at the college who were conservative -- I mean Reagan reactionaries. Another thing is that -- well, I will say that I think some of the administration people put a check on some of this, though we had a kind of student outbreak that suggests that they were

quite unsucessful. While I offer those I might list some others, but I think they are the chief ones. In their classes students at William and Mary were not terribly excited. The faculty was not on the whole. Some of the students came to me to say, "We'd like to take the next session off because we'd like to discuss Vietnam and show that we are not doing things as usual. We just want to have an educational experience on Vietnam, so we're not coming to class." And I wrote a memo which I sent to the members of the department; I said that the function of our classes in government was to discuss these things, and the proper place for the student to be was here -- that we were discussing them in the context of an academic discipline, which was a better place to discuss them than out here in the sunken garden somewhere. I think other faculty members had the same kind of feeling. They didn't go along with much of this. Now we did have some -- you couldn't distinguish them from the students -- or they were more extreme.

Well, students were more excited about the issues of dormitory living and that kind of thing. You might say that took some of the heat off. William and Mary students have often felt that they had to do something that had become popular in the rest of the country. If they were swallowing goldfish in most institutions, about two years later they'd swallow goldfish at William and Mary. That was true of the panty raids -- these took place about a year after they had been stopped at other places. And you had other things like that. To some extent the students at William and Mary vented their feelings

in these issues with the administration. The administration was so vulnerable and had so antagonized them that they felt it was a sufficient way of showing rebellion. It showed a deeper concern for real issues than some of the magnificent world-wide ones or some of the insignificant trivial ones. No, I think that they on the whole showed themselves rather responsibly.

Williams: This is a question I think I know the answer to, but I will ask it anyhow. Did you feel that Paschall trusted the faculty members and brought them into a role of decision making in the '60s?

Moss: No, not really. He avoided them. If he could handle a decision without the faculty having any participation, he would do it that way. When he had to concede, he would concede, as he did on the freedom of tenure statement. But I think that he had the idea that the less he had to do with the faculty or faculty problems the better. Now on the other hand he did fight for faculty salaries at William and Mary. And this was one occasion when I did have a favorable relationship with him. I was doing the self-study part on faculty, and we spent -- took a great deal of effort to make the case for William and Mary salaries being improved. We gave this to him, and I think that he recognized how he could use it and used it. Now we made some gains that were not made by other institutions. But the atmosphere in the state at that time was one of improving faculty salaries.

And there was a very clear case to be made out of it. Institutions inferior to William and Mary had higher salaries than we did. And of course, one of the things that Paschall was able to do was exercise a considerable amount of influence in Richmond, He had more political pull than anyone we had connected with the college during the time I've been here, and I would say that the college gained from it. Certainly this building program wouldn't have been accomplished. Chandler, of course, initiated it, but I think that it was Paschall who had much to do with putting it through.

Williams: You say that Paschall avoided the faculty if at all possible, and yet you wrote in the faculty section of the '64 self-study about faculty leadership "rebuilding" after the Chandler administration. How would you reconcile those two? Was the faculty rebuilding independent of the president?

Moss: Yes, that was what they were doing. The part that was under Chandler may not merely have been a tactic; it may have been the kind of issues that were coming up at the time. Under Chandler the faculty was very badly split, and he played into this. When he came here (I don't know whether he consiously did this or not) -- but they sometimes say that when a new commander comes on board the thing for him to do is to completely disrupt everything so that nobody can do anything. If you're going to organize at all, it has to be under the new leadership of the commander; bust up the ship in every way, every

relationship, and then reconstruct it in your own pattern. Now maybe this is just a good navy tradition that he felt intuitively; maybe he consciously did it. But at any rate he pulled things to pieces. And if there was anything he didn't understand the tendency was for him to get into it and pull it to pieces, and then perhaps reconstruct it his own way. Now Paschall didn't do that, and the result was that the faculty leadership could develop as it had in the Pomfret regime -- in fact, I'd say a little better. And this was due (I believe I mentioned this in the report) to the fact that there was a group of men of approximately the same age and status at the college who were very effective on the floor of the faculty, who were conscientiously trying to do what they could, who were interested in educational policy, and these people were a kind of core for the faculty -- you might almost say constituted a kind of faculty senate because they might be the only people at a faculty meeting because so many didn't come. But there was no requirement of a majority quorum; I think that the quorum was very small. That group was made up of Evans and Williams and McDonald, for example. Others participated one way or another -- Neiman, for example. And I think that they were sufficiently in agreement that they didn't have any great problems. They were not personally in competition with each other.

Williams: You've talked this time and last time about clashes with the presidents: Chandler and Paschall. I had wondered why if you disagreed so much with these men (even though this was perhaps more verbal in the Chandler administration than in the Paschall administration), why was it then that you didn't take the Board of Visitor's invitation?

Moss: To leave?

Williams: To leave.

Moss: Well now, I suppose it must have been the fact that I didn't have a job to go to immediately. I wasn't worried about that because I had a farm over here across the river. I think I still had it -- yes, I still had it then. And I could have made do one way or another, but I had not contemplated any such change. I hadn't thought, "Well now, I'll be leaving William and Mary. Let's look for another place." So I had no plans that way. But I think even more than that that I was sure of the ground that I was standing on. I knew that I could fight and that I could fight to a finish and make it come out all right. I didn't have any question about that. I had really gotten myself into that kind of role. If, after having in the period from '51 through to '55 taken a position of leadership, ~~and then~~ in '55 had gone, I would have felt that I was running out on it. There is the story of the man in the 1848 Revolution in Paris who had said, "Oh, you mustn't go over the barricades, " and he said, "I must; they are my followers." He had to go with them, you see. Well, as a matter of fact it was a case of hav-

ing come into a role not altogether by choice, having adapted myself to it, having gotten into it -- well, confronted with that and feeling sure I could come through all right. I wasn't worried about coming through. The board had opened the door wide for what they got. I guess that was the reason.

Williams: You said that you felt very much locked into this role of the leader of the loyal opposition.

Moss: Yes, I did. And I may say that in retrospect as I look at it in retirement and [with] less involvement that this had its penalties. I can see how the situation was inescapable and partly [from] my own personality, partly my own background, partly the circumstances here -- that it was predictable that things would go as they did. It also carried some penalties because I could not have, in a way I did not function well administratively because I had been uncompromising, and then how can you begin to compromise with some of those same factors? Obejctively I would say yes, any good political scientist knows that the world is not ideal and you have to do these things. But still it's not comfortable; it's awkward. And almost as a reaction to that I felt, for example, when the chance came along to take part in the choice of a new president* that I had to go to no ends to see to it that this came out right and that I did my own job right. I feel fortunate that it did come out that way. But there was a kind of penalty that went along with it (being opposition leader), and it meant penalties for my family and so on. I think that I might have declined to do it if I had realized

*in 1971

how extensive it would be. But this is usually what comes from such involvement. It's not just one person's...

Williams: You also said that this was one reason that you could never have gone into an administrative role.

Moss: I could have done this at New York University, for example, where I was before. One reason is that the latitude was greater. You didn't have -- at the level where I would have been -- you didn't have to compromise quite as ~~it would have been~~ at William and Mary, where the margins were very, very narrow. And this puts you into a straightjacket, so that if you are operating administratively you've got to do some things that are not necessarily immoral, but they are inconsistent with the position you've taken. So I have a great deal of sympathy for Pomfret, for example, who found this awkward, and sympathy for Chandler and Paschall, to some extent. At an earlier time in my life and before some of these things had happened I could have gone into administration, and under very favorable circumstances I might have here. But those circumstances, you just didn't get here.

Williams: Do you feel that a dean here has to operate with too many competing interests?

Moss: Well, it isn't so much competing interests as it is that a man has to resign himself from any heroic role. For example, I think that given the circumstances that Marsh and Jones made good deans for William and Mary. But neither one of them was ever able to do anything that he could be very, very happy about or that

made a name for him in any way. Marsh made a name for himself as an efficient administrator so that they took him down at Wofford College. Jones took care of the situation; while I was often impatient about his inaction (it seemed to be) or his lack of decision, as I look back on it I think he did a marvellous job, you might say, [in] bridging the difficulties and getting through. Paschall, you see, having been in Jones's class when he was a student here, there was a good relationship. And Jones knew how to work with him. I think that Jones probably was less comfortable with Chandler. But both Jones and Marsh deserve a good deal of credit. And Fowler deserves a great deal of credit. Now Fowler didn't get along with them nearly as well. Fowler, well, you might say that Fowler and I shared some qualities in this, that Fowler had been fighting all these years at the barricades. His style may have been different, but he was doing this. Then to have to deal with such a man as Paschall.... Now Paschall really cut him out of things. The deanship shrank under Paschall because Paschall worked around Fowler. Paschall ceased coming to faculty meetings, for example, because they just weren't agreeable to him. And he didn't know what to do. He was at a loss.

Williams: One thing that we might insert here: you've also said that you felt that some members of the Board of Visitors thought their statement back in '55 about faculty allegiance was misunderstood, that Dr. Morton and Dr. Guy had written and protested this.

Moss: Guy and Morton had written, and I saw last night [Cold] an item from the newspaper in which it reported that they had said they were satisfied with the explanation given by the rector. I don't think this satisfaction was anything more than an acknowledgement, yes, the rector was sorry that he had been misunderstood. Of course, this is satisfactory to know he was sorry. Now I didn't feel quite the same way about it because I felt in a very personal way that I had been -- that this was written for me. Now it was in general terms and for alot of other people, but I couldn't escape. I had to say something, preferably publicly. But I should have gone in with my resignation, or else I should have said, no, that I wasn't. If I was going to say that I wasn't, it was alot more effective to do it publicly. I may say that one reason I came to William and Mary was that after having had experience at Williams College and New York University I felt that I could understand the political situation at the state institution, having a little more confidence in being able to deal with it. I never read the situation as many of my fellow faculty members did, that the board not only had legal power but that they had political power. I felt that these men who were asserting such power were in fact exceedingly weak in the positions they were taking and in their ability to act. I felt perfectly capable of dealing with it. Of course, in the last analysis, I took care of myself. I didn't get hurt badly, except it hurt my family. I think I had to

spend too much time on it, but it would have been better if I hadn't put my attention to other things.

Williams: You say that you felt the board was weak. Where did greater powers lay than in the board?

Moss: Well, they were weak personally in that their acceptance of the job of member of the board usually involved some kind of personality factors that did not make them effective. For example, I think that many board members derive a great deal of personal satisfaction out of being board members of this ancient institution with these distinguished alumni. This is another way of saying that they're really pretty small fry, and they find gratification in this kind of association. Now that's just one little thing, and to some of them it weighed more than others. I think there were many on the board at one time or another to whom it didn't make much difference. They were glad to have this association, but it didn't make that much difference. Shewmake on the other hand, was vulnerable here; it was neurotic with him. Then politically I knew these men had their troubles. The state organization wasn't a solid block, as most people seemed to think. They couldn't get away with anything they wanted. These were mostly henchmen of politicians and not men who could command. I think Judge Hooker, for example had a political base of his own which made him a more powerful man. And I tink that this meant that on the board they had to pay attention to him. But some of these others -- who are they? They didn't carry so much weight. Now sometimes

there were some good men appointed to the board. But the bulk of them were rather insignificant, and those that you might say were finer people personally were not very effective people. I think for example of John Garland Pollard, who was a very nice person. I like him. But why didn't he interrupt that meeting where Chandler was chosen and say, "Now look here, gentlemen, something is being put over here. What are you going to do about it? If you don't do something about it, I'm going to the governor." No, I think they were at their wit's ends. They didn't understand the college. They didn't understand what was going on; their answers to questions were feeble. And then like most committees or boards, instead of one man speaking for the board as a matter of course because he was the commanding figure, no, they reached decisions that were compromise decisions. They were not sure which decisions they had always reached. They fumbled around. No, I would say that the board at William and Mary was pretty close to incompetent as an effective agency until this board which chose Graves. Even that had some people on it who are not much, but there was a group of men on the board when Graves was chosen that was prepared to do a very good job. And when they made their decision it was respected and carried weight.

Williams: Is this a major problem that William and Mary has of being a state institution, then?